

A QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ADVAITA-VEDĀNTA

The VOICE of ŚĀṆKARA


śaṅkara-bhāratī

Chairman, Advisory Board

V. R. Kalvanasundara Sastri

Editor

N. C. Krishnan



Volume TEN
Numbers 3 & 4

Nov. 1985

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esā śaṅkara-bhāratī vijagate
nirvāṇa-sandāyini

victorious is the voice of śaṅkara,
leading, as it does, to liberation

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
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Sri N. C. Krishnan

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HOMAGE TO ŚAṆKARA

[109]

शङ्करपरावतारं
किङ्करपापौघपाटनपटिष्ठम् ।
पङ्कजपादमुखेड्यं
तं कलये शङ्कराचार्यम् ॥

śaṅkaraparāvatāraṁ

kiṅkarapāpaughapāṭanapatiṣṭham

paṅkajapādamukhedyaṁ

taṁ kalaye śaṅkarācāryam.

I reflect on Śrī Śaṅkarācārya who is an incarnation of Lord Śiva, who is most adept in destroying the flood of sins of his servants, and who is adored by the preceptors beginning with Śrī Padmapāda.

[110]


कमलोद्भवरूपान्तर-
 मण्डनमिश्रान्तरङ्गशुद्धिचणम् ।
 शितिकण्ठापररूपं
 शिरसा प्रणतोऽस्मि शङ्कराचार्यम् ॥

*kamalodbhava-rūpāntara-
 maṇḍanamīśrāntaraṅgaśuddhicaṇam
 śitikaṅṭhāpararūpaṁ
 śirasā praṇato'smi śaṅkarācāryam.*

I bow with my head to Śrī Śaṅkarācārya who is, indeed, another form of Lord Śiva (Śitikaṅṭha), and who is adept in cleansing the heart of Śrī Maṇḍana-misra, an incarnation of Lord Brahmā, the Lotus-born.

Śitikaṅṭha refers to Lord Śiva whose neck is white because of *vībhāti*. Compare *Śrīrudrapraśna*, 5, 1: *namo nilagrīvāya ca śitikaṅṭhāya ca*.

Jagadguru Śrī Saccidānandaśivābhīnava Nṛsiṁhabhāratī
 in *Śrīśaṅkarācāryasuvārṇamālāstavarāja*



MĀYĀ AND BRAHMAN:
A MATHEMATICAL INTERPRETATION*

Jagadguru Śrī Candrasekharendra Sarasvatī

Bhāskarācārya, one of India's greatest mathematicians, in his book, the *Bījaganita* says:

वधादौ वियत्खस्य खं खेन घाते
खहारो भवत्खेन भक्तस्य राशिः ।
अस्मिन्विकारः खहारे न राशावपि
प्रविष्टेष्वपि निःसृतेषु ।
बहुष्वपि स्याल्लयसृष्टिकालेऽनन्ते-
ऽच्युते भूतगणेषु यद्वत् ॥

*vadhādau viyatkhasya kham khena ghāte
khahāro bhavatkhena bhaktasya rāśiḥ.
asminvikāraḥ khahāre na rāsāvapi
praviṣṭeṣvapi nissrteṣu.
bahuṣvapi syāllayasrṣṭikāle'nante-
'cyute bhūtagaṇeṣu yadvat.*

*Reproduced from the *Indian Philosophical Annual*, Vol. II (Madras: Centre of Advanced Study in Philosophy, University of Madras, 1966), pp. 275-77.

The meaning of the stanzas is: "Zero multiplied by any number is zero. Zero divided by any number is zero. But any number divided by zero is termed *khahāra* (or infinity)."

"If any finite or infinite number is added to or taken away from this *khahāra*, it remains unaltered. It is like the infinite Brahman without a second, which remains unaltered both by creation and absorption."

Bhāskarācārya, in the above two stanzas, has explained the mathematical idea of Advaita. He states that any number divided by zero is called *khahāra*, a value which neither increases by addition nor decreases in value by subtraction. It has already been shown that infinity minus infinity continues to be infinity. It can also be shown that infinity plus infinity or any finite quantity is also infinity.

A : $1+2+3+4+\dots$ to infinity is infinite in value.

B : $1+1+1+1+1+\dots$ to infinity is infinite in value.

A+B : $1+2+3+4+5+\dots$ to infinity is infinite in value.

Thus, at *pralaya*, when a number of finite or infinite quantities enter Brahman, Brahman continues to be unaltered; and so, the *prapañca* or *tvam*, which enters Brahman, is *tat* (that) in nature, as it neither increases nor decreases the value of the original. Anything which neither increases nor decreases the value may be either *śūnya* (zero) or *māyā* (negligible or of very, very small value). Bhāskara's zero is not the *śūnya* of the Buddhists but the *māyā* of the Advaitins. Modern mathematicians think that zero, in the sense of *śūnya*, should not enter any mathematical process as it is of the nature of the horse's horn or the son of a barren woman. His zero is of the nature of

$\frac{1}{n}$ — when $n \rightarrow \infty$ without the symbol of Lt before it.

For Lt $\frac{1}{n} = \text{Zero (4—4)}$ •
 $n \in \infty$

(a mathematical entity, a something), but $\frac{1}{n}$ is
 $n \in \infty$

of the nature of māyā, which is not a complete nothingness. Therefore Bhāskara's *khahāra* is 1 divided by

$\frac{1}{n}$ or $\frac{1 \times n}{1} = \rightarrow \infty = \text{khahāra}$.
 $n \ni \infty$ $n \in \infty$

Thus Brahman is only an approach.

The *Kena Upaniṣad*, in describing Brahman, says:

नाहं मन्ये सुवेदेति नो न वेदेति वेद च ।

यो नस्तद्वेद तद्वेद नो न वेदेति वेद च ॥

“I do not think I know; but I do not know that I do not know. Whosoever amongst us knows, knows. He who does not know does not know.” (Section 2, Verse 2).

यस्यामतं तस्य मतं, मतं यस्य न वेद सः ।

अविज्ञातं विजानतां विज्ञातमविजानताम् ॥

“By him who thinks that Brahman is not comprehended, Brahman is comprehended; he who thinks that Brahman is comprehended, does not know Him.

Brahma-jñānis think that Brahman is beyond comprehension; and the ignorant think that Brahman is comprehended." (Section 2, Verse 3)

The truth of the above verses from the *śruti* can be very easily understood, if we take up an example from mathematics. Suppose a man says he knows the value of infinity, then he has not understood infinity correctly; but if he says that the value of infinity could not be understood, then he has correctly understood the infinity. As *Om* is used as a very good sound-symbol for Brahman, infinity can be stated as a mathematical symbol for Brahman.

Bhāskara's statements *viz.*, zero \times any number = zero, and any number divided by the zero is *khahāra* (infinity), are two apparently different statements of one and the same Advaita truth. The above mathematical statements interpreted in terms of Advaita will mean that $\frac{a}{\Delta a} = \infty$ or $a = \infty \times \Delta a$; *i.e.* Infinity or Brahman multiplied by Zero, *kha* or *māyā* produces a limited *prapañca* or a mathematical 'a' 'which is nothing new' or another special *sat*, which would differ in value from the numbers which constitute the infinity. The result of the operation is of no new value, as it can be only some value already in the original. Thus the limited *prapañca* is fundamentally the one *Sat*, except that its *nāma*, *rūpa*, etc. are *mithyā*, in as much as *khahāra* \times zero is some number which is negligible or *māyā* in comparison with *khahāra*. So Bhāskara compares this *Khahāra* (Infinity) to *Ananta* or *Acyuta*, who is unchanged both by the creation and absorption of infinite *bhūta-gaṇas*.

Very often it is stated in the *śrutis* that Brahman or *Sat* is one. But this one is not the numerical one which is half of two or one-fourth of four but the infinite one in which all the mathematical numbers get merged and lost. Bhāskara describes Brahman as one in the last *śloka* of the *Līlāvati*:

अष्टौ व्याकरणानि षट् च भिषजां व्याचष्ट ताः संहिताः
 षट्कर्कान् गणितानि पञ्च चतुर्वेदानधीते स्म यः ।
 रत्नानां त्रितयं द्वयञ्च बुबुधे मीमांसयोरन्तरं
 सद्ब्रह्मैकमगाधबोधमहिमा सोऽस्याः कविर्भास्करः ॥

aṣṭau vyākaraṇāni ṣaṭ ca bhīṣajāṃ vyācaṣṭa tāssāṃhitāḥ
ṣaṭtarkān gaṇitāni pañca caturvedān-adhīte sma yaḥ
ratnānām tritayam dvayañca bubudhe mīmāṃsayor-antarām
sadbrahmaikamagādhabodhamahimā so'syāḥ kāvira-
bhāskaraḥ,

and as *Ananta* and *Acyuta* in the eleventh verse of the *Bījagaṇita*. Thus the unity of Brahman is not the unity of the number one but the One of the mathematical infinity or Advaita.

N.B. $\frac{2}{0}$ (kha) = Infinity (*khahāra*)

∴ Infinity × Zero = 2 or any number.

∴ Brahman × Māyā = Limited Prapañca.

*For $\lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} \frac{1}{n} = \text{Zero (4-4)}$ but $\frac{1}{n}$ is a mathematical

entity, a something of the nature of *māyā*, which is not complete nothingness.

OUR COUNTRY, ITS CULTURE AND CIVILISATION*

Jagadguru Śrī Jayendra Sarasvatī

Our country is an ancient country, with an ancient religion and also an ancient civilisation. Today, it is a free country once again and it has a place of honour in the comity of nations. What is this greatness and honour of our country due to? It is not because of advance in industry that our country is being honoured but because as compared to other countries, our country has had a very ancient civilisation and culture which can give peace of mind and stability to every individual. In the spiritual sphere India is so much advanced that one can get peace of mind very easily here. Peace of mind is something which cannot be purchased by anyone by just paying a few rupees, but it has to be secured by each individual through his own effort and internal transformation. Such an internal transformation can take place in our country because ours is a sacred country. That is why even foreigners come to our country. Not being able to get peace of mind in

*Courtesy: *Our Heritage* — ed. Dr T. M. P. Mahadevan; Pub. Sri V. T. Rajan (Madras: M/s Rajan & Co. Printers, 1976) pp. 6-11.

their own countries, they come to our country to achieve mental peace and spiritual transformation.

Similarly, foreigners come to our country also to study our ancient language Sanskrit; and they try to imbibe our culture and civilisation and get peace of mind, because they have *śraddhā* for it. But what do we find in our country? Our people are being attracted by the customs and manners and dress habits of other countries. In fact, there is a craze or *moha* for foreign customs and manners. The foreigners have *śraddhā* or faith in our customs and manners, while our people just try to ape their habits blindly. That is why there is some kind of unrest and agitations going on in our country. If we do not have peace of mind, how can we give peace to others or radiate peace to them?

We have a national flag and a national bird, and there is an agitation going on in regard to a national language also. In the same way, we have to struggle to preserve our own ancient culture and civilisation as well. This is a task which devolves on all of us. Since politicians are not doing it, we ourselves have to do it. All the people of our country have to do it. It is the bounden duty of everyone to preserve our culture and civilisation. Everyone should take this solemn pledge, in fact, not merely take this pledge but see that it is implemented as well.

In this task of preservation of our culture and civilisation, first we have to concentrate on the children, because they are going to be the protectors of these in the future.

Sometimes, when we see our children these days, we begin to wonder whether they have been born in

our country or elsewhere. By all means, let them study in any school they like, and wear whatever dresses are prescribed for these schools and read whatever they like. But at least when they come back to their houses, let them wear the Indian dress and let them do everything according to our tradition and culture. Outside, they may wear whatever dress they like, but at least in the temple they should wear their traditional dress. Similarly, at the time of taking meals also, let them wear their traditional dress. This should be taught to our children from infancy. Otherwise, they will suffer very much in this *Kaliyuga* whether they remain in our country or go elsewhere.

The householders have a great duty to perform in this connection; particularly, the parents have a special duty towards their children. An earnest attempt should be made by them to teach their children Indian culture and Indian civilisation. Our *dharma* and our civilisation have to be protected by us.

Often, the complaint is heard that enough time is not available for this purpose. That is not true. Actually, for playing games, for reading newspapers, and for doing ever so many other things, people get plenty of time. It is only when it comes to the question of practising *dharma* or practising religion that it is said that they have no time. Out of the 24 hours of the day, even if about 20 minutes could be spared for this purpose, that would be more than sufficient. That itself will start making a great difference in their lives, and it will protect them in their present life and in their future lives as well.

The first thing that everyone has to realise is what exactly is our *dharma*, and what exactly our civilisation

is, and what exactly our culture is. If the mother behaves like a daughter, and the father behaves like a son, then the daughter will start behaving like a mother, and the son will start behaving like a father, and there will be an utter inversion of values and this will result in the transgression of their respective limits by everyone. So, first of all, it is the parents who have to develop *śraddhā* or faith in our culture and civilisation. The mother should remember that she is a mother first, and similarly the father should remember that he is a father, and so on. Both should realise that they have a duty as parents to their children. Similarly, a *guru* should behave like a *guru* and a disciple should behave like a disciple and not *vice versa*. It is only in this way that we can maintain some respect and discipline in our country, and then only the restlessness of our minds will go.

At present, what we find is that many people have some *pārāyaṇa* in their houses, do *pūjā*, and worship some deities. But merely doing these things without a deep-seated faith in the living culture of India would be useless. If we leave off our *dharma* and do worship, etc., then all that worship would be thoroughly useless. Therefore, the first thing that we have to do is to preserve our culture and our civilisation, our *ācāra* and our behaviour and conduct, our *dharma*, our *bhakti* and our traditions. These have to be protected in their own form and not in any other form.

These are like flowing rivers. Unless we take care of them and preserve their flow, they will become like rivers which may start flowing fast initially with great gush of water but which later on dry up into just a huge mass of sand only. It is only when we preserve

our civilisation, culture and tradition that we can keep the river of *dharma* flowing perennially without its getting dried up in the desert sand of dead habit.

The first thing that has to be done in this regard is to cast off our craze for the customs and manners and dress forms of other countries. If we do not do so our life will be full of miseries and difficulties.

From early infancy our children must be taught our *dharma*, and they must be put on the right path. We cannot expect this to be done by Government, nor can anyone expect this to be done even by the schools. Therefore, naturally, this duty devolves on the parents. The parents have to initiate their children into the path of *dharma*, and the right path has to be taught to them. Often, private tuitions are arranged for various subjects like physics, chemistry, mathematics, etc. for the children. But nobody bothers about arranging tuitions in culture and civilisation and *dharma* for children. We would suggest that some tuition should be given to the children in the subject of Indian culture, Indian civilisation and Indian religion and *dharma*. First, the parents themselves have to undergo this tuition and then they should undertake this tuition for their children as well. If we do this in order to protect this *dharma*, then that *dharma* itself will protect us. If we do not protect *dharma*, how can *dharma* protect us. Some people bring up a dog in their houses in order to get protection from thieves. But unless they take care of the dog and feed it properly how can the dog give them protection? In the same manner, we have to take care of our *dharma* so that *dharma* can take care of us. So, it is said:

“धर्मो रक्षति रक्षितः।”

If the parents do not take care of their children, then the children also will not take care of them in later life; and, the moment they get some money, they will just run away from the family; and in his old age, the father may have to go on working for earning his livelihood throughout his life, and undergo the miseries of it. If only the parents take interest and teach their children properly today, then surely the children will take care of them during their old age and feed them.

We have a very ancient heritage of great literature in our country. We have *bhakti* literature, *jñāna* literature, and so on. Our children should be taught a little bit about the lives of the great saints and great thinkers. People from the West are coming to our country to learn about these things, but we are not doing anything to preserve our culture and tradition in our own country. Not only should our children learn at least one song by each of these saints, or *bhajans* by each one of them, but they should also be able to speak about them. This will be their greatest treasure as in a bank, and this will be their greatest capital for their future.

Often, it is said that the atmosphere for practising our *dharma* is not there. It is said that the atmosphere for following our cultural traditions is not congenial and therefore we cannot be virtuous and good; and, therefore, we tend to become bad, corrupt, and unrighteous.

In the previous *yugas*, God has incarnated in the form of Rāma, Krishna and others. But in *Kaliyuga*, there is no scope for an incarnation yet. Out of the four quarters of this *yuga*, only the first quarter is still going on. It is only at the end of the fourth quarter that God will incarnate in the form of *Kalki*. But,

are things really so bad? It is said that corruption is increasing, indiscipline holds sway and is rampant in all spheres of life, and people say that *adharmā* is increasing and they are suffering from various maladies, physical and otherwise; thus we are told that the world is full of misery. And people often come to me and ask “Svāmiji, what is the way out? What is the solution for all these problems?”

In my opinion, things are not really so bad. It is only when *adharmā* grows to unmanageable proportions and the evil forces raise their ugly heads to an intolerable height that *Kalki* will incarnate and not till then. After all, we are not so bad or unrighteous at the present moment. It is because of the atmosphere or environment that we behave in a bad way. If only we can create a congenial atmosphere around ourselves, we can still remain good. By being in the company of good and holy people, and by going to temples and spending time there, we can still see that we remain good and virtuous. It is only when we are in bad company or bad environment or bad atmosphere that we tend to become bad. So, we should attempt all the time to be in the company of good people; only then can we continue to be good and virtuous.

Following the tradition of Śrī Ādi Śaṅkara Bhagavatpāda, who prayed to Lord Krishna, the teacher of the whole world, the Jagadguru, let us also pray to Lord Krishna to shower His blessings on all of us. Lord Krishna has taught us so many things in the *Gītā*. But merely doing *pārāyaṇa* or reading of the *Gītā* is not enough. We have to imbibe the message of the *Gītā* in its true spirit, and make it a practical reality in our daily life by practising its teachings as a true *sādhaka*.

May God shower His blessings on all and lead everyone to greater prosperity and well-being!

THE PHILOSOPHY OF ŚAṄKARA

by

Professor S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri

(Extracted from Saṅkarācārya, G. A. Natesan & Co.)

(Contd. from Vol. X, No. 2)

THE PHILOSOPHY OF ŚAṆKARA

by

Professor S. S. Srinivasarayan Sastri

(Extracted from Śaṅkarācārya, G. A. Vasvan & Co.)

(Contd. from Vol. X, No. 2)

verbal structure in a previous aeon (*kalpa*) and reproduces them in exactly that form. Of course, if we were trying to *argue* to *Īśvara's* omniscience from his authorship of the *Vedas*, we would be reasoning in a circle; for that authorship is itself known from the *Veda* and might not deserve credence except on the ground of the author being omniscient. We do not, however, depend on bare reasoning; we rely rather on reasoning to substantiate the revealed truth. And this is the only legitimate procedure in all quest of final truth. Reasoning can make connections and *test* trust, but never *establish* it; for it suffers from a twofold defect. The basis of an inference is not itself given by an inference ultimately; we may argue that if A is B, C is D, that A is B and therefore C is D; but how do we know that A is B? Possibly by another inference based on X being Y; but how do we know that X is Y? Either we set out on an infinite regress or we must come to rest on some basis other than inference. And this is reinforced by a further consideration; in inference we accept the consistent and avoid the contradictory; reasoning proceeds on the axiom that truth cannot be self-contradictory; but how is this axiom established? Not by reasoning, since it is the presupposition of reasoning itself. Secondly no mere argumentation can give final satisfaction; for cleverness in argument admits of degrees; and the accepted truth of to-day will become the exploded fiction of to-morrow, when a more able reasoner appears on the field; this is what is happening in the development of the sciences. Philosophy is the quest of final truth and cannot be at the mercy of clever people. We have to rest not on the provable, but on the basis of proof, the self-evident. The Vedic utterances are the expressions of such self-evident truth;

they are the expressions of dispassionate seers wedded to truth; and the whole body of doctrine is revealed by an omniscient *Īśvara*. Hence our faith in scripture.

Brahman as Revealed by the Veda

The same *sūtra* (I, i, 3) is given an alternative interpretation. Brahman is established, it is said, on the basis of scripture (the *śāstra*), not on the basis of inference. There are systems (*darśanas*) other than the Vedānta, e.g., the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and the Yoga, which believe in an omniscient God, but seek to establish this by inference. And since the second aphorism of the *Vedāntasūtras* refers to the creation, etc., of the world, one may imagine that the Vedāntin too intends to establish by inference an author of the creation, etc. This however, is incorrect; for, in the first place, inference is defective; from known analogues such as pot and potter, or house and builders, we may infer a creator with limited knowledge, or a multitude of co-operative creators, not a single, omniscient, omnipresent, omnipotent creator. Even if inference could somehow take us to *Īśvara*, it would just leave us there, while the Vedāntin's faith in creation and the creator is only as a channel to the realisation of the ever-existent and uncreated. It is because the *nirguṇa* Brahman is ever at the back of Vedāntin's mind that he very definitely rejects inference and upholds the *śāstra* as the only source of valid knowledge of the truth, the non-difference of Brahman from the self. The twofold interpretation is given of this *sūtra*, not because Śaṅkara was in two minds about it, but so that it may serve as an indication of the twofold aspect of the entire Vedānta teaching, what one may call the transphenomenal and the near-phenomenal (the *niṣprapañca* and the *saprapañca*).

Capacity of Language to Reveal the Nirguṇa

The Vedāntin does not have an easy task in establishing Brahman on the authority of scripture. He has to encounter difficulties, one common to all Vedāntins and the other peculiar to the Advaitin. Revelation is in language and language relates primarily to action and what is accomplishable thereby. If we look at the process of learning a language, we find that the learner sees a set of acts consequent on the hearing of one set of words, say, "bring the cow", another set of acts consequent on other words, e.g., "tie up the cow", a third set of acts consequent on yet another verbal grouping, e.g., "bring the horse" and so on; by putting the words and acts together, through a suitable process of addition and subtraction, he comes to know the meaning of "cow", "horse", etc. Though some words denote entities, e.g., "horse" and "cow", their significance has to be known only through their subservience to some act or other. It is intelligible that the words of the *Veda* signify certain courses of conduct and their results, e.g., sacrifices, heavenly enjoyments, etc. But Brahman is not an act; nor is it the goal of an act, since it is eternally existent. How then can it be made known by language, even if it be scriptural? The answer consists in showing that there are other processes of learning a language, e.g. dictionaries, the teaching of elders, etc. When the parent indicates the moon to the child, and gives out its name, the child learns the word 'moon' to mean that entity, but not as subordinate to any act, such as touching it or tying it. And language is used to signify existents; e.g., when one is told that a son has been born to him, the speaker, the hearer and the onlooker understand the entity as the sense, not an act that may or may not be

consequent on the information. Further, we do make use of a large number of negative statements, in the form of prohibitions; prescriptions may enjoin acts, but it is hard to conceive this in the case of a prohibition, like "kill not." The statement has reference to one who has not killed, but actually or possibly intends to kill, being moved thereto by passion; but the mere longing to murder does not make a murderer of that person; the non-killing is already there; and all that is required is the perpetuation of that state, not the performance of act therefor. Language, may, therefore, be significant in respect of what is neither an act nor what is accomplishable thereby; and Brahman may be the purport of the Vedānta.

But now the Advaitin has to face another difficulty. In language, we assert something as a predicate in relation to something else, the subject; very often, if not always, this is the relation of an attribute to a subject. Whatever it be, the assertion is of a relation, while Brahman, we have said, is above relations, inasmuch as all relation is unintelligible and non-real. How can the supra-relational Brahman be the purport of language which is relational? The difficulty is not insuperable; for we do use language to signify what is above relation. We are familiar with statements of recognition, *e.g.*, "This is the same man I saw yesterday at Madura." What we assert here is the identity of a person seen here and now with one seen yesterday at another place; to-day and yesterday, this place and another place — these are not compatible qualifications; one and the same thing cannot be black and also white; no more can it be both now and then, both here and elsewhere, unless we treat the identity as essential, while the differences are irrelevant and acci-

dental; that is just what we mean when we recognise someone and put it in words; the essence that is this individual is capable of being qualified by sets of incompatible and accidental attributes, *e.g.*, presence yesterday at Madura and presence here to-day; the words used signify, on the face of them, relation to both sets of attributes; but the sense meant to be conveyed is an identity which rises above both sets of relations. This is what is called the supra-relational or impartite sense (*akhaṇḍa-artha*) of words; and because of this, language can make known the impartite Brahman, that is neither subject nor predicate.

Canons of Interpretation

The *sāstras* teach us that reality is one and that it is non-different from one's own self. But in some places they appear to teach difference also. We have therefore to inquire into the meaning of the texts. If a statement appears in a particular context, with a beginning and an end, we must try to interpret the whole context harmoniously. If a certain statement is made repeatedly, there is a strong presumption that that is meant to be true. If the sense conveyed is novel, neither established nor contradicted by other valid knowledge, that sense is presumably true; so too if that sense is fruitful, and not barren. Sometimes the scriptures praise or condemn; the existence of praise and the absence of condemnation are strong presumptions in favour of truth. Above all, one has to look for consistency and explicability. Though reason cannot establish, it can test what is offered as true; and intelligibility in the light of reason is an important determinant in the interpretation of texts. The application of these tests reveals non-difference to be the purport

of the Vedānta. Whereever it is taught, it harmonises with the beginning and end of the context; it is repeated often; it is novel, unlike quality and difference, which are patent to ordinary experience; it is fruitful, since its realisation is release from all misery; it is praised and its opposite is frequently condemned; and it stands the test of reason.

Brahman-realisation

The first understanding of the sense of the scriptures will not, however, suffice. It is assailed by frequent doubts: is it possible? On the contrary, is not the opposite, *viz.*, difference, the sole possibility? Such doubts have to be set at rest finally by continual reflection and uninterrupted contemplation, pursued with faith. As a result of these comes what is called the final psychosis, the last transformation of the mind, *viz.*, Brahman-realisation. It comes as transcending, sublimating or sublimating all earlier and lower mental acts directed to the apprehension of plurality and difference. He, who has realised Brahman, no more apprehends duality. But even Brahman-realisation falls short of Brahman, since it is a mental act or psychosis relating to Brahman; it is knowledge *of* Brahman; not the knowledge that *is* Brahman, unlike lower psychoses, however, this does not require something other than itself for its removal; after it has destroyed lower forms it destroys itself. When a forest fire is started by a couple of bamboos, it consumes not merely the rest of the forest, but even those very bamboos; when the powder of the clearing nut is added to muddy water, it precipitates to the bottom both the other foreign matter and itself as well.

Jivanmukti

When this final intuition is achieved depends on the maturity of the individual. The realisation is of the eternal, not of what has to come into being; hence it is unnecessary to wait for any length of time. The seeker's mind must have become pure and capable of intuiting the supra-relational. How soon this happens depends on the *karma*, which had been accumulated by the individual and is responsible for his present embodiment. If that fetter is not too heavy, realisation may come even within the course of this life; and after realisation, no fresh *karma* (*āgāmi*) will accrue, while of the past *karma*, that which has been accumulated but has not yet taken effect (*sañcita*) will not cling to or affect the self, any more than water will cling to the lotus leaf. Only what has begun to be effective (*prārabdha*) will continue to exist, so long as this body lasts; for that *karma* is like an arrow which has been released from a bow and must go on till it hits the target or its velocity is exhausted. The persistence of this *karma* is no bar to realisation or release, which is a matter of knowledge and experience. If someone whose body continues should yet say that he experiences freedom, who are we to question it? No doubt release and the co-existence of nescience are incompatible; but the continuance of the body requires the postulation only of a part or aspect or trace of nescience. *Māyā* no longer veils; only the world projected by it endures for a while. It is true that absolute and final release (*videhamukti*) comes with death; but *śruti* says that he is released even already; there is no reason therefore to make the final intuition coincident with or subsequent to physical decease. He who has had this vision, though embodied, is really disembodied; he is a

jīvanmukta; him pleasure and pain touch not; he sees no duality, but oneness; whence then can there be delusion or sorrow?

Science, Morality and Religion

Until this vision is gained, lower mental acts are not to be dismissed as merely useless or inimical to the truth; for error is the gateway to truth. In truth, the body is not the self; one is a perfect contrast to the other; but in all walks of ordinary life, we act as if the body were the self; we strive for and attain bodily satisfaction, as if it were real bliss; we educate the senses and the mind, though these are psycho-physical, while knowledge is spirit; we build up cities and communities, love them, worship them, fight for them, though these are physical entities of greater or less subtleness; even the final intuition has to be achieved by the mind, a psycho-physical mechanism, perfected by psycho-physical discipline; true it is that son and wife are dear for the sake of the self, not for their own sake; but if one did not start with love of son or wife, one would never arrive at knowledge or love of the self; the lower, though apparently opposed, is not inimical to the higher; on the contrary, it is serviceable to the higher and continues valid until the highest is realised. The good is not the enemy of the better, unless there is a blind clinging to the former; then, of course, the good becomes good-for-nothing. The obligations of self-preservation, the duties to kith and kin, the higher moral demands of community, nation and humanity, all these are good in their measure; they are partial goods which turn evil, only when they take up our entire vision and energies, under the pretence that they are the whole good. He who cares not for his own body will not be there to do anything for his

family; while from him who cares for his body alone the family can get nothing at all. The ultimate value is not a mere negation; in transvaluing it also fulfils the lower values. Hence there is a legitimate place for science, morality and even popular religion in the philosophy of Śaṅkara.

An Estimate

Our presentation of this philosophy has sought to minimise technicalities and avoid points of controversy. It may continue to be dry but it is hoped that it is not altogether obscure. We shall close with a brief evaluation of the system.

Śaṅkara was not the first expositor of the philosophy of non-dualism. His (alleged) *paramaguru* (preceptor's preceptor), Gauḍapāda, was a distinguished professor of that school. If Śaṅkara's interpretation of the Vedānta texts and the *Brahma-sūtras* is correct, then the Ṛṣis of the *Upaniṣads*, and Vyāsa, the redactor of the *Brahma-sūtras*, should have been among the earliest Advaitins. In later times we hear of a rather profound Advaita thinker called Bhartṛprapañca. About Śaṅkara's own time there was Maṇḍana Miśra, who made distinctive contributions to Advaita philosophy, such as were adopted by some later Advaitins in preference to Śaṅkara's own position. And the development of Advaita did not stop with Śaṅkara. Points not touched on and not elaborated were discussed in great detail by later-day Advaitins; some of them are notable for the reconciliations they sought to effect between pure non-dualism and (1) the pluralism of ordinary experience, (2) the claims to recognition of worship and meditation (*upāsana*), (3) the claims of intense religious devotion (*bhakti*). Those who cannot

live in the intensely colourless light of pure Advaita may find themselves in greater sympathy with some of Śaṅkara's followers, like Vācaspati or Bhāratīrtha or Madhusūdana Sarasvatī than with Śaṅkara himself. Despite all this, Śaṅkara occupies a pre-eminent place in Indian Philosophy.

The reason for this is not far to seek. Tradition, as we have seen, attaches great importance to the *Upaniṣads*, the *Bhagavad Gītā* and the *Vedānta Sūtras*. It is one thing to have a vision of non-dualism for oneself; it is quite another to bring it home to others on the basis of a systematic interpretation of these scriptures, coupled with the use of argumentation as far as reason will take us. Śaṅkara was the earliest of such expositors whose work has come down for us; and his successors have always tried to carry out or to supplement his programme, not to supplant his work. In clearness of vision, singleness of purpose, clarity and depth of the style of exposition (*bhāṣyam prasanna-gambhīram*), few, if any, can rival Śaṅkara, while none has excelled him. Added to all this was the romantic charm of the youthful ascetic, who renounced before he had lived, and had completed his life's work before many others are ready to begin theirs. Little wonder that myths gathered thick and fast about his life-story and the historic figure turned into a fabled hero.

The main strength of Śaṅkara's position is also that of Advaita generally, that it seeks not to destroy but to fulfil. It has no quarrel with other systems; for, as has been said, one does not quarrel with one's own hands or feet. Our knowledge is defective, our affections are divisive, our goals are trivial. But they come as goods, when they appear on the scene, to the indivi-

duals suited therefor; by their very pursuit, they get outgrown and give place to larger ideals, broader visions, nobler pleasures; what has taken place, however, is a sublimation of the lower into the higher, not a fight between the two, resulting in the defeat of the former. To him who has no vision of non-dualism, evil is uncompromisingly so; there can and should be no trafficking with it; if self be the sole reality, all pursuit of the non-self, whether for economic gain, aesthetic enjoyment or religious ecstasy, is bound to be unreal and so far and so forth evil; it should be unhesitatingly opposed without fear or favour. The Advaitin, however, holds a different view; to him all pursuit is of the non-real (he does not say unreal as that term has no meaning for him); for the real is above both seeking and finding, pursuit and reach, being the ever realised. Such being the nature of all pursuits, where is the ground for unreserved condemnation of some and the exaltation of others? No one of them can be wholly good, nor any wholly evil. Why not then condemn all pursuit as evil? That is no doubt true from the ultimate (*pāramārthika*) viewpoint; but is not condemnation itself an activity in the pursuit of an apparently not yet realised truth? Then, like all other pursuit (*vyavahāra*) condemnation too is to be condemned, with the result that our other pursuits are left with their relative degree of value. Hence it is that the true Advaitin does not go forth ravening for controversial prey; rather does he seek to conserve and ennoble. Note for nothing is Śaṅkara glorified as the consolidator of the six religious faiths (*ṣaṅmatasthāpana ācārya*).

Besides tradition which links Śaṅkara's name to almost every temple of repute in South India, and

works like the *Maniṣāpañcakam* which proclaims his willingness to accept the man of vision as his preceptor, be he a brahmin or a Caṇḍāla, there are also some other indications of his relative catholicity and freedom from convention. His early renunciation in defiance of commonly accepted authorities calling for the preliminary stages of the householder's and the forest-dweller's life is not without significance. Almost alone among the more important commentators, Śaṅkara makes it clear that the Śūdra's disabilities extend not to Brahman-knowledge, but only to the study of the Vedānta. And the insignificant word 'tarhi' (then) in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* is specially commented on to show that woman's wit or *strībuddhi* is not a universal or everlasting bar to knowledge, but only for a time; Kātyāyanī suffered from this disability only at that time (*tasmin kāle*) while Maitreyī was free from it then.

INQUIRY INTO FIVE SHEATHS*

T. M. P. Mahadevan

I. The Method of Synthesis

The problem of method is vital to every system of metaphysics. The results of a philosophical inquiry depend not a little on the method that a philosopher adopts. The method and the material are interdependent. If we may make use of a Kantian distinction, we may say that method without material is barren, while matter without method is blind. Descartes is called the Father of Modern Philosophy because of his innovation in the field of metaphysical methodology. Kant calls himself the Copernicus of Philosophy, because of the unique epistemology that he gave to the world.

“The diversity of our opinions,” says Descartes, “is not because some are more reasonable than others, but only because we conduct our thought by different ways, and do not all consider the same things.”¹ Of all the different ways of approach, the most important

*Courtesy: T. M. P. Mahadevan, *The Pañcadaśī of Bharatīrtha Vidyāranya*. Centre for Advanced Study in Philosophy, University of Madras, 1975, pp. 25-39.

are the objective and the subjective methods. Those metaphysical systems which pursue the objective path land themselves in crass materialism and atheism. Though Descartes began with the method of 'universal doubt', and started his metaphysics with the postulate '*cogito ergo sum*', he relinquished this position while actually building the superstructure of his system. The mathematical method of the Cartesian philosophers is mainly an objective method. It is because of this method that even Spinozism lends itself to a materialist interpretation. In the East, the Vaiśeṣika system makes use, for the most part, of the objective method. With its analytic way of classifying the various phenomena of the universe, it leaves us with an infinite number of finite particulars.⁷ But particulars cannot be the ultimate realia. A billiard-ball universe will satisfy no thorough seeker of truth. Of late this objective method has invaded even the realm of psychology. The Behaviourist materializes the mind, makes it a shadow of the flesh and explains its functions in terms of physics and physiology.

The subjective method is equally one-sided, and if pursued to its logical conclusion, would lead to subjectivism and skepticism. The history of the English empiricist school bears witness to this fact. The psychological method which Locke inaugurated led logically to the phenomenalistic pluralism and skepticism of David Hume. The Buddha's way, in the East, was to a great extent subjective and psychological. Though he was launched upon his career of philosophic thought by an objective observation of human misery, in so far as his aim was to discover the cause and the cure of sorrow, the Buddha had to choose the subjective method of introversion and psychological analysis.

And a thoroughgoing method of this kind involved him naturally in the position of a methodological agnosticism. There are certain systems which employ both the objective and the subjective methods, but in an unsynthesized fashion. The Sāṅkhya system, pursuing the objective method, traces all the manifold of sense perception to the primal source, *pradhāna* or *prakṛti*, the prius of creation; and through the subjective method of inquiry it arrives at a plurality of *puruṣas*. Because of a lack of synthesis the Sāṅkhya is left with *prakṛti* as opposed to *puruṣa* and one *puruṣa* as distinct from another.

The Upaniṣadic method is a synthesis of the objective and the subjective ways of metaphysical approach to truth. The terms '*ādhyātmika*' and '*ādhidavika*' occur often and in a successive order in the *Upaniṣad*. The cosmic ether is spoken of as identical with the ether of the heart. "He who is in the *puruṣa* and He who is in the sun is one" says the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad*.³ Uddālaka in the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* instructs his son, how from the *sat*, one only without a second, the world sprang forth. After describing in detail the process of the objective manifestation of the Self of the universe, Uddālaka turns with a dramatic swiftness and says that the universal Self is identical with the self of Śvetaketu, his son. "That which is that subtle essence (the root of all), in it all that exists has its self. It is the True, It is the Self, and thou, O Śvetaketu, art That."⁴ This is a typical instance of the synthetic method of the *Upaniṣads* and of the system of Vedānta which has its roots in them. It is through this method that the Advaitins reach the unitary Absolute which can be characterized neither as objective nor as subjective. And, Bhāratīrtha-Vidyāranya, who is one of the

ablest exponents of the post-Śaṅkara Advaita, wields this weapon of synthesis in an excellent and eminent manner. In the *Pañcadaśī* (ch. II) he adopts the objective method and discriminates the *sat* from the elements and their evolutes. The *sat* is shown to be distinct from the *mahābhūtas* and their modifications. In the third chapter, *Pañcakośaviveka*, Bhāratīrtha-Vidyāraṇya establishes through a subjective analysis that the self is not a psycho-physical organism, that the sight of the *Ātman* is not to be lost in the sheaths that seem to encase it.

II. The Taittirīya Inquiry

The *Pañcakośa-viveka-prakaraṇa* bases its arguments on the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* taking the cue from the text of the *Brahmānandavallī*, ‘*yo veda nihitam guhāyān paramē vyaman, so’snute-sarvān kāmān saha*’ (He who knows It placed in the innermost recess, the transcendental *ākāśa*, realizes all his desires with the omniscient *Brahman*).⁵ After defining *Brahman* as *satyam*, *jñānam*, and *anantam*, (existence, knowledge, and infinity), the *Brahmānandavallī* proceeds to say that *Brahman* is not ordinarily realized as such because it is hidden in the cavity of the sheaths, which are products of the unmanifest *ākāśa*. “In this cavity are hidden all the substances in all the three times because it is the cause and it is exceedingly subtle. *Brahman* is placed within this cavity.”⁶ The sheaths veil the *Ātman* from our view; and it can be realized only when the veils are lifted. The *Brahmānandavallī* of the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* “which seeks to show with the help of knowledge that the individual self is *Brahman* which is within and beyond the five sheaths beginning with that made of food and ending with that made of bliss goes on to

extract the substance within by divesting it of the five sheaths formed by ignorance, just as we should remove the many chaff-coverings from a *kodrava* grain.” By this process of discrimination the Self is realized to be separate from the sheaths. The coverings are the creations of ignorance. When the night of nescience is dispelled through the light of knowledge, the *Ātman* is realized to be the only Reality.

The *Bhṛguvalli* illustrates this principle by means of the story of Bhṛgu, the son of Varuṇa. Bhṛgu implored his father to teach him the knowledge of *Brahman*. Varuṇa gave his son a formula and asked him to find out *Brahman* for himself. “That from which”, he said, “these beings are born, that by which, being born, these beings live, and that they enter into at the end, know that; that is *Brahman*.” Applying this formula, Bhṛgu found out that *anna*, *prāṇa*, *manas*, and *viññāna* could not satisfy the definition. He slowly penetrated deeper and deeper till he learnt the innermost *Ānanda* to be *Brahman*. The *Ātman* is not the physical body made of food; it is not the psychical self with its volitional, emotional, and cognitional activities; it is not even the bliss of sleep which is a product of ignorance. The *Ātman* is beyond the five sheaths, the modes of *māyā*.

III. The Five Sheaths

We have already said that the third chapter of the *Pañcadaśī* is an elucidation of the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* where the *Ātman* is described as hidden in the cavity of the five sheaths. The grossest of the sheaths is the *annamaya*, the physical body made of food; *prāṇamaya* is the sheath of the vital airs, and it is the energizer of the body; *manomaya* is the sheath of the mind; subtler

than that is the *vijñānamaya*, the sheath of the intellect with the power of cognition; and the subtlest of all is the *ānandamaya*, the sheath of enjoyment enveloped in ignorance. These five sheaths lie one within the other in a serial order; and that which is within takes on the form of that which is without, like mercury that is poured into a crucible. The *annamaya* sheath is born of the food assimilated by the parents, and it is sustained by food alone. This physical sheath is not the *Ātman*, for it comes into being at one moment and goes out of existence at another. That which is born is bound to perish, and that which perishes cannot be real. If the physical body is considered to be the *Ātman*, then this body was not existent in the previous life. Yet in this life we reap the results of our past *karma*. The agent is denied, but still we observe the fruit of his actions. This would involve us in the fallacy known as *akṛtābhyāgama*, the influx of the unacquired. This body will not continue to exist in the next life. If the body were identical with the *Ātman*, there would be none to enjoy, in the life to come, the effects of the deeds done in the present life, since this body will be non-existent then. There occurs the defect of *kṛtanāśa* or the destruction of acquired. The sheath of food is a modification of *māyā*. It cannot be the *Ātman* which is the supreme Intelligence. The *prāṇamayakośa* is the vitalizer of the physical body. It gives strength to it, impels the various senses to their respective functions. Even this sheath of *prāṇa* cannot be the *Ātman*, for it is inert, devoid of intelligence. The self is not a biological phenomenon. It is not an incessant flow of force, an unceasing stream of activity. It is absurd to speak of the self as pure duration or as the vital impulse. The *Ātman* is not an empirical category like that of the

biologists. It is very often said that the self is the mind, the Idea. The mental sheath is that which identifies itself with the body and considers itself to be possessing a house, children, etc. The mind is subject to changing passions and passing moods; and so it cannot be the self. That which is a victim of modifications cannot be the changeless *Ātman*. Change implies imperfection, an inherent want. The *Ātman* is immutable and perfect. It is not the mind. It is not the finite monad of Leibniz or of James Ward. The *manas* is the *icchāśakti* or the power of desire. In the *Ātman* there can be no desire for it is *pūrṇakāma*, the fulfilment of all desires. The intellect which is a reflection of the supreme Intelligence remains dormant in sleep, and, on awakening, it fills the body upto the finger-tips. It is the doer of all deeds possessing the power of cognition. It is the *viññānamayaakośa* and not the *Ātman*. The intellect does not function in abnormal minds or during sleep. It is a victim to the vicissitudes of time, and hence it cannot be the super-temporal. While enjoying the fruits of good deeds there is a certain mode of the mind turned inward which is a reflection of *Ānanda*. When that enjoyment ends, it rests in the form of sleep. This mode of the mind is termed *ānandamaya*, the sheath of enjoyment. It is not the Self, for it exists only at certain times. Interpreting '*maya*' as '*prācurya*' (fulness), the theistic interpreters of the Vedānta and even the Vṛttikāra who preceded Śaṅkara identify the *ānandamaya ātman* with the supreme Self. *Ānandamaya* is 'fulness of felicity', and this, according to them, can only be the highest Self. But this way of interpreting the *Taittirīya* text does not suit the context. As Śaṅkara observes in his commentary, *ānandamaya ātman* is an effect and not the unconditioned *Ātman*. *Ānanda*,

bliss, is the fruit of knowledge and *karma*. *Ānanda-maya* is that which is made of that bliss. But this *ānanda* is not the Supreme Bliss which is *Ātman*. It is only an effect of *karma* and knowledge. The *ānanda-maya* is within the sheath made of knowledge. The termination '*mayat*' is here used in the sense of modification or change, as in the case of *annamaya*, etc. Further, the Upaniṣad states that the *ānandamaya* is 'reached' (*saṅkramaṇa*). Reaching is possible only of things which are not *Ātman* and which are effects by nature. The word '*ānandamaya*' occurs in a context where the other sheaths are described. *Annamaya* is a modification of food; and so *ānandamaya* must also be a modification of *Ānanda*. It cannot itself be *Ānanda*. Further, scripture attributes head, hands, trunk, and so on, to the *ānandamaya-brahman*. But *Brahman* itself which is the uncaused cause of all things cannot have limbs. It is also said that *Brahman* is the supporting tail of this sheath; that which needs a support cannot itself be the prop of all things. Hence *ānandamaya* cannot be the unconditioned *Ātman*. It is only the reflection of the Bliss which is *Ātman*. The original which is reflected is the supreme Self of the nature of Bliss.

IV. *The Self*

The Universal Self is defined in the *Taittirīya* text as *satyam*, *jñānam*, and *anantam*, existence, knowledge, and infinitude. That Bliss which is reflected in the *ānandamaya* is the *Ātman*, since it is eternal and everlasting. That, whose nature, by which it is cognized, does not change, is *satyam* (truth). That, whose nature, by which it is determined, changes, is *anṛtam* or false. The bliss which is the *Ātman* is eternal, and hence it is *satyam*.

The five sheaths have been characterized as *anātmān* (not-self). The *annamaya* is not the *Ātman*, because it is a modification of food. It has only a modal existence. The *prāṇamaya* is not the Self, since it is unintelligent and inert. It is blind force, a mere strife and striving. The *manomaya* is not the *Ātman*, for it is also a mode. It undergoes ceaseless change. The *viññānamaya* is not the Self, because it ceases to function in sleep and other abnormal states. And the bliss of sleep cannot be the *Ātman*, since it is not permanent. Thus it is clear that the sheaths cannot be the Self. But the sheaths are experienced, while the *Ātman* is not experienced. How, then, can something which is not experienced be posited to exist? True, the *ānandamaya* and all other sheaths are experienced and nothing else is so experienced; but there must be something which, though itself being unexperienced, makes all other experience possible. And that is the *Ātman*. If it is an object of experience, then, there must be something else to experience it, and so on *ad infinitum*. So the *Ātman* cannot be an object of experience. It is the substratum of all experience. Because it is itself experience, it is not a fact of experience; and because there is nothing apart from it to know it, it is not an object of knowledge. "Where there is duality, there one perceives another, one smells another, one tastes another, one contacts another, knows another; but where all this is *Ātman*, who is there to think, touch, and know whom? Who can know him by whom all this is known?...Who can know the knower?"¹⁰ Because the *Ātman* is not an object of experience, it is not non-existent. It is not a non-object of experience like the horns of a hare or the son of a barren woman. Nor is it like a pot which is not

an object of experience when it is hidden by non-cognition. It is self-resplendent experience, and hence it is not an experienced object. The substances like sugar which transmit their qualities to others have no desire to enjoy those qualities themselves. Nor is there any other substance which can impart to them those traits. The Self is itself experience; it needs no other experiencer for its existence. It is self-luminous, and hence it requires no other external source of illumination. Even prior to all these worlds, it shines. It is after its effulgence that all shine. The world is made luminous by its light. "Here in this dream state this self is self-luminous."¹¹ "It shines prior to all this objective universe."¹² "When he shines, everything shines after him; by his light all this is lighted."¹³ These texts of scripture declare the self-luminosity of the *Ātman*. Yājñavalkya says to Maitreyī: "Who can cognize that by which everything is cognized? By whom can the knower be known?"¹⁴ The mind which is the instrument of knowledge, can grasp only external objects. It cannot know the knower even as the chisel cannot understand the carpenter. The *Ātman* can be known "neither by speech nor by the mind."¹⁵ "It cognizes the objects; and there is none else who cognizes it."¹⁶ The real which is of the nature of Intelligence is different from the known and the unknown. It is neither the manifest world of name and form which is presented to the senses; nor is it the unmanifest *māyā*, unrevealed to sense-perception. It is neither the modes of *māyā* nor *māyā* itself. The experience of self-consciousness is an undeniable fact. Even to deny, there must be the one who denies. Doubt implies a doubter. Just as the words "Have I a tongue or not?" are a source of ridicule, even so is the statement: "the *caitanya* is not

known by me; it is to be known." When all the objects of the world of which there is knowledge are discarded, the pure consciousness which remains uncontradicted is *Brahman*. The witness, *jñāna*, is realized in its self-nature, after the relinquishment of the five sheaths.

To say that only *śūnya* remains when the sheaths are discarded is impossible. Self-existence cannot become a matter of controversy. Nobody doubts his own existence. Descartes who began doubting everything could not doubt his own existence. '*Cogito ergo sum*' is the first postulate of his philosophy. The dictum is not at the far end of a syllogistic process. "Self-knowledge is far too primitive and simple to admit of an *ergo*. If the 'I am' depends on an 'I think', the 'I think' must also depend on another *ergo*, and so on, and it will land us in infinite regress." "The man who calls this syllogism", says Hegel, "must know little more about a syllogism, save that the word '*ergo*' occurs in it. Where shall we look for the middle term? It was as a self-evident or immediate truth that the *cogito ergo sum*, the maxim on which the whole history of modern philosophy was built, was stated by its author." "It is not an inference, but the expression of a unique fact. In self-consciousness, thought and existence are indissolubly united." As for our existence, says Locke, we perceive it so plainly and so certainly that it neither needs nor is capable of proof. In Kant, the transcendental unity of apperception is the central postulate. "All knowledge and logic start with this first principle of self-certainty." Self-knowledge is inseparable from self-existence. Śaṅkara says that Self-knowledge which is neither logical nor sensory is the presupposition of every other kind of cognition. It is beyond proof, since it is the basis of all proof. If a person asserts that

Brahman is unreal, then he is predicating his own unreality; for he is no other than *Brahman*. The Self is indescribable. It is not an object of sense. It cannot be known through logical reasoning. Though it is not cognized, it is intimately intuited. Spinoza describes intuitive knowledge or *scientia intuitiva* as consisting not in "being coincided by reasons but in an immediate union with the thing itself." Pascal makes a distinction between two ways of thinking, the mathematical (*l'esprit geometrique*) and the finer, nobler way (*esprit de finesse*). It is only the latter kind of knowledge that can take us to the ultimate truth. Truth is lived and not known. Intuition is integral knowing, synthetic insight. It is neither immediate sensation nor mediated thought. It is the highest kind of experience, the experience of Self. Because the *Ātman*, without being an object of senses, is immediately intuited, it is self-luminous and self-revealing.

We have already said that the *Ātman* is defined by scripture as *satyam*, *jñānam*, and *anantam*. The Self is real, intelligent, and infinite. These adjuncts are intended to define and not to qualify the *Ātman*. A qualification serves to distinguish the qualified from all others of the same species; a definition, on the other hand, serves to distinguish the defined from the whole world. The Self is real since it is the substratum of all changes. Being is reality; becoming is unreal. This may be construed as tantamount to saying that *Brahman* is the cause, and hence also inert like clay. To meet this objection scripture declares that the *Ātman* is knowledge, pure consciousness. The word '*jñānam*' means knowledge and not 'having knowledge'; for it is an adjunct of the word '*Ātman*'. The Buddhists also admit that the real is consciousness, but their concep-

tion of intelligence is that it is momentary and moving. The *kṣaṇikavijñānavāda* holds that *vijñāna* or consciousness is perpetual movement, ceaseless change. But the *Ātman* cannot be reduced to change and movement. It cannot be a flux. So scripture adds that the Self is not only reality and consciousness, but also infinity (*ananta*).

That is real which cannot be sublated. Non-contradiction is the mark of reality, as contradiction is the sign of unreality. Bradley says: "Ultimate reality is such that it does not contradict itself; here is an absolute criterion... Our standard denies inconsistency, and therefore asserts consistency. If we can be sure that the inconsistent is unreal, we must logically be just as sure that the reality is consistent. Reality is known to possess character, but this character is at present determined only as that which excludes contradiction."¹⁷ In sleep and *samādhi*, the gross and the subtle universes are negated; but the Self remains as the witness of this negation. There is no state or moment in which the Self ceases to be the witness. It is nowhere contradicted; hence it is the real. When the various objects are removed from a room, the formless ether remains; even so, that which remains when all things are negated is the Self. If it is said that nothing is left when everything is contradicted, there must be at least that consciousness which knows that nothing remains. It is this consciousness that is termed in the Vedānta as the *Ātman*. Call it *śūnya* or *sākṣi*, the Self confronts us as the most stubborn fact. There can be a difference, only in the words which are uttered to define the Absolute. All attempts to define it are bound to be futile. It is on account of the inherent contradiction of finite words, that scripture, instead of describ-

ing what the *Ātman* is, proclaims what it is not. This method is sometimes spoken of as being defective and barren. Oldenberg in his work on the *Upaniṣads* makes a distinction between the Upaniṣadic philosophy and the Kantian metaphysics and suggests as parallels to the former the teaching of Plotinus, the Sufis and the Christian mystics like Eckhart. But he forgets that the "cognoscendo ignorari" of Augustine, the "*neti, neti*" of Yājñavalkya, the "weder dies noch das" of Eckhart are "far more sure indexes of spiritual humility, and consequent possession of reality, than the self-satisfied and half-halting dictates of an Agnosticism on the grounds of Pure Reason, which must destroy knowledge in order to make room for faith."¹⁸ The method of negation is not really one of bare negation without significance. All that can be characterized as being of 'this' nature, can be relinquished as unreal. The *Ātman* cannot be particularized. It can be described only as being 'not this.' Thus we have seen that the Self is reality and pure consciousness.

Infinity is threefold; infinity in space, in time, and in substance. *Ākāśa* is a spatial infinity, but it is limited by time and other substances. The Self transcends time, and it is not limited by any other thing. Because it is all-pervasive, it is not conditioned by space. Because of its eternal nature, it is not crushed by time. Since it is not different from anything else, it is not limited by other substances. It is eternal, all-pervasive, the substratum of all things, the subtlest of the subtle. "Like ether it penetrates all, and it is eternal." "It is the eternal of all eternal, the supreme spirit of all sentient beings."¹⁹ "All this is indeed *Brahman*; *Brahman* is all this."²⁰ Space, time, and other objects are unreal

modifications of *māyā*, and there can be no limitation caused to *Brahman* by them.

V. *The Self is Brahman*

The *Ātman* is identical with *Brahman*. "That *Ātman*, the real, is *Brahman* itself; *Brahman* is the *Ātman*. There is nothing to be doubted here. The *praṇava*, the real, is *Ātman* alone. The *Ātman* which is *Nṛsiṃha* is *Brahman*."²¹ The *Ātman* is called *Nṛsiṃha* by scripture, because it is the destroyer of the bonds of the humans who are crippled by transmigratory life. The Self is *Brahman*.

The universal and unitary Self appears to be split up as *Īśvara* and the *jīvas*. But in reality the *Īśvaratva* and the *jīvatva* are unreal superimpositions of the adjuncts, viz., *māyā* and the five sheaths. The sheaths were shown to be modifications of *māyā*. The *māyāśakti* belongs to *Īśvara*. It produces the world, regulates and governs it. Because of the reflection of Intelligence in it, it seems to possess consciousness. It appears to be alive and animating. *Brahman* seems to attain *Īśvaratva*, because of its apparent association with this *śakti*. When the five sheaths are superimposed on the Self, it becomes the *jīva*, the empirical self. But the principle, which appears as *Īśvara* when it is in association with *māyā* and as the *jīva* due to the superimposition of the sheaths, is the same *Brahman*. This is comparable to a person becoming father to one and grandfather to another. Apart from the son and the grandson, that person is neither the father nor the grandsire. When we discard *māyā* and its effects and perceive their non-reality, *Brahman* is realized to be pure and infinite.

One who knows *Brahman* thus becomes *Brahman*. "The knower of *Brahman* reaches the highest."²² Reach-

ing *Brahman* is realizing it to be oneself. "He who knows for certain the supreme *Brahman* realizes that he is himself *Brahman*."²³ The Self is not born, nor does it perish. And since the knower of *Brahman* is identical with it, he escapes the shackles of birth and death. Never does he return to this empirical existence.

NOTES

1. *Discourse on Method and Metaphysical Meditations* (Scott's Edition), p. 2.
2. Though the Vaiśeṣika speaks of substances which are infinite like the *Ātman* and the *ākāśa*, it is illogical for the system to hold the view of a plurality of infinites.
3. *Taittirīyopaniṣad* (hereafter abbreviated as TU), II. viii, 1; III, x, 4.
4. *Chāndogyopaniṣad* (hereafter abbreviated as CU), VI, viii, 7.
5. TU, II, i, 1.
6. Śaṅkara's commentary on TU, II, i, 1.
7. Śaṅkara's commentary on TU, II, ii, 1.
8. TU, III, i, i
9. Śaṅkara's Commentary on TU, II, v, 1.
10. *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad*, IV, v, 15.
11. *Ibid.*, IV, iii, 9.
12. *Nṛsiṃhottaratāpinyupaniṣad*, 2.
13. *Kāthopaniṣad*, v, 15.
14. *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad*, IV, v, 15.
15. *Kāthopaniṣad*, vi, 12.
16. *Śvetāśvataropaniṣad*, iii, 19.
17. *Appearance and Reality*, p. 136.
18. R. D. Ranade *Constructive Survey of Upaniṣadic Philosophy* (Oriental Book Agency, Poona, 1926), Preface, p. 9.
19. *Kāthopaniṣad* v, 13; *Śvetāśvataropaniṣad*, vi, 13.
20. *Maṇḍūkyaopaniṣad*, 2.
21. *Nṛsiṃhottaratāpinyupaniṣad*, 9.
22. TU, II, i, 1.
23. *Muṇḍakopaniṣad*, III, ii, 9.

Śaṅkara Bhagavatpāda's
VIṢṆUPĀDĀDIKEŚĀNTAVARNANA
STOTRAM

(Contd. from Vol. X, No. 2)

Translation with notes

by

Dr. N. Gangadharan

Dr. N. Gangadharan

STOTRAM

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May the *Śrīvatsa* of Lord Viṣṇu, whose consort is Śrī (Lakṣmī) confer on us abundant prosperity like the Goddess of wealth on the dear child in union with the prosperity extended by the Kaustubha uninterrupted. It (*Śrīvatsa*) adds to the beauty of the *vakṣasthala* (breast) which is extremely beautiful like the darkness to the throat of the enemy of Kāla (*i.e.* Śiva), the stain to the disc of the Moon and the bees to the bunch of flowers of a tree.

Because the Kaustubha gem and *Śrīvatsa* mark adorn the breast of Lord Viṣṇu, they are described as conferring prosperity in union.

[30]

सम्भूयाम्भोधिमध्यात्सपदि सहजया यः श्रिया संनिधत्ते
नीले नारायणोरःस्थलगगनतले हारतारोपसेव्ये ।
आशाः सर्वाः प्रकाशा विदधदपि दधच्चात्मभासान्यतेजां-
स्याश्चर्यस्याकरो नो द्युमणिरिव मणिः कौस्तुभः सोऽस्तु
भृत्यै ॥

May the Kaustubha gem, that is the abode of wonders and is like the Sun, be for our prosperity. Soon after rising up from the middle of the ocean together its (the gem's) sister, namely, Śrī, it (the Kaustubha) adorns the terrestrial region in the form of the blue *urāṅ-sthala* (breast) of Lord Nārāyaṇa, being adorned by the stars in the form of the garlands, illuminating the different quarters with its own lustre, bearing the lustres of other things.

About the origin of the Kaustubhagem, refer to the notes under verse (28).

[31]

या वायावानकूल्यात्सरति मणिरुचा भासमानासमाना
 साकं साकम्पमंसे वसति विदधती वासुभद्रं सुभद्रम् ।
 सारं सारङ्गसंधैर्मुखरितकुसुमा मेचकान्ता च कान्ता
 माला मालालितास्मान्न विरमतु सुखैर्योजयन्ती जयन्ती ॥

May the victorious garland (of the Lord), that associates us with happiness and that which is fondled by Lakṣmī, not rest. When it is wafted favourably in the wind it is illumined by the matchless rays of the (Kaustubha) gem and it rests on the shoulder with a shake rendering (the chest of) the Lord beautiful. The edges of the flowers (are) beautiful with dark blue colour with the swarm of bees reverberating with their wings.

The word *maṇi* stands for Kaustubha. The term 'Vāsubhadra' denotes Lord Viṣṇu. The word *jayanti* in the last line obviously stands for *Vaijayanti*, the garland.

[32]

हारस्योरुप्रभाभिः प्रतिवनवनमालांशुभिः प्रांशुरूपैः
 श्रीभिश्चाप्यङ्गदानां शबलितरुचि यन्निष्कभाभिश्च भाति ।
 बाहुल्येनैव बद्धाञ्जलिपुटमजितस्याभियाचामहे तद्-
 बन्धार्तिं बाधतां नो बहुविहतिकरीं बन्धुरं बाहुमूलम् ॥

We pray with folded palms the beautiful shoulder-joint of the unconquered Lord. May it destroy our tormenting manifold suffering in the form of the bondage. It shines with variegated rays with the abun-

dant lustre of the necklace, the elongated rays of the garland of flowers (gathered) from different forests, the splendour of the armlets and the rays of the golden ornaments.

The term *ajita* meaning unconquered is found in the *Viṣṇu-sahasranāmastotra* also as denoting Lord Viṣṇu.

[33]

विश्वत्राणैकदीक्षास्तदनगुणगुणक्षत्रनिर्माणदक्षाः

कर्तारो दुर्निरूपाः स्फुटगुणयशसां कर्मणामद्भुतानाम् ।
 शार्ङ्गं बाणं कृपाणं फलकमरिगदे पद्मशङ्खौ सहस्रं
 विभ्राणाः शस्त्रजालं मम दधतु हरेर्बाहवो मोहहानिम् ॥

May the hands of (Lord) Hari bestow the destruction of my infatuation. They have the sole aim of protecting the universe and in keeping with that (aim) they are capable of producing kings having such qualities. They are inexplicable doers of wonderful deeds which make explicit their merits and fame. They bear the manifold weapons such as the bow, arrow, sword, shield, disc, mace, lotus and conch.

[34]

कण्ठाकल्पोद्गतैर्यः कनकमयलसत्कुण्डलोत्थैरुदारैः

उद्योतैः कौस्तुभस्याप्युरुभिरुपचितश्चित्रवर्णो विभाति ।
 कण्ठाश्लेषे रमायाः करवलयपदैर्मुद्रिते भद्ररूपे
 वैकुण्ठीयेऽत्र कण्ठे वसतु मम मतिः कुण्ठभावं विहाय ॥

May my mind discard the narrow-mindedness and dwell on the throat of Vaikuṅṭha (Viṣṇu). It shines with the variegated colours of the rays emanating from the ornaments on the neck the shining glorious golden (ear) pendants and the Kaustubha gem. It bears the auspicious marks of the bracelets of (Goddess) Ramā (Lakṣmī) as she embraces it.

The term Vaikuṅṭha found in the *Viṣṇusahasranāmastotra* is explained by Parāśara Bhaṭṭa as follows: A person who connects or unites the earth with water, sky with wind, and wind with light is known as Vaikuṅṭha.

[35]

पद्मानन्दप्रदाता परिलसदरुणश्रीपरीताग्रभागः

काले काले च कम्बुप्रवरशशधरापूरणे यः प्रवीणः ।

वक्राकाशान्तरस्थस्तिरयति नितरां दन्तारौघशोभां

श्रीभर्तुर्दन्तवासोद्युमणिरघतमोनाशनायास्त्वसौ नः ॥

May the Sun-like lip (cover of the teeth) of the consort of Śrī destroy the darkness in the form of our sins. It causes the rejoice of Padmā (Lakṣmī). Its frontal part shines with the splendour of red colour. It is proficient in filling the excellent moon-like conch now and then. It conceals the flowing beauty of the stars, the teeth by remaining inside the sky in the form of the face.

Here the lip of the Lord is identified with the Sun. The epithets in the first three lines as applicable to the Sun are: It gives happiness to the lotus. Its frontal part shines with the splendour of Aruṇa. It is proficient in filling the moon, the excellent conch now and then. It remains in the sky, the face of the Lord and conceals the beauty of the stars, the teeth.

[36]

नित्यं स्नेहातिरेकान्निजकमितुरलं विप्रयोगाक्षमा या
 वक्त्रेन्दोरन्तराले कृतवसतिरिवाभाति नक्षत्रराजिः ।
 लक्ष्मीकान्तस्य कान्ताकृतिरतिविलसन्मुग्धमुक्तावलिश्रीः
 दन्ताली सन्ततं सा नतिनुतिनिरतात्रक्षतादक्षता नः ॥

The glorious row of teeth of the consort of Lakṣmī protect us who are always bent on making obeisance and worship. It appears as if the cluster of stars are always staying in the interior of the moon-face itself unable to be separated from its beloved on account of extreme affection. It has the glory of beautiful pearl-necklace extremely shining and having a charming form.

[37]

ब्रह्मन्ब्रह्मप्यजिह्वां मतिमपि कुरुषे, देव संभावये त्वां
 शंभो, शक्र ! त्रिलोकिमवसि किममरैः, नारदाद्यः सुखं वः ।
 इत्थं सेवावनम्रं सुरमुनिनिकरं वीक्ष्य त्रिष्णोः प्रसन्न-
 स्यास्येन्दोरास्रवन्ती वरवचनमुधा ह्लादयेन्मानसं नः ॥

On seeing the assembly of divine sages who bend before him with obeisance (the Lord) asks: "Oh! Brahmā! Do you show an upright attitude towards the *Vedas*? Oh! Śambhu (Śiva)! I honour you. Oh! Śakra (Indra)! do you protect the three worlds along with the gods? Oh! Nārada and others! are you keeping well?" Let these excellent nectar of words flowing from the moon-face of the graceful (Lord) Viṣṇu, who feels pleased, make our minds rejoice.

The word *brahmaṇi* (in the locative case) denotes the *Vedas*.

[38]

कर्णस्थस्वर्णकम्बोज्ज्वलमकरमहाकुण्डलप्रोतदीप्यन् -
 माणिक्यश्रीप्रतानैः परिमिलितमलिश्यामलं कोमलं यत् ।
 प्रोद्यत्सूर्याशुराजन्मरकतमुकुराकारचोरं मुरारेः
 गाढामागामिनीं नो गमयतु विपदं गण्डयोर्मण्डलं तत् ॥

May the region of the cheeks of (Lord) Murāri dispel the great calamities which may come to us. Being illumined by the radiance of the rubies set in the beautiful, shining, big, fish-shaped, golden ear-ornaments, the soft (region of the cheeks) having the black (complexion) as the bee robs the beauty of an emerald mirror illumined by the rays of the rising Sun.

The term Murāri denotes Kṛṣṇa, as the slayer of the demon Mura.

[39]

वक्त्राम्भोजे लसन्तं मुहुरधरमणिं पक्वबिम्बाभिरामं
 दृष्ट्वा दष्टुं शुकस्य स्फुटमवतरतस्तुण्डदण्डायते यः ।
 घोणः शोणीकृतात्मा श्रवणयुगलसत्कुण्डलोस्रैर् मुरारेः
 प्राणाख्यस्यानिलस्य प्रसरणसरणिः प्राणदानाय नः स्यात् ॥

May the nose of (Lord) Murāri be for conferring life on us. It is the path of flow of the wind called *prāṇa*. It shines on the lotus face. After having seen the gem-like lower lip beautiful like a ripe *bimba* fruit,

(to be continued)

Śaṅkara Bhagavatpāda's

DEVĪ CATUṢṢAṢṬYUPACĀRA-PŪJĀ STOTRAM

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Translation with notes

by

Dr. S. S. Janaki

[37]

कर्पूरेण युतेर्लवङ्गसहितैः कङ्कोलचूर्णान्वितैः
 सुश्वादुकमुकैःसगौरखदिरैःसुस्निग्धजातीफलैः ।
 मातः केतकपत्रपाण्डुरुचिभिस्ताम्बूलवल्लीदलैः
 सानन्दं मुखमण्डनीयमतुलं ताम्बूलमङ्गीकुरु ॥

*karpūreṇa yutair-lavaṅgasahitaiḥ kaṅkolacūrṇānvitaiḥ
 susvādu-kramukaiḥ sagaurakhadiraiḥ susniḡdha-jātīphalaiḥ
 mātah ketakapatra-pāṇḍu-rucibhis-tāmbūlavallīdalaiḥ
 sānandaṁ mukhamaṇḍanīyamatulam tāmbūlam-aṅgīkuru.*

Oh Mother! kindly accept with joy the *tāmbūlam* that will add uniquely to your charm. The *tāmbūlam* consists of the ingredients of scented camphor, cloves, powdered *kaṅkola* (tailpepper, 'vāl-milagu' in Tamil), scented betelnuts, white catechu, soft nutmeg, and tender betel leaves shining like the petals of the *ketaka* (fragrant screw-pin, 'Tāzham' in Tamil).

[38]

एलालवङ्गादि-समन्वितानि कङ्कोल-कर्पूर-समीरितानि ।
 ताम्बूलवल्लीदलसंयुतानि पूगानि ते देवि समर्पयामि ॥

*elālavaṅgādi-samanvitāni, kaṅkola-karpūra-samīritāni
 tāmbūlavallīdala-samyutāni, pūgāni te devi! samarpayāmi.*

Oh Goddess! I offer you betel nut with the leaves, cardamom, cloves, *kaṅkola* and scented camphor.

[39]

ताम्बूलवल्लीदल-निर्जित-हेमवर्णं
 स्वर्णाक्तपूगफल-मौक्तिक-चूर्णयुक्तम् ।
 रत्नस्थगिस्थितमिदं खदिरेण युक्तं
 ताम्बूलमम्ब वदनाम्बुरुहे गृहाण ॥

tāmbūlavallīdala-nirjita-hemavarṇam
svaṛṇākta-pūgaphala-mauktika-cūrṇayuktam
ratnasthagi-sthitam-idam khadireṇa yuktam
tāmbūlam-amba! vadanāmburuhe grhāṇa.

Oh Mother! please accept to chew the *tāmbūla* with catechu, a mixture of nut powder, and bits of gold and other jewels, kept in a gem-studded container along with the greenish yellow betel leaves outshining gold.

[40]

महति कनकपात्रे स्थापयित्वा विशालान्
 डमरुसदृशरूपान्बद्धगोधूमदीपान् ।
 बहुघृतमथ तेषु न्यस्य दीपानुकम्पान्
 भुवनजननि कुर्वे नित्यमारात्रिकं ते ॥

mahati kanakapātre sthāpayitvā viśālān
damaru-sadr̥śa-rūpān baddha-godhūmadīpān
bahughṛtam-atha teṣu nyasya dīpānukampān
bhuvanajanani! kurve nityam-ārātrikam te.

O Mother of all worlds! I present to you always the light offering, with (the wicks dipped in) large quantity of ghee poured inside the drum-shaped wheat dough kept in a golden vessel.

[41]

सविनयमथ दत्त्वा जानुयुग्मं धरण्यां
 सपदि शिरसि धृत्वा पात्रमारात्रिकस्य ।
 मुखकमलसमीपे तेऽम्ब सार्धं त्रिवारं
 भ्रमयति मयि भूयात्ते कृपाद्राः कटाक्षाः ॥

*savinayam-atha dattvā jānuyugmam dharanyām
 sapadi śirasi dhṛtvā pātram-ārātrikasya
 mukhakamala-samīpe te'mba sārḍham trivāram-
 bhramayati mayi bhūyāt-te kṛpārdrāḥ kaṭākṣāḥ.*

Oh Mother! then humbly kneeling down on the floor and taking the lamp-container on my head, let me show it round near your lotus face three times. While this is done, may your favourable glances moist with compassion, be directed on to me.

Verse (29) above describes the usual waving of lights before the goddess. Verses (40) and (41) are about special lamps lit in flour-doughs (*Mūvilakku* in Tamil) to be shown on special occasions.

[42]

अथ बहुमणिमिश्रैर्मौक्तिकैस्त्वां विकीर्य
 त्रिभुवनकमनीयैः पूजयित्वा च वस्त्रैः ।

मिलितविविधमुक्तादिव्यलावण्ययुक्तां
जननि कनकवृष्टिं दक्षिणां तेऽर्पयामि ॥

*atha bahumaṇi-miśrair-mauktikais-tvāṁ vikīrya
tribhuvana-kamaṇīyaiḥ pūjayitvā ca vastraiḥ
mīlita-vividhamuktā-divya-lāvanyayuktāṁ
janani! kanakavr̥ṣṭim dakṣiṇāṁ te'rpayāmi.*

Oh Mother! I will be then scattering on you, pearls and other excellent gems from the three worlds, and then don you with new clothes, I also present you a shower of gold dazzling with varied pearls.

The different cordialities (*upacāras*) shown to the deity are enumerated in the Āgamic texts to be associated with the five elements (*pañca-bhūtas*). Waving of lights, and putting on gem-set and golden ornaments are related to the element of fire (*agni*).

आग्नेयमिष्टमणिदीपाद्याभरणादि ।

“*āgneyam-iṣṭamaṇir-dīpādyābharanādi*” (Kriyā, *Siddhāntasārāvali* of Trilocana Śivācārya, v. 24)

[43]

मातः काञ्चनदण्डमण्डितमिदं पूर्णेन्दुबिम्बप्रभं
नानारत्नविशोभिहेमकलशं लोकत्रयाह्लादकम् ।
भास्वन्मौक्तिक-जालिकापरिवृतं प्रीत्यात्महस्ते धृतं
छत्रं ते परिकल्पयामि शिरसि त्वष्ट्रा स्वयं निर्मितम् ॥

*mātaḥ kāñcana-daṇḍa-maṇḍitamidem-pūrṇendubimba-
prabham
nānāratna-viśobhihemakalaśam lokatrayāhlādakam
bhāsvan-mauktika-jālikāparivṛtam-prītyātmahaste dhṛtam
chatram te parikalpayāmi śirasi tvaṣṭrā svayam
nirmitam.*

Oh Mother! I am providing over you the umbrella with a golden staff fondly held by me, lustrous like the full moon, fitted on top with a gem-studded golden top like a *kalaśa*, delighting the three worlds, encircled with a network of embossed pearls, and fashioned by Tvaṣṭā, the heavenly builder.

[44]

शरदिन्दुमरीचिगौरवर्णैर्मणिमुक्ताविलसत्सुवर्णदण्डैः ।
जगदम्ब विचित्रचामरैस्त्वामहमानन्दभरेण वीजयामि ॥

śaradindu-marīcigauravarṇair-
maṇimuktāvīlasat-suvarṇa-daṇḍaiḥ
jagadamba! vicitra-cāmarais-tvām-
aham-ānandabhareṇa vijayāmi.

Oh Mother of the Universe! overjoyed, I am now fanning you with a pair of unique chowries, white like the autumnal moon-beams, provided with golden staff studded with pearls and other jewels.

As noted above under verse (42) the various cordialities to be performed to a deity before and after *abhiṣeka* are related to the five elements. The *Siddhāntasārāvalī* (Kriyā, v. 24) associates the offering of scented incense and waving chowries with the wind-element — *dhūpaṁ tathā cāmaraṁ mārutamayāḥ*.

धूपं तथा चामरं मारुतमयः ।

[45]

मार्तण्डमण्डलनिभो जगदम्ब योऽय-
म्भक्त्या मया मणिमयो मुकुरोऽर्पितस्ते ।

पूर्णेन्दुविम्बरुचिरं वदनं स्वकीय-
मस्मिन्विलोकय विलोलविलोचने त्वम् ॥

*mārtanda-maṇḍalanibho jagadamba! yo'yam-
bhaktyā mayā maṇimayo mukuro'rpitas-te
pūrṇendu-bimbaruciram vadanam svakīyam-
asmin-vilokaya vilolavilocane! tvam.*

Oh Mother of all worlds! with devotion I offer you, this gem-studded mirror, resembling the sun's disc. Kindly present before it your face, enchanting like the disc of the full moon, and endowed with tremulous glances.

[46]

इन्द्रादयो नतिनतैर्मुकुटप्रदीपै-
नीराजयन्ति सततं तव पादपीठम् ।
तस्मादहं तव समस्तशरीरमेत-
न्नीराजयामि जगदम्ब सहस्रदीपैः ॥

*indrādayo natinatair-mukuta-pradīpair-
nīrājayanti satatam tava pādapiṭham
tasmād-aham tava samasta-śarīram-etan-
nīrājayāmi jagadamba! sahasradīpaiḥ.*

Oh Universal Mother! Indra and other gods show you always the waving of lights at your foot-pedestal by the lamps of their shining crowns while they are bending down in salutation. I shall, therefore, offer a thousand lights for your entire body.

[47]

प्रियगतिरतितुङ्गो रत्नपल्याणयुक्तः
 कनकमयविभूषः स्निग्धगम्भीरघोषः ।
 भगवति कलितोऽयं वाहनार्थं मया ते
 तुरगशतसमेतो वायुवेगस्तुरङ्गः ॥

*priyagatir-atituṅgo ratna-palyāṇayuktah
 kanakamayavibhūṣah snigdthagambhīra-ghoṣah
 bhagavati! kalito'yam vāhanārtham mayā te
 turagaśatasameto vāyuvegas-turaṅgah.*

Oh Goddess! now is ready for your riding the group of hundreds of horses, capable of flying speedily like wind, very lofty, provided with seats embossed with gems, ornamented with gold and producing warm and deep neighing sounds.

[48]

मधुकरवृतकुम्भे न्यस्तसिन्दूररेणुः
 कनककलितघण्टः किङ्किणीशोभिकण्ठः ।
 श्रवणयुगलचञ्चामरो मेघतुल्यो
 जननि तव मुदे स्तान्मत्तमातङ्ग एषः ॥

*madhukaravṛtakumbhe nyasta-sindūrareṇuḥ
 kanaka-kalitaghāṇṭhah kiṅkiṇīśobhikaṅṭhah
 śravaṇayugala-cañcac-cāmaro meghatulyo
 janani! tava mude stān-mattamātaṅga eṣah.*

Mother! may this intoxicated elephant, decorated with *kuṅkuma-tilaka* at the temple round which bees are hovering, with small tinkling golden bells round the neck, and the large flapping ears resembling dark clouds, be for your enjoyment.

[49]

द्रुतरतुरगैर्विराजमानं
 मणिमयचक्रचतुष्टयेन युक्तम् ।
 कनकमयमहं वितानवन्त-
 भगवति ते हि रथं समर्पयामि ॥

drutatara-turagair-virājamānam
maṇimaya-cakra-catustayena yuktam
kanakamayam-aham vitānavantam-
bhagavati! te hi ratham samarpayāmi.

Oh Goddess! I am offering the golden chariot drawn by fine fast-moving horses and fitted with four gem-set wheels.

[50]

हयगजरथपत्ति शोभमानं
 दिशि दिशि दुन्दुभिमेघनादयुक्तम् ।
 अतिबहु चतुरङ्गसैन्यमेत-
 द्भगवति भक्तिभरेण तेऽर्पयामि ॥

haya-gaja-ratha-patti-śobhamānam
diśi diśi dundubhi-meghanāda-yuktam
atibahu-caturaṅga-sainyam-etad-
bhagavati! bhakti-bhareṇa te'rpayāmi.

Oh Goddess! I offer you most devotedly this large four-limbed army shining with horses, elephants, chariots and foot-soldiers, while the drum-beats are roaring in all directions like thundering clouds.

(to be continued)

THE TWO MĪMĀMSĀS*

Dr. R. Balasubramanian

The Veda consists of two parts. The earlier part known as Karma-kāṇḍa deals with rituals, and the later part known as Jñāna-kāṇḍa deals with knowledge. Jaimini wrote the *Pūrvamīmāṃsāsūtra* in order to explain what is taught in the Karma-kāṇḍa of the Veda. The Pūrvamīmāṃsā of Jaimini is popularly known as the Karma-mīmāṃsā. With a view to bringing out the central teaching of the Jñāna-kāṇḍa of the Veda, the celebrated Bādarāyaṇa (Vyāsa) composed the *Uttaramīmāṃsāsūtra* which is also called Brahma-mīmāṃsā or Śārīraka-mīmāṃsā. Bādarāyaṇa's work is more popularly known as the *Brahma-sūtra* or the *Vedāntasūtra*. All systems of Vedānta accept the authority of the Veda as a whole. The two Mīmāṃsās of Jaimini and Bādarāyaṇa are expositions of the teachings of the two parts of the Veda, the Karma-kāṇḍa and the Jñāna-kāṇḍa respectively. An inquiry into the *scope* of authority of the two Mīmāṃsās and the relation between them is necessary for every system of Vedānta.

All systems of Vedānta excepting Advaita maintain that a previous study of the Pūrvamīmāṃsā is necessary before one undertakes the study of the Uttaramīmāṃsā, and that the two constitute one scriptural authority.¹ Nimbārka who is said to have flourished in the later half of the thirteenth century A.D. is of the view that the two parts of the Veda form one whole, and that the two *Mīmāṃsās* also which are expositions of the two parts of the Veda form one scriptural authority.² According to Śrīkaṭṭha, who is also said to have lived towards the close of the thirteenth century, an inquiry into the nature of Brahman can begin only after a study of the nature of Karma, for the two stand in the relation of worship (*ārādhana*) and the worshipped (*ārādhyā*), means (*sādhanā*) and end (*sādhyā*). Vallabha, who is assigned to the close of the fifteenth century and the beginning of the sixteenth century, argues that the two Mīmāṃsās deal with one topic, viz., God and that, therefore, they constitute one scriptural authority. The teachers of Viśiṣṭādvaita (qualified non-dualism) also hold the view that the two Mīmāṃsās deal with one topic, viz., God and that, therefore, they constitute one scriptural authority. Rāmānuja (A. D. 1017-1127) says in the *Śrībhāṣya* that the inquiry into Karma and that into Brahman constitute one body of doctrine.³ It may be pointed out in this connection that the view expressed by Rāmānuja on this issue is a very ancient one; it must be definitely as ancient as Bodhāyana himself who is said to have been the first commentator on the *Brahmasūtra*. Rāmānuja quotes in his *Śrībhāṣya* the following passage which he ascribes to Bodhāyana: "This sārīraka-doctrine is connected

with Jaimini's doctrine as contained in sixteen chapters; this proves the two to constitute one body of doctrine." Jaimini's *Pūrvamīmāṃsā* begins with the aphorism: "Then, therefore, the inquiry into Dharma"; and the last aphorism of the *Uttaramīmāṃsā* is: "There is no return on account of the scriptural statement." Starting from the opening aphorism of the *Pūrvamīmāṃsā* and ending with the last aphorism of the *Uttaramīmāṃsā*, we have, according to Rāmānuja, one body of doctrine, one scriptural authority. The *Yatīndramatā-dīpikā* explains the standpoint of Viśiṣṭādvaita as follows:

The Veda is divisible into two parts, the earlier one treating of Karma and the later one treating of Brahman. The earlier section is that which treats of Karma that is worship. The later section is that which treats of Brahman which is the object of worship. Hence both the Mīmāṃsās constitute a single scriptural authority.⁴

Unlike the other systems of Vedānta, Advaita maintains that the two Mīmāṃsās should be kept apart as two different branches of study, each being authoritative in its own sphere. It is, therefore, necessary to find out why Advaita insists on the clear demarcation between the two. The Viśiṣṭādvaita view, according to which the two Mīmāṃsās constitute one scripture, may be taken as representing the view of the other systems of Vedānta on this particular issue. Though it will be difficult to say whether Nimbārka, Śrīkaṇṭha, and Vallabha were influenced by Rāmānuja on this issue, all of them maintain like Rāmānuja that

the two Mīmāṃsās form one body of doctrine: and all of them, it appears, lived after Rāmānuja. In view of the fact that Rāmānuja follows Bodhāyana who is considered to be the first commentator on the *Brahma-sūtra*, Rāmānuja may be taken as the representative of the other Vedāntins *on this particular issue*. We are, therefore, left with two standpoints, the standpoint of Advaita according to which the two Mīmāṃsās do not constitute one scripture, and the standpoint of the other systems of Vedānta, taking Viśiṣṭādvaita as providing the lead for them.

In order to find out whether the two Mīmāṃsās constitute one scriptural authority or not, let us first consider the subject matter (*viśaya*) of each, the person who is qualified to study (*adhikārin*) each one of them, and the fruit (*phala*) which accrues to one who follows the teaching of each, for if there is difference between any two branches of study in respect of these three factors, it is a sure indication that they are different.

Dharma constitutes the subject matter of the Pūrvamīmāṃsā which begins with "Then, therefore, the desire to know Dharma." That is to say, the Pūrvamīmāṃsā seeks to explain Vedic rituals like Jyotiṣṭoma by setting forth the nature of Karma (*karma-svarūpa*), the *modus operandi* to be followed when a Karma is to be performed, the interpretation of scriptural texts applicable to each Karma, etc. One who desires to perform sacrifice and other rites, and who longs for heaven (*svarga*), etc., is the person qualified to study the Pūrvamīmāṃsā of Jaimini. As a result of the study of the Pūrvamīmāṃsā, one attains the knowledge of what is to be done (*kartavyatā-jñāna*). Or, it may be said that heaven, etc., are the fruits

which accrue to one who performs Karma as enjoined in scripture.

In the case of the Uttaramīmāṃsā which begins with "Then, therefore, the desire to know Brahman," the subject matter is Brahman which is ever-existent and which is not what is to be accomplished. One who is equipped with the fourfold means of eligibility (*sādhana-catustaya*) and one who has no desires excepting the desire for liberation is the person who is qualified for the study of the Uttaramīmāṃsā. The fourfold means of eligibility will comprise the following spiritual requisites: (1) discrimination between things permanent and transient, (2) renunciation of fruits of action, here and hereafter, (3) the six treasures as they are called, viz., control of the mind, control of the senses, withdrawing from objects, ideal forbearance, faith, and constant practice to fix the mind in God, and (4) the intense desire for release. The fruit which accrues to one who undertakes the study of the Uttaramīmāṃsā after fulfilling the condition of eligibility is Brahman-realization (*brahma-jñāna*) or liberation (*mukti*) which is eternal. So in view of the difference between the Pūrvamīmāṃsā and the Uttaramīmāṃsā in respect of subject matter, condition of eligibility, and the nature of the end which is attained, the two disciplines, according to Advaita, are different; and they should not be treated as constituting one scriptural authority.

It is no argument to say that, since both of them are Mīmāṃsās, they have to be treated as one scripture. If this argument were valid, then by the same logic one may argue that the six auxiliary disciplines may be treated as one scripture, for each one of them is an

auxiliary discipline (*aṅga*). But it is not so. 'Chandas' is a treatise on prosody. 'Kalpa' is a work dealing with rituals. 'Śikṣā' is concerned with the accent, quantity, etc., of letters. 'Nirukta' elucidates the meaning of rare Vedic words. 'Vyākaraṇa' is grammar. 'Jyotiṣa' is a treatise on astrology. Since each one of them has its own subject matter which is different from that of others, they are treated not as one scripture, but as different scriptures, in spite of the fact that all of them are referred to by the collective name 'Aṅga.' The same is the case with the two Mīmāṃsās which are two different scriptures, in spite of the fact that both of them bear a common name 'Mīmāṃsā' to which Pūrva (earlier) and Utra (later) are prefixed to distinguish the one from the other.

It may be argued that the two sections of the Veda called the Pūrva-kāṇḍa and the Uttara-kāṇḍa are the two sections of one and the same Veda; and so the two Mīmāṃsās, which are expositions of the two sections of one and the same Veda, must also be treated as one scripture. This argument is not convincing. What is claimed for the two Mīmāṃsās may as well be claimed for the six auxiliary disciplines of the Veda. As auxiliary disciplines of the Veda and also as teaching what is in conformity with the Veda, all of them may be treated as one scripture and not as different scriptures. But this is not correct. It must, therefore, be admitted that each discipline has its own subject matter or field of inquiry which serves to distinguish it from other disciplines. Consider, for example, the study of morals. Sociology, among other things, studies morals from its own point of view; and ethics, too, studies morals from a different point of view. What distinguishes ethics from sociology is not only its aim,

but also the method of study it adopts in dealing with its material. Because they have something in common, it should not be said that there is no difference between them, and that they form one discipline. The difference between the two which serves to confer upon each an independent status as a separate branch of inquiry is in essential respects. The same thing holds good in the case of the two Mīmāṃsās.

Sudarsanavyāsabhaṭṭa in his *Śrutapṛakāśikā* which is a commentary on Rāmānuja's *Śrī-bhāṣya* puts forth the following argument in order to show that the two Mīmāṃsās must be treated as one scripture. The entire Veda has its purport in Brahman. This is clearly brought out in a text of the *Kaṭha Upanisad* (I.2.15): "I will tell you briefly of that goal which all the Vedas propound..." There is also the *Gītā* text (XV. 15) which says: "I alone am to be known from all the Vedas." That is to say, one and the same Brahman is taught by the earlier and later portions of the Veda, and since the theme dealt with is the same (*pratipādyā-aiikyāt*), the Veda which consists of two portions must be treated as one body of doctrine (*vedasya eka-prabandhatvam*). If so, the two Mīmāṃsās which are only commentaries on the two portions, which are related as earlier and later, of one and the same Veda, must be treated as constituting one body of doctrine.

This argument, too, is not convincing. There are scriptural passages which bring out in unmistakable terms the difference in the subject matter dealt with in the earlier and later portions of the Veda. It is not uncommon to identify the earlier portion of the Veda as *Veda* and the later portion as *Vedānta*. Making a clear demarcation between *Veda* and *Vedānta* as two

entirely different spheres, scripture declares that the two portions of the Veda do not have a common theme. The *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad* (III. 2.6) speaks about "the ascetics who have well ascertained the meaning of the Vedānta knowledge." The *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* narrates the discussion between Yājñavalkya and Vidagdha, the son of Śakala. In the course of the discussion, Yājñavalkya asks Vidagdha whether he knows "that Person who is to be known from the Upaniṣads." (III. 9.26) While these two Upaniṣadic passages lay emphasis on the specific subject matter of the Vedānta by such terms as 'the knowledge of the Vedānta' (*vedānta-vijñāna*) and 'the person (i.e. Brahman) taught in the Upaniṣad' (*auṇiṣadam puruṣam*), the following passages from the *Gītā* (II. 42-5) clearly set forth the subject matter of the Veda, the motive as well as the nature of those who are involved in the pursuit of it, and the result which accrues to them:

O Pārtha, no conviction of a resolute nature is formed in the minds of those who are attached to pleasures and power, and whose minds are drawn away by that flowery speech which the unwise — enamoured of Vedic utterances, declaring that there is nothing else, full of desire, having heaven as their goal — utter, (a speech) which promises birth as the reward of actions and which abounds in specific acts for the attainment of pleasure and power. The Vedas treat of the triad of the Guṇas. O, Arjuna, be free from the triad of the Guṇas...

That is to say, the *Gītā* speaks about the subject matter of the Veda (*veda viśaya*), the utterance of the

Veda (*vedavāda*), the unwise (*aviṣācitah*) who are full of desire (*kāmātmānah*), heaven as the end, and the various specific acts (*kriyāviśeṣa*) for specific ends. It is obvious that when the *Gītā* speaks about all these it has in view the earlier section of the Veda, and not the later section popularly known as the *Vedānta*. So the ritualistic part of the Veda deals with Karma, the nature of Gods (*devatā-svarūpa*) who are propitiated, heaven etc., but the *Vedānta* (i.e. the *jñāna-kāṇḍa*) expounds Brahman which is of the nature of existence (*sat*), knowledge (*cit*), and bliss (*ānanda*), which is eternal (*nitya*) and ever-existent (*siddha*).

The Veda, for example, refers to the attainment of 'imperishable' fruit through the performance of the 'four-month sacrifice' (*cāturmāsya*). There is also reference to the attainment of 'immortality' through drinking *soma* juice.⁶ The Veda enjoins that one should perform fire-sacrifice (*agnihotra*) as long as one lives.⁷ It also enjoins the performance of *Jyotiṣṭoma* sacrifice at the time of spring.⁸ The *Vedānta*, on the contrary, says that the Self cannot be attained through any act.⁹ One should renounce, says the Upaniṣad, the very day one is disgusted with the things of the world.¹⁰ One realizes the Self through the control of the mind, the control of the senses, etc.¹¹ It is obvious from this that while the Veda is concerned with heaven etc., through the performance of Karma, the *Vedānta* deals with Brahman-Ātman suggesting renunciation, control of the mind, etc., as the essential requisites for attaining Brahman-realization.

It is not possible to argue that the Veda and the *Vedānta* constitute one scripture on the basis of values of life (*puruṣārtha*) as suggested by the author of the

Śrutaparakāśikā. The Veda and Vedānta do not have the same end in view. A *puruṣārtha* is an end which is sought after by man and which is worthy of attainment. What is the nature of the highest end which is sought to be explained by the Veda and the Vedānta? To the Veda, the highest end worthy of attainment is heaven (*svarga*). But the happiness which a person enjoys through the attainment of heaven is only transitory. The Vedānta, on the contrary, considers Brahman as the highest end; and Brahman which is ever-existent, which is not what is to be accomplished by Karma, is eternal. So it follows that the Veda and the Vedānta which deal with what is ephemeral and eternal respectively are different in the same way as the *Dharmaśāstra* (code of right conduct) is different from the *Arthaśāstra* (economics). Every branch of learning has a certain end in view, and there is no exception to this. It is a flimsy argument to suggest that the different branches of learning must be treated as one scripture because all of them have a certain end in view (*puruṣārtha*) which serves as the common factor among them though the end itself may differ from system to system. So, the Veda and the Vedānta which are concerned with two different goals of life are undoubtedly different. It follows that the Pūrvamīmāṃsā of Jaimini and the Uttaramīmāṃsā of Bādarāyaṇa which explain the teachings of the Veda (i.e. the *Pūrvakāṇḍa*) and the Vedānta (i.e. the *Uttarakāṇḍa*) respectively are also different.

Reference was made earlier to the view that all the Vedas have their purport in Brahman. It was also pointed out that there is scriptural support for this view. It is quite possible to uphold this view, viz., that the purport of the entire Veda is in Brahman,

without prejudice to the view that the Pūrvamīmāṃsā and the Uttaramīmāṃsā are two different scriptures.

According to Advaita, Brahman-Ātman is the only reality. The pluralistic universe which we claim to see is an illusion. Just as a rope appears as a snake, even so the non-dual Brahman-Ātman appears as the world of diversity. The object in front is only a rope. But due to ignorance of the real nature of the object in front, it is mistaken for a snake. The rope which is in front is the substratum on which a snake is falsely superimposed. What is superimposed does not really have an existence independently of that on which it is superimposed. At the time of the illusion, we say: "This is a snake." Subsequently when we come to know that the object in front is not a snake, but only a rope, we express ourselves by saying: "This is not a snake, but a rope." The correction which we make is not in respect of the 'this' which is presented to us, but only in respect of the 'what'. Our judgement of the 'this', that is, what we say of the given object, is erroneous. What is illusory points to the real on which it is superimposed. In the same way, the pluralistic universe which is not-Self is superimposed on the self which alone is real. Just as the illusory snake points to the rope which is the substratum, even so the various objects of the phenomenal world point to the non-dual Brahman-Ātman on which they are superimposed. The words which denote objects like pot etc., which are only illusory, have their purport in Brahman-Ātman which is the substratum. So every word that we use for the purpose of denoting some object or other has its purport only in Brahman, though superficially

speaking we may say that each word signifies this or that object.

In another way also we can show that everything which we cognize points to Brahman. The things of the world are objects of knowledge by virtue of their being *sat* (being) and as *asat* (non-being). Every object which one cognizes is in its essential nature being or *sat*. It may be cognized as being characterized by certain qualities which may be common as well as specific. Common qualities are what may be called class characteristics which are uniformly present in all the members of a class, e.g., animality, cowness, etc. Specific qualities are those which inhere in a particular member of a class and which serve to distinguish one object from another belonging to the same class. For example, the white colour of a cow distinguishes it from another cow which is not white. So certain qualities may be peculiar to some one individual or thing; certain other qualities may be common to all the members of a particular class, but not to other members of a different class. But the one aspect which is uniformly present in every object that we cognize is being or *sat*. Every object is being, whatever be the aspect with which it is cognized. A table is being; a pot is being; a tree is being. It is the being or *sat* aspect which is uniformly present in all of them. A table is different from a pot, and a pot from a tree. The same thing holds good, with regard to all other objects. But every object which is presented to our cognition is necessarily being or *sat*. It is being or *sat* which comes to be endowed with various characteristics, general as well as specific, in our day-to-day experience (*vyavahāra*). We can abstract all these characteristics one after another from the object. In that case, being or *sat* alone will be left

over. Take the case of a pot. A pot is what it is because of the various factors like clay, a certain shape, a certain colour, etc., which constitute it. If it is abstracted of all the characteristics through reason, what will be left over is just being or *sat*. This being or *sat* which is uniformly present in all the objects of cognition is no other than Brahman.

There is another way also in which we can explain the same point. It is Brahman alone which is to be known through a *pramāṇa* (means of knowledge), because it is Brahman alone whose real nature is concealed by the insentient objects remains unknown. An object like a pot which is insentient is not strictly speaking what is known through a *pramāṇa*. The one thing which has to be known is Brahman. Brahman-knowledge (*brahmajñāna*) alone is real knowledge. If we talk about the knowledge of other objects and other objects of knowledge, it is only by courtesy at the empirical level. So all the Vedas, the different branches of learning, the different means of knowledge like perception, make known Brahman through the objects which we experience. The *Chāndogya* text, "All this, indeed, is Brahman,"¹² seeks to establish Brahman as the Self of all. If Brahman-Ātman constitutes the Self of all, then the words which denote the various objects of the world denote Brahman.

In practice, however, we admit a number of *pramāṇas* and maintain that each *pramāṇa* has its own scope, that each as a means of knowledge is authoritative in its own field, and the function of one *pramāṇa* cannot be taken over by another. Colour which is perceived by the visual sense cannot be perceived by the tactile sense. Similarly what we

know through inference cannot be known through perception. Just as we recognize different means of knowledge, even so we recognize different objects of knowledge (*prameya*). The Veda (i.e., the Karma-kāṇḍa) explains Karma, its nature, the procedure to be followed when a particular Karma is to be performed, etc. Vyākaraṇa (grammar) which is a different branch has its own theme for exposition. The same applies to other branches of study. It follows that the earlier section of the Veda is different from the later section, and that the two Mīmāṃsās which are expositions of the two sections of the Veda are also different from each other.

The following are some of the notable points of difference between the two Mīmāṃsās. According to the Pūrvamīmāṃsā, Karma alone gives rise to fruits; heaven is the highest goal; there is no such thing as liberation; there is no Īsvara (the Supreme Ruler); it is Dharma alone which maintains the world; the entire Veda has its purport in action. The Uttaramīmāṃsā or Vedānta differs from the Pūrvamīmāṃsā in each one of these respects; for it maintains that Īsvara alone is the giver of fruits in accordance with Karma, that liberation is the supreme end, that the happiness of heaven which is transitory and surpassable is inferior when compared with Brahman-bliss which is eternal and unsurpassable, that Īsvara maintains the world, and that the later portion of the Veda has its purport in Brahman which is ever-existent. Therefore, the contention of Sudarsanācārya that the two Mīmāṃsās have a single theme, and that there is no incompatibility of views (*nāsti arthavirodhaḥ*) between them is unacceptable.

The difference between the Pūrvamīmāṃsā and the Uttaramīmāṃsā is emphasized not with a view to minimizing the importance of the former or to ignore the utility of Karma in the matter of attaining the knowledge of Brahman, but mainly to vindicate that the two Mīmāṃsās cannot constitute one body of doctrine (*ekasāstram*) as it is held by other schools of Vedānta in opposition to Advaita. That Karma is indirectly useful to the attainment of knowledge is admitted by Advaita. That is, the disinterested performance of Karma gives rise to the purity of mind (*cittaśuddhi*) which in its turn gives rise to the desire to know Brahman (*brahma-jijñāsā*); and a person who has such a desire will inquire into the Vedānta; and as a result of the inquiry into the Vedānta, there arises Brahman-knowledge (*brahma-jñāna*). Since there are several stages to be gone through between the performance of Karma and the attainment of knowledge, Karma can only be indirectly useful to the attainment of knowledge. And so the Pūrvamīmāṃsā which deals with Karma is useful to the study of the Uttaramīmāṃsā in an indirect way. It is for this reason that the word *atha* which occurs in the opening aphorism of the *Brahma-sūtras* has been explained by Śaṅkara as meaning 'immediately after the possession of the (fourfold) means of eligibility' (*sādhana-sampattyanantaryam*) and not as immediately after the study of the karma-sāstra.

It is no argument to say that, since the Pūrvamīmāṃsā which deals with Karma is useful, though only indirectly, to the study of the Uttaramīmāṃsā, it should be considered along with the latter as constituting one scripture. If this argument were valid, the same thing could be claimed for Nyāya (logic) and

other studies. The Nyāya system which explains the nature of ether, etc., is also, one could argue, conducive to the study of the Uttaramīmāṃsā and so it might also on this ground be considered along with the Uttaramīmāṃsā as constituting one scripture.

According to Rāmānuja, the two Mīmāṃsās constitute one body of doctrine, and if one could try to work out the difference between them, it will amount to just the difference between the two halves of the Pūrvamīmāṃsā or the difference between one chapter and another. In the Pūrvamīmāṃsā the first six chapters constitute one half known as 'upadeśaṣaṭka', and the next six chapters constitute the second half called 'atideśaṣaṭka'. The difference between the two halves arises because of the difference in the content dealt with therein. In spite of this difference, the two halves are treated as constituting one body of doctrine called the Pūrvamīmāṃsā. A book may be divided into several chapters, each chapter having its own content. Nevertheless, the several chapters different from one another will exemplify the central theme of the book; and so all the chapters must be treated as constituting one body of doctrine or as expounding a single theme. In the same way one has to explain, according to Rāmānuja, the difference between the two Mīmāṃsās. Rāmānuja's assumption in this argument is that the two Mīmāṃsās deal with a single principal theme, and that the minor topical differences which one notices in them are not detrimental to their doctrinal unity.

But his assumption is wrong, for the two Mīmāṃsās do not have a single theme. While Dharma is the principal theme of the Pūrvamīmāṃsā, Brahman

is the central topic of the Uttaramīmāṃsā. The opening aphorism of each Mīmāṃsā testifies to this in the same way as the opening aphorisms of Yoga and Vyākaraṇa clearly indicate that they are different.

Let us consider another argument which has been advanced to show that the two Mīmāṃsās constitute one body of doctrine. The entire Mīmāṃsā beginning with the aphorism, "Then, therefore, the desire to know Dharma" and ending with the aphorism, "There is no return on account of the scriptural statement," consists of a related subject matter which is presented in a definite sequence (*saṅgati-viśeṣa-viśiṣṭa-kramam*). In certain places rituals like sacrifice as taught in the Veda are inquired into. In other places, meditation (*upāsanā*) which is also action is inquired into. Thus the entire Mīmāṃsā has its purport only in action (*kriyāparam*). Though there may be discussion of minor topics, which are related with one another, for the purpose of elucidating the central theme, the Mīmāṃsā as a whole has its purport only in one single theme, viz., action, and so it is one body of doctrine.

Such an argument will be detrimental to the Viśiṣṭādvaitin who believes in the combination of knowledge and action (*jñānakarma-samuccaya*) as the means to liberation. If it is true that only action is what is taught in both the Mīmāṃsās, then there is no place for Jñāna as something different from Karma. What applies to *upāsanā* (meditation) will also apply to Jñāna. If *Upāsanā* is action as it is in the form of a mental activity (*manovyāpāra-rūpatvāt*), Jñāna must also be treated as action, for it means *what one knows*; that is to say, it conveys the meaning of the verbal root *jñā* to know (*jñādhātvartho hi jñānam*), and

a root conveys the sense of action. In fact Rāmānuja explains Jñāna in the sense of Dhyāna or Upāsanā, and so it is also a mental activity.¹¹ According to the Viśiṣṭādvaitin, Karma alone is not the means to liberation (*mokṣa*) but Karma in combination with Jñāna is the means. Karma is action, and Jñāna also as explained earlier is action. If so, when the Viśiṣṭādvaitin speaks about combination of knowledge and action, what he is really suggesting is combination of action with action (*karmakarma-samuccaya*), and he cannot have anything more than a combination of the action with another action unless he restates the subject matter of the two Mīmāṃsās.

It may be argued that Jñāna is not a mental activity, but is the result or fruit (*phalam*) of mental activity. If Jñāna in this sense is accepted, there is no such thing as mere Karma (*kevala-karma*). One who wants to perform a Karma should also have the knowledge of substances like clarified butter (*ājya*), etc., required for the performance of Karma. Why, then, is it said that liberation (*mokṣa*) is not attained through Karma alone (*kevala-karmaṇo na mokṣaḥ*) but only through Karma and Jñāna?

It is no argument to say that by mere Karma is meant Karma which is devoid of knowledge of Brahman. Strictly speaking, Karma has no association with Brahman-knowledge. And so it is meaningless to speak about *karma-combined-with-jñāna* and *karma-not-combined-with-jñāna*, for any such expression admits the possibility of the combination of Karma and Jñāna. Nor can it be said that Karma performed by one who has the knowledge of Brahman is Karma which is in combination with Jñāna, but Karma which

is performed without Brahman-knowledge is *mere karma (kevala karma)*. One who has attained Brahman-knowledge does not perform any Karma; and one who is involved in Karma has not attained Brahman-knowledge. Karma and knowledge are mutually exclusive; they cannot coexist. A Brahma-jñānī is one who has renounced the objects of the world. One of the 'six treasures' which a person who is to embark on the study of Vedānta should possess is Uparati which has its implication as far as the renunciation of Karma (*karma-sannyāsa*). Voluntary activities of the body required for the performance of any Karma presuppose the functioning of the mind. When there is the functioning of the mind, there will be mental modification which is really distraction of the mind. It is a case where the mind being attracted is engrossed in this or that object. Uparati which means turning away from objects of sense not only implies quieting the mind, but also the renunciation of all voluntary bodily activities as a further consequence of it. It is, therefore, impossible to associate the performance of any Karma with one who embarks on the study of Vedānta, much less so with one who has attained Brahman-knowledge.

To sum up: The two Mimāmsās are two separate branches of study; and so they should not be treated as constituting one body of doctrine or one scriptural authority. Each has its own theme, Karma in the case of the Pūrvamīmāṃsā and Brahman in the case of Uttaramīmāṃsā. There is nothing in common between the two excepting the Vedic authority on which both are based. But the two sections of the Veda on which they are based do not have a common theme.

The basic difference between the two sections, Karma-kāṇḍa and Jñāna-kāṇḍa, of the Veda is also carried over in the two Mīmāṃsās which are just expositions thereof. There is neither temporal sequence nor logical consequence between the two Mīmāṃsās.

NOTES

1. See Dasgupta: *A History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. IV, (Cambridge University Press), p. 324.

2. कर्म-ब्रह्ममीमांसयोरैकशास्त्रम् ।

3. See Rāmānuja's commentary on the *Brahmasūtra*, I, i, 1.

4. See *Yatindramata-dīpikā* tr. by Swami Adidevananda (Sri Ramakrishna Math, Madras 4), p. 41.

5. (i) नित्यानित्यवस्तुविवेकः । (ii) इहामुत्रफलभोगविरागः।

(iii) शम-दम-उपरति-तितिक्षा-समाधान-श्रद्धाः ।

(iv) मुमुक्षुत्वम् ।

6. What is attained through the performance of *caturmāsya* is not really imperishable. It is said to be imperishable in the sense that it lasts for a longer time than other results. Similarly immortality to which the drinking of *soma* juice is said to be conducive is not real immortality.

The passages which are referred to here are the following :

(a) अक्षय्यं ह वै चातुर्मास्य-याजिनःसुकृतम् ।

(b) अपाम सोमं अमृता अभूम ।

7. यावज्जीवं अग्निहोत्रं जुहुयात् ।

8. वसन्ते वसन्ते ज्योतिषा यजेत ।

9. नास्ति अकृतः कृतेन ।

Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad, I. 2. 12.

10. यद्दहरेव विरजेत् तद्दहरेव प्रव्रजेत् ।

Jābāla Upaniṣad, 4.

11. शान्तो दान्त उपरतस्तिक्षुः समाहितो भूत्वा आत्मन्येवात्मानम्पश्यति ।

Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad, IV. 4. 23.

12. सर्वं खल्विदं ब्रह्म । III, 14, 1.

13. Rāmānuja says in his commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra*, I. i. 1:

“The knowledge which the Vedānta texts aim at inculcating is a knowledge other than the mere knowledge of the sense of sentences and denoted by dhyāna, upāsana, and similar terms.”

ADVAITA VEDĀNTA AND WESTERN THOUGHT*

R. K. Tripathi

Quite a variety of absolutisms are found in the West and it is always possible to compare Advaitism with one or the other type. But we feel that comparisons are too easily drawn and due attention is not paid to the distinction. If only to appreciate the peculiarities of different systems, it is more important to draw distinctions. We therefore propose to draw attention to certain peculiarities of Advaitism which distinguish it from western types of absolutism. In our analysis of these peculiarities, their justification too will be discernible as these are the cardinal features of Advaitism.

I

Advaitism is very often described as a kind of monism. But it would be well to remember that Advaitism or non-dualism is not mere monism. The emphasis here is on *non* or negation, the negation of all kinds of quality or difference. As is well known,

* Courtesy: *Indian Philosophical Annual*, vol. VII, University of Madras, Madras, (1971), pp. 36-43.

difference or *bheda* is of three kinds — *svagata* (internal), *svajātiya* (that between individuals of the same class) and *viajātiya* (that between different species). A mere monism may not allow the second and the third kinds of difference, but it is compatible with the reality of the first kind of *bheda*. *Brahma-pariṇāmavāda* for example is monistic but not advaitic. All the three kinds of difference are rejected by Advaitism. For the same reason, Advaitism cannot accept a view of ultimate reality as a person as is advocated by theism. The ultimate for Vedānta must be free from all difference, but the penultimate or Īsvara can be conceded to be the highest person. The distinction between Brahman and Īsvara is only logical or epistemological and not ontological.

Western thought generally speaking seems to shudder to think of the falsity of difference. Even those who are inclined to deny the reality of difference go only as far as the doctrine of identity-in-difference. It is felt that identity without difference would be pure blank and mere nothing, at least the difference between the self and not-self must be admitted. It is not realized that the absolute ceases to be the absolute and infinite to the extent it depends on duality and difference. Not only that, it will be impossible to know or realize the absolute if it has anything different from the self. The Advaitic absolute excludes nothing as it is the self of everything (*ātmā sarvasya ātmā*). Advaitism believes in the doctrine of pure identity and holds that all difference presupposes it. That identity cannot be known without difference does not prove that identity cannot be without difference. The absolute as the universal self shines in its own light (*svayamjyoti*). In

sleep there is consciousness without consciousness of objects.

Some western thinkers — Plotinus, Spinoza, and in contemporary times, Heidegger — are found to be talking of Being, Pure Being, the ground of Being. But they cannot be called Advaitic. It is one thing to speculate about the unity of existence and it is quite another to provide a systematically and critically worked out theory of falsity or of the relation between reality and appearance. It is not enough for philosophy to intuit mystically the oneness of all existence. A critical refutation of the claim of plurality to be real is necessary; philosophy should be able to show how plurality is able to put forth a claim for reality. Hegel and Bradley no doubt make a dialectical approach but they do not find plurality as absolutely false. Advaitism is neither an intuitive assertion of identity nor a rational synthesis of plurality. It is rather a critical awareness of the falsity of difference; identity is arrived at by negation (*neti neti*).

Being false, difference can be only due to ignorance, ignorance which forges or fabricates it, super-imposes it on the real and makes it appear as real. The fact of super-imposition explains two things — the reason why difference appears to be real and also the reason why it must be rejected in order to arrive at identity. The doctrine of *adhyāsa* or super-imposition is thus one of the most distinguishing features of Advaitism. On this crucial point, not only western thinkers, but even the Mādhyamika, one of the most critical systems of India, seem to fumble. The point is that if the appearance or the natural view of things is true, then there is no need for the search of reality

i.e., philosophy. And if the appearance is false, then it must be grounded in something or else it will be independent and absolute. The absolute having no particularity cannot be aggressive or hostile to anything and so even the false can sit on it and claim reality. The Vedānta therefore is keen about clearing or negating our first view of things which covers reality; it is essentially critical. The peculiarity of Vedānta is to start with the problem of *adhyāsa* and *avidyā* and to reach reality by negation.

II

It may appear from what has been said about the dialectical demonstration of difference that Advaita Vedānta can be purely a rationalistic system or that the truth of Vedānta can be reached exclusively on the basis of reason. Is a purely rationalistic absolutism such as that of Hegel or Bradley not possible? Probably in their anxiety to make Advaita independent of *śruti*, some exponents of Advaita would take this view. Śaṅkara's introduction to his commentary on the Advaita Prakaraṇa of the *Māṇḍūkya-kārikā* lends an apparent support to the view that the Advaita can be established purely on the basis of reason. Śaṅkara says, *śakyate tarkena api jñātum* (the Advaitic truth can be known by reason also). But we ask: is it a matter of choice for us to know Brahman either by reason alone or with the help of *śruti*? This is an important issue and we must be clear about the Vedāntic position. If Brahman could be known by reason alone, *śruti* would be no more indispensable, and it would be difficult to understand those statements in the Upaniṣads as well as in Śaṅkara Bhāṣya where unaided

reason has been clearly declared as incompetent to know Brahman.

Here we may first of all point out that in the above statement Śaṅkara does not say *tarka-mātreṇa api* (by reason alone); he says *tarkeṇa api* (by reason also). Secondly, it should also be noted that this statement occurs after the Āgama Prakaraṇa where Advaita has already been demonstrated on the basis of *śruti*. Finally we should remember that the Advaita has two aspects — the positive and the negative, the reality of Brahman and the falsity of the world. Reason can at best succeed, by pointing out relativity and contradiction, only in proving the falsity of appearance. But that is not the whole truth; merely by proving the falsity of duality one cannot have the positive knowledge of Brahman either as *saccidānananda* or as one with our innermost self. Purely on the basis of reason, Kant was able to show that what we know is only appearance, but he could not give us any positive knowledge of the unconditioned. And even the Mādhyamika has to depend on tradition, mere dialectic is directionless.

Our contention therefore is that for Advaita as a philosophy, *śruti* and reason are both necessary but neither is sufficient. *Śruti* is not sufficient because there is the need to interpret and understand it in a consistent manner. *Śruti* is not a treatise, but a record of revelation. Also the language of *śruti* being concerned with the transcendent cannot be literal. So reason is necessary to interpret the *śruti* in a consistent and intelligible manner. Reason is necessary also to answer possible objections against the teaching of the *śruti*. The content is supplied by the *śruti* and the form is given by reason.

But although reason is necessary, it is not sufficient. This is because reason by itself is only formal and empty; it is only critical and not cognitive of any reality. Apriorism or the belief that reason can know reality *a priori* is one of the basic fallacies of western thought. The only alternative to apriorism in the West is empiricism; the remedy is worse than the disease. But in India apriorism and empiricism are both rejected and philosophy turns to listen to *śruti*. What cannot be seen must be heard about. Reason whether in science or in philosophy stands in need of some data which for science comes from sense experience, and for philosophy from revelation or the experience of the transcendent. Reason alone can never give us existence or reality. Even in the empirical sphere, we cannot be sure of the existence of anything on the basis of inference alone; on the basis of smoke we can only say that fire should be there and not that it is there. It is more so in the sphere of philosophy. Reason can at best indicate some possibility, it cannot give us categorical assurance. For Vedānta the existence of Brahman as the cause of the world is not proved by reason, it is revealed by *śruti*. The Kantian criticisms do not apply to Vedānta. The world would be absolute unless it is grounded in something and *śruti* tells us that the ground of the world is Brahman.

The West does occasionally recognise the limits of reason, but it does not appreciate the importance of *śruti*. If all the natural sources of knowledge are necessarily dependent upon and confined to perception, then either no knowledge of the transcendent is possible or we must accept some source giving us that knowledge. If the absolute were not known it could not be our self, and if it were not, our self could not be

known. Moreover, in view of the experiences of saints and seers, it cannot be held that the absolute is not known or knowable. Therefore there must be a means of knowing the absolute and that is *śruti*. The function of *śruti* is to set at rest all speculation about the unconditioned by giving us categorical knowledge; it removes also doubts regarding the possibility of knowing or realising the absolute. Mere reason can only grope or speculate. A purely rationalistic absolutism such as that of Hegel or Bradley can never be sure of the nature and existence of the absolute, much less can they show us the way to realize it. The Vedāntic absolute is revealed by *śruti* and confirmed by immediate experience. However, *śruti* and *anubhava* should not be separated; they form a continuous process.

It is sometimes objected that the acceptance of *śruti* is faith and not knowledge. It is also pointed out that if *śruti* is the source of the knowledge of the absolute, where is the need for philosophy? We may answer that the acceptance of *śruti* is not blind faith but knowledge. For one thing, the teaching of *śruti* is open to analysis and criticism. Secondly *śruti* can give us even direct knowledge and can open up immediate experience. All the same, we do not hold that *śruti* is enough; reason is necessary for presenting the teaching of the *śruti* in a consistent and coherent manner and this is what we call philosophy. If unaided reason is empty, unaided *śruti* is unintelligible. Listening has to be intelligent.

III

Like the ordinary uninstructed individual, the West believes that for the attainment of the goal of life,

knowledge is not enough; it must be supplemented by action. This is true universally so far as our natural attitude is concerned. Faith in the efficacy of action is what may be called animal faith. But philosophy is not animal faith. All the systems of Indian philosophy, specially Advaita, uphold the doctrine of the self-sufficiency of knowledge. Whatever is achieved by action must have a beginning and therefore also an end; it must be temporal. The eternal which is already there has only to be discovered by knowledge and not achieved by any action. If the goal of life is something eternal and infinite, it cannot be achieved by action, and the goal cannot be anything less.

In other words, the West has not yet reached the conclusion that the basic problem of our life is ignorance or rather the ignorance of the true nature of self. That all the problems of life may well be due to some basic ignorance is not considered by the West even as a possibility. But the Vedānta like other systems of Indian philosophy takes it as the fundamental presupposition of all philosophy. If the ills and imperfections of life are real and intrinsic to the self, they can by no means be removed either by knowledge or by action. If however they are unreal, only knowledge can help us. In any case, the true nature of the self has to be found out unless we feel that we know it already.

It is because of the failure to appreciate the importance of the ignorance of the self, that western thought generally fails to be directly relevant to life. At most it gives us either some *a priori* world view or some kind of ideology. It does not directly solve the problem of self. To be relevant to life, it is necessary to formulate the problem of philosophy in terms of the

ignorance of self. In this regard Vedānta succeeds more than any other system of philosophy. The supreme importance of philosophy for Vedānta is that it solves the problem of life by giving us a knowledge of the self; philosophy is *ātma-vidyā*. It is this feature which distinguishes philosophy at once from science and religion or the path of devotion. Science gives knowledge but does not solve the problem of the self and religion or love of God seeks to solve the problem of self but not by knowledge. Both the nature and the indispensability of philosophy can be seen by looking upon it as giving us saving knowledge. Knowledge is not merely power or virtue; it is the very saviour.

IV

It appears to us that in the West philosophy is generally equated with other disciplines which require only an intellectual competence. Even for Plato knowledge of mathematics is sufficient qualification for philosophy. This is not so for Vedānta. Not merely moral purity but also a kind of spiritual awakening is necessary for understanding and appreciating philosophy. Nothing clouds our vision so much as moral impurity because nothing binds us to matter as immoral life does. And there can be no earnest search for the eternal unless there is a deep disillusionment regarding the temporal life and its values. The seeker of truth must be capable of loving truth more than anything else, and that is possible only when one has come to realise that only truth matters and nothing else, so that no sacrifice is too much for the sake of truth.

There is, in other words, such a thing as fitness for philosophy or else philosophy will fail to deliver the goods and we will quickly jump to the conclusion that philosophy is useless. It is curious that if someone does not appreciate music, we do not blame music, but if someone fails to appreciate Vedānta, we do not blame the individual but Vedānta itself. It hurts our ego to think that we are not fit for Vedānta which only proves that we are really not fit. It is a false kind of democracy to open the doors of philosophy to everyone. It is nothing short of degrading philosophy to the level of the common man. As Plato put it philosophy is meant only for her genuine sons.

V

At the end, we may point out a feature of Vedānta which distinguishes it not only from western thought but also from other Indian systems. In the West it is argued that man has a finite intellect and so it is impossible for him to know the absolute and the infinite. The fallacy in this argument is twofold. First, it is wrong to compare the human mind and the absolute in size or quantitatively. Bradley would even say that the human mind is a part of the absolute. Really speaking all the phenomenal things including the human mind differ from the absolute qualitatively as belonging to two different levels or orders. There is no question of the human mind being a part of the absolute unless the absolute is taken to be a mere totality or even a harmonious whole. For Vedānta the absolute is the inner essence or reality of everything and as such it is at once immanent and transcendent. The absolute is neither one more reality beside others,

nor a mere synthesis of empirical appearances, nor is it an empty nothing; it is the real self of everything.

The other fallacy in the above argument is to think that the absolute is something different from us, at least partly. It is forgotten that if the absolute were anything different, even though partly, it would not be absolute as it would exclude something, our self. The absolute must be all comprehensive but not literally, or else it will be dependent on the constituents. It is all comprehensive only in the sense that it sustains everything, is the ground of everything. The Vedānta therefore rightly asserts the identity between the self and the absolute. The absolute can be known precisely because it is our very self, not the self which is empirically known but the inner self which illumines everything. Just as there is no distinction of the knower and the known in the case of the self, even so there is no such distinction in the case of the absolute. The self or rather the absolute can be known and known immediately. Reality or self is self-luminous; it does not need a separate knower.

In some Indian systems, it is suggested that so long as man is embodied, he cannot realise his true self. In other words, the true self can be realised only when it stands apart from the body after death. In this way, the possibility of realizing the self remains for ever a matter of faith only. There is a fallacy here too. What stands in the way of realizing the self is not the body but the identification with body or *adhyāsa*, and *adhyāsa* is due to ignorance. So if and when ignorance is removed, the self is realised and it does not matter whether the body is there or not — since ignorance can be removed here and now, it is possible to

realise the self here and now. The Vedāntic absolute is therefore neither impossible to realise nor is the realisation merely a thing of the future or faith. There can be a confirmation of the Vedāntic truth even in this life. This is one of the most important features of Advaita Vedānta.

In short, we may say that the special features of Advaita as distinguishing it from Western thought are; its doctrine of *adhyāsa* and *avidyā*, its emphasis on the indispensability of *śruti*, its view of the self-sufficiency of knowledge, its view of philosophy as a spiritual quest, and finally its doctrine of *jīvanmukti*. Philosophy cannot justify itself except as a spiritual endeavour and cannot survive scepticism unless its goal is realisable here and now.

RIGHT KNOWLEDGE

One should have the conception that one is *Brahman* which is without qualities, without actions, Eternal, free from duality, free from unhappiness, pure, awakened and free.

Having gained a perfect knowledge of bondage and liberation with their causes (viz., Ignorance and Knowledge respectively), having acquired a complete understanding of the cause and effect which are objects of knowledge and are, (therefore,) to be negated, and having properly known the one supreme and pure Truth (to be the Self) which is beyond all objects of knowledge, known in the *Vedāntas* and taught by *Śrutis* and knowers of *Brahman* one stands free from the fear of being born again, becomes all-knowing, has everything accomplished, goes beyond grief and delusion and, (therefore) has the acme of his life fulfilled.

The Self cannot be accepted or rejected by Itself or others, nor does It accept or reject anyone else. This is right Knowledge.

For this Knowledge, the subject of all the *Vedāntas* produces the conviction that the Self is *Brahman*. One becomes perfectly free from the bondage of this trans-migratory existence when one achieves it.

Śri Śaṅkara, *Upadeśasāhasrī*, II, xvii, 81-84.

ŚARĪRAKAVYĀKHYĀPRASTHĀNABHEDAḤ

by

Ātmavidyābhūṣanam V. S. V. Gurusvāmi Śāstri

(Contd. from Vol. X, No. 2)

SHIRAKAVYAKHYATYASHEKZARBHIDAH

by

Dr. S. S. Srinivasan, M. A., Government College, Coimbatore

(Coimbatore, 1957)

[51]

‘आदिमं सूत्र’मित्येवमाद्यसूत्रावतारणे ।
यज्जगाद तदेव स्यात्पृथक्शास्त्रत्वसाधकम् ॥

[52]

‘अथातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासेत्येवं सद्ब्रह्मगोचरः ।
पृथक्शास्त्रसमारम्भः सुतरामुपपद्यते ॥

[53]

प्रतिपत्तिविधेर्ब्रह्म विषयो यद्युपेयते ।
अथातो धर्मजिज्ञासेत्येवारब्धतया पुनः ॥

[54]

नारभ्येत पृथक्शास्त्रमारभ्येत तदन्यथा ।
शिष्टधर्मविजिज्ञासेत्येवंरूपे’ति भाष्यकृत् ॥

[55]

चतुर्लक्षणमीमांसापृथक्शास्त्रत्वनिर्णयम् ।
समन्वयाधिकरणे मुक्तकण्ठमभाषत ॥

[56]

‘एक आत्मन’ इत्यत्र यत्कृतं भगवत्पदैः ।
शास्त्रप्रमुख एवेति पूर्वपक्षप्रदर्शनम् ॥

[57]

न तत्स्वमतमालम्ब्य किं तु वृत्तिकृतां मतम् ।
क्वचित्प्रदर्शयत्येवं भाष्यकृद्दृत्तिकृन्मतम् ॥

[58]

शास्त्रैक्यं खलु ते प्राहुरपवर्षादयो बुधाः ।
तदङ्गीकृत्य वादोऽयं भाष्यकर्तुरितीष्यते ॥
नो चेत्समन्वयान्तोक्तविरुद्धार्थमिदं भवेत् ॥

(iv) अज्ञानं भावरूपं, मायाविद्ययोरेकत्वं सदसद्विलक्षणरूपं मिथ्यात्वम्

[59]

भावरूपं तथाज्ञानं विस्तरेणोपवर्ण्यते ।
'प्रत्यक्षेणानुमानेनावश्यमेवे'ति च स्थले ।
मायाविद्यापदार्थैक्यमपि तैरभ्युपेयते ॥

[60]

जगतः प्रागवस्था च याधीना परमेशितुः ।
स्वरूपबोधरहिता जीवा यस्यां सुशेरते ॥

[61]

यया विना परेशस्य स्रष्टृत्वं नैव सिद्ध्यति ।
आकाशोऽक्षरमव्यक्तमज्ञानं प्रकृतिस्तथा ॥

[62]

मायाविद्येति शब्दैः सा कीर्तितेति हि भाष्यकृत् ।
अवोचत्तादधोनत्वसूत्रार्थस्योपपादने ॥

[63]

इदमस्य भवेद्भाष्यं मूलमित्यनुमीयते ।
मिथ्याज्ञाननिमित्तेति भाष्यवाक्यार्थवर्णने ॥

[64]

मिथ्यानिर्वचनीयत्वमज्ञानं च जडात्मिका ।
शक्तिरित्यर्थकथनान्मिथ्यात्वमिदमुच्यते ॥

[65]

विलक्षणत्वमसतः सतश्चेतीदमिष्यते ।
आरम्भणाधिकरणभाष्यवाक्यप्रमाणकम् ॥

[66]

‘नासदासीन्नो सदासीत्तम आसी’दिति श्रुतौ ।
तमः पदं मुख्यवृत्त्या प्रोक्तमिथ्यात्वबोधकम् ।
आरम्भणेत्यादिनेदं भाष्येणोवाच भाष्यकृत् ॥

(v) ब्रह्मज्ञानोत्पत्त्यर्थानि अग्निहोत्रादिकर्माणि

[67]

ब्रह्मज्ञानोपयोगित्वं श्रौतानां सर्वकर्मणाम् ।

चत्त शुद्धिकरत्वेन पद्मपादैर्विवक्ष्यते ।
ऋणत्रयनिवृत्त्यै तु कर्माणीति स्मृतिः स्तुतिः ॥

[68]

प्रमाणमपि वक्ष्यामः शाङ्करादाकरादिह ।
'विहितत्वाच्चाश्रमे'ति 'सर्वापेक्षे'ति सूत्रयोः ॥

[69 - 70]

'यज्ञेनेति श्रुतेर्विद्यासाधनं कर्म च खिलम् ।
तथा विविदिषायोगात्स्वोत्पत्तौ साधनम्भवेत् ॥
अपेक्ष्यन्ते च कर्माणि स्वोत्पत्तौ विद्यया यथा ।
फलोत्पत्तौ तथा नैवापेक्ष्यन्त' इति भाष्यकृत् ।
निपुणं वर्णयामास तत्समूलमिदं मतम् ॥

(vi) ईश्वरजीवयोर्विम्बप्रतिविम्बभावः प्रतिविम्बसत्यत्वञ्च

[71]

प्रतिविम्बस्य सत्यत्वं बिम्बाद्भेदश्च साध्यते ।
प्रतिविम्बो भवेज्जीवो बिम्बभूतः परेश्वरः ।
मायाविद्यादिवाच्यायामिति च प्रतिपाद्यते ॥

[72]

'रूपं रूपं प्रतिरूपो' 'दृश्यते जलचन्द्रवत्' ।
इति श्रुतिवचो मूलमस्य शारीरके तथा ॥

[73]

विद्यते साधकं मानमाभासेत्यत एव च ।
उपमा सूर्यकेत्येवं सूत्रयोर्भाष्ययोस्तयोः ॥

(vii) वेदान्ताः भूतवस्तुपरा एव

[74]

प्रथमां स्मरतः प्रातिपदिकार्थे च पाणिनेः ।
न क्रियापरता सर्वशब्दानामिति संमतम् ॥

[75]

इति मध्यस्थदृष्ट्यापि वेदान्तानां प्रमाणता ।
एतत्सुनिपुणं पद्मपादैरत्र निरूप्यते ॥

(viii) स्मर्यमाणारोपः अवश्यमभ्युपगन्तव्यः

[76]

अज्ञातपीतवर्णस्य पीतशङ्खभ्रमस्थले ।
भवान्तरानुभूतस्य पीतिम्नः स्मरणं भवेत् ॥

[77]

अङ्गीकार्यं यतस्तस्माल्लक्ष्येष्वेतादृशेषु हि ।
जन्मान्तरानुभूतार्थस्मरणं शरणं ध्रुवम् ॥

[78]

वक्तव्या गतिरेषैवेत्येवं व्युत्पादनाय तु ।
भवान्तरे भुक्तित्तरसस्मृतिसमुद्भवाम् ॥

[79]

स्तन्येऽर्भकस्य तिक्तत्वभ्रान्तिं व्युत्पादयन्ति ते ।
 तत्स्मर्यमाणारोपं तु भणन्त्येतादृशस्थले ॥
 नैवानुभूयमानस्य स्यादारोप इतीष्यते ॥

(ix) ज्ञानार्थयोरुभयोरपि अध्यासोऽवश्यंभावी

[80]

अर्थोपसर्जनं ज्ञानमर्थो ज्ञानोपसर्जनः ।
 अध्यस्यते चोभयथा बाधधीसाधकत्वतः ।
 इदं रजतमित्यस्य प्रत्ययस्य भवेदियम् ॥

[81]

शुक्तिरेव न रजतमित्येवंरूपया धिया ।
 एतावन्तं कालमभान्मिथ्यैव रजतं तथा ॥

[82]

मिथ्यैव रजतं चेति धीरभूदिति बोध्यते ।
 मिथ्यात्वाध्यवसानं यत्तद्बाधः शुक्तिकाधिया ॥

[83]

शुक्तिधीबाधकत्वं च विषये विषयिण्यपि ।
 प्रदर्शितज्ञानरीत्या मुख्यमेव भवेदतः ॥

[84]

कस्य मिथ्यात्वतः कस्य मिथ्यात्वं संभवेदिति ।
विनिगन्तुमशक्यत्वान्मिथ्यात्वमुभयोरपि ॥

[85]

बाधप्रतीतिविषयो ह्युभयं चान्यथापतेत् ।
बाधस्तु तत्प्रतीतेरप्यतः स्यादुभयोरपि ।
ज्ञानार्थयोरिहाध्यास इति सम्यङ्न्यरूपि तैः ॥

(x) रजतं मायामयमेव

[86]

मायामयत्वं जगतो बोधयिष्यन्नसाधयत् ।
मायामयत्वं रजते पद्मपादः सयुक्तिकम् ।
अधिष्ठानज्ञानदोषसंस्कारैः कारणैस्त्रिभिः ॥

[87]

जन्यतेऽध्यास इत्यर्थं स्मृतिरूपेति भाष्यतः ।
जगदुर्व्यक्तमेवैते विस्तरादुपपत्तिभिः ॥

(xi) विषये विषय्यध्यासोऽपि उपपन्न एव

[88]

विषयानुभवानन्दौ नित्यत्वं चेति सन्ति हि ।
चैतन्यादपृथक्त्वेऽपि धर्मा भान्ति पृथग्यथा ॥

[89]

इति प्राह चितोऽध्यासं विषयेऽप्युपपत्तिभिः ।
भाष्यभावविदां मध्ये पद्मपादोऽग्रणीर्मतः ॥

[90]

वक्तव्यविषयाः प्रायः प्रोक्ताः प्रथमवर्णके ।
शास्त्रसारदिदृक्षणामलं प्रथमवर्णकम् ॥

[91]

पदार्थवाक्यार्थनिरूपणे वा श्रुत्यन्तगूढाशयसूचने वा ।
स्वतन्त्रसिद्धान्तसमर्थने वा न भाष्यमुल्लङ्घयति स्म विद्वान् ॥

[92]

या प्रक्रिया पद्मपादोपदिष्टा सा पञ्चपाद्युक्तदिशाभ्यधायि ।
तन्मूलभूतान्यपि भाष्यवाक्यान्युक्तानि सर्वाणि विमर्शपूर्वम् ॥

V. श्रीमण्डनः

[93]

श्रीमच्छङ्करदेशिकैर्विरचितं भाष्यं हि शारीरकं
तद्व्याख्यां रचयांबभूव रुचिरां श्रीपद्मपादो यतिः ।
श्रीमन्मण्डनपण्डितोऽपि तदनु श्रीशाङ्करं निर्मलं
दृष्ट्वा भाष्यमशेषतत्त्वनिकषं सद्ब्रह्मसिद्धिं व्यधात् ॥

[94]

ब्रह्मसिद्धिप्रणेतायं श्रीमानाचार्यमण्डनः ।
षड्दर्शनीपारदृशवा मीमांसाद्वयपारगः ॥

(i) वेदान्तानां प्रामाण्यं स्थापयितुं ब्रह्मसिद्धिप्रणयनम्

[95]

बुबोधयिषुरद्वैतं सर्वतन्त्राविरोधतः ।
पूर्वमीमांसकैः पूर्वैर्भट्टपादादिभिर्यथा ॥

[96]

अर्थवादतया प्रोक्ता वेदान्ताः कर्मलालसैः ।
तथा तथाविधान्पूर्वान्नानुकर्तुमियेष सः ॥

[97]

किन्तु चक्रे ब्रह्मसिद्धिमद्वैतब्रह्मबोधिनीम् !
चत्वारः सन्ति काण्डाश्च ब्रह्मसिद्धिविभाजकाः ॥

[98]

ब्रह्म तर्को नियोगश्च सिद्धिरित्याह्वयान्विताः ।
संक्षिपामीह सिद्धान्तान्ब्रह्मसिद्धौ प्रदर्शितान् ॥

[99]

श्रुतीः स्मृतीर्व्यासगौडपादोक्तीर्मानयत्ययम् ।
क्वचिद्वैयासिकीं सूक्तिं भगवत्पादभाषितम् ॥

[100]

विमृशंस्तद्विरुद्धार्थान्स्वतन्त्रो बोधयत्यसौ ।
वेदान्ता निखिला ब्रह्मप्रतिपत्तिविधायकाः ॥

[101]

इति प्राभाकरव्याख्यां त्रिविधां स निराकरोत् ।
भर्तृप्रपञ्चमिश्राणां भट्टपादगुरोस्तथा ।
सिद्धान्तभेदान्विमृशन्क्वचित्तान्प्रतिषेधति ॥

[102]

निर्विशेषं न सामान्यमिति भट्टमतं स्फुटम् ।
संहताखिलभेदोऽतः सामान्यात्मेति वर्णनात् ॥

[103]

निराकरोन्मण्डनार्यः सामान्यं ब्रह्म तद्वदन् ।
सर्वदर्शनसिद्धान्तसामरस्यविधित्सया ॥

[104]

शब्दाद्वैतं स्फोटवादं क्वचिच्छाब्दिकसंनिभः ।
शब्दात्परोक्षविज्ञानं क्वचित्तार्किकसोदरः ॥

[105]

अन्यथाख्यातिवादश्च ज्ञानकर्मसमुच्चयम् ।
महामीमांसको भूत्वा प्रगल्भोऽयमभाषत ॥

(अनुवर्तते)

ŚĀRĪRAKAVYĀKHYĀPRASTHĀNABHEDAḤ

Ātmavidyābhūṣaṇam V. S. V. Gurusvāmi Śāstrī

Free rendering in English

by

J. R. S. Vasani Ramanan

(Contd. from Vol. X, No. 2)

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IV. (iii) *Śārīraka Mīmāṃsā Śāstra* (Aphorisms of Vedānta philosophy) is a separate treatise

[50]

Śrī Padmapāda has held that the Śārīraka Mīmāṃsā (Brahma Sūtras) is a separate treatise. In support of this view, we shall now pick out the words used by Śrī Śaṅkara in his commentary on the Brahma Sūtras.

[51]

In his introduction to the first *sūtra* of the Brahma Sūtras, Śrī Śaṅkara mentions '*ādimaṇi sūtram*' which means the first *sūtra* and this forms the basis for Śrī Padmapāda's view.

[52]

It is quite appropriate to begin the new Śāstra pertaining to Brahman, as indicated in the first Sūtra — "Now, therefore, the enquiry into Brahman."

[53 - 54]

If the Vedānta Śāstra had the injunction of contemplation as its purpose, then having already begun even with the *sūtra*, "Now, therefore, the enquiry into religious duty" there was no necessity of beginning a separate Śāstra; or if it were to be commenced then, it ought to have been commenced as, 'now, therefore, the enquiry into the remaining religious duty.'

[55]

In this manner, Śrī Śaṅkara has categorically stated in the Samanvaya chapter that the Vedānta Śāstra is a separate treatise.

[56]

What Śrī Śaṅkara has said in his commentary '*śāstra-pramukha eva ...*' to the Brahmasūtra, '*eka ātmanaḥ śarīre bhāvāt*' (III-iii-53) is only the objector's contention.

[57 - 58]

The commentators like Upavarṣa and others have chosen to consider the Dharma Sūtras and Brahma Sūtras as a single treatise. Only their view is expressed by Śrī Śaṅkara in his commentary on the Brahma Sūtra, III-iii-53. If that had been his own view, then his commentary on the Brahma Sūtra, I-i-4 would have become a contradiction. But it is not so.

IV. (iv) *The positive nature of nescience, the identity between māyā and avidyā and sadasadvilakṣaṇatva (neither real nor unreal) of illusion*

[59]

Now the positive nature of nescience (*bhāvarūpa*) is explained. Śrī Padmapāda has considered the word *māyā* as identical with *avidyā* while explaining '*pratyakṣeṇānumānenāvaśyam...*'

[62]

The nescience which is the condition of the world before its emergence, which is under the control of

God, in whom all the *jīvas* rest at the time of deluge without knowing their real nature, and without whom the act of creation would not take place, is called by the names, *ākāśa*, *akṣara*, *avyakta*, *ajñāna*, *prakṛti*, *māyā*, *avidyā*, etc. — Thus Śrī Śaṅkara has said in his commentary on the Brahma Sūtra, '*tadadhīnatvāt arthavat*' (I-iv-3).

[63 - 65]

While commenting on the word of Adhyāsabhāṣya, '*mithyājñānanimittaḥ*' of Śrī Śaṅkara, Śrī Padmapāda has explained the word *mithyā*, which according to him, means the ignorance, the indescribable, the objective power, etc. This nescience is said to be neither real nor unreal (*sadasadvilakṣaṇa*). This is the view to which Śrī Śaṅkara's commentary on the Brahma-sūtra, '*tadananyatvam-ārambhaṇa-śabdādibhyaḥ*' (II-i-14) forms the basis.

[66]

In the Śruti text, "there was neither *asat* nor *sat* but there was darkness" the word *tamas* (darkness) refers to the nescience — thus Śrī Śaṅkara has said in his commentary.

IV. (v) *The performance of karmas or rituals bring about only the rise of knowledge of Brahman.*

[67]

All the karmas or rituals laid down in the Śruti texts help in the rise of the knowledge of Brahman. Śrī Padmapāda says that such rituals when performed

by a person purify his mind and they clear the three types of debts pertaining to the gods, the sages and the ancestors.

[68]

The source of this view is the commentary of Śrī Śaṅkara on the Brahmasūtras, '*sarvāpekṣā ca yajñādi śruterāśvavat*' (III-iv-26) and '*vihitattvāccāśramakarmāpi*' (III-iv-32).

[69 - 70]

Quoting the Śruti text (Bṛhadāraṇyaka IV-iv-22) it has been said that the duties or *karmas* are only a means to the attainment of knowledge. They are helpful in producing knowledge but not its fruit viz., liberation, which is not attainable except through knowledge.

IV. (vi) *The difference between the image and its reflection and the reality of reflection*

[71]

The real nature of reflection and the difference between the image (*bimba*) and its reflection (*pratibimba*) are going to be explained now. Īsvara or the God could be considered to be the image and the *jīva*, His reflection. Moreover, these two are associated with the words *māyā* and *avidyā*.

[72]

The Śruti texts '*rūpaṁ rūpam-pratirūpo*' (Kaṭhopanīṣad) and '*dr̥śyate jalacandravat*' (Brahma-bindūpanīṣad) serve as the basis for the concept of image and reflection.

[73]

Similarly, the Brahmasūtras, 'ābhāsa eva ca' (II-iii-50) and 'ata eva ca upamā sūryakādivat, (III-ii-18) and Śrī Śaṅkara's commentary on them form the basis for the concept mentioned before.

IV. (vii) *The Vedānta texts should be accepted as valid even in the absence of any predicate*

[74]

It should be noted that the grammarian, Pāṇini has considered the *prātipadikas* (stem form of any noun) as representing the first case. From this it is clear that all the words of a sentence could be taken for consideration even when there is no predicate.

[75]

Thus in an impartial manner, all the texts of Vedānta philosophy should be accepted as valid and Śrī Padmapāda has explained this point clearly.

IV. (viii) *The superimposition of past thoughts should be accepted*

[76]

A white conch appears to be yellow to a person, who has no knowledge of how yellow colour would look like. This could be justified only when we say that, that person had had the knowledge of yellow colour in his previous birth.

[77]

Under similar circumstances we have no other go than to say that the person recollects what he had experienced in his previous birth.

[78 - 79]

Only in this manner, we can explain a child re-collecting bitterness when it actually sucks its mother's milk. It is because the child has experienced the taste of bitterness in its previous birth, it recollects it in the present birth while sucking its mother's milk. Thus the taste of bitterness becomes a superimposition in the present birth when the child has not actually experienced it earlier.

IV. (ix) *The superimposition of both the object of error and the erroneous cognition should be accepted*

[80 - 83]

When a person sees an object of illusion, viz. shell he perceives it as 'this is silver' due to erroneous knowledge. Later when he goes near, he perceives it as 'this is only a shell and not a silver', and understands, 'so far only illusory silver was glittering'. From this it could be understood that the person had got the right knowledge, 'this silver was illusory'. The object of error, from the point of view of the shell is contradicted by right cognition. Similarly, the erroneous cognition is contradicted by the right knowledge. When the object of illusion is perceived as it is, both the object of error as well as the erroneous cognition are contradicted simultaneously.

[84 - 85]

It is difficult to say as to which one between the object of error and the erroneous cognition, is responsible for the illusion. So we have to admit that both are responsible for the illusion that is caused. Thus it has been proved by Śrī Padmapāda that there is the superimposition of both the object of error as well as the erroneous cognition.

IV. (x) *The illusoriness of silver*

[86]

In order to establish the illusoriness of the world, Śrī Padmapāda had at first established the illusoriness of silver by advancing sound arguments on the basis of the three causes viz. *adhīṣṭhāna jñāna*, *doṣa* and *saṁskāra*.

[87]

Citing various reasons and on the basis of the word, '*smṛtirūpaḥ*' of Śrī Śaṅkara, Śrī Padmapāda has clearly explained what superimposition is.

IV. (xi) *Superimposition of the Self on the objects*

[88 - 89]

Even though the consciousness, the bliss and the existence are not different from the pure Consciousness, they appear to be different — thus the superimposition of the Self on the objects has been explained by citing various reasons. Śrī Padmapāda is considered to be the foremost among those who had had a good grasp of Śrī Śaṅkara's commentary.

[90]

All points that are deemed important have been explained in the first *varṇaka* or part and the first *varṇaka* is sufficient to cater to the needs of those who want to taste the essence of the sacred scriptures.

[91]

Śrī Padmapāda who was a great scholar has never stepped out of the framework of Śrī Śaṅkara's commentary, while explaining the words or sentences based on the implied sense of some of the Vedic texts and while presenting his own views.

[92]

I have explained what Śrī Padmapāda has written in his work, the *Pañcapādikā*. I have also mentioned the words or sentences of Śrī Śaṅkara's commentary that have formed the basis of Śrī Padmapāda's views.

V. *Śrī Maṇḍana*

[93]

Śrī Śaṅkara has written a vivid commentary on the *Brahma Sūtras*. Śrī Padmapāda has written a commentary on Śrī Śaṅkara's *Bhāṣya*. Similarly, Śrī Maṇḍana has written a commentary called the *Brahmasiddhi*.

[94]

The great Ācārya, Śrī Maṇḍana, the author of the *Brahmasiddhi* was well-versed in all the six systems in Indian philosophy and in particular, he was a master of both *Pūrva Mīmāṃsā* and *Uttara Mīmāṃsā*.

V. (i) *The writing of the Brahmasiddhi is to establish the validity of knowledge*

[95 - 97]

The famous exponents of Pūrva Mīmāṃsā such as Kumārila Bhaṭṭa and others have said that the Vedānta texts praise only actions (*arthavāda*). Śrī Maṇḍana did not want to follow the foot-steps of Kumārila. So, he wrote the work called the Brahmasiddhi, thereby expounding the principles of Advaita philosophy. There are four sections (*kāṇḍas*) in the work Brahmasiddhi.

[98]

Those four sections or kāṇḍas deal with Brahman, Tarka, Niyoga and Siddhi. Let me now, summarise the points explained in the Brahmasiddhi.

[99 - 100]

In his Brahmasiddhi, Śrī Maṇḍana has quoted the Śruti texts, the Smṛtis, the words of Śrī Vyāsa, Śrī Gauḍapāda and others. Śrī Maṇḍana analyses their views and points out that all the texts of Vedānta establish the nature of the Ultimate Reality. Śrī Maṇḍana analyses the views of Prabhākara, Bhartṛ-prapañca and Kumārila and rejects them wherever necessary.

(to be continued)

A NOTE ON SPHOṬA

The eternal Vedas which are not to be treated as an aggregate of an external, insentient sounds are our source knowledge in respect of *dharma* and *adharma*. The grammarian philosophers who subscribe to the theory of *sphoṭa* argue that the *Veda* conveys its meaning only through *sphoṭa*. According to them, a word which is uttered conveys its meaning through an unperceived, partless, unitary symbol called *sphoṭa*. The different letters of a word reveal this latent symbol to the mind as they are uttered in succession one after another; and this symbol called the *sphoṭa*, which is different from the letters, directly presents the meaning of the word. So a word does not directly convey its meaning, but it only serves to arouse the symbol (*sphoṭa*) which conveys the meaning.

There is no need, according to Advaita, to postulate *sphoṭa* for the purpose of explaining how the meaning of a word is grasped at one moment, even though the letters of a word come into consciousness one after another. It is true that the letters of a word are uttered in succession one after another, and that they are perceived one by one. But the unitary meaning which a word conveys can be explained in terms of the function of the mind which has the power of synthesizing the different elements which were originally perceived at different moments of time. A word, whether secular or scriptural, which is nothing but consciousness delimited by the mental mode conveys its meaning, and the unitary meaning of a word is grasped by the intellect which is illumined by the consciousness. And so there is no need for *sphoṭa* at all.

(R. Balasubramanian, *The Taittirīyopaniṣad-bhāṣya-vārttika of Sureśvara*, p. 429)

ABHEDAḤ PARAMAM SĀMYAM

by

Bhāsyabhāvajña V. R. Kalyānasundara Śāstrī

(Contd. from Vol. X, No. 2)

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सोदरयोराकारसाम्ये सति देवदत्तं दृष्ट्वा यज्ञदत्त इति कश्चित् प्रत्येति, सा हि प्रतीतिभ्रान्तिः । एवं ब्रह्मब्रह्मविदोराकारसाम्यप्रयुक्ता हि ब्रह्मविदि ब्रह्मप्रतीतिभ्रान्तिरेव भवेत् । सा च भ्रान्तिभंगवत्या उपनिषदो भवतीति वक्तुं न शक्यते । तस्मान्मुक्तस्य ब्रह्माभेद एव, भेदकोपाध्यभावात् । न च अप्राकृतनामरूपात्मकभेदकोपाधिरस्तीति वाच्यम्, नामरूपात्मकसर्व-
द्वैतस्य प्राकृतत्वेन अप्राकृतनामरूपसत्त्वे मानाभावात् । न च वैकुण्ठलो-
कोऽप्राकृत इति तद्गतनामरूपे अप्राकृते इति वाच्यम्, तस्यापि दृश्यत्वेन
मायामयत्वात् । न च शुद्धसत्त्वमयत्वात्तस्याप्राकृतत्वमिति वाच्यम्,
मलिनस्येव शुद्धस्यापि सत्त्वस्य प्रकृतिपरिणामत्वाविशेषात् । यद्यपि
मर्त्यलोकापेक्षया देवलोकस्य, देवलोकापेक्षया ब्रह्मलोकस्य च सुखाल्प-
त्वानल्पत्वप्रयुक्तं तारतम्यमस्ति, तथापि प्राकृतत्वाप्राकृतत्वात्मकस्तु
भेदो नास्त्येव, सर्वस्यापि प्राकृतत्वात् । तदप्युक्तम्भगवता —

न तदस्ति पृथिव्यां वा दिवि देवेषु वा पुनः ।

सत्त्वं प्रकृतिजैर्मुक्तं यदेभिः स्यात् त्रिभिर्गुणैः ॥

न च इति । तद्विष्णोः परमं पदं अप्राकृतमिति वाच्यं, इष्टापत्तेः । न च तत्पदं
वैकुण्ठलोक एवेति वाच्यम्, स्वरूपवाचित्वात्तत्र पदशब्दस्य । तच्च स्वरूप
सच्चिदानन्दलक्षणं ब्रह्मैव । तदेव जीवस्यापि स्वरूपम् । अज्ञानात्
तदविदित्वा 'मनुष्योऽहम्' इत्याद्यध्यासं प्राप्य संसारी भवति, ज्ञानात्
तद्विदित्वा अध्यासं विहाय स्वरूपेणैव तिष्ठतीति सिद्धं मुक्तौ जीवब्रह्मा-
द्वैतम् । एतेन

मम साधर्म्यमागताः ।

इति गीतावाक्यमपि व्याख्यातं वेदितव्यम् ॥

किञ्च साधर्म्यं सादृश्यमिति व्याख्यानमप्यसङ्गतमेव । तथा
हि—सर्वज्ञसर्वेश्वरसर्वशक्तिसर्वनियामकसर्वजगत्सृष्टिस्थितिसंहारकर्तृसर्व
कल्याणगुणनिलयपरमात्मसादृश्यस्य किञ्चिज्ज्ञपरतन्त्राल्पशक्तिनिया-
म्याजगत्कर्तृनिर्गुणाणुस्वल्पवद्दजीवेऽसंभवात् । न च मुक्तावप्यणोर्जीवस्या-

सर्वगस्य भवितुमर्हति सर्वज्ञत्वसर्वान्तर्यामित्वादीश्वरधर्मसञ्चयः । न च मुक्तौ सर्वव्याप्येव जीव इति वाच्यम्, तथा सति बहूनां मुक्तजीवानां सर्वव्यापिनां सत्त्वेन सर्वभूतानां हृद्देशे ईश्वरवत्त्वे सर्वे अपि जीवा वर्तेरन् । न चेष्टापत्तिः ।

ईश्वरस्सर्वभूतानां हृद्देशेऽर्जुन तिष्ठति ।

इति वक्ष्यमाणत्वेन सर्वे मुक्तजीवा हृद्देशे तिष्ठन्तीति क्वाप्यप्रतिपादने-
नान्तर्यामिब्राह्मणादिषु एकस्यैवेश्वरस्य सर्वभूतस्थितिप्रतिपादनेन च
विरोधात् । बहुषु नियामकेषु सत्सु एको बद्धजीवः केन नियमितं कुर्यात् ?
बहूनां नियामकेश्वराणां सत्त्वे कथमेकेश्वरत्वव्यवहारः ? न च
मुक्तजीवाः सर्वव्यापिनः सन्तोऽप्यनियामकाः सन्तस्तूष्णीं वर्तन्त इति
वाच्यम्, तथा सतीश्वरसाधर्म्यायोगात् । एतेषां मुक्तजीवानामीश्वरानि-
याम्यत्वे ईश्वरस्य सर्वेश्वरत्वाभावप्रसङ्गात् । तन्नियाम्यत्वे च बन्धमुक्तयो
रविशेषात् । अस्मद् हृदि ईश्वरसत्त्वं नियमनलिङ्गेनानुमीयते, अनन्त-
मुक्तजीवसत्त्वं तु केन प्रमाणेन वेद्यते ? न केनापि । न च शास्त्रेणेति
वाच्यम्, शास्त्रे 'अनन्ता मुक्तजीवा भूतानां हृदि वर्तन्ते ईश्वरवत्' इति
क्वाप्यप्रतिपादनात् । किञ्च यत्प्रदेशे जीवास्सन्ति तत्प्रदेशे नेश्वर इति
न स्यादीश्वरस्य सर्वव्यापित्वमपि । प्रकृतिपुरुषसंयुक्तेश्वरस्य प्रकृतिवियुक्त-
पुरुषस्य वा कथं साम्यम् ? यदि मुक्तजीवेश्वरयोः क्वचिदंशे साम्य
क्वचिदंशे वैषम्यमित्युच्यते, तर्हि बद्धजीवेश्वरयोरपि ज्ञातृत्वनित्यत्वा-
द्यंशे साम्यमस्त्येवेति व्यर्थं स्यात्

मम साधर्म्यमागताः

इति वचनम् । आगतेः प्रागेव साधर्म्यसत्त्वादिति ॥

न च

यथोदकं शुद्धे शुद्धमासिक्तं तादृगेव भवति ।

एवं मुनेर्विजानत आत्मा भवति गौतम ॥

इति श्रुतिरिह प्रमाणमिति वाच्यम्, शुद्धस्योदकस्येव शुद्धस्यात्मनो न भेदः । यस्तूपाधिप्रयुक्तो भेदः स उपाधिनाशात् इति जीवस्य ब्रह्माभेद एव तच्छ्रुतित्वात्पर्यात् । कलशे गृहीतं गङ्गोदकं गङ्गायां पुनः कलशादवतारितं चेद्गङ्गाभेदमेवायाति गङ्गातः कलशोदकस्य यो भेदकः कलशात्मक उपाधिस्तस्य त्यागात् । न तु गङ्गासाम्यम्प्रयाति, साम्यस्य तत्रादर्शनात् । साम्यं हि वस्तुद्वयोपलब्ध्यधीनम् । प्रकृते तु जलरूप-मेकमेव वस्तूपलभ्यत इति कथं साम्यावकाशः? एवमीश्वरचैतन्याजीव-चैतन्यस्य यो भेदक उपाधिरन्तःकरणात्मकस्तस्य विधया नाशे सति जीवचैतन्यमीश्वरचैतन्याभेदमेव प्रपद्यते, न तु साम्यम्, भेदकाभावेन भेदाभावात् । न ह्यन्तःकरणनाशानन्तरं चैतन्यस्योपलम्भः, येन साम्यस्यावकाशः स्यात्, उपाधिसद्भावदशायामेव जीवेश्वरयोः साम्यं ज्ञातृत्वादिरूपम्, न तूपाधिरहित्ये इति, न प्रकृतश्रुतेर्जीवेश्वरसाध्यप्रति-पादकत्वम्, किन्तु तदभेदप्रतिपादकत्वमेव । न हि घटे नष्टे सति घटा-काशमहाकाशयोः साम्यम्भवितुमर्हति, किन्त्वभेद एव । न च तादृशेवेति तादृक् शब्दस्वारस्यात् साम्यपरत्वं श्रुतेरिति वाच्यम्, तादृक् शब्दस्यापि तदभेद एव तात्पर्यात् । न हि न्यायविरुद्धमर्थं श्रुतिरप्यभिप्रेयात् । नापि

परेण परधर्मा च भवत्येव समेत्य वै ।

इति वसिष्ठसंहितानुसारात् साम्यस्वीकार इति वाच्यम्, किमुपाधिं परित्यज्य परेण समेति जीव उतापरित्यज्य? यदि परित्यज्य समेति तर्हि परधर्मा भवतीत्यस्य पराभेदं प्राप्नोतीत्येवार्थः । द्वितीये तु परसदृश-धर्म इत्येवार्थः । अस्मिन् पक्षे तु समेत्येत्यस्यानुपपत्तिः । सति भेदकोपाधौ तत्सङ्गत्ययोगात् । न च घटपटयोरिव सङ्गतिरिह वाच्या, निरवयवा-सङ्गचैतन्यस्य तादृशसङ्गायोगात् ॥

यदि तु शङ्खचक्रादिमानीश्वरोऽत्र परशब्देन विवक्षितः, तर्हि समेत्येत्यस्य सान्निध्यं प्राप्येत्यर्थः । सगुणमुक्तश्चायं जीवः करणकलेव-

रादिमानेवेति स्वयमपि शङ्खचक्रादिमत्त्वरूपमीश्वरसाधर्म्यं प्राप्नुयादेव ।
तस्मान्नेयं स्मृतिर्जीविश्वराभेदं श्रुतिशतसिद्धं निरोद्घुमीष्ट इति । किञ्च

यो वै भूमा तदमृतम्

इति श्रुतिरमृतशब्दस्य भूमब्रह्मवाचित्वे सति तमर्थं विहाय जीवब्रह्म-
भेदं कल्पयित्वा जीवरूपमर्थं वर्णयतस्तव साहसिक्यं प्रति को नाम बुधो
न विस्मयेतेति ॥

ABHEDAḤ PARAMAM SĀMYAM

(Non-difference is Supreme Identity)

by

Bhāṣyabhāvajña V. R. Kalyānasundara Śāstri

English translation by

Dr. R. Balasubramanian

(Contd. from Vol. X, No. 2)

ABHEDA PARANAMI SHIVAM

(A Treatise on the Unity of God)

BY

BRHAGWANATHA S. K. KALYANACHARYA

English translation by

Dr. R. Balasubramanian

(Contd. from Vol. 2, No. 51)

and "Reaching the highest light, he appears in his own form" (*Chāndogya*, VIII, iii, 4). These texts which convey the same meaning declare that one who is free from name and form and thereby free from differences arising therefrom becomes a mode of Brahman by virtue of oneness in respect of knowledge. In respect of the oneness of the mode (with Brahman), the oneness of reality is in the primary sense as in the case of "This is that cow." This argument is untenable. The statement, "One reaches the *Puruṣa*..." refers to *sāyujya*. It cannot be said that proximity to the place, etc., are spoken of, for in that case it should not have been said that "one reaches the *Puruṣa*." The explanation of the word "*Puruṣa*" as "proximity to the *Puruṣa*," etc., is untenable. It cannot be said that "reaching the *Puruṣa*" means "union with the *Puruṣa*", for union with the supreme Self which is devoid of parts and action by the individual self which is also of the same nature is untenable. Thus, the *śruti* text (which speaks about the taintless soul attaining supreme *sāmya*) has its purport only in *sāyujya*. In the same way, the meaning of the *śruti* text (which speaks about *param jyotiḥ*) is: The liberated person attaining the highest light, *i.e.* the highest Brahman, appears in his own form, *i.e.* remains as the Self which is *sat*, *cit* and *ānanda*. Thus since there is harmony in the meaning conveyed by the above mentioned *śruti* texts, even the text, "The knower of Brahman becomes Brahman itself," should be explained directly as it is (in the primary sense) and not in the secondary sense. The contention that "The knower of Brahman becomes Brahman itself" means "The knower of Brahman becomes equal to Brahman," and so, to say that the knower of Brahman becomes a mode of Brahman is to resort to secondary meaning.

Further, the recognition, "This is that cow," conveys the sense of the identity of the cow by abandoning the incompatible meanings of the words, 'this' and 'that'. Since the text, "The knower of Brahman becomes Brahman itself," is not of the nature of recognition, the case of the cow should not be given as an example. To speak of identity on the basis of similarity of form is due to illusion. On the basis of the similarity in form between the two brothers, Devadatta and Yajñadatta, if a person on seeing Devadatta perceives him as Yajñadatta, that perception is, indeed, erroneous. Thus, on the basis of the similarity between Brahman and the knower of Brahman, to say that one perceives Brahman when one sees the knower of Brahman is erroneous perception. It is not possible to say that this kind of erroneous perception takes place in the *Upaniṣad* which is respected as authority. Hence, the liberated person is non-different from Brahman itself, because the *upādhi* to cause difference between them is absent. It cannot be said that there is name-and-form *upādhi* which is *aprākṛta* to cause difference between them; since all kinds of difference through name-and-form are *prākṛta*, there is no evidence for the existence of name-and-form which is *aprākṛta*. It is no argument to say that *vai-kunṭhaloka* is *aprākṛta* and that name-and-form existing therein is *aprākṛta*; for, since that (name-and-form) too is perceived, it is nothing but *māyā*. It cannot be said that, since it is of the nature of *śuddha-sattva*, it is *aprākṛta*, for the *śuddha-sattva* also, like *malina-sattva*, is a transformation of *prakṛti*. Even though there is gradation caused by the non-abundance and abundance of happiness as we compare the mortal world with *deva-*

loka, and *deva-loka* with *brahma-loka*, there is no difference among them in the sense of *prākṛta* and *aprākṛta*, because all of these (worlds) are products of *prakṛti*. If it be said that "the supreme abode of Viṣṇu" is *aprākṛta*, it can be accepted. It should not, however, be said that that abode is *Vaikunṭha-loka* alone, for the word "*pada*" conveys the meaning of essential nature. Its essential nature is Brahman which is *sat*, *cit*, and *ānanda*; and that alone is the nature of the *jīva*. Not realizing its nature because of *ajñāna*, it thinks of itself such as "I am a man" and so on; and so on account of *adhyāsa* (superimposition), it is in bondage. But knowing its nature through attaining knowledge, it removes *adhyāsa* and remains in its essential nature; and so there is non-difference between *jīva* and Brahman in the state of liberation.

From what has been stated above, it follows that the statement of the *Bhagavadgītā*, "They have attained unity with Me..." (XIV, 2) has to be interpreted in the same way. Moreover, the explanation of "unity" as "similarity" is untenable. Thus, the *jīva* who is parviscient and other-dependent, who has limited power, who is subject to control, who is not the creator of the world, who is devoid of qualities, who is atomic in size, and who is small cannot be similar to the supreme Self who is omniscient and omnipotent, who is the Lord and controller of all, who is the source, support, and end of the entire universe, and who is the abode of all auspicious qualities. Even in the state of liberation, the *jīva* who is atomic and parviscient cannot be associated with the qualities of *Īsvara* such as omniscience and the inner controllership of all beings. It cannot be said that the *jīva* is all-pervasive in the state of liberation; if that were the case, the

many, all-pervasive liberated souls should reside in the hearts of all beings like Īsvara. This, however, is not accepted, because it has been said, "O Arjuna, Īsvara abides in the hearts of all beings;" and also because it has not been stated anywhere that all the liberated souls reside in the hearts of all; and also because it comes into conflict with sections such as "*antaryāmi-brāhmaṇa*" which establish that Īsvara who is one resides in all beings. If there are many rulers, what will a *jīva*, who is in bondage do? If there are many Īsvaras who are rulers, how can there be the talk of one Īsvara? It is no argument to say that, even though the liberated *jīvas* are all-pervasive, they remain quiet without being controlled; in that case they cannot be equal to Īsvara. If the liberated souls are not controlled by Īsvara, it will result in Īsvara not being the ruler of all. But if He controls them, there will be no difference between bondage and liberation. The presence of Īsvara in our hearts is inferred through the reason of His controlling us; but, what is the *pramāṇa* through which His presence in all the liberated souls is known? Not through any *pramāṇa* at all. It cannot be said that it is known through scripture, for nowhere has it been said in the scripture that all the liberated souls reside, like Īsvara, in the hearts of all beings. Further, in the place where *jīvas* are present, Īsvara cannot be present; then it will result in Īsvara, not being omniscient. How can Īsvara who is associated with *prakṛti* and *jīva* be equal to the *jīva* who is devoid of *prakṛti*? If it be said that there is similarity in some respects and dissimilarity in some other respects between the liberated soul and Īsvara, in that case on account of similarity between the bound *jīva* and Īsvara in


respect of cognizership and eternality, the statement "They (who have resorted to this knowledge) have attained unity with me" will be futile, for there is unity or oneness even prior to resorting to this knowledge.

It cannot be said that the *śruti* text, "Oh Gautama! as pure water poured on pure water becomes verily the same, so also does become the Self of the man of knowledge who is given to deliberation," (*Kaṭhōpaniṣad*, II, i, 14) is the *pramāṇa* in this regard; for, as in the case of pure water, there is also in the case of the pure Self there is no difference. The purport of this *śruti* text is that, since the difference (between the *jīva* and Brahman) is caused by the *upādhi*, it disappears when the *upādhi* is destroyed, and so the *jīva* is non-different from Brahman. The water from the *Gaṅgā* collected in a vessel becomes one with the *Gaṅgā* when it is let into the *Gaṅgā* from the vessel, for the *upādhi*, viz., the vessel which has differentiated the water in the vessel from the *Gaṅgā* is no more there. It does not become similar to the *Gaṅgā*, for the similarity is not perceived. Indeed, similarity is dependent on two objects. In this case, since only one object, viz., the water, is apprehended, how can there be similarity? Thus, since the *upādhi*, viz., the internal organ which differentiates the *jīva*-consciousness from Īsvara-consciousness is destroyed through knowledge, the *jīva*-consciousness and Īsvara-consciousness become, indeed, non-different; they do not become similar to each other; for, there cannot be any difference in the absence of the differentiator. Subsequent to the destruction of the internal organ, there is no duality of consciousness, and so there is no scope for similarity. Therefore, only during the state when there is the *upādhi*, it is possible to speak of similarity, such as

cognizership, between the *jīva* and *Īsvara*, and not when the *upādhi* is absent; and so the present *śruti* text does not seek to establish similarity between the *jīva* and *Īsvara*. On the contrary, it establishes their non-difference alone. Indeed, when the pot is destroyed, there cannot be similarity between the ether in the pot and the great ether outside, but only non-difference. It cannot be said that this *śruti* text has its purport only in similarity on account of the meaning of the word “*tādr̥k*”, as there is the expression “*tādr̥geva*” in the text. Since the import of the word “*tādr̥k*” is in non-difference between them, *śruti* too will not convey a meaning which is opposed to reasoning. Nor can it be said that the sense of similarity should be construed following the statement contained in the *Vasiṣṭha-saṁhitā*, “Being united with the supreme, the *jīva*, indeed, becomes endowed with the nature of the supreme.” Does it mean that the *jīva* becomes similar to the supreme reality by abandoning the *upādhi* or without abandoning it? If it becomes similar (to the supreme reality) by abandoning it, then the expression “*paradharmū bhavati*” means “*parūbhedam prāpnoti*,” i.e. attains non-difference with the supreme reality. If the latter, it means the attainment of a nature similar to that of the supreme reality; and in this case the expression “*sametya*” (being united) is untenable. When there is the differentiating *upādhi*, unity (with the Supreme) is untenable. Union as in the case of a pot and a cloth is not what is stated here, for this kind of union is not possible in the case of consciousness which is partless and unattached.

If it be said that *Īsvara* who possesses conch, disc, etc., is meant by the word “*para*”, then the word “*sametya*” means having attained “*sānnidhya*”

(proximity.) The *jīva* who has attained *saguṇa-mukti* is in possession of the organs, body, etc., and so he too attains a form possessing conch, disc, etc., similar to that of *Īsvara*. Therefore, this *smṛti* text will not prevent the non-difference between the *jīva* and *Īsvara* which is established by hundreds of *śruti* texts. Further, even though *śruti* text, "Verily, the infinite is the immortal" (*Chāndogya*, VII, xxiv, 1) conveys, by the word "*amṛta*", the infinite Brahman, you give up the meaning conveyed by it and suggest difference between the *jīva* and Brahman. Which learned man will not laugh at your audacity in suggesting the sense of *jīva* (for the word *amṛta*)?



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१ संसाराध्वनि तापभानुकिरणप्रोद्भूतदाहव्यथा-
 खिन्नानां जलकाङ्क्षया मरुभुवि भ्रान्त्या परिभ्राम्यताम् ।
 अत्यासन्नसुधाम्बुधिं सुखकरं ब्रह्माद्वयं दर्शय-
 त्पेषा शङ्करभारती विजयते निर्वाणसन्दायिनी ॥

samsārādhvani tāpabhānukiraṇaprodhūtadāhavyathā-
khinnānāṃ jalakāṅkṣayā marubhuvī bhrāntyā
paribhrāmyatām
atyāsannasudhāmbudhiṃ sukhakaraiṃ brahmādvayaṃ
darśayaty-
eṣā śaṅkarabhārati vijayate nirvāṇasandāyini.

To those who are afflicted, in the way of the world, by the burning pain given rise to by the scorching sun-shafts of misery, and who through delusion wander about in the desert (of worldliness) seeking water — showing the felicitous ocean of nectar, which is very near, the non-dual *Brahman*, this — the Voice of Śaṅkara — is victorious, leading, as it does, to liberation.