

A QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ADVAITA-VEDĀNTA

The VOICE of ŚĀṆKARĀ

śāṅkara-bhāratī

Editor
T. M. P. MAHADEVAN

Volume TWO
Number THREE



NOVEMBER

1977

esā śaṅkara-bhāratī vijayate
nirvāṇa-saṁdāyini

victorious is the voice of śaṅkara,
leading, as it does, to liberation.

The Voice of Śaṅkara

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Homage to Sankara

[37]

नत्वा विशुद्धविज्ञानं शङ्करं करुणानिधिम् ।
भाष्यं प्रसन्नगम्भीरं तत्प्रणीतं विभज्यते ॥

*natvā viśuddhavijñānaṁ śaṅkaraṁ karuṇānidhiṁ
bhāṣyaṁ prasannagambhīraṁ tatpraṇītaṁ vibhajyate*

Having rendered obeisance to Śri Śaṅkara of wisdom pure, of grace the ocean, we (proceed to) analyse the clear (yet) deep commentary written by him.

—Vācaspatimiśra (Bhāmati)

[38]

साक्षात्कृतब्रह्मभासा प्रहसन्मुखपङ्कजम् ।
महीयांसमहं वन्दे गरीयांसं जगत्पतिम् ॥

*sākṣāt kṛta brahmabhāsā prahasanmukha pañkajam
mahiyāmsamaham vande garīyāmsam jagatpatim*

I offer salutations to the world Preceptor, the great and venerable Śri Śaṅkara who has a smiling lotus-like face on account of his direct realization of Brahman.

—Nṛsimhāśrama (Tattvaviveka)

[39]

आचार्यकृतिनिवेशनमप्यवधूतं वचोऽस्मदादीनाम् ।
स्थयोदकमिव गङ्गाप्रवाहपातः पवित्रयति ॥

*ācāryakṛtiniveśanamapyavadhūtam vaco' smdādīnām
rathyodakamiva gaṅgāpravāhapātaḥ pavitrayati*

As the waters of a highway are purified by falling into the current of the Ganges, even so are the lowly words of those like us by their conjunction with the work of the Master :

—Vācaspatimiśra (Bhāmati)

[40]

सर्वश्रुत्यन्तसारार्थतदन्यक्षीरनीरयोः ।
विवेके यः परो हंसः तं वन्दे शङ्कराभिधम् ॥

*sarvaśrutyantasarārthatadanya kṣīranīrayoḥ
viveke yaḥ paro hamsaḥ tam vande śaṅkarābhidham*

I offer salutations to Śri Śaṅkara who is the *Hamsa* par excellence in distinguishing the milk in

the form of the true import of all the Upaniṣads,
from water — the false theories.

—sītārāmaśāstri in his Brahmasūtra-vṛthi

[41]

नौमि सूत्रकृतं व्यासं नारायणमजं शिवम् ।
सर्ववेदार्थतत्त्वज्ञं भाष्यकारं सदार्तिहम् ॥

*naumi sūtrakṛtamvyāsam nārāyaṇamajam śivam
sarvavedarthatattvajñam bhāṣyakāraṁ sadārtiham*

I salute Sri Vyāsa who is an incarnation of Lord Nārayaṇa and is the author of the Brahma - sūtra and Śri Śaṅkara who is an incarnation of Lord Śiva, the author of the bhāṣya on the Brahma-sūtra and who ever removes the evil of *saṁsāra*.

—Rāmabrahmendra sarasvatī in his
Bhāṣyasārasaṅgraha

[42]

सदाशिवसमारम्भां शङ्कराचार्यमध्यमाम् ।
अस्मदाचार्यपर्यन्तां वन्दे गुरुपरम्पराम् ॥

*sadāśivasamārambhām śaṅkarācāryamadhyamām
asmadācāryaparyantām vande guruparamparām*

I salute the line of preceptors which begins with Lord Śiva and ends with our preceptor having Śri Śaṅkara in the middle.

Hindu Dharma

Jagadguru Sri Chandrasekharendra Sarasvati

There are ever so many religions in this world. Each has a separate name of its own to distinguish it from the others. All these names are personal and are derived from the founders of the respective faiths. Thus Buddhism takes its name from its founder, Lord Buddha. Jainism from Jina, Muhammadanism from its prophet, Muhammad, Christianity from Jesus Christ, Zoroastrianism (the religion of the Parsees) from its founder Zoroaster, and the Chinese religion, Confucianism, from its propounder, Confucius. No doubt all these founders of new religions have been great men possessing the power to attract many men to their way of thinking. Thus every other religion has a distinctive name of its own on the above lines. But if you ask a youngster belonging to our religion what religion he professes, he would, if he happens to have received a little



English education, at once reply that he belongs to the Hindu Religion. On the other hand if we ask our peasants about the name of our religion, they would be at a loss to give a common name to it. If we put the same query to those employed in writing negotiable documents in the South of India, they would describe themselves as they do at the top of these documents, as belonging to the Saivite or the Vaisnavite cult. These are really sub-divisions in our faith and cannot be taken as representing the whole of it; but even these names are not derived from those of any historic personages but merely follow the names of the respective divine forms selected for personal worship. If Hinduism is really the name of our religion, it should have been known and described as such even during the period of our remote forefathers. But it would appear that to our ancestors of even a few centuries back, the name Hinduism would have been a strange and meaningless term. It is so because ours is a religion without a name.

No doubt the sub-divisions in our faith go by certain specific names. These again take their names only after the various forms of the one Almighty selected for *upāsana* and not after human beings. For the general faith however it would be difficult to find a common name. Of late a name has been much in use *viz.*, Sanātana Dharma, but even this cannot be said to be the strictly traditional name of our religion, for in that case it should be known as such to the poor peasant and to the humble widow, as in the case of the followers of other man-made religions. But such is not the case.

The term Hinduism is really a name somebody has presented us with. We can find in History a clue as to how this term came to be coined. Our forefathers were once the inhabitants of the region watered by the river Sindhu (the modern Indus) which, to some foreigners who came into contact with us was known as Indus. From this they christened the land in which this river flowed as the Indu Desa or 'the land of the Indus'. Naturally and in course of time they applied this name to the entire Bhāratavarṣa of which the part watered by Sindhu formed but a slice.

Again, every religion has some distinguishing symbol which at once marks it off from the others. The cross of the Christians is one such example. The Hindus on the other hand, have no apparent symbol to point to as being common to all of them. As we are without a name, even so we are without a common symbolising badge. Ours, therefore, appears to be a religion without a name and a distinguishing mark! For instance, some of us wear the sacred ash, while others wear the "Viṣṇupad" on their foreheads. Some among us are "Vira Vaiṣṇavas" and an equal number, the "Liṅgāyats" and similar others, are "Vira Śaivas". All these, however, have the consciousness that they are the adherents of one common religion.

The real grandeur of our faith consists in its being nameless. The need for names for an article arises only when there are many of that type so that each could, in some way, be distinguished from the others. But if there is one and one only of that

article, why need a name for it? To take a concrete instance, if there are say four Rāmasvāmis or Mukerjis, in a village we must give them different initials or personal names to tell the one from the other or otherwise distinguish between them by calling one of them, Rāmasvāmi or Mukerji, the dark, another of them, Rāmasvāmi or Mukerji, the fair, and so forth. If there be only one Mukerji or Rāmasvāmi, there is hardly any further naming required.

Even so, with our religion What is religion? It is that which shows us the way out of this miserable cycle of births and deaths or in other words sins and sorrows. It was pointed out at the outset that other religions are known by the names of their respective founders. These religions therefore did not exist before the rise of these great personages. Specific dates are assigned to every such religion. It naturally follows that ours is a religion which existed before all these other faiths were born. Thus it should have existed at a time when it was the only religion in the world, administering to the spiritual needs of the humanity as a whole. This then explains our religion not having had a specific original name, as there was no second religion from which this name should distinguish it. It was merely the Dharma—a word synonymous with Religion.

It would appear then that its having no specific name is itself a distinctive symbol. Although the religion has no distinguishing name of its own there is in it a common basis — viz., *the faith in the final authority of the Vedas i.e., "Veda Prāmāṇyam", in*

spiritual matters. This is also implied in the saying current in some of our mother tongues that makes the Vedas a simile for authoritativeness !

Because of their unshakable authority as the eternal divine laws even persons who were ordained by them as ineligible to utter the vedic mantras, as part of the vedic duties, reverentially obeyed the teachings. The question then arises that, if ours was the only religion prevalent at the time, were our religious principles observed by all the inhabitants of the world? We can now give plenty of instances to show that the reply to this question is in the affirmative.

For instance, one of the charges against Jesus which made the Jews crucify him was that Jesus drank water from a well intended for the lower classes. Does this not imply the existence of a caste system even before Jesus's time?

Again an inscription unearthed in *Egypt*, dated 1280 B. C. contains the terms of a treaty between Rameses II and the Hittites. In this treaty the vedic deity, "*Maitravaruna*", has curiously enough been cited as the witness ! (See H. R. Hall's "*Ancient History of the Near East*"—pp. 364 et seq.) Besides, in the ancient Egyptian Chronology, we find a series of kings bearing the name of Rāma as for example, Rameses, I, Rameses II, Rameses III, etc.

In the island of *Madagascar* off the Eastern coast of South Africa, as many as seventy-five per cent of the names of places happen to be sanskrit names. Most of them are akin to the name of the hero of the *Rāmāyaṇa*.

We are all aware of the *Great Sahāra Desert* in Northern Africa. There is a theory that all deserts once formed the beds of the seas or Sāgaras. Is the suggestion far-fetched, that the modern name, Sahara, is a corruption of the Sanskrit "Sāgara"? It is said that while the Sahara was under water there was a thick population around its banks and that the names of those people were mostly Sanskrit and were even related to the name of the lord of Kosala. (*See Encyclopaedia Britannica, Vol. XXIII, Title—Sahara*).

Evidences such as these are not wanting in the opposite part of the Globe. In distant *Mexico* a festival is being celebrated at about the same time as the Indian "Navarātri" or "Dusserah" and it is known as "Rāmasitā." (*See p. 56 of the Text and Plate 24 in T.W.F. Gann's "The Maya Indians of Southern Yucaton, North and British Honduras"*.) Further, the excavations made in that country have resulted in an abundance of the idols of lord Gaṇēśa being unearthed (*Baron Humboldt quoted in Har Bilas Sarda's "Hindu Superiority" p. 151*). The ancient inhabitants of those parts were "Āstikas" (*i.e.*, those who believed in "Veda Prāmāṇyam" or the authoritative-ness of the Vedas) a term which still lingers in the modern name "Aztees" which is now given to this group!

In Peru, a country in the West of South America, the inhabitants were sun worshippers. Their principal festivals of the year fell on the solstices. (*See—Asiatic Researches, Vol. I, P. 426*). They were known as the "Incas," a name derived from one of the names of the Sun, "Ina".

While speculating in this strain, it is tempting to make another observation on the remarkable similarity between a series of names of places in California and several purāṇic names. We have all heard of the well-known story of the sixty thousand sons of King Sagara being burnt to ashes by the sage Kapila, to save whose souls their descendant Bhagīrata, is said to have brought down the Ganges to the earth. The story goes that the horse sought for by the sons of Sagara was found in the netherlands (*Pātāḷa Loka*). America being roughly India's antipodes on the globe, is this description of that land in the Purāṇas as the netherland to be laughed at? Is it not very suggestive that California might be a corruption of "*Kapila Aranya*" (Kapila's forest), and that the two modern islands near by, *viz.*, "*The Horse Island*" and "*The Ash Island*," might represent the places where the horse of King Sagara was kept and where King Sagara's sixty thousand sons were burnt to ashes?

Figs. 128 and 129 at page 621 of "The Native Tribes of Central Australia," by Spencer and Gillen (Macmillan, 1899) depict a kind of dance said to be current among the wild native tribes of Australia. This dance is described in the book as "The Siva Dance." On closer examination, the dancers appear to have painted on their forehead a third eye, a fact suggestive of the possibility that the people of even such distant lands as Australia were once well-versed in Vedic lore.

Nearer home in the Eastern Archipelago evidences of the prevalence of the Hindu Faith are abundant. *Java* bristles with relics of Hindu cult

and worship. In Borneo there is a forest which the Westerners were for a long time describing as a virgin forest (*i. e.*,) not having been penetrated by man (*Wallace—“The Malay Archipelago”, pp. 44-45*). A party of explorers, after they had gone a few hundreds of miles, discovered a stone which contained an inscription commemorating in detail the performance of some specified “*Yāgas*” and “*Yajñas*” (Vedic sacrifices) by a certain king (Yūpa inscriptions of Mūlavarman of Koeti, Borneo).

All these evidences only go to prove that our religion which was the only religion the world possessed for a long time, had spread all over the world.

It will not be out of place to examine here some conceptions of Hinduism about the Universe. The common Hindu belief about our terrestrial Globe is that it is composed of seven “*Dvīpas*” or land masses. Ādi Śaṅkara Bhagavadpādācārya refers to this in the following sentence in one of his books:—

सप्तद्वीपा च मेदिनी ।

Each one of these “*Dvīpas*” consists of several “*Varṇas*” each of which in turn consists of several “*Khaṇḍas*”. Our country (*India*) has been described in our scriptures as “*Bharata Khaṇḍa*”, said to be a part of “*Bhārata Varṣa*”, which in turn is supposed to be situated in “*Jambūdvīpa*.” Mount “*Meru*” (the modern peak, *Everest* in the *Himalayas*) is supposed to be to the north of all the seven “*Dvīpas*”. There is an ocean belt between every two *Dvīpas*. The sun and the moon are said to move round “*Meru*”.

Let us now examine in detail the real import of these conceptions. The Westerners teach us in our geography books that the earth is round and they flatter themselves with the thought that this truth was first revealed to us by them. The Sanskrit term for "geography" is "*Bhū Goḷa*" which itself means "*the round earth.*" Is not the very existence of this word proof of the fact that our ancients were aware of this fundamental geographical truth about the special nature of the Earth? In the ancient Indian mathematical science, words, such as "*Khagoḷa*" and "*Bhū Goḷa*" occur which are further evidences in support of the above. In our "*Saṅkalpa Mantras*" we use the word "*Brahmāṇḍa*" while referring to the earth. The term *aṇḍa*" in this word really means an egg (*i. e.*) an oval-shaped body!

Let us now imagine the whole earth as a lime fruit with the part of it containing "*Meru*" (Himalayas) directed towards the north as its apex. Then "*Meru*" becomes the north pole and, hence, the northern most point on the earth. This position, then, will, sufficiently explain the saying—"*सर्वेषामपि वर्षाणां मेरुत्तरतः स्थितः*" The rest of the sphere is all to the south of it. To the eye of a man standing on the apex of it, the sun and the moon would appear to go round it (*i. e.*) the sun would not be exactly overhead at any part of the year, but would always be to a side of it. This is what is meant by the statement in our *Sāstras* that the sun goes round "*Meru*". There is thus nothing in these conceptions which could be considered as being contradicted by modern geographical discoveries.

Let us take another conception. Our *Śāstras* say that the Pole Star (*“Dhruva”*) is exactly above *“Meru”*. At first sight this appears to be against the established truths of modern geography. Imagine, for a while, that our earth were a spinning top. Let the position occupied by the Pole Star be indicated by a spot exactly above the apex of the top when it rotates quite vertically. As the motion of the top varies, its vertical position will also change so that positions on it other than its apex will come to be directly under the position of Pole Star. This phenomenon suggests the possibility that the Pole Star might have been directly over mount *“Meru”* at the time our ancients saw things and recorded them for us in our *Śāstras*, and that, in course of time, this position was swerved from due to changes in the rotation of the earth.

All these modern discoveries about the geography of our earth seem, therefore, to have already dawned on our ancient seers. References to these truths are also found in the works of *Āryabhaṭṭa*, *Varāhamihira*, and *Appayya Dīkṣita*.

Thus we come back to the truth which we established at the outset, *viz.*, ours was the only religion extant on the face of the earth for a long time. All the other religions of the the world have only taken up and developed some phases of our bigger faith which contains all the aspects of the different religions.

As our religion or Dharma is the one faith common to all the world, even so, Sanskrit, the language of our religion, is common to all the other

tongues of the world. Today they call Sanskrit a "dead language". Even taking this expression to mean literally, it contains a sublime truth. Which is it that dies?—the body, or the soul? It is the body that dies. The soul is eternal and imperishable. Sanskrit is the soul of all the other languages. Most of the words in the etymology of these languages can be derived from Sanskrit roots or *Dhātus*. The other "living" languages of the world have therefore themselves for the body and Sanskrit for their soul. Applying this theory to Sanskrit, we find that it is a language which is all soul *sans* a body to envelope it. Hence, the expression *dead language* does not seem to be an altogether inappropriate description of it!

To conclude, our faith and our language, once had world-wide existence. The one basis of our religion is the supreme authoritativeness of the *Vedas* (*Veda Prāmānyam*). All the other extant religions of the world are but phases of our bigger faith. With a little propaganda characterised more by kindness and love than by conceit and arrogance, it might yet be possible for us to convince others of this truth.



Vedanta*

Jagadguru Sri Jayendra Sarasvati

(Continued from Volume II number 2)

The philosophy of Advaita as expounded by Śaṅkara is based upon the authority of the scriptures. The schools of Indian thought that conform to scriptural teachings are characterised as prelude to the theory of Advaita.

The unique feature of Śrī Śaṅkara's interpretation of Advaita lies in this that the eternal speech (viz) the Veda became possessed of its true import as Śrī Śaṅkara has proved, unlike the Mīmāṃsakas, and other exponents of the Veda, that no part of the scripture is insignificant.

Another distinguishing feature of Śrī Śaṅkara's philosophy is that the *smṛti* texts, *Itihāsas* and the *Purāṇas* also are taken to be authoritative scriptures

* Translated from Tamil Original.

as they only conform to the teachings of their primary source, namely, the Vedas.

Language presented immense difficulty on the part of the layman to understand the essentials of the philosophical schools. In ancient times, the works on orthodox schools of Indian philosophy were written in Sanskrit which could be understood only by a select few. In later times, however, the followers of Buddha and Jainism wrote their treatises in Pāli or prakṛt which happened to be the mother-tongue of the exponents of those schools. This facilitated the easy comprehension of the essential of Buddhism and Jainism, by lay men. Perhaps this may be the chief reason for many people embracing Buddhism and Jainism. As regards the orthodox systems too many preceptors started writing works in their respective regional languages. The period of Ālwars and Nāyanmars marks this stage. During this period lay men fully comprehended the teachings of the Hindu Religion and the orthodox systems of philosophy and re-embraced the Hindu-faith. During the period of King Ashoka, noteworthy writers like Nāgārjuna patronised Buddhism and Jainism. The people too started following the Buddhistic and Jainic tenets. After some period people generally became followers of the Hindu faith.

During the 11th or 12th centuries, Śrī Rāmānuja, Madhvācārya, the Saivait Saint, Meykaṇḍar and the Lingayaths critically examined and finally rejected the Buddhist and the Jainic doctrines which had received a fresh impetus during their period. However the schools of thought advo-

cated by Rāmānuja and Madhvācārya, inspite of their doctrinal differences, were both based upon the teachings of the Vedas, the Smṛtis, Purāṇas and Ithihāsas, besides Āgama texts.

The Lingayat school does not accept fully the authority of the scriptures, Smṛtis, Purāṇas and Ithihāsas. But like all the Hindus they followed the procedure of the Hindus in their daily duties and worship of God. They advocated idol worship a feature which owes much to Rāmānuja and Madhvācārya. Both accepted Viṣṇu as ultimate reality, although they differed as regards the means of attaining Him. The word 'Vaiṣṇava' refers to both the view-points of Rāmānuja and Madhvācārya.

The smārthas who follow the teachings of Śaṅkarācārya perform the duties relating to their respective stage of life without marking their bodies with hot metallic designs, without wearing the symbols signifying the path of their worship. They perform their allotted duties receiving instructions from the elderly and old people of their locality. The great pontiffs who came in the line of succession of the great Ādi Śaṅkara gave initiation to their successor-designate into the Māha Vākhyas, performed *pūjā* and their allotted deed invoking the blessings of God for the welfare of the entire humanity. According to Advaita the multifarious god-heads such as Brahmā, Viṣṇu, Śiva, Sarasvatī, Lakṣmī and Pārvatī are all referred to by the term God/goddess. All living beings are designated as Jīvas. The essence of these is Ātman. In the same way the essence of God is Brahman and these two are non-different from each other. The living beings-the human beings-

should realise their true nature through worship of God.

According to Advaita too, there are specific worlds of God-heads like Kailāsa, Vaikunṭha, etc. But liberation does not consist in reaching the worlds of God and becoming god-like. On the other hand, it is to remain in one's true nature.

Advaita recognises *jīvan-mukti* (i. e.) liberation while continuing to live in the body. This is due to the fructified deeds. When the latter are exhausted, the so-called *jīva* remains as Brahman which is final liberation. In order to attain the state of liberation, worship of a chosen deity is an important factor. There are several god heads. Yet one can worship one's chosen deity which facilitates the rise of the knowledge of Brahman. The chosen deity too is a manifestation of Brahman; and when the knowledge of Brahman arises the chosen deity which is worshipped, the *Jīva* who worships - these remain as Brahman.

On account of differences in one's temperament, one may be attracted towards a particular Godhead. Whichever Godhead one worships, one ultimately realises the self-luminous consciousness which is Brahman. In regard to several God-heads there should not be a thought that one is higher and another is lower. One can have preferences but can have no exclusion.

Śrī Śaṅkara who has established *nirguṇa-Brahman* to be the ultimate reality has also established on the basis of scriptures a six-fold path of worship relating

to the Sun-god (*Āditya*), Goddess (*Āmbikā*), Lord Viṣṇu (*Viṣṇu*), Gaṇeśa (*Gaṇanātha*), Śiva (*Maheśvara*) and Subrahmanya (*Kumāra*) - for the benefit of those who cannot directly meditate upon the ultimate Reality. The seeker after liberation can chose any one of the above deities and worship it with devotion. The grace of the God ensuing from such worship besides removing the impediments that stand in the way of spiritual path gives concentration of mind which is essential for pursuing meditation upon the ultimate Reality. *Bakti* or loving devotion occupies the most important place on the practical side of Advaita. It involves several modes such as listening to the qualities and activities of God (*Śravaṇam*), reciting the qualities of God (*kīrtanam*), meditation upon the qualities of God (*smaraṇam*), worship of the feet of the idols of God (*pāda sevānam*), offering of flowers, fruits, water, etc. (*arcanam*), obeisance and prostration (*vandanam*), dedication of all activities to God (*dāsyam*), friendly attitude to God (*sakhyam*), offering oneself and one's dependents for the service of God (*ātmanivedanam*). The mind as the aspirant by the pursuit of *bakti* of the above forms becomes free from all impurities and thereby enables him to pursue *nididhyāsana* on *nirguṇa Brahman*. In *Vivekachūḍāmaṇi* Śrī Śaṅkara characterises *nididhyāsana* as *bhakti* which is more intellectual than emotional.

To sum up: duality is caused by ignorance. When ignorance, the cause, is removed, the effect, namely, duality is also removed. The true nature of our self would manifest then as pure consciousness and bliss. Prior to the rise of the knowledge of Self, the duality is taken to be real. Just as the appearance of two

moons caused by pressing the eyelids with the tip of the finger and just as the appearance of several moons in waters filled in several vessels, are taken to be real till the limiting adjuncts are removed, in the same way the world of duality is treated to be real so long as the limiting adjunct (viz) *avidyā* is not removed. It is in this sense that the world is admitted to be empirically real. The ordinary course of secular and religious activities including *bhakti* towards God goes on undisturbed until the rise of the knowledge of Brahman. The world thus provides an opportunity to the aspirant to pursue the means to liberation and when the knowledge of self arises *avidyā* and its effect, the world, disappear and the self remains in its true nature which is liberation — the final import of Vedānta.

Manisha-pancakam

Sankara Bhagavatpada

PROLOGUE

There is a legend connected with the composition of the quintad of verses '*Maniṣā-pañcakam*' by Śrī Saṅkarācārya. One day, in Vārāṇasī, the Ācārya was walking towards the sacred river Gaṅgā, accompanied by his disciples. At a distance he espied an untouchable coming towards him, followed by four ferocious dogs. Addressing the untouchable, the Ācārya said, "Go away; go away!" The untouchable asked in reply, "What should go away; and from what! Is it the physical body that should get away; or is it the self? If it be the body, all bodies are made of the same stuff, and why should one body get away from another? If it be the self, how can it get away, and from what, since it is non-dual?"

अन्नमयादन्नमयमथवा चैतन्यमेव चैतन्यात् ।

यतिवर दूरीकर्तुं वाञ्छसि किं ब्रूहि गच्छ गच्छेति ॥

*annamayād-annamayam athavā
caitanyam eva caitanyāt,
yativara¹ dūrīkartum vāñchasi
kim brūhi gaccha gaccheti.*

“Is it one body made of food from another body made of food, or is it consciousness from consciousness — which, O the best among ascetics, you wish should get away, by saying ‘Go away ; go away’ ? Do tell me !”

Neither from the standpoint of matter, nor from that of spirit, is there difference. All matter is one; spirit is one. Differences arise, and seem to be relevant only when the two are superimposed, each on the other, or when the characteristics of each are mistaken for those of the other. Wisdom lies in discriminating between them, and in realizing that what appears to be matter is not real, and that spirit alone is real.

The untouchable goes on to explain the transcendent unity of the Self despite the apparent differences :

प्रत्यग्बुधुनि निस्तरङ्गसहजानन्दावबोधाम्बुधौ
विप्रोऽयं श्वपचोऽयमित्यपि महान्कोऽयं विभेदभ्रमः ।
किं गङ्गाम्बुनि बिम्बितेऽम्बरमणौ चाण्डालवीथीपथः-
पूरे वाऽन्तरमस्ति काञ्चनघटीमृत्कुम्भयोर्वाऽम्बरे ॥

1. Variant reading : ‘*dvijavara*’ (*Madhumañjarī*).

*pratyag-vastuni nistarāṅga-sahajānandāvabodhāmbudhau
 vipro'yam śvapaco'yam ityapi mahān ko'yam vibheda-
 bhramah,
 kiṁ gaṅgāmbuni bimbite'mbaramaṇau cāṇḍālavīthīpayāḥ-
 pūre vā'ntaram asti kāñcanaghaṭī mṛtkumbhayor-vā'
 mbare.*

“In the inner reality which is the ocean of natural bliss and knowledge, free of waves, what great delusion of difference is this — as ‘this one is a *brāhmaṇa*’ and ‘that one is an eater of dog’s flesh’! Is there difference in the sun which is reflected in the waters of the Gaṅgā and in the pools in streets where the untouchables live, or in ether that is present in a gold vessel and in a mud pot?”

The Self is of the nature of existence-consciousness-bliss. It is unchanging and unvarying — an ocean that is undisturbed and undisturbable. It is totally devoid of non-existence, inertness, and misery. It is not non-being, not non-self-luminous, not dis-value. Hence, the definition of its essential nature is stated in the formula, existence (*sat*)—consciousness (*cit*) — bliss (*ānanda*). Existence, consciousness, and bliss are not to be regarded as characteristics of the Self, each distinct from the other two. The Self or Brahman is not characterised by existence, etc. The Self is existence-consciousness-bliss; existence is consciousness; consciousness is bliss. There is not even the least trace of difference in and for the Self. The Self has nothing similar to it nor anything dissimilar; and it is not a whole of parts. It is homogeneous, the same all over, and always. Even these expressions, it should be remembered, are made possible only after superimposing spatio-temporal limitations

on the Self. But, the implication of such descriptions is to convey the truth that the Self is non-dual, that it has no limits or limitations. This is what the figure of the waveless ocean indicates. The Self is like an ocean without shore, and without the slightest agitation. How could any distinction pertain to it — distinctions such as the one between the high-born and the lowly of birth? There is no possibility of even the minutest difference in Brahman which is, everywhere, of one impartite essence (*ataḥ sarvatra akhaṇḍaikarase brahmaṇi na manāg-api bheda' vakāśaḥ. Tātparyadīpikā*). The differences appear only on account of adjuncts such as the body, etc. These differences, however, do not affect the Self.

Two illustrations are given to explain this truth — one from the point of view of the reflection-theory (*pratibimbavāda*), and the other from that of the limitation-theory (*avaccheda vāda*). The same sun gets reflected in the pure waters of the Gaṅgā and in the impure water-pools in localities where the untouchables live. The difference in the media of reflection does not make for any difference in the sun that is reflected. It is not a different sun in each case : it is the same sun. Similarly, the Self that is reflected in the different internal organs — in *brāhmaṇas* and *caṇḍālas* — remains the same without any change whatsoever. There is nothing like the *brāhmaṇa*-self as distinct from the *caṇḍāla*-self.

There is no valid reason for rejecting the reflection-analogy as being defective. The argument that since the Self is formless it cannot be reflected is pointless, because the essential point in the analogy is that the differences in the adjuncts do not import

any difference into the prototype ; and this point is adequately explained in terms of the analogy. Surely, those who employ this analogy do not wish to maintain that there is a physical reflection, or that the internal organ is a gross physical medium of reflection like a sheet of water or a piece of mirror. The expression 'reflection' in regard to the Self is used in the figurative sense ; the consciousness which is associated with the internal organ is not the original consciousness which is the Self ; it is 'reflected' consciousness — *cidābhāsa*. The differences among mental consciousnesses are to be attributed to minds, and not to the Self which is pure consciousness. The analogy of reflection, thus, is not unsound. No analogy is on all-fours. If the compared and compared-with were identical, there would be no comparison.

The ether - analogy is suggested from the standpoint of the limitation-theory (*avaccheda-vāda*). Ether (*ākāśa*) is the nearest physical analogy to the Self. Phenomenally speaking, ether is all-pervasive and super-sensible. Hence, an Upaniṣadic passage declares : "The Self is all-pervasive and eternal, like ether" (*ākāśavat sarvagataś-ca nityaḥ*). Ether cannot be really divided or delimited. Yet, superimposing the characteristics of apparently limiting adjuncts we speak of 'pot-ether', etc. When the pot is moved, for instance, ether is not moved. Differences there are between, say, a vessel made of gold and a pot made of clay. But in ether there is absolutely no difference. The ether present in the gold vessel is not superior to the ether present in the clay-pot. In fact, it is the same ether. Similarly, the Self is the same in spite of the different body-

mind complexes. The bodies of *caṇḍālas*, *brāhmaṇas*, cows, etc., may be different. But, the Self which pervades them all is non-different. Like ether, it pervades all, is devoid of all relation, and is of one consistent homogeneous nature.

A wrong analogy may be cited in order to press the view that the Self becomes different in the different bodies, that it is really affected by the distinctions of inferiority-superiority, etc., on account of association with inferior bodies, superior bodies, etc. Does not milk, however pure it may be, become impure when kept in a leather container? The reply is that the analogy is wholly inapt. Milk is of the same grade of reality as the leather-container, viz., empirical, and gets into actual relation with it. Not so is the Self. The *caṇḍāla*-body is not of the same grade of reality as the Self. The association of the illusory body with the supremely real (*pāramārthika*) Self will not produce in the latter the defects of the former. If a learned *brāhmaṇa*, for instance, has a dream in which he appears as a *caṇḍāla*, it would be wrong to say that he really becomes an untouchable. Moreover, the Self is not, like milk, a limited whole; it cannot become the content of a container; it cannot take on, in reality, the attributes of the non-self. The essential nature of a thing can never change. The Self is unchanging, immutable. Therefore, why this distinction between a *brāhmaṇa* and a *caṇḍāla* for one who ought to see the same Self in all?

Śaṅkara listened to the words of wisdom that fell from the lips of the untouchable, and at once knew that it was Lord Śiva Himself that had come in the

guise of the *caṇḍāla*. In truth, it was a piece of mono-acting — a case of the same Reality playing the double role of the teacher and the taught. Here, we have a dramatic illustration of what Śaṅkara says in the *Dakṣiṇāmūrti-stotra* : “It is the identical Reality that appears in such different forms as ‘disciple’ and ‘preceptor’, ‘son’ and ‘father’, etc. The untouchable and the Bhagavatpāda were both of them manifestations of the supreme Śiva. The present drama was enacted so that Bhagavatpāda Śaṅkara could pour out of his heart the quintessence of the wisdom of unity in a quintad of scintillating verses, the *Maniṣā-pañcakam*.

THE TEXT

VERSE ONE

जाग्रत्स्वप्नसुषुप्तिषु स्फुटतरा या संविदुज्जृम्भते
 या ब्रह्मादिपिपीलिकान्ततनुषु प्रोता जगत्साक्षिणी ।
 सैवाहं न च दृश्यवस्त्विति दृढप्रज्ञापि यस्यास्ति चे-
 चाण्डालोऽस्तु स तु द्विजोऽस्तु गुरुरित्येषा मनीषा मम ॥

jāgrat-svapna-suṣuptiṣu sphuṭatarā
yā samvid-ujjṛmbhate
yā brahmādi-pīpīlikānta-tanuṣu
protā jagat-sākṣiṇī,
saivāham na ca drśyavastv-iti
dṛḍhaprajñāpi yasyāsti cet
cāṇḍālo'stu sa tu dvijo'stu
gurur-ity-eṣā maniṣā mama.

“That consciousness which shines clearly in the states of waking, dream, and deep sleep, that witness of the world which interpenetrates all beings from Brahmā down to an ant—that, verily, I am, and not the seen object”—he to whom there is such firm knowledge is the preceptor, be he a *caṇḍāla* or *brāhmaṇa*. This is my conclusive view.

The truth proclaimed by Śaṅkara in the *Maniṣā pañcakam* is that from the standpoint of the supreme Reality—if standpoint it may be called—there are no differences. He who has realized this plenary truth is the real preceptor (*guru*): what the empirical status of such a one is, is of no moment at all—he may be a *caṇḍāla*, he may be a *brāhmaṇa*, or he may be any other: that makes no difference whatsoever to his non-dual experience, or to his title to true preceptorship.

When Śiva in the guise of an untouchable asked Śaṅkara, “What should go away; and from what?,” the standpoint adopted was that of the supreme truth (*pāramārthika*). As soon as Śaṅkara recognized this, he knew that the untouchable was, verily, the Lord of the universe, Śiva, who had come to reveal the plenary experience of non-duality — that He was the teacher of the saving knowledge, the absolute Self, the lord of all. And immediately, he made a spirited affirmation of his faith in non-duality and gave an indication of his own Self-experience in the five verses constituting the *Maniṣā-pañcakam*.

The first four verses, according to Bālagopā-lendramuni, author of the *Madhumañjarī*, are based

on the four major texts (*mahāvākyas*), respectively : “Consciousness is Brahman’ (*prajñānaṁ brahma*), of the *R̥g-veda*, ‘I am Brahman’ (*aham brahmāsmi*), of the *Yajur-veda*, ‘That thou art, (*tat tvam asi*), of the *Sāma-veda*, and ‘This self is Brahman, (*ayam ātmā brahma*), of *Atharva-veda*. The fifth verse sings the praise of the status of freedom and bliss that results from the realization of the truth of the major texts—the status that is eternal, and not something that is newly acquired.

Now, the first verse:—

There are three states of experience : waking, dream, and deep sleep. In waking one experiences the external world of objects through instruments of cognition such as the sense-organs, and gains enjoyments which are gross in character. In dream, there is not the external world, nor do the sense-organs, etc., function ; yet one experiences a world of images fashioned by the mind out of past impressions, and derives enjoyments that are of a subtle nature. In deep sleep, there is neither the external world of things nor the internal world of images ; yet, it is not a state of absence of experience. For, on waking up again, one recalls that one slept happily, and that one did not know anything. While the latter aspect of the recall testifies to the presence of ignorance, the former bears testimony to the non-cessation of consciousness. An analysis of the three states of experience reveals the truth that while the objects, modes of experience, etc., vary and are inconstant, the basic consciousness which is the Self, does not vary and is non-inconstant. The Self is self-luminous, and ever-shining. It is homogeneous, non complex, the same

all over. It is *prajñāna*, pure awareness that neither rises nor sets.

The Prābhākara Mīmāṃsaka contends that the self is not self-luminous. According to him, the self is not consciousness, and while consciousness (*sarvīṭ*) is self-luminous, the self is not. It is consciousness that illumines the self as the locus and the object as the content. In a cognitive situation such as "I know the pot", consciousness or cognition which is self-luminous manifests the self or "I" as the locus and the pot as the object. Consciousness, in the Prābhākara system, is an attribute of the self; and since substance and attribute are different, the self is not consciousness. It is consciousness that is self-revelatory, and not the Self. Moreover, consciousness is not the only attribute of the Self; there are other attributes such as desire, aversion, volition, etc. These attributes appear in the self when there is conjunction of it with the mind, and as regulated by *karma*. In the state of deep sleep where there is no such conjunction, the Self remains absolutely attributeless; it is not characterised by even consciousness then. Thus, the Prābhākara view is that when there is cognition, the cognition reveals itself and also the self as the locus and the object as the content. Without a cognition to reveal it, the Self is not revealed anywhere.

The Prābhākara distinction between the Self and consciousness is not acceptable to Advaita-Vedānta. The fundamental error in this view is that it reduces the Self to the ego-principle and converts consciousness into an attribute. The Prābhākara believes that the Self is made manifest by con-

consciousness as its locus, even as the object is manifested as content. Now, we ask: Is the manifesting consciousness (*samvit*) inert or is it intelligent? If it is inert, then it would be on a par with the Self and the object; and there would result universal blindness, with nothing to illumine or to be illumined. If consciousness is intelligent, even then, how could the Self and the object be rendered intelligent by it? Surely, just because the son is a learned person, it does not follow that the father too should be a learned person. If it be said that consciousness becomes manifest along with the manifestation of the Self and the object, then we ask: are the two manifestations different from consciousness, or are they non-different? If the manifestation of consciousness is different from consciousness, then it would mean that consciousness is different from manifestation, that it is unmanifest, that in other words, it is inert. If this be the case, there would be nothing to distinguish consciousness from the object. It cannot also be that the manifestation of the Self and the object is different from consciousness; for, if the manifestation of object is different from consciousness, then it cannot be that consciousness manifests the object; and a relation being required to relate the manifestation to consciousness, there would be infinite regress. Let us turn to the other alternative, that the manifestations of consciousness, on the one hand, and of the Self and the object, on the other, are non-different from consciousness. If a manifestation other than consciousness is not admitted, then it would mean that consciousness, the object and the Self are always together. But, the togetherness always of consciousness and the object is not possible; for, when con-

consciousness has for its sphere a past or a future object, there is no togetherness. Some one may say at this point that of manifestation, the objects are the forms. But this is absurd. Objects and manifestation or luminosity are not the same. The objects are experienced as being long, short, big, small, etc., not so is luminosity. The objects, in fact, are indeterminable; and they ought not to be confused with luminosity or manifestation which is determinate. In fact, it is this luminosity that is the Self, the immutable self-luminous consciousness. Consciousness is not an attribute of the Self; it is the Self. While the states of experience change and vary, consciousness remains without change and variation.

Terms such as 'consciousness' (*saṃvit*), 'knowledge' (*bodhaḥ*), 'witness' (*sākṣī*), 'the immutable' (*kūṭastha*), 'self' (*ātmā*), etc., which are familiar to those who are learned in the scriptures, are not so to the others. How could those others understand the truth?, it may be asked. The reply is that acquaintance with terminology is not necessary. There are equivalents to the terms in question in the popular languages used by the common people; with those equivalents they must be acquainted. Even otherwise, they know that 'awareness' is the condition of the possibility of all experience. All of them do have the experience "I know". They may not be able to formulate a proof, etc. Yet, they "know", they have "experience". Bālagopālendramuni explains this by an illustration. It is only those who are versed in the Purāṇas, etc., that know that the Moon is the 'heart' or 'eye' of God. This, the common folk may not know. But these latter, however, know that the moon is a luminary with cool rays,

round in shape, etc. Similarly, the people at large do know that consciousness is what makes experience possible. Thus, it is clear that even those who are devoid of discriminative wisdom are aware of the self as consciousness. Hence, the Ācārya says that consciousness "shines clearly" (*sphuṭatarā ujjṛmbhate*) in the three states of experience.

Having explained what 'consciousness' (*prajñānam*) is, the verse proceeds to indicate what Brahman is. Brahman is the substrate of all beings from the Creator Brahmā down to ants and blades of grass. It is the self of all, the basic reality. It is the cosmic witness (*jagat-sākṣī*), the revealer of the entire universe. While it reveals everything, nothing is required to reveal it, for, it is self-luminous. The universe has no light of its own, being inert; and so, it cannot shine by itself. It cannot be said that even in the absence of a witness the inert universe may be known by the non-inert self which is the substrate of knowledge; for, we ask, how is this known, that the universe is inert and the self is non-inert? It must be admitted that it is as evidenced by knowledge or manifestation that the distinction is made between the object which is inert and the subject which is non-inert; it is that knowledge which, we say, is the witness-self.

The Bhāṭṭa-Mīmāṃsaka regards knowledge or manifestation as an act and a result. It is called an act because it is the fruit of an act of transformation, and act and fruit are identical. Manifestation, thus, is what is generated by an act of cognition in respect of its object. This is the Bhāṭṭa view which will not bear scrutiny. If manifestation, which is of the nature of the knownness of the object

is what is generated, it would be inert, even as the pot generated by clay is, on the rule that whatever is produced is inert. Manifestation, then, being indistinguishable from the object insofar as it too is inert, cannot manifest itself. Moreover, in regard to the statement of the Bhāṭṭa that cognition is the generator of manifestation, this must be made clear. Does cognition get transformed into manifestation, or does it merely occasion manifestation as a new product? Not the first, because cognition or knowledge is not subject to change, and transformation is possible of only what is subject to change, like milk which gets transformed into curd; of the unchanging knowledge, transformation is not possible; if knowledge were to change, then it would become an object, like milk; and if it becomes an object, it would cease to be knowledge. Nor is the second alternative that knowledge occasions manifestation as a new product, intelligible; for knowledge is not a substance; only what is a substance may produce another substance, e.g., the threads may give rise to cloth; and so, knowledge which is a non-substance cannot produce manifestation. Moreover, the theory of new production (*āraṃbha-vāda*) holds that the non-existent effect is produced, that there is production *de novo*. But, it makes no sense to say that of the non-existent manifestation, knowledge is the producer. Were knowledge to produce the non-existent manifestation, it may as well produce a barren-woman's son! Other than these two theories—the theory of transformation and the theory of new production — no explanation has been attempted for causation. And so, we say, manifestation is not generated by knowledge. Nor is knowledge what is generated. What

was stated above with reference to manifestation is true of knowledge also. If knowledge is what is generated, then it would be inert. The objector may, here, ask: Do we not observe that cognition of colour, etc., arises as a result of the contact of the sense-organs of sight, etc., with the coloured object, etc.? The reply is, that the appearance of the rise of knowledge is an illusion. What is generated, really, is the mental mode which has taken on the form of the object. The generatedness of the mental mode is wrongly transferred to the knowledge or consciousness (the self) which is conditioned by the mental mode, even as the red colour of the hibiscus flower is erroneously attributed to the crystal which is proximate to the flower. Thus, knowledge appears to be generated, but illusorily. In all cases of knowledge, such as pot-cognition, cloth-cognition, etc., it is so. What is generated is only the particular mode of the mind, and not knowledge. Therefore, knowledge which is not what is generated is real; and manifestation or luminosity which is non-different from it is real. The argument may be put in the form of a syllogism: What is in dispute is real, since while being existent it is non-generated, like the self. It cannot be said that this syllogism may be used to establish the reality of prior non-existence (*prāgabhāva*); for, prior non-existence does not satisfy the condition of being existent. Thus, our conclusion is that 'knowledge', 'manifestation,' 'witness', 'self', etc., are but different expressions for the same reality.

Now, it has been shown that one and the same consciousness runs through the three states of experience, and that one and the same Brahman which

is the substrate of all beings is the witness of the universe. These are not two—consciousness *and* Brahman; the truth is that consciousness is Brahman. How could the two be one—it may be asked—the subjective consciousness and the objective ground? Brahman is the cause of the origination, sustentation, and destruction of the world; the self is consciousness that resides in the individual. Can these two be the same? The answer is given in the same scriptures that define Brahman and Ātman. The Reality as conditioned by an individual psychophysical organism is called *jīva*; the same Reality as the ground of the universe is referred to as *Īśvara* (God). When the limiting conditions are removed, it will be realized that Reality is non-dual. This is the meaning of the major texts. These texts should be interpreted in the same manner as the identity statement 'This is that Devadatta' is understood. 'This-ness' and 'that-ness' are adventitious; Devadatta is the same. Similarly, the Self which is pure being, consciousness, and bliss is the same; the distinction of microcosm and macrocosm does not apply to it.

Some thinkers believe that *jīva*-hood of the Self is real and natural, and not illusory—in which case Brahman would be different from the self. But they are wrong in so believing. If the *jīva*-hood of the self be real and natural, then, even in the state of release, the self would not be free from *jīva*-hood; for, one's nature can never be removed. If that be the case, pleasure, pain, etc., would continue to fall to the lot of those who have gained release. And, what release is this, that cannot guarantee freedom from pleasure, pain, etc.?

The thinkers in question may say: Just as by association with tamarind the verdigris is removed from copper, through worship, etc., of God, jīva-hood may be removed from the self; consequently, the self may gain release which consists of union (*sāyujya*) with God; and it will then be rid of *samsāra* with its associate pleasures and pains. The view that the above statement expresses is unintelligible. Just as burning and luminosity which constitute the nature of fire will at no time leave it, even so if jīva-hood is natural to the self, it will never leave. It is true that sometimes, when obstructed by spells, charms, etc., the burning and luminous nature of fire may not be evident; but even then, that nature is present in fire; were fire to lose its nature, it would cease to be fire. Similarly, if pleasure, pain, etc.—which, in fact, constitute jīva-hood—were natural to the self, they may remain obstructed for some time through special disciplines, etc., but they will never get destroyed. Therefore, it should be admitted that, if the jīva be really and absolutely different from Brahman, it could never gain the status of Brahman (*brahma-bhāva*) even through hundreds of disciplines.

Some other Vedāntins say: “We do not believe in a release which consists in gaining identity with Brahman (*brahmatādātmya*); our conception of release is that it is a state in which the jīva realizes its similarity (*sāmya*) to Brahman.” Now, we should like to know what “similarity to Brahman” means. Does release consist in gaining partial similarity to Brahman or total similarity? If it be said that the similarity to Brahman is in part, then, since the

souls in transmigration are similar in part to Brahman in so far as they are conscious beings, they should be regarded as released souls. If the similarity is held to be total, then that is impossible. As between exactly identical things there is no similarity. There could be similarity only between things that are at least in some respects different. If the *jīva* and Brahman are equal or identical in all respects, then there would be nothing to distinguish the one from the other. And, what would result is our view, viz. that the *jīva* is non-different from Brahman, and not the view that the *jīva* is similar to Brahman.

The one who has realized the truth that the so-called individual soul is non-different from Brahman is a *jīvan-mukta* (liberated while yet living). His knowledge is of the form "I am the Self, Brahman, and not the body, etc., which are perceived objects." His knowledge is firm, unshakable. Just as in the case of ordinary people, desires, etc., arise automatically, even without instruction, because of impressions gathered in previous lives, so in the case of the wise one, Self-knowledge arises without any present effort, on account of previous disciplines. To the wise one the Self is as immediate and direct as—nay, more than—the pot that is given in sense-perception.

The wise one to whom there is firm Self-knowledge is the true preceptor (*guru*)—be he a *brāhmaṇa* or a *caṇḍāla*. He is, verily, Brahman: and so the distinctions caused by birth do not apply to him. If it be asked how a *caṇḍāla* could become a preceptor our reply is: if he has realized the Self, it means

that he is free from all conceits conditioned by caste, etc., and so he is perfectly pure—in fact, he is the ever-pure, eternal, non-dual Brahman. The distinctions of caste, etc., do not belong to Brahman; they are illusorily caused by *karma* which itself is occasioned by nescience. The *Viṣṇupurāṇa* declares, “The Self is neither a god, nor an animal, nor a human being, nor a tree.”

*pumān na devo na paśur-na
naro na ca pādapaḥ.*

“Just as the one sky appears differently coloured as white, blue, etc., so the one Self appears as different on account of deluded perceptions.”

*sita-nīlādi-bhedena yathaikam
dṛśyate nabhaḥ
bhrānti-drṣṭibhir-ātmā'pi
tathaikaḥ pṛthak-pṛthak.*

VERSE TWO

ब्रह्मैवाहमिदं जगच्च सकलं चिन्मात्रविस्तारितं
सर्वं चैतदविद्यया त्रिगुणयाऽशेषं मया कल्पितम्
इत्थं यस्य दृढा मतिः सुखतरे नित्ये परे निर्मले
चाण्डालोऽस्तु स तु द्विजोऽस्तु गुरुरित्येषा मनीषा मम ॥

*brahmaivāham idaṁ jagac-ca sakalam
cinmātra-vistāritam
sarvaṁ caitad-avidyayā triguṇayā
'śeṣam² mayā kalpitam,*

2. Variant reading: *śeṣam* = *śeṣavaram* (*Tātparyā-dīpikā*.)

*ittham yasya dṛḍhā matī-sukhatare
 nitye pare nirmale
 caṇḍālo'stu sa tu dviḥ'o'stu
 gurur-ity-eṣā maṇiṣā mama.*

"I am Brahman alone. And, this entire world has been spread out by pure consciousness. All this, without residue, has been superimposed by me through nescience which consists of the three *guṇas* (*sattva*, *rajas*, and *tamas*)"—thus, he to whom there is firm knowledge in respect of the eternal, blemishless supreme (Brahman) which is unexcellible bliss, is the preceptor, be he a *caṇḍāla* or a *brāhmaṇa*. This is my conclusive view.

The basic text for this verse is "I am Brahman" (*aham brahmāsmi*).

The wise one's experience is further defined here. For the one who has realized the non-dual Self, the world of duality is not real; for him, there is not the subject—object distinction. He knows that the world is an illusory appearance put up by nescience. Since nescience has ceased for him, he is not affected by *samsāra*.

The Self that is indicated by the concept "I" is Brahman; it is the plenary Reality which is eternal and distinctionless; it is pure consciousness which is the substrate of the world-appearance. The world is a superimposition on Brahman, even as the pseudo-silver is on nacre. Apart from the nacre, the silver has no reality. Similarly, apart from Brahman, the world is not real. As has already been shown, the "I" and Brahman are the same; and so, it is on the "I" that the world is superimposed.

The world, it may be said, is not illusory like nacre-silver. Nacre-silver is a content of erroneous perception. Not so is the world which gives room for non-erroneous empirical usage. And so, the world must be regarded as being absolutely real (*pāramārthika*). To this contention, we reply: The world is a superimposition on the non-dual Brahman which is of the nature of seer (*dṛg-rūpa*), even as nacre-silver is a superimposition. Therefore it is that we consider the world to be non-real. Even though the world accommodates relatively non-erroneous empirical usage, it is what is superimposed because it is of the nature of what is seen (*dṛśyatvāt*), like nacre-silver. The world, in its entirety, is of the nature of what is seen, because it is inert, and is made manifest by the self-luminous seer, Brahman, which is pure consciousness. Therefore, the superimposed world of plurality is, indeed, non-real.

Now, may not non-duality too be non-real? it may be asked. Our reply is that non-duality cannot be non real. The non-dual Self is the seer; it is not of the nature of a seen object; and so, it cannot be what is superimposed. If non-duality, too, like duality, be what is superimposed, then, what is the substrate on which it is superimposed? A substrate there should be, for, substrateless delusion is impossible. For non-duality which is said to be the superimposed, is the substrate non-duality itself, or is it duality? Since there is no non-duality other than the alleged superimposed non-duality, the first alternative is not possible. Nor is the second alternative intelligible, for non-duality cannot be superimposed on duality which is a mere illusion. Our

experience in the world is that silver, etc., which are the contents of illusion are superimposed on nacre, etc., which are relatively real. And so, if non-duality is the superimposed, there should be a substrate which is supremely real, and not what is illusory. Nor may it be said that, while in the world what is real may be the substrate, in the case of non-duality that is not possible because there is nothing else besides it, and so, what is illusorily imagined may be the substrate for non-duality ; for, duality has no substance whatsoever, since it is a mere superimposed appearance ; it, in fact, has no reality other than that of Brahman which is its substrate ; and, if duality which is the superimposed be regarded as the substrate, there would be the defect of self-contradiction. One and the same thing cannot be both the superimposed and the substrate. And, if both duality and non-duality be what are superimposed, then, since there is no third category at all, there would be no substrate, and the contingency of substrateless delusion would result.

It may be suggested : Let nullity (*śūnya*) be the substrate of both duality and non-duality. But, this suggestion, when analysed, would be found to be untenable. Nullity is the merest void ; it can in no way be defined. It cannot be even designated as "it". How can it serve as substrate ? How can it be the limit of sublation ? The nacre, in the illustration, is the substrate because when the silver delusion is sublated in the form 'This is not silver' the nacre-nature of what is in front is affirmed in the form 'This is nacre'. But, nullity, even because it is nullity, cannot serve as the limit of sublation. The

negation of the superimposed must lead to the affirmation of the substrate. No affirmation is possible of nullity. Were it to be affirmed, it will cease to be nullity.

Thus, it is clear, non-duality cannot be the superimposed. It is duality that is superimposed on non-duality which is Brahman, the homogeneous pure consciousness. The world of duality has no reality of its own. What is real in it is Brahman — existence, consciousness, bliss. It is, therefore, stated in the present verse that the entire world has been spread out by pure consciousness, that it is a superimposition on pure consciousness which is the Self, and that the cause of superimposition is nescience, whose three constituents—*sattva*, *rajas*, and *tamas* — are responsible for the variety of phenomena that compose the world.

He who has realized the non-dual Brahman, which is the substrate of the world-appearance, is a *jīvan-mukta*. No matter in what condition his body was born, and where, he is a true preceptor. The distinctions of caste, etc., do not belong to him, even as they do not belong to Brahman; for, verily, he is Brahman, the eternally pure Self.

VERSE THREE

शश्वन्नश्वरमेव विश्वमखिलं निश्चित्य वाचा गुरो-

नित्यं ब्रह्म निरन्तरं विमृशता निर्व्याजशान्तात्मना ।

भूतं भाति च दुष्कृतं प्रदहता संविन्मये पावके

प्रारब्धाय समर्पितं स्ववपुरित्येषा मनीषा मम ॥

śaśvan-naśvaram eva viśvam akhilaṁ
niścītya vācā guroḥ
nityam brahma nirantaram vimṣatā
nirvyāja-śāntātmanā,
bhūtaṁ bhāti ca duṣkṛtaṁ pradahatā
samvinmaye pāvake
prārabdhāya samarṣitam svavapur-
ity-eṣā maṇiṣā mama.

“The entire universe constantly perishes” — determining thus through the teaching of the preceptor, he who contemplates ceaselessly the eternal Brahman, has his mind rendered guileless and quiescent, gets the evil results of his past and future deeds burnt up in the fire of knowledge, and offers up his body to *prārabdha* (i. e. *karma* that is responsible for present embodiment). This is my conclusive view.

In this verse, the meaning of the major text, “That thou art” (*tat tvam asi*) is indicated.

When the competent teacher imparts the following instruction to the pupil who has the necessary qualification: “The basic Reality is Brahman; that thou art”, the latter realizes the truth of non-duality. He knows at once that the world is an illusory appearance, that Brahman is the sole reality, and that he—the so-called individual—is non-different from Brahman. In other words, he realizes that the phenomena constituting the world are inconstant and perishing and that Brahman is the plenary reality, the true eternal Self. In order to achieve this realization, he has his mind rendered guileless and quiescent;

he becomes free from passions, and gains stillness of mind. The residual mental impressions of the past are destroyed (*vāsanā-kṣaya*), and the mind itself ceases (*manonāśa*). Contemplation of the Self gains in depth and firmness. When the wisdom of the truth (*tattva-jñāna*) has become firmly established, one gains release even while tenanting a body; he becomes a *jīvan-mukta*.

It will be clear that, since what makes for bondage is ignorance or nescience, what effects release is knowledge or wisdom. *Karma* or action cannot serve as the direct means to release, because it is itself a product of ignorance. As against this Advaita-view, some thinkers urge that a combination of knowledge and action (*jñāna-karma-samuccaya*) is the means. Scripture-ordained duties and good works should never be renounced; they should be combined with the quest for Self-knowledge in order to gain release. This view is not sound; for a combination of knowledge and action is not possible whether they be regarded as equals or as principal and subsidiary. Action demands that the individual concerned should consider himself to be an agent; and agency is possible only by identifying the self with the body-mind complex which is not-self. This wrong identification is due to ignorance. So, it is evident that ignorance is the root-condition of the possibility of action. Therefore, it does not stand to reason to hold that action is the means to release. Knowledge, in the present context, means knowledge of the non-dual Self which is not an agent or enjoyer. It arises as destroying ignorance, the cause of evil, consisting in veiling the true nature of the Self as Brahman and projecting the illusory world. Since action and

knowledge are, thus, opposed to each other absolutely and completely, they cannot be combined. Moreover, they lead to contrary results—action reinforces bondage, knowledge effects release. Action is possible only where bondage is preserved; and through action *saṁsāra* is sustained. The knowledge of the Self, on the contrary, dispels the darkness of ignorance, and destroys the conceit of agency, etc., which constitute bondage. As action and knowledge cannot co-exist, they cannot be combined. When it is evident that knowledge and action cannot be treated as equals, or knowledge as the principal and action as the subsidiary, it does not require much effort to show that action cannot be the principal with knowledge as its subsidiary. The fruit of action is very small indeed—it is perishable fruit such as cattle, progeny, and heaven. Knowledge yields the highest fruit—the plenary bliss. Therefore, it is utterly improper to say that knowledge whose fruit is great is subsidiary to action whose fruit is small. The fore-sacrifices, *prayājas*, etc., may well be subsidiary to the *āgneya* sacrifice, etc., because the former have no separate fruit, and they occur in the context of *āgneya* for which fruit is mentioned. The rule that would apply here is that in the proximity of that which has fruit, that which has no fruit is the subsidiary thereof. Knowledge is not related to action (i. e. ritual), as the fore-sacrifices are to *āgneya*; because Scripture mentions fruit for knowledge—and that, the highest fruit. It cannot be said that the mention of fruit in the case of knowledge is an eulogy; for knowledge is not taught as a minor topic in the context of the ritual sections of the Veda. Knowledge constitutes the theme of the *jñānakāṇḍa*, viz, the Upaniṣads. It

cannot, therefore, be made a subsidiary of ritual. Thus, since the contexts are different, knowledge cannot be regarded as subordinate to ritual. Furthermore, he who is eligible to perform ritual is the one who is endowed with desire for fruits such as heaven, progeny, etc., whereas he who is eligible for knowledge is the one who has renounced attachments. As the eligibility for knowledge is different from the eligibility for action, knowledge cannot be a subsidiary of action. We have already shown how opposed the two are to each other. The nature of one is what the nature of the other is not. Action is non-luminous, because it is a product of ignorance; knowledge is luminous, because it is of the nature of the self-luminous Brahman. Just like darkness and light, the two cannot be together. And so, how is it possible to combine them as principal and subsidiary?

It is not that action has no use whatsoever. Scripture-ordained duties, good works, serve to purify the mind. It is the purified mind that can pursue the path of knowledge. In this manner, we should understand the respective positions of *karma* and *jñāna* in the scheme of spiritual disciplines. Karma is the remote auxiliary (*ārād-upakāraka*), and not the direct means to release. It is perfectly intelligible, therefore, that one should renounce all attachments before one could long for knowledge, or gain knowledge itself. Such a one has a mind which has been rendered guileless and quiescent.

Guilelessness and quiescence of the mind are the means that facilitate contemplation of Brahman which is unexcellible bliss. The guiles of the mind in the form of residual impressions (*vāsanā*) get

activitated as occasions arise. The *vāsanās* are the afflictions of the mind resulting from past repeated experiences. Their long-standing nature lends them strength and obduracy. They constitute what may be called the demoniacal heritage (*āsurisamṣat*) of the afflicted mind. How are these *vāsanās* to be removed? It is by cultivating the contrary tendencies. The tendencies that are opposed to the demoniacal heritage constitute what is known as the divine heritage or the heritage of the gods (*daivisamṣat*). Non-violence, freedom from pride, non-conceit, etc., are the virtues that go to form the divine heritage. These virtues should be cultivated and strengthened, so that the demoniacal tendencies could be overpowered and obliterated. The removal of the *vāsanās* (*vāsanā-kṣaya*) should, thus, be accomplished. The mind, then becomes guileless (*nirvyāja*). But, this is not enough. The mind itself should be destroyed (*manonāśa*); it should become quiescent (*śānta*). The stuff of the internal organ as it gets transformed into successive modes going out to sense-objects is called 'mind' (*manas*). When the outgoing tendency is arrested through conscious control, and when the mental-stuff gets transformed into the mode of control, we have destruction of the mind. As long as the mind is not controlled or destroyed, the *vāsanās* will not get removed completely, and as long as there is some residue of the *vāsanās* still left, the mind will not be destroyed. The two disciplines thus, are mutually helpful to each other. And, they together constitute the means to knowledge.

It has now been shown that *vāsanā-kṣaya* and *manonāśa* lead one to knowledge, and that knowledge

is the direct means to release. The present verse further proceeds to point out the nature of the state that is called *jivan-mukti*. When one gains release through knowledge, one's body need not fall. In fact, the continuance of the body is in no way incompatible with the status of release. What happens when release is gained is a change in perspective. Before release, one took the world of which the body is a part to be real; after gaining Self-knowledge, one realizes that the world is an illusory appearance. If the body were real, then release could come only after the destruction of the body. But, since the body is not real, its continued appearance or disappearance is of no consequence.

Karma which is responsible for the repeated embodiment of the soul is three-fold; *sañcita*, the fund of accumulated deeds of the past which will bring about future births; *āgāmī*, the deeds that one does in the present life and will do in future lives — these will be added on to *sañcita*; and *prārabdha*, that portion of the past deeds which has given rise to the present birth, i.e. the *karma* that has begun to fructify in the form of the present embodiment. Of these three varieties of *karma*, *sañcitā* and *āgāmī* do not belong to the man of realization because they get burnt up in the fire of knowledge; and they do not any longer affect him by producing merit (*puṇya*) and demerit (*pāpa*), both of which are evil in so far as they perpetuate transmigration. If it be asked how could the man of realization be absolved from the evil results of *sañcita* and *āgāmī*, we reply: even because he does no longer identify himself with the illusory projections of nescience, beginning with

egoity (*ahaṅkāra*) and ending with the physical body. His realization is of the form of the truth: "I did nothing in the past; I do nothing in the present; I shall do nothing in the future. In all the three times I am free from the sense of being an agent of actions. I am Brahman." What others may continue to observe as his actions are not *his* actions; they do not attach themselves to him even as water does not stick to the lotus-leaf. Thus, for the man of Self-knowledge, there are no deeds, whether good or bad, nor the consequences thereof. As we have already shown, even meritorious deeds are of the nature of evil, since they too cause embodiment.

There now remains the question about *prārabdha karma*: why should this too be not destroyed for the man of Self-knowledge? The one who asks this question is the one who bears a body and is yet unreleased; such a one sees the *jīvan-mukta* also to continue living in a body. The answer has to be framed in the language that he can understand: the continuance of the *jīvan-mukta's* body for a while longer has to be accounted for. The present body is the result of *prārabdha*; it is only when the fruit of *prārabdha* has been exhausted that the body will fall. But the continuance of the body does not in any way affect the *mukta's* state of wisdom; for he knows that the body is not real, that it is but an illusory appearance. But, then, the continuance of the effect after the cause has ceased to be may be objected to: When nescience, the cause of bondage and embodiment, has been destroyed, how could the body stay on? In answering this objection, several illustrations are given. The potter may remove the rod from

the wheel on which he shapes the pot ; but the wheel continues to rotate till the momentum is spent. Similarly, even though the cause of embodiment, nescience, has been destroyed through knowledge, its effect, viz , the body, may persist till the *prārabdha* gets exhausted through enjoyment. In a dream a person sees a ferocious tiger; he is seized with fright and wakes up. Now, the cause of fear has been removed ; yet, the person's body continues to tremble for a time. This is another example. Let us imagine an archer practising archery : he has a number of arrows in his quiver ; one of the arrows he has taken out of the quiver and shot it from his bow at the target ; another he has taken in hand and placed it on the bow-string, ready to be shot. Now, let us suppose that at this stage the archer resolves not to continue the practising of archery ; he may, then, throw away the quiver full of arrows ; he may also cast away the arrow that he has in hand : but he cannot recall the arrow he has already released from his bow ; that must do its work, and only then it will stop. This illustration may help us in understanding why, while *sañcita* and *āgāmi* are not there for the *jīvan-mukta*, *prārabdha* must work itself out and is therefore inescapable. To the question : how to destroy *prārabdha*?, the answer is : by enjoying the merit and demerit occasioned by it. This is what is meant when it is stated in the present verse that the *jīvanmukta* offers up his body to *prārabdha*. But all this explanation it should be remembered, is from the standpoint of the unreleased. For the *jīvanmukta*, there is no body at all; and so there is no need either for explaining the continuance of the body.

The Bhagavatpāda expresses the Self-experience of the *jīvan-mukta* thus elsewhere :—

*dṛṣi-svarūpaṁ gaganopamaṁ param
sakt-vibhātaṁ tvajam-ekam akṣaram,
alepakam sarvagataṁ yad-advayaṁ
tadeva cāham satataṁ vimukta om-iti.*

“The non-dual Reality is of the nature of the seer, comparable to ether ; it is supreme, all-effulgent, unborn, one, immutable, stainless, and all-pervading : that (Reality), verily, I am — ever free, ‘Om’.”

VERSE FOUR

या तिर्यङ्नरदेवताभिरहमित्यन्तः स्फुटा गृह्यते
यद्भासा हृदयाक्षदेहविषया भान्ति स्वतोऽचेतनाः ।
तां भास्यैः पिहितार्कमण्डलनिभां स्फूर्तिं सदा भावय-
न्योगी निर्वृतमानसो हि गुरुरित्येषा मनीषा मम ॥

*yā tiryāṅ-nara-devatābhir-aham-ity-
antaḥ sphuṭā gṛhyate
yad-bhāsā hṛdayākṣadeha-viṣayā
bhānti svato'cetanāḥ,
tām bhāsyaiḥ pihitārka-maṇḍala-nibhām
sphūrtim sadā bhāvayan
yogī nirvṛta-mānaso hi gurur-itye-
ṣā manīṣā mama.*

That (Pure Consciousness) which is realized within clearly as “I” by animals, men and gods ; that by whose light the mind, the sense-organs, the

body, and the objects, which are by themselves non-intelligent, shine; that which is (hidden) like the solar orb that is covered by what are illumined by it (viz. the clouds) — contemplating that Effulgence always, the yogī becomes filled with the supreme happiness in his mind. That one is the preceptor. This is my conclusive view.

The major text whose meaning the present verse explains is: ‘This self is Brahman’ *ayam ātmā brahma*. The self is that which illumines the mind, the sense-organs, etc.; Brahman is the basic reality which shines as ‘I’ ‘I’ in all grades of beings — animals, men, gods. The identity or non-difference of the self and Brahman is not realized because of the veil cast by nescience (*avidyā*), which itself has no *locus standi* as apart from Brahman. Nescience which is itself illumined by Brahman hides it, even as the cloud which is itself made known by the sun’s light covers the sun. The one for whom nescience has been destroyed through knowledge is the *mukta*, the true *yogī*. His is the bliss of Brahman; his mind gets filled with unexcellable happiness. Or rather, he is the one who has realized his non-difference from Brahman that is the plenary bliss.

That which shines as “I” “I” in all beings (*jīvas*) is the supreme Self, Brahman. The following objection may be raised to this statement: In experiences such as “I am a man”, the concept “I” is seen in apposition with the body, etc., as associated with the attribute of human-ness, etc. And so, the content of the concept “I” is the body, etc., and not the self. Our reply to this objection is: It is

the self that is properly the content of the concept "I" (*aham-pratyaya*). The body, etc., which constitute the not-self, are the content of the concept "this" (*idam-pratyaya*). But because of delusion caused by superimposition, the attributes of the not-self appear as belonging to the self, even as "redness" seems to belong to the crystal in the proximity of the hibiscus flower. This is certainly an error, being the cognition of 'that' in what is not-that (*atāsmiṅ tad-buddhiḥ viparyayaḥ*). The gross body which is a modification of food cannot truly be the sphere of the concept "I". In the case of inert things such as pot, etc., it is clear that they cannot be the contents of the concept "I". The same is true of the body; hence, the body is not the self. The sense-organs too are not the self for the same reason, viz., that they are non-intelligent.

A doubt may arise in regard to the status of the intellect (*buddhī*). Is not the intellect at least, which is intelligent, fit to be the sphere of the concept "I"? Our answer is: no. The intellect is subject to origination and destruction, like pot, etc., and is not of the nature of intelligence. Therefore, it cannot be the content of the concept "I". What is true of the intellect is true of the egoity (*ahamkāra*) also. The egoity is a mode of the *sattva*-constituent of the internal organ; and so, it is what is illumined by the self which is consciousness. It is inert like any other object, and cannot serve as the sphere of the concept "I". Moreover, the egoity is subject to mutations, as is evidenced by the experience of all people in the form: 'I am happy; I am miserable, etc. What is subject to mutation or transformation is not the self,

e.g., the body. It is well-known that what is subject to transformation is non-eternal. The egoity which takes on several modes, in the manner we have just indicated, cannot be the intelligence-self; that it is inert by nature must be admitted. Thus all things ranging from the physical body upto the egoity are of the same class as pots, etc., they are objects, and are not the self. It is the witness-self which is of the nature of pure consciousness that alone is the content of the concept "I".

If the self which is pure consciousness be the content of the concept "I", how could it be self-luminous?, it may be asked. How the self becomes the content of the concept "I", although self-luminous, it is not difficult to understand. It is as self-luminous that the self becomes the content of the concept "I". The concept "I" is a mode of the mind, it is true. A cognitive mode reveals its object by (a) destroying ignorance regarding it, and (b) by illumining it. It is in this manner, for instance, that a pot is made known by the cognition relating to it. Cognition which is a mode of the mind pervades the pot (*vṛtti-vyāpti*); and as a consequence, the reflection of consciousness which is the self pervades the pot and illumines it (*phala-vyāpti*). The pot which is a dense object, thus, requires a double pervasion — pervasion by the mental mode and pervasion by the reflection of consciousness — before it becomes known. In the case of the self, however, what is necessary is only the mental mode in order to destroy the ignorance regarding it. When ignorance is destroyed, it shines of its own accord, being self-luminous. There is no need, here, of a

reflection of consciousness. Thus it is that the self becomes the content of the mental mode, the concept "I". There is no incompatibility whatsoever with the self being self-luminous. In fact, it is the self as the witness that manifests even the concept "I"; and manifesting the concept, it manifests itself. The self-luminous, immutable, and eternal self is, thus, the content of the concept "I"; and that is Brahman.

Nothing other than the self is self-luminous. The mind, the sense organs, the body, and the objects have no light of their own. They are non-intelligent; it is by the light of the Self that they are manifested.

"If the Self is clearly manifest as "I" ' I' to all living beings, then, all would get released without the least effort; there would be no need for any discipline." To this objection we reply: Although everyone knows the self as the content of the concept "I", all do not know that the self is of the nature of the unattached consciousness-bliss. Because of the obstruction caused by nescience, which itself is made manifest by the self, they do not have discriminative knowledge. The present verse illustrates this by giving the analogy of the clouds hiding the sun. Children looking up at the cloud-cast sky imagine that the sun is without light. Similarly, the ignorant people look upon the self as what is limited and non-luminous. Hence the need for contemplation and discrimination. The self should be realized in its true nature — as what is distinct from the body, the sense organs, the mind, etc., as that which is clearly manifest as "I", as the witness-consciousness that is unrelated to, and unaffected by, anything, as

the non-dual reality that is the self-luminous, homogeneous, intelligence. One should realize one's non-difference from the non-dual Reality through ceaseless contemplation. In the terminology of Patañjali's Yoga, this is called *samprajñāta-samādhi*.

In order to get this state of steadfast awareness, one has to practise yoga: one has to become a yogi. The cultivation of the virtues such as calmness, restraint, etc., the disciplining of the body, sense-organs, etc., the regulation of the breathing process—all these are helpful to gaining mind-control. It is the controlled and concentrated mind that is capable of perceiving the truth. The mind should finally be rendered free of modifications; and then the supreme Self becomes manifest. When the Sun of wisdom rises, the darkness of ignorance flees. This is liberation, *mokṣa*. It is of the nature of infinite, eternal bliss. The one who has this plenary experience is the true preceptor.

VERSE FIVE

यत्सौख्याम्बुधिलेशलेशत इमे शक्रादयो निर्वृता
 यच्चित्ते नितरां प्रशान्तकलने लब्ध्वा मुनिर्निर्वृतः ।
 यस्मिन्नित्यसुखाम्बुधौ गलितधीर्ब्रह्मैव न ब्रह्मविद्-
 यःकश्चित्स सुरेन्द्रवन्दितपदो नूनं मनीषा मम ॥

yat-saukhyāmbudhi-leśa-leśata ime
śakrādayo nirvṛtāḥ
yac-citte nitarām praśāntakalane
labdhvā munir-nirvṛtaḥ,

*yasmin-nitya-sukhāmbudhau galita-
dhīr-brahmaiva na brahma-vit
yaḥ kaścīt sa surendra-vandita-pado
nūnam maṇiṣā mama.*

That ocean of bliss, by taking a very small drop of which Indra and other gods become happy; that by gaining which in the mind that has become perfectly quiescent without modification, the ascetic experiences happiness; that ocean of eternal bliss, by dissolving the mind into which, one remains even as Brahman, and not merely as a knower of Brahman—he (who knows this), whoever he may be, is the one whose feet are adored by (even) the king of the gods. Surely, this is my conclusive view.

In this, the last verse, the fruit of knowledge—the supreme goal—is praised. The nature of the goal, which is release, is indicated by saying that it is unexcellable bliss, one vast ocean of happiness. The bliss that is release, which is but another expression for Brahman-Ātman, is compared to the ocean in order to give an idea of its limitlessness. It is bliss that does not bear even a trace of misery, and does not admit of anything exceeding it. Empirical happiness may be measured; but the transcendent bliss is immeasurable. The higher one mounts in the orders of living beings, the happiness increases. The bliss that the knower of Brahman enjoys knows no bounds. Empirical happiness is as nothing before it. The highest conceivable happiness which we associate with the status of the gods such as Indra is but a minute particle of Brahman-bliss. After gaining Brahman-bliss, there is nothing else to be gained.

The one who realizes Brahman is, in fact, not a knower of Brahman, but is Brahman itself. This is the ultimate and most adorable status, *parama puruṣārtha*, the supreme human goal.

He who has dissolved his mind in the ocean of the plenary bliss is, verily, that ocean itself. This final experience is what is referred to in yoga as *asampraññātasamādhi*. There is not the distinction, here, of subject and object, experiencer and the experienced. "He who has transcended the distinction of seeing and not-seeing, and remains in the pure status, is Brahman and not merely a knower of Brahman." This is the status which is adored by the gods and the humans. He who has gained this status is the true preceptor.

In the status of release, there is total absence of misery (*duḥkhābhāva*), there is the experience of bliss (*sarvakāmāpti*), there is nothing further to be done (*kṛtakṛtyatva*) or gained (*prāpta-prāpyatva*). Misery is caused by nescience. In release there is no misery, because nescience has been destroyed. In release there is supreme bliss, because the non-dual Self which is of the nature of eternal release is *parama-ānanda*. All desires are for attaining ends. Release is the final end; after attaining it, there could be no desire left. All our doings are for accomplishing some results which we long for; the greatest fruit is release; after realising it, there is nothing more to be done. The ultimate gain is release; after gaining it, nothing remains to be gained.

The one who has realised the final goal which is release is the true preceptor.

EPILOGUE

The divine untouchable listened to the verses of the *Maniṣāpañcakam* replete with the highest wisdom. In fact, it was to occasion the composition of this quintad of verses that this drama was enacted. It was now time that the disguise was discarded. In the place of the untouchable there now stood Śiva, the lord of the universe (Viśvanātha); and the dogs had assumed their original form, viz. that of the four Vedas. The Ācārya offered obeisance to the Lord, and gave expression to the great truth that while at the lower levels of experience there are differences between God and the soul such as the one between master and servant, or the one between whole and part, from the standpoint of the supreme reality there is no difference whatsoever :

दासस्तेऽहं देहदृष्ट्याऽस्मि शंभो
जातस्तेऽशो जीवदृष्ट्या त्रिदृष्टे ।
सर्वस्याऽऽत्मन्नात्मदृष्ट्या त्वमेवे-
त्येवं मे धीर्निश्चिता सर्वशास्त्रैः ॥

*dāsaste'ham deha-dṛṣṭyā'smi sambho
jātaste'mśo jīva-dṛṣṭyā tridṛṣṭe,
sarvasyātman-ātma-dṛṣṭyā tvamevetye-
evam me dhir-niścitā sarva-śāstraiḥ*

“From the standpoint of the body, O Śiva, I am Thy servant; from the standpoint of the soul, O Thou with three eyes, I become a part of Thine; and O the Self of all, from the standpoint of the Self, I am verily Thou : this is my settled conclusion reached with the help of all *Śāstras*.”

The Lord Śiva was profoundly pleased: He showered His blessings on Śaṅkara, His own *Avatāra*, for the successful fulfilment of the great mission of re-establishing spiritual unity, and then disappeared into the Formless whence He had taken shape.

No 'High' and 'Low' for the Wise

The *dharma*s (virtuous actions) pertaining to caste, stage in life, etc., that are performed by those who are without attachment, are the cause for attaining the status of gods, etc., and are high and pure. The *dharma*s that are mixed with *adharma* (unrighteousness) lead to the attainment of the status of humans, and are middling. The types of activities that are *adharma* bring about the status of animals, etc., and are low. When one realizes the self that is one, non-dual, and free from all illusory assumptions, one does not attain the different kinds of status, high, middling, and low. This is just like the intelligent one not seeing the defilement in the sky that is seen by children. Then (*i. e.*, when the self is realized), the mind does not arise in the forms of gods, etc., that are the results of activities, high, middling, and low. Indeed, in the absence of the cause the effect does not arise, even as crops do not appear in the absence of seeds.

—from Śaṅkara's *Commentary on the Māṇḍūkya-kārikā*.

Lalitapancaratnam

Sankara Bhagavatpada

[1]

प्रातः स्मरामि ललितावदनारविन्दं
बिम्बाधरं पृथुलमौक्तिकशोभिनासम् ।
आकर्णदीर्घनयनं मणिकुण्डलाढ्यं
मन्दस्मितं मृगमदोज्ज्वलफालदेशम् ॥

*prātaḥ smarāmi lalita vadanāravindam
bimbādharaṁ pṛthula mauktika śobhināsam
ākaraṇadīrgha nayanam maṇi kuṇḍalāḍhyam
mandasmitam mṛgamadojjwala phāla deśam*

I remember in the morning the lotusface of Goddess Lalitā. (It has) red lips, the nose shining with one big pearl, the eyes elongating upto the ears, the ear-pendant made up of gems, a gentle smile, and the forehead shining with musk.

The poet Mūka also has sung in a century of verses on the glory of the gentle smile of the Goddess in his *Mūkapañcaśati*.

[2]

प्रातर्भजामि ललिताभुजकल्पवल्लीं
 रक्ताङ्गुलीयलसदङ्गुलिपल्लवाढ्याम् ।
 साणिक्यहेमवल्याङ्गदशोभमानां
 पुण्ड्रेक्षुचापकुसुमेषुसृणीर्दधानाम् ॥

*prātarbhajāmi lalitā bhujakalpa vallīm
 raktāṅgulīya lasadānguli pallavāḍhyām
 māṅkiyahema valayāṅgada śobhamānām
 puṅdreksucāpa kusumeṣu sṛṇīrdadhānām*

I worship in the morning the arms of Goddess-Lalita, the *kalpavalli*. (They have) the tender fingers shining with red rings. (They are) beautiful with golden bangles and bracelets (studded) with rubies. (They) bear the sugarcane — bow, flower — missile and goad.

The gentle bestowing arms of the Goddess are identified with the boon — granting tree.

[3]

प्रातर्भजामि ललिताचरणारविन्दं
 भक्तेष्टदाननिरतं भवसिन्धुपोतम् ।
 पद्मासनादिसुरनायकपूजनीयं
 पद्माङ्कुशध्वजसुदर्शनलाञ्छनाढ्यम् ॥

*prātarbhōjāmi lalitā caraṇāravindam
bhakteṣṭadāna nīratam bhavasindhu pōtam
padmāsanādi suranāyaka pujanīyam
padmānkuṣa dhvaja sudarśana lāchanāḍhyam*

I bow in the morning to the lotus — feet of Goddess Lalita. It is keen on granting the wishes of the devotees. It is the ship (that conveys us) across the ocean of birth and death. It is to be worshipped by the lord of celestials such as the one seated on the lotus (Brahmā) It bears the marks such as the lotus, goad, flagstaff and disc.

[4]

प्रातस्तुवे परशिवां ललितां भवानीं
त्रय्यन्तवेद्यविभवां करुणानवद्याम् ।
विश्वस्य सृष्टिविलयस्थितिहेतुभूतां
विद्येश्वरीं निगमवाङ्मनसादिदूराम् ॥

*prātahstuve paraśivām lalitām bhavānīm
traiyaṅta vedya vibhavām karuṇanavaḍhyām
viśvasya sṛṣṭi vilayaṣṭhiti hetu bhutaīm
vidyesvarīm nigamvañ manasādi dūram*

I sing in the morning the glory of the extremely benevolent form of Goddess Lalitā, the consort of Lord Sīva. Her greatness is to be known through the *Upaniṣads*. She is faultless compassion. She is the cause of the creation, existence and destruction of the universe. She is the presiding deity of mystic learning. She is beyond the purview of the *Vedas*, speech and mind etc.

[5]

प्रातर्वदामि ललिते तव पुण्यनाम
 कामेश्वरीति कमलेति महेश्वरीति ।
 श्रीशाम्भवीति जगतां जननी परेति
 वाग्देवतेति वचसा त्रिपुरेश्वरीति ॥

*prātar vadāmi lalite tavapunya nāma
 kāmēśvarīti kamaleti maheśvarīti
 śrī śāmbhavīti jagatam janani pareti
 vāgdevateti vacasā tripureśvarīti*

I utter in the morning by (my) words your meritorious name Oh ! (Goddess) Lalita ! such as Kāmēśvarī (Bestower of desires), Kamalā, Maheśvarī, Śrīśāmbhavi, Supreme Mother of the Universe, Vāgdevatā (Presiding deity of speech) and Tripureśvarī (the consort of Lord of Tripura).

[6]

यः श्लोकपञ्चकमिदं ललिताम्बिकायाः
 सौभाग्यदं सुललितं पठति प्रभाते ।
 तस्मै ददाति ललिता झटिति प्रसन्ना
 विद्यां श्रियं विपुलसौख्यमनन्तकीर्तिम् ॥

*yah ślōka pañcakamidam lalitāmbikāyāḥ
 sowbhāgyadam sulalitam paṭhati prabhāte
 tasmai dadāti lalitā jhaṭithi prasannā
 vidyām śriyam vipula saukhyamanantakīrtim.*

Whoever reads in the early morning these five verses in praise of Mother — goddess Lalitā, the Goddess Lalitā becomes pleased with him immediately and showers upon him knowledge, wealth endless happiness and fame.

The Philosophy of Advaita*

R. Thangasami

The philosophy of Advaita is based upon *prastānatraya* — the triple canon of the Vedānta (i.e.) the *Upaniṣads*, the *Bhagavatgīta* and the *Brahma-sūtra*. The central doctrine of Advaita may be briefly stated thus: God (*Īśvara*) soul (*jīva*) and the world (*prapañca*) which are distinct realities according to the pluralistic and the theistic schools of Vedānta are only the appearances of the transcendental entity called Brahman or Ātman through *māyā-avidyā*. Brahman-Ātman is the ultimate reality and it is the truth, existence, consciousness, bliss and non-dual. Owing to *māyā-avidyā*, it appears as God, soul and the world. *Māyā-avidyā* and the world are indeterminate (*mithyā*) as either real or absolute nothing. *Īśvara* is a complex of Brahman and *avidyā* and *jīva* is a complex of Brahman and *avidyā* and its products namely, the physical body and the subtle body. The essential nature of *Īśvara* and *jīva* is Brahman. *Īśvara* is always aware of his identity with

* Translated into English from *Sanskrit Original*.

Brahman and so he is ever-released. *Jīva* although it is of the nature of Brahman yet under the influence of *avidyā* it has lost sight of its identity with Brahman by falsely identifying itself with the mind which is the most important factor of the subtle body. In the states of waking and dream, the *jīva* has the notion of "I" and it is chiefly due to its identification with the mind. In the state of deep sleep, mind provisionally merges in *avidyā* and so there is no identification with the mind. Consequently there is no notion of "I" in the state of deep sleep. From this it follows that the state of being a *jīva* is due to the identification of Brahman-Ātman with mind and this identification is due to *avidyā*. The state of being a *jīva* would last as long as there is relation to mind. This relation would cease to exist when the mind vanishes, through the removal of *avidyā*. *Avidyā* could be removed by the intuitive knowledge of Brahman. When the latter arises, *avidyā* is removed. The mind which is the effect of *avidyā* is also removed and the so-called *jīva* remains as pure Brahman which is liberation. *Jīva* in its essence is not a knower. On the other hand it is of the nature of knowledge. Its being a knower is due to its association with mind which, however, is false.

Advaita accepts three levels of reality — apparent, empirical and absolute. Of these, apparent reality belongs to illusory objects like shell-silver, rope-snake, etc., which are sublated by the knowledge other than the knowledge of Brahman, (namely) the knowledge of shell, the knowledge of rope, etc. The empirical reality belongs to objects of the waking state and they are sublated only by the knowledge of Brahman. Absolute reality constitutes the essen-

tial nature of Brahman and it consists in non-sublatability in the three divisions of time — past, present and future. The objects of the dream state are taken to be real till the sleeper awakes. In the same way, the objects of the waking state are taken to be real till the *jīva* wakes to reality. But they are indeterminable or *mīṭhya* as they would be sublated by the intuitive knowledge of Brahman.

The root-cause of the entire world is *māyā-avidyā*. It consists of three constituents *Sattva*, *rajas*, and *tamas*. This *māyā-avidyā* is present in Brahman. At the time of dissolution, the entire world remains in a latent form in *avidyā*. At the time of creation, owing to reflection (*īkṣaṇa*) on the part of Brahman associated with *avidyā*, *māyā* gets itself transformed into subtle elements, *tanmātrās* or non-quintuplicated elements. From these spring into being all subtle bodies as well as the gross bodies.

Brahman-Ātman associated with *māyā-avidyā* the causal body, the subtle body and the gross body is known as *jīva*. These three factors which constitute the limiting adjunct of *jīva* would be removed by the direct knowledge of Brahman.

In the case of one to whom the knowledge of Brahman has arisen, all his accumulated merits and demerits would be annihilated. A portion of them which has started yielding its result and which is known as *prārabdha-karma* and which continues to exist till its results are experienced. Till that time one who has attained the knowledge of Brahman and thus liberated would continue to live in the body. Such a one is known as *jīvan-mukta*. When

the *prārabda-karma* is exhausted by experiencing its fruits the *jīvan-mukta* is dissociated from psycho-physical organism and remains as Brahman. This is known as final liberation. Thus according to Advaita, it is Brahman which through *māyā* is said to be bound; and it is said to be liberated when *avidyā* is removed.

Advaitins accept six *pramāṇas*, namely, perception, inference, comparison, verbal testimony, presumption and non-apprehension. Among these Advaitins assign a most important place to verbal testimony, that is the scripture. Brahman-Ātman transcends mind and the sense-organs. Hence excepting scriptures, perception and other proofs cannot function in respect of Brahman. So it has been said: a scripture becomes a scripture only when it makes known an object which cannot be known through perception and other proofs.¹ It has also been said: scripture is the proof in respect of objects which are supra-sensuous.² Scriptural texts like "O, gentle one, prior to creation this alone existed—one without a second."³ clearly set forth that reality is one only.

Brahman-Ātman is of the nature of consciousness. In empirical state when sense-organs function in regard to their respective objects, mind also comes through the sense organs, reaches the place of those objects and assumes the forms of those objects. This modification of the mind into the form of those objects is known as *vṛtti* and consciousness which is

1. *sampradāyoktiḥ*
2. *Brahma-sūtra-bhāṣyā*, II, i, 27.
3. *Chāndogya* VI, ii, I.

the essential nature of Brahman-Ātman is reflected in the *vṛtti*. The *vṛtti* inspired by the reflection of Brahman-Ātman in it is known as empirical cognition. The substratum of this empirical cognition is the seer (*draṣṭā*). The object of the empirical cognition is known as *dṛśya*. Of these three factors the *draṣṭā* and *dṛśya* are seeming diversifications of consciousness, (*dṛk*) which is Brahman-Ātman. This consciousness is thus two-fold — unconditioned and conditioned. The unconditioned one is of the nature of existence, free from any substratum and content. This alone is referred to by the terms Brahman, paramātmā etc. The conditioned one, on the other hand, depends upon a substratum and a content. Brahman-Ātman is the substratum of all the objects of the world including the empirical cognitions.

The *Taittirīya* text "That from which these beings arise, that by which the created beings are sustained and that into which they merge at the time of dissolution — seek to know That—that is Brahman"⁴ conveys that Brahman is the cause of the world. The *Brahma-Sūtra* "from which the origination, etc., of this world proceed"⁵ affirms the above view. When it is said that the entire world is the effect and Brahman is the cause, it comes to this that the cause namely, Brahman is free from the specific characteristics of the effect. A lump of clay which is the cause of pot, jar, etc., does not possess, in its causal state the specific characteristics of the effects.

4. *Taittirīya*, II, i, 1.

5. *Brahma-Sūtra*, I, i, 2.

namely, potness, jariness, etc. It follows that the primal causal of every object, namely, Brahman must be free from all specific characteristics. Although the Upaniṣads make reference to two aspects of Brahman, namely, the attributeless and the one endowed with attributes, yet it is the attribute-less aspect that is real and the other aspect is caused by *māyā*.

In order to understand the true nature of Brahman-Ātman. Sri Śankara gives forth two kinds of definitions: *svarūpa-lakṣaṇa* and *taṭastha-lakṣaṇa*. Of these two, the former one consists of the essential nature of the object concerned, and the latter one is only an adventitious feature and not the essential feature of the object that is to be defined. These two types of definitions have this in common, namely, that they differentiate the object wherein they are present from other objects.

In the case of Brahman, it, being the cause of the world, is not the essential nature of Brahman. It is only its adventitious feature caused by *avidyā*. Hence the characteristic of being the cause of the world is only a *taṭastha-lakṣaṇa* of Brahman.

The Upaniṣadic texts⁶ like "Brahman is *truth*, consciousness and absolute" and "Brahman is consciousness and bliss",⁷ etc. convey the *svarūpa-lakṣaṇa* of Brahman. That which is not contradicted in the three divisions of time—past, present and future is truth or Reality. Consciousness is that which mani-

6. *Taittiriya, Brahmavalli*, 1.

7. *Bṛhadārāṇyakā*, III, ix, 28.

ifests itself without depending upon any other factor and which manifests everything else that is superimposed upon it. Happiness or bliss with reference to which every object of the world is an ancilliary and which is not an ancilliary to anything. This definition applies to Brahman-Ātman. So it has been said : "Experts describe bliss as one with reference to which all objects in the world are ancilliary and which by its very existence gives up the state of being an ancilliary to anything else. This description is exactly applicable to Brahman-Ātman. Hence Brahman-Ātman is of the nature of Bliss."⁸

It comes to this : Brahman-Ātman is of the nature of truth consciousness and Bliss. This constitutes the *svarūpa lakṣaṇa* of Brahman.

(to be continued)

On the Relative Strength of Perception and Verbal Testimony in Advaita

Dr N. Veezhinathan

All systems of religion and philosophy have to deal with the three concepts of God, soul and the world. While the pluralistic and the dualistic school of Śrī Rāmānuja and Śrī Madhva hold the above three to be distinct realities, the Advaita of Śrī Śaṅkara holds that these three are only seeming diversifications of a transcendental reality called Brahman which is non-dual.

An objection is raised as regards the view that Brahman is non-dual. Brahman is said to be non-dual in the sense that there is no second entity apart from it. But perception gives us the knowledge of the existence of the world. Hence Brahman cannot be non-dual.

Advaitins answer the above objection by saying that the non-dual nature of Brahman would be contradicted only when the world that is perceived

is real. But it is not so. The Upaniṣadic texts such as 'Objects are merely referred to by names such as pot, etc.'¹ affirm that the world is indeterminable or *mithyā*. They are, therefore, known as *mithyātva-śruti*. The existence of an indeterminable world does not in any way contradict the non-dual nature of Brahman.

Now it is objected that one cannot conclude that the world is indeterminable, as it is opposed to perception. The latter in forms like 'The pot is real' (*ghaṭaḥ san*) comprehends the reality of objects of the world like pot, etc.

Some preceptors of Advaita argue² that perception comprehends the objects of the world as real, and so perception and the *mithyātva-śruti* are in conflict with each other. But, just as the subsequent knowledge revealing the true nature of a barren land arises only by invalidating the knowledge of mirage which arose earlier, so also the knowledge from the *mithyātva-śruti* arises only by invalidating the perceptual cognition which arose earlier. This principle of the subsequent one depriving the earlier one of its validity is known as *apaccheda-nyāya* which is arrived at in the section known as *apacchedādhikaraṇa* in the *Pūrva-mīmāṃsā-sūtra* :

*paurvāparye pūrvadaurbalyam prakṛtiwat.*³

We shall explain the above maxim in some detail. In the *jyotiṣṭoma* sacrifice, the priests should go around the sacrificial fire by holding the waist-cloth of the priest in front. If Udgāta – the priest who chants the hymns of the *Sāma-veda* – lets go the

waist-cloth of the priest in front of him, then to expiate this, the sacrifice should be concluded without giving any sacrificial fee to the priests. If *Pratihartā* - the priest who chants the hymns of the *Ṛg-veda* - does so, then the sacrifice should be completed by giving the entire wealth of the sacrificer as the sacrificial fee. If the two let go the waist-cloth successively, then the sacrificer should conclude the sacrifice by giving as fee that which relates to the later loss of grip.

The *sūtra* referred to above, in order to explain this maxim, makes a reference to a model sacrifice (*prakṛtivat*). There are two kinds of sacrifices, one a model sacrifice (*prakṛti-yāga*) and another a sacrifice modelled on it (*vikṛti-yāga*). There is a general rule that the *vikṛti-yāga* must be performed like *prakṛti-yāga*. It follows from this that the accessories prescribed in respect of *prakṛti-yāga* would exactly apply to *vikṛti-yāga*. But in certain cases the vedic text specifically prescribes with reference to *vikṛti-yāga* an accessory different from the one prescribed in respect of *prakṛti-yāga*.

Now according to the rule that *vikṛti-yāga* must be performed like *prakṛti-yāga* the knowledge of *prakṛti-yāga* arises first and knowledge of *vikṛti-yāga* arises later. Even if the order of the vedic texts which enjoin the performance of *prakṛti-yāga* and *vikṛti-yāga* is reversed, then also the knowledge of *prakṛti-yāga* alone would arise first. It is because the performance of *vikṛti-yāga* depends upon the knowledge of *prakṛti-yāga*.

Thus since the knowledge of *prakṛti-yāga* and its accessory arises earlier, the knowledge of the *vikṛti-yāga* with a different accessory which arises later cannot arise without sublating the knowledge of that accessory of *prakṛti-yāga*. The point that is of importance here is that the subsequent one sublates the antecedent one.

The application of the *apaccheda-nyāya* suggests that scripture is more powerful than perception. This means that a scriptural text must be taken in its literal sense even though that text is in conflict with perception. But some scriptural texts are interpreted in a figurative way in order to have no conflict with perception. For example the vedic text 'The strew is the sacrificer' which speaks of the identity between the strew and the sacrificer is interpreted in a figurative way to mean that the strew is as important as the sacrificer. It is because the primary sense of the above text, namely, the identity of the strew and the sacrificer is opposed to perception which clearly shows that the two are totally distinct. From this it follows that perception is more powerful than scripture. The result of this conclusion is that perception which gives rise to the knowledge of the reality of the world is more powerful than the scriptural text which gives rise to the knowledge that the objects of the world are interminable.⁴

The followers of the *Vivaraṇa* school⁵ argue that all scripture is more powerful than perception. This, however, is a general rule. And, there is an exception to this which is as follows: if there arises the contingency of the perceptual cognition becoming devoid of any content when contradicted by the

knowledge arising from scripture, then, perception is more powerful than scripture and the latter should be interpreted in such a way as not to have any conflict with perception. If, on the other hand, we could provide some content for perceptual cognition, when the latter is contradicted by the knowledge arising from the scripture, then, the latter is more powerful than perception.

The followers of the *Vivaraṇa* school interpret⁶ the text 'The strew is the sacrificer' in the light of what has been said above. According to the general rule that all scripture is more powerful than perception, the scriptural text 'The strew is the sacrificer' which conveys the identity of the strew and the sacrificer is more powerful than perception which clearly shows that strew and the sacrificer are totally different, and hence it could contradict the perceptual cognition. But the latter when contradicted by scripture would become devoid of any content.

It is thus : the difference between the strew and the sacrificer known through perception, when contradicted by the scripture which conveys the identity between the two, cannot be considered as absolutely real ; for, if it were so, then there would be contradiction with the Upaniṣadic teaching that Brahman is the sole reality.

The difference between the two cannot be taken as apparently real like silver that appears in a shell. For, an object can be admitted to be apparently real, if it is sublated by a perceptual cognition prior to the rise of the knowledge of Brahman. The

silver that appears in a shell is sublated by the perceptual cognition of the form 'This is shell only' prior to the rise of the knowledge of Brahman. The difference between the strew and the sacrificer is not at all sublated by a perceptual cognition prior to the rise of the knowledge of Brahman. Hence it cannot be apparently real.

The difference between the strew and the sacrificer cannot be taken as empirically real. This requires a discussion regarding the nature of identity between the strew and the sacrificer conveyed by the scriptural text. The identity cannot be taken as absolutely real ; for, if it were so, there would be contradiction with the Upaniṣadic teaching that Brahman is the sole reality. It cannot be apparently real like silver that appears in a shell ; for, unlike silver which is perceptually known to be identical with the 'this-element' of shell in the form 'This is silver', the sacrificer is not perceptually cognised as identical with the strew. Hence we have to maintain that the identity between the strew and the sacrificer conveyed by the vedic text is empirically real. Thus when identity between the strew and the sacrificer conveyed by the vedic text is to be taken as empirically real, difference between the two known through perception cannot be taken as empirically real ; for, difference and identity possessing same level of reality cannot be predicated of in respect of two entities such as strew and the sacrificer.

It would be clear from the above that if perception which apprehends the difference of strew from the sacrificer is contradicted by the vedic text which

speaks of identity between the strew and the sacrificer, then the perceptual cognition cannot be explained as having for its content difference which is either absolutely real, or empirically real, or apparently real. This means that perceptual cognition would become devoid of any content. This, however, is improper because contentless cognition is a contradiction in terms. Hence we must admit that in the present case perception is more powerful than the scripture and the latter should therefore be interpreted in such a way as not to have any conflict with perception. That is why the text 'The strew is the sacrificer' is interpreted in a secondary way to mean that the strew is as important as the sacrificer.

In the case of *mithyātva-śruti* the position is different. Perception which gives us the knowledge of the reality of the objects of the world is contradicted by the *mithyātva-śruti* which gives us the knowledge that objects of the world are not real. But, when contradicted, there does not arise the contingency of the perceptual cognition becoming devoid of any content. It is because objects having empirical reality are provided as the content of the perceptual cognition.⁷ Since perception when contradicted by the *mithyātva-śruti* does not become devoid of any content, *mithyātva-śruti* is more powerful than perception.

Now the Dualists argue⁸ that just as scripture is known to be of greater force than perception on the basis of the maxim arrived at in the *apacchedādikaraṇa*, so also perception is known to be of greater force than scripture on the basis of the maxim

arrived at in the *upakramādhikaraṇa*.⁹ As a result of this, there is no stronger reason to decide that only *apaccheda-nyāya* operates in the case of conflict between perception and scripture.

The maxim arrived at in the *upakramādhikaraṇa* is as follows: if a particular section of a text conveys a unitary sense, and if there is noticed any apparent contradiction between the meanings of the initial passage and that of the concluding passage, then the concluding passage must be interpreted in such a way as not to have any conflict with the meaning of the initial passage. It is because the initial passage is of greater force than the concluding passage.

The above position is explained further by saying that at the time of the origination of the knowledge of the meaning of the initial passage nothing is opposed to it, as the knowledge of the meaning of the concluding passage which is opposed to it has not arisen. And, the knowledge of the meaning of the concluding passage, at the time of its origination, has the knowledge of the meaning of the initial passage opposed to it. In other words, the former is *asañjāta-virodhi*, that is, it has nothing opposed to it at the time of its origination, while the latter is *sañjāta-virodhi*, that is, it has something opposed to it at the time of its origination itself. It is on the basis of this that the former is said to be of greater force than the latter, and the concluding passage must be interpreted in such a way as not to have any conflict with the meaning of the initial passage.

The Pūrva-mīmāṃsā school explains the above maxim by making a reference to a particular section

of the Veda which deals with a sacrifice that is to be offered to Varuṇa. The initial passage of that section of the veda is : ' Prajāpati gave a horse to Varuṇa and He performed four pot-herd sacrifices as an offering to Varuṇa '. From this it is known that one who gives horses by way of gift must perform, as his duty consequent on the gift, a sacrifice as an offering to Varuṇa. The initial passage thus speaks of the performance of a sacrifice as an offering to Varuṇa by one who gives horses by way of gift.

The concluding passage is : ' As many horses as one receives by way of gift, so many pot-herd sacrifices one has to perform as an offering to Varuṇa. ' From this it is known that one who receives horses by way of gift has to perform a sacrifice as an offering to Varuṇa.

Thus the meanings of the initial and the concluding passages are contradictory to each other as the former speaks of a sacrifice to be offered to Varuṇa by one who gives horses by way of gift, whereas the latter speaks of a sacrifice to be offered to Varuṇa by one who receives horses by way of gift. The whole section of the Veda which deals with the sacrifice to be offered to Varuṇa cannot be taken to be valid, if the initial and the concluding passages convey that such a sacrifice is to be performed by persons possessing opposite characteristics such as giving horses by way of gift and receiving horses by way of gift. Hence one of the two passages must be taken in its secondary sense to suit the meaning of the other. As we have said earlier, the initial passage is more powerful than the latter one, and

hence the latter must be interpreted in a secondary sense in order that it may have no conflict with the meaning of the initial passage. The Pūrva-mīmāṃsā school, therefore, interprets the word 'receives' in the concluding passage in the sense of 'causes to receive' by adding the causative suffix (*ṇic*). Now the concluding passage would mean 'As many horses as one *causes to receive* by way of gift, so many four pot-herd sacrifices one has to perform as an offering to Varuṇa'. This is exactly the import of the initial passage. It is only when the latter passage is interpreted in conformity with the meaning of the initial passage, we can maintain that the whole section deals with a sacrifice to be offered to Varuṇa by persons having similar characteristic of giving horses by way of gift ¹⁰

The point that is of importance here is: The Dualists argue that the relation between perception and *mithyātva-śruti* must be viewed in the light of the above maxim. Perceptual cognition of the world arises earlier and it is not opposed to anything because at the time of its origination, the knowledge arising from the *mithyātva-śruti* which is opposed to it has not arisen. Hence it is *asañjāta-virodhi*. The knowledge arising from the *mithyātva-śruti*, however, at the time of origination itself, has perceptual cognition opposed to it. Hence it is *sañjāta-virodhi*. According to the maxim arrived at in the *upakramādhikaraṇa*, the initial cognition, since it is *asañjāta-virodhi* is more powerful than the latter cognition of *mithyātva-śruti* which is *sañjāta-virodhi*. Hence perceptual cognition invalidates the knowledge arising from *mithyātva-śruti*. ¹¹

Appayya Dīkṣita argues¹² that the above contention, namely, that perceptual cognition which arises earlier invalidates the subsequent cognition arising from the *mithyātva-śruti* on the basis of the maxim of *upakrama-nyāya* is wrong. It is because the *upakrama-nyāya* is applicable only when there is contradiction between the initial passage and the concluding passage of a particular section of a text that conveys a unitary sense. This means that the contradiction that is to be resolved by the application of *upakrama-nyāya* is between two sentences which come under a single *pramāṇa*—verbal testimony. In other words, the *upakrama-nyāya* is applicable only when there arises contradiction between two sentences. In the present case, the contradiction is between perception on the one hand and the *mithyātva-śruti* on the other. This means that the contradiction is not between two sentences but between two different *pramāṇas*. Hence the *upakrama-nyāya* does not apply here. The *apaccheda-nyāya* alone applies; and, the subsequent cognition arising from the *mithyātva-śruti* invalidates the earlier cognition arisen from perception.

Adhering for the moment to the stand-point of the *pūrvapakṣin* that perception and *śruti* are in conflict with each other, it has been said above that *śruti* sublates perception and the world is, therefore, indeterminable. Some preceptors of Advaita argue that there is no conflict between perception and *śruti*. We shall refer to their views briefly.

Sarvajñātman¹³ is of the view that the discussion regarding the conflict between perception and the *mithyātva-śruti* is based on the assumption that

perception too, like the *mithyātva-śrutī* is a *pramāṇa* or proof. It is not so. A proof is that which makes known an unknown object, that is, an object veiled by *avidyā*. This definition is applicable only to the Upaniṣads whose content is Brahman. It is because the latter alone, by being self luminous, can be veiled. Everything apart from it is inert and needs no cause for being veiled. It follows from this that the Upaniṣads alone give the knowledge of the unknown entity—Brahman, that is, an entity veiled by *avidyā*. Hence they alone can be termed *pramāṇa* in the strict sense of the term.

Perception, on the other hand, has a semblance of a *pramāṇa*. Its object (say) pot cannot be concealed by *avidyā* as it is inert by nature. But the consciousness delimited by pot which could manifest the pot is veiled by *tūlāvidyā* or modal ignorance which is a derivative of *avidyā*—the primal nescience and which is identical with *māyā*.¹⁴ The consciousness delimited by pot, thus being veiled by *tūlāvidyā*, could not manifest the pot. Perception gives rise to a mental state in the form of pot, and removes the *tūlāvidyā*. The consciousness delimited by pot manifests itself then, and manifests the pot too. And it is this function of perception that answers to its validity in ordinary experience. Since perception does not manifest pot, etc., directly in the manner in which the Upaniṣads manifest Brahman, it is called *pramāṇābhāsa*, that is, one which has a semblance of *pramāṇa*. And, a *pramāṇābhāsa* can never contradict a *pramāṇa*.

Some other perceptors hold¹⁵ the view that pot, etc., are directly concealed by *tūlāvidyā*. Hence per-

ception which makes known the pot gives the knowledge of the pot which is unknown hitherto. The definition of a proof is thus applicable to perception also. The latter, therefore, is as valid as the Upaniṣads.

Perception which is a proof in the strict sense of the term gives rise to the knowledge—*ghaṭaḥ san*, or 'The pot is *sat*'. The *sat* element here does not stand for the reality of pot. On the other hand, it stands for the genus or universal (*sattā-jāti*) or spatial and temporal relation, or the essential nature of the object itself. These can be explained as follows:

(i) The *sat* element is constant in the cognitions such as *ghaṭaḥ san*, *paṭaḥ san*, etc., while the objects vary. And, on this ground it can be admitted that *sat* element is the genus or the universal *sattā-jāti* present invariably in all the objects.

ii) The perceptual cognition in the form 'The pot is here and now' (*īha idānīm ghaṭaḥ asti*) has for its content the relation of a particular place and time to the pot. And it is exactly this spatial and temporal relation of the pot that is referred to by the word *asti* which stands for the word *sat*.

iii) The cognition and the corresponding usage 'The pot does not exist' (*ghaṭaḥ na asti*) have for their content the absence of pot. The expression *na* refers to absence, while the word *asti* which stands for *sat* refers to the essential nature of the object concerned.

Thus the *sat* cognized through perception stands for the universal *sattā-jāti* or spatial and temporal relation of an object, or the essential nature of an object. And none of these is in conflict with the indeterminable nature of an object conveyed by the *mithyātva-śruti*. Those who advocate that objects of the world are indeterminable on the basis of the *mithyātva-śruti* do not deny in the case of pot, for example, its generality, or its spatial and temporal relation, or its essential nature. What they deny is unsublatedness in respect of objects. If the *sat* element cognized in perception stands for unsublatedness, then there will be conflict with *mithyātva-śruti* which conveys that objects of the world are subject to sublation. Since it is not so, there is no conflict between perception and the *mithyātva-śruti*.

Another view¹⁶ is that perception comprehends the objects as *sat* or unsublated. Yet, there is no conflict with *mithyātva-śruti*. It is because unsublatedness is two-fold as unsublatedness for all time, and unsublatedness till there arises the knowledge of Brahman. The former is opposed to *mithyātva* and it pertains to Brahman only. The latter is not opposed to *mithyātva* and it pertains to the objects of the world.

Advaitins make the above two-fold distinction as unsublatedness for all time and unsublatedness till there arises the knowledge of Brahman on the basis of the Upaniṣadic text - 'The *prāṇas* are real; of these, the self is the reality'¹⁷. Here the word-*prāṇas* stands for the world. This text conveys that

reality or unsublatedness in Brahman is superior and that in the world is inferior. And superiority and inferiority in respect of unsublatedness can be explained only as unsublatedness for all time and unsublatedness for a little while respectively. The former pertains to Brahman and the latter, to the world. In accordance with the *Upaniṣadic* text 'One who has realized Brahman transcends name and form'¹⁸ which speaks of the sublation of the world by the knowledge of Brahman, it is concluded that unsublatedness in respect of the world is unsublatedness till there arises the knowledge of Brahman.

Thus perception cognizes the objects of the world to be *sat* or unsublated till there arises the knowledge of Brahman. *Mithyātvā-śruti*, on the other hand, conveys that the objects of the world do not have unsublatedness for all time. And, hence there is no conflict between the two

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2. See *Samkṣepaśārīraka*, II, 114.
3. *Pūrva-mīmāṃsā-sūtra*, VI, v, 19/54
4. *Siddhānta-leśa-saṅgraha*, (Chowkhāmba Sanskrit Series Office, Benares, 1916), p. 279.
5. *Ibid* p. 287.
6. *Ibid*, pp. 288-9.
7. *Ibid*, p. 291.
8. *Ibid*, pp. 300-1.
9. *Pūrva-mīmāṃsā-sūtra*, IV, xv, 36-37.

10. *Siddhānta-leśa-saṅgraha*, pp. 300-301.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 301.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 302.
13. *Samkṣepa-śārīraka*, II, 7-9.
14. Advaitins admit modal ignorance or *tūlāvidyā* as the cause of illusory silver, etc. For details see *Samkṣepa-śārīraka*, edited by N. Veezhinathan, (Madras University Philosophical Series, No. 18, 1972), Part I, pp. 72-73.
15. *Siddhānta-leśa-saṅgraha*, pp. 271-272.
16. *Ibid.*, pp. 273-274.
17. *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad*, II, i, 20.
18. *Muṇḍakopaniṣad*, III, ii, 8.

अद्वितीयात्मनः शास्त्रप्रमाणकत्वं स्वप्रकाशत्वं च*

Dr. N. VEEZHINATHAN

श्रीन्यासशङ्करसुरेश्वरपद्मपादान्
वेदान्तशास्त्रसुनिबन्धकृतांस्तथान्यान् ।
विद्याप्रदानिह यतिप्रवरान् दयालून्
सर्वान् गुरुन् सततमेव नमामि भक्त्या ॥

“न चैकं तदन्यत् द्वितीयं कुतस्स्यात्
न वा केवलत्वं न चाकेवलत्वम् ।
न शून्यं न चाशून्यमद्वैतकत्वात्
कथं सर्ववेदान्तसिद्धं ब्रवीमि ॥” इति

दशश्लोक्यां श्रीभगवत्पूज्यपादानामुक्तिः ‘यतो वाचो निवर्तन्ते, अप्राप्य-
मनसा सह’ [तै. उ. २. ४] इति तैत्तिरीयश्रुनेरर्थम् अनुवदति । अद्वय-
शासने पदार्थो द्विविधः—दृक् दृश्यं च । दृश्यपदार्थोऽपि द्विविधः—माया
तत्परिणामभूतो द्वैतप्रपञ्चश्च !

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तत्र भेदग्राहिप्रमाणस्य दुर्निरूपत्वात् द्वैतप्रपञ्चो न पारमार्थिकः, अपि तु मिथ्याभूतः । तथा हि-किं घटपटौ परस्परं भिन्नौ इति धीः भेदसाधिका, किं वा घटः पटात् भिन्न इति धीः, अथ वा घटः पटो न इति धीः घटपटयोः भेद इति वा धीः भेदसाधिका ।

प्रथमः पक्षः तावन्न समीचीनः । परस्परभावग्रहस्यैव भेदग्रहाधीन-तया अन्योन्याश्रयापातात् । 'भिन्नौ' इति च प्रत्ययस्य भेदविशिष्टविषयत्वात् पूर्वं विशेषणीभूतभेदज्ञानायोगेन तदयोगाच्च ।

द्वितीयकल्पोऽपि न समीचीनः । 'पटाद्धिन्नः' इति पटावधिको भेदः प्रतीयते । पटस्य भेदावधित्वं नाम तत्प्रतियोगित्वमेव इति भेदप्रतीतौ तत्प्रतियोगितया पटप्रतीतिः, ततश्च तत्प्रतियोगितया भेदप्रतीतिः इति अन्यो-न्याश्रयप्रस्तायाः भेदप्रतीतेः स्वरूपसिद्धिः न भवति ।

'घटः पटो न' इति धीः भेदसाधिका इति तृतीयपक्षोऽपि दुष्टः । एतस्याः प्रतीतेः तदुभयतादात्म्यनिषेधगोचरत्वे परमते घटपटनिरूपित-तादात्म्यतदभावयोः असत्त्वेन तद्गोचरायाः तस्याः अप्रामाण्यापातात् ।

एवं 'घटपटयोः भेदः' इति धीः भेदसाधिका इति तुरीयपक्षोऽपि असमीचीनः । घटपटयोः भेदप्रतीतेः पूर्वं 'तयोः' इति उल्लेखायोगेन अन्योन्याश्रयतापातात् ।

तदेवं भेदग्राहिप्रमाणानिरूपणात् द्वैतप्रपञ्चः मिथ्याभूतः । श्रुतयः अपि द्वैतमिथ्यात्वबोधनद्वारा अद्वैतं बोधयन्ति । 'सलिल एको द्रष्टा अद्वैतो भवति' [बृ. उ. ४. ३. ३२] इति श्रुतिः उक्तार्थे प्रमाणम् । सलिल इव

सलिलः स्वच्छ इत्यर्थः । स्वच्छत्वं स्वगतभेदशून्यत्वमेव । एकः-सजातीय-
भेदशून्यः; अद्वैतः-विजातीयभेदशून्यः; द्रष्टा-स्वप्रकाशचिद्रूपः भवति इति
श्रुतेरर्थः । इयं श्रुतिः सर्वदा एवरूपता आत्मनः विद्यते इति ज्ञापयति ।
अनेन रूपान्तरं मायिकं इति ध्वन्यते ।

तथा 'एकमेवाद्वितीयम्' [छा. उ. ६. २. १] इति श्रुतिरप्यत्र
प्रमाणम् । एकमिति सजातीयाभावः प्रतीयते, अद्वितीयमिति 'न विद्यते
द्वितीयं यस्य' इति विजातीयाभावः प्रतीयते । 'नेह नानास्ति किञ्चन'
[बृ. उ. ४. ४. १९] इति श्रुत्यन्तरेण सर्वस्य जगतः अविशेषेण निषेधः
प्रतीयते ।

एवं 'न तदश्नाति किञ्चन, न तदश्नाति कश्चन' [बृ. उ. ३. ८. ८.]
इति श्रुतिरपि अद्वितीयात्मतत्त्वे प्रपञ्चासत्यत्वे च प्रमाणं भवति । तत्-ब्रह्म,
न किञ्चन अश्नाति-व्याप्नोति; एतावता ब्रह्मसंबन्धः जगति निषिध्यते; तत्-
ब्रह्म, न कश्चन अश्नाति - व्याप्नोति - एतावता जगत्संबन्धः ब्रह्मणि निषि-
ध्यते । ब्रह्मणः असङ्गाद्वितीयचिन्मात्रस्य परमार्थसत्यत्वात् प्रपञ्चस्य माया-
कल्पितत्वेन अनृतत्वात् सत्यानृतयोः वास्तवसंबन्धायोगात् ।

तदुक्तं संप्रदायविद्भिः वार्तिककृद्भिः सुरेश्वराचार्यैः—

'निःसङ्गस्य ससङ्गेन कटस्थस्य विनाशिना ।
आत्मनोऽनात्मना योगः वास्तवो नोपपद्यते ॥'

(बृ. वा. २. १. ३०५) इति ।

तथा च सर्वानृतसंबन्धशून्यं सर्वभ्रमाधिष्ठानं सर्वबाधावधिभूतं परमार्थसत्यं ब्रह्म इति प्रतिपादितं भवति ।

एवं 'मृत्योः स मृत्युमाप्नोति य इह नानेव पश्यति' (वृ.उ.४.४.१९) इति श्रुतिरपि भेदनिन्दया अद्वैतमेव द्रढयति । वस्तुगत्या नाना नास्त्येव । तथापि नाना पश्यति यः स तस्मात् पुनः पुनः संसारमापद्यत इति नाना-दर्शनस्य संसारहेतुत्वे अर्थात् एकत्वदर्शनस्य मोक्षहेतुत्वम् आयाति । एवं एताभिः श्रुतिभिः द्वैतसत्त्वस्य मिथ्यात्वं प्रतिपादितम् ।

दृश्यत्वाद्यनुमानोपोद्बलितः वाचारम्भणशब्दोऽपि द्वैतमिथ्यात्वमेव प्रतिपादयति । 'वाचारम्भणं विकारो नामधेयम्, मृत्तिकेत्येव सत्यम्' इति छान्दोग्यश्रुतिः (६.२.४) । विकारः - घटादिः, वाचा - 'घटशरावादिरस्ति' इत्यादिशब्देन, आरम्भ्यते व्यवहियते इत्यारम्भणम् ; वाचा व्यवहियते एव, न वस्तुतोऽस्ति विकारः, तस्य दुर्निरूपत्वात् इति भावः । कथं तर्हि 'मृद्वस्तुनः सकाशात् घटादिः जातः' इति कार्यकारणयोर्भेदव्यवहारः । इत्यत आह - नामधेयं - भेदव्यवहारः नाममात्रम् अर्थशून्यमिति यावत् । विकारवत् भेदोऽपि अनिर्वचनीयः । किं तर्हि सत्यम् ? तत्राह - मृत्तिकेति मृत्तिका इत्यनेन मृत्तिकात्वेन रूपेण घटशरावादि विकारेषु प्रतीयमानं कारणरूपं वस्तु सत्यम् । विकारसत्यत्वमेवकारेण व्यवच्छिद्यते । एवं मृदा-देरवान्तरकारणस्य तत्तत्कार्यापेक्षया सत्यत्वे सिद्धेऽपि परमार्थसत्यत्वं नोपेयते । श्रुत्या ब्रह्मव्यतिरिक्तस्य सर्वस्यैव बाधितत्वात् । ब्रह्मणस्तु परमार्थसत्यत्वं सर्वात्मना बाधशून्यत्वात् अभ्युपगम्यते । निषेधवाक्यसमभिव्याहृतविधि-वाक्यगतः एवकारः विधित्वप्रतिबन्धकः - अनुवादत्वद्योतकः । तस्मात्

अस्य वाक्यस्य मृदादिसत्यत्वबोधकत्वं नास्ति, अपि तु स्वकारणापेक्षया मृदादेरपि मिथ्यात्वबोधकत्वमेव इति । अत एव जगत्कारणस्य सत्यत्वे मृदादि सत्यत्वम्, जगतो मिथ्यात्वे च मृदादिकार्यस्य घटादेरनृतत्वं च दृष्टान्तत्वेन च श्रुत्या उपादीयते ।

तदुक्तं पञ्चदश्याम्—

एवं मायामयत्वेन विकारस्यानृतात्मताम् ।

विकाराधारमृद्भस्तुसत्यत्वं चाब्रवीच्छ्रुतिः ॥ (१३-३८) इति ।

भामतीनिबन्धेऽप्युक्तम्—

‘तदनेन प्रमाणेन विकारजातस्यानिर्वाच्यतया सिद्धमनृतत्वम्, कारणस्य निर्वाच्यतया सिद्धं सत्यत्वं च ‘मृत्तिकेत्येव सत्यम्’ इत्यादिना प्रबन्धेन दृष्टान्ततयानुवदति श्रुतिः’ (भा. पृ. ४५६) इति ।

एवं द्वैतप्रपञ्चस्य मिथ्यात्वेन आत्मनः अद्वितीयत्वं सिद्धं भवति । अद्वितीयात्मा च सत्यज्ञानानन्दादिरूपः । अस्य अद्वितीयात्मतत्त्वस्य भू-
भावः—जीवजगद्भेदः, जीवपरमेश्वरभेदः, जीवपरस्परभेदः, जगत्परस्पर-
भेदः, जगत्परमेश्वरभेदः—इति पञ्चविधभेदेन आवरणविक्षेपशक्तिमद-
ज्ञाननिमित्तकेन कलुषीकृत इव भवति । भूः कलुषीकरणं हि परिच्छिन्न-
त्वारोपमात्रम्, न तु स्वरूपशानिः । आरोपेण वस्तुसत्तानपायात् । ‘यत्र
यदध्यस्तं तत्कृतेन दोषेण गुणेन वा अणुमात्रेणापि स न संबध्यते’ इति
न्यायात् । अथ अद्वितीयात्मा रूपाद्यभावेन प्रत्यक्षायोग्यः, तद्व्याप्यलिङ्गा-
भावेन अनुमानागोचरः, सादृश्यरहितत्वेनोपमानाविषयः, तद्विना अनुपपद्य-
मानार्थाभावेन अर्थापत्तिप्रमाणागम्यः, अभावविलक्षणत्वेन अनुपलब्धिप्रमाणा-

गोचरः । परिशेषात् वेदान्तैकसमधिगम्यं सत्यज्ञानानन्तानन्दात्मस्वरूपमद्वैतं वस्तु । 'तं तु औपनिषदं पुरुषं पृच्छामि' (वृ. उ. ३.९.२६), 'नावेद-विन्मनुते तं बृहन्तम्' (शाट्यायनीयोपनिषत्, ४), इत्येवमादिवेदान्त-वाक्येभ्यः, 'शास्त्रयोनित्वात्' (ब्र. सू. १. १. ३) इति श्रीवादरायणवच-नाच्च ज्ञायते, अस्य आत्मतत्त्वस्य वेदान्तमहावाक्यमेव प्रमापकं इति ।

वाक्यं च पदार्थज्ञानद्वारा बोधकम् । पदार्थज्ञानं च मुख्यया वृत्त्या लक्षणया वा भवति । शब्दप्रवृत्तिनिमित्तानां षष्ठी-जाति-गुण-क्रियादीनां अन्यतमस्यापि-असङ्गत्वात्, अगुणत्वात्, अविक्रियत्वात्, असामान्यत्वात् आत्मनि अभावात् न अभिधेयः-मुख्ययावृत्त्या प्रतिपाद्यः आत्मा इत्यर्थः ।

तदेतदाहुराचार्याः संप्रदायविदः—

“षष्ठीजातिगुणक्रियादिरहिते सर्वस्य विज्ञातरि

स्वय्यज्ञानविजृम्भिता न हि गिरो मुख्यप्रवृत्तिक्षमाः”

(सं. शा. १. २३९) इति

संबन्धः षष्ठी इति मधुसूदनीटीका । तेन लक्षणया-जघन्यवृत्त्या वेदान्ताः प्रत्यगात्मानं बोधयन्ति ।

लोके घटादेर्हि जडत्वात् प्रमाणाधीनवृत्तिप्रतिफलितचैतन्यव्याप्यत्वं विना स्फुटता न संभवति । 'अयं घटः' इति घटाकाराकारितचित्तवृत्तिः अज्ञातं घटं विषयोक्त्य तद्गताज्ञाननिरसनपुरस्सरं स्वगतचिदाभासेन जडा घटं भासयति । वृत्तिप्रतिफलितचैतन्यमेव फलमित्युच्यते । घटादेः एवं फलविषयता विद्यते । आत्मनः स्वत एव प्रकाशरूपत्वात् तदतिरिक्तस्फुरणा-

संभवाच्च न प्रमाणाधेयस्फुरणाश्रयत्वं इति न फलव्याप्यता इत्यर्थः । तेन वेदान्तवाक्यं आत्मनि अविद्याध्यारोपितमतद्धर्मं निवर्तयत्येव केवलम् । अविद्याध्यारोपितातद्धर्मनिवर्तकत्वात् सिद्धं शास्त्रस्य प्रामाण्यं आत्मनि विषये । वेदान्तजन्यवृत्तिकृताविद्यानिवृत्तिरूपफलशालितया शास्त्रप्रमाणकः अद्वितीयात्मा इति 'तं तु औपनिषदं पुरुषं पृच्छामि' (वृ.उ.३.९.२६) इत्यादिश्रुतीनाम्, 'शास्त्रयोनित्वात्' (ब्र.सू.१.१.३) इति सूत्रस्य चार्थः । स्वप्रकाशः आत्मा वृत्तिप्रतिफलितचैतन्याविषयः इति 'यतो वाचो निवर्तन्ते' (तै.उ.२.४) इति श्रुतेरर्थः । भगवत्पूज्यपादैश्च प्रतिपादितमेतत् समन्वयाधिकरणे—'अविद्याकल्पितभेदनिवृत्तिपरत्वात् शास्त्रस्य । न हि शास्त्रमिदन्तया विषयभूतं ब्रह्म प्रतिपादयिषति । किं तर्हि ? प्रत्यगात्मत्वेन अविषयतया प्रतिपादयत् अविद्याकल्पितं वेद्यवेदितृवेदनादिभावमपनयति' (ब्र.सू.भा. १.१.४) इति ।

एवंरीत्या—

अद्वैतमात्मपदमाहुरनन्यमानं
द्वैतं प्रमाणमिह च प्रतिपादयन्ति ।
वाक्ये निजे पदविरोधमनीक्षमाणाः
पाण्डित्यमप्रतिहतं प्रतिलभ्य धीराः ॥ (सं.शा.१.१.१६)

इति उपहासपूर्वकमुक्तस्य दूषणस्य उद्धारः संक्षेपशारीरके कृतः ।
एवं अद्वितीयात्मा शास्त्रप्रमाणकः स्वप्रकाशश्च ।

साङ्केतिकविवरणम्

छा. उ.	—	छान्दोग्योपनिषद्
तै. उ.	—	तैत्तिरीयोपनिषद्
बृ. उ.	—	बृहदारण्यकोपनिषद्
बृ. वा.	—	बृहदारण्यकोपनिषद्भाष्यवार्तिकम्
ब्र. सू.	—	ब्रह्मसूत्रम्
ब्र. सू. भा.	—	ब्रह्मसूत्रशाङ्करभाष्यम्
भा.	—	भामती (निर्णयसागर प्रेस, १९१७)
सं. शा.	—	संक्षेपशारीरकम्



Questions : Answers

QUESTIONS MAY BE SENT TO THE OFFICE OF ĀDI SAṆKARA ADVAITA RESEARCH CENTRE. THEY WILL BE ANSWERED IN THIS COLUMN.

Q. What is *Sat* ?

A : *Sat* is that which does not suffer annihilation or change in the three divisions of time, Past, Present and Future and which is of the nature of consciousness and bliss.

Q: What is *Asat* ?

A : *Asat* is that which changes in the three divisions of time, Past Present and Future, that which perishes, that which appears in different forms and that which is the source for anxiety, disease and pain.

Q: What is Ātman ?

A : Ātman is pure consciousness and bliss. It is different from body-mind complex. It is eternal and immutable.

Q: How many kinds of Ātman are there ?

A : From the absolute stand-point, Ātman is one. But from the empirical stand-point, a two-fold distinction is made as *Gauṇātmā* and *Mithyātmā*.

Q What is *Gauṇātmā* ?

A : *Gauṇātmā* means the figurative self. When one identifies oneself with one's father, mother, son and others and suffers when they suffer and feel as if dead when they die, there is the figurative self in operation.

Q: What is *Mithyātmā* ?

A : *Mithyātmā* means illusory self – the body-mind complex in the sense that there is a conscious feeling of 'I' and 'Mine' with reference to them and the distinction between one's self and the body-mind complex is not distinctively known.

Q: If Ātman were one, then how could we account for the existence of the world ?

A: When we say that Ātman is one, we are not predicating oneness with reference to Ātman. What is meant when it is said Brahman is one is that there is the absence of a second entity which is real. Through *avidyā* which is not real, Ātman appears as the world of objects both internal and external ; *avidyā* is called *māyā*. The Self, as limited by *avidyā*, is the *Jīvā* (individual soul). The same self as endowed with *māyā* is *Īśvara* (God). *Īśvara* through *māyā* projects the world in order to provide empirical basis for the souls with its adjuncts consisting of three bodies, viz. Causal, Subtle and Gross. The Vedas, etc., are also intended to provide the soul with the means for liberation.

Q: Is the world an absolute nothing like a hare's horn ? Or does it have manifestation like shell-silver, rope-serpent, etc. ?

A: One must make a distinction between an absolute nothing and an indeterminable object. Schools of thought other than Advaita admit only two kinds of objects real and unreal. By the word 'real', the Dvaita Vedānta means absolute nothing like hare's horn etc. They are never given in perception. The world is given in perception and so it is not an absolute nothing, nor is it real, because it is subject to annihilation. Hence it is neither real nor unreal — (i.e.) an absolute nothing ; but is indeterminable either as real or as an absolute nothing.

Just as the objects of the dream-state are taken to be true till one comes back to the waking state, in the same way the objects of the empirical world are real till there arises the knowledge of the self. Just as the dream-objects are taken to be non-real, when one comes back to the waking state, in the same way, the empirical world is considered to be non-real when there arises the knowledge of the self.

ABOUT THE PUBLISHERS

The Ādi Śaṅkara Advaita Research Centre was established in 1975 under the guidance and with the blessings of His Holiness Jagadguru Śrī Śaṅkarāchārya of Kāñchi Kāmakōṭi Pitha. The main objectives of the Centre, among other things, are:—

- (1) to undertake the carrying on of scientific research for the extension of knowledge in the fields of Natural and Applied Sciences generally, and in particular in the fields of Physics and Metaphysics.
- (2) to undertake and carry on scientific study and analysis of the Advaita system of thoughts as expounded by Ādi Śaṅkara and to conduct research as regards the relevance of his teachings in solving present day ills of mankind.
- (3) to undertake, promote and encourage the study of ancient philosophical systems of India.
- (4) to undertake research for the purposes of establishing norms necessary for realising the divinity in man through moral, spiritual and cultural infrastructure.

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संसाराध्वनि तापमानुकिरणप्रोद्भूतदाहव्यथा-
 खिन्नानां जलकांक्षया मरुभुवि भ्रान्त्या परिभ्राम्यताम् ।
 अत्यासन्नसुधाम्बुधि सुखकरं ब्रह्माद्वयं दर्शय-
 त्येषा शङ्करभारती विजयते निर्वाणसंदायिनी ॥

*samsārādhvani tāpabhānukiraṇaprodhbhūtadahavayathā-
 khinnānām jalakāṅkṣayā marubhuvi bhrāntyā
 paribhrāmyatām,
 atyāsannasudhāmbudhim sukhakaram brahmādvayam
 darśayaty-
 eṣā saṅkarabharatī vijayate nirvāṇasamdayinī.*

To those who are afflicted, in the way of the world, by the burning pain given rise to by the scorching sun-shafts of misery, and who through delusion wander about in the desert (of worldliness) seeking water—showing the felicitous ocean of nectar, which is very near, the non-dual *Brahman*, this—the Voice of Śaṅkara—is victorious, leading, as it does, to liberation.