

A QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ADVAITA VEDANTA

The VOICE of **ŚĀṆKARĀ**

śaṅkara-bhāratī

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C. K. Kavyanasundara Sastry

Editor
N. C. Krishnan

Volume ELEVEN
Number FOUR



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1987

esā śaṅkara-bhāratī vijayate
nirvāṇa-sandāyini

victorious is the voice of śaṅkara,
leading, as it does, to liberation

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HOMAGE TO ŚAṄKARA

[117]

प्रणम्रान्तरङ्गाब्जबोधप्रदात्रे
दिवारात्रमव्याहतोस्त्राय कामम् ।
क्षपेशाय चित्राय लक्ष्मक्षयाभ्यां
विहीनाय कुर्मो नमः शङ्कराय ॥

praṇamrāntaraṅgābja-bodhapradātre
divārātram-avyāhatosrāya kāmam
kṣapeśāya citrāya lakṣmakṣayābhyāṁ
vihīnāya kurmo namaḥ śaṅkarāya.

Let us bow to Śrī Śaṅkara, who makes the lotus-heart of his devotees bloom with knowledge, whose brilliance is ever-effulgent throughout day and night, and who is a wonderful Moon (the Lord of night — the dispeller of darkness), spotless and undecaying.

[118]

प्रणम्रास्यपाथोजमोदप्रदात्रे
 सदान्तस्तमस्तोमसंहारकर्त्रे ।
 रजन्यामपीद्धप्रकाशाय कुर्मो
 ह्यपूर्वाय पूष्णे नमः शङ्कराय ॥

pranamrāsya-pāthoja-modapradātre
sadāntastamastoma-saṁhāarakartre
rajanyāmapīddha-prakāśāya kurmo
hyapūrvāya pūṣṇe namaḥ śaṅkarāya.

Let us bow to Śrī Śaṅkara, who is a very rare Pūṣan — Sun God, who makes the lotus-like faces of his devotees pleased, who destroys always the ignorance (darkness) of his devotees, and who shines with charming brilliance even at night.

Jagadguru Śrī Saccidānandaśivābhinava Nṛsimhabhārati
 in Śrī Śaṅkarācāryabhujāṅgaprayāntastotra

ON JĪVANMUKTA*

Śrī Śaṅkara Bhagavatpāda

[1]

यथास्थितमिदं सर्वं व्यवहारवतोऽपि च ।
अस्तं गतं स्थितं व्योम स जीवन्मुक्त उच्यते ॥

That person to whom the world comprising ether and other objects ceases to be, even though he is engaged in all the activities of the world as usual, is said to be a *jīvanmukta*.

[2]

नोदेति नास्तमायाति सुखदुःखे मनःप्रभा ।
यथाप्राप्तस्थितिर्यस्य स जीवन्मुक्त उच्यते ॥

That person in whose mind pleasure and pain do not appear and disappear and whose life is in harmony with the world as it is, is said to be a *jīvanmukta*.

*Extract from the *Sarvavedāntasiddhāntasārasaṅgraha*, 967-979.
Translated by Dr V.K.S.N. Raghavan

[3]

यो जागर्ति सुषुप्तिस्थो यस्य जाग्रन्न विद्यते ।
यस्य निर्वासनो बोधः स जीवन्मुक्त उच्यते ॥

That person who is (spiritually) awake in sleep, who has no waking state (like others), and whose consciousness is free from all *vāsanās*, is said to be a *jīvanmukta*.

[4]

रागद्वेषभयादीनामनुरूपं चरन्नपि ।
योऽन्तर्व्योमवदत्यच्छः स जीवन्मुक्त उच्यते ॥

That person whose mind is pure like *ākāśa*, even though his actions seem to be in accordance with likes and dislikes, is said to be a *jīvanmukta*.

[5]

यस्य नाहंकृतो भावो बुद्धिर्यस्य न लिप्यते ।
कुर्वतोऽकुर्वतो वापि स जीवन्मुक्त उच्यते ॥

That person whose mind is not touched by the sense of "I", whether he is engaged in action or is quiet, is said to be a *jīvanmukta*.

[6]

यः समस्तार्थजालेषु व्यवहार्यपि शीतलः ।
परार्थेष्विव पूर्णात्मा स जीवन्मुक्त उच्यते ॥

That person who remains as the infinite Self, who though engaged in the various activities of life, remains cool and unattached as in the case of the activities of others, is said to be a *jīvanmukta*.

[7]

द्वैतवर्जितचिन्मात्रे पदे परमपावने ।

अक्षुब्धचित्तविश्रान्तः स जीवन्मुक्त उच्यते ॥

That person is said to be a *jīvanmukta*, who has a free and unagitated mind, who has reached the goal (abode) of supreme purity, constituted by pure consciousness alone and devoid of duality.

[8]

इदं जगदयं सोऽयं दृश्यजातमवास्तवम् ।

यस्य चित्ते न स्फुरति स जीवन्मुक्त उच्यते ॥

That person is said to be a *jīvanmukta* in whose mind there is no trace of duality as 'this world,' 'this person', 'this person is such', because all those seen as such only are unreal.

[9]

चिदात्माहं परात्माहं निर्गुणोऽहं परात्परः ।

आत्ममात्रेण यस्तिष्ठेत्स जीवन्मुक्त उच्यते ॥

That person is said to be a *jīvanmukta* who remains as *ātman* alone, realizing "I am *ātman*", "I am consciousness," "I am the supreme *ātman*," "I am free from *guṇas*," and "I am greater than the great."

[10]

देहत्रयातिरिक्तोऽहं शुद्धचैतन्यमस्म्यहम् ।

ब्रह्माहमिति यस्यान्तः स जीवन्मुक्त उच्यते ॥

That person is said to be a *jīvanmukta*, who realises in his mind "I am beyond the three *dehas* (of gross, subtle and causal nature)," "I am the pure consciousness," and "I am Brahman."

[11]

यस्य देहादिकं नास्ति यस्य ब्रह्मेति निश्चयः ।
परमानन्दपूर्णो यः स जीवन्मुक्त उच्यते ॥

That person is said to be a *jīvanmukta* who is free from the limitations of body, etc., who is firmly established in Brahman, and who is full of supreme bliss.

[12]

अहं ब्रह्मास्म्यहं ब्रह्मास्म्यहं ब्रह्मेति निश्चयः ।
चिदहं चिदहं चेति स जीवन्मुक्त उच्यते ॥

That person is said to be a *jīvanmukta* whose firm conviction is "I am Brahman," and "I am pure consciousness."

[13]

जीवन्मुक्तिपदं त्यक्त्वा स्वदेहे कालासात्कृते ।
विशत्यदेहमुक्तित्वं पवनोऽस्पन्दतामिव ॥

The *jīvanmukta*, in due course, leaves his mortal coil and attains the state of *videhamukti*. His attainment of the latter state is comparable to the wind attaining calmness.

ELUCIDATION OF CONTENTMENT*

T. M. P. Mahadevan

The *Tr̥pti-dīpa* of the *Pañcadaśī* is devoted to a description of calm contentment and supreme satisfaction that are consequent upon *Brahman*-knowledge. In its march from ignorance to enlightenment the self is said to pass through seven stages. The seventh and the final stage is the state of release where there is the supreme felicity, the peace of eternity. The *Tr̥pti-dīpa* gives us a glowing account of the final state of felicity as also of the steps that lead thereto. It is in the form of a commentary on the scriptural text which declares: "If the *puruṣa* knows the self as 'this am I', then desiring what and for whose desire should it suffer along with the body?"¹

The import of this scriptural passage is, herein, clearly explained, whereby it becomes patent how the one who is released in embodiment enjoys the state of satisfaction.

*Courtesy: T.M.P. Mahadevan, *The Pañcadaśī of Bhāratī-tīrtha Vidyāranya*, Centre for Advanced Study in Philosophy, University of Madras, 1975, pp. 93-135.

1. *Nature of Creation*

As an introduction to the explanation of what the word '*puruṣa*' stands for, an account of the nature of creation is given. Creation, according to Advaita, is illusory manifestation. It is neither real transformation nor production *de novo*. *Māyā* is the prius of creation. It shows forth illusorily the *jīva* and the Lord as mere appearances. The *jīva* and the Lord are superimpositions, and by them are all other things superimposed. Scripture declares: "*(prakṛti)* creates the *jīva* and the Lord as reflections; it becomes both *māyā* and nescience."² Both the *jīva* and the Lord are non-real manifestations; they are the products of *māyā*; and in their turn they produce the entire universe. The macrocosmic universe which begins with the 'thought' of the Lord and ends with his 'entry' in the form of the *jīva* is the product of the Lord. Scripture declares: "It thought: 'let me become many,'" and then, "the self having entered in the form of the *jīva*," etc.' The cosmos has its origination in the Lord's contemplation and finds its completion in the production of *jīva*-hood. Of the entire external world of animate and inanimate objects, the Lord is the artificer. Of the internal world of transmigratory existence which begins in the state of waking and ends in release, the *jīva* is the author. The *jīva* is the progenitor of its own microcosmic world. "That *jīva*, being deluded by *māyā* and depending on the body, creates everything. In waking it alone finds satisfaction in the manifold objects of enjoyment like woman, food, drink, etc."³ In the state of waking the *jīva* delights itself with external objects. "Even in dream which is the world produced by its own *māyā*, the *jīva* is the enjoyer of pleasure and pain." If in waking the *jīva* sports with

the external world, in dream the sphere of its ravings is the internal world of fiction and fancy. "During the time of sleep when everything is dissolved, it obtains happiness suppressed by *tamas*." "And again due to conjunction with the deeds of the past birth, the same *jīva* dreams and wakes. The *jīva* who sports in these three spheres, of it, indeed, is the entire manifold born." The *jīva* is tossed from one birth to another, from one state to another, like the weaver's shuttle, without cessation. It lives in the cocoon of its own making. From death to death it travels by the force of its delusion. But when it frees itself from the shackles of ignorance, it is no more taunted by transmigration; there is no longer any misery for it. "That which shines in the world of waking, dream, sleep, etc., that *Brahman* I am; knowing thus (he) is released from all bondage." Release which is brought about by knowledge is the end of transmigration. Of the transmigratory life which begins in waking and comes to a close in release, the *jīva* is the agent. It forges its own bonds, and finally frees itself from its own fetters.

2. *Puruṣa*

Having described the nature of creation, the meaning of the word '*puruṣa*' is explained. The self of the nature of immutable non-attached intelligence is the locus of delusion. The same self as reflected in the intellect owing to reciprocal superimposition is spoken of in the *śruti* as the '*puruṣa*'. The bare *jīva* is not meant by the word '*puruṣa*'. The *jīva* as based on the self alone is eligible for release, etc. In fact, no delusion is experienced without a locus thereof. When the *jīva* as conjoined with the locus-element takes hold of the delusion-element, it begins to have the conceit 'I am

the subject of transmigration.' The presentation of illusory silver is dependent on the substrateness of nacre. Only in conjunction with the this-element of nacre is the delusion-element of silver presented. But when the delusion-element is discarded, when the substrate becomes the principal factor of experience, then there is the realization as 'I am the non-attached intelligence-self.'

It may be objected that as the non-attached self is not the object of the cognition 'I', it does not stand to reason to use the word 'I' in respect of it. This objection is not sound. The word 'I' has three senses. One of them is the principal and the other two are secondary. The principal usage of the word 'I' is with regard to the combined-form of the immutable self and the reflection of intelligence. Due to reciprocal superimposition, the vulgar identify the immutable with the reflection, and designate this combined form as 'I'. But those who know the truth discriminate between the permanent self and the perishing reflection. When they talk in terms of scripture they use the word 'I' in respect of the former. And in empirical usage they designate the latter as 'I'. Though the same concept is used for both of them, they do not confound the two. When in empirical usage the enlightened say 'I go' etc., what they mean by the concept 'I' is the reflection of intelligence as distinct from the immutable self. But from the point of view of scripture they use the concept 'I' in 'I am non-attached, I am the intelligence-self', etc., only in respect of the bare immutable self. The denotation of 'I' through secondary implication is the eternal self.

It may be said that since knowledge as well as ignorance belong only to the reflection of intelligence

and not to the self it cannot be asserted of the self that it *knows* as 'I am the immutable'; and that it is ridiculous to say that the knowledge 'I am the immutable' belongs to the reflection of intelligence, for the reflection is not the prototype, the shadow is not the substance. This objection is not sound. There is no reality for the reflection apart from that of the prototype. The reflection of intelligence is of the nature of the immutable alone. Since its being a reflection is only apparent, its immutability alone remains as the eternal reality. According to the *ābhāsavāda*, the locus of the reflection of intelligence is the immutable intelligence defined by the internal organ. The reflection which is superimposed is not different from the substrate of superimposition. When the reflection-ness of the reflection is sublated, the immutable alone remains. Between *Brahman* and the immutable there is apposition in the principal sense; and between the immutable and the reflection of intelligence there is apposition through sublation.

If it be said that even the cognition 'I am the immutable' is illusory, since it belongs to the illusory reflection of intelligence, it is a contingency of the acceptable. When it is known that the rope-snake is unreal, the reality of its movement is nowhere admitted. If the snake be a fiction then its movement must also be a fiction and not a fact. When it is declared of the reflection of intelligence that it is illusory, its knowledge must also be illusory. Indeed, one cannot eat the cake and keep it too.

It is no doubt true that even the cognition 'I am the immutable' is illusory. But this knowledge is quite efficient to remove transmigration and its attendant

misery. Both the establisher and sublatter must belong to the same genus as their object. The dream-appetite can be satiated only by the dream-food. No amount of real food can satisfy the hunger felt in the dream. Similarly empirically felt needs can be satisfied only by empirical remedies, not otherwise. There is a saying in the world: "Offer oblations to suit the *yakṣa*." As is the ailment, so should the remedy be. An illusory disease can be removed by an illusory antidote. Dream is destroyed by the dream-created tiger. In the same way, knowledge, though illusory, is capable of destroying ignorance and its consequent misery of transmigratory existence. There is no discrepancy whatever in the *puruṣa*, which is related to the immutable, discriminating itself from the immutable and cognizing as 'I am the immutable.' This is the truth taught in the the scriptural passage by the word '*asmi*' (I am).

3. *Seven Stages*

The scriptural text speaks of the self as 'this' because the self is to be immediately experienced. Just as we have clear perception of the body as 'I am a *brāhmaṇa*' etc., we should have cognition, more immediate than the immediacy of perception, of the self as 'I am the immutable self,' etc. Śaṅkara in the *Upadeśa-sāhasrī* says: "He for whom there is, like the cognition of the body, knowledge of the self which is the sublatter of the body-cognition, is released even without his will."

If it be said that the word 'this' indicates the natural immediacy of the self, let it be so; since the self is the self-luminous intelligence, it is ever immediate. The immediacy and self-luminosity of the self do not really conflict with our ignorance of it. Mediacy and

immediacy, knowledge and ignorance, both of them are intelligible in respect of the self. Once ten companions, after crossing a swollen river, counted themselves. The man who counted without reckoning himself counted only nine. Though his person was most immediate in existence to him, nay, identical in existence with him, he did not know that he was the tenth. A passerby who happened to observe the unnecessary commotion that prevailed among these comrades accosted them with the words: "There is among you the tenth man." Then he addressed the man who counted and said "you are the tenth." The pilgrimage in ignorance is analogous to the travel of these comrades. Though the self is most immediate and intimate we are in thorough ignorance with regard to it. The statement 'There is no self' very common among the ignorant is comparable to the sobs and sighs of the man who counted and said 'There is not the tenth person; he is not to be seen.' This is a product of ignorance; the learned call it the obscuration brought about by ignorance. The ten travellers not finding the tenth person began to weep and shout 'The tenth man was drowned in the river,' etc. The crying, etc., of these comrades are referred to by those who know as 'projection,' a product of ignorance. The words of the passerby "The tenth man is not dead; he is here" gave them mediate knowledge like the knowledge of heaven, etc. When the trustworthy person counted them and said pointing to the man who had originally counted 'You are the tenth,' then there was immediate cognition of himself which put an end to the state of misery which they were in. There was mirth in the place of gloom peals of laughter in the place of pain and misery. In the example given above

seven stages are discernible: ignorance, obscuration, projection, mediate knowledge, immediate experience, the removal of misery, and contentment. These seven stages can be observed in the pilgrimage of the self.

The reflection of intelligence with its mind attached to transmigration does not know the reality of its existence, namely, the self-luminous immutable. This is its ignorance of its own inner nature. This is the starting point of its progress to perfection. The reflection incidentally says: "There is not the immutable; it does not appear," and proceeds to assert: "I am the agent; I am the enjoyer." While the former is due to obscuration, the latter is due to projection. The existence of the self is first obscured, and then qualities like agency and enjoyership which are not inherent in the self are superimposed on the self. Either due to scriptural testimony or due to the grace of the preceptor there is at first mediate knowledge in the form "The immutable exists;" and then, through inquiry there results the immediate experience: "I alone am the immutable." These two are the fourth and the fifth stages in the quest for truth. When there is the immediate experience of the true nature of the self, there is the relinquishment of the assemblage of misery and pain like agency and enjoyership; and there dawn supreme happiness and divine contentment, for what is to be done has been done and what is to be attained has been attained. This is the twofold fruit of the tree of knowledge — the removal of misery and the reaching of bliss. These, then, are the seven stages: ignorance, obscuration, projection, mediate cognition, immediate experience, release from misery, and unexcellible bliss. These seven are the states not of the self, but of the reflection of intelligence, and in them

are included both bondage and release. Of them, the first three, *viz.*, ignorance, obscuration, and projection are together the cause of bondage. Ignorance is that state of indifference which exists prior to inquiry in the form 'I do not know'. Non-knowledge is the cause of the empirical usage of indifference. Inquiry conducted on wrong data yields the conclusion 'The self does not exist; it does not appear.' This empirical usage of what is contrary to truth is the product of obscuration. The form of the reflection of intelligence which possesses two bodies is called the projection. The host of misery, like agency, etc., called transmigrating which is the cause of bondage, is the product of the projection of ignorance. Although both ignorance and obscuration are established prior to projection, they belong to projection alone, and not to the self. Even prior to the actual production of projection there is its impression; hence there is no contradiction in stating that ignorance and obscuration are the states of projection, *i.e.*, the reflection of intelligence. It cannot be objected that since ignorance, etc., are superimposed on *Brahman* they are the states of *Brahman*, for all states—not only these—are superimposed on *Brahman* alone. If it be said that the states subsequent to projection as expressed by the statements, "I am the transmigrating individual; I am enlightened; I am free from misery; I am contented", appear to be inherent in the *jīva* and not in *Brahman*; then even the prior states of ignorance and obscuration, "I am ignorant; the existence and presentation of *Brahman* are not seen by me," etc., appear certainly to be inherent in the *jīva*. Equally with the other states even ignorance and obscuration seem to be dependent on the *jīva*. The preceptors have taught that *Brahman*

is the abode of ignorance because it is the substrate of the latter. Ignorance is here declared to be the state of the *jīva* because of the conceit of the *jīva* in ignorance.

The twofold knowledge — mediate and immediate — removes ignorance; and with the destruction of ignorance perish its products, the two kinds of obscuration: "It does not appear; it does not exist." By mediate knowledge is destroyed the cause of the obscuration of the existence of the self; and by immediate experience is removed the other obscuration, namely the non-appearance of the self. Since the superimposition of the *jīva*-hood is discarded with the destruction of obscuration, the entire transmigration — misery which is another name for it — consisting of agency, etc., is removed without a trace. When, thus, all misery is dispelled and the self's nature of eternal freedom is revealed, and as there is not even the remotest possibility of the revival of misery, there is unexcellible bliss, unalloyed happiness.

A discussion of the seven states had to be entered upon because the scriptural text which is being commented on in the present article purports to teach that immediate experience and removal of misery are dependent on the *jīva*.

4. *Mediate and Immediate Knowledge*

It was said that the significance of the word "this" is to indicate that the self is the content of immediate experience. The meaning of immediacy here is twofold. The self is said to be immediate because it is self-luminous; it is a content of immediate experience because it is cognized by a mode of the intellect.

Immediacy in the sense of the self-luminosity of the self does not conflict with the mediate cognition of the self. The self does not cease to be self-luminous when it is mediately cognized; for even the mediate cognition is of the form that the self is self-luminous. When there is not the cognition "I am *Brahman*," but when there is the cognition "*Brahman* exists," it is called mediate knowledge. This mediate knowledge is not illusory, because its sublation cannot be demonstrated. It can be sublated only by the evidence which says, "*Brahman* does not exist;" but such evidence is nowhere found. Hence it is wrong to maintain that mediate knowledge is illusory. If it be said that the mediate knowledge is illusory because it does not have the specific nature of *Brahman* for its content, then even the cognition of heaven whose content is only of the general form as "heaven exists" and not the specific form as "this is heaven" must be illusory. Then it may be said that mediate knowledge is illusory because it has for its content *Brahman* which is the content of immediate experience. This is not true. Even the mediate knowledge does not present *Brahman* to be mediate. The knowledge under discussion is said to be mediate because it does not give us direct intuitive experience of *Brahman* in the form "This is *Brahman*." If it be said that mediate knowledge is illusory because it does not apprehend an element of its content, then even the cognition of pot, etc., must be illusory because the entire pot is never perceived. Though unlike the pot, *Brahman* is without parts, it seems to be endowed with parts which are ultimately to be excluded. The elements or parts which are to be excluded are the element of non-existence and the element of non-appearance. The former is removed by mediate

knowledge and the latter by immediate experience. That a content, though immediate, can be mediately known is well exemplified by the story of the ten travellers. When the trustworthy person tells the travellers that there is the tenth man, he is not deluding them. Similarly, the statement "*Brahman* exists" is not erroneous. In both the cases there is the obscuration of ignorance.

A bare statement yields only mediate knowledge. But when the meaning of the statement is inquired into, the specific nature of the content becomes explicit with the result that there arises immediate experience. When the full purport of the sentence "The self is *Brahman*" is cognized after a thorough inquiry, *Brahman* becomes the content of immediate experience. In the example of the travellers also we find that there is the experience of the immediate presence of the tenth person only after an enquiry. When the trustworthy person is questioned as to who the tenth man is, he counts all the ten and reveals to them the tenth man who was all the time there alone. The cognition which is thus obtained after inquiry is never destroyed. No longer could the travellers harbour the belief that one of them had perished in the floods. Similarly, in the case of *Brahman* there is at first the mediate knowledge of its existence from the scriptural statements like, "In the beginning this was *sat* alone, one only without a second," etc. Then, the major texts like "That thou art," when their purport is clearly understood, reveal the immediacy of *Brahman*. Never more does this knowledge that the self is identical with *Brahman* attain inconstancy. Since the immediacy of *Brahman* is well established, there is no fear of losing the intuitive experience of *Brahman*. That there is mediate know-

ledge from mere statement and immediate knowledge from the statement whose meaning has been inquired into is illustrated in the episode of Bhṛṅgu of the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad*. Understanding *Brahman*, at first, mediately through its characteristic of being the cause of origination, etc., Bhṛṅgu came to have immediate experience of *Brahman* through a searching and prolonged inquiry. Though, in this case, Bhṛṅgu's parent did not instruct his son in the words "That thou art," etc., he pointed out to him the field of inquiry, namely, the five sheaths. Through repeated inquiry into the nature of the sheaths, Bhṛṅgu came to realize that Bliss is *Brahman* and that the self is identical with *Brahman*. After declaring 'reality', 'knowledge', and 'infinity' to be the essential characteristics of *Brahman*, scripture shows that the same infinite *Brahman* is to be known as lying in the cave of the sheaths.

The episode of Indra in the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* is a similar instance in point. Indra, after knowing mediately the characteristics of the self as indicated in the passage, "That self which is devoid of defect, rid of the ravaging effects of age, free from death and misery, etc.," approached his preceptor four times with a view to acquire intuitive experience of the self. The *Aitareya Upaniṣad* indicates *Brahman* mediately in the passage "In the beginning, this was the one only self; nothing else existed", etc., and later by the method of superimpositions and subsequent removal, the *Upaniṣad* imparts an intuitive experience of *Brahman* as being of the nature of intelligence. Mediate cognition of *Brahman* results from all the minor texts of scripture; from the inquiry into the purport of the major texts is derived the immediate experience of *Brahman*. This view is not without support from the preceptors and

pioneers of Advaita. Śaṅkara in his *Vākyavṛtti* states that the major texts are for the sake of the establishment of the immediate experience of *Brahman*. Hence it is wrong to contend that the major texts do not yield immediate insight into the truth. Through inquiry into the purport of the major texts one realizes the identity between the self and *Brahman*. The intelligence defined by the internal organ which is the abode of the word and concept of 'I' is indicated by the word 'thou' in the major text. *Īśvara* who is defined by *māyā*, who is the source of the world, whose characteristics are omniscience, etc., who is conditioned by the quality of mediacy and who is of the nature of reality, etc., is indicated by the word 'that'. When we consider merely the expressed senses of the two words we find that they contradict each other. To one and the same object we would then have to attribute both immediacy and mediacy, finitude and infinitude. Hence, discarding the first meanings of the words, we must probe into their secondary implications. The kind of secondary implication which is applicable to the major texts like 'That thou art' is that which is obtained by relinquishing a part of their primary meaning. As in the case of judgment 'This is that person', in respect of the major texts also the exclusive-non-exclusive implication is to be resorted to. In such cases as these, the express sense either of the related or of the qualified is not intelligible. The sense of the major texts is declared by the learned to be the impartite reality which is of the one consistency of intelligence. The inner intelligence which shines as the witness of all intellects is the self which is unexcellable bliss. There is no other entity besides it. It is all-that-which-is. When in this manner there is the cognition of

the identity between the self and *Brahman*, then alone is removed the non-*Brahmanhood* of the sense of 'thou' and as a consequence, the mediacy of the sense of 'that' ceases. When the non-*Brahmanhood* of 'thou' and mediacy or remoteness of 'that' are removed, there is gained the intuitive insight into the nature of the self which is the fullness of bliss, the sole reality which is without a second. Those who assert that there is only mediate knowledge from the major texts do not really know the purport of scripture. They are quack doctors of philosophy, not real knowers of the truth. Setting aside the final doctrine of scripture, it may be argued that logic tells us that from a sentence only mediate cognition results; that, for example, from a statement about heaven we get only an inferential knowledge about heaven. The argument takes the following syllogistic form: The major text gives only mediate knowledge; because it is a sentence; like the sentence about heaven. This syllogism is not valid, for the *probans* is inconstant in the case of the tenth man in the episode of the travellers. From the statement, "You are the tenth man," there certainly results immediate knowledge. Hence, it is not established that because the major text is a sentence it yields only mediate knowledge. It may be said that if the *jīva*, which is itself immediate, desires the immediacy of *Brahman*, the established immediacy which is inherent in it may perish. But this fear is without any ground, because what the opponent regards as a defect is really a contingency of the acceptable. The individuality of *jīva* is not desired to be maintained. On the contrary, it is the destruction of its individuality that is sought after.

It may be said that the immediacy of the *jīva* is intelligible because the *jīva* is defined by an adjunct,

but not that of *Brahman* because *Brahman* is devoid of adjuncts. This objection is not valid. That *Brahman* is devoid of adjuncts is not established. The cognition of *Brahman* has for its content only that which is defined by adjunct. Until there is final freedom from the shackles of the body, the adjuncts are not removed. The difference between the adjuncts respectively of the *jīva* and of *Brahman* is this, that while the *jīva* is conjoined with the intellect, *Brahman* is free from such conjunction. Conjunction with the intellect is the adjunct of the *jīva*, while non-conjunction with the intellect is the adjunct of *Brahman*. Now, it may be asked: 'A positive fact like the conjunction with the intellect is certainly an adjunct; but how is a negation such as the non-conjunction with the intellect an adjunct?' To this objection, the reply is: 'the definition of adjunct is this: That which is the cause of difference which exists so long as the product lasts is an adjunct.' This definition applies equally to the affirmation and the negation of the conjunction with the intellect. As is affirmation, so is negation an adjunct. Gold is no doubt different from iron. But there is little difference between them when they become the fetters of a man. Conjunction and non-conjunction with the intellect are adjuncts in so far as both of them serve to differentiate the *jīva* from *Brahman*.

That negation is not bare negation, that equally with positive assertion it is instrumental to *Brahman*-knowledge is declared by all the preceptors of Advaita. The function of the Vedāntas is twofold, i.e., through the exclusion of the not-that and through direct affirmation. The exclusion of the not-self is as essential as the positive assertion about the self. A contention may be raised here: "If the Vedāntas teach *Brahman*

through excluding the universe, how could there be the cognition through apposition in the form 'I am *Brahman*', since the sense of 'I' which falls on the side of the not-self is also to be excluded?" To this contention the reply is: Since only a part of the sense of 'I' is relinquished, the statement 'I am *Brahman*' is quite intelligible through exclusive implication. By renouncing the internal organ, the intelligence-witness-self which remains, is seen to be of the nature of *Brahman*. In the statement 'I am *Brahman*', by the word 'I' is meant the self which is free from conjunction with the internal organ.

5. *Brahman-knowledge: Pervasion by Intellect*

The witness, though self-luminous, is in common with the other things pervaded by a mode of the intellect alone. Nor is this tantamount to the relinquishment of the final doctrine of the self-luminosity of *Brahman*. The authors of the sacred teaching have excluded only the pervasion by the fruit, namely the reflection of intelligence in the mental mode. Not the reflection but the mental mode is capable of apprehending the self. The not-self is apprehended both by the mode and by the fruit, the reflection of intelligence, which is present in the mode. By the mode of the intellect, ignorance is destroyed; by the reflection of intelligence the pot is presented. But in the case of *Brahman*, though for the sake of the removal of ignorance the pervasion of the mode is required, there is no necessity for the reflection since *Brahman* shines by its own light. It is a light that was never on sea or land. It lends its lustre even to the luminaries of the firmament. The reflection of intelligence is important to illumine its prototype. For the perception of pot, etc, both the light of the eye and the

lamp-light are required; but for the perception of lamp none except the eye is needed. As in the mode that apprehends the pot, etc., even in the mode which is of the form of *Brahman* there is present the reflection of intelligence. But in the former case the reflection which is not identical with the pot manifests the pot, while in the latter instance the reflection does not appear to be different from *Brahman*. Like the lamp-light in the presence of the noon-day sun, before the mighty effulgence of *Brahman* the borrowed light of the reflection fades into nothingness. Need it than be said that it is powerless to produce in *Brahman* the excellence called manifestation? The text, "Knowing that to be distinctionless, infinite, devoid of *probans* and example, not the the object of the instruments of knowledge, and beginningless, the enlightened are released,"⁶ declares of *Brahman* that it is not pervaded by the fruit. The word '*aprameya*' indicates that *Brahman* is not apprehended by the reflection. The text "By the mind alone is this to be attained; there is no plurality whatsoever"⁷ clearly states that *Brahman* is pervaded by the mode of the intellect.

NOTES

1. *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad*, IV, iv, 12.
2. *Nṛsiṃhottaratāpinyupaniṣad*, 9.
3. *Chāndogyopaniṣad*, IV, ii, 3.
4. *Ibid.*, IV, iii, 2, 3.
5. *Upadeśa-sāhasrī*, verse iii, 5.
6. *Amṛtabindu Upaniṣad*.
7. *Kāthopaniṣad*, iv, 11.

(to be continued)

THE NATURE AND DESTINY OF THE INDIVIDUAL SOUL IN ADVAITA*

N. Veezhinathan

THE NATURE OF THE INDIVIDUAL SOUL (JĪVA)

i. *Jīva — The Blend of the Supreme Self and Avidyā
and Mind*

God (Īsvara), the individual soul (*jīva*), and the world form the subject-matter of all religion and philosophy. According to Advaita, all these three are seeming diversifications of the transcendental entity called Brahman or Ātman which is non-dual and pure consciousness. Advaitins seek to explain the nature of *jīva* in three different ways: *pratibimba-vāda*, *ābhāsa-vāda*, and *avaccheda-vāda*. These three may be explained successively as follows.

Pratibimba-vāda: This view is advocated by Padmapāda in his *Pañcapādikā* and his commentator Prakāśātman in his *Vivaraṇa*. According to this view, *avidyā* which is superimposed on Brahman, the pure

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consciousness, receives its reflection, like a mirror, the reflection of a face. The pure consciousness which serves as prototype (*bimba*) is Īsvara, and He is not affected by the defects pertaining to the limiting adjunct — *avidyā*. The pure consciousness that is reflected in *avidyā* and its product — mind in its gross or subtle state is *jīva*. The latter is affected by the defects pertaining to the limiting adjuncts. This is as it should be; for, the nature of a limiting adjunct (say) mirror presents the defects in it like impurity, etc., in the face that is reflected and not in the face that serves as prototype. This view allows for the fact that Īsvara according to Advaita is not overpowered by *avidyā*, His limiting adjunct. Īsvara is pure consciousness that serves as prototype. And the defects of limiting adjunct are presented only in the reflected image and in the prototype. Īsvara, thus, is not overpowered by *avidyā*; on the other hand, He controls it. Of the two powers characterizing *avidyā*, namely, *āvaraṇaśakti* and *vikṣepa-śakti* the former is inactive in His case. The truth of duality is not concealed from Him. He never loses sight of His identity with the non-dual Brahman. *Avidyā* however, is operative on its *vikṣepa* phase. Consequently the variety of the world appears to Him, but He at the same time realizes that it is nothing more than an apparent diversification within Himself.

Jīva, on the other hand, is pure consciousness that is reflected in *avidyā* and its product — mind in its gross and subtle states. Being a reflected image, it is overpowered by its limiting adjuncts. The true nature of Brahman is veiled from it; it identifies itself with the physical and psychical accompaniments brought about by the *vikṣepa-śakti* of *avidyā* and therefore it experiences misery in the form of transmigration.¹

This theory known as *pratibimba-vāda* is explained in a slightly different way by Sarvajñātman. He holds⁴ both Īsvara and *jīva* to be the pure consciousness that is reflected in *avidyā* and mind respectively. This way of viewing Īsvara as reflected consciousness in *avidyā* forces us into the conclusion that Īsvara, being a reflected image, is affected by the defects present in the limiting adjunct — *avidyā*, and as such He cannot be viewed as one who always realizes His identity with the non-dual Brahman. Sarvajñātman seems to feel this difficulty and sets forth⁵ the view that Īsvara is pure consciousness that serves as the prototype. Brahmānanda, however, gets over this difficulty by pointing out⁶ that the Upaniṣadic text “He who knows everything in its general and particular aspects”⁷ states that Īsvara is an omniscient being. This omniscience would not hold good if Īsvara may be regarded as consciousness that serves as the prototype or as consciousness that is reflected. In either case, He is an omniscient being. According to both these views *jīvas* are many owing to the plurality of minds.

The unique feature of the *pratibimba-vāda* is that the reflected image is identical with the prototype and hence it is real. But the reflection which is only immanence of pure consciousness in the limiting adjunct and the limiting adjunct — these two are not real. It is only the immanence of pure consciousness in the limiting adjuncts that allows for the fact of viewing the consciousness as associated with the characteristic of being the source of the universe (*Īśvaratva*) or the characteristics of being an agent and enjoyer (*jīvatva*). These two — *Īśvaratva* and *jīvatva* are caused in pure consciousness when the latter is reflected in the limiting adjunct and hence they are not real. It comes to this:

the reflection of pure consciousness in the limiting adjunct is not real; but the reflected consciousness is real.⁸

Ābhāsa-vāda: This view is advocated by Suresvara.⁹ It is almost the same as the previous one. It is different only in the conception and interpretation of the nature of reflection. According to the previous view, in a reflection, the reflected image is identical with the prototype and hence it is real. But it is only wrong localisation, transposition, etc. of the original in the limiting adjunct that are not real. According to the *ābhāsa-vāda*, the reflected image is not identical with the prototype; it is different from it and it is indeterminate either as real or as unreal.¹⁰ The pure consciousness that is reflected in *avidyā* is *Īsvara*; and the consciousness that is reflected in mind is *jīva*. *Īsvara* and *jīva* being reflected consciousness are different from the prototype consciousness and are indeterminate either as real or as unreal. It might be said that the indeterminate character of the reflected images, namely, *Īsvara* and *jīva* precludes the possibility of viewing the former as having the characteristics of being the cause of the universe, the internal ruler, etc., and the latter as having the characteristics of being the knower, agent, and enjoyer. Suresvara gets over this difficulty by pointing out that the reflected consciousness in *avidyā* and in mind are falsely identified with the consciousness that serves as the prototype, and this accounts for *Īsvara* — the reflected consciousness in *avidyā* being viewed as the creator of the universe, and *jīva* — the reflected consciousness in mind being viewed as the knower, agent, and enjoyer.¹¹

The consciousness that is reflected in mind identified with the prototype consciousness is *jīva*. Since

mind is manifold, the consciousness that is reflected in it is also manifold. And the prototype consciousness falsely identified with consciousness reflected in mind appears to be many. Īsvara, on the other hand, is the prototype consciousness identified with the consciousness reflected in *avidyā*. Since *avidyā* is one, the consciousness that is reflected in it also is one. Consequently the prototype consciousness identified with the consciousness that is reflected also is one. Hence Īsvara is one.

Avaccheda-vāda: This view is advocated by Vācaspatimisra in his *Bhāmatī*. Vācaspatimisra does not favour the theory of reflection of Brahman. While commenting on the *adhyāsa-bhāṣya*, Vācaspatimisra observes that there could not be any reflection of Brahman which is free from any colour. An object having colour could receive the reflection of that thing which has colour. Brahman being free from any colour cannot have any reflection in mind, which is also colourless. How could there be any reflection of sound, smell, taste, etc.? On this ground he advocates the theory known as *avaccheda-vāda*. According to this view, Brahman delimited by *avidyā* is *jīva* which is its locus (*āśraya*) and Brahman which is not conditioned by it, but which is the content (*viṣaya*) of *avidyā* is Īsvara.¹⁶

Vācaspatimisra in his *Bhāmatī* compares *jīva* to the etheric space delimited by jar, pot, etc.¹⁷ Since there could be only delimitation and not reflection of etheric space in jar, pot, etc., and since Vācaspatimisra compares the *jīva* to the etheric space delimited by jar, pot, etc., we must take that Vācaspatimisra favours the *avaccheda-vāda*. According to this view,

since *jīvā* is the locus of *avidyā* and since there is plurality of *avidyā*, the *jīvas* are many.

ii. *Jīva — The Agent of Karma*

Jīva or the individual soul who is the blend of the supreme self and mind is the agent of all *karma*. This view emerges by way of criticism of the Sāṅkhya view that mind or intellect (*buddhi*) alone is the agent and not the *jīva*.¹² According to the Sāṅkhya school, the *jīva* is only an enjoyer (*bhoktā*) and it is an enjoyer in the sense that it is reflected in the modes or states of intellect. Agency which is present in *buddhi* only is taken to be present in the *jīva* owing to non-discrimination between the *jīva* and the intellect. There does not exist agency in the *jīva*. It is a case of *akhyāti* — absence of discrimination between the *jīva* and the mind. Consequently the usage "I am the agent" which involves reference to the *jīva* as an agent is only a figurative usage like the usages "Devadatta is a lion." The Upaniṣadic texts such as "The self is supra-relational"¹³ and the like primarily convey the *jīva* to be free from any agency. This is the Sāṅkhya view.¹⁴

Advaitānanda in his *Brahmavidyābharṇa* and Amalānanda in his *Śāstradarpaṇa* critically examine the above view and conclude that that view is unsound. The arguments advanced by them may be stated as follows: the Sāṅkhya school holds that the *jīva* is an enjoyer only by attaining its reflection in the mental modes. In order that the *jīva* may be reflected in the mental modes what is necessary is that it must be related to mind. But since the *jīva* in its essential nature is supra-relational, its relation with mind cannot be real but only be indeterminable. When relation is thus indeterminable, it is reasonable to hold that the charac-

teristic of being an experient or an enjoyer also which is based upon that relation must be indeterminable. If it were natural to the *jīva*, then, it would continue to exist even in the state of liberation, and this would be against the conclusive view of the Sāṅkhya school that the *jīva* in the state of liberation remains as pure consciousness. This same explanation may be extended to the case of agency also.¹³ Thus the difference between the Sāṅkhya view and the Advaita view as regards the agent of *karma* is as follows: according to the Sāṅkhya school *buddhi* or intellect alone is the agent. Owing to non-discrimination between the *jīva* and the intellect, the *jīva* is viewed to be the agent. The usage "I am the agent" which refers to the *jīva* as the agent is only a figurative usage. Since this view as has been discussed above is wrong, the Advaitin holds that the *jīva* whose essential nature is the supreme self when associated with the intellect is the agent. The usages "I am the agent" is not a figurative one; and it should be taken literally as referring to the *jīva* which is conveyed by the word "I" as the agent.

Having this in mind, the author of the *Brahma-sūtra* establishes the view that the individual soul or *jīva* is the agent of *karma* in the section known as *kartr-ādīkaraṇa*.¹⁴ Vācaspatimīśra in his *Bhāmatī* explains the view of the author of the *Brahma-sūtra* thus: the injunctive texts prescribe the means such as sacrifice and the like with reference to one who desires the ends like heaven, etc. It is well-known, that the individual soul desires those ends; or it is the experient of those ends. If it is held that the intellect is the agent and the self is the experient as the Sāṅkhya school holds, then there arises the defect namely, that the agent of actions does not experience the fruits of

actions, while the experient of the fruits of actions is one who has not performed any action. In this case, it must be held that the injunctive texts prescribe the means with reference to one and convey the relation of fruits that ensue from those means to another. The result of this argument is that the injunctive texts are to be treated as not valid. So it is to be held that the injunctive texts prescribe the means like sacrifice, etc., with reference to the *jīva* who desires heaven, etc. The *jīva*, therefore, is the agent of *karma* like sacrifices, etc.¹⁷

The author of the *Brahma-sūtra* further states that the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* text¹⁸ in the section dealing with the nature of the *jīva* states that in the dream state "it moves about freely in its own body." Since one who is not an agent cannot move about and since the above Upaniṣadic text states that the *jīva* moves about, the *jīva* is an agent.¹⁹ In the same way, the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* text²⁰ states that at the time of deep sleep the *jīva* takes the power of all sense-organs. Since one who is not an agent cannot take power of anything and since *jīva* is said to take the powers of the sense-organs, it is known that the *jīva* is an agent.²¹ Further, the *Taittirīya* text²² "*viññāna* performs the sacred and secular activities" states that *viññāna* or the *jīva* is the agent of *karma*. It might be said that the word *viññāna* signifies only mind or intellect and not *jīva* and so it is only the mind that performs all *karma*. But this contention is wrong. It is because, intellect or mind is known to be only an instrument and not an agent, from the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* text²³ "by means of *buddhi* the *jīva* takes to itself the powers of sense-organs." So, if it is said that the word *viññāna* means only mind, then since mind is only an instrument we should have the instrumental suffix

added to the word *vijñāna* and thus have the word *vijñānena*. Moreover, the verbal suffix *te* in the verb *tanute* conveys the sense of agent; and, the agent must be specified by a word having nominative case-ending. In the *Taittirīya* text mentioned above, we have the word *vijñānam* having nominative case-ending. It cannot refer to *buddhi* because *buddhi*, as has been said earlier, is only an instrument and not an agent.²⁵ So the word *vijñānam* signified only the *jīva* who is said to perform all activities — sacred or secular.²⁶

One objection may be raised in this connection. If *jīva* is said to be the agent of *karma*, then it means that it is independent. Being independent, it should engage itself in action that would give forth only beneficial results to it. But it is observed that the *jīva* engages itself in actions which give forth the results that are not beneficial to it. So, it is clear that *jīva* is not independent. If it is not independent, it cannot be an agent.²⁷

This objection is answered by the author of the *Brahma-sūtra*.²⁸ And, the author of the *Ratnaprabhā* summarises the view-point of the author of *Brahma-sūtra* thus: *jīva* is the agent and as such it is independent. But independence does not mean absence of dependence on anything else. Such an independence even God cannot have; for, only by depending upon the merit and demerit of the *jīva*, He creates the world. So *jīva* is independent in the sense that it impels all the productive factors while itself remaining without being impelled by the productive factor. Although independent in this sense, the *jīva* pursues the means which lead to unwelcome results under the erroneous notion that those means lead to beneficial results. So the

performance of *karma* that leads to unwelcome results by *jīva* does not suggest that it is not independent and therefore not an agent.²⁸ Moreover, the Upaniṣadic text which prescribes Vedāntic study, reflection and meditation as means for self-realization presumptively implies that the *jīva* is an agent. It is clear that one who is entitled for self-realization has to pursue the 'means' thereof. To pursue the 'means' means to be an agent in respect of these means.²⁹ According to the Sāṅkhya school, *buddhi* is not entitled for self-realization and so it cannot be an agent in respect of Vedāntic study, reflection, and meditation. The self is admitted by them to be a non-agent. So instruction regarding the means of self-realization would become purportless as there is no agent to pursue those means according to the Sāṅkhya school.³⁰ But according to Advaita, *jīva* is entitled for self-realization and so it is an agent in respect of Vedāntic study, reflection, and meditation.

From the foregoing discussion, it would have become clear that *jīva* is the agent of all *karma*. *Jīva*, according to Advaita, is only a blend of the supreme self and the mind.

iii. *Karma — Its Causation*

We shall now pass on to the discussion regarding the causation of *karma*. *Jīva* undergoes transmigration as associated with eight factors, namely, (i) the five senses of action, (ii) the five senses of knowledge, (iii) the four modes of mind, (iv) the five vital airs, (v) the five unquintuplicated elements of earth, water, fire, air and etheric space, (vi) desire, (vii) action, and (viii) *avidyā*.³¹ The word 'action' or *karma* refers to the other factors known as *vidyā* and *pūrvaprajñā*.³² Of these three, *vidyā* stands for the subtle forms of valid

knowledge, contrary knowledge, and erroneous knowledge the *jīva* had acquired in its innumerable births.³² *Karma* stands for *dharma* and *adharmā* which resulted from the performance of prescribed and interdicted actions in the previous births.³³ The performance of actions leave behind them a tendency to perform a similar action again. This tendency is termed *samskāra*.³⁴ In the same way the experience of the fruits of actions leave behind them a tendency to perform such action which would give forth similar experiences. This tendency is termed *pariśeṣa* or *phalavāsanā* or *bhāvanā*.³⁵ These two kinds of tendencies are referred to by the term *pūrvaprajñā*. Here we shall refer to them as *vāsanā*.

Avidyā by itself cannot make the *jīva* perform karmas. For, in the state of deep sleep wherein *avidyā* alone exists veiling the true nature of the self, activity on the part of *jīva* is not observed. So *avidyā* by itself does not prompt the *jīva* to perform *karma*, but it does so through *kāma*. The *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* text³⁶ mentions *kāma* as the factor that leads the *jīva* to act. Śrī Śaṅkara in his commentary on the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* says that *kāma* is the cause of *karma*. What he means he explains further by stating that *kāma* prompts one towards the performance of *karma*.³⁷ In the case of one who has realized the self and is free from *kāma* no activity is seen.³⁸ His commentator Acyutakṛṣṇānanda Tīrtha in the commentary *Vanamālā* states that Śrī Śaṅkara thus shows on the basis of perception aided by the method of agreement and difference that *kāma* is the factor that leads the *jīva* to perform *karma*.³⁹

Suresvara in his *Vārtika* on Śaṅkara's *Bhāṣya* on the *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* cites a text from the *Manu-smṛti* in support of the view mentioned above. The text

is: "No activity is observed in the case of one who is free from desire; and, whoever performs action, sacred or secular, does so by being prompted by *kāma*."⁴¹ The *Bhagavad-gīta* text also states that *kāma* and *krodha* make the *jīva* act.⁴² It must be noted here that *krodha* is only an aspect of desire or *kāma*. It is of the form of desire to annihilate or destroy something.⁴³ Since *krodha* is thus only an aspect of *kāma*, it is said that *kāma* makes the *jīva* act.

We said that the *jīva* carries with it the three factors of *vidyā*, *dharma* and *adharma*, and *vāsanās*. These constitute what is usually known as *svabhāva* or *prakṛti*.⁴⁴ The *vāsanās* are manifested in accordance with the *dharma* and *adharma* which give rise to a new birth for the *jīva*.⁴⁵ There may be good *vāsanās* or bad ones or both. Under the influence of these *vāsanās* even wise men who have the knowledge that the self alone is eternal and the world is non-eternal perform *karma*. The *vāsanās* that are not good give rise to *kāma-krodha* or *rāga-dveṣa* in the mind of the *jīva* and make it act. The *vāsanās* give rise to *kāma* or *rāga* in respect of an act which is prohibited in the scripture but which is erroneously made known to be the means to a desired end. In the same way the *vāsanās* give rise to *krodha* or *dveṣa* in respect of an act which is prescribed in the scripture and which is erroneously not taken to be the means to a desired end. Further these *vāsanās* give rise to *kāma* and make the *jīva* perform optional rites seeking selfish ends. All these three, namely, performance of prohibited deeds, non-performance of prescribed deeds, and the performance of optional deeds seeking selfish ends make one swerve from the path that leads to liberation. And the *vāsanās* that are good in character make the *jīva* perform pre-

scribed actions and optional rites also without any desire for their fruits, and thereby lead the *jīva* in the path of liberation — the highest human end.¹⁰

It comes to this: when *dharma* and *adharmā* give rise to a new birth for the *jīva*, the *vāsanās* which are stored up in the mind of *jīva*, are manifested. It is these *vāsanās* that make the *jīva* act by giving rise to *kāma*. So any action done out of *kāma* would definitely lead to fresh bondage for *jīva*. And any action done without desire, by being influenced by the *vāsanās* that are good, do not bind the *jīva*.

iv. *Nature of Agency — Real or Indeterminable*

Now we have to discuss the question whether agency pertaining to *jīva* is real or indeterminable. This question arises on the basis of the two sets of Vedic passages of which one affirms that *jīva* is supra-relational,¹¹ and the other,¹² the injunctive text, by conveying that the performance of sacrifices, etc., are means to a desired end, presumptively implies that the *jīva* is an agent. The *jīva* cannot be an agent and a non-agent at once, and, so either of the two characteristics must be interpreted in such a way as not to have any conflict with the other one.

The Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā school considers that agency is real on the part of the *jīva*, since there is no valid proof to disprove this view. This school further holds that the injunctive text which speaks of the *jīva* as agent is supported by the experience 'I am the agent' and so the Upaniṣadic text which speaks of the *jīva* as non-agent and which is unsubstantiated by any perceptual experience must not be interpreted literally and must be taken secondarily, that is, praising the *jīva* who is the agent of actions.¹³

The above contention is refuted by Śrī Śaṅkara in his commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra* and following him by Suresvara in his *Vārtika* on the *Bṛhadāraṇyako-paniṣad-bhāṣya*. Their view may be stated as follows: if agency were natural to the *jīva* and real, then the latter cannot be dissociated from the former like heat which is natural to fire and which never gets itself dissociated from the latter. The result of this argument is that *jīva* will always be an agent of actions and consequently the experient of the results of actions. This means that it must undergo cyclic existence for ever, and there is no possibility of release.³⁰ In this case the scriptural texts prescribing the means to release would become purportless.

But it may be argued that if agency were natural to the *jīva*, it does not preclude the possibility of the *jīva* attaining release. It is because agency is only the power to act, and this power would lead to action only when aided by auxiliary causes such as the desire to act, the knowledge that a particular act is the means to the desired end, etc. If these auxiliary causes are absent, then the *jīva* would remain without performing action, although it possesses the power to act. The means to release prescribed in the Upaniṣadic texts are useful to remove these auxiliary causes. So the *jīva*, although it possesses the power to act, cannot perform action. Since the *jīva* does not perform any action in the absence of the auxiliary causes, no fruit would ensue and consequently there would be no fresh bondage.³¹

The above contention, however, is wrong. It is said that agency which is the power to act would not make the *jīva* engage itself in the performance of action

if the auxiliary causes explained above are absent. And, the auxiliary causes are admitted to be removed if one pursues the means to release. But it must be noted that the auxiliary causes would be removed only when their cause, namely, *avidyā* is removed. So the view that the means to release set forth in the scriptures when pursued would remove the auxiliary causes would mean only this much, namely, that the auxiliary causes remain in a latent form. There is every possibility of their assuming a gross form, and the result would be that they would make the agency or 'the power to act' present in the *jīva* express itself. As a result of this, *jīva* would engage itself in the performance of actions. Consequently there will ensue the fruits of actions and thereby fresh bondage for *jīva*. Thus liberation would be impossible according to the view that agency is natural to *jīva*.

Moreover, liberation is said to result by the knowledge of the true nature of *jīva* which is eternal, pure consciousness, and ever-released. The knowledge of self of this nature cannot be had if agency were natural to *jīva*. So it must be admitted that *jīva* in its essential nature is pure consciousness, that is, the supreme self. It is not an agent. The supreme self when associated with mind is viewed as *jīva* and the characteristics of mind such as agency, finitude, etc., appear in the *jīva* falsely. This false appearance is superimposition. Thus agency is only superimposed on the *jīva* and it is not real.²² The *Bṛhadāraṇyako-paniṣad*²³ states that *jīva* thinks *as it were* and acts *as it were*. The expression *as it were* means that the characteristics of thinking and being and agent are not natural to *jīva*. But it *seems* to think and act when the mind with which it is associated thinks and acts.

It follows from the above that the supreme self attains the state of *jīva* when associated with the mind. And, in the *jīva* which is essentially identical with the supreme self, the characteristics of the mind such as agency, finitude, and the like are superimposed. The association of mind to the supreme self is brought about by *avidyā*. And so the characteristics of the mind presented in the *jīva* which is identical with the supreme self also must be *āvidyaka* — illusory. This fact is emphasised by the text of the *Kaṭhōpaniṣad*, namely “the supreme self itself when associated with body, mind and senses is viewed as the enjoyer by the wise ones.”³⁴

The scripture first states that *jīva* is an agent and enjoyer only when enveloped by *avidyā* in the passage “When there is duality *as it were*, then one sees others,”³⁵ and it further states that these characteristics do not exist in *jīva* when it attains the knowledge of the self in the passage, “When all this has become the self, by what can one see and what.”³⁶ In the same way, the scripture states that the *jīva* being an agent and an enjoyer is exhausted in the waking and dream states and it passes on to the deep sleep state where it becomes free from any pain that would arise out of its being an agent, etc. And that passage is: “just as a falcon roaming in the sky becomes tired, folds its wings and hastens to its nest, so does the self hasten to this state (of deep sleep) where falling asleep, it cherishes no more desires and has no more dreams.”³⁷ In this state, the *jīva* is the supreme self; of course, associated with *avidyā* but free from agency, etc. — the characteristics of mind — as this state is free from mind. The scripture states “That really is its true form”³⁸ and concludes by saying “That is the highest

goal.”” The characteristics of being an agent etc., are found in *jīva* in the waking and dream states because the *jīva* then is in relation to mind. These characteristics are not found in the state of deep sleep because the *jīva* is not related to mind then, as the mind provisionally merges in *avidyā*.⁶⁰

The above is the account given in the Upaniṣads as regards the nature of agency. The author of the *Brahma-sūtra* summarizes this in the aphorism *yathā ca takṣobhayatā*.⁶¹ This aphorism seeks to explain agency as well as non-agency spoken of with reference to *jīva* in the Upaniṣads on the analogy of a carpenter who becomes a non-agent when free from axe and other instruments. It is thus: in ordinary experience, a carpenter is an agent when he works with axe and other instruments and he feels misery on account of doing work. And the same carpenter when he does not do any work after having laid down the tools is a non-agent and is happy. That is, he becomes free from pain that could arise by doing work. In the same way *jīva* when associated with mind in the waking and dream state is an agent; and, in the deep sleep state when it is free from the association of mind although not from *avidyā*, it is no longer an agent and it experiences bliss. Extending this line of explanation to the state of liberation, we can say that since *avidyā* is removed then, *jīva* ceases to be a *jīva* and remains as bliss.

Thus the characteristics of being an agent, etc. present in the *jīva* are not natural to it, but are only due to *jīva*'s association with mind. Hence they are not real.

v. *Agency of Jīva Depends upon Īsvara*

So far we have said that agency is not natural to, but is only superimposed on *jīva*. Now there arises the question whether *jīva* acts on his own accord or as directed by Īsvara. This question arises because of the two sets of texts which seem to be mutually contradictory. One set of vedic texts such as 'one who desires heaven should perform *jyotiṣṭoma* sacrifice' and the like would be intelligible only if *jīva* is taken to be acting on his own accord. But the other sets of vedic texts such as 'He, who, Himself dwelling in *jīva*, controls it from within,'¹¹ 'He makes those whom He wishes to lead to the higher worlds, do good deeds,'¹² and the like speak of Īsvara as directing *jīva* to act. Hence the necessity to discuss this question.

The Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā school holds that *jīva* acts on his own accord and not as being directed by Īsvara on the ground that if Īsvara were admitted to direct the *jīva* to act, then He will be subject to partiality and cruelty. We observe that some *jīvas* perform good deeds and some other *jīvas* perform bad deeds. If Īsvara were held to be directing the *jīva* to act, then it implies partiality and a resulting inclination in favour of some *jīvas* and against some *jīvas*. Moreover, if Īsvara directs the *jīva* to commit interdicted actions which result in the experience of misery, then He is cruel, that is, He has positive pleasure in inflicting misery upon the *jīvas*. On this ground we must admit that Īsvara does not direct the *jīva* to act; and the latter acts on his own accord.

It may be said: Īsvara directs the *jīva* to act not independently, but by depending upon the previous merits and demerits accumulated by the *jīva* in its

earlier births. It follows from this that some *jīvas* perform good deeds and some others bad ones as directed by Īsvara only. But Īsvara is neither partial nor cruel as He directs the *jīvas* to perform those acts on the basis of their merits and demerits.

This contention, however, is wrong. Īsvara could direct the *jīva* to act on the basis of the merit and demerit of the latter. This view presupposes the existence of merit and demerit in *jīva*. Merit and demerit, however, could exist in *jīva* only when the latter performs the good deeds and commits the bad ones. And such performance by *jīva* is possible only as directed by Īsvara. Thus we are involved in the fallacy of a vicious circle (*cakraka-doṣa*). In order to obviate this difficulty it should be held that Īsvara directs the *jīva* to act not on the basis of its merits and demerits but quite independently. In that case, for the reasons stated earlier, Īsvara must be held to be partial and cruel.

Thus in view of the difficulties regarding both the views, namely, that Īsvara makes the *jīva* act on the basis of its past merit and demerit and that Īsvara makes the *jīva* act without depending upon anything, it is more reasonable to conclude that *jīva* acts on his own accord subject as it is to the defects of passion and hatred and equipped as it is with the instruments of action. This view is in conformity with ordinary experience also. In the cases of agricultural pursuits, etc., we do not find any entity such as Īsvara apart from bullock and other instruments of actions.⁶⁴ So we have to conclude that the Upaniṣadic texts which speak of Īsvara as directing the *jīva* to act must be understood as eulogistic statements intended to praise the quality of lordship of Īsvara.⁶⁵

This *prima facie* view is rejected by the author of the *Brahma-sūtra*. *Jīva* is enveloped by *avidyā* and identifying itself with mind, sense-organs, and body, it becomes the agent of actions, and the experient of the results of actions as sanctioned by God who resides in all beings and who directs every actions. This he affirms on the basis of the Upaniṣadic text — “The self-luminous one who is hidden in all beings, is all-pervasive, the inner self of all beings, and the overseer guiding all activities. It changelessly abides in all beings, it is the witness, the knower, the one only (without a second) and is free from all qualities, and changes.”⁶⁶ *Jīva* no doubt is endowed with all instruments of actions, and is associated with passion and hatred which lead him to act. It is also true, as the *pūrvapakṣin* has maintained, that in ordinary experience such as in agricultural pursuits, *Īsvara* is not perceived to be the cause. Yet, as regards all the actions *Īsvara* is known from the scriptural texts to be the general cause. The *Kauṣītaki Upaniṣad* declares: “He makes those whom He wishes to lead to the abyss of hell do evil deeds,”⁶⁷ and “He makes those whom He wishes to lead to the higher worlds, do good deeds.”⁶⁸ The other text states “He, who, Himself dwelling in *jīva* controls him from within.”⁶⁹ So *Īsvara* must be taken as a general cause. He must be understood on the analogy of rain, which is the common cause and which makes the individual seeds grow up as small or large creepers in accordance with the variety to which the seeds belong.⁷⁰ In the same way, *Īsvara* causes the *jīva* to act in accordance with its past merit or demerit.

The above texts, the *pūrvapakṣin* has pointed out, are to be taken as eulogistic statements and are not to be interpreted literally to mean that *Īsvara* directs the

jīva to act; for, if we subscribe to this view, then we will be involved in the fallacy of vicious circle. But it is not so. Īsvara depending upon the merits and demerits accumulated by the *jīvas* in their earlier births causes them to act in the present; and He made them act in the past by depending upon what they did before that past, and so on, *ad infinitum*. *Infinite regress* here is not a defect, as transmigratory existence is admitted to be beginningless. If it were admitted to have a beginning, then it should be held that it has come into existence without a cause. The result of this argument would be that those who had attained release may again be involved in transmigratory existence.⁷¹ So the acceptance of the view that Īsvara directs the *jīvas* to act in accordance with their merits and demerits accumulated in their earlier births does not involve the fallacy of the vicious circle; and, so the Upaniṣadic texts which set forth this view need not be interpreted in a secondary way.

So it must be admitted that while it is *jīva* alone who acts, it is Īsvara who makes him act in accordance with his merits and demerits accumulated in his earlier births.⁷²

vi. Īsvara — *The Dispenser of the Fruits of Actions*

Closely allied with this discussion is the question whether the actions that are performed by the *jīvas* give forth their results by themselves or as directed by Īsvara. We observe that Jaimini and his followers are of the opinion that actually actions by themselves give forth their fruits. The injunctive texts such as “one who desires heaven should perform *jyotiṣṭoma* sacrifice” and the like enjoins sacrifice with a view to attaining heaven. These texts presumptively imply that the

sacrificial act by itself gives forth the result, namely, heaven. If this were not the case, no one would perform any sacrificial act in order to gain an end (say) heaven. So it must be admitted that actions by themselves give forth their fruits.

But one objection may be raised: when a sacrificial act (say) *jyotiṣṭoma* is performed, its result, namely, heaven is to be attained only in a future life which necessarily involves a long interval between the performance of sacrifice and the attainment of the fruit. So sacrificial act which ceases to exist soon after it is performed cannot give forth its fruit.

In order to obviate this difficulty, Jaimini and his followers link the performance of sacrifice and its fruit by assuming an enduring thing which results from the performance of sacrificial act and serves as the antecedent of the fruit, namely, heaven. It is the resultant element that is known as *apūrva* or in the terminology of the Prābhākara school, *niyoga*. So action gives forth its result through *apūrva*.¹³

Or, it may be said that an action when performed gives forth its fruit, but the agent of action experiences the fruit at a future time.¹⁴

Both these views are wrong. It is not correct to hold that an act gives forth its fruit, but it is experienced later; for, a fruit cannot be called as a fruit at all unless it is related to its experient. In ordinary experience a fruit is so called precisely at that time when it is experienced by the experient. So it is not reasonable to say that action gives forth its fruit now, but the fruit is experienced later.¹⁵

The view that *apūrva* gives forth the fruit also is wrong. Śrī Bādarāyaṇa argues¹⁰ that *apūrva* being an insentient principle cannot by itself give forth the fruit unless directed by the sentient principle, namely Īsvara. The *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* text "He, the great unborn Self, is the one who dispenses food and wealth"¹¹ and the *Bhagavad-gītā* text "The devotee with faith granted by Me endeavours to worship Me by performing actions relating to his stage and class of life; and as ordained by Me he attains the fruits of those actions"¹² explicitly state that Īsvara is the dispenser of the fruits of actions.

II

THE DESTINY OF THE INDIVIDUAL SOUL

i. *Transmigration*

So far we have explained that the *jīva* performs deeds, meritorious and sinful or prescribed and interdicted, by being prompted by *kāma* which is manifested by the *vāsanās*. The *vāsanās*, in turn, are revealed in accordance with the *dharma* and *adharmā* (the immediate fruits of prescribed and interdicted actions) which give rise to a new body for the *jīva*. And God remains as the witness of the actions of *jīva* and He is the dispenser of the fruits of actions.

The karmas thus performed by the *jīva* may be classified into three: (a) *sañcita-karma* — the effects of the past actions, namely, *dharma* and *adharmā* with the exception of what has already borne fruit and whose force has spent itself in some form of the experience of the individual; (b) *prārabdha-karma* — that which has started yielding its fruit as the individual's experience of pleasure and pain in his present body or life; and (c)

āgāmi-karma, that which results from the individual's fresh activities in the present birth and which is added to the stored up *dharma* and *adharma* and which determine the individual's future, fate, and fortune. It should be added here that only a portion of the *sañcita-karma* which becomes ripe for manifestation gives rise to the new body for the *jīva*.

The fruits of *karma* are threefold: if the *karma* is sinful then *adharma* would ensue from it, and the result would be birth for the *jīva* in animal world. If the *karma* is meritorious, then *dharma* would ensue from it and the result would be birth for the *jīva* in the divine world. If the *karma* is of a mixed character, then both *dharma* and *adharma* would ensue from it, and the result would be birth for the *jīva* as a human being.⁷⁹

A portion of the *sañcita-karma* which has become ripe for manifestation and which has thereby started yielding its fruit has given rise to the present body or life of a *jīva*. This portion of the *sañcita-karma* which is known as *prārabdha-karma* relates the *jīva* to a body which is known as birth. This is characterised by prescribed duties, age, learning, occupation, wealth, pleasure, and intelligence. At the time of death, if the portion of *sañcita-karma* that is meritorious in character becomes ripe for manifestation, then the *jīva* associated with the *puryaṣṭaka* reaches the heaven through the path of manes or it reaches the world of Hiraṇyagarbha through the path of Gods. On the other hand if that portion of *sañcita-karma* is sinful in character, then the *jīva* is either born as insects or as birds or as mosquito or it reaches the hell. This, of course, is the third course, the other two being the path of manes and the path of Gods.

ii. *The Path of Manes (Pitryāna)*

The house-holder who lives in villages and who is exclusively devoted to the performance of *agnihotra* and other rites prescribed in the Vedas, and who engages himself in digging of wells and tanks and laying out of gardens and who protect those who had sought asylum under him and who does not injure any being and who makes gifts both in sacrifices and outside proceeds after death, through the path of manes to heaven. The gross body perishes here; and the soul associated with the 'eight factors' (*puryaṣṭaka*) explained earlier proceeds to heaven. First it reaches the deity ensouling smoke and being passed on by that deity, it reaches to the deity of the night; from there it reaches to the deity of the darker fortnight and from there it reaches to the deity ensouling the six months during which the sun moves southwards; from there to the world of manes, and from there, to *ākāśa* and from *ākāśa* it reaches the heaven. The performer of rituals and other acts having thus gone through the deities ensouling smoke and the rest is eaten *as it were* by deities like Indra and others. This means that the soul becomes the object of enjoyment for Indra and other deities and, yet the soul enjoys its own pleasure by sporting with these deities. The body for the soul fit for the experiencing of these pleasures is an aqueous one produced in the heaven. It is through this aqueous body that it is enabled to experience the joys in the heaven.⁹⁰ Thus the path through which the householder who does meritorious deeds reaches the heaven is known as the path of manes.

The *Chāndogyopaniṣad*⁹¹ states that those who have reached the heaven through the path of smoke

stay there till their actions are exhausted (*yāvat sampā-tam uṣitvā*) and return to the earth by the same path as they went and attain noble or ignoble birth.

Now the question that arises in this connection is whether the soul returns to the earth after the exhaustion of all its karmas or whether there is any remnant of *karma* still left. This question is raised on the basis of the *Chāndogya* text cited above, and the two texts of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* of which the first one namely, ‘when all the action of theirs is exhausted (by the experience of their fruits) they return to this earth’²² speaks of the exhaustion of all action in the heaven. It might be said that the expression ‘all action’ means those actions which could be exhausted by experiencing their fruits in the heaven only. This contention is wrong; for, the other text of the same *Upaniṣad* “Having in heaven exhausted the effects of all actions whatsoever which he has done in this world, he returns therefrom to this world for doing action again”²³ refers by the expression ‘whatsoever action’ to all actions without exception. So it must be admitted that the soul experiences the fruits of all his actions in the heaven.

Moreover, death brings into fruition all the accumulated actions of the soul. This means that death stands for the experience of all the accumulated deeds in the world to which the soul reaches after death. When one is alive, the accumulated deeds do not give forth their fruits, as then one is experiencing the fruits of those actions which have fructified. Accumulated deeds therefore remain without giving their fruits till the death of man; and they keep the soul in the new region till their fruits are exhausted. Then the soul

descends to earth without any *kārmic* residue whatsoever.

Before discussing this question we must bear in mind that the *Chāndogya* text³⁴ states that those who return from the heaven to earth are born a noble birth or an ignoble one in accordance with the good or bad deeds. The *smṛti* text also states that the difference between man and man as regards a particular environment, family, complexion, age-limit, knowledge, conduct, wealth, pleasure and intelligence is due to the unrequited residue of actions with which the souls descend to the earth after enjoying the fruits of their deeds in heaven. This shows that the difference between man and man which is observed ever since the time of birth cannot be explained unless we admit that the soul descends to the earth with the accumulated unfructified deeds attached to their subtle body. The *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* texts "When all the actions of theirs is exhausted by the experience of their fruits, they return to earth,"³⁵ and "Having in heaven exhausted the effects of all actions whatsoever which he has done in this world, he returns therefrom to this world for doing action"³⁶ refer only to the exhaustion of that *karma* by the force of which the soul has reached the heaven.

Nor is it correct to maintain that there is left a remnant of the *karma* by the force of which the soul reaches the heaven. It is because the remnant of that *karma* must necessarily be a good one, and so the birth here must also be a noble one. But the Upaniṣadic text states that the birth may be an ignoble one also which must be due to the accumulated demerits only.

It follows from the above that the soul associated with the accumulated karmas known as *anuśaya*³⁵ returns to the earth after the exhaustion of that *karma* by the force of which he reached the heaven. And the most powerful among the accumulated karmas determine the nature of birth in this world.

Now this answers the other contention, namely, that death, like a lamp which illumines all the objects that fall within its range, manifests all the accumulated deeds. This means that after death all accumulated deeds would mature and would give forth their results in the new region to which the soul reaches.³⁶ This contention is wrong on five grounds which may be explained as follows:

I. The *pūrvapakṣin* has maintained that while one is alive the actions which have fructified prevented the manifestation of unfructified deeds; and, when the fructified deeds have ceased to exist at the time of death unfructified deeds are manifested. Śaṅkara while refuting this contention points out that extending the line of explanation of the *pūrvapakṣin* we could say that actions having different and contrary fruits cannot fructify simultaneously. Moreover, a comparatively weak *karma* obstructed by a powerful *karma* cannot bring forth its fruit in the new region.

II. Each *karma* is attended by its specific fruit. This law would be violated if it is held that all the accumulated actions of a soul join together and give forth one birth in the new region which the soul reaches after death.

III. It might be said: death indicates the annihilation of comparatively weak karmas and the fruits

of powerful karmas are experienced in another world. This contention is wrong; for, there is no valid proof to hold that some karmas fructify after death and some are annihilated. It is because *karma* will be exhausted either by experiencing its fruit or by some expiatory rites or by the knowledge of the self. The *smṛti* text — “sometimes a good deed has to remain without giving forth any fruit till one’s miseries are experienced” states that a *karma* obstructed by another *karma* which bears a fruit contrary to the former and which has fructified has to remain. All this shows that accumulated karmas, both good and bad, cannot join together, give rise to a birth in the new region which the soul reaches after death, and be experienced there.

IV. The contention that all the actions come to fruition after death is unsound for the reason that it goes against the *smṛti* text which states that certain sins cause several births for expiating them.

V. The illustrative example of lamp must be understood in the following sense. Just as a lamp manifests gross objects and not the minute ones, so also death manifests the powerful actions and not the one which is comparatively weaker. Therefore the view that all actions become manifest at the time of death is unsound as it is contrary to scripture, *smṛti* text, and reasoning. So, if the *karma* that would lead to heaven is stronger at the time of death, the soul reaches heaven and after the exhaustion of that *karma*, it descends to the earth along with unfructified deeds known as *anuśaya*. The comparatively stronger *karma*, meritorious or sinful would fructify and give forth a noble or ignoble birth as the case may be.

The path through which the soul — *anuśāyin* returns to this world from heaven is described in the

Chāndogya Upaniṣad thus: "They return again by the same path as they came, to *ākāśa*, from *ākāśa* to air, and having become air they become smoke; and having become smoke, they become mist; having become mist, they become the cloud; having become the cloud they rain; then they are born as rice and barley, herbs and trees, sesamum and beans. Henceforth the exit becomes extremely difficult; for whoever eats the food and sows the seed, he becomes like unto him."⁹ In this passage, it is said that the *anusāyin* becomes *ākāśa* and the like. It is not reasonable that one object should attain the essential form of another. Śrī Śaṅkara, therefore, interprets the expression 'to become *ākāśa*,' etc., to mean only the attainment of similarity to *ākāśa*, etc.¹⁰ That is under the influence of *avidyā*, the *anusāyin* considers himself to be identical with *ākāśa*, etc. Finally he falls down on the earth with rain. After this the soul has to reach that condition of rice, barley, etc., from which position it has to emerge as a man. The Upaniṣadic text states that to emerge from the position of rice, barley, etc., as a man is more difficult,¹¹ which by implication means that it is difficult to reach the condition of rice, barley, etc.¹² This further implies that the stages of descent earlier to the stage of rice, barley, etc., are easier. The reference to the descent being easy or difficult has reference to the shortness or the length of time taken for the descent. The conclusion, therefore, is that till falling down with rain, the descent of the soul from the earlier condition is effected in a very short time. After this it takes a long time for the soul to reach the condition of rice, barley, etc., and much longer time to emerge as a man.

The difficulty involved in the exit of the *anusāyin* after falling as rain into the form of rice, etc., is explained by Śrī Śaṅkara thus: the *anusāyins*, being carried by water-currents, reach the rivers, and from there, the sea. In the sea they may be swallowed by aquatic reptile which may be swallowed by others. Then the *anusāyins* together with the aquatic reptiles may become dissolved in the sea; and, together with the seawater they are drawn up by the rays of the Sun and fall again as rain upon deserts or stony places. There they may be drunk by serpents or by other wild animals. These animals may be eaten up by other animals and thus the *anusāyins* would go on and on in an endless round. At times they may fall as rain among inanimate objects and become dried up then and there. At long last they are born (*jāyante*) as rice, barley, etc.”

Now it is to be discussed whether the *anusāyins* actually attain the species of immovable entities like rice, barley etc., and experience pleasure or pain there, or they merely come into contact with those immovable entities. The author of the *Brahma-sūtra* and following him Śrī Śaṅkara state that the *anusāyins* merely come into contact with such immovable entities, and they do not actually attain the species of immovable entities and experience pleasure or pain there. This is similar to the earlier stages during their descent where it is said that they do not become *ākāśa* or air and they only become similar to *ākāśa*, etc., by merely coming into contact with them. In the same way, the *anusāyins* merely come into contact with rice, barley, etc. Moreover the Upaniṣadic text “Whoever eats the food and whosows the seed, he becomes like unto him”¹¹ states that the *anusāyin* enters into a mother’s womb. This presumptively implies that before this stage, the *anusāyin* does

not attain any birth in the form of rice, barley, etc.²⁸ So the expression "are born" (*jāyante*) in the Upaniṣads²⁹ should be understood in the secondary sense of coming into contact with the species only.

It must be added here that those who had committed sinful deeds actually attain the form of rice, etc., in order to experience the fruits of their deeds. But what is emphasized here is that the *anusāyins* who descend from heaven do not attain the form of rice, etc., but merely come into contact with them.³¹

The *anusāyin* thus comes into contact with rice, barley, etc., and this, as has been explained above involves much difficulty. Much more difficult it is for the *anusāyin* to emerge as man; and this difficulty Śrī Śaṅkara explains thus: the food with which the *anusāyin* has become associated may be eaten by the celibates or infants or old people. At last when a procreating agent eats the food with which the *anusāyin* is associated and sows the seed in a mother's womb, the *anusāyin* enters it and then he is born associated with the bodies developed from the embryo. The *Upaniṣad* says "Whoever eats the food and sows the seed, then he (the *anusāyin*) becomes like unto him." This means that if the unfructified merits of the *anusāyin* are mature enough to bring forth the fruit, then the rice, barley, etc., with which the *anusāyin* has become associated will be eaten by persons of noble birth. On the other hand, if the unfructified demerits of the *anusāyin* are mature enough to bring forth the fruit, then rice, barley, etc. with which the *anusāyin* is associated will be eaten by persons of ignoble births or by animals. So the bodies that the *anusāyin* take will be in accordance with their *anusāya* or *kārmic* residue.

Thus the soul, that is, the *jīva* whose meritorious deeds are mature enough to fructify reach heaven through the path of manes; and, after the fruits of those deeds are exhausted there, it returns to the earth associated with *anuśaya* and is born in accordance with that *anuśaya*.

The path through which the *jīva* reaches the heaven and the path through which it returns to the earth and is born again comprise among other things the celestial world (*dyu*), rain (*parjanya*), earth (*prthvī*) man (*puruṣa*), and woman (*yoṣit*). These five are to be meditated upon as the "five fires" (*pañcāgni*) and this meditative exercise is known as *pañcāgni-vidyā*;" and the worshipper reaches the world of Hiraṇyagarbha through the path of Gods.

iii. *The Path of Gods (Devayāna)*

The path of Gods or *devayāna* is that by which the celibates, the house-holders who meditate upon the 'five fires' explained above, hermits who are engaged in the performance of their duties with faith and those who are engaged in the meditative worship of *saguṇa*-Brahman known as *aham-grahopāsanā* and the ascetics who do not attain the knowledge of the self in this life itself, reach the world of Hiraṇyagarbha." This path is described in the Upaniṣads as marked by the presence of several deities presiding over light, day, month, etc. But the Upaniṣads differ among themselves in describing the order of arrangement of these deities along the path.

To begin with, the *Chāndogyopaniṣad* in the fifth *adhya*ya describes the path thus: "the house-holders who meditate upon the 'five fires,' and hermits and ascetics who perform their duties with faith go to light;

from light to day; from the day to the bright fortnight; from the bright fortnight to the six months during which the sun moves northwards; from the months to the year; from the year to the sun; from the sun to the moon; from the moon to lightning. There comes a being not belonging to the creation of Manu; he takes these to the world of Hiraṇyagarbha. This path is known as *devayāna*.”¹⁰⁰ This path is described in this same manner in the fourth *adhyāya* also of the same *Upaniṣad*.¹⁰¹

The *Kauṣītaki Upaniṣad* describes the path of Gods in a slightly different way thus: “Having come on the path of Gods, the soul comes to the abodes of Agni, Vāyu, Varuṇa, Indra, Prajāpati, and Brahmā (Hiraṇyagarbha.)”¹⁰²

The *Bṛhadāraṇyakoṣanīṣad* describes the same path thus: “The house-holders who meditate upon the “five-fires” and hermits and ascetics who, with faith, are engaged in the meditative worship on the *saguṇa*-Brahman go to light; from light to the day; from the day to the bright fortnight; from the bright fortnight to those six months during which the sun moves northwards; from the months to the divine world; from the divine world to the sun; from the sun to the lightning. There comes a being not belonging to the creation of Manu; and he takes them to the world of Hiraṇyagarbha.”¹⁰³

The order of arrangement of the presiding deities in the path of Gods given in the above three Upaniṣadic texts is as follows:

1. *Chāndogyoṣanīṣad*:

(1) Light (2) Day (3) Bright fortnight (4) Six months during which the sun moves northwards

(5) Year (6) Sun (7) Moon, and, (8) Lightning.

2. *Bṛhadāraṇyakoṇiṣad*:

(1) Light (2) Day (3) Bright fortnight (4) Six months during which the sun moves northwards (5) Divine World (6) Sun, and, (7) Lightning.

3. *Kauṣītakyuṇiṣad*:

(1) Agni (Light) (2) Vāyu (3) Varuṇa (4) Indra, and, (5) Prajāpati.

The author of the *Brahma-sūtra* concludes that the path mentioned in all the three texts cited above is one only as the destination to be reached is the same, namely, the world of Hiraṇyagarbha. The passages differ only in respect of the description of the order of arrangement of several presiding deities as described above. The author of the *Brahma-sūtra* suggests that the presiding deities which are not mentioned in a particular text but which are mentioned in the other texts must be grouped together and the specific order of arrangement of the presiding deities should be determined. He, therefore, holds:¹⁰⁴

I. In all these texts light (*agni*) is mentioned first. But according to the *Kauṣītakī* text,¹⁰⁵ *Vāyu* is mentioned next to light. *Vāyu* cannot be placed next to light according to the other two texts wherein 'day' follows 'light.' Moreover, there is the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* text,¹⁰⁶ which mentions *Vāyu* before the sun. So *Vāyu* must be placed before the sun.

II. According to the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* text,¹⁰⁷ 'divine world' is mentioned after 'month'. But, on the basis of the *Chāndogya* text,¹⁰⁸ we have to insert 'year' after 'month' because 'year' is only an extension of month.

III. The *Kauṣītakī* text mentions Varuṇa. And Varuṇa should be placed after lightning on the authority of the *Chāndogya* text¹⁰⁹ — “There is lightning; it is making noise, and then may be it will rain.” Here it is said that ‘rain’ would occur after lightning. Since Varuṇa is the lord of rain and since rain is mentioned after lightning, Varuṇa must be placed after lightning.

IV. After Varuṇa, Indra and Prajāpati should be successively placed on two grounds: (1) the *Kauṣītakī* text mentions so; and (2) there is no other position where they could possibly be placed.

Thus the order of arrangement of the deities in the path of Gods is: (1) light, (2) month, (3) year, (4) the divine world, (5) Vāyu, (6) Sun, (7) Moon (8) Lightning, (9) Varuṇa, (10) Indra, and, (11) Prajāpati.

Here just like Vāyu, Sun, Moon, Varuṇa, Indra and Prajāpati, light, month, year, the divine world, and lightning also stand for the deities presiding over them respectively. Thus the path of Gods is characterised by the presence of deities who are employed to lead the soul to the world of Hiranyagarbha. These deities come under the domain of creation by Manu — the manifestation of *Virāt-puruṣa*. That the soul is taken through the path of Gods by the deities who do come under the domain of creation by Manu is presumptively known from the Upaniṣadic text¹¹⁰ which states that when lightning takes charge of the soul, an *amānavapurūṣa*, that is, one who does not come under the domain of creation by Manu comes and lead the soul to the world of Hiranyagarbha.¹¹¹ Varuṇa, Indra, and Prajāpati are only subordinates to the *amānavapurūṣa* assisting the latter in leading the soul to the world of Hiranyagarbha.¹¹²

Thus the house-holders who meditate upon the five fires, celibates, hermits, those who are engaged in the *ahamgrahopāsanā*, and the ascetics who do not get the knowledge of the self here — all these reach the world of Hiraṇyagarbha through the path of Gods. They attain the knowledge of the self there, and are liberated along with Hiraṇyagarbha at the end of this cosmic age.¹¹⁸ It is to be noted in this connection that one reaches the world of that deity — the deity upon whom one meditates. The content of *ahamgrahopāsanā* is conditioned Brahman, and so, the worshipper reaches the world of conditioned Brahman — the world of Hiraṇyagarbha.

There are others who are engaged in another type of meditative worship known as *pratīkopāsanā* wherein, as has been explained earlier, a symbol is worshipped as the conditioned Brahman. Conditioned Brahman is, therefore, only adjectival in respect of the symbol which is substantive and therefore primary. So those who are engaged in the meditative worship of *pratīka* or a symbol do not meditate upon the conditioned Brahman and so they do not reach the world of Hiraṇyagarbha.¹¹⁹ Moreover, in respect of the *pratīkopāsanā* such as *nāma*, *vāk*, *manas*, etc., the scriptures¹²⁰ declare that each succeeding one gives forth greater result than the preceding one. The difference in the fruits of the upāsanās suggest that the contents of the upāsanās, that is, the symbols possess excellence in a greater or lesser degree. But the conditioned Brahman which is the content of the *ahamgrahopāsanā* is one and one only, and so there will not be any difference in experience in the world of the conditioned Brahman — the world of Hiraṇyagarbha. On this ground also, those who are engaged in the *pratīkopāsanā* — the

fruits of which differ — cannot go to the world of Hiraṇyagarbha, wherein there is no gradation in experience of the joys of that world.¹¹⁶ They however proceed in the path of Gods. But when they reach the stage where the deity presiding over lightning takes charge of them, the *amānavapurusa* does not take them to the world of Hiraṇyagarbha. They live in the world of lightning till the end of this cosmic age. Again at the time of creation, they are reborn according to their *anuśaya* — the accumulated merit and demerit.

So far the path of Gods.

iv. *The Third Position*

The *jīva* who had not performed meritorious deeds by virtue of which it could reach heaven or the world of Hiraṇyagarbha and who had committed interdicted actions reaches the hell or is born here as small creatures in the shape of the flea, the mosquito, the insects, and so forth. There are certain most heinous interdicted actions the fruit of which should be experienced only in hell; and, there are some other interdicted actions the fruits of which could be experienced by being born as mosquito and the like.

Thus the *jīva* being influenced by the *vāsanās* and through them by *kāma* performs prescribed actions and reaches heaven or the world of Hiraṇyagarbha, or commits interdicted actions and reaches hell or is born as mosquito, etc.¹¹⁷

v. *Karma and Free-will*

We shall now discuss the question: to what extent is man free to act according to his own free-will? We have said that the *vāsanās* resulting from the perfor-

mance of karmas and also from the experience of the fruits of karmas determine the direction of man's activities in the present life by giving rise to *kāma*. To the same effect the text of the *Gītā*¹¹ states that "Everyone is impelled to activity in accordance with his characteristic and innate quality which is the result of his inward propensities, the result of the karmas of the previous births."

Man is conditioned by the *vāsanās* and although he has the knowledge of the teachings of the Veda, yet, he acts in such a way that is not conducive to his future well being. The *vāsanās* are manifested in the present birth, and they are more powerful than the teachings of the Veda, when man acts according to his own *vāsanās*. As Śrī Śaṅkara points out in the *Adhyāsa-bhāṣya*, even one who has the intellectual conviction that Brahman alone is real, acts according to the dictates of his *vāsanās*. Knowing that a particular act would lead to hell, men commit prohibited deeds by being prompted by the *vāsanās* or the latent impressions that are sinful in nature. Lord Kṛṣṇa points out¹² that "they are not even afraid of the defect of the sin arising out of transgressing My teachings."

This gives rise to the most important problem, namely, the scope of the scriptural injunctions and prohibitions. The latter have scope only when man is free to act on the basis of his free-will. If it is said that his activities are conditioned by *vāsanās*, then he is not free to perform the prescribed deeds or to refrain from prohibited actions. There is none who is free from *vāsanās* and so the whole range of Vedic texts would become purportless. Not only this. The Vedānta text¹³ which conveys that the realisation of

the self is the means to the supreme human end and therefore one must study Vedāntic texts, reflect and meditate upon its teachings would become purportless, as an aspirant being conditioned by his *vāsanās* is not at all free to pursue Vedāntic study, etc.

Herein lies the necessity of *karma*. But it must be noted that when we speak of the necessary causation or determination of activity in accordance with the ante-natal tendencies, that is, *vāsanās*, it should not be supposed that the Advaitins accept the theory of determinism and so have to deny the existence of freedom. The pre-natal *vāsanās* which each *jīva* carries with it can be counteracted or modified by cultivating tendencies having a reverse direction. The *Yoga-sūtra* emphasises the possibility of cultivating the will to turn the mind towards the contrary ideas when the mind is troubled with sinful thoughts. Here is the reconciliation of the doctrines of freedom and necessity. We admit necessity because we hold that the direct fruits of *karma*, namely, *dharma* and *adharma* give rise to birth characterized by age, learning, occupation, wealth, pleasure, intelligence, etc. These cannot be altered on any account. We admit freedom since we hold that *vāsanās* which are manifested in accordance with *dharma* and *adharma* can be counteracted by cultivating the will to turn away our mind from the influence of bad *vāsanās* and to pursue good actions. As Professor Hirianna points out: "This is not fatalism, but the very reverse of it."¹²¹

The *Bhagavad-gītā*¹²² also admits the possibility of overcoming the *vāsanās*. It states that it is the nature of senses of knowledge and action to be attached towards their respective objects. There is desire towards

objects that are prohibited in the scriptures and there is aversion towards objects that are prescribed in the scriptures. Thus in respect of a particular sense and its object there is an invariable connection born out of either desire or aversion. Free will lies in checking this tendency of the senses proceeding towards prohibited deeds out of desire or checking the tendency of senses that turn away one's mind from the prescribed deeds. To check up the tendency one must have the knowledge of the teachings of the scriptures that the self alone is real and everything else beginning with mind is unreal. What we call the *vāsanās* direct one towards committing a deed, prohibited in the scriptures, through giving rise to *kāma*. *Kāma* is that which gives rise to the knowledge that a particular thing which in reality is a means to unwelcome results is a means to a desired end. In the same way the *vāsanās* turn away one's mind from the performance of prescribed deeds through giving rise to *krodha* or *dveṣa* which gives rise to the notion that a particular thing, which in fact leads to supreme human end, is not so. When by the study of scripture if one knows that the performance of a particular thing is prohibited and as such its performance will lead to unwelcome results, then, the false knowledge that it is a means to a desired end, does not create any desire to perform it. In the same way when by the study of scripture, if one knows that the performance of a particular thing is the means to the desired end, then the false notion arising out of *vāsanās* that it is not a means to a desired end, cannot produce any *krodha* or *dveṣa* towards its performance. Hence scripture prompts one to the performance of the prescribed deeds and prevents one from committing interdicted acts. The knowledge arising out of the study of scrip-

ture is powerful, and it checks the *vāsanās* and thereby *kāma* and *krodha*. Thus scripture is useful; and, man through the study of scripture should strive hard to check up the tendencies which through *kāma-krodha* prompt one towards interdicted acts and desist from the prescribed ones. Scripture and freedom to act based on free-will therefore are significant. This view is based upon the *Bṛhadāranyakopaniṣad*¹⁴¹ passage which sets forth the activity contrary to the scriptural teachings to be the activity belonging to the demons, and the activity based on the scriptural teachings to be the activity of the divine beings.

Human effort based on the study of the scripture has thus its unique place in shaping the future destiny of the *jīva* against the *vāsanās*.

In the *Yogavāsiṣṭha*, Vasiṣṭha instructs Śrī Rāma thus: "Everything in this world, O! gentle one from the Raghu race! is invariably accomplished by everyone by free action accompanied by well directed effort."

*sarvameva hi sadā saṁsāre raghunandana
samyak prayatnāt sarveṇa pauruṣāt samavāpyate*

Here the word *sarva* means progeny, wealth, heaven, the world of Hiraṇyagarbha and liberation. The word *pauruṣa* means human effort or free action, namely, the action of the agent consisting of such acts like *putrakāmeṣṭi*, husbandry, the *jyotiṣṭoma* sacrifice, devotion to *saguṇa*-Brahman, practice of *jñānayoga*, etc.

Vasiṣṭha proceeds to add that free action is of two kinds, one in accordance with the teachings of the scripture and another against the scriptural teachings.

The former one leads to the highest human end, while the latter leads to unwelcome results.

*uccāstram śāstritam ceti pauruṣam dvividham smṛtam
tatra uccāstram anarthāya paramārthāya śāstritam*

Here the word *uccāstra* means adultery, theft, etc., and *śāstrita* means practice of obligatory and occasional rites. The word *anartha* means hell and the word *paramārtha* means the supreme human end, that is, liberation. Vasiṣṭha points out that the supreme human end, namely, liberation is achieved through meritorious actions coupled with the qualities acquired by the correct practice from childhood, by practising the path prescribed in the Śāstras and by associating oneself with good men who are keenly pursuing the path prescribed in the scripture. From this it will be clear that free action is necessary in order that one may attain the highest end.

Śrī Rāma thereupon raises the question whether one could go against the *vāsanās* or the latent impressions arising out of meritorious or sinful actions performed in innumerable previous births. He says: "I follow the course open to me as directed by the latent impression stored up by me in my innumerable previous births. Being utterly helpless in this way, I cannot do anything according to my will."

*prāktanam vāsanājālam niyojayati mām yathā
mune tathāiva tiṣṭhāmi kṛpaṇaḥ kim karomyaham*

Thereupon Vasiṣṭha says that since one is dependent upon the operation of one's past impressions in one's actions, it is necessary that in order that one may

liberate oneself from such dependence one is free to act.

*ata eva hi rāma śreyah prāpnoti śāśvatam
svaprayatnoḥanītena pauruṣeṇeva nānyathā*

He further points out that the collection of past impressions is of two kinds: good and bad. There are the latent impressions arising out of the performance of prescribed deeds and by committing interdicted actions. If one is carried away by the force of the good latent impressions stored up in mind, then, one shall by that very course attain the eternal stage in no length of time.

*vāsanaughena śuddhena tatra ced apanīyase
tatkrameṇa āśu tenaiva padam prāpsyasi śāśvatam*

But, he adds, if the force of previous latent impressions that are bad lead one to misery, then one must try to subdue it with one's own effort.

*atha ced aśubho bhāvaḥ tvām yojayati saṅkate
prāktanah tadasau yatnāt jetavyo bhavatā svayam*

Here *yatna* means the observance of religious rites prescribed in the Śāstras which counteract the forces of bad impressions and this force must be subdued by one's own efforts. But if one is carried away by both kinds of impressions, then although no effort is necessary in the case of good impressions, the bad ones must be displaced by well-directed effort as prescribed in the Śāstras.

*śubhāśubhābhyām mārgābhyām vahantī vāsanā sarit
pauruṣeṇa prayatnena yojanīyā śubhe pathi*

If one's mind is engrossed in bad impression, then it must be diverted into right path by strong personal effort.

*aśubheṣu samāviṣṭam śubheṣveva avatārayet
svamaṇaḥ puruṣārthena balena balinām vara*

Here, the word *aśubha* or bad impressions means such desires as adultery, theft, and the like; *śubha* or right path means meditation on the import of the sacred texts or on some manifestations of God.¹²

From the foregoing discussion it would have become clear that the *vāsanās* if they are bad, can be overcome and man is free to pursue good actions according to his own free-will. Since man is free to choose the right course in preference to what is wrong, Lord Kṛṣṇa has said: "Think fully over what I have taught, and do as you like."¹³ The Lord has thus declared the right course and man is free to avail himself of the opportunities. *Karmas* performed with desire or *kāma* bind the *jīva*.

vi. *Liberation*

Since *jīva* is thus free to act and since *karma* performed with desire or *kāma* bind the *jīva*, Advaitins hold that *karma* performed without any attachment towards its fruits is distantly conducive to the rise of the knowledge of the self. *Karma* when performed in the above manner leads to the purity of heart (*sattva-suddhi*) which in its turn, gives rise in the mind of the aspirant an intense desire for release in addition to the qualities of *dama*, *sama*, etc. Then he has to give up performance of *karma* and pursue *śravaṇa*, *manana* and *nididhyāsana*. When all the impediments in the mind

of the aspirant are removed by pursuing *śravaṇa*, *manana* and *nididhyāsana*, and when the major texts of the Upaniṣads are contemplated, there arises the direct knowledge of the self. *Avidyā* is annihilated thereby, but the latent impression of *avidyā* or *avidyā-samskāra* continues to exist.

In the case of one who has attained to the knowledge of the self, all the *sañcita-karma* is annihilated. There is no possibility of accumulating fresh merit or demerit. Such a one continues to live till the *prārabdha-karma* which has started yielding its fruit and which has given rise to the present body in which the knowledge of the self has arisen is exhausted. In this stage, he performs *karma* in order to maintain *lokasaṅgraha*. No fruit ensues by his performing *karma* in this stage, as he performs *karma* without any sense of agency. In fact, he is said to do *karma* from the standpoint of the ignorant; and, from his stand-point he is a non-agent as he has once for all realized the falsity of the relation between mind and other factors which perform acts and the self which in reality is supra-relational. When the *prārabdha-karma* is exhausted, the body of *jīvanmukta* falls off, and he remains as Brahman which is liberation.¹²⁶

NOTES

Abbreviations: Bh. G. — *Bhagavad-gītā*. Brh. — *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad*. BS — *Bṛahma-sūtra*. BSB — *Bṛahma-sūtra-bhāṣya* of Śrī Śaṅkara. BSV — *Bṛahma-sūtra-vṛtti* of Sadāśivabrahmendra, Sri Vani Vilas Sastra Series, 6, Sri Vani Vilas Press, Srirangam, 1927. GD — *Gūḍhārthadīpikā* of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, Nirṇaya Sagar Press, Bombay, 1912. Kath. — *Kāthopaniṣad*. Kauṣ — *Kauṣītakī Upaniṣad*. Mund. — *Muṇḍakopaniṣad*. NR — *Nyāyaratnāvalī* of Brahmānanda

Sarasvatī, Kasi Sanskrit Series, No. 65, 1928. *N* — *Nārāyaṇī* of Narayana Tīrtha, Kasi Sanskrit Series, No. 65, 1928. *PP* — *Pañcapādikā* (Madras Govt. Oriental Series, Madras, Vol. LV, 1958. *RP* — *Ratnaprabhā* of Govindānanda, Nirnaya Sagar Press, Bombay, 1909. *SB* — *Śaṅkarabhāṣya*. *SB* — *Siddhāntabindu*, Kasi Sanskrit Series, No. 65, 1928. *SD* — *Śāstradarpaṇa*, Sri Vani Vilas Press, Srirangam, 1913. *SS* — *Saṅkṣepa-sārīraka*. *V* — *Vivarana*, Madras Government Oriental Series, Madras, Vol. CLV, 1958. *VM* — *Vanamūlū* of Acyutakṛṣṇānanda Tīrtha, Sri Vani Vilas Sastra Series, No. 13, Sri Vani Vilas Press, Srirangam, 1913.

1. *PP*, pp. 108, 111; and *V*, pp. 287, 294. See also *SB*, p.225 and *NR*, p.225.
2. *SS*, III, 277-8.
3. *Ibid.*, II, 176-7.
4. *NR*, p. 227.
5. *Mund.*, I, 9.
6. *SS*, III, 277-8.
7. *SB*, pp. 219 ff.
8. *NR*, p. 225.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 168.
10. *N*, p. 232.
11. *Bhūmati* on *BSB*, II, ii, 4; II, iii, 13; and III, ii, 3.
12. *BS*, II, iii, 33.
13. *Brh.*, IV, iii, 15.
14. *BV.*, p. 549.
15. *Ibid.* vide also *SD*, p. 159.
16. *BS*, II, iii, 33-39
17. See *Bhūmati* on *BSB*, II, iii, 33.
18. II, i, 18.
19. *BS*, II, iii, 34.
20. *Brh.*, II, i, 18.
21. *BS*, II, iii, 35.
22. *Taitt.*, II, 5
23. *Brh.*, II, i, 17.
24. *RP*, p. 544.
25. *BS*, II, iii, 36.
26. *RP*, p. 544.
27. *BS*, II, i, 37.
28. *RP*, p. 545.
29. *Ibid.*
30. *Ibid.*
31. *SS*, III, 16.
32. *Brh.*, IV, iv, 2.
33. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Vārtika*, IV, iv, 112.
34. *Ibid.*, IV, iv, 115.
35. *Ibid.*, IV, iv, 118.
36. *Ibid.*, IV, iv, 124.
37. *Brh.*, IV, iv, 5.
38. *SB* on the *Taitt.*, I.
39. *Ibid.*
40. *VM*, p. 3.
41. II, 4
42. III, 37.
43. *GTL*, p. 94.
44. *Bh. G.*, III 5 and 33; XVIII, 59 and 60.
45. *GD*, p. 633.
46. *Ibid.*, pp. 170-1.
47. *Brh.*, IV, iii, 15.
48. *jyotiṣṭomena svargakāmo yajeta*
49. *RP*, p. 546. See also *Jaimini-Sūtra*, I, ii, 7.
50. *BSB*, II, iii, 40.
51. *Ibid.*
52. *Ibid.*
53. *Brh.*, IV, iii, 7.
54. *Kaṭh*, III, 4.
55. *Brh.*, II, iv, 14.
56. *Ibid.*
57. *Ibid.*, IV, iii, 19.
58. *Ibid.*, IV, iii, 21.

59. *Ibid.*, IV, iii, 32.
 60. *BSB*, II, iii, 40.
 61. *BS*, II, iii, 40.
 62. Cited in *BSB*, II, iii, 41.
 63. *Kaus.*, III, 8.
 64. *BSB*, II, iii, 42.
 65. *SD*, p. 160.
 66. *Śvet.*, VI, ii.
 67. *Kaus.*, III, 8.
 68. *Ibid.*
 69. Cited in *BSB*, II, iii, 41.
 70. *BSB*, II, iii, 42.
 71. *Ibid.*, II, i, 3.
 72. *Ibid.*, II, iii, 42.
 73. *BS*, III, ii, 40.
 74. *BSB*, III, ii, 38.
 75. *Ibid.*
 76. *BS*, III, ii, 41.
 77. *Bṛh.*, IV, iv, 24; *vide*
 also *BS*, III, ii, 39.
 78. *Bh. G.*, VII, 21.
 79. *Ibid.*, XVIII, 12.
 80. *BSB*, III, i, 7 and *ŚB* on
Chānd., V, x, 3-4.
 81. *Chānd.*, V, x, 5.
 82. *Bṛh.*, V, ii, 16.
 83. *Ibid.*, IV, iv, 6.
 84. *Chānd.*, V, x, 7.
 85. *Bṛh.*, VI, ii, 16.
 86. *Ibid.*, IV, iv, 6.
 87. *BS*, III, i, 8.
 88. *Bhōmatī*, p. 607.
 89. *Chānd.*, V, x, 5-6.
 90. *BSB*, III, i, 22.
 91. *Chānd.*, V, x, 6.
 92. *ŚB* on *Chānd.*, V, x, 6.
 93. *Chānd.*, V, x, 6.
 94. *Ibid.*
 95. *RP.*, p. 619.
 96. *Chānd.*, V, x, 6.
 97. *BSB*, III, i, 24.
 98. *Chānd.*, V, 3-9. See also
Bṛh., VI, ii, 9-15.
 99. *ŚB* on *Chānd.*
 100. *Chānd.*, V, x, 2.
 101. *Ibid.*, IV, xv, 5.
 102. *Kaus.*, I, 3.
 103. *Bṛh.*, VI, ii, 15.
 104. *BS*, IV, iii, 1-3; and *BSB*.
 105. *Kaus.*, I, 3.
 106. *Bṛh.*, V, x, 1.
 107. *Ibid.*, VI, 15.
 108. *Chānd.*, V, x, 2.
 109. *Ibid.*, VI, xi, 1.
 110. *Chānd.*, V, X, 2.
 111. *ŚB*, on *Chānd.*, IV, xv, 5.
 112. *BS*, IV, iii, 6.
 113. *BS*, IV, iii, 10-11; and IV,
 iv, 22.
 114. *BSV*, p. 327.
 115. *Chānd.*, VII, i, 5; VII, ii,
 1-2; VII, iii, 1.
 116. *BS*, IV, iii, 15-16.
 117. *Chānd.*, V, x, 8, and *Bṛh.*,
 VI, ii, 16; *vide* also *BSB*,
 III, i, 12-17.
 118. *Bh. G.*, III, 5.
 119. *Ibid.*, III, 35.
 120. *Bṛh.*, IV, v, 6.
 121. Hiriyanna, M. *Outlines of Indian Philosophy*, p. 130.
 122. *GD.*, pp. 169-176.
 123. *Bṛh.*, I, iii, 1.
 124. This section is taken from Vidyāraṇya's *Jīvanmukti-Viveka*
 125. *Bh. G.*, XVIII, 63.
 126. For details *Saṅkṣepasāriraka*, (Madras University Philoso-
 phical Series, No. 18, University of Madras 1972) pp. 126-
 145.

THE ESSENTIAL DEFINITION OF BRAHMAN

by

Michael Comans

(Contd. from Vol. XI, No. 3)

However, when we perceive that a vase which was formerly on the mantelpiece is now in pieces on the floor we certainly feel that there has been a radical change in the existence of the vase. How can the Advaitin say that "existence" is free from change? The Advaitin can reply that every perception contains two "aspects": the cognition of the object and the cognition that it exists." The object certainly changes but the cognition that it exists does not change. For example, in the perception, "there is a vase on the mantelpiece," there is the cognition of the vase and of the fact that it exists. Upon the perception of the broken vase there is the cognition of the pieces and there is the cognition of their existence. The vase is now in pieces, but the attribute "is" which was co-existent with the vase in the statement "the vase is" now inheres in the pieces so that one says: "a piece exists." It cannot be shown that the "is" of the preceding sentence differs from "exists" in the latter sentence. Because something which possesses an attribute such as the colour green can be distinguished from something which possesses a blue colour. Existence, however, does not possess any distinguishing feature and so the "is-ness" inhering in one thing cannot be differentiated from the "is-ness" inhering in something else.

If the pieces of the vase were crushed to powder, then too that powder *is*. If the powder is reduced to molecules then the molecule *is*. Even if that molecule was destroyed so that nothing could be perceived and somebody stated: "nothing exists" it means that nothing *is*. All change occurs in relation to "is" which persists unchanged even though the substantive to which it is connected undergoes change. Hence existence i.e. "is-ness" is real.

One may argue that the conception of "is-ness" is a mere abstraction. However the Upaniṣad passage also states that Brahman is knowledge i.e. awareness, and in the same section the Upaniṣad teaches that Brahman is the Self ["from that, from this Self..."]¹⁴ If Brahman is awareness which is identical to the Self then Brahman cannot be a mere abstraction, because one's own self-awareness is immediately evident and it is not just an abstraction.

An objection could then be raised that if Brahman is considered to be identical to the awareness pertaining to the individual self then Brahman would be mutable and consequently unreal. Because (a) it is well known that a person's awareness undergoes change for it is a common expression that one's awareness can be "expanded" through new insights and experiences. Also, awareness changes because a person is not always the same: seeing, hearing, thinking, doubting, ascertaining, happiness and sadness etc. are all indicative of changing awareness. (b) Moreover no one says that they perceived the existence of their awareness prior to their birth. On the contrary there is the non-cognition (*anupalabdhi*) of awareness prior to one's birth which indicates the prior non-existence (*prāg-abhāva*) of awareness at that time. (c) Furthermore, at the time of deep sleep there is no awareness at all. When a person awakes and is asked what he was aware of during sleep, he would answer: "I did not know anything." It can be concluded from such an answer that awareness is absent during deep sleep. For these reasons, if Brahman is identical to the awareness belonging to the individual, because the awareness belonging to the individual is impermanent then Brahman too would be impermanent.

We shall examine each of those objections in turn. First, the Advaitin accepts that the awareness which is manifest in all epistemological activities and psychological states is subject to change. The Advaitin, however, considers that there are two "types" of awareness. The first type consists of awareness which is conditioned by the modes of the mind (*vṛttiviśiṣṭam caitanyam*).²⁵ This awareness manifests in two forms: as the subject (*ahamvṛtti*) or I-notion (*ahaṅkāra*) and in the form of the various types of cognition which are objects (*idamvṛtti*) of the I-notion.²⁶ This means that awareness, conditioned by the modes of the mind, manifests as the subject of experience, i.e. "Mr So and So" and it also manifests in the form of the various types of cognition i.e. "I see", "I hear", "I think" etc. This type of awareness which is conditioned by the mind is what is normally accepted to be the self, however it is not what the Advaitin intends by the word "Self" (*ātman*).

The second type of awareness is the Self which is considered to be identical with Brahman. This awareness is of a fundamental nature: it constitutes the "core" of the person, it is free from all objective factors and is not subject to change. Although the various cognitions change, this essential awareness (*svarūpa-caitanya*) does not change for it is only on account of such awareness that the variations in cognitions become known. With respect to the illumination of cognitions, this awareness is called the "witness consciousness" (*sākṣīcaitanya*).²⁷ A cognition can be seen to change because of the continuing presence of this "witness consciousness" which reveals the prior absence, the presence and the subsequent absence of any cognition. Though cognitions can change with great rapidity,

the awareness which illumines the cognition, and the presence of the following cognition is not itself seen to change. If the awareness [A] which illumines a cognition is seen to change like the cognition, then in order to note that awareness has changed, there should be another awareness [B] to reveal the change in the previous awareness [A]. If it is said that the second awareness [B] changes, then its change has to be revealed through postulating another awareness [C] which is unchanging in so far as it illumines the change in the previous awareness [B]. If that awareness [C] undergoes alteration then there must be another awareness [D] to note its alteration and so there would be an infinite regress.

Nor could the change in awareness A be perceived by awareness B and the modification in awareness B be revealed by awareness A. Because if awareness A is the object of awareness B then awareness A cannot, either simultaneously or subsequently, become the subject which illumines awareness B. For the subject, in order to be a subject, must not become an object. And for this reason, if awareness A is the subject then it is unable to objectify itself and such objectification would be a necessary condition in order to reveal that it has undergone change. Therefore, Advaitins consider that there is a single fundamental awareness which illumines all changing mental events and which is not seen to change and because there is no negating factor, this awareness is real.²⁵

Furthermore, the prior non-existence of awareness cannot be proved. In order to prove such prior non-existence, it should be apprehended either by oneself or by someone else. If one does, not exist then one

cannot apprehend one's prior non-existence. If one exists, then too one cannot apprehend one's prior non-existence because the person exists at the very time he seeks to apprehend his non-existence. Moreover, the absence of recollection of the prior existence of awareness does not establish its non-existence. Because in that case, people who are unable to recollect previous events — such as the experiences of early childhood — could not have existed at the time of the absence of recollection.

Nor can the prior non-existence of awareness be apprehended by someone else. Because awareness cannot be objectified either by oneself or by another. The prior non-existence of awareness cannot be proved by arguing that there is no cognition of awareness prior to one's birth: just as the absence of a book on the table can be proved by its non-cognition, so too the prior non-existence of awareness can be proved by its non-cognition. Such an argument is not correct because the book is capable of being perceived if it were present on the table and from the fact that we do not cognize the book which is capable of being perceived (*yogyānupalabdhi*) we know that it does not exist on the table. Awareness, however, is not capable of being objectified like a book and so the non-cognition of the prior existence of awareness cannot be cited as a proof for the non-existence of awareness.²⁹

Thirdly, it was objected that awareness cannot be real because it is absent during deep sleep. However the fact that the individual knowing subject is not manifest during deep sleep only proves that the knowing subject is not a permanent entity. The absence of knowership, however, does not prove the absence

of awareness because upon waking there is the experience of a sense of continuity: the waker does not think that he is essentially different from the one who was asleep. This sense of continuity can be accounted for by the continued presence of awareness which remains as the basis of waking cognition, dream cognition and the absence of cognition during deep sleep. Though the states of waking, dream and deep sleep are mutually discrepant, the sense of Self persists. This is because awareness is identical to "I am-ness" and awareness neither disappears during deep sleep nor manifests at the time of waking; but rather awareness persists unchanged during the states of waking, dream and dreamless sleep.

In the sentence: "Brahman is real, knowledge, limitless" the word "limitless" (*ananta*) has two functions. First, as we have seen, it removes the limited, literal meaning from the two words "real" and "knowledge" so that these words indicate that Brahman is "limitless real" i.e. existence and "limitless knowledge" i.e. awareness. The word "limitless" also serves to reveal that Brahman has no limitation in terms of space, time, or on account of another object. Brahman is not spatially limited since both the concept of space and everything within space have no separation from existence. The concept of time, too, is not separate from awareness. In fact, the concepts of space and time both occur in awareness and are objects of awareness. Because they are objects of awareness they cannot be identical to awareness and so the subject-awareness is inherently free from space and time. Nor can Brahman be limited by an object, because all objects undergo change and consequently they are not absolutely real. A real thing can limit

another real thing, but what is real cannot be limited by something which is of a lesser order of reality. Hence Brahman cannot be limited by objects which are only apparently real.

If Brahman, existence-awareness, is not limited in terms of space and time, or in respect of objects, then Brahman is non-dual. Our experience, however, would seem to contradict this because we do not experience our awareness as "non-dual" but rather our experience is that every person has their own individual awareness. According to the Advaitin, the idea that one person's awareness is essentially separate from another's is not from the standpoint of the fundamental awareness which is the Self, but it is with reference to the awareness conditioned by the modes of the mind and manifested by the mind in the form of the individual "I" thought (*ahamvrtti*). Brahman, the fundamental awareness, reveals the individual "I" thought along with its modifications in terms of happiness and sadness etc. in the waking state, and it also reveals the absence of the "I" thought in deep sleep. This fundamental awareness, which is immediately evident in experience as "I am-ness," cannot be objectified and so it is unable to be said as "such and such." If the fundamental awareness of one person is distinct from that pertaining to another person, then it has to be shown to be separate by means of some distinguishing characteristic. A red flower, for example, can be distinguished from yellow and white flowers because it has the distinguishing attribute of redness. Awareness, however, cannot be objectified and so a distinguishing feature cannot be seen and it is only on the basis of a distinguishing feature that one is able to say: "my awareness is fundamentally diffe-

rent from your awareness." Awareness is seen to have neither form nor distinguishing attributes and hence it is not possible to show an intrinsic difference between the awareness of one sentient being and that of another.

The sentence: "The knower of Brahman attains the supreme" initiated three questions, two of which have been answered. First, it was shown that the word "supreme" refers to Brahman since any other attainment would be of a limited nature. The sentence also gave rise to the expectation as to what is the nature of Brahman and this was determined through the implied meaning of the words "*satyam jñānam anantam*". The final question, as to the means for the gain of the knowledge of Brahman, has been partially answered. The idea of a "gain" is meaningful only if there is a separation between the one who gains and what is gained. Brahman, however, is not spatially remote from the knower: Brahman is the very existence-awareness in which knowledge takes place. Therefore there is no real "gain" of Brahman but rather Brahman is not "gained" because of ignorance. Śaṅkara states that: "Brahman, although the nature of the Self, can be unattained due to ignorance"¹⁰ and he cites the well known example of the "tenth man" who, while busily counting the other people, omits to count himself though he makes up the required number.¹¹ Because the non-attainment of Brahman is due to ignorance, the "gain" of Brahman is really the gain of the already gained.

Although Brahman is not separate from the seeker, the knowledge that Brahman is the essential Self of the

seeker is not known due to ignorance. Ignorance can only be removed by knowledge and knowledge must take place in the intellect. Hence the *śruti* now specifies the place where the knowledge of Brahman can be gained: यो वेद निहितं गुहायां परमे व्योमन् । “The one who knows [Brahman] situated in the intellect in the supreme space [in the heart].” Though Brahman is not limited to a particular location, Brahman is said to be “situated in the intellect” because the intellect is the location where Brahman can be apprehended as the Self. Śaṅkara states that:

Brahman, situated in that [intellect] is clearly apprehended by a mode of that [intellect]. Because otherwise [i.e. apart from such an apprehension], Brahman has no connection with [i.e. Brahman is not located in] a particular place and time on account of [Brahman] being all pervasive and free from distinction.”

Brahman has to be known by a mental mode which apprehends that the essential Self is a being who is free from all objective factors: name, attributes, thoughts, doership and enjoyership etc. and which, in conjunction with the adjunct of the intellect, becomes the seer, hearer, thinker etc.” This mental mode arises out of the operation of a special means of knowledge, i.e. the Upaniṣad statements, which are to be communicated by a teacher who knows the methodology of instruction. The specific means for the arising of such a mental mode is listening (*śravaṇa*) to the teaching from a proper teacher, carefully considering (*manana*) what has been heard and steadfast contemplation (*nīdīdhyāsa*) upon the nature of the Self. An elaboration of these three

specific means is beyond the scope of this paper and can be reserved for a later occasion.

The Upaniṣad passage concludes by stating the result of this knowledge of Brahman: सोऽश्नुते सर्वान् कामान् सह । ब्रह्मणा विपश्चितेति ॥ "he enjoys all desired [objects] simultaneously, as [identified with] the omniscient Brahman." Whereas the experience of ordinary people is limited to the finite enjoyment derived through the relation of the sense object and the sense organ, the knower of Brahman can enjoy all desirable things simultaneously, on account of being Brahman. For the knower of Brahman sees that his Self is identical to the Self of all beings and he knows that all experiences are witnessed by the same awareness which illumines his own intellect. Moreover, the knower of Brahman "enjoys all desired objects simultaneously" because he knows that the fulness of the Self is what is sought through the satisfaction of a desire. Such a person is not *dependent* upon the gain of objects and the manipulation of events for his own satisfaction. He knows the truth of his own being, the truth of the world and the true nature of the Lord and in his knowledge he is complete, for the knower of Brahman has gained what is supreme.

NOTES

23. Cf. Śāṅkara's commentary on the *Gītā* 2.16: "...sarvatra buddhidvayopalabdheḥ sadbuddhir asadbuddhir iti."

24. *tasmād vā etasmād ātmana ākāśaḥ sambhūtaḥ.*

25. Cf. *Vedāntaparibhāṣā*, p. 8 (edited and translated by S.S. Suryanarayana Sastri, Adyar, 1942, reprinted 1971); *vṛttivisiṣṭam caitanyam idam ity ucyate.*

26. Cf. *Pañcadaśi*, 6.70. Also, *Śrutisārasamuddharaṇam*, verse 14.
27. Cf. for example, *Pañcadaśi*, ch. 10.
28. *Ten Principal*, *op.cit.*, p. 283 f; *sanmātraṁ ca anupāpan-
nāṁ jñānakartṛtvādiviśeṣavattve sati. sanmātraṁ ca satyam.*
29. Śrī Rāmānuja attempts to employ this reasoning against the Advaitin. Cf. *Śrī Bhāṣya, Mahāśiddhānta* (Karmarkar's edition p. 56); *yogyānuṣṭhānādiviśeṣavattve sati. sanmātraṁ ca satyam.*
30. *Ten Principal*, *op.cit.*, p. 282; *evam avidyayā ātmabhūtam api
brahmānāptaṁ syāt.*
31. *ibid.*
32. *ibid.*, 286; *tasyāṁ nihitam brahma tadvṛttiyā viviktatayopa-
labhyata iti na hy anyathā viśiṣṭadesakūlasambandho'sti brahmaṇa,
sarvagatatvān nirviśeṣatvāc ca.*
33. Cf. *Vanamālā op.cit.*, p.116; *buddhivṛttiyā "tat tvam asi" iti
śrutijanitayā buddhivṛttiyā sakāśād viviktatayā grhyata ityarthah.
yadvā buddhivṛttiyā buddhisamsargeṇa viviktatayā sphuṭatayā draṣṭṛtva-
śrotṛtvāmantṛtvādiviśeṣavattve sati. sanmātraṁ ca satyam.*

HOMAGE TO VYĀSA

त्रैलोक्यनाथहरिमीड्यमुदारसत्त्वं
 शक्तेस्तनूजतनयं परमेष्ठिकल्पम् ।
 जीमूतमुक्तविमलाम्बरचारुवर्णं
 वासिष्ठमुग्रतपसं प्रणतोऽस्मि नित्यम् ॥

I always prostrate before Vyāsa who is Viṣṇu, the Lord of the three worlds, who is praiseworthy, who is characterized by the *sattvaguna*, who is the grandson of Śakti, who resembles Brahmā, who is endowed with the pleasing colour of the sky that is clear by being free from clouds, who comes in the line of Vasiṣṭha and who is omniscient.

Śrī Toṭakācārya. *Śrutisārasamuddharaṇam*, 1.

ŚĀRĪRAKAVYĀKHYĀPRASTHĀNABHEDAḤ

by

Ātmaidyābhūṣaṇam V. S. V. Gurusvāmī Śāstri

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VI श्रीसुरेश्वरः

[216]

सुरेश्वरो नाम यतिर्बभूव
 शिष्योत्तमः शङ्करदेशिकस्य ।
 गुरोः समानः सकलेषु तन्त्रे-
 ध्वनन्यसाधारणधीविलासः ॥

[217]

तैर्बाह्रदारण्यकतैत्तिरीय-
 भाष्ये प्रणीतानि हि वार्तिकानि ।
 श्रीदक्षिणामूर्तिनुतौ च पञ्चो-
 कृतौ तथा तानि विनिर्मितानि ॥

[218]

नैष्कर्म्यसिद्धिश्च तथा प्रणीता
 तत्सन्ति पञ्च प्रथिताः प्रबन्धाः ।
 तद्ग्रन्थनिर्दिष्टदिशा तदीय-
 सिद्धान्तभेदानिह वच्मि कांश्चित् ॥

[219]

प्रायः सुरेश्वरगुरुर्भगवत्पदानां
 पन्थानमेव विमलं विपुलीकरोति ।
 आचार्यमण्डनसमः कचिदेष धीमान्
 श्रीशाङ्करोपरि विमर्शपरो बभूव ॥

[220]

भर्तृप्रपञ्चमिश्रस्य मण्डनस्य मतं तथा ।
कचित्कचिद्विमृशति स्वाशयं दर्शयन्नसौ ॥

श्रीसुरेश्वराचार्यैः भगवत्पादव्याख्यादूषणपूर्वकं तद्विरुद्धव्याख्या-
प्रदर्शनम्

[221]

परस्परं विरुध्येते शङ्करश्च सुरेश्वरः ।
येषु येषु स्थलेष्वेतदर्शयामीह सांप्रतम् ॥

[222]

बार्हदारण्यके भाष्ये वार्तिके परिदृश्यते ।
प्रथमे पुनरध्याये ब्राह्मणे पञ्चमे किल ॥

(i) पुत्रेणैवेत्यत्रत्यस्य एवकारस्य कर्मविद्यापदाभ्यामपि योजनं
भगवत्पादकृतं न युक्तमिति निरूपणम्

[223]

‘अथ त्रयो वाव लोका’ इति श्रुत्यर्थवर्णने ।
पुत्रेणैवेत्यादिवाक्यं व्याख्यातं भाष्यकर्तृभिः ॥

[224]

कर्मविद्यापदाभ्यामप्येवकारस्य योजनात् ।
सुरेश्वरोऽदूषयत्तद्विद्यथे’त्यादिवार्तिके ॥

[225]

कर्मविद्यापदाभ्यां यदेवकारस्य योजनम् ।
तृतीयाश्रुतितः स्वर्गसाधनत्वस्य लाभतः ॥

[226]

एवकारान्वयो व्यर्थः कर्मविद्यापदोत्तरम् ।
पित्रादिमुवनप्राप्तेः साधनैरितरैरपि ॥

[227]

संभवादेवकारोऽत्र पुत्रस्यैवावधारकः ।
व्याख्यानमिदमेवात्र विदोषं दोषवत्परम् ॥

[228]

इदमेव ततो ग्राह्यं न तु यदोषवन्मतम् ।
इति स्पष्टं भाष्यकृतो व्याख्यां दुष्टामुवाच सः ॥

(ii) सम्प्रतिः सुमूर्खं पुरुषमात्रकर्तव्या न भवति किन्तु प्रव्रजिष्य-
पुरुषविशेषकर्तव्यैव सा

[229]

ब्राह्मणेऽन्यत्र तत्रैव सुमूर्खोः पुरुषस्य हि ।
स्वकर्तव्यक्रियाणां यत्पुत्रसात्करणं तु तत् ॥

[230]

संप्रतिशब्दार्थतया प्रादर्शि भगवत्पदैः ।
सुरेश्वरस्तदूषयित्वा व्याचक्षेऽन्यथैव तत् ॥

[231]

कौषीतक्यादिनिगममन्वादिस्मृतिसंमता ।
संप्रतिः क्रमसंन्यासविधिरेवेति बोध्यते ॥

[232]

प्रैष्यन्निति पदस्यार्थं मरिष्यन्निति वर्णितम् ।
भाष्यकृद्भिः परित्यज्य प्रव्रजिष्यन्निति स्फुटम् ॥

[233]

व्याख्याय बोधयामास स्वीयमाशयमन्यथा ।
अस्मिन्नेव तथाध्याये चतुर्थे ब्राह्मणे पुनः ॥

(iii) निदिध्यासनं न ध्यानमात्रं किन्तु साक्षात्कारात्मविज्ञानम्

[234 - 235 ab]

भाष्यकृद्भ्यामत्रानुवादात्तु निदिध्यासनमब्रवीत् ।
सुरेश्वरोऽनुवादस्थविज्ञानेनेति शब्दतः ॥
साक्षात्कारात्मविज्ञानं निदिध्यासनमिच्छति ।

(iv) संन्यासः त्रैवर्णिकविषयः, न ब्राह्मणमात्रविषयः

[235 cd - 236]

तृतीये पुनरध्याये पञ्चमे ब्राह्मणे तथा ॥
ब्राह्मणस्यैवाधिकारं संन्यासे प्राह भाष्यकृत् ।
सुरेशस्तं व्याजहार वैश्यक्षत्रिययोरपि ॥

[237]

सर्वाधिकारविच्छेदीत्युत्तरस्माच्च वार्तिकात् ।
विद्वत्संन्यासविषयमितीदं केचिदब्रुवन् ॥

[238 ab]

इदं साधु न वेत्येतदन्यत्वान्नात्र चिन्त्यते ।

(v) स मेने न वदिष्यामीत्येतद्वाक्यं एनेन संबदिष्यामीति व्याख्येयम्, न न वदिष्यामीति

[238 cd - 239]

चतुर्थे च तथाध्याये तृतीये ब्राह्मणे पुनः ॥

‘स मेने न वदिष्यामी’त्येतद्वाक्यं तु भाष्यकृत् ।
न वदिष्यामीति मत्वा याज्ञवल्क्यो जगाम तम् ॥

[240]

इति पूर्वोक्तवाक्यार्थं वर्णयामास हि स्फुटम् ।
व्याख्यामिमां दूषयित्वा बभाषे तु सुरेश्वरः ॥

[241 - 242 ab]

एनेन संबदिष्यामीत्येव व्याख्येयमित्यसौ ।
भाष्यकृद्द्वर्णितां व्याख्यामशुभामेव शंसितुम् ॥
शुभां स्वकीयां व्याख्यां सोऽबोधयच्छीसुरेश्वरः ।

(vi) “आत्मेत्येवोपासीत,” “विज्ञाय प्रज्ञां कुर्वीत” - इत्युभयत्रापि न कोपि विधिः

[242 cd - 243]

एवं तत्रैव चाध्याये चतुर्थे ब्राह्मणे पुनः ॥
‘आत्मेत्येवोपे’ति वाक्ये सूच्यते भगवत्पदैः ।
पक्षे प्राप्तत्वकथनान्नियमाख्यविधिस्तथा ॥

[244]

‘विज्ञाये’त्यादिवाक्ये तु मुक्तकण्ठमभाषत ।
नियमाख्यविधिं भाष्ये भाष्यकृद्विस्तरादपि ॥

[245]

उभयत्र न कोऽप्यस्ति विधिरित्येव वार्तिके ।
सुरश्वरो विस्तरशः साधयामास युक्तिभिः ॥

[246]

भाष्यकृद्विधिवादस्य प्रौढिवादत्वमब्रवीत् ।
एवं विरोधा वर्तन्ते श्रीशङ्करसुरेशयोः ॥

(vii) मायाशबलं ब्रह्म जगत्कारणम्

[247]

ऐकात्म्याध्यवसानाय जगत्कारणचिन्तनाम् ।
नियमेनैवारभन्ते सर्वेऽप्यद्वैतवादिनः ॥

[248]

तत्तयोरस्ति संबन्धः कश्चिदित्यवसोयते ।
तथा हि यावज्जगतः कारणं प्रविचार्य तत् ॥

[249]

आत्मैवेति न निश्चीतिस्तावत्सर्वेषु वस्तुषु ।
निगूढात्माप्येक एवेत्येवं नैवास्ति निर्णयः ॥

[250]

यद्यात्मनोऽप्यन्यदेवाभविष्यत्कारणं तदा ।
नाभविष्यन्निगूढात्मा निखिलेष्वपि जन्तुषु ॥

[251]

सर्वकार्यानुप्रविष्टं स्वरूपं कारणस्य हि ।
यदि चान्यत्कारणं स्यादात्मनो जगतस्तदा ॥

[252]

एकविज्ञानतः सर्वविज्ञानं प्रतिजानती ।
श्रुतिः पीडयेत नियतं तद्भवेदसमञ्जसम् ॥

[253]

आत्मकारणवादेऽपि शङ्कास्मान्नैव मुञ्चति ।
अतत्कार्याचेतनानां विज्ञानं चात्मधीवशात् ॥

[254]

कथं स्यादिति शङ्कात्र पुनः संजायते यतः ।
विवर्तवादाश्रयणे सालक्ष्यं न विद्यते ॥

[255]

कार्यकारणयोर्यस्मात्तास्मादत्र सुरेश्वरः ।
परिणामाख्यवादं च स्वीकुर्वन्नात्मनस्तथा ॥

[256]

अज्ञानेन विशिष्टस्य कारणत्वं निरूपयन् ।
मन्ये यथोक्तमाक्षेपं पर्यहार्षीत्सयुक्तिकम् ॥

[257]

अव्याकृतप्रक्रियायां साभासाज्ञानवान्परः ।
आत्मा कारणमित्येवमजस्रं प्रत्यपादयत् ॥

[258]

अन्तर्यामिब्राह्मणस्य कारणात्मनि चान्वयम् ।
सर्वसाक्षितया यच्च फलदातृत्वमीश्वरे ॥

[259]

बोध्यते तज्जगद्योनिमधिकृत्यैव संगतम् ।
द्वारीकृत्याज्ञानमेव सर्वकर्तृत्वमिष्यते ॥

[260]

अव्याकृतप्रक्रियायां जगत्कारणचिन्तने ।
सुरेश्वरैः साध्यते तु जगत्कारणमीश्वरः ॥

[261]

तत्राज्ञानमुपाधिः स्यादज्ञानस्य प्रधानताम् ।
आश्रित्य जडहेतुत्वं चित्प्राधान्यविवक्षया ॥

[262]

चिदात्महेतुताप्यत्र संभवेतां परात्मनि ।
तथा जनिष्यमाणांश्च प्राणिनः प्रति विद्यते ॥

[263]

कर्माज्ञानं भावनापि सहकारीह कारणम् ।
कालत्रयेऽपि चाज्ञानकार्याणां तदधीनता ॥

[264]

साक्षित्वं चित्प्राधानत्वादन्तर्यामित्वमात्मनः ।
कारणत्वेन जगतः प्रोक्तं कारणचिन्तने ॥

[265]

अव्याकृतं तथाकाशः प्राणः सत्यमितीदृशाम् ।
शबलब्रह्मवाचित्वं शब्दानां संप्रसाधितम् ॥

[266]

तज्जगत्कारणं ब्रह्म शबलं भवतीश्वरः ।
इति सिद्धान्तयन्त्येते बृहदारण्यवार्तिके ॥

[267]

'सर्वशक्ताच्च सर्वज्ञादीश्वरादेव कारणात् ।
नामरूपात्मकानेककर्तृभोक्त्रादिसंयुतम् ॥

[268]

अचिन्त्यरचनारूपं जगदेतदजायत ।
न संसारी न चाभावो न स्वभावो न चाणवः ॥

[269]

नापि प्रधानं जगतः कारणं' चेति भाष्यकृत् ।
जन्मादिसूत्रभाष्ये यद्ब्रह्मभाषे तद्भवेदिह ॥
शबलब्रह्मवादस्य मूलमित्युपतर्क्यते ॥

(viii) दृष्टिदृष्टिवादः

[270]

'कामः संकल्प' इत्यादिश्रुतिव्याख्यानवार्तिके ।
इन्द्रियाणां हि सर्वेषां मनोवृत्तिविशेषता ॥

[271]

तत्तात्पदार्थरूपेण मनसः परिणामिता ।
सर्वात्मतैवं मनसो विस्तरेणाभिधीयते ॥

[272]

घटादिदृष्टिरेवोक्ता तत्तत्सृष्टितया यतः ।
तद्दृष्टिसृष्टिवादोऽयं बोध्यतेऽत्र सुरेश्वरैः ॥
सूत्रभाष्यप्रणेतृभ्यामप्ययं प्रतिपाद्यते ॥

[273]

वितण्डयैव बाह्यार्थः सूत्रकारैः समर्थितः ।
अत एव च बौद्धैस्तु स्वप्नादिप्रत्ययो यथा ॥

[274]

बाह्यार्थविकलस्तद्वज्जाग्रज्ज्ञानमितीरिते ।
व्यासाचार्यैः परोक्तः स दृष्टान्तो न निराकृतः ॥

[275]

विज्ञानवादिभिर्ज्ञानाद्बाह्यार्थे त्वपलापिते ।
अपनीतो ह्यर्धभार इति मत्वानुमोदितः ॥

[276]

दृष्टान्तोऽयं स्वकर्तव्यो बाह्यार्थस्यापलापने ।
'बाह्यार्थविकलाज्ज्ञानाज्जातसंस्कारकाद्भृदः ॥

[277]

स्वाप्नो हि प्रत्ययो बाह्यविकलो यः प्रजायते ।
तत्साक्षी तैजस'श्चेति भाष्याद्दृष्ट्यात्मकं जगत् ॥

[278]

ज्ञानातिरिक्तज्ञेयार्थवादिनां मन्दतापरम् ।
ज्ञानाद्वाह्यं तु नास्तीति वादिनां श्रेष्ठतापरम् ॥

[279]

नाभाव उपलब्धेरित्यत्र भाष्यकृतां वचः ।
श्रुतिसूत्रार्थकं यत्तदपि साधकमिष्यते ॥

[280]

प्रकाशानन्दयतिनाप्येतत्समुपबृंहितम् ।
अनूद्यते च सिद्धान्तलेशसंग्रहकर्तृभिः ॥

[281]

मतं सुरेश्वरस्यैतत्केषांचिदिति विस्तरात् ।
सुरेश्वरैस्तत्र तत्र बृहदारण्यवार्तिके ॥

[282]

प्रतीचि ब्रह्मणि तथा ज्ञानमात्मनि कीर्त्यते ।
प्रत्यग्ब्रह्मात्मशब्दानामर्थनिर्वर्णनच्छलात् ॥

[283]

पर्यायतापि तत्रैव स्फुटं तैरुपपाद्यते ।
तदविद्याश्रया विम्बी केवलैव परा चितिः ॥

[284]

इदमेव मतं तेषामिति निश्चीयते बुधैः ।
न ब्रह्म भाति नैवाहं जानामीति प्रतीतितः ॥

(अनुवर्तते)

VI. *Sureśvara*

[216]

Suresvara was a saint and one of the best disciples of Śrī Śaṅkara. He was well-versed in all *śāstras* and had an extra-ordinary brilliant intelligence.

[217]

He wrote the *Vārttikas* (in verse form) on the *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad-bhāṣya* and the *Taittirīyopaniṣad-bhāṣya* (of Śrī Śaṅkara). He also wrote the commentaries on the *Dakṣiṇāmūrtistotra* and the *Pañcikaraṇa*.

[218]

Including his *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi*, there are five well-known works of Suresvara. Let me point out some important viewpoints of Suresvara as found in his works.

[219]

Following mainly the faultless path of Śrī Śaṅkara, Suresvara expounds and elaborates the views of Śrī Śaṅkara. In a few places this learned author, similar to Maṇḍanācārya, has given his comments on the views of Śrī Śaṅkara.

[220]

In a few places, Suresvara has first given his comments on the views of Bhartṛprapañca and Maṇḍana; and then he has established his own view.

[221]

Let me first point out certain instances wherein Suresvara differs from the views of Śrī Śaṅkara.

[222]

With regard to the commentary on the *Bṛhadāraṇyakoṇiṣad* text (I. v. 16) Suresvara differs from the views of Śrī Śaṅkara.

(i) “Śrī Śaṅkara has construed the word ‘eva’ with the words *karma* and *vidyā*. This is not proper” says Suresvara.

[223 - 228]

Śrī Śaṅkara has commented on the passage, ‘*putreṇaiva ...*’ while explaining the *śruti* text, “*atha trayo vāva lokāḥ...*” He has construed the word *eva* (found in *putreṇaiva*) along with the words ‘*karma*’ and ‘*vidyā*.’ Suresvara finds fault with this view, as he comments on it in the *Vārttika* beginning with *vidyayā*, etc., and says that it is not proper to construe the *eva* along with the words *karma* and *vidyā* here. By the use of instrumental case itself, they (*karma* and *vidyā*) are found to be *sādhana* (means) for *svarga*; and hence it is in vain to construe ‘*eva*’ next to the words *karma* and *vidyā*. Even other *sādhanas* are useful to the accomplishment of *pitṛ-loka*, etc. So the word ‘*eva*’ here is used in the sense of *avadhāraṇa* with regard to ‘*putrasya*’. This explanation alone is free from fault, whereas the other one is erroneous. Therefore ‘*eva*’ should be construed with *putreṇa* alone. This view alone is acceptable and not the other. Thus Suresvara has found fault with the view of Śrī Śaṅkara.

(ii) “*Sampratti*” is not to be followed by a ‘*mumūrṣu*’ alone but it is to be followed, in particular by one who wants to become a *sannyāsin*.

*Free rendering by Dr. V. K. S. N. Raghavan.

[229 - 230]

While commenting on another text of the *brāhmaṇa* (*Bṛhadāraṇyaka Up.* I, v, 7), Śrī Śaṅkara has explained the term 'sampratti' as follows. When a person wants to die, he has to pass on the enjoined duties (prescribed for him) to his son (as responsible for fulfilling them). Such a passing on of duties to a son by his father is known as *sampratti*. Suresvara has turned down this explanation and comments on it otherwise.

[231 - 233 ab]

According to the *Upaniṣads* — *Kauṣītakī*, etc. — and the *Manusmṛti*, etc., 'sampratti' refers to *krama-sannyāsa-vidhi* alone. Herein, while Śrī Śaṅkara has explained the word "praīṣyan" as *marisyān*' (who likes to die), Suresvara has explained it well as 'pravrajīṣyan' (who wants to become a monk).

(iii) '*Nididhyāsana*' is not meditation alone, but it includes direct self-knowledge.

[233 cd - 235 ab]

In the fourth *brāhmaṇa* of this *adhyāya* itself (*Bṛhadāraṇyaka Up.* I, iv, 7), Śrī Śaṅkara has explained *nididhyāsana* as *dhyāna* alone. But Suresvara has explained this term to include direct self-knowledge by construing the meaning of '*viññānena*' that is supplied in the context.

(iv) '*Sannyāsa*' is applicable not only to Brahmins, but also to *Kṣatriyas* and *Vaiśyas*.

[235 cd - 238 ab]

While commenting on the fifth *brāhmaṇa* of the third *adhyāya* (*Bṛhadāraṇyaka Up.* III, v, 1), Śrī

Śaṅkara has told that Brahmins alone are eligible to take to *sannyāsa*. But Suresvara has spoken of this eligibility to Vaisya and Kṣatriya as evident from the *vārttika* beginning with “*sarvādhikāra*.” Some others have held that this eligibility is with regard to *Vidvat-sannyāsa* (renunciation of the wise). Whether this is right or wrong is not explained here further because it is a different problem.

(v) *The text ‘sa mene ...’ should be explained as ‘I shall confer with him’ and not as ‘I will not speak.’*

[238 cd - 242 ab]

Again, while commenting on the text of the third *brāhmaṇa* of the fourth *adhyāya* (*Bṛhadāraṇyaka Up.*, IV, iii, 1), Śrī Śaṅkara has explained the text ‘*sa mene na vadisyāmi ...*’ as Yājñavalkya went to him, thinking that ‘I will not speak’. Suresvara has explained this text as “This is to be elaborated only as ‘I shall confer with him’.” Thus Suresvara rejects the view of Śrī Śaṅkara and underlines his view as right.

(vi) *There is no injunction in the case of both the texts: “ātmetyevopāsita” and “vijñāya prajñām kurvita.”*

[242cd - 246]

While commenting on the text of the fourth *brāhmaṇa* of the same *adhyāya* (*Bṛhadāraṇyaka Up.* IV. iv), Śrī Śaṅkara has referred to *niyama-vidhi* as enjoined in the sentence “*ātmetyevopāsita ..*” because it is arrived at on one way of interpretation. In the case of another sentence of the same section, namely “*vijñāya prajñām kurvita*” Śrī Śaṅkara has avowedly commented that there is enjoined the *niyamavidhi*. While explaining

both the above-mentioned sentences in his *Vārttika*, Suresvara has established through right arguments that there is no injunction of any *vidhi*. But Śrī Śaṅkara, in his *Bhāṣya* (on the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Up.*) has held that the *vidhivāda* is highly commendable (in this context). Thus there are some contradictions between the views of Śrī Śaṅkara and Suresvara.

(vii) *Brahman reflected in māyā constitutes the cause of the world.*

[247]

All the Advaitins begin their exposition of Brahman for establishing the view of 'one *Ātman* alone' based on the discussion of *jagatkāraṇa* (the primary cause of the world).

[248 - 252]

Therefore it is concluded that there is relation between the two (*viz.* the one Self and the cause of the world). To explain: If it is not confirmed, after a proper analysis, that the one Self is indeed, the cause of the world, then it is also not possible to conclude that there is only one Self hidden in all objects. If the cause of the world were something other than the Self, then also the Self cannot be the one hidden in all creatures. Indeed, the essential nature of the cause is that it is immanent in all effects (of it). Moreover, if the cause of the world be a thing other than the Self, then surely the Vedic text which declares that "By the knowledge of the One (Self), everyone knows everything" becomes untenable; and such a predicament is indeed improper.

[253 - 254 ab]

Even on the basis of *ātmakāraṇa-vāda*, our doubt is not removed, because there arises the doubt *viz.*, "How can there be the knowledge of *acetanas*, which are not the products of *ātman*, by the sole knowledge of the Self?"

[254 cd - 256]

Because Suresvara felt that if he resorts to Vivartavāda then there will not arise any similarity between the effect and the cause, he upheld the view of Parināmavāda with respect to the self that is qualified by ignorance and proved its being the cause; thus did he refute the objection pointed out earlier, I surmise.

[257]

With regard to the evolutionary process of unmanifested (*prakṛti*), the cause is the supreme Ātman which has the reflection of ignorance -- thus has he (Suresvara) explained often.

[258 - 259]

Īsvara is held to be the causal Ātman, (i) which is explained in the *Antaryāmi-brāhmaṇa*, (ii) which is the witness (consciousness) of all, and (iii) which is the bestower of fruit (liberation) — this view is derived on the basis of His being the origin of the world and He is said to be the creator of all through *avidyā* alone.

[260 - 266]

In the discussion of the cause of the world and with respect to the process (of the evolution) of the unmanifested (*prakṛti*), Suresvara has established that Īsvara is the cause of the world. *Ajñāna* (*avidyā*) is

the *upādhi* (limiting adjunct). *Ajñāna* is the *pradhāna* (*prakṛti*); so *Īsvara* is the cause of it; *Īsvara* is also the cause of *cidātman* (*jīva*) with reference to the *cit* being the primary one. Even with regard to those creatures which will be born later, *Īsvara* is the material cause; and *karman*, *ajñāna* (ignorance), *bhāvanā* (mental impression) are the accessory cause. In all the three times, the effects of *ajñāna* are dependent on Him (*Īsvara*). While discussing about the ultimate cause, the Self is spoken of as the witness-self, the *antaryāmin* (because it is principally *cit*), and the cause of the world. The 'unmanifest', the 'ether', the 'vital air', the 'truth' and such other words have their primary meaning indicative of Brahman. The cause of the world is Brahman. In its reflection, it becomes *Īsvara* — thus Suresvara has explained in the *Bṛhad-āranyakopaniṣad-vārttika*.

[267 - 269]

Śrī Śaṅkara has explained in the commentary on the *janmādisūtra*: "*Īsvara* is the cause of the creation, etc. of the world. He is omnipotent and omniscient. This world — of unimaginable form and variety, full of innumerable agents and enjoyers possessing names and forms — has emerged from *Īsvara*. The cause of the world is neither a being that has transmigration, nor non-being, nor nature, nor atoms, nor *pradhāna* (the primordial matter)." Thus it is supposed that the commentary on the *janmādisūtra* of Śrī Śaṅkara is the basis for the *śabala-brahmavāda*.

(viii) *Drṣṭi-sṛṣṭi-vāda*

[270 - 272]

While he explains the *vyākhyāna* (*bhāṣya*) of the *śruti* text, '*kāmaḥ saṅkalpaḥ*' (desire, will ...), in his

vārttika, Suresvara says: "all the sense-organs are nothing but a special type of *mano-vṛtti* (mental-mode); mind itself transforms into respective objects; and everything is made up of mind (as it were). With regard to the creation of many things, the respective objects are created like pot, etc." Thus indeed is the *drṣṭi-sṛṣṭi-vāda* understood by Suresvara. Even Sage Vyāsa and Śrī Śaṅkara, authors of the *Brahmasūtra* and the *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* respectively, have explained it as above.

[273 - 274]

Sūtrakāra (Sage Vyāsa has explained the nature of the objects of the phenomenal world through '*vitandā*' alone. So he has not refuted the example given by the Buddhists who explained the knowledge of objects gained in waking state as similar to the knowledge of objects gained in dream, etc., *viz.* not in consonance with the objects of external (physical) world.

[275]

When the Vijñānavadins referred to the objects of the external world as out of purview of (real) knowledge (*jñāna*), Sūtrakāra has admitted it thinking that "half a burden has been removed."

(to be continued)

वैफल्यमुपदेशस्य नाद्वैते, तत्परत्र हि

भाष्यभाष्यः वरद्वर् कल्याणसुन्दरशास्त्री

ननु “न शास्ता न शास्त्रं न शिष्यो, न शिक्षा न च त्वं न चाहं न चायम्प्रपञ्चः” इत्याघोषयतः शङ्करमते ग्रन्थारम्भ एव नोपपद्यते - गुरुशिष्यादिद्वैताभावादिति, चेदुच्यते - परमार्थदशायां द्वैताभावेऽपि व्यवहारदशायां रज्जौ सर्पवत् शुक्तौ रजतवत् आत्मनि स्वप्नवच्च यावदविद्यं तत्सत्त्वान्न ग्रन्थारम्भानुपपत्तिरिति । अस्ति हि द्वैतिनामपि समाध्यादौ द्वैताभावः, अन्यत्र द्वैतसत्त्वम् । किम्बहुना - सर्वेषामपि प्राणिनां सुषुप्तौ द्वैताभावस्वप्नजागरयोस्तु द्वैतसत्त्वं चेति सर्वजनविदितमेव—

यत्र त्वस्य सर्वमात्मैवाभूत्तत्केन किम्पश्येत्

इत्यादिश्रुतेः । सुषुप्तिमुक्तिविषयत्वं चास्य वचनस्य

स्वाप्ययसम्पत्त्योः

इति सूत्रेण भगवता व्यासेनैव स्थापितम् । न च द्वैतसत्त्वे व्यवहारः, व्यवहारसत्त्वे द्वैतमित्यन्योन्याश्रय इति वाच्यम्, अनादित्वादुभयो-र्वीजाङ्कुरवत् । नाप्यङ्गजनाश्रयो व्यवहार इति वाच्यम्, लीलया जगज्जन्मादिषु व्यवहरत ईश्वरस्याप्यङ्गत्वापत्तेः । तस्माद्द्वैताश्रय एव व्यवहारः, व्यवहाराश्रयमेव द्वैतम्, यथा शब्दाश्रयोऽर्थः अर्थाश्रयः

शब्दश्च । उभयमपीदमद्वैते ब्रह्मणि मायया कल्पितमिति न ब्रह्मणो द्वैतप्रसङ्गः । अयं चार्थः विस्तरेण प्रतिपादितः गौडपादकारिकायां गौडपादाचार्यैः

मायामात्रमिदं द्वैतं अद्वैतं परमार्थतः ।

उपदेशादयं वादः ज्ञाते द्वैतं न विद्यते ॥

इत्यादिवचनैः ॥

ईश्वरः प्रलयदशायां सूक्ष्मचिदचिद्विशिष्टः, प्रपञ्चदशायां तु स्थूलचिदचिद्विशिष्ट इति विशिष्टाद्वैतिनो वदन्ति । ततश्च सर्वदापि चिदचिद्विशिष्ट एवेश्वर इति चिदचितोरीश्वरसायुज्यस्य नित्यसिद्धत्वा-
न्निष्फलत्वेन तावदनारम्भणीयं विशिष्टाद्वैतमते वेदान्तशास्त्रम् । चितो जीवस्याचिद्विशिष्टेश्वरसायुज्यं चार्धांशेन स्थावरत्वं जनयतीति पुनरनर्थ-
प्रदञ्च । अर्जुनश्चित्, शास्त्रमचित्, विशिष्टस्त्वीश्वर इति स्थिते अर्जुनशास्त्रविशिष्ट ईश्वरोऽर्जुनायोपदिशति शास्त्रमिति प्राप्तमिदमपार्थं खलु वाक्यमर्जुनादिभिन्नस्यैव तदुपदेशक्रियान्वयौचित्यात् । न च लक्षणया विशेषणांशत्यागः, अपृथक्सिद्धयोर्विशेषणयोस्त्यागायोगात्, त्यागे सति विशेषणस्वरूपासिद्धेः । अर्जुनदेहरूपाचिद्विशिष्टस्य कृष्ण-
देहरूपाचिद्विशिष्टस्य चेश्वरस्यैकत्वेन गुरुशिष्यभेदायोगाच्च । कृष्ण-
देह इवार्जुनदेहेऽपीश्वरसत्त्वानङ्गीकारे ईश्वरस्य सर्वव्याप्तिभङ्गप्रसङ्गात् । न चार्जुनदेहविशिष्टचित्ते कृष्णदेहविशिष्ट ईश्वर उपदिशतीति वाच्यम्, अर्जुनदेह इव कृष्णदेहेऽपि चितस्सत्त्वादन्यथा तद्देहावच्छिन्नेश्वरस्य चिद्वैशिष्ट्याभावेन चिदचिद्विशिष्टेश्वरत्वाभावादर्जुनदेहतचिद्विशिष्टस्य कृष्णदेहतचिद्विशिष्टस्य चैकत्वात् ॥

अथ यत्कैश्चिदुच्यते 'शङ्करमते ग्रन्थारम्भ एव तावन्न सम्भवति; परमपुरुषस्य भगवतः श्रीकृष्णस्य परमार्थदृष्टेर्निर्विशेषकूटस्थनित्य-
चैतन्यात्मयाथात्म्यसाक्षात्कारान्निवृत्ताज्ञानतत्कार्यतया अज्ञानकृतभेद-
दर्शनं तन्मूलोपदेशादिव्यवहाराश्च न सङ्गच्छन्ते ।' इति, तन्मन्दम् । तेषां मतेऽप्यवाप्तसमस्तकामस्य परिपूर्णस्यात्मारामस्यानन्दमयस्य परम-

पुरुषस्य कथमर्जुनदुःखनिरीक्षणतदुपदेशादिव्यवहारास्सङ्गच्छेरन् ? लीलयेति चेत्तर्हि माययेति विद्धि — यथा मायावशादजोऽव्ययो भूतानामीश्वरो भगवान् जात इव व्ययित इवोग्रसेनस्य पाल्य इव प्रतीयते, तथा पार्थाय किमप्युपदिशन्निव न प्रतीयतां किम् ? परमार्थतस्तु न कृष्णो न पार्थः नाप्युपदेशः॥

‘एकमेवाद्वितीयं ब्रह्म’

अस्ति, व्यवहारतस्तु सर्वमपि द्वैतमिति न काचिदस्माकं क्षतिः ॥

अथ च वक्तव्यं परिपूर्णं निष्कामे हरौ कथं लीलोदय इत्यत्रोत्तरम्, न च बालवदिति वाच्यम्, बालस्याज्ञत्वात्सकामत्वाच्च दृष्टान्तत्वाभावात्। न च राज्ञः कन्दुकविहारवदिति वाच्यम्, तस्यापि तत्रापरिपूर्णस्य सुखकामस्यैव प्रवृत्तिदर्शनात्। न च लोकानुग्रहार्थमिति वाच्यम्, लोकानुग्रहरूपे प्रयोजने अवशिष्टे सति भगवतः पूर्णकामत्वव्याघातात्। तस्माद्भवतामपि मायैवात्र शरणम्। न च माययापि कथमसङ्गतार्थसिद्धिरिति वाच्यम्, मायायां सर्वसम्भवादिति न्यायात् ॥

ननु परमपुरुषस्यार्जुनं प्रत्युपदेशो मायया भवतु नाम; इदानीन्तनाचार्यपरम्परायाश्शिष्यपरम्परां प्रत्युपदेशः कथम्? द्वैतदर्शने विद्वत्ताभावाद्द्वैतादर्शने वाग्व्यवहाराभावाच्चेति चेत्, मैवम्। अपरोक्षीकृतात्मतत्त्वस्यापि गुरोर्यावद्देहपातं बाधिताध्यासानुवृत्त्या व्यवहारलोपाभावात्। देहातिरिक्तमात्मानं विदन्नपि त्वं यथा मनुष्योऽहं वैष्णवोऽहं रामानुजोऽहमिति ब्रवीषि तद्ददस्माकं किं न स्यात्? न च बाधितानुवृत्तस्य भेदज्ञानस्य उपदेशादिप्रवृत्तिहेतुत्वं नेति वाच्यम्, आत्मज्ञानेन बाधितस्य अनुवर्तमानस्य देहात्मभ्रमस्य भोजनादिप्रवृत्तिहेतुत्वदर्शनात्। न हि देहातिरिक्तात्मज्ञानी कश्चिदपि निर्भोजनादिव्यापारो वर्तते — भोजनादिव्यापारो हि देहात्मभ्रममूलकः। नाहं देह इति मन्यानो न हि मुखेन भुङ्क्ते भोक्तुमिच्छति वा ॥

यदप्युच्यते — विम्बभूत ईश्वरस्वप्रतिविम्बभूतायार्जुनाय तत्त्वं कथमुपदिशेत्; न हि कोऽप्यनुमत्तः पुरुषः स्वदर्पणप्रतिविम्बाय किम-

प्युपदिशेदिति, तदपि तुच्छम् । कोऽपि पुरुषः प्रतिबिम्बाय किमपि न वक्तीत्यत्र किं बिम्बप्रतिबिम्बयोरत्यन्ताभेदः कारणम्? किं वा प्रतिबिम्बमिथ्यात्वम्? यद्वा प्रतिबिम्बे चैतन्याभावः? नाद्यः — अत्यन्ताभेदे बिम्बप्रतिबिम्बव्यवहारस्यैव लोपप्रसङ्गात्, अयं बिम्बोऽयं प्रतिबिम्ब इति व्यवहारो हि बिम्बप्रतिबिम्बभेदमूलकः, अयं घटोऽयं पट इति व्यवहार इव घटपटभेदमूलकः । एषं सति दर्पणगतप्रतिबिम्बाय सुतरां भिन्नाय किमिति नोपदिशेत् पुरुषः । नापि द्वितीयः — रज्जुसर्पस्य रज्जुज्ञानेनेव प्रतिबिम्बस्य केनापि ज्ञानेन बाधादर्शनात्, अबाधितस्य चामिथ्यात्वात् । न हि कोऽपि दर्पणगतं स्वप्रतिबिम्बं स्वयं स्वरसतः मिथ्येति मन्यते । अतः परिशिष्टस्तृतीयः — अविद्याचित्प्रतिबिम्बास्तु चैतन्यवन्त एवेति न दर्पणप्रतिबिम्बतुल्या इति सङ्गच्छत एव स्वप्रतिबिम्बानां स्वभिन्नत्वेन स्वस्योपदेशः कृष्णस्येति । न चैवं बिम्बप्रतिबिम्बयोर्जीवेश्वरयोर्भेदे कथमद्वैतसिद्धिरिति वाच्यम्, यावदविद्यं बिम्बप्रतिबिम्बादिभेदसद्भावेऽपि परमार्थं दशायामविद्याया एवाभावेन बिम्बप्रतिबिम्बभेदाभावाद्वाद्द्वैतहानिरिति । एतेन

नित्यो नित्यानां चेतनश्चेतनानाम्

इति मन्त्राज्जीवेश्वरद्वैतसिद्धिरिति परेषां वचनमपि दत्तोत्तरम् :

एको बहूनां यो विदधाति कामान्

इति तन्मन्त्रशेषस्य व्यावहारिकजीवेश्वरभेदरक्ष्यरक्षकभावाद्यनुग्राहकत्वात् ॥

किञ्च नात्र चिन्मात्रस्योपदेष्टृत्वादिकम्, तस्य निर्धर्मकत्वात्; किन्तुर्हि कृष्णदेहेन्द्रियाद्याकारपरिणतमायावच्छिन्नचित्तेरेव? सा हि अर्जुनदेहेन्द्रियाद्याकारपरिणताविद्यावच्छिन्नचित्तेर्भिन्नैव । अत एव खलु

तत्त्वमसि

इत्यत्र विशेषणांशं विहाय विशेष्यांशे लक्षणा स्वीकृता, तस्माद्विशिष्टयोः कृष्णार्जुनयोर्भेदादस्त्युपदेशोपपत्तिः इति ॥

यञ्चोच्यते — गुरोरद्वितीयात्मविज्ञानादेव ब्रह्माज्ञानस्य सकार्यस्य सर्वस्य नष्टत्वाच्छिष्यं प्रत्युपदेशो निष्प्रयोजनम् इति, तदपि तुच्छम् । यावद्देहपातमात्मज्ञस्यापि गुरोर्देहेन्द्रियादिप्रपञ्चप्रतीतिसद्भावः प्रागेव प्रत्यपादि । ऐन्द्रजालिकेन गगने गन्धर्वनगरं निर्मितम्, नेदं गन्धर्वनगरं किन्तु गगनमेवेति जानतामपि यावदिन्द्रजालं प्रतिभात्येव । अयञ्च प्रपञ्चः यस्याद्वितीयात्मज्ञानेन बाधितस्तथैव दग्धपटवद्बन्धकः न त्वन्यस्येति कृत्वा न गुरुज्ञानेन शिष्याज्ञाननिवृत्तिः, प्रतिपुरुषमविधाभेदात् प्रपञ्च-भेदाच्च । यथा नयनसन्निहितहस्ता बहवः पुरुषा एकमेव सूर्यं न पश्यन्ति, नयनासन्निहितहस्तस्तु विदग्धस्तं पश्यति, नैतद्विदग्धकर्तृकाद्वितीय-सूर्यावलोकनमविदग्धपुरुषाश्चयसूर्याज्ञाननिवर्तकं तद्वत्प्रकृतेऽपीति । विपरीतञ्चेदं यदेकस्य ज्ञानादन्यस्य भ्रमनिवृत्तिरिति, न हि एकस्य रज्जुयाथात्म्यज्ञानादन्यस्य रज्जुसर्पभ्रमो निवर्तमानो दृष्टः श्रुतो वा ॥

वस्तुतस्तु विशिष्टाद्वैतमेव तत्त्वमित्यभिमन्यमानानां मत एव सुत-
रामुपदेशानुपपत्तिरुपदेशानर्थकत्वञ्च । तथा हि, चिदचिच्छरीरकत्वेन
चिदचिदन्तस्थः परमात्मा कृष्णः चितोऽर्जुनस्य वहिराभिमुख्येन
गुरुस्सन् कथं वर्तेत, न ह्यान्तरं वस्तु वहिस्स्यात् । यदि चिदचितोर्बहि-
रपि कृष्णस्स्यात्तर्हि कृष्ण एव चिदचितोश्शरीरं स्यात्, चिदचिद्व्याप्तश्च
स्यात् । चिदचितोरीश्वरापृथक्सिद्धविशेषणत्वेन स्वापृथक्सिद्धविशेष-
णाद्वन्धात्स्वयं पृथिव्या इव चिदचिद्भयां पृथगीश्वरस्यावस्थानमपि न
सम्भवतीति कृत्वा पृथगवस्थितवस्तुद्वयधर्मस्य गुरुशिष्यभावस्योपपत्तिः
कथं कृष्णार्जुनयोरपृथगवस्थितयोः चिदीश्वरयोः? अपृथक्सिद्धविशेषण-
वाचि शब्दानां विशेष्यपर्यन्तत्वनियमात् अर्जुनपदार्थोऽपि चिदचिद्विशिष्ट
ईश्वर एवेति कृत्वा कृष्णोऽर्जुनायोपदिदेशेतद्वाक्यमपि न युज्यते ।
सर्वव्यापिनस्सर्वशरीरस्य सर्वान्तरस्येश्वरस्य कृष्णदेहेन्द्रियादिष्वि-
वार्जुनदेहेन्द्रियादिष्वप्यहंममग्रहस्यैवौचित्येन कृष्णोऽहमर्जुनस्त्वं नरा-
धिपा इमे इति अहं त्वमिदं ब्रह्मिदं शः कथमुपपद्यताम्? कृष्णोऽहम-
र्जुनोऽहं नराधिपा अहमिति हि वक्तव्यम् । यद्वा कृष्णो मे अर्जुनो मे

नराधिपा मे इति वक्तव्यम् । अभ्युपेत्य चेदं सर्वमुच्यते । परमार्थतस्तु चिदचितोरीश्वरापृथक्सिद्धत्ववादोप्ययमतितरासङ्गत इत्यपि यथावसरं प्रपञ्चेन निरूपयिष्यते ॥

किञ्च चेतनाचेतनात्मकनिखिलजगत्परमकारणभूत ईश्वरः कृष्णः स्वजातत्वेन स्वाभिनेष्वर्जुनादिषु कथं भेदबुद्धिमीयात् — न हि मृदो भिद्यते घटः । कथं वा स्वाभिनायार्जुनाय स्वयमुपदिशेत् किमपि? उपदेशो हि भेदमूलकः । एवमर्वाचीनाचार्यपरम्परापि स्वमिथान्यातपि चेतनान् परमकारणेश्वराभिधान् विदुषी सती परमकारणेश्वराभिन्न-चेतनेभ्यश्शिष्येभ्यः कथमुपदिशेत् किमपि?

ननु परमेश्वराज्जीवा जायन्त इत्यत्र जीवानामौपाधिकमेव जन्मा-स्माभिरिष्यते, न तु स्वरूपतः । जीवानां ज्ञानैकाकारत्वेन नित्यत्वादिति चेत्, तर्हि ज्ञानैकाकारे आत्मनि भेदकाभावात् सिद्धमद्वैतमिति स्वमतप्रच्युतिः, परमतप्रवेशश्चेत्यपि दोषद्वयं प्रसक्तं स्यात् । न च स्वरूपतो भेदाभावेऽपि धर्मतोऽस्ति भेद इति वाच्यम्, तस्य धर्म-स्याप्यौपाधिकत्वेन स्वरूपगतत्वाभावात् ॥

अनुवर्तते ।

FUTILITY OF INSTRUCTION — NOT IN ADVAITA BUT ONLY ELSEWHERE*

Bhāṣyabhāvajña Brahmaśrī V. R. Kalyāṇasundara Śāstrī

There is an objection that there is no scope for undertaking the study of the scriptural text in the philosophy of Śaṅkara for the reason that there is no difference between the teacher and the disciple, and so on; for, it is declared that “There is neither teacher nor disciple, neither scripture nor instruction, neither *you* nor *I*, nor this world.” The reply to this objection is that, even though there is no duality from the absolute standpoint, there is duality from the empirical standpoint; and so there is untenability for undertaking the study of the scriptural text. Indeed, even for the Dvaitins there is the absence of duality in states such as *samādhi*, even though there is duality at other times. There is no further need to emphasise this point. It is well-known to all that there is absence of duality in deep sleep, though in the states of dream and waking there is duality. There are *śruti* texts such as: “When, verily, everything has become the Self, then by what and whom should one see?” (*Bṛhadāraṇyaka Up.*, 2.4.14). That this *śruti* text is about the states of deep sleep and liberation has been established by Sage Vyāsa in the *Brahma-sūtra* (4.4.16): (“The declaration

* Translated by Dr. R. Balasubramanian

of absence of all cognition is made) having in view either of the two states, *viz.*, deep sleep and liberation, for this is made clear (by the scriptural texts).” It is no argument to say that empirical distinction will be possible only if there is duality, and that duality will be possible only if there is empirical distinction; and so there arises the fallacy of mutual dependence; this argument is untenable because both of them, like seed-sprout series, constitute a beginningless series. Nor can it be said that empirical distinction is made only by the ignorant, for in that case even the Lord must be said to be ignorant inasmuch as He makes empirical distinction in the world through His *līlā*. So we have to say that empirical distinction is dependent on duality and that duality is dependent on empirical distinction, in the same way as the object is dependent on the word and the word, on the object. Both of them are superimposed on the non-dual Brahman through *māyā*; and so there is no scope for duality for Brahman. This point has been established at great length by Gauḍapāda in his *Māṇḍūkya-kārikā*, through statements such as: “This duality is mere illusion; non-duality is the supreme Reality,” (1.17) “This explanation is for the purpose of teaching. Duality (implied in the explanation) ceases to exist when the supreme Reality is known.” (1.18)

The Viśiṣṭādvaitins hold that Īśvara is qualified by *cit* and *acit* in their subtle condition in the state of dissolution and by *cit* and *acit* in their gross condition in the state of manifested world. Consequently, since Īśvara is all the time qualified by *cit* and *acit*, the latter are in union with Īśvara eternally, there is no need for undertaking the study of *Vedānta* texts in the Viśiṣṭādvaita school due to the futility of such study.

There is also the danger inasmuch as the *jīva*, which is *cit*, by its union with *Īsvara* which is qualified by *acit*, will become one half inert. When it is held that Arjuna is *cit*, that scripture is *acit*, and that *Īsvara* is a qualified being, to say that *Īsvara* who is qualified by Arjuna and scripture gives scriptural instruction to Arjuna is absurd, because the act of instruction will be intelligible only when it is done with regard to someone different from Arjuna. It cannot be said that one of the qualifying attributes is dropped through implication, for abandonment of one attribute is untenable inasmuch as the attributes are inseparably related (to the substance); and an attribute will cease to be what it is, if it is abandoned (from the substance). Since *Īsvara*, who is qualified by the *acit*-body of Arjuna as well as by the *acit*-body of Kṛṣṇa, is one, it is not possible to have the teacher-disciple distinction; and if the presence of *Īsvara* in the body of Arjuna is not accepted as it is accepted in the case of the body of Kṛṣṇa, it will be detrimental to the view that *Īsvara* is omnipresent. It is no argument to say that *Īsvara* who is qualified by the body of Kṛṣṇa instructs the *cit* qualified by the body of Arjuna, for there is *cit* in the body of Kṛṣṇa also in the same way as there is *cit* in the body of Arjuna. If this be not the case, it will follow that *Īsvara* who is delimited by that body (of Kṛṣṇa) is not qualified by that *cit*; consequently He cannot be one who is not qualified by *cit* and *acit*; and the Lord who is qualified by the *cit* inherent in the body of Arjuna and by the *cit* inherent in the body of Kṛṣṇa is one.

Someone argues as follows: undertaking the study of the scriptural text in the school of Śaṅkara is not possible, because from the absolute standpoint Lord

Kṛṣṇa, the supreme person, is one who has realized the Self which is attributeless, immutable and eternal consciousness; and since He is free from *ajñāna* and its products, it is not possible to associate with Him the apprehension of difference due to *ajñāna* and the act of instruction based thereon. This argument is untenable. How is the apprehension of the suffering of Arjuna as well as the act of instruction, etc., by the supreme person possible since, even according to the opponent, the supreme person is one who has all His desires fulfilled, who is perfect, and full of bliss enjoying the bliss of the Self? If it be said that He does all this through *līlā*, then the Advaitin could say that He does all this through *māyā*. Just as the Lord who is birthless and deathless and who is the ruler of all beings appears to have birth and death and also as one who is ruled by Ugrasena due to *māyā*, even so why should He not appear to be one who is instructing Arjuna? From the absolute standpoint, there is neither Kṛṣṇa nor Arjuna, nor any instruction; there is Brahman alone, which is one and non-dual. However, from the empirical standpoint there is duality everywhere and so there is no defect in our position.

Further, this has to be answered: How does *līlā* arise in Hari who is perfect and free from desires? It cannot be said that it arises as in the case of a child, for a child does not know the truth and also has desires; and so it cannot be cited as an example. Nor can it be said that it is like a king playing with a ball, for even in this case the art (of playing) is that of one who is not perfect and who is desirous of pleasure. Nor can it be said that it is for the sake of the protection of the world; if there remains the desire for the protection of the

world in the Lord, then it is inconsistent with the view that the Lord is one who has all his desires fulfilled. Hence, one has to take refuge in *māyā* (for answering this question). It cannot be asked how the non-relational nature of the Lord can be established through *māyā*, for everything is possible through *māyā*.

It may be asked: Let it be that the teaching to Arjuna by the supreme person has been on the basis of *māyā*. How are we to account for the tradition of successive teachers offering instruction to successive disciples in the present time? When duality is apprehended, the knower of truth is absent; but when duality is not apprehended, there is no scope for speech. This argument is not satisfactory. Empirical activity following the sublation of *adhyāsa* is not absent in the case of a preceptor till such time that his body falls off, even though he has the direct realization of the Self. Even though you know that the Self is different from the body, you say: "I am a man," "I am a Vaiṣṇava," "I am Rāmānuja," in the same way, why not (in the case of a preceptor) in our view? It cannot be said that, when the knowledge of duality is sublated, it is not possible to have the activity of instruction, etc.; even though the false identification of the Self with the body has been sublated by the right knowledge of the Self, there is still the activity of eating, etc. For one who knows the Self as different from the body, the activity of eating, etc. continues. Indeed, the act of eating, etc. is based on the false identification of the Self with the body. One who knows: "I am not the body", does not eat; nor does he desire to eat.

There is also another objection: How can Īsvara who is the prototype teach Arjuna who is His reflec-

tion? Indeed, no one who is not mad would think of instructing one's reflection seen in a mirror? This objection too is untenable when it is said that no one would teach anything to one's own reflection, what is the reason therefor? Is it because of total non-difference between the prototype and its reflection? Or, is it because of the illusory nature of the reflection? Or, is it because of the absence of consciousness in the reflection? It cannot be the first alternative; if there is total non-difference, then the empirical usage of difference between the prototype and its reflection is untenable. The empirical usage, "This is the prototype", and "This is the reflection", is indeed based on the difference between the prototype and its reflection, in the same way as the empirical usage, "This is a pot", and "This is a cloth", is based on the difference between pot and cloth. If so, why should not the person instruct His reflection which is completely different from Him? The second alternative also is untenable. Just as the rope-snake is sublated by the knowledge of the rope, the reflection does not suffer sublation by any knowledge; and what is not sublated cannot be illusory. Indeed, no one considers one's reflection in a mirror as illusory by its very nature. So the third alternative remains. Since the reflection of consciousness in *avidyā* is endowed with consciousness, it is not similar to the reflection in a mirror; and so Kṛṣṇa's instruction to one's own reflection which is different from Him is tenable. How is non-dualism tenable, it should not be asked, when there is difference between the prototype and its reflection? So long as there is *avidyā*, there is difference between the prototype and its reflection. But from the absolute standpoint there is no *avidyā* itself; consequently in the absence of the difference between the

prototype and its reflection there is no danger to non-dualism. This provides the answer to the view held by others, *viz.*, the *śruti* text, “the eternal among the eternal, the intelligent among the intelligent beings” (*Śvetāśvatara Up.* 6. 13) lends support to the difference between *Īsvara* and *jīva*. The remaining part of this *śruti* text which says (that God) is “the one among the many, who grants desires” justifies the protector-protected distinction based on the empirical difference between *Īsvara* and *jīva*.

Further, the pure consciousness cannot be the teacher, etc., for it is devoid of qualities; who then is the teacher? It is only consciousness conditioned by *māyā* which has manifested itself in the mind-sense-body complex of Kṛṣṇa; and that is different from the consciousness conditioned by *avidyā* which has manifested itself in the mind-sense-body complex of Arjuna. That is why in construing the meaning of the text, “*tat tvam asi*,” by abandoning the qualifications, the qualified is retained through implication. So there is difference between Kṛṣṇa and Arjuna who are qualified beings, there is justification for instruction (by the former to the latter).

There is also the objection: the attainment of the knowledge of the non-dual Brahman-Ātman by the teacher results in the destruction of *ajñāna* and all its products; consequently the instruction to the disciple is futile. This objection too is meaningless. It has already been said that the perception of the world comprising the body, the senses, etc., continues even for the teacher who has known the Self, till such time

that his body falls off. A magician projects a celestial city in the sky. Though he knows that this is not a celestial city, but only the sky, it appears so long as the magic continues. This world which gets sublated by the knowledge of the non-dual Self attained by one does not bind only that, for it has become like a burnt cloth. It does not remove the ignorance of another person; and so the ignorance of the disciple does not get removed by the knowledge attained by the teacher. Since the ignorance inherent in each person differs, there is also difference in the experience of the world by everyone. A number of persons who press the eye-balls with their fingers do not see only one sun. On the other hand, a wise man who does not keep the fingers close to the eyes and press them sees only one sun. Just as the perception of the non-dual sun by the wise man does not remove the ignorance of the unwise man about the sun, even so it is in the present case. It is wrong to say that the erroneous cognition of one person is removed by the knowledge of another person. It is nowhere seen or heard that one person's erroneous cognition of a rope as a snake is removed by another person's right cognition of the rope as it is.

The real position is that there is not only no scope for, but also futility of, instruction in the view of those who think that Viśiṣṭādvaita alone is the truth. How could Kṛṣṇa, the supreme Self, who has *cit* and *acit* as His body and who is inside *cit* and *acit*, be the perceptor of Arjuna who is *cit* by remaining outside him and facing him? Indeed, what is inside a thing cannot be outside it. If Kṛṣṇa is also outside *cit* and *acit*, then

Kṛṣṇa alone is the body of both *cit* and *acit* and is pervaded by both of them. *Cit* and *acit* are inseparable attributes of Īsvara. Just as earth cannot exist separately from smell which is its inseparable attribute, even so Īsvara cannot exist in separation from *cit* and *acit*; if so, how could teacher-disciple relation which exists between two separate beings be possible between Kṛṣṇa and Arjuna who are Īsvara and *cit* not having separate existence? Since the words which denote the inseparable attributes have their purport in the qualified object, the word which denotes Arjuna has its purport in Īsvara who is qualified by *cit* and *acit*; consequently, the statement that Kṛṣṇa gives instruction to Arjuna is also untenable. Īsvara who is omnipresent, who has all beings as his bodies, and who is inside of all beings must speak of "I" and "mine" even with reference to the body, the senses etc., of Arjuna as he does with reference to the body, the senses, etc., of Kṛṣṇa; if so, how is the usage of "I", "you" and "these" tenable in such statements, "I am Kṛṣṇa", "you are Arjuna", and "These are rulers"? Indeed, it must be said, "I am Kṛṣṇa", "I am Arjuna", "I am these rulers". Or, it must be said, "my Kṛṣṇa", "my Arjuna", "my rulers". This is just *abhyupetyavāda*, i.e. accepting the standpoint of Viśiṣṭādvaita. The truth is the view that *cit* and *acit* are inseparably related to Īsvara is not at all tenable; and this will be brought out later in detail.

Further, Lord Kṛṣṇa is the ultimate cause of the entire world of sentient and insentient beings; how could He have the notion of difference with regard to Arjuna and others who have come out of Him and

who are non-different from Him? Indeed, a pot is not different from clay. How could He give any instruction to Arjuna who is not different from Him? Indeed, instruction is based on difference. Thus, how could the succession of teachers at present knowing fully well that other *jīvas*, like them, are non-different from Īsvara, the ultimate cause, offer any instruction to the disciples?

It may be argued: when it is said that the *jīvas* originate from the supreme Īsvara, what we mean is that origination is connected with the *upādhi* and not with the essential nature (of the *jīvas*), because the *jīvas* who are of the nature of knowledge, alone are eternal. In that case, since there is nothing to differentiate the Self which is of the nature of knowledge, it results in non-duality; and this amounts to the abandonment of one's position and the acceptance of the opposite view — a case of double fault. It cannot be said that, even though there is no difference in the essential nature of the Self, there is difference because of the attribute. Since the attribute too is adventitious, it does not touch the essential nature of the Self.

(to be continued)

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खिन्नानां जलकाङ्क्षया मरुभुवि भ्रान्त्या परिभ्राम्यताम् ।

अत्यासन्नसुधाम्बुधिं सुखकरं ब्रह्माद्वयं दर्शय-

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khinnānāṁ jalakāṅkṣayā marubhuvi bhrāntyā

paribhrāmyatām

atyāsannasudhāmbudhiṁ sukhakarāṁ brahmādvayaṁ

darśayaty-

eṣā śaṅkarabhārati vijayate nirvāṇasandāyini.

To those who are afflicted, in the way of the world, by the burning pain given rise to by the scorching sun-shafts of misery, and who through delusion wander about in the desert (of worldliness) seeking water — showing the felicitous ocean of nectar, which is very near, the non-dual *Brahman*, this — the Voice of Śaṅkara — is victorious, leading, as it does, to liberation.