

A QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ADVAITA - VEDĀNTA

The VOICE of ŚĀNKAṚĀ


śāṅkara-bhāratī

Chairman, Advisory Board
V. R. Kalyanasundara Sastri

Editor
N. C. Krishnan

Volume TWELVE

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1987

esā śaṅkara-bhāratī vijagate
nirvāṇa-sandāyini

victorious is the voice of śaṅkara,
leading, as it does, to liberation

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HOMAGE TO ŚAṄKARA

[119]

नतानां हृदब्जानि फुल्लानि शीघ्रं
करोम्याशु योगप्रदानेन नूनम् ।
प्रबोधाय चेत्थं सरोजानि धत्से
प्रफुल्लानि किम्भो गुरो ब्रूहि मह्यम् ॥

*natānām hṛdabjāni phullāni śīghraṁ
karomyāśu yoga-pradānena nūnam
prabodhāya cettham sarojāni dhatse
praphullāni kimbho guro! brūhi mahyam.*

Oh Master! please tell me whether you have fullblown lotuses thinking thus: "Let me, indeed, make the lotus-hearts of devotees blossom quickly by yielding *yoga* (imparting right knowledge) and make the devotees attain self-realization.

[120]

प्रभाधूतचन्द्रायुतायाखिलेष्ट-
प्रदायानतानां समूहाय शीघ्रम् ।

प्रतीपाय नम्रौघदुःखाघपङ्क्ते-
मुदा सर्वदा स्यान्नमः शङ्कराय ॥

*prabhādhūtacandrāyutāyākhileṣṭa-
bradāyānatānām samūhāya śighram
pratīpāya namraugha-duḥkhāgha-paṅkter-
mudā sarvadā syānnamah saṅkarāya.*

Happily do I ever bow to Śrī Śaṅkarācārya (i) who by his radiance makes ten-thousands of moons rid of stains, (ii) who quickly fulfils all the desires of the hosts of devotees who bow to him, and (iii) who destroys completely the immense miseries and sins of the numerous devotees.

Jagadguru Śrī Saccidānanda Śivābhinava Nṛsimhabhārati
in *Śrī Śaṅkarācāryabhujāṅgaprayātastotra*



THE REPUBLICAN IDEA IN THE VEDAS*

Jagadguru Śrī Candrasekharendra Sarasvatī

The general idea among the people about ancient Indian administration is that it was a monarchical system with no provision made for the expression of public opinion. The king ruled the country, of course not alone, but with the aid of his courtiers, nobles and councillors. There were the royal family members who, along with the Chief Minister, took the decisions which were implemented by the Government officials. There are, however, a few scribes who hold a different opinion. Being victims of some biased British historians, in the name of research, they affirm that the kings were only the puppets of "very clever" Brahmins who held sway over others. There was no place for public opinion to be voiced, and it was only the British who gave us the idea of republicanism, and therefore a purely Western concept.

But the facts are otherwise. For provision had been made since the Vedic times for the reflection of the opinion of the representatives of the people in the governance of the land. This is evidenced by the use

* Translation : Argus

of such expressions as "sabhā", "samiti", "vidathā", etc. in the Vedic hymns. It is obvious that wise men of the country gathered in such assemblies and considered matters pertaining to the administration of the country and outlined schemes and gave decisions which were followed by the king strictly. These "samitis" were not dominated by the Brahmins nor by a coterie of Brahmins and Kṣatriyas, according to impartial British historians; but all classes, castes and communities were represented in them.

One might have noticed the phrase "Namo Namaḥ" being repeated often, while the Rudra-abhishekam is conducted in the temples. The Rudra stotra comes in the Yajur-Veda Taitirīya Saṁhitā. The prayer is offering obeisance to everything that lives and breathes in the universe, everything that is regarded as the manifestation of the all-pervading Paramātman. Along with the several ślokas referring to every object as only the form of Śiva, one comes across these lines "Homage to all Sabhās, Homage to all Sabhāpatis." This has a bearing to the Sabhā, the House of representatives of the people, and the President of the assembly, referred to as the Sabhāpati.

Today we have several sabhās, chief of which is the Saṅgīta sabhā. When one says one is going to the "sabhā", obviously it is meant a concert. But in ancient times, when one referred to "sabhā", it meant only the Legislative Assembly. The Sanskrit word "sabhā" is in Tamil transformed into "Avai". As the Sabhā was organised by wise men for the benefit of the people, it was regarded as the "svarūpa of Īsvara", and that is the reason why homage is paid to it in the Rudra mantra.

In Cidambaram the Lord Paramesvara is figured in a perfect form as Naṭarāja and his *sannidhi* is called the “Sabhā” or more usually the “Kanaka Sabhā”. The Divine Dancer is the sovereign of everything in the universe, animate and inanimate. He is also the emperor of Tribhuvana and he has four more sabhās: the Rajata sabhā (in silver) in Madurai; the Ratna sabhā in Tiruvālaṅgāḍu; the Tāmra sabhā in Tinnevely; and the Citra sabhā in Courtallam. In the last place, there is no sculpture at all, but it is full of paintings. Altogether Naṭarāja has five Sabhās and the presiding deity of these assemblies is not called the Speaker but Sabhāpati; he does not speak but he dances.

Although we are all speaking of Him as Naṭarāja, the Dīkshitaras of the Cidambaram refer to Him as the Lord of the “Sabhānāyakar Temple”. The Lord is not only the Sabhānāyakar and Sabhāpati, but He is also the Sabhā itself. It is to prove this fact that the Vedic scripture “Śrī Rudram” pays “Homage to the Sabhā”. The thesis that “the will of the people is the will of God” is nothing new to us, not at all a Western concept which we have borrowed, but *sui generis* ours, as it had come down to us from the ancient Vedic times.

Three essential requisites for members of the legislature to discuss political affairs are stressed, namely, sharp intelligence, excellent character, and proficiency in expression; this is what one learns from the Vedic literature. To acquire these talents, there are several mantras and prayers in our Vedas. It is quite well known that Rishis of old were not only known for their wisdom but also for their exemplary character. Regard-

ing the third qualification of eloquent expression, to enable them to get seats in the assemblies, there is a reference in the Vedas to their prayer: "May we have the power and strength to speak forcibly and eloquently in the Vidathā!" (meaning the Assembly or Sabhā).

Mention was already made about the reference to Sabhā and Sabhāpati in the famous "Rudra" prayer, which comes in the Yajur Veda. From the Ṛg Veda too five prayerful hymns have been collected, which is called the "Pañca-Rudram", where this prayer occurs:

हवनश्रुत्तो रुद्रेह बोधि बृहद्रुदेम विदथे सुवीराः ।

(*havanaśrunno rudreha bodhi bṛhad vadema vidathe suvirāḥ* — R.V. 2.33.15)

Thus, it is obvious that only he who possesses the three qualities of intelligence, character and eloquence is fit to be a "Sabhya", that is, to get membership in the legislature. Just to call one a "Sabhya" implies that he has all these three qualities. There are also other mantras signifying that it is not enough to be a king, but he must be a Sabhya too.

The duties of the legislator ("Sabhya") are defined in the last sūkta of the tenth maṇḍala of the Ṛg Veda appealing to the members to keep the welfare of the people as primary, to discuss their problems in detail and come to some unanimous conclusions. Leaders and statesmen of the world, admiring the sentiments of this sūkta, found in the *Ṛg Veda*, the first book of the world, wonder why this should not become the motto of the world body, the United Nations Organisation. The hymn reads:

“Supreme God, our Guide eternal, showerer of the choicest bounties!

All beings on the surface of this earth, Thou hast created

So marvellously alike, and hast brought them together in close bond.

So it is that Thou dost emerge into the highlight of our consciousness

As the one Master Architect. Rain on us all, blessings, unnumbered.

“Assemble for a common purpose; confer together with open minds and hearts;

Pool your thoughts for integrated wisdom; for, behold!

The great gods themselves have come to enjoy their fortune, because of their unity.

“May our prayer be one and the same; may we belong to one confraternity;

May our minds move in accord; may our hearts work in unison for one supreme goal;

Let us be inspired by a common ideal;

Let us worship Thee with this offering of harmony and unanimity.

“May the inmost aspirations of all be perfectly harmonious;

May your hearts be in unison; may absolute concord reign in your minds,

So that you may be welded into strong fellowship and unity.”

It is in the light of this noble ideal that all communities and castes had united together in legislatures, framed laws and the administration of the country carried on in perfect peace and harmony. It is, therefore, a canard to affirm that the Brahmins alone made the laws of the land. Along with the Brahmin priest, there were the “senānī”, the “grāmaṇī” and others who constituted the framework of the government. While the “grāmaṇī” looked after the civil side of the government of the village, the “senānī” looked after the military side, or what we call today the law and order situation. Obviously the “senānī” could not have been a Brahmin; he must have been a Kshatriya. The “grāmaṇī” also was not a Brahmin; the post still remains today and he must have been a non-Brahmin.

(Evidently the word “grāmaṇī” became later “grāma maṇiyam” and from that has come the modern word “maniakkāram”).

When one looks at the Vedic mantras, it is manifest that every community and class of the society had affirmed their loyalty to the new king at the time of his ascension (“paṭṭābhishekam”) to the throne. This is positive proof that along with the monarchical, there was also the republican — the two systems joining hands and marching together in the India of the past.

THE DISTINCTIVE CONTRIBUTIONS OF VĀCASPATI MIŚRA TO ADVAITA

V. N. Seshagiri Rao

Vācaspati Miśra (9th century A.D.) was a versatile genius with encyclopaedic learning. He had a wonderful expositional skill and presentation of whatever subject or system he chose to handle. He had a life-long passion for philosophic truth. He wrote on all the important *darśanas* instancing his philosophic objectivity and width.

The following are the works of Vācaspati: (i) *Nyāya-kaṇikā* — a commentary on the *Vidhiviveka* of Maṇḍana; (ii) *Tattva-samīkṣā* — a commentary on Maṇḍana's *Brahma-siddhi*; (iii) *Tattvabindu* — an independent treatise on Vākyārtha; (iv) *Nyāya-vārttika-tātparya-ṭīkā* — a commentary on Udyotakara's *Nyāya-vārttika*; (v) *Nyāya-sūci* — a supplement to *Tātparya*; (vi) *Sāṅkhya-tattva-kaumudī* — a commentary on Īśvara Kṛṣṇa's *Sāṅkhyakārikā*; (vii) *Tattva-vaiśārādī* — a commentary on Vyāsa's *Yoga-bhāṣya*; (viii) *Bhāmatī* — a commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra-bhāṣya* of Śaṅkara. All these works find their reference in the concluding verse of the *Bhāmatī*.

It is maintained in this article that Vācaspati's distinctive contributions to Advaita lay only in contrast with what came to be later known as the Vivaraṇa school. As far as the *ontological* non-dualism is concerned he has nothing to differ from Śaṅkara, on the one hand and Maṇḍana, on the other. It is only in the nature of details, methods of reasoning and techniques that he develops positions, we may recognise as different from the *Vivaraṇa* and these may be regarded as his contributions.

The most important issues on which the *Bhāmātī* school of Vācaspati differs from the Vivaraṇa school are: (i) *avidyā* and its locus; (ii) whether *avidyā* is one or many; (iii) whether *jīva* is a reflection (*pratibimba*) or a delimitation (*avaccheda*) of Brahman; (iv) whether plurality of *jīva* is due to one *avidyā* or many *avidyās*; (v) the nature of verbal knowledge as the cause of self-realisation, i.e., whether or not *śabda* imparts direct and immediate knowledge; (vi) whether *manas* is an *indriya* or not; (vii) the object of *akhaṇḍākāravṛtti* i.e., whether it is conditioned or unconditioned Brahman; (viii) whether or not there is *vidhi* (injunction) in the *Upaniṣadic* precept: *ātmā vā are draṣṭavyaḥ śrotavyo mantavyo nididhyāsitavyaḥ* (*Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* II. iv. 5); (ix) the place of *karma* in the scheme of Advaitic *sādhana*, etc.

The Most Important Points

According to Vācaspati, the locus of *avidyā* is the individual self (*jīva*) and Brahman is its object (*viśaya*). In maintaining this emphatic view, Vācaspati closely follows Maṇḍana and parts company with Śaṅkara who avoids asking the question.

This view on the problem of the locus of *avidyā* is opposed to the view of the Vivaraṇa school which maintains that *Brahman* is both the locus and object of *avidyā*. Suresvara and also Prakāśātman maintain that the *jīva* cannot be the locus of *avidyā* inasmuch as the former is a modification of *avidyā*. Thus the Vivaraṇa school does not admit any distinction between the locus (*āśraya*) and the object (*viśaya*) of *avidyā*.

(ii) Further, according to Vācaspati, *avidyā* differs from individual to individual. It is positive and specific to each *jīva*. In fact, according to him, there are as many *avidyās* as there are *jīvas*. He thus believes in a plurality of even *mūla-avidyās*. This remarkable view of Vācaspati, is opposed to the Vivaraṇa school, which postulates only one *avidyā* that is common to all the *jīvas*, but has different modes or potencies (*śaktis*) to bind the *jīva*.

Vācaspati recognises two kinds of *avidyā*: (a) *mūla-avidyā* or primal nescience (*kāraṇa-avidyā*) and (b) *tūla-avidyā* or derivative nescience (*kārya-avidyā*). Both are beginningless. If the derivative *avidyās*, in his view, are sublatale by cognition of the object to which they refer, the primal nescience is removable only by the knowledge of the supreme Reality. Vācaspati postulates a plurality of even *mūla-avidyās*, in order to show the distinction between the bound and the released and thus to avoid the paradox '*eka-muktau sarva-mukti-prasaṅgaḥ*.'

(iii) Again, if *pratibimbavāda* i.e., the theory that *jīva* is but a reflection (*pratibimba*) of Brahman in *avidyā*, is advocated by the Vivaraṇa school, *avacheda-vāda* i.e., the theory that *jīva* is an apparent limitation

(*avāccheda*) of the unlimited Brahman is Vācaspati's most advanced and pet theory.

(iv) If the *Bhāmatī* school advocates a plurality of *jīvas* through its postulation of many *avidyās*, the Vivaraṇa school moves to reconcile the plurality of the *jīva* with the singleness of *avidyā* by postulating many *śaktis*, for the one and the only one *avidyā*.

(v) Again, the views of the two schools on *śabda* or Vedic testimony differ from each other. Vācaspati's view is that *śabda* causes only mediate knowledge. It gives only indirect and mediate knowledge. It is to be made direct and immediate through constant practice of rational contemplation (*manana*) and meditation (*nīdīdhyāsana*) which is the direct cause of realisation. This view technically termed *prasaṅkhyāna* is fully upheld by Maṇḍana and Vācaspati. Vācaspati is of the view that when *śāstra-jñāna* (*aham-brahmāsmi*) is continued relentlessly, it ends up in self-realisation and this experience of the self removes all *avidyā*. Thus for the school of Maṇḍana and Vācaspati, *nīdīdhyāsana* is the principal organum of the knowledge of self, whereas *śravaṇa* and *manana* are secondary.

This view of Vācaspati is diametrically opposed to the view of the Vivaraṇa school, according to which *śravaṇa* is the principal incentive towards the realisation of *Ātman*, and *manana* as also *nīdīdhyāsana* are subservient to it (*phalopakāryaṅga*). In other words, *manana* and *nīdīdhyāsana* only effect the concentration of the mind. The mind is not an instrument here for the realisation of *Brahman*.

Thus the Vivaraṇa school holds that knowledge through verbal testimony (*śravaṇa*) is of itself immedi-

ate. Prakāśātman, in his *Vivarana* asserts that though the Upaniṣadic texts impart immediate knowledge of Brahman, yet because of certain defects such as *viṣayabhogavāsanā*, *pramāṇa-asambhāvanā* and *viparīta-bhāvanā*, it appears to be mediate. He quotes the *Chāndogya* text which says that by mere instruction, immediate knowledge is effected. However, whether *śabda* is *parokṣa* or *aparokṣa* there is no difference of opinion among the two schools regarding its importance as the *only means* leading to spiritual knowledge.

(vi) For the *Bhāmatī* school, *manas* is a sense organ (*indriya*) and it is a precept of *sākṣin*. Vācaspati's argument is that *manas* is the instrument for internal perception and therefore it is a sense organ. The knowledge of happiness, misery etc., are valid since they are generated by the *manas*.

But Padmapāda points to the possibility of one's being aware of oneself without the instrumentation of mind. In the view of *Vivarana*, immediate cognition may result even from the verbal testimony, without the functioning of a sense organ, internal or external and that the mind is not a sense organ.

Bhāratīrtha Vidyāranya in his *Pañcadaśī* tries to synthesise the above two opposed views. He characterises *manas* as an internal self.

(vii) Again, the *Bhāmatī* and the *Vivarana* schools differ, as to what is said to be the intuition of pure Brahman and what is said to be the intuition of conditioned Brahman. According to Vācaspati, what is veiled by nescience is the conditioned Brahman, inasmuch as the unconditioned is flawless; it cannot be veiled; nor can it be revealed. What is revealed by

final intuition must therefore, concludes Vācaspati, be conditioned Brahman.

But according to Vivaraṇa school, pure Brahman unenveloped by any *upādhi* (adjunct) is an object of *manovṛtti*. That is, the non-delimited Brahman is the object of *akhaṇḍākāra-vṛtti*.

For Vācaspati, pure Brahman cannot be the object of any knowledge. It is self-effulgent. The conditioned Brahman alone is the object of realisation.

(viii) Further there is a difference between the *Bhāmatī* and the *Vivaraṇa* schools with regard to the discussion whether or not there is *vidhi* (injunction) in the Upaniṣadic precept: '*ātmā vā are draṣṭavyaḥ śrotavyo mantavyo nididhyāsitaḥ*' (the Self is to be seen, to be heard, to be reflected and contemplated upon).

According to the Vivaraṇa school, self-realisation, the ultimate aim of life is possible only through the injunction, *ātmā vā are draṣṭavyaḥ*... It is at the root of studying and understanding the Vedānta. The origin of Vedāntic studies, is in the injunction of *śravaṇa*. Prakāśātman emphasises upon the realisation of the Self only through this injunction. And, on the *vidhi*, the Vivaraṇa school concludes that *śravaṇa* is principal one and *manana* and *nididhyāsana* are auxiliary.

But Vācaspati is of the view that *śravaṇa*, *manana* and *nididhyāsana* are not the objects of any injunction but are only objects of factual statement (*vihitānuvādaka*). These belong to the realm of pure knowledge (*jñāna*) which is completely devoid of any injunctive force. Vācaspati goes on to say that knowledge arises

as soon as the conditions of it are fulfilled; and for this no clamp of *vidhi* is necessary.

(ix) Again the *Bhāmatī* and the *Vivarāṇa* schools advocate different views as to the place of *karman* in the scheme of Advaitic *sādhana*. Maṇḍana and Vācaspati are of the view that *karman* has a part to play in the scheme of *sādhana* by giving rise to the desire to know Brahman (*vividiṣā*). *Karman*, in this sense, is a means of the means to *mokṣa* i.e., *jñāna*. Vācaspati is of the view that the desire to know can be brought about by practising ritual and this in due course fulfils itself through knowledge and release.

But the *Vivarāṇa* school holds that rituals are contributors to knowledge itself and not merely to the desire to know. That is, the performance of the ritual (*karman*) is a means, not to create desire to have the knowledge of Brahman, but a means to have the knowledge of Brahman itself (*vedana-sādhana*).

To summarise, if Vācaspati maintains the view that *karman* is conducive to *vividiṣā*, the *Vivarāṇa* school maintains the view that *karman* is conducive not to *vividiṣā* but to *vidyotpāda*.

AVIDYĀ AND THE ILLUSORY WORLD*

R. Balasubramanian

I. *As the Cause of the World, Avidyā is Bhāva-rūpa*

What is existent (*bhāva-rūpa*) alone can be the cause of something. What is non-existent (*abhāva*) cannot play the role of a cause just because it is non-existent. Since *avidyā* is the *cause* of the appearance of the pluralistic universe, it must be admitted, according to Advaita, to be something existent. Further, Advaita holds that the world of plurality and *avidyā* which is its cause are false or illusory (*mithyā*). If *avidyā* is characterized as *bhāva-rūpa*, it is not in the sense that it is real (*sat*), but only in the sense that it is something positive or existent to be distinguished from what is negative or non-existent. Though *avidyā* is not real, it is nevertheless existent according for the appearance of the world, until it is sublated by the immediate knowledge of the ultimate reality. One of the arguments adduced by the Advaitin to show that *avidyā* is *bhāva-rūpa* is that the world of plurality which is illusory is caused by *avidyā*, which is also illusory.

* Courtesy: *Journal of the Madras University*, Sec. A : Humanities, XLVIII, 1, Jan. 1976.

The point which the Advaitin stresses here is that what is illusory can be produced only by what is illusory through change or modification. It is also necessary to bear in mind that the Advaitin holds the view that, while *avidyā* is the transformative material cause (*pariṇāmyupādāna-kāraṇa*) of the world, Brahman is its transfigurative material cause (*vivartopādāna-kāraṇa*).

II. Rāmānuja's Objection

Rāmānuja criticizes the Advaita view that an object which is illusory must have as its material cause what is illusory. He says: "The reasoning of the section which contains the *sūtra* (II, i, 4), '*na vilakṣaṇatvāt*,' will dispose of the argument which maintains that of an illusory thing the material cause must also be illusory."¹ Rāmānuja's objection calls for a careful examination of the causal relation between Brahman and the world as well as *avidyā* and the world, as set forth in Advaita.

III. Cause-effect Relation between Brahman and the World

The section called "*na vilakṣaṇatvādhikaraṇa*" of the *Vedānta-sūtra*² which has been referred to by Rāmānuja does not in any way refute the Advaita view that of an illusory thing the material cause must also be illusory. This section is intended to establish by means of reasoning that Brahman is both the material and the efficient cause of the world by refuting the objections thereto.

In an earlier section known as "*prakṛtyadhikaraṇa*" of the *Vedānta-sūtra*³ Śaṅkara argues that Brahman is not only the efficient cause, but the material cause as well (*prakṛtiḥ ca*), and that this view is in accordance

with the promissory statement (*pratijñā*) and the illustrations (*dr̥ṣṭānta*) which we find in scripture. The *Chāndogya* makes the promissory statement that by knowing Brahman "what is not known becomes known" (*avijñātam vijñātam*). This promissory statement will be meaningful only if it is said that Brahman is the material cause of the world, and that through knowing Brahman everything which is dependent on, and originates from, it comes to be known. *Śrutī* itself explains the promissory statement by means of examples. By knowing one lump of clay, it says, all that is made of clay is known; by knowing one nugget of gold all that is made of gold is known.⁷ In the same way, to know Brahman, which is the material cause, is to know everything which originates from it.

Śaṅkara shows in "*na vilakṣaṇatvādhikaraṇa*" that Brahman, though of a different nature from the world, can nevertheless be its cause; and his standpoint in this section is not opposed to, but only reaffirms, his view as stated in "*prakṛtyadhikaraṇa*". He argues in the *bhāṣya* on *sūtra* II, i, 6 that cause and effect cannot be similar in all respects.⁸ If they were similar in all respects, they cannot be distinguished from each other as cause and effect. Though cause and effect cannot be similar in every respect, something in the cause, or some qualities of it, must be found in the effect, as the clay in the lump is found in the pot which comes out of it. The same is true in the case of Brahman and the world. Brahman is to be found in everything in the world with the result that we speak of everything as real (*sattā*), though there is difference between Brahman and the things of the world in other respects.⁹

In other words, though the nature of Brahman is such that it is different from the world, it is nevertheless the cause, both efficient and material, of the world. This point needs clarification with a view to show how this is not prejudicial to the claim that of an illusory thing the material cause must also be illusory.

IV. *Reply to Rāmānuja's Objection*

When Advaita says that Brahman is the cause of the world, certainly the reference is not to Brahman which is *nirviśeṣa*, which is non-relational and undifferentiated, for such an entity by its very nature cannot be the cause of the world. That is why *śruti* says that Brahman, the ultimate reality, has neither an effect nor a cause to which it is related.' If, on the other hand, it be said that it is Brahman associated with *avidyā* that is the cause of the world, then it would only establish the Advaita view that *avidyā* which is illusory (*mīthyā*) and which has Brahman as its locus is the material cause of the world which is also illusory. Brahman which is *nirviśeṣa* is immutable. *Avidyā* (also known as *ajñāna* or *māyā*) which is falsely associated with Brahman, the pure consciousness, undergoes modification (*pariṇāma*) and appears as the world of plurality. In other words, *avidyā*, according to Advaita, is the transformative material cause (*pariṇāmy-upādāna-kāraṇa*) of the world. In so far as Brahman remaining immutable serves as the locus (*adhiṣṭhāna*) for *avidyā* which through modification appears as the pluralistic universe, the former is said to be the transfigurative material cause (*vivartopādāna-kāraṇa*) of the world. In order to account for the appearance of the world, both Brahman and *avidyā* are necessary — the former serving as the locus without

in any way being affected by *avidyā* or its modification, and the latter as the radical adjunct of Brahman for the appearance of the world. Though *avidyā* is without a beginning (*anādi*), it is nevertheless terminable by the right knowledge; and so it has an end (*anta*). It is both experienced and sublated; and so it is illusory (*mithyā*). If *avidyā* is *mithyā*, the world which originates therefrom through transformation cannot be but *mithyā*. The nature of the material cause is found in its effect. Just as the clayness of the lump is in the pot which is made out of it, even so the illusoriness of *avidyā*, the material cause, is seen in the world which is its effect. It follows that of the illusory world the material cause is also illusory.

V. *Similarity as well as Difference between Cause and Effect*

It may be argued that Brahman which is real, consciousness, and bliss is the cause of the world. Reality, consciousness, and bliss are the *characteristics* of Brahman. The nature of Brahman, according to this argument, is found in the world which is its effect, for we say that the world exists (*asti*), that it is seen (*bhāti*), and that it is the object of our enjoyment (*priyam*). These characteristics of the world which we experience in our day-to-day life, according to this argument, are indeed the characteristics of Brahman. As the cause, so is the effect. And so, Brahman which is described as real, consciousness, and bliss is the cause of the world.

This argument is of no avail. It is only Brahman associated with *avidyā* that can be spoken of as *sat*, *cit*, and *ānanda*, and not Brahman which is *nirviśeṣa*. Advaita maintains that Brahman by its very nature is

nirviśeṣa and that reality, consciousness, and bliss cannot be predicated of it as its attributes unless we associate it with *avidyā*.¹³ The affirmative text of the *Taittirīya*¹⁴ which says that "Brahman is real, consciousness, and infinite" is interpreted in the final position of Advaita *only negatively* to convey the idea that the ultimate reality is different from what is unreal, what is insentient, and what is finite. Since it is impossible to state the nature of Brahman as such-and-such in terms of any of the categories known to us, or by means of words whose scope is restricted to denote only that which has *jāti*, *guṇa*, *karma*, and *sambandha*,¹⁵ even this *Taittirīya* text which states the essential nature (*svarūpa-lakṣaṇa*) of Brahman has to be explained, in the final analysis, only negatively. Brahman is devoid of specifications (*nirviśeṣa*). It is devoid of attributes (*nirdharmaka*). It can only be spoken of as what it is not, and not as what it is. *Śruti* which is verbal testimony, in view of the limitation with regard to the usage of words for denoting anything stated above, serves only to remove the false notions about Brahman, which we have entertained due to *avidyā*.¹⁶ So, if we speak of Brahman as *saccidānanda*, it is from the relative standpoint of the *vyāvahārika* which presupposes, and is conditioned by, *avidyā*.

Though it is wrong to say that reality, consciousness, and bliss are the attributes of Brahman, it is nevertheless true that the nature of Brahman which is *saccidānanda* is reflected in the world which is its effect. What is illusorily superimposed (*kalpita* or *adhyasta*) on something does not have any reality of its own apart from its locus (*adhiṣṭhāna*). The illusory snake has no reality of its own apart from the rope, its locus, on which it is superimposed. By borrowing the reality

of its locus, it presents itself to be real. In the same way, the world which is an illusory superimposition on Brahman appears to us as though it is real, sentient, and blissful. The world in this respect is credited with a certain nature which does not belong to it, but which it has borrowed from Brahman, its locus.

Just as the nature of Brahman is reflected in the world, even so the nature of *avidyā* which is the transformative material cause of the world pervades it. If the world is illusory (*anṛtam*) and insentient (*jadam*) and is the source of misery (*duḥkham*), it is because of its being a product of *avidyā*, which is illusory, insentient, and a source of misery. Just as the clayness of the lump is found pervading the entire pot which comes out of it, even so the nature of *avidyā* is seen pervading the world which originates from it.

VI. *Brahman-cum-Avidyā as the Cause of the World*

Inasmuch as Brahman associated with, or through *avidyā* is the cause of the world, the nature of Brahman as well as that of *avidyā* is reflected in the world.¹³ It means that Brahman serving as the locus and remaining immutable is the transfigurative material cause (*vivartopādāna-kāraṇa*) for the appearance of the world therein through *avidyā*, and the illusory *avidyā* manifests itself through modification as the world of name and form in Brahman which is the locus. In other words, the relation between Brahman and the world is one of transfiguration or apparent change (*vivarta*), whereas the relation between *avidyā* and the world is one of transformation or actual change (*pariṇāma*). According to Advaita, neither Brahman in itself nor *avidyā* by itself is the cause of the world.¹⁴ Brahman in itself, as stated earlier, is

neither the cause nor the effect of anything. *Avidyā* which is insentient cannot, without its association with the sentient principle, be the cause of anything. So Advaita holds the view that Brahman through *avidyā*, or Brahman qualified or delimited by *avidyā*, or *avidyā* which is located in Brahman, is the cause of the world. Wherever *śruti* ascribes causality to Brahman or Ātman, it is not with reference to pure, non-differentiated, non-relational Brahman, but only with regard to Brahman which is associated with *avidyā*. Brahman in this sense, *i.e.* as what is associated with *avidyā*, is undoubtedly *saviśeṣa*. And it is Brahman which is *saviśeṣa* that is the cause of the world, and not Brahman which is *nirviśeṣa*. It is, therefore, not surprising that there is similarity (*sālakṣaṇya*) between Brahman, which is the cause, and the world which is its effect. If the insistence is on similarity between cause and effect, — and the opponent insists on this similarity in the *sūtra*, II, i, 4, when he says that Brahman cannot be the cause of the world in view of the difference in nature between Brahman and the world— then the Advaita explanation of the causal relation between Brahman and the world meets the point fully.

The standpoint of Advaita in respect of the causality of the world can be expressed in the form of an inference as follows: This world which is seen as having the dual nature must have been produced by a cause which has the dual nature, because there must be similarity between cause and effect, as in the case of clay and pot.¹² As stated earlier, the world has the dual nature because it *appears* not only to be *saccid-ānanda*, but is also illusory, insentient, and full of sorrow; and the cause of the world which has the dual nature is Brahman associated with *avidyā*.

We have already said that cause and effect cannot be similar in all respects; and if they were, there would not be two different things to be related as cause and effect. In addition to similarity in some respects between them, there must be difference. And if the opponent were to insist upon the difference between Brahman and the world which are to be related as cause and effect, even then the Advaita explanation meets the demand. According to Advaita, Brahman which is real, consciousness, and bliss is the cause of the world which is false, insentient, and sorrowful *through avidyā*. The world as we see it is radically different from Brahman. Nevertheless, Brahman *through avidyā* is the cause for the appearance of the world. Inasmuch as Brahman-in-itself cannot be the cause of the world, and since it is necessary to admit *avidyā* to account for the appearance of the world in Brahman, which is the locus, Advaita maintains that *avidyā* which is responsible for the manifestation of the world through its own modification (*pariṇāma*) must be admitted to be something positive or existent (*bhāva-rūpa*).

It is no argument to say that Brahman-in-itself can be the cause of the world. Brahman-in-itself is devoid of the potency (*śakti*), viz. *avidyā* or *māyā*, to create the world. That is why Advaita says that from the absolute point of view Brahman alone is, and there is no such thing as *avidyā* in it. *Avidyā* being *mithyā*, its relation with Brahman which is real is also *mithyā*. There cannot be any real relation between two relata of which one is real and the other false. So Brahman-in-itself cannot be the cause of the world. If, on the contrary, Brahman is credited with the potency to create the world, then that potency which is associated with

Brahman is called *avidyā*. It means that Brahman conditioned by, or through, *avidyā*, or the complex of Brahman-and-*avidyā* is the cause of the world. Though *avidyā* is characterized as the potency of Brahman, it cannot be anything but *mithyā*, according to Advaita. The potency called *avidyā* cannot exist as different from that which possesses it. Nor can it exist as identical with that in which it is supposed to inhere. Since its nature is such that it cannot be different from, or identical with, that which possesses it, it is said to be indeterminable (*durnirūpa* or *anirvacanīya*) or illusory (*mithyā*).

It does not matter how we speak about the cause of the world; we may say that Brahman qualified or delimited by *avidyā*, or that *avidyā* located in Brahman, or that Brahman through *avidyā*,¹⁴ is the cause of the world. Whatever be the manner of expression, it is *avidyā*, and *avidyā* alone, that is the transformative material cause of the world, and not Brahman. According to Advaita, the ontological status of *avidyā* is *mithyā*. What is cognized cannot be unreal (*asat*). Inasmuch as *avidyā* is cognized, it must be different from the unreal. What is real (*sat*) can never suffer sublation. In so far as *avidyā* suffers sublation by means of the right knowledge, it cannot be real. It means that *avidyā* has a peculiar ontological status such that it is different from both the real and the unreal; consequently it is characterized as indeterminable (*anirvacanīya*) as either real or unreal. And for the same reason it is said to be illusory (*mithyā*). Just as the transformative material cause of a clay-pot is clay, even so the transformative material cause of the world which is *mithyā* must be an entity which is equally *mithyā*. And this entity is *avidyā*. So far as

Brahman is concerned, remaining immutable all the time, it serves as the locus (*adhiṣṭhāna*) for the appearance of the world through *avidyā*. Advaita, therefore, holds the view that while Brahman is the transfigurative material cause, *avidyā* is the transformative material cause of the world. It is this view that is sought to be conveyed in the “*na vilakṣaṇatvādhikaraṇa*” of the *Vedānta-sūtra*. Therefore, Rāmānuja’s criticism that the Advaita view, viz. “of an illusory object the material cause also must be illusory,” is opposed to the teaching contained in the “*na vilakṣaṇatvādhikaraṇa*” is not justified.

VII. *Resumé of the Advaita Position on the Causality of Brahman-cum-avidyā*

Before we consider Vedānta Deśika’s criticism that neither Brahman nor *māyā* as understood in Advaita is the material cause of the world, it is necessary to bear in mind the following points which emerge from what we have said above.

(1) Both *śruti*¹⁷ and the *Vedānta-sūtra*¹⁸ declare that Brahman is the material cause of the world.

(2) *Śruti* texts which refer to the creation of the world ascribe causality to Brahman qualified by *māyā* or *avidyā* (*māyā-viśiṣṭam brahma*). This is obvious from the *śruti* text which says: Indra (*i.e.* the Self) assumes many forms through *māyā*.¹⁹ That Brahman-in-itself, devoid of *māyā* or *avidyā*, cannot be the cause of the world, has already been explained.

(3) Material causality (*upādānatva*) is ascribed to Brahman and *māyā* in two different ways. While Brahman is the transfigurative material cause, *māyā* or *avidyā* is the transformative material cause. A material

cause is one which has the capacity to give rise to an effect in its own being.²⁰ This explanation of material causality holds good in the case of both Brahman and *avidyā*. Brahman gives rise to the appearance of the world in its own being by serving as the locus (*adhi-ṣṭhāna*) without undergoing any change whatsoever. *Avidyā*, on the contrary, gives rise to the appearance of the world through modification in its own being.

(4) Since Brahman is the locus for the illusory appearance of the world therein, it is admitted to be the material cause in the primary sense (*mukhyam-upādānam*) and not in the secondary sense.

(5) Brahman is the material cause in so far as it is the unchanging locus for the appearance of the world therein, only because of its nature being concealed by *avidyā*.

(6) The ascription of material causality in the direct sense of the term to Brahman as explained above is in keeping with the *śruti* text²¹ which says that Brahman is free from change (*avikāra*).

VIII. *Viśiṣṭādvaita View of Causal Relation between Brahman and the World*

A brief reference to the *Viśiṣṭādvaita* explanation of the causal relation between Brahman and the world is also necessary in this context in order to follow the view expressed by Vedānta Desika. According to *Viśiṣṭādvaita*, the entire world of sentient and non-sentient beings constitutes the body of Brahman. Brahman is always qualified by *cit* and *acit* both in the causal and effect conditions. However, there is this difference between the causal state and the effect state. In the causal state both *cit* and *acit* are in a subtle form,

while in the effect state they are in a gross form. So according to Viśiṣṭādvaita, Brahman with *cit* and *acit* in their subtle form is the cause, and Brahman with *cit* and *acit* in their gross form is the effect. It must be noted here that *acit* or *prakṛti* alone, according to Viśiṣṭādvaita, is subject to modification, and not Brahman with which it is related as its inseparable attribute (*apṛthaksiddha-viśeṣaṇa*). In other words, Viśiṣṭādvaita rejects *Brahma-pariṇāma-vāda*, i.e. the view that Brahman undergoes modification. By assigning the changes to *prakṛti* and the imperfections to the *jīva*, Viśiṣṭādvaita keeps Brahman free from both changes and imperfections.

IX. *Vedānta Deśika's Explanation of the Material Causality of Brahman*

Comparing the standpoint of Viśiṣṭādvaita with that of Advaita, Vedānta Deśika observes:

Though that which is qualified is the material cause, the attribute alone is subject to modification. Since the entity qualified by the attribute is indirectly the locus (for the change), objection cannot be raised for use of the word "material cause" (*upādāna*) with regard to that entity. Just as even for you (i.e. the Advaitin), though *avidyā* alone is what is subject to modification (*vivarta*) directly, Brahman is said to undergo apparent change in view of the fact that *avidyā* is dependent on the Witness-Brahman, even so, (in our view) though the substance (*prakṛti*) which constitutes the body of Brahman is subject to modification directly, Brahman, which is responsible for originating the change and on which the changing entity is dependent, can be spoken of as what is subject to change. This, however, does not lead to any change

in the entity qualified by the attribute. Just as you accept Brahman to be the locus for the change indirectly, even so do we accept this. And there is no defect in this...''

X. *Objections against Vedānta Deśika's Explanation*

Vedānta Deśika's statement of the Viśiṣṭādvaita position and its comparison with that of Advaita deserves careful consideration. What is obvious from the foregoing observation of Vedānta Deśika's is that Brahman which is immutable is not the material cause directly, but only indirectly (*paramparayā*), for the material causality of *prakṛti*, its attribute, which alone is subject to modification, is ascribed to Brahman. The real position, then, comes to this: Brahman which is not *upādāna-kāraṇa* is said to be the *upādāna-kāraṇa* by courtesy or in a figurative sense. If so, Brahman is only *nimitta-kāraṇa*; and this is exactly the view advocated by the Dvaita Vedāntin.

Whereas the Viśiṣṭādvaitin can speak of Brahman as the material cause only indirectly or in the figurative sense, the Advaitin says that Brahman is the material cause in the primary sense of the term. Since Brahman is the unchanging locus for the appearance of the world therein, it is *upādāna-kāraṇa* in the direct sense of the term. Advaita does not give credit to Brahman for something which it does not really deserve. It does not subscribe to the view that Brahman becomes the material cause, not in its own right, but through the agency of something else. It maintains that both Brahman and *avidyā* are the material cause — Brahman through *vivarta*, and *avidyā* through *pariṇāma*. Therefore to say that the explanation of the causal relation between Brahman (qualified by *prakṛti*

or *acit*) and the world as given in Viśiṣṭādvaita is like the one between Brahman and the world as stated in Advaita is anything but true.

If Brahman, as stated by Vedānta Desika explaining the position of Viśiṣṭādvaita, is the material cause indirectly, is it admitted that Brahman undergoes modification or not? If it does undergo change, then the Viśiṣṭādvaita view comes into conflict with the *nirvikāra-śruti*²³ which says that Brahman is free from change. If it be said that Brahman does not really undergo any change, though the change takes place only in *prakṛti* which constitutes its body (*śarīra*), then the negation of change in Brahman by the *nirvikāra-śruti* becomes unintelligible. What is affirmed alone can be denied. Denial of change in Brahman presupposes a prior affirmation of it in Brahman. If the change that takes place in *prakṛti* is to be attributed to Brahman, it can be done only by means of superimposition (*adhyāropa*), *i.e.* by ascribing to Brahman something which it really does not have. What is affirmed of Brahman through superimposition can be denied subsequently. It is well-known that a change in the body (*śarīra*) does not at all involve a change in the self, the sentient principle (*śarīrin*). Considering that Viśiṣṭādvaita does not adopt the technique of superimposition (*adhyāropa*) and negation (*apavāda* or *niṣedha*), and that it explains the relation between Brahman and *prakṛti* in terms of *śarīra-śarīri* relation, we have to say that it fails to give an intelligible account for the *nirvikāra-śruti*. This difficulty, however, does not arise in Advaita. Both Brahman and *avidyā*, according to Advaita, are the material cause (*upādāna*). The modification that takes place in *avidyā* is falsely superimposed on Brahman which is its locus. When

the modification of *avidyā* is wrongly affirmed of Brahman, the *nirvikāra-śruti* negates it when it says that there is no change in Brahman. Thus, in the Advaita account, there is scope for the work of *nirvikāra-śruti*.

Further, Brahman spoken of as the cause of the world in *śruti* texts such as "Being alone was in the beginning",²¹ which deal with this problem, is *viśiṣṭa*, i.e. it is what is qualified by, or associated with, *avidyā*. Such *śruti* texts purport to teach that both Brahman and *avidyā* are the material cause in the real sense of the term. They do not convey the idea that *avidyā* alone, which is associated with Brahman, is the material cause. There is, therefore, no justification for Vedānta Desika's contention that *prakṛti* alone, which undergoes change, is the material cause and that Brahman qualified by *prakṛti* is the material cause only indirectly (*paramparayā*). It is in the primary sense of the term that Brahman is said to be the material cause of the world in the *sūtra* "*prakṛtiṣca pratijñā-drṣtānta-anuparodhāt.*"²²

There is a text in the *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad*, which says: "Know then that *prakṛti* is *māyā*, and the wielder of *māyā* is the great Lord."²³ It does not matter, so far as Advaita is concerned, whether *prakṛti* is called *māyā* or *māyā* is called *prakṛti*. The view which it is concerned about is that *māyā* which is the material cause of the world is *mithyā*, and that the world which, through modification, originates from a material cause which is illusory must *ex hypothesi* be illusory. The causal relation between *māyā* and the world takes place through the modification (*pariṇāma*) of the former into the latter. Consequently both cause and effect have the same ontological status (*samasattāka*). *Māyā*,

though illusory, is empirically real; and the illusory world too which comes out of *māyā* is empirically real.

XI. *Vedānta Deśika's Objection*

Vedānta Deśika says:

The illusoriness of *māyā* is contradicted by the absurdity which arises if *māyā* were not the cause (of the world). And the reality of the cause is quite frequently shown by examples such as clay. By statements like "It is insentient, and exists for the other; it is eternal and is always subject to modification," "Having no beginning and end, it is the mother which gives rise to the objects," the eternality of *prakṛti* is established, and also its illusoriness is refuted... The word "*māyā*" refers to the entity which is the instrument (*upakaraṇa*) to the creation of variegated things."²

XII. *Reply to Vedānta Deśika's Objection*

Vedānta Deśika's argument cannot be accepted for the following reasons. *Upakaraṇa* is not the same thing as *upādāna*. While the wheel and the staff are the instruments (*upakaraṇa*) for producing a pot, clay is the material cause (*upādāna*) out of which a pot is produced. The first objection to be raised is that Vedānta Deśika while holding the view at the commencement of the passage quoted above that *māyā* is the material cause, should end by saying that *māyā* is the *instrument* for the creation of the variegated world. If it is the transformative material cause, it cannot also be the instrumental cause. In other words, there is no harmony between the beginning and the end of the passage.

It is accepted both by Advaita and Viśiṣṭādvaita that *māyā* or *prakṛti* is the material cause only through

modification. However, Advaita maintains that whatever is subject to modification is not eternal. Further, there is sublation for *māyā* by the right knowledge. So the second objection to be urged against Vedānta Deśika is that *māyā*, otherwise called *prakṛti*, which is constantly changing, has an end, and therefore is not eternal. The illusoriness of *māyā* and its non-eternality go together. Inasmuch as *māyā* is both experienced and sublated, it is characterized as *mithyā*.

Thirdly, though *māyā* is admitted to be the cause of the world, it does not follow that it is real (*sat*). There is no rule that a cause — and for that matter even a material cause — must be absolutely real in order to play its role as a cause. An entity can be empirically real (*vyāvahārika-sattā*), and yet be the transformative material cause. Clay (and thereby its material cause, *viz. māyā*) is said to be real in the *Chāndogya* text²³ because it exists till the attainment of Brahman-realization. This, however, does not mean that it is absolutely real.

XIII. *Further Objection Raised by Vedānta Deśika*

With a view to refute the Advaita view that *māyā* which is *mithyā* is the material cause of the illusory world, Vedānta Deśika argues as follows:

Though *māyā*, which is the material cause, is *mithyā*, it does not follow that the world is illusory just because it is produced therefrom. In accordance with the principle contained in the “*na vilakṣaṇatvādhi-karana*,” an effect, though of a different nature from its cause, can take place; and you too admit that from what is not real something which is real can originate. There is, indeed, no royal edict that only from an illu-

sory instrumental cause real thing can take place, but not from a material cause (which is illusory). As in the case of material cause and its effect, there is no contradiction due to sequence between what is real and what is not real, for there is no contradiction when a particular state of a substance which does not exist earlier exists subsequently... Therefore, even though the illusoriness of the material cause is established by *śruti*, the illusoriness of the effect does not follow therefrom. Only the reality of the material cause is conveyed in the teaching of *sadvidyā*, etc. with a view to refute *asatkārya-vāda*, through *śruti* texts such as "The clay alone is real," "These have for their source Being." Thus, it has been shown that there is no contradiction when the effect is real, even though its material cause is illusory; by the same principle it follows that even though the effect is illusory, there is no contradiction when its material cause is real. By this is refuted the assumption of the indeterminable *ajñāna* as well as the view that of an illusory object the material cause must be illusory.²³

XIV. *Reply to the Objection*

Vedānta Desika's argument is untenable. It is first of all necessary to bear in mind that causal relation can hold good between two things which are similar in some respects, as also between two things which are dissimilar. Though Brahman is of a different nature from the world, it is nevertheless the cause of the world. And there is similarity between *māyā* and the world which are related as cause and effect. Secondly, the question whether cause and effect have the same ontological status or not is raised only with regard to the material cause and its effect, and not with

regard to the instrumental cause and its effect. In the case of *pariṇāma*, e.g. clay which through transformation becomes a pot, cause and effect have the same ontological status, i.e. the same reality; but in the case of *vivarta*, e.g. rope which appears as a snake, their ontological status is different, i.e. while the cause has a higher reality, the effect has a lower reality. In the former case, both clay and pot are empirically real; in the latter, while the rope is empirically real (*vyāvahārika*), the snake which illusorily appears therein is apparently or phenomenally real (*prātibhāsika*). The wholesome principle involved in each of these two cases — *samasattāka* or sameness of reality in the case of *pariṇāma*, and *viśamasattāka* or difference in reality in the case of *vivarta* — can never be disregarded. Since the relation between *māyā* and the world is one of *pariṇāma*, the two must have identical reality. So Vedānta Deśika's argument that even though *māyā* is *mithyā*, the world which originates therefrom through modification need not be *mithyā* cannot be accepted. In other words, the view that from an illusory material cause an effect which is real can come into existence through modification therefrom cannot be sustained. It is futile to invoke "*na vilakṣaṇatvādhikāraṇa*" of the *Vedānta-sūtra* in support of this patently untenable position.

Vedānta Deśika argues that there is no incompatibility between a cause which is real giving rise to an effect which is illusory. This will hold good in the case of *vivarta-vāda*, and not in the case of *pariṇāma-vāda*. As stated earlier, Advaita maintains that Brahman which is absolutely real is the unchanging locus for the illusory world which appears therein due to *avidyā*. The relation between *māyā* and the world

being one of modification, it is not possible to say that though *māyā* is real its effect is illusory. Since there is incompatibility between a cause which is real and an effect which is illusory in the case where the effect comes into being through modification from its material cause, Vedānta Desika's claim that he has shown the tenability of causal relation in this case is but a bare assertion.

Being or Brahman is the central topic of discussion in the sixth chapter of the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*. Citing the example of clay and its modifications, the *Chāndogya* text says, "Clay alone is real, its modifications exist only in name arising from speech."¹⁰ Since this example relates to the causal relation from the standpoint of *pariṇāma* according to which both cause and effect have the same ontological status, *i.e.* identical reality (*samasattāka*), — a point which is quite well-known to us — strictly speaking there is no need for *śruti* to make a declaration to the effect that clay alone is real. If it is said that this is what *śruti* really intends to do, it amounts to totally ignoring the universe of discourse or the context (*prakaraṇa*). It is Brahman and not clay that is the topic of discussion in the context. Therefore, the *Chāndogya* text mentioned above must be interpreted without prejudice to the central idea discussed in the chapter.

Clay that is mentioned in the *Upaniṣad* is suggestive of Brahman which alone is real, the world of plurality being an illusory appearance thereof. Just as the modifications of clay which exist only in name do not exist independently of clay, even so the world of plurality which is superimposed on Brahman does not exist independently of Brahman, its locus. *Prakṛti* or

māyā which is superimposed on Brahman is illusory (*mīthyā*) for the reason already stated. Even if it be said that "clay" in this context is suggestive of *māyā* or *prakṛti*, which is the transformative material cause of clay and other things of the world, *māyā* or *prakṛti* is said to be real only from the *vyāvahārika* standpoint; that is, its reality holds good as long as there is no Brahman-realization. On this interpretation, *māyā* or *prakṛti* has only empirical reality; and this is only another way of saying that it is *mīthyā*. So the Advaita view that of the illusory world the transformative material cause must also be illusory holds good.

NOTES

1. Rāmānuja, *Śrībhāṣya* (T. Srinivasa Sarma (ed.), Nirnaya-sagar Press, Bombay, 1916), p. 181:

मिथ्यार्थस्य हि मिथ्यैव उपादानं भवितुमर्हतीति एतदपि, 'न विलक्षणत्वात्' इत्येतदधिकरणन्यायेन परिह्रियते ।

2. II, i, 4-11.

3. I, iv, 23-27.

4. VI, i, 3.

5. *Chāndogyopaniṣad*, VI, i, 4-5.

6. अत्यन्तसारूप्ये च प्रकृतिविकारभाव एव प्रतीयते ।

7. See Śaṅkara's commentary on the *Vedāntasūtra*, II, i, 6: ब्रह्मणोऽपि तर्हि सत्तालक्षणः स्वभाव आकाशादिषु अनुवर्तमानो दृश्यते ।

8. *Śvetāsvataropaniṣad*, VI, 8: न तस्य कार्यं करणञ्च विद्यते ।

9. See Rāmarāyakavi, *Śrīśaṅkarāśaṅkara-bhāṣya-vimarśaḥ* (Guntur, 1953), p. 321:

अज्ञानावच्छिन्नमब्रह्मैव सच्चिदानन्दं, न तु निर्विशेषं ब्रह्म, तस्मिन् सत्ता-ज्ञानादि-विशेषायोगात् ।

10. II, i, 1.

11. See Śaṅkara's commentary on the *Bhagavadgītā*, XIII, 12.

12. See Śaṅkara's commentary on the *Vedāntasūtra*, I, i, 4:
अविद्याकल्पितभेदनिवृत्तिपरत्वात् शास्त्रस्य, न हि शास्त्रं इदंतथा
विषयभूतम्ब्रह्म प्रतिपिपादयिषति ।

13. See Rāmarāyakavi, *op. cit.* p. 321:

एवमज्ञानावच्छिन्नस्य ब्रह्मणो जगत्कारणत्वादेव जगति तदुभयधर्मान्वयः ।

14. *Ibid.*, p. 321:

न ह्यस्माभिः केवलाद्ब्रह्मणः केवलादज्ञानाद्वा जगज्जातमित्युच्यते, किन्तु
अज्ञानावच्छिन्नाद्ब्रह्मणः, ब्रह्माश्रितादज्ञानाद्वेति ।

15. *Ibid.*, p. 321:

सच्चिदानन्दात्मकं अनृतजडदुःखात्मकञ्च इदं जगत्तथाविधकारणजन्य-
मेव भवितुमर्हति कार्यकारणयोः सालक्षणेन भवितव्यात् मृद्वटवत् ।

16. अज्ञानावच्छिन्नाद्ब्रह्मणः जगज्जातम् । ब्रह्माश्रितादज्ञानात्
जगज्जातम् ।

The following verse from the *Saṅkṣepasārīraka* I, 323 is relevant
in this context:

साभासमेतदुपजीव्यच्चिद्वितीया संसारकारणमिति प्रवदन्ति धीराः ।
साभासमेतदिति संसृतिकारणत्वे द्वारम्परम्भवति कारणता दृशस्तु ॥

17. *Taittirīyopaniṣad*, III, i, 1.

18. I, iv, 23.

19. *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad*, II, v, 19.

20. उपादानता हि स्वात्मनि कार्यजनिहेतुत्वम् ।

21. *Śvetāśvataropaniṣad*, VI, 19: निष्कलं निष्क्रियं शान्तम् ।

See also *Nṛsiṃhottaratāpinyupaniṣad* IX, 1: अविकारो हि
उपलब्धः सर्वस्य सर्वत्र ।

22. See *Vedāntadeśika*, *Śatadīpaṇī*, "brahmopādānatvānya-
hānuḥpoṣattibhaṅga" :

विशिष्टोपादानतायां विशेषणमात्रस्य परिणामित्वेऽपि विशेष्यस्यापि परम्परया आश्रयत्वेन आश्रयत्वमात्रविशेषात् उपादानशब्दवाच्यत्व-प्रतिक्षेपस्त्वशक्यः । यथा भवतोऽपि अविद्याया एव साक्षाद्विवर्ताश्र-यत्वेऽपि तस्या एव साक्षिभूतब्रह्माधीनसत्ताकत्वाद्ब्रह्म विवर्तत इत्युक्तिः, तथा परिणामस्यापि साक्षाद्ब्रह्मशरीरभूतद्रव्यगतत्वेऽपि तस्य तदारब्ध-तया तदधीनतामात्रात् ब्रह्म परिणमत इति वक्तुं शक्यम् । नैतावता विशेष्यस्य साक्षाद्विकाराश्रयत्वप्रसङ्गः परम्परया आश्रयत्वं तु भवतां इव अस्माकमपि सम्मतम्, अदोषावहश्च ।

It may be noticed that in the quotation given above, Vedānta Deśika in the restatement of the Advaita view speaks about the change which *avidyā* undergoes as *vivarta*. The expression that he uses is: "*bhavato'pi avidyāyā eva sūkṣādvivartāśrayatve'pi*." This is a wrong statment of the position of Advaita. The change in the case of *avidyā*, according to Advaita, is *pariṇāma*, and not *vivarta*. Vedāntadeśika cannot certainly be unaware of the use of the word *vivarta*, and of the distinction between *vivarta* and *pariṇāma* always kept in view, in Advaita.

23. *Śvetāśvataropaniṣad*, VI, 19.

24. *Chāndogyopaniṣad*, VI, ii, 1.

25. *Vedāntasūtra*, I, iv, 23.

26. IV, 10: मायां तु प्रकृतिं विद्यात्, मायिनं तु महेश्वरम् ।

27. Vedāntadeśika, *Śatadūṣaṇi*, "*māyopādānatvānyathānupa-
pattibhaṅga*" :

मायाया मिथ्यात्वं प्रकृतित्वान्यथानुपपत्त्या बाधितम् । कारणसत्यत्वञ्च बहुशो मृद्दृष्टान्तादिभिर्दर्शितम् ।

‘ अचेतना परार्था च नित्या सततविक्रिया । ’

‘ गौरनाद्यन्तवती सा जनित्री भूतभाविनी । ’

इत्यादिभिः प्रकृतिनित्यत्वसिद्धेश्च तन्मिथ्यात्वं निरस्तम् । ... अतो विचित्रसृष्ट्युपकरणभूत-अर्थविशेष एव मायाशब्दशक्तिः ।

28. *Chāndogyopanīṣad*, VI, i, 4: वाचारम्भणं विकारो नाम-
धेयम्, मृत्तिकेत्येव सत्यम् ।

29. *Vedāntadeśika*, *Śatadūṣaṇī*, "mūlyopādānato'nyathānupapa-
ṭtibhaṅga":

मिथ्यारूपमाद्योपादानत्वेऽपि तदुत्पन्नमात्रस्य प्रपञ्चस्य मिथ्यात्वं न
सिद्धव्यति; न विलक्षणत्वाधिकरणन्यायेन विलक्षणादपि विलक्षणकार्यो-
त्पत्तिसम्भवात्, असत्यात् सत्योत्पत्तेः युष्माभिरेव स्वीकाराच्च । न हि
अस्ति राजशासनं मिथ्याभूतेन निमित्तेनैव भाव्यम्, न तु उपादानेनेति ।
उपादानत्वोपादेयत्वादिवत्सत्यत्वमिथ्यात्वयोः क्रमेण अविरोधात्, पूर्व-
स्मिन् काले स्वरूपेणासत् एव द्रव्यस्यावस्थाविशेषस्य उत्तरकाले सत्त्व-
वदविरोधात् ... अत उपादानमिथ्यात्वे श्रुतिसिद्धेऽपि न कार्यमिथ्यात्व-
सिद्धिः । उपादानसत्यत्वमेव च सद्विद्यादिषु असत्कार्यवादनिरासपूर्वकं
'मृत्तिकेत्येव सत्यम्' इति, "सन्मूलास्सोम्येमाः" इत्यादिभिः अभिधीयते ।
एवमुपादानमिथ्यात्वेऽपि कार्यसत्यत्वाविरोध-उपपादनन्यायेन कार्य-
मिथ्यात्वेऽपि उपादानसत्यत्वाविरोधोऽपि उपपादित एवेति मिथ्या-
भूतस्य मिथ्याभूतमेव उपादानम्भवितुमर्हति इति अनिर्वचनीयज्ञान-
कल्पनमपि निरस्तम् ॥

30. VI, i, 4.

THE TATVAŚUDDHI AND SUBJECTIVISM*

S. S. Sūryanārāyaṇa Śāstri

The *Tattvaśuddhi* is a work on Advaita-vedānta, ascribed to one Jñānaghanapāda. It is repeatedly referred to by Appayya Dīkṣita in his *Siddhāntaleśasaṅgraha*, and from these references Mr. Makhanlal Mukherjee¹ has tried to reconstruct and present the central teaching of the work as a variety of the doctrine of *Drṣṭi-srṣṭi*, the view that cognition is itself creation, that *esse* is *percipi*. The principal reference to the *Tattvaśuddhi* is in the commencement of the II chapter of the *Siddhāntaleśasaṅgraha* where it is cited as maintaining the view that difference is not perceptually cognised, the function of the sense-organs being the cognition of reality as such, not as diversified. Such a view seems to provide for one grade of reality alone; and the transition to the position that whatever is cognised is created, with and by the cognition, seems easy to make. *Prima facie* there is a case for making out the author of the *Tattvaśuddhi* to be *Drṣṭi-srṣṭi-vādin*.

*Courtesy: *Collected Papers of Professor S.S. Suryanarayana Sastri*, University of Madras, 1961, pp. 369-374.

This, however, need not be the last word on it, for, happily, a manuscript of the work is available.² That this is the work referred to by Appayya Dīkṣita is abundantly clear since at least two of the views cited by Appayya can be traced here. One of these is the view that even perception establishes non-duality. This commences on the second page with the words “किं च, प्रत्यक्षेणाप्यद्वैतं साधयितुं पश्यामः, तस्य सन्मात्रविषयत्वात्” and goes on through pages 3 and 4. The other is the explanation of God’s omniscience;³ since God has perceived all past things at the time they existed, they appear to Him constantly even as they did then, there being no cause of fresh obscuration in His case, as possessing the residual impressions produced by those manifestations, His uninterrupted memory of those objects is intelligible; similarly since Brahman is endowed with the power of *māyā* and since *māyā* even prior to creation is transformed into the manifestation of all things to be created in conformity with the unseen accumulated potencies of the *jīvas*, for Brahman as the witness thereof, there is knowledge of future things as well.

This elaborate demonstration of Brahman’s omniscience may well make one pause before identifying the *Tattvasuddhi* view with solipsism. And the doubt gains strength from the fact that even the view about the non-dual reality alone being primarily cognised in preception is taken from Maṇḍana Misra, as proved by a quotation from the *Brahmasiddhi*: “लब्धरूपे क्वचित् किञ्चित् तादृशेव निविध्यते” etc.; and Maṇḍana is certainly not a *drṣṭi-srṣṭi-vādin*,⁴ believing as he does in the creation of the world by Īsvara, who is distinct from the *jīvas* and is the content of the nesciences of which they themselves are the loci.

The *dr̥ṣṭi-sṛṣṭi-vādin* does not believe in a God distinct from the cognising *jīva*; a God even if admitted can be nothing more than the creation of the *jīva*; similarly he cannot recognise the current distinction between dream and waking or between the released and the bound; indeed, as Appaya says, he has one solution in which he washes off all difficulties that clog his theory, the dream analogy. He, the dreamer, is alone real; everything else is just a dream. A position which admits God as creator, and the relative permanence and reality of the external world is as far removed from this as any non-dualistic system can be; for, in the last resort, even the most realistic type of Advaita cannot but admit that God's causation is like the causation of dreams, that it involves no change in Himself and that the external world is a superimposition. But in so far as distinction can be made within this general position, the *Tattvaśuddhi* does not incline to *dr̥ṣṭi-sṛṣṭi* solipsism. In the following pages are set out a few extracts to establish this; they will be found to relate to Brahman's creatorship and the empirical permanence and reality of the world.

I. *Īsvara* is other than the *jīvas* and is the creator of the world. Brahman is the material cause and controller of the world.

(1) On page 13, the inquiry is started as to whether an omniscient *Īsvara* exists as other than the *jīva* in bondage: किं संसारिविलक्षणः सर्वज्ञ ईश्वरो नाम कश्चिदस्ति किं वा नेति । After noticing in the subsequent pages some attempts to establish the Lord and His omniscience through reasoning, it is said on folio 17 that the author holds to the existence of God, not because of perception and inference, but because of Scripture: अत्र समाधि-

रभिधीयते: न प्रत्यक्षानुमानाभ्यामीश्वरं प्रतिपादयामहे, किं तु वेदान्त-
वाक्यावष्टम्भात्; तथा हि, 'यः सर्वज्ञः सर्ववित्, तस्य भासा सर्वमिदं
विभाति ... इत्यादिश्रुतिशक्तेन ईश्वरे सर्वज्ञे अवगम्यमाने कथमसौ
नास्तीति ब्रूयात् ?

(2) सकल-जगदुपादान-कारणत्वात् संवित्-स्वरूपत्वाच्च सर्वा-
भेदेन साक्षात्करणम् तावत् सिद्धम् । Here Īsvara being the
material cause of the world is explicitly declared (Folio
18).

(3) तथा च ब्रह्मणो मायाशक्तिमत्त्वात् मायायाश्च सृष्टेः प्रागेव
सृज्यमान-निखिलपदार्थस्फुरण-रूपेण जीवाद्यनुसारेण विवर्तमान-
त्वात्, तत्साक्षितया तदुपाधिकस्य ब्रह्मणोऽपि तत्साधनत्व-सिद्धेः अना-
गत-वस्तु-विज्ञानोपपत्तिः । It is clear that no jīva is at liberty
to create whatever he fancies, but that māyā transforms
itself in conformity with the adṛṣṭa of each jīva, even
prior to creation, that Brahman knows these forms of
māyā, is thus instrumental in creation and is omniscient
as knowing even future objects in this way (p. 18).

(4) चेतनमेव ब्रह्म जगदुपादानमधिष्ठातु च । The intelligent
Brahman alone is the material cause and controller of
the universe.

(5) अनिर्वचनीय-मायोपाधिकब्रह्मैव जगदुपादानम् । Brah-
man alone as conditioned by the indeterminable māyā
is the material cause of the world.

(6) अतो वेदान्त-वाक्य-तात्पर्य-समधिगतम् ब्रह्म स्वमायावेश-
वशेन समस्त-बाह्याध्यात्मिक-प्रपञ्चाकारेण विवर्तते । Brahman
that is understood as the one purport of all Vedānta
texts, as associated with its own māyā, illusorily trans-
forms itself into the whole universe, external and in-
ternal (p. 31).

II Relative permanence of the world:

(1) प्रत्यभिज्ञा हि वस्तुनः पूर्वापरकाल-सम्बन्धावमर्शेन
स्थायित्वमेव साधयति, न क्षणिकत्वम् । Recognition establishes

permanence alone, not momentariness since it refers to the relation of the thing to two times, earlier and later (p. 46).

(2) मृदादि-कारणस्य प्रत्यभिज्ञया स्थायित्व-प्रतीतेः । In the case of causes like clay permanence is known by recognition (p. 149).

III. Recognition of empirical reality:

(1) आसंसारविमोक्षाद्यथाप्रतिभासं माया-विजृम्भित-प्रमाण-प्रमेय-भेदव्यवहाराभ्युपगमात् । Till final release from bondage, there is admitted empirical usage of differences like cogniser, etc., as evolved by māyā (p. 1).

(2) तस्मान्मन्त्रार्थवादानां विधिम् प्रत्युपयोगित्वेऽपि देवता-विग्रहवत्त्वादौ जगत्सर्ग-प्रलयादौ च प्रत्ययोत्पादत्वात् तस्य च वाद्यानुप-लब्धेः कर्मणि शब्दे च विरोधाभावात् सर्गादिप्रतिपादन-द्वारेण शेष्युप-कारसम्भवादुपपद्यतेतरामेव प्रामाण्यम् । This passage seeks to establish the validity of the texts about creation, etc., though they are not the purport of Scripture, on the ground that they are unsublated and are of some use to the principal purport; such justification of the creation texts is inconsistent with the view that cognition is creation (p. 70).

(3) ब्रह्मणा एव परमार्थ-सत्यत्वेऽपि प्रातिभासिकस्यापि दृश्य-प्रपञ्चस्य यथाप्रतिभासम् व्यवहाराभ्युपगमाल्लक्षणादि-समस्त-व्यवहारो-पपत्तेः । The empirical reality of the world of experience is admitted here (p. 60).

(4) तत्र किम् तत्त्वावेदक-प्रामाण्य-हानिः, आहोस्विद् व्यवहा-राङ्गता-लक्षण-प्रामाण्यहानिरिति वक्तव्यम्; पूर्वस्मिन् अस्मदिष्टमेव चेष्टित-म्भवतापीति नास्माकमनिष्टापत्तिः । उत्तरस्मिन्नुष्ण-जल-विज्ञानस्य देहा-त्मप्रतीतेश्च अयथार्थत्वेऽपि व्यवहारकारणत्व-दर्शनात् स्वप्न-विज्ञानस्यैव आप्रबोधात् प्रपञ्चस्य मिथ्यात्वेऽपि तद्विषयज्ञानस्य आ-परमार्थतत्त्व-बोधात् व्यवहाराङ्गतोऽपपत्तेः सकल-लौकिक-वैदिक-व्यवहारोपपत्तिः ।

This passage distinguishes between the validity that consists in making known the truth and validity that consists in accord with empirical usage. The latter is possessed even by the cognition of the world; for just as dream cognition is valid within its own sphere till one wakes up, even so the world cognition is valid in the empirical sphere till there arises the realisation of the world's unreality; for it is only this which is inconsistent with the empirical usage (pp. 93-94).

(5) द्वैत-प्रत्यक्षस्य अद्वितीयागम-बाध्यत्वेऽपि न शुक्ति-रजत-ज्ञान-तुल्यत्वम्, व्यावहारिकबाधाबाधवैषम्यात्। Everything short of absolute reality is not to be dumped into one category of unreality; for on the ground of sublation or non-sublation by experience, a distinction is possible there too; the former is merely apparent, like the cognition of nacre-silver; the latter is the empirically real, e.g. normal perception of difference (p. 98).

(6) यत् यदाकारम् तत् तदालम्बनम् दृष्टम् यथा परमार्थ-रजतम्। The use of the word "paramārtha" distinguishes it from nacre-silver, recognising for it a higher grade of reality.

(7) अद्वितीय-प्रमाणस्य तत्त्वावेदकत्वेन प्रामाण्यम्; द्वैत-प्रति-भासस्य पुनरासंसारविमोक्षाद् व्यावहारिकम् अतत्त्वावेदकत्वेन प्रामा-ण्यम्; ततश्च समस्त-लौकिक-वैदिक-व्यवहारः। This passage makes the same distinction and has the same import as passage (4) (p. 159).

It will be seen from a consideration of passages (4), (5) and (7), under the third heading that it does little justice to the author to say that according to him "every case of ordinary perception is illusory." "The facts of (determinate) perception of the jug, etc.,

are false, having nothing to distinguish them from the illusory perception of a piece of silver in the mother-of-pearl,"⁶ and that the position is to be "characterised as *sattā-dvaividhya-vāda*."⁷ The position is no doubt different from what the writer calls the *ekasattā-vāda* of the *Nyāyasudhā*; but it may be more adequately described as the *sattā-traividhya-vāda*. And those who adopt this view of three grades of reality are not subjectivists except in so far as all Advaitins have to be classed as such.

The account given in the *Siddhāntaleśasaṅgraha* is necessarily meagre and one legitimately wonders whether the writer in the *Quarterly* has not been induced to wander farther afield than is justifiable. Monistic thought in India is not exhausted by the two varieties of *dṛṣṭi-sṛṣṭi-vāda*; as the writer himself notices, there is a *sṛṣṭi-dṛṣṭi-vāda* too. The view that particularity and difference are due to super-imposition is common to this view also, yet it does not become a form of subjectivism. The criticism of the view that difference is perceived is taken over almost bodily from the *Brahmasiddhi*; a very short and compressed abridgement is found in the *Bhāmati* (on the *samanvaya-sūtra*). Yet no one has maintained seriously or with success that Maṇḍana or Vācaspati is a subjectivist. How far the interpretation of the *Nyāyasudhā* position is correct it is impossible to say, as the material on hand is very meagre and no manuscript seems to be available yet. But in the case of the *Tattvasuddhi* at least it seems clear that a study of the text itself will make it difficult to accept the view that the work is an exposition of the *dṛṣṭi-sṛṣṭi-vāda*.

NOTES

1. *Indian Historical Quarterly*, IX. 4, pp. 912-922.
2. In the Government Oriental Manuscripts Library, Madras, R. No. 2897.
3. *et seq.*, esp. folio 18.
4. The view that he was the founder of *dr̥ṣṭi-sr̥ṣṭi-vāda* is favoured by some because of a misapprehension. Maṇḍana and after him Vācaspati hold to a plurality of souls and a plurality of nesciences located in them. The conclusion seems inevitable that each *jīva* through his nescience is the creator of a separate world and that the common world postulated by empirical usage is only a consilience of illusions. This, however, is only one possible interpretation, the one given by Madhusūdana Sarasvatī in his *Siddhāntabindu*; but as pointed out by Brahmānanda in the *Binduṭīkā*, this is not the orthodox interpretation as given in the *Kalpataru*, etc. Both Maṇḍana and Vācaspati insist on the creatorship of *Īśvara*. How this is consistent with the rest of their teaching has been considered by us in the Introduction to the *Bhāmātī Catuṣṣūtrī* (Theosophical Publishing House, Adyar).
5. *Indian Historical Quarterly* IX, 4, p. 921.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 914.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 917.

ELUCIDATION OF CONTENTMENT

by

Dr T. M. P. Mahadevan

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6. *Need for Repeated Inquiry*

It was said that the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* text which is being commented on in the present section attributes to the *jīva* the states of immediate experience and removal of misery. The words "If he knows the self as 'this am I'" indicate the direct experience of the nature of *Brahman*. Though immediate experience is the legitimate result of the study of the scriptural texts, hearing or studying them once is not enough. The *sūtrakāra* says (IV, i, 1) that "Reception (of the mental functions of knowing, meditating, etc., is required) on account of the text giving instruction more than once." Reception is needed in order to deepen the knowledge once gained. Śaṅkara says, "Hearing, etc., along with calmness, etc., are to be practised in such a way that the knowledge of the sense of the sentence 'I am *Brahman*' becomes firm." For various reasons the knowledge from the scriptural texts once heard or studied is prone to be weak. First, there is a variety and multiplicity of scriptural texts which may give rise to doubts. Secondly, since the sense of the major texts which is of the form of the imparitite non-dual *Brahman* is non-empirical, there may arise a sense of its impossibility. Lastly, the conception of the contrary in the form of conceit like agency, etc., tends to weaken the knowledge of the truth once gained. As these three factors work in concert to make *Brahman*-knowledge appear slender and superficial, to match their strength scripture must be studied over and over again.

Repeated 'hearing' serves to dispel all doubts as to the intentions of scripture. In the section dealing with works, due to differences among sub-sections

and differences among desires, various works are enjoined. From this it may be inferred that even in the section about knowledge, conflicting statements are to be found. To remove such a possible doubt, repeated study is necessary. Hearing or study is the cognition that for the entire Vedāntas the sole purport is *Brahman*. In the *Samanvayādhyāya* of the *Brahmasūtra* the nature of hearing is clearly explained. *Manana* or reflection is the process of making the meaning of the Vedāntas intelligible by finding out adequate arguments. Reflection removes the contingency of the impossibility of the sense of Vedānta and presents it as a perfect possibility. This is declared in the second chapter of the *Brahmasūtra*. Due to long practice ranging over a period of innumerable births, there arises every moment the cognition that the body is the self; similarly also the notion that the world is real. Such conceptions of the contrary vanish when there is one-pointed meditation. This is achieved, even prior to the instruction about the truth, through meditation. That one-pointedness of the mind is the result of meditation is patent from the fact that the enquiry into meditation on the qualified *Brahman* is found in the sacred teaching of Vedānta.

If a person has not practised meditation prior to the instruction about *Brahman*, in his case the notions of the contrary are removed by the practice of *Brahman*, i.e., by pondering over the truth of the identity between *Brahman* and the self. The wise call that to be the practice of *Brahman* which consists of thinking about *Brahman*, hearing about *Brahman*, and speaking about *Brahman*. The *śruti* enjoins that a *brāhmaṇa* who is a hero in the realm of the spirit should know *Brahman* and gain steadiness in that knowledge, and

that he should not fritter away his energy in directing his thoughts to other things. His whole attention must centre round the self. Lord Kṛṣṇa strikes the same note when he says in the *Gītā*: "Those people who think of me and meditate on me without interruption, to them who are steadfast I convey what they lack and preserve what they already have." Both scripture, and the traditional code enjoin the constant one-pointedness of the intellect in the self so that the conceptions of the contrary may cease. Those are conceptions of the contrary which, obscuring the real nature of things, project the cognition of their contraries. When a youth regards his parent as his foe, he is harbouring in his bosom the conception of what is contrary to truth. The ultimate truth is that the self is not the body and that the world is an appearance. The conception of the contrary of this truth is that the body is the self and that the world is absolutely real. Since this conception is destroyed only by the conception of the truth, the distinction of the self from the body and the illusoriness of the world must be constantly meditated upon.

It may be asked whether there is not any rule to be observed in conceiving the nature of the self as distinct from the body and contemplating the illusoriness of the world, as there is in chanting of spells or meditation on the visible image. The reply is that there is no rule whatever in regard to contemplating the real, for this contemplation has a visible fruit. Chanting of spells and meditation on an image have for their fruit some unseen results. Hence, they are governed by rules and regulations. But *Brahman*-knowledge is not a hypothetical fruit like the attainment of heaven. It is, like the activity of eating, conditioned by no hard and

fast rule. A man who is hungry does not care for conventions. He is not bound by rules as the man who chants the spells is. The only aim of his endeavour is to appease his appetite. He may eat or not eat; or he may indulge himself in some other activity; but all the same his only object in view is to satisfy his hunger. Chanting of spells is not like the activity of eating. Chanting is governed by rules which, if not observed, lead to obstacles. If the chanting be done in a way quite contrary to the rule, great harm is wrought. Instead of beneficial effects, baneful results are reaped. The conception of the contrary, on the other hand, are, like hunger, the cause of visible misery. To vanquish this misery any means can be employed without any regard as to rules and regulations. The means to the vanquishment of misery was pointed out already. It is the thinking, hearing, and talking of *Brahman*.

Even in the case of steady concentration on *Brahman* there is not the compulsion that the mind is to be quelled, as there is in the case of meditation on visible image, etc. Meditation is defined as the uninterrupted flow of the mind which has for its sphere, the visible image. Here the strict rule is that there should not be vacillation in the mind. Patañjali defines *yoga* as the process of controlling the modifications of the mind. Mind-control is of prime importance in meditation. Meditation is the technique of mind-control. The mind is noted for its feverish activity and propensity for wandering. The shafts of the mind are swifter than even the cyclonic wind and the speed of the light-waves. The mind is often compared to a maddened monkey drunk deep of the intoxicant of desire and roaming in the wilds of sense-objects. Arjuna reflects this idea when he says to Kṛṣṇa, in the *Gītā*: "Verily,

the mind, O Kṛṣṇa, is restless, turbulent, strong, and unyielding; its control, like that of the wind, I consider to be very hard to achieve." Difficult though it be, it is, nevertheless, possible to curb the current of the mind.

The flow of the mental stream can be arrested by constant effort and continued endeavour. Vasiṣṭha in the *yogavāsīṣṭha* says to Rāma that the control of the mind is more difficult to achieve than emptying the ocean, unearthing the mighty Sumeru, or extinguishing a raging conflagration. The achievement of this difficult feat, namely the control of the mind is the *raison d'être* of meditation. In the contemplation of *Brahman*, however, there is nothing to be compelled, no force whatever. Not only is there no restriction with regard to thinking, talking, etc., of *Brahman*; a raw mind is struck with wonder at the variety of ways in which the nature of *Brahman* has been declared in stories and scriptures. But from the path, stories do not deflect him, whose mind has culminated in the cognition "The self alone is intelligence; the world is illusory." The roots of knowledge which support him are too firm to allow him to be tossed by every passing gust of desire. But strong as the roots are, the tree is uprooted by the stronger storm. The operations of agriculture, merchandise, menial service, etc., activity in the spheres of poesy and logic and such other occupations distract the mind from contemplation; for these avocations do not remind one of the truth. They tend more to obscure the real than reveal it. Activities like eating, etc., do not, however, impede the progress of the man who contemplates the self. They do not totally throw the self into the limbo of oblivion. They are not incompatible with the contemplation

of the self. Even if the flow of contemplation be interrupted for a moment, subsequently it regains its former swiftness.

There is nothing very harmful in the bare forgetting of the truth for a while. The acme of misery lies in the conceptions of the contrary. Though the activities like eating, etc., may be the cause of forgetting the truth for a time, they do not project the contrary notions; and as the memory of the truth follows immediately after the cessation of such activities, there is no lease of life given to the notions of the contrary to protrude themselves. But indulgence in logic, etc., are not on a par with activities like eating, etc. For the man who practises the other arts there is no need for remembering the truth. Since poesy, etc., are contrary to the knowledge of the truth, they subvert what is true and distract their votary from the path of true knowledge. "Know that one self alone; leave off all other speech; it is the bound of immortality,"¹⁰ declares a scriptural text. "Do not ponder over many words. It is only the exhaustion of speech."¹¹ Distracted attention would lead one nowhere. All activities must cease if *Brahman*-knowledge is to be made unshakable. Learning of scriptures other than the Vedāntas does not help the seeker after truth. On the contrary, it pulls him down, serving only as a dead-weight. Food, etc., cannot be given up, because without them the *jīva* cannot live. This is not the case with non-Vedāntic study. Such study lures the aspirant very easily away from *Brahman*-knowledge. The contention that house-holder saints like Janaka were knowers of *Brahman*, though engaged in the management of worldly affairs, is not relevant. They had attained perfection in *Brahman*-knowledge.

Like the rock of ages, they stood firm and fixed in the knowledge of the self; and no allurements would be powerful enough to draw them away from their post. But those who are only on the way to perfection should not expose themselves to this hazard. A growing plant requires a fencing, whereas a stately tree can rely on its own resources.

7. *Knowers of Brahman and World Affairs*

The knowers of *Brahman* engage themselves in the affairs of the world, knowing fully well that the world is illusory. Their action is caused by their past deeds which have begun to bear fruit. Unconcerned, they do what *prārabdha* goads them to do. Though in the world, they are not of the world. Holding their heads in solitude, they delegate their hands to society. They are not affected by the effects of their deeds. Their deeds may even appear to be wrong and questionable. They may appear to act in undesirable ways. But their actions are not intended by them; and they are in no way hindered by their occupations. *Karma* is imperious in its course. There is none who can oppose its current. Those who know that *prārabdha* can be destroyed only by enjoying its effects submit to it without being scorched by its heat. The enlightened and the ignorant alike have to reap the consequences of their *prārabdha*. Both have to walk in a path strewn with thorns. But while the enlightened walk with shoes on, the ignorant have no such protection to enable them to pass unhurt. The vulgar are led astray by their whimsical moods, whereas the wise regard themselves as witness and not victims of their moods. Two travellers wend their way on the same road; and both of them are equally fatigued. One of

them knows that the destination is near, and so he quickens his pace in the hope of reaching it soon. But the other is heavy of heart, and not knowing that his place of rest is nigh, he plods on with dragging steps.

The person who has well intuited the self is not troubled by the notions of the contrary. The *Bṛhad-āraṇyaka* text speaks of such a person when it says, 'Desiring what and for whose desire should he suffer along with the body.' Where there is the cognition of the illusoriness of the world, there is no room for the distinction of the subject who desires and the object of desire. When the utter bankruptcy of the world is realized, the trinkets of the world cease to bear any fascination for man. And if there be no subject to desire and no object to be desired, all misery comes to an end, like the lamp unfed by oil. A man who knows the truth about the *fata morgana* is not bewildered by it. The exquisite world of fancy created by the magician does not lure those who know it to be such. Without being deceived by it, they cast a smile at its exquisiteness and unreality. Similarly the man who understands through inquiry the adventitious and apparent character of the beauties of the world does not set any value on them. Beholding their defects, he desires to relinquish them. That the world is full of misery is patent on its very face. There is misery in gathering the objects of the world; there is misery in preserving them. When they perish there is misery again. The world is miserable through and through. The things which we regard as the most beautiful in the world are not really beautiful. Even the most ravishing woman in the world is no more than a mass of flesh and a bundle of bones. Defects and ugliness of the things of the world such as these are clearly indicated in the scriptures. A man

who constantly ruminates over them can never be deluded. He is not caught in the meshes of *māyā*; and there is no misery for him. If there be a discernment of the defects of the worldly objects, there cannot arise any desire to enjoy them. A person, though harassed by hunger, does not long to eat poisoned food. If even the person who is extremely hungry should shun poison, how could a man who is satiated with sweet dishes ever think of taking it? How could one who has drunk deep the nectar of *Brahman*-knowledge, long for a sip of hemlock from the fatal cup of the world?

If at any time the *jñānin* should desire for sense-enjoyments owing to the presence of *prārabdha*, he would not enjoy them with any satisfaction or ardour. He would approach them with supreme discontent; and his relish is comparable to that derived from having to eat the faeces. A householder saint who has faith in the teaching of scripture and in the words of the preceptor, though experiencing the objects of the world, does not attach himself to them. He feels sorry that his *karma* has not yet come to an end, and goes about his business without any liking for it. The discomfort which the *jñānin* feels is not a burning born of *samsāra*; on the contrary, it is the expression of his non-attachement, of his aversion for the objects of the world. The *sāmsārika* heat is the product of illusory cognition. Ignorance is the source of the misery of transmigration. The *jñānin* who has transcended nescience is not affected by the ruffle of the empirical life. If he be discomforted at any time, it is due to his dislike for the objects of sense. That he is not in tune with the enjoyment of the world is patent from the fact that he gets disgusted with it very soon. Desires do not multiply in his case. Desire is

like a burnt seed, impotent to produce the sprout. In the case of the ignorant, desires do not die with enjoyment. Fulfilled desires bring in fresh ones. Like fire fed by fuel, they grow from more to more. But enjoyment which is combined with discernment does not breed fresh desires. The sun of knowledge scorches the seed of desire, making it ineffectual to sprout forth and yield fresh fruits. A thief does not deceive a friend who knows him to be a thief. The *jñānin* knows the treachery of desire, and he is not victimised by them. He becomes the master of desires, and not their slave. His mind which is controlled by contemplation does not run after the objects of sense. A modicum of sense-enjoyment seems mountain-like to him. A prince who is freed from captivity is satisfied with a village given to him. But a king who is not pestered by foes casts his greedy eyes on neighbouring principalities. The *jñānin* is a man who is free from the prison-house of the world. Even an insignificant portion of worldly enjoyment suffices to satiate him.

8. *Prārabdha: Three Kinds*

“Now, if the enlightened see only defects in the objects of the world, how could *prārabdha* evoke in them desire for enjoyment?” The reply to this will be clear when we realize that *prārabdha* is of three kinds: (1) that which generates desire, (2) that which yields enjoyments, even though not desired, and (3) that which originates enjoyment due to the desire of another.

The pilferer, the glutton, and the adulterer know that their respective acts would only lead to disaster. But driven by the force of the *prārabdha* which generates desire, they indulge in activities which undermine them.

Such deeds cannot be prevented even by the Lord. For the Lord himself has declared in the *Gītā*: "Even a man with knowledge acts in accordance with his nature; the creatures pursue nature; what can restraint do?"¹² All men act according to the impressions of their past deeds, both good and bad. Even the Lord does not prevent the course of *prakṛti*. The *prārabdha* will end only when its force is spent. If there be any other way by which it can be discarded, then personalities like Nala, Rāma, and Yudhiṣṭhira would not have subjected themselves to hazards and hardships. Nor is non-intervention on the part of the Lord incompatible with his omnipotence; for even the determinate nature of *prārabdha* is a necessary element in the scheme of the Lord.

NOTES

8. *Gītā*, ix, 22.
9. *Ibid.*, iv, 34.
10. *Muṇḍakoṇiṣad*, II, ii, 5.
11. *Bṛhadāraṇyakōṇiṣad*, IV, iv, 21.
12. *Gītā*, iii, 33.

(to be continued)

BHAKTI IN ADVAITA

*T.P. Ramachandran**

1. *The Two Levels of Bhakti*

Common religion represents the transition from the love of the world to the love of God. It manifests itself at just the stage when man has developed sufficient dispassion (*vairāgya*) towards the world to make him turn to God but not enough to make God the sole object of his love. Naturally, common religion is a compromise between God-love and world-love. One begins to love God because of frustrations in worldly love. But, since the habit of running after worldly ends is deep-seated by force of long practice, God is sought only for help in worldly pursuits. One performs a *yāga* or a *pūjā*, for example, for getting wealth or progeny or plentiful rain. To invoke God even for such a purpose as to advance knowledge or for guidance in a moral situation partakes of common religion.

The love of God as a means to an end is called *aparā* (lower) *bhakti*. It is also called *vaidhi bhakti* because it follows certain rules and regulations (*vidhis*)

*Professor, Radhakrishnan Institute for Advanced Study in Philosophy, University of Madras, Madras-5.

according to the specific results desired. Such *bhakti* may take many forms like prayer, ritualistic worship, ceremony, and festival. The distinguishing features of this level of *bhakti* are these. (1) The devotee requires something concrete to fix his mind on as representative of God. Representative worship takes two forms. God may be worshipped in a symbol (*pratīka*), mostly an object of nature, like the sun, the moon, the sea, etc. The devotee worships God either as manifested in or as governing these objects. Or God may be worshipped in some suitable image (*pratimā*), i.e. an idol or a picture constructed by man. (2) As God is not his only beloved object, the devotee is not lost in constant contemplation of God. He is engaged in worship only at specific periods, which shows that it is not spontaneous.

Bhakti as commonly practised tends to perpetuate *saṁsāra*. Desire necessitates the enjoyment of the results desired, and enjoyment in turn causes fresh desire. Since enjoyment requires bodily existence, we are caught in an endless succession of births. Common religion, like common ethics, thus makes for bondage, though worship with a personal motive is better than a life of utter Godlessness. It leads to *abhyudaya*, rise in the scale of *saṁsāra*. Those who worship God with personal motives, like those who do meritorious deeds, go to *pitṛloka* at death, and having exhausted the fruits of their worship, return to the earth. Hence common religion is a stage of discipline to be transcended.

The task of all Vedānta is to render *bhakti* a means to *mokṣa*. Since desire for worldly goods is the cause of bondage, Vedānta teaches us to renounce all thought of reward in worshipping God. The love of God ought to be an end in itself. In fact, since it is our dissatisfac-

tion with the finite that makes us turn to God, the logical culmination of that dissatisfaction is the complete renunciation of worldly desires and the adoption of God as the sole object of our love. Further, love is the force which seeks integration with the loved object. Hence love of God as a means of satisfying worldly desires is not true love. That alone is genuine love of God which seeks nothing but union with him. Extraneous motives ought not to find any place in the love of God. Such disinterested love of God makes for release from *samsāra*; for God is infinite, and to realize God is to be free from finitude. The motive of *bhakti* determines its fruit. In the *Bhagavad-gītā* (IV, 11) the Lord says that howsoever men approach him, even so does he reward them. Śrī Śaṅkara explains the idea in accordance with the classification of devotees given in *śloka* VII, 16 of the *Gītā*. The Lord rewards those devotees who seek selfish ends by securing to them those ends; he rewards the unselfish who do their prescribed duties and seek for *mokṣa* by granting them knowledge (the means to *mokṣa*); he rewards men of knowledge who have renounced the world and seek for *mokṣa* by granting them *mokṣa*; similarly he rewards men in distress by relieving them from distress.¹ As God rewards us in the way we seek him, it is important that in order to realize God, we must worship him solely for the sake of that realization.

The lower *bhakti* rests on the supposition that God is an entity apart from our selves. It is the *bhakti* of those who are ignorant of the true nature of the Lord, namely as non-different from our true self. The basis of the higher (*parā*) *bhakti* is the conviction that God is no other than our true self. It is the *bhakti* of the enlightened man (*jñānī*), who looks upon God as his

very self. The *Bhagavad-gītā śloka* VII, 16 mentions four classes of devotees — the man in distress (*ārta*), the man who seeks knowledge of the real nature of the Lord (*jijñāsu*), the man who seeks wealth (*arthārthī*), and the wise man (*jñānī*), i.e. he who knows the real nature of the Lord. Among these, it is only the *jñānī* who can worship God without extraneous motives and for the sole object of realizing God. It is well known that the self is the only object of intrinsic love. So when God is known as identical with the self, the devotee loves nothing but God. For this reason the *bhakti* practised by the *jñānī* is rated by the Lord of the *Gītā* as the most excellent one (ślokas VII, 17 and 18).² It alone is *parā bhakti*. The *bhakti* of the other three types mentioned above belong to the lower (*aparā*) level.

By the knowledge of *Īsvara* as the real self what is meant here is only an intellectual conviction as regards this truth. If the non-difference of soul and God were to become a direct experience, then there would be no more need for *bhakti* (though it may in some cases continue to be practised by force of old habit). But here we refer to *bhakti* as a *sādhana*, as a means to such experience. Hence the knowledge that informs the *parā bhakti* is the mediate knowledge of the non-difference of soul and God.

The transition from the lower form of *bhakti* to the higher takes place in an organic manner. The realization of our limitations and our inability to achieve our worldly ends is the beginning of common religion, which is marked by a sense of dependence on the infinite, God. God, at this stage, is looked upon as an outside entity. Though the worship of God as a means

of satisfying our personal ends is not the right attitude to take towards God, it has its usefulness; for once the love of God gains a foothold on the mind, no matter what the motive that prompts it, it has a way of spreading itself out and conquering the mind. According to the *bhramara-kṛtā-nyāya*, the mind takes the colour of that on which it thinks constantly. Thus, gradually it becomes a settled habit with us to turn to God at every stage in our life for our private ends. Then the feeling of dependence may steadily grow into a consuming passion for God. At this stage the presence of God begins to be felt within. He is no longer an outside agent, but the self of our self. He guides from within as he used to inspire us from without. The notion of the self as the ego, which is born of attachment to the body, wears out by now, and the *bhakta* is firmly convinced that he is only an instrument in the hands of God, who rules from within. *Bhakti* becomes more intense when God is felt within. Gradually, with the growing intensity of *bhakti*, the conviction of the inwardness of God ripens into that of identity with him. God not merely rules from within the self, but *is* the true self. In the initial stages this is a felt conviction. Later it becomes a conscious conviction. When once this conviction has dawned, it in its turn revolutionises the standpoint of *bhakti* and makes it the sole concern of the devotee.

When the devotee is firmly convinced that the self, which is the object of intrinsic love, is no other than God, self-love is merged in God-love, and God comes to be loved for his own sake. *Bhakti* enters a new phase. The motives which initiated *bhakti* are no longer present. God becomes the object of intrinsic love. The position is exactly the reverse of what

obtained in the beginning. Instead of God being loved for the sake of something else, everything else becomes lovable only in so far as it helps to realize God. This is *parā bhakti*, or higher devotion. Being directly concerned with *mokṣa*, it is called *mukhya bhakti*. Since *aparā bhakti* has the value of leading to *parā bhakti* and is thereby indirectly connected with *mokṣa*, it is called *gaunī bhakti*.

Although *bhakti* by its own inner urge evolves into its higher form, other factors might contribute to its metamorphosis. (1) An intensification of the spirit of *vairāgya*: dispassion for the world is the beginning of love for God. But in the initial stage dispassion is not such as to make man turn completely away from world. When, through further frustration in the pursuit of earthly goods, the spirit of dispassion becomes more intense, the distracting influence of the world on *bhakti* might be obviated. (2) *Vairāgya* is a negative attitude. Side by side with aversion for worldly goods one develops also the desire for *mokṣa* (*mumukṣutva*). While, thus, on the one hand, one is weaned away from the world, one is also, on the other, attracted towards God. (3) The knowledge that the self is not the ego but God himself, apart from being a product of *bhakti*, might also be inculcated through study and reflection. (4) The example of great saints in history as well as in scripture might inspire one to all-sacrificing love for God.

Parā bhakti is spontaneous and ineffable and is so intense that it breaks through the rigidities of conventions and rules. It is *ananya* (exclusive) *bhakti* or *ekānta* (one-pointed) *bhakti*. The devotee is aware of and asks for nothing but God. In fact this is the only real love

of God (*mukhya bhakti*), for it asks for no reward. The term *bhakti-yoga* properly applies to this kind of love. It is the practice of *yoga*, i.e. steady application, in *bhakti*. It is uncontaminated by any sense of egoism. The devotee is so much lost in God that he is practically numb to anything that goes on around him. Such was the love of the gopīs for Śrī Kṛṣṇa. It is not manifested at set periods, but takes lasting possession of the soul.

The path of *parā bhakti* is not quite an easy one in the early stages. It encounters obstacles in the shape of old *saṃskāras* which reassert themselves. In spite of being convinced that the ego is non-real and that God is the true self and sole end of man, egoistic tendencies (*durita*), like the seeking of sense pleasures, persist and prevent the devotee from concentrating on God. Unless these tendencies are removed (*durita kṣaya*), the mind will not rest on God without straying in other directions. *Parā bhakti* itself is a purifier. But until it gains a foothold on the mind, one has to practise *niṣkāma karma* along with *bhakti* in order to remove these tendencies. As the Lord says in the *Gītā*, it is only those whose sins have come to an end through the performance of pure deeds that can worship him with a firm resolve.³

2. *The Place of Bhakti-yoga in Advaita*

Parā bhakti, which is *bhakti-yoga*, is free from selfish desire; it is *niṣkāma bhakti*. Hence it leads to *mokṣa*. The question follows, whether it leads to *mokṣa* directly or indirectly. The answer to this depends on the conception of *mokṣa*. Theistic schools of Vedānta regard the attainment of nearness to God in *Brahmaloka* as *mokṣa*. *Bhakti-yoga* leads to this goal directly.

The object of devotion is Īsvara. Hence the attainment of Īsvara is the natural consummation of *bhakti-yoga*.

According to Advaita, the attainment of *Brahmaloka* is not final release. It is release only in a relative sense. Liberation in the real sense of the term is the realization of the non-dual Brahman. The obstacle to such realization is *avidyā*. And *avidyā* can be destroyed only by *jñāna*, or direct experience of the non-dual Brahman. Hence *jñāna* alone is the direct means to *mokṣa*. *Bhakti* cannot directly lead to the realization of the non-dual Brahman, as it is not the antidote to *avidyā*. Like *karma*, *bhakti* is born out of and sustained by the sense of distinction. *Bhakti* requires the sense of distinction between the soul and God, although its inner urge is towards identity with God. The path of *bhakti* can lead to *mokṣa* of the Advaita conception only indirectly, i.e. through the path of *jñāna*.

There is no doubt that *bhakti-yoga* in its natural course leads to *Brahmaloka* as its independent objective result. But if the practice of *bhakti-yoga* is followed up by the practice of *jñāna-yoga* during the same lifetime, *bhakti-yoga* will become indirectly useful to the realization of the non-dual Brahman instead of leading to *Brahmaloka*.

Bhakti-yoga, like *karma-yoga* and *upāsana*, produces results in two directions. The objective result of *bhakti-yoga* is the attainment of *Brahmaloka*. The practice of disinterested *bhakti*, however, leaves also certain effects on the subject. It produces in the devotee two qualities which are not only useful but essential requirements for *jñāna-yoga*, namely purity of the mind (*citta-suddhi*) and its concentration (*citta-aikāgrya*).

One cannot take to *jñāna-yoga*, much less can one attain success in it, without the mind being pure and steady.

The purification of the mind may be secured either through the removal of selfish, i.e. anti-social, tendencies (*durita-kṣaya*) or through the cultivation of imaginative sympathy, i.e. love for all beings even while they are regarded in our ignorance as distinct and different from our own selves. *Karma-yoga* purifies the mind in the former way. But *bhakti-yoga* secures the same end in the latter way. In this respect it resembles *upāsana*.

One cannot truly love God without at the same time loving all beings; for, as the Lord says in the *Gītā* (X,39), there is no being, whether moving or un-moving, that can exist without him. Therefore the enlightened devotee, who is the superior type, who is endowed with the (mediate) knowledge of the Supreme Reality, worships God with the thought that God is the source of the whole world.¹ Even the ordinary, unenlightened, desire-filled devotion to God (*aparā bhakti*) has a chastening influence on the mind of the devotee in that the love of God tends to curb evil tendencies and initiate the disposition for *mokṣa*.² How much more is *bhakti* a purifier when it is free from worldly desire (such desirelessness resulting from dispassion towards the world)³ and accompanied by the knowledge that the Lord is the source of the whole world?⁴ Therefore it is declared that absence of enmity for any of the creatures (*nirvairah sarvabhūteṣu*) — even though these might have done great harm to him — is one of the important virtues of the best of devotees who regards God as the highest goal to be reached.⁵

In addition to effecting mental purification, *bhakti* produces the habit of mental concentration also. Here also it resembles *upāsana*, and in this respect both *bhakti* and *upāsana* differ from *karma*, which is not intended to produce this effect. The importance of fixing the mind exclusively on the Lord is stressed in the *Bhagavad-gītā* passage XII, 8. When the *bhakta* acquires the knowledge of the infinite glory and power of the Lord, he becomes endowed with concentration (*avikampena yogena*) as referred to in the *Gītā* passage X, 7. With this *bhakti* rises to the higher level. The enlightened devotees, firm in the knowledge that the Lord is the Supreme Reality and the source of all, worship him with the mind fixed on the Supreme Reality (*bhāvasamanvitāḥ*), as declared in passage X, 8 of the *Bhagavad-gītā*.⁹ The presence of concentration in the higher devotion practised by the enlightened (*ananyamanasāḥ*) is referred to also in passage IX, 13 of the *Gītā*. As the Lord is the only object of love, the devotee has no attachment for anything else (*saṅgavar-jitāḥ*).¹⁰

The habit of one-pointed devotion to the personal God proves a great asset when one practises the difficult discipline of *jñāna-yoga*. The three constituents of *jñāna-yoga* are *śravaṇa*, *manana*, and *nididhyāsana*. In spite of being convinced of the truth of non-duality through *śravaṇa* and *manana*, the dualistic tendencies of the mind, which are inimical to the non-dual experience (*viparīta bhāvanā*), may unconsciously reassert themselves. *Nididhyāsana* is meant to overcome these tendencies. Hence it has two aspects. Negatively, the mind must be dissociated from thoughts of objects other than Brahman, like the body and so forth. Positively, the mind must be put through a procession

of like thoughts referring to the secondless Brahman. (*vi-jātiya-dehādi-pratyaya-rahita-advitiya-vastu-sajātiya-pratyaya-pravāhaḥ nididhyāsanam*).¹¹ Such a process is indeed very difficult. It is the highest form of meditation. Hence it presupposes a great deal of training in the art of contemplation. *Bhakti-yoga* is an excellent preparation for *nididhyāsana*.

Although *bhakti* resembles *upāsana* in the cultivation of purity and concentration, it has an advantage over the latter in respect of these. In *bhakti* one acquires these qualifications in a spontaneous and sweet manner without having to undergo the effort involved in *upāsana*. This explains why the popularity of *bhakti* is wider than that of the path of meditation as such.

We have said that while the disinterested practice of *bhakti* tends to lead one ultimately to *Brahmalokā*, its immediate effects on the votary are to purify the mind and make it one-pointed. If these immediate subjective effects of *bhakti* are exploited in favour of *jñāna-yoga*, one may realize by virtue of such preparation the non-dual Brahman either in the same life or in a more favourable future life¹² instead of going to *Brahmaloka* at death. Hence in the Advaita scheme of discipline *bhakti* has no independent status; it is to be practised as a means to *jñāna*, which alone can lead to real release. *Bhakti-yoga*, therefore, is a part of the preliminary training like *karma-yoga* and *upāsana*. It should be followed up by hearing (*śravaṇa*), reflection (*manana*), and meditation (*nididhyāsana*), which constitute *jñāna-yoga*.

Bhakti yoga prepares the ground for *jñāna-yoga*. This is the general contribution of *bhakti* to Advaita

discipline. In addition to this, however, *bhakti-yoga* has the special quality of entering into the framework of *jñāna-yoga*. *Bhakti-yoga* is capable of transforming itself into *nididhyāsana*. There is no doubt that the practice of *bhakti* presupposes the bringing down of the concept of Nirguṇa Brahman to the concept of Īsvara. Attributes and names and forms are superimposed on Brahman for the purpose. Thus Īsvara, or Brahman clothed in personal forms, is the object of *bhakti*. But these forms are intended just to enable the devotee to direct his love on the infinite and formless. Hence, the greater the intimacy that the devotee develops with the infinite, the less does he need the aid of the forms. Naturally, therefore, when *bhakti* becomes more and more intense, the forms put on Brahman, so to say gradually *melt* away, that is they drop off from the attention of the *bhakta* until the *bhakta* can do with the minimum of them. The worship of God the manifest (Īsvara) evolves into the worship of God the unmanifest, the Imperishable (Akṣara), in the words of the *Gītā* (XII, 3). The line that divides the worship of the Akṣara from *nididhyāsana* is very thin. The transition from the highest reach of *bhakti* to the contemplation of the truth of non-duality is imperceptible and smooth. *Nididhyāsana*, or *buddhi-yoga*, is the natural culmination of *bhakti-yoga*.¹³

Thus *bhakti-yoga* not only prepares the ground for *jñāna-yoga*, but also holds the possibility of merging into *jñāna-yoga* at the stage of *nididhyāsana*. The highest level of *bhakti* may thus be identified with *nididhyāsana*, or *dhyāna*, in which state one may experience the Ātman.¹⁴ The *Bhagavad-gītā* passages XII, 3 and 4, describe the worship of Akṣara Brahman, and we hardly find any difference between worship of this

order and *nididhyāsana*. Śrī Śaṅkara's commentary on these two slokas lends support to the identification of the worship of the Akṣara with *nididhyāsana*. In the worship referred to the devotees contemplate the Imperishable (Akṣara) everywhere (*parisamantāt upāsate*) and they are one with the Lord himself (*bhagavat-svarūpāṇām satām*).¹⁵ This identification is evident also in the encomium paid to the worshippers of the Akṣara in the *Bhagavad-gītā* passage XII, 20. Śrī Śaṅkara explains their devotion as consisting in the knowledge of the Supreme Reality (*paramārtha-jñāna-lakṣaṇām bhaktim*).¹⁶ Thus, if the aspirant does not stop with *bhakti-yoga*, but, pursuing the path of Advaita, follows it up with *śravaṇa* and *manana*, *bhakti-yoga* will evolve into *nididhyāsana* and, by removing distractions, enable the knowledge derived from the *sāstras* to fructify into immediate experience, which is release. The *Bhagavad-gītā* passage XI, 54 bears testimony to this.¹⁷

We have said that if *bhakti-yoga* is followed up by *jñāna-yoga*, there is the possibility of sudden realization of the non-dual Brahman (*sadyo-mukti*). This may result even during the same life or, if there is any obstacle thereto, in a more favourable future life. If, however, *bhakti-yoga* is not followed up by *jñāna-yoga* within the same lifetime, at the time of death, as the objective fruit of *bhakti-yoga*, one will attain to *Brahmaloka*.

Even as leading to *Brahmaloka*, *bhakti-yoga* must be considered helpful to the attainment of final release; for those who are not qualified for the path of *jñāna* while on earth become capable of it on attaining to *Brahmaloka*. Those who reach *Brahmaloka* become

equal to God. Since they attain lordly powers except the power to create, the path of *jñāna* is easy in their case. Thus attaining *jñāna* without difficulty,¹⁸ they also realize the Nirguṇa Brahman at the time of the retraction of the world.¹⁹ This is *krama-mukti*, liberation by stages. Thus, in any case, *bhakti-yoga* leads to *mokṣa* not directly, but through *jñāna-yoga*.

The conception of *krama-mukti* reflects the true spirit of Advaita as a universal religion. Although Advaita is emphatic on the position that the goal of *mokṣa* is nothing short of the realization of Ātman, or Brahman, and that *jñāna* alone leads to it, it adopts a greatly sympathetic and catholic attitude with regard to other conceptions of the goal and the way. It recognizes and accepts them as stages leading to the highest ideal of *Brahmānubhava*. It does not, therefore, look down on any mode of discipline, be it even the crudest form of spirit worship. It realizes that, after all, the conception that one has of reality and the kind of discipline to which one resorts for its attainment is commensurate with one's capacity. It recognizes *adhikārabheda*, differences in qualification in the aspirants. Consequently, it acknowledges *mokṣa* of a relative kind as leading to *mokṣa* in the absolute sense.

Finally, a word has to be said about the relative statuses of *karma* and *bhakti* in Advaita. *Bhakti* is nearer to *jñāna* than *karma* is. There is not that anti-thesis between *bhakti* and *jñāna* as between *karma* and *jñāna*. Both *karma* and *bhakti* presuppose distinction. But *bhakti* by its very nature aims at getting beyond distinction. Unlike this there is nothing within the content of *karma* which seeks to rise beyond distinction. The transition from *bhakti* to *jñāna* is hardly discerni-

ble. But there is a clear line of transition from *karma* to *jñāna*. The transition is one of displacement of *karma* by *jñāna*. We may therefore say that in the scheme of graded discipline conceived by Advaita teachers for the evolution of the aspirant *bhakti* and *upāsana* together come midway between *karma* and *jñāna*.

NOTES

1. ...*ye phalārthinaḥ tān phala-pradānena, ye yathokta-kāriṇaḥ tu aphalārthinaḥ mumukṣavaśca tān jñāna-pradānena, ye jñāninaḥ san-nyāsinaḥ mumukṣavaśca tān mokṣapradānena, tathā ārtān ārti-haraṇena, ityevaṃ yathā prapadyante ye tān tathaiṃ bhajāmi...*: *BhGB*, IV, 11.

2. *teṣāṃ caturṇāṃ madhye jñāni tattvavit tattvavittvāt nityayuk-
taḥ bhavati ekabhaktiśca anyasya bhajanīyasya adarśanāt, ataḥ saḥ
ekabhaktiḥ...viśeṣaṃ ādhikyam āpadyate atiricyata...priyaḥ hi yasmāt
aham ātmā jñāninaḥ, ataḥ tasyāham atyartham priyaḥ prasiddham hi
loke ātmā priyaḥ bhavati. tasmāt jñāninaḥ ātmatvāt vāsudevaḥ
priyaḥ bhavati... sa ca jñāni mama vāsudevasya ātmaiveti mamātyar-
tham priyaḥ*: *BhGB*, VII, 17.

*āsthitaḥ ārodhum pravṛttaḥ saḥ jñāni hi yasmāt ahameva bhagavān
vāsudevaḥ nānyaḥ asmi ityevaṃ yuktātmā samāhita-cittaḥ saṃ mēmeva
param brahma gantavyam anuttamāṃ gatim gantum pravṛttaḥ...*:
BhGB, VII, 18.

3. *BhG*, VII, 28.

4. *BhG*, X, 8.

5. *vide BhG*, IX, 30-2.

6. *vide BhG*, IX, 33.

7. *vide BhG*, X, 8.

8. *BhG*, XI, 55, and Śrī Śaṅkara's commentary thereon.

9. *vide* Śrī Śaṅkara's commentary on this: *bhāvasamanvitaḥ—
bhāvaḥ bhāvanā paramārtha-tattvābhiniवेशḥ tena samanvitāḥ saṃyutāḥ
ityarthaḥ*.

10. *BhG*, XI, 55.

11. Sadānanda, *Vedāntasāra* (M. Hiriyanna's edn), p. 13.

12. *vide BhG, VII, 19, and Śrī Śaṅkara's commentary thereon.*

13. *vide BhG, X, 10. ~*

14. *...enam ātmānam nirasta-samasta-prapañcam avyaktam samrūdhanā-kāle paśyanti yoginaḥ. samrūdhanam ca bhakti-dhyāna-praṇidhānādyanuṣṭhānam: BSB, III, 2, 24.*

cf. Vivekacūḍmaṇi, vv. 31-2.

15. *BhGB, XII, 3-4.*

16. *BhGB, XII, 20.*

17. *vide Śrī Śaṅkara's commentary on this passage :...sarvairapi karaṇaiḥ vāsudevādanyat na upalabhyate...tayā bhaktyā... jñātum śāstrataḥ, na kevalam jñātum śāstrataḥ draṣṭum ca sūkṣātkartum tattvena tattvataḥ, praveṣṭum ca mokṣam ca gantum ...*

18. *teṣāṃ ca svayaṃ-pratibhāta-vedatvāt : BSB, I, 3, 26.*

19. *samyagdarśana-vidhvasta-tamasūṃ tu nitya-siddha-niroḍha-parāyaṇānāṃ siddhaiva anāvṛttiḥ. tadāśrayaṇenaiva hi saguṇa-saraṇānāṃ api anāvṛtṭisiddhiḥ iti : BSB, IV, 4, 22.*

A NOTE ON THE ATTAINMENT OF MUKTI

वेदान्त विज्ञानसुनिश्चितार्थाः

सन्यासयोगाद्यतयः शुद्धसत्त्वाः ।

ते ब्रह्मलोकेषु परान्तकाले

परामृताः परिमुच्यन्ति सर्वे ॥

Those who have pure mind and who have become ascetics then, and who pursue the Vedāntic study, etc., by renouncing everything, ascertain the nature of the Self by the knowledge arising from the *Upaniṣads*. (And because the knowledge is not ripened), they remain in the world of Hiraṇyagarbha and, after having got the ripened knowledge, they attain liberation (*mukti*).

[The *Muṇḍakopaniṣad*, III. ii. 6; cf. the *Saṅkṣepa-sārīraka* of Sarvajñātman, III, 362]

THE FOUR INDISPENSABLE
QUALIFICATIONS*

Śrī Śaṅkara Bhagavatpāda

[1]

ब्रह्मात्मैकत्वविज्ञानं सन्तः प्राहुः प्रयोजनम् ।
येन निःशेषसंसारबन्धात्सद्यः प्रमुच्यते ॥

The realization of the unity of Ātman and Brahman is, according to the wise, the purpose of knowledge. Through this realization, one gets liberated from all the bonds of *samsāra* at once.

[2]

प्रयोजनं संप्रवृत्तेः कारणं फललक्षणम् ।
प्रयोजनमनुद्दिश्य न मन्दोऽपि प्रवर्तते ॥

Pravṛtti or action has its cause in achieving a goal or fruit. Even a dullard does not, indeed, take up any action without the aim of obtaining some fruit.

*An extract (vv. 10 ff.) from the *Sarva-siddhānta-sāra-saṅgraha* of Śrī Śaṅkara Bhagavatpāda. Free rendering by V.K.S.N. Raghavan.

[3]

साधनचतुष्टयसंपत्तिर्यस्यास्ति धीमतः पंसः ।
तस्यैवैतत्फलसिद्धिर्नान्यस्य किञ्चिदूनस्य ॥

Only a wise man equipped with all the four indispensable qualifications (*sādhana-catustaya*) achieves this fruit (the realization of the unity of Ātman and Brahman). But one who is lacking in any one of the four qualifications cannot achieve the fruit.

[4]

चत्वारि साधनान्यत्र वदन्ति परमर्षयः ।
मुक्तिर्येषां तु सद्भावे नाभावे सिद्ध्यति ध्रुवम् ॥

The great sages say that there are four indispensable qualifications which are conducive to *mukti*. If these qualifications are lacking, there is no *mukti* at all.

[5]

आद्यं नित्यानित्यवस्तुविवेकः साधनं मतम् ।
इहामुत्रार्थफलभोगविरागो द्वितीयकम् ॥

The first *sādhana* is the discrimination between the eternal and the non-eternal objects; and the second one is the dispassion towards the enjoyment of the fruits of actions, here and hereafter.

[6]

शमादिषट्कसंपत्तिस्तृतीयं साधनं मतम् ।
तुरीयं तु मुमुक्षुत्वं साधनं शास्त्रसंमतम् ॥

The third *sādhana* is the acquisition of the sixfold virtues beginning with *sama* (tranquillity); the fourth *sādhana* is the desire for *mokṣa* as enjoined by scripture (*śāstra*).

[7]

ब्रह्मैव नित्यमन्यत्तु ह्यनित्यमिति वेदनम् ।
सोऽयं नित्यानित्यवस्तुविवेक इति कथ्यते ॥

The discrimination between the eternal and non-eternal objects consists in the cognition of (i) Brahman alone as eternal, and (ii) all else as non-eternal.

[8 - 9]

मृदादिकारणं नित्यं त्रिषु कालेषु दर्शनात् ।
घटाद्यनित्यं तत्कार्यं यतस्तन्नाश ईक्ष्यते ॥
तथैवैतज्जगत्सर्वमनित्यं ब्रह्मकार्यतः ।
तत्कारणं परं ब्रह्म भवेन्नित्यं मृदादिवत् ॥

(To explain:) The cause such as clay, etc. is eternal because its existence is seen in all the three times; but its effect like the pot, etc. is not eternal, for its destruction is seen (by us). Similarly, this whole world is not eternal as it is but the effect of Brahman; but the cause, *viz.* the supreme Brahman alone is eternal like the clay, etc.

Note: The eternality which is attributed to clay in the example is only relative. When compared with pot, pan, etc. produced from it, it is eternal.

[10]

सर्गं वक्तव्यस्य तस्माद्वा एतस्मादित्यपि श्रुतिः ।
सकाशाद्ब्रह्मणस्तस्मादनित्यत्वे न संशयः ॥

Even the *śruti* text, “*tasmādvā etasmād...*” (*Taittirīyopaniṣad*, II, i, 1) says that the creation of this world has Brahman as its cause; and so, there is no doubt about the non-eternality of the world.

[11]

सर्वस्यानित्यत्वे सावयवत्वेन सर्वतःसिद्धे ।
वैकुण्ठादिषु नित्यत्वमतिभ्रम एव मूढबुद्धीनाम् ॥

When once it is established on all accounts that everything which has parts is, indeed, non-eternal, it is but the illusion of the dullards who hold that *vaikunṭha*, etc. are eternal.

[12]

अनित्यत्वं च नित्यत्वमेवं यञ्छ्रुतियुक्तिभिः ।
विवेचनं नित्यानित्यविवेक इति कथ्यते ॥

Thus the enquiry into the eternality and the non-eternality of objects by means of scripture and reason is said to be *nityānityaviveka* (discrimination between the eternal and the non-eternal).

(to be continued)

VIṢṆUPĀDĀDIKEŚĀNTAVARṆANASTOTRA

by

Dr N. Gangadharan

(Contd. from Vol. X, No. 3-4)

ALPHABETICAL INDEX

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it becomes the beak of a parrot that swoops down to have a bite at it. The nose has been made red by the rays of the ear-pendant shining on the pair of ears of Murāri.

Notes: Mura was a demon killed by Kṛṣṇa and Kṛṣṇa is referred to as the enemy of Mura.

[40]

दिक्कालौ वेदयन्तौ जगति मुहुरिमौ संचरन्तौ रवीन्दू
 त्रैलोक्यालोकदीपावभिदधति ययोरेव रूपं मुनीन्द्राः ।
 अस्मानब्जप्रभे ते प्रचुरतरकृपानिर्भरं प्रेक्षमाणे
 पातामाताम्रशुक्लसितरुचिरुचिरे पद्मनेत्रस्य नेत्रे ॥

The two eyes of the lotus-eyed Lord (Viṣṇu) are shining with the rays of red, white and black (colours). They look at the people with extreme compassion. They have the splendour of the lotus. The sages declare that they are really of the form of the Sun and Moon, which two, moving in the world, make us know the direction and time and are the lamps which illumine the three worlds.

[41]

पातात् पातालपातात् पतगपतिगतेभ्रूयुगं मुग्धमध्यं
 येनेषञ्चालितेन स्वपदनियमिताः सासुरा देवसंघाः ।
 नृत्यल्लालाटरङ्गे रजनिकरतनोरर्धखण्डावदाते
 कालव्यालद्वयं वा विलसति समया बालिका मातरं नः ॥

May the pair of eye-brows, bent in the middle, belonging to the Lord who rides the king of birds pro-

tect us from falling into the nether world. The host of gods along with the demons are held in their places by a slight movement of (the pair of eye-brows). Are they the pair of black serpents, the child that sports near the mother on the shining forehead which is like a half of the moon?

Notes: The word *patagapati* denotes Garuda, the vehicle-bird of Lord Viṣṇu.

[42]

लक्ष्माकारालकालिस्फुरदलिकशशाङ्गार्धसंदर्शमोलन्-
 नेत्राम्भोजप्रबोधोत्सुकनिभृततरालीनभृङ्गच्छदाभे ।
 लक्ष्मीनाथस्य लक्ष्मीकृतविबुधगणानङ्गबाणासनार्ध-
 च्छाये नो भूरिभूतिप्रसवकुशलते भ्रूलते पालयेताम् ॥

May the creeper-like eye-brows of the consort of Lakṣmī which are skilful in yielding abundant prosperity and which resemble the half of the bow of the God of love aimed at the host of celestials protect us. They resemble the rows of bees which gently rest awaiting the blossoming of the lotus, namely, the eye which has closed at the sight of the half-moon, namely, the forehead that is shining with the bees on the tresses resembling a mark.

Notes: The reading *apāṅga* in the third line has been changed to *anaṅga* as it makes better sense.

[43]

रूक्षस्मारेक्ष्वापच्युतशरनिकरक्षीणलक्ष्मीकटाक्ष -
 प्रोत्फुल्लत्पद्ममालाविलसितमहितस्फाटिकैशानलिङ्गम् ।
 भूयाद्भूयो विभूत्यै मम भुवनपतेर्भ्रूलताद्वन्द्वमध्याद्-
 उत्थं तत्पुंड्रमूर्ध्वं जनिमरणतमःखण्डनं मण्डनं च ॥

May the vertical mark that rises from the middle of the pair of eye-brows of the Lord of the worlds be again and again for my prosperity and for the destruction of darkness in the form of birth and death. It is the glorious crystalline *liṅga* emblem of Īsāna adorned with the full-blown lotus-garland in the form of the delicate glances of (goddess) Lakṣmī resembling the arrows fallen from the sugarcane bow of angry Smara (God of love).

Notes: The word *Bhuvanapati* denotes Lord Viṣṇu. The word Īsāna denotes Lord Śiva in one of His five forms, namely, Sadyojāta, Tatpuruṣa, Vāmadeva, Īsāna and Aghora.

[44]

पीठीभूतालकान्ते कृतसुकुटमहादेवलिङ्गप्रतिष्ठे
 लालाटे नाट्यरङ्गे विकटतरतटे कैटभारेश्चिराय ।
 प्रोद्घाटयैवात्मतन्द्रीप्रकटपटकुटीं प्रस्फुरन्तीं स्फुटाङ्गं
 पट्वीयं भावनाख्यां चटुलमतिनटी नाटिकां नाटयेन्नः ॥

May our actress, namely, the clever mind, enact for long the drama known as meditation on the dramatic stage of the spacious forehead of the foe of Kaiṭabha. (That stage) has become the base of the *liṅga* form of Mahādeva and of the ends of locks of hair.

Notes: Kaiṭabha and Madhu are the names of demons killed by Lord Viṣṇu. These demons are said to have sprung up from the ear of Lord Viṣṇu while He was asleep.

[45]

मालालीवालिधाम्नः कुवलयकलिता श्रीपतेः कुन्तलाली
 कालिन्द्यारुह्य मूर्ध्नो गलति हरशिरः स्वर्धुनीस्पर्धया नु ।
 राहुर्वा याति वक्रं सकलशशिकलाभ्रान्तिलोलान्तरात्मा
 लोकैरालोक्यते या प्रदिशतु सकलैः साखिलं मङ्गलं नः ॥

May the tresses of hair of consort of Śrī adorned by the blue water-lily resembling a garland of bees and a resting place of bees confer all auspiciousness on us. Is it the Kālindī that ascends and falls from the head (of Viṣṇu) to compete with the Ganges (falling) from the head of Śiva? Or is it looked at by the people as to whether it is the Rāhu that reaches the face entertaining a doubt that it is the moon having all the digits?

Notes: Kālindī denotes the river Yamunā. Svardhunī denotes the celestial Ganges. The face is conceived as the Moon and the tresses of hair fancied as Rāhu attempting to seize it.

[46]

सुप्ताकाराः प्रसुप्ते भगवति विबुधैरप्यदृष्टस्वरूपा
 व्याप्तव्योमान्तरालास्तरलमणिरुचा जिज्ञताः स्पष्टभासः ।
 देहच्छायोद्गमाभा रिपुवपुरगरुप्लोषरोषान्निधूम्याः
 केशाः केशिद्विषो नो विदधतु विपुलक्लेशपाशप्रणाशम् ॥

May the locks of hair of the enemy of Kesi confer on us the destruction of the bondage of excessive torment. They appear to be sleeping when the Lord is asleep. Their true form is not seen even by the gods. They are volumes of thick smoke of the fire from the

burning of incense, namely, the bodies of the enemies, the rising splendour from the reflection of the body, having a splendour clearly visible being made beautiful by the rays of sparkling gems which fill the inter-space in the sky.

Notes: Kesi was a demon killed by Kṛṣṇa (manifestation of Viṣṇu).

[47]

यत्र प्रत्युत्तरत्नप्रवरपरिलसद्भूरिरोचिष्प्रतान-
 स्कूर्त्या मूर्तिर्पुररेद्युमणिशतचितव्योमवहुर्निरीक्ष्या ।
 कुर्वत्पारेपयोधिज्वलदकृशशिखाभास्वदौर्वाग्निशङ्कां
 शश्वन्नः शर्म दिश्यात्कलिकलुषतमः पाटनं तत्किरीटम् ॥

May that crown which tears off the darkness in the form of the sin of Kali, always produce pleasure. The image of the foe of Mura is imperceivable like the sky set with hundreds of Suns, in the shooting display of multitudes of rays shining with excellent gems. It causes the doubt whether it is the submarine fire that shines with its stout flame of the fire on the other side of the milky ocean.

Notes: Mura was a demon killed by Kṛṣṇa and hence Lord Viṣṇu is addressed as the foe of Mura, namely, Murāri.

[48]

भ्रान्त्वा भ्रान्त्वा यदन्तस्त्रिभुवनगुरुरप्यब्दकोटीरनेकाः
 गन्तुं नान्तं समर्थो भ्रमर इव पुनर्नाभिनालीकनालात् ।
 उन्मज्जन्नूर्जितश्रीस्त्रिभुवनमपरं निमंमे तत्सदृक्षं
 देहाम्भोभिः स देयान्निरवधिरमृतं दैत्यविद्वेषिणो नः ॥

May that navel of the foe of the demons confer on us unending ambrosia. Therein, the preceptor of the three worlds (Brahmā), after having wandered again and again for many crores of years was not able to reach the end of the navel-lotus-stalk, just like a bee rose up and created another (universe of) three worlds together with the water with renewed splendour.

[49]

मत्स्यः कूर्मो वराहो नरहरिणपतिर्वामनो जामदग्न्यः

काकुत्स्थः कंसघाती मनसिजविजयी यश्च कल्की

भविष्यन् ।

विष्णोरंशावतारा भुवनहितकरा धर्मसंस्थापनार्थाः

पायासुर्मां त एते गुरुतरकरुणाभारखिन्नाशया ये ॥

May the partial manifestations of Viṣṇu such as the Fish, the Tortoise, the Boar, the Man-lion, the Dwarf, Jāmadagnya, Kākutstha, the Killer of Kāmsa, the Conqueror of God of love and the Kalki that is of the future, which are beneficial for the world and are for establishing *dharma* and are the abodes overburdened by the weight of extreme compassion, protect me.

Notes

The term Kākutstha denotes Rāma as one belonging to the scion of Kakutstha. The term *Manasijavijayī* refers to Buddha who renounced the pleasures. All the partial manifestations of Lord Viṣṇu are for upholding *dharma* by destroying the evil forces and protecting the world and people.

The Fish manifestation was made during the reign of the seventh Manu when the whole earth was swept

away by a flood and all living beings perished except the pious Manu. Manifesting as the Tortoise, Lord Viṣṇu supported the earth. Lord Viṣṇu manifested as Boar, killed the demon Hiraṇyākṣa and rescued the earth which was rolled and taken away by him, to the nether world. The Man-lion manifestation was made to protect His devotee Prahlāda from the haughty demon Hiraṇyakāṣipu, Prahlāda's father. Jāmadagnya denotes Paraśurāma, son of Jamadagni and well-known as the killer of the *kṣatriyas* twenty-one times in order to avenge the harm done by Kārttavīrya to Jamadagni.

Kalki is the tenth manifestation of Lord Viṣṇu that would be taken by Him to destroy the wicked and liberate the world.

[50]

यस्माद्वाचो निवृत्ता सममपि मनसा लक्षणाभीक्ष्माणाः

स्वार्थालाभात्परार्थव्यपगमकथनश्लाघिनो वेदवादाः ।

नित्यानन्दं स्वसंविन्निरवधिविमलस्वान्तसंक्रान्तबिम्ब-

च्छायापत्त्यापि नित्यं सुखयति यमिनो यत्तदव्या-

न्महो नः ॥

May that lustre of eternal bliss, namely, the knowledge of the self, from which the speech has turned back together with the mind, which the Vedic statements beholding (only) the *lakṣaṇā* eulogise the narration of the return from the unintended one when the desired aim is not obtained and which makes the ascetics always feel happy even by getting the reflection of the image of the unlimited and stainless thing within, protect us.

Notes

The verse begins with the idea conveyed by the popular Upanishadic statement यतो वाचो निवर्तन्ते अप्राप्य मनसा सह । in almost identical words. The whole verse is expressive of the Advaitic concept of the identity of the individual soul and Supreme Brahman, the former as a reflection of the latter.

Every word has three powers — *abhidhā*, *lakṣanā* and *vyañjanā*. *Abhidhā* means the literal power or sense of a word, denotation. It conveys the meaning which belongs to a word by convention. *Lakṣanā* means an indirect implication or secondary signification of a word when the direct meaning does not convey any sense. The third power of a word, namely, *vyañjanā* is that which a word suggests.

[51]

आ पादादा च शीर्ष्णो वपुरिदमनघं वैष्णवं यः स्वचित्ते
 धत्ते नित्यं निरस्ताखिलकलिकलुषे संततान्तः प्रमोदम् ।
 जुह्वञ्जिह्वाकृशानौ हरिचरितहविः स्तोत्रमन्त्रानुपाठै-
 स्तत्पादाम्भोरुहाभ्यां सततमपि नमस्कुर्महे निर्मलाभ्याम् ॥

One who constantly holds in his thought this spotless body of Viṣṇu from foot to head gets removed of all the sins of the Kali, (and gains) eternal inner rejoice. We always pay respectful obeisance to the pair of stainless lotus feet, accompanied by the repetitions of hymns and sacred mystic syllables, offering oblations with the legends of Hari in the sacrificial fire, namely, the tongue.

СЕРИЯ АНТИ-ПЕСТИДЕН-БЕДНИ

СЕРИЯ АНТИ-ПЕСТИДЕН-БЕДНИ

СЕРИЯ АНТИ-ПЕСТИДЕН-БЕДНИ

ŚARĪRAKA-VYĀKHYĀ-PRASTHĀNA-BHEDAḤ

by

Ātmavidyābhūṣanam V. S. V. Gurusvāmī Śāstri

(Contd. from Vol. XI, No. 4)

HOMAGE TO LORD VIṢṆU

वेदानुद्धरते जगन्निवहते भूगोलमुद्विभ्रते
 दैत्यं दारयते बलिं छलयते क्षत्रक्षयं कुर्वते ।
 पौलस्त्यं जयते हलं कलयते कारुण्यमातन्वते
 म्लेच्छान् मूर्च्छयते दशाकृतिकृते कृष्णाय तुभ्यं नमः ॥

Adoration unto you, Oh Lord Kṛṣṇa! As Fish, you have retrieved the *Vedas*; as Tortoise, you have held aloft the world; as Boar, you have lifted the globe of the Earth; as Man-lion, you have slain Hiraṇyakaśipu; as Dwarf, you have defeated Mahābali; as Parasurāma, you have destroyed the kṣatriyas; as Śrī Rāma, you have vanquished Rāvaṇa; as Balarāma, you have used the Plough; as Buddha, you have been full of compassion; as Kalki, you will destroy the Mlecchas — thus, indeed, you make the ten advents (*avatāras*).

Jayadeva's *Gītagovinda*

Notes: Although this hymn concludes with the verse (51) in most of the editions, the edition of the Samata Publication, Madras, has an additional verse which I give below.

[52]

मोदात्पादादिकेशस्तुतिमिति रचितां कीर्तयित्वा त्रिधाम्नः
 पादाब्जद्वन्द्वसेवासमयनतमतिर्मस्तकेनानमेद्यः ।
 उन्मुच्यैवात्मनैनोनिचयकवचकम्पञ्चतामेत्य भानो-
 विम्बान्तर्गोचरं स प्रविशति परमानन्दमात्मस्वरूपम् ॥

After having sung this hymn on Viṣṇu from foot to head set with rejoice, whoever pays obeisance by bowing down with his head with devotional mind at the time of doing service to the pair of lotus feet, getting released from the shackles of the multitudes of sins and attaining death enters the disc of the Sun, that is of the form of supreme Bliss, namely, the supreme Self.

Notes: The word, *Tridhāman* refers to Vāmana manifestation of Lord Viṣṇu.

[285]

अविद्वाञ्जीव इत्येवं सर्वलोकप्रसिद्धितः ।
अविद्यासंश्रयो जीवो विषयो ब्रह्म चेत्यसौ ॥

[286]

पक्षो युक्ततया भायात्केषांचिद्विदुषामिति ।
सुरेश्वरस्यैव पक्षो युक्त इत्युच्यते तथा ॥

[287]

अविद्यायाः प्रसिद्धेः प्राक् जीवब्रह्मभिदा यदि ।
अभविष्यच्च लब्धात्मा पक्षोऽसेत्स्यत्तादा त्वयम् ॥

[288]

अविद्यासिद्धिसापेक्षो भेदः स्याद्ब्रह्मजीवयोः ।
अविद्याया विलासो हि पृथक्तामात्रमिष्यते ॥

[289]

वाचस्पतिसहस्रेणाप्याश्रयं विषयं विना ।
उपपादयितुं तस्याः सिद्धिर्नैवेह शक्यते ॥

[290]

पन्थानमिममेवाह सर्वज्ञात्ममुनिः शिवम् ।
अत एवानूद्यते तदप्पयाध्वरिभिः कृतौ ॥
स्वकीयायां च सर्वज्ञगुरोरेव मतं त्विति ॥

(ix) मायाविद्ययोः ऐक्यम्, भावरूपत्वं च

[291]

मायाविद्यापदार्थैक्यं वार्तिकैरभिधीयते ।

अमित्रवदविद्येति तैत्तिरीयकवार्तिके ॥
 पिधानमिति नैष्कर्म्यसिद्धौ व्याख्याप्रदर्शनात् ॥

[292]

साभासाज्ञानवत्तत्त्वं जगत्कारणमित्यपि ।
 प्रसाधनाद्युक्तिभिस्तैर्वृहदारण्यवार्तिके ॥

[293]

भावरूपामविद्यां तेऽभिप्रयन्ति सुरेश्वराः ।
 असत्यः प्रतिबिम्बो यः स चाभासतयोच्यते ॥

[294]

प्रतिबिम्बो भवेद्भाववस्तुन्यादर्शसंनिभे ।
 अज्ञानं चापि साभासं तद्गुणं चास्य भावता ॥
 इदं तु 'तदधीनत्व' सूत्रभाष्यप्रमाणकम् ॥

(x) जाग्रत्स्वप्नसुषुप्तीनां तिसृणामपि प्रत्येकमवस्थात्रयवत्त्वम्

[295]

जाग्रत्स्वप्नसुषुप्त्याख्यास्तिस्रोऽवस्था भवन्ति याः ।
 तिसृणामपि तासां तास्तिस्रः प्रत्येकमित्ययम् ।
 विषयो वार्तिककृता विशदं प्रतिपाद्यते ॥

[296]

सिद्धान्तविन्दुकृच्चेमं विषयं समवर्णयत् ।
 मन्येऽहमनुवादोऽयमेतस्माद्वार्तिकादिति ॥

(xi) सुषुप्तौ अविद्यासद्भावः

[297]

नामरूपविभिन्नं यदज्ञानं तन्न विद्यते ।
सुषुप्तौ किंतु तद्भेदशून्यमित्युपदिश्यते ॥

[298]

सुषुप्तिकालेऽविद्यायाः सद्भावस्तैः समर्थितः ।
माण्डूक्यभाष्यमेवास्य मूलमित्यनुमीयते ॥

[299]

‘प्रज्ञानघन’ इत्येतत्पदार्थप्रतिपादने ।
विभज्यमानं निखिलं नैशेन तमसा यथा ॥

[300]

रात्रौ घनमिवास्त्येनं प्रज्ञानघन इष्यते ।
‘आनन्दमय’ इत्यस्य पदस्याप्युपवर्ण्यते ॥

[301]

आनन्दप्राय एवार्थो नैवानन्द इति स्फुटम् ।
भगवत्पादपूज्यैस्तत्प्रमाणं प्रकृते भवेत् ॥

(xii) साक्षिसद्भाव-तदेकत्व-प्रतिपादनम्

[302]

एवं साक्षित्वरूपं तदेकत्वं च प्रसाधितम् ।
सुरेश्वरैः सुनिपुणं वार्तिकैर्बहुयुक्तिभिः ॥

[303]

जानाम्यहं मामित्यत्र स्फुरणं यत्प्रदृश्यते ।
तत्साक्षिणः स्वरूपं स्यादावत्यो बुद्धिवृत्तयः ॥

[304]

तावतीनां चिदाभासद्वारा द्रष्टी परैव चित् ।
बुद्धेर्द्रष्टृश्रैकतैव दृष्टेर्द्रष्टेति वाक्यतः ॥

[305]

भावा भूता भाविनश्च विद्यमाना भवन्ति ये ।
संनिकृष्टा विप्रकृष्टाः स्थूलाः सूक्ष्माश्च तेऽखिलाः ॥

[306]

अवस्थादेशकालेषु सर्वेष्वपि यथा स्थिताः ।
भासन्ते च तथाक्षाणामभावोऽप्यवबुध्यते ॥

[307]

यदिदं प्रथनं सर्वदेशकालेष्वनश्वरम् ।
अन्तरा साक्षिचैतन्यं समर्थयितुमीश्वरः ॥

[308]

शक्रोऽपि न भवेत्तस्मात्साक्ष्युपेयं मनीषिभिः ।
किञ्च प्रपञ्चवृत्तान्तः सर्वः प्रज्ञानपूर्वकः ॥

[309]

अप्रज्ञाने भवेत्सर्वमन्धकारप्रनृत्तावत् ।
प्रोक्तमेतद्विस्तरेण वार्तिकेषु सुरेश्वरैः ॥

[310]

‘नैनद्देवा आप्नुवन्ति’त्येवमीशश्रुतिस्तथा ।
‘साक्षी चेता केवले’ति श्रुतिर्भाष्यं तयोरपि ॥

[311]

प्रकृतार्थे प्रमाणं स्यादिति मन्यामहे वयम् ।
 यत्त्वनुव्यवसायात्मज्ञानमित्यभिधीयते ॥
 नैयायिकादिभिस्तत्तु प्रोक्तमाक्ष्येव नापरम् ॥

(xiii) जीवस्य सृष्टिकर्तृत्वम्

[312]

मनोनिष्ठतया सृष्टिकर्तृत्वस्य प्रसाधनात् ।
 जीवस्य सृष्टिकर्तृत्ववादोऽप्येषामभीप्सितः ॥

(xiv) नैष्कर्म्यसिद्धि-ब्रह्मसिद्धि-वार्तिकानां एककर्तृत्वं श्रीमदप्पय-
दीक्षिताभिमतम्

[313]

सिद्धान्तलेशसंक्षेपप्रारम्भेऽप्पयदीक्षितैः ।
 'नियमः परिसंख्या वा विध्यर्थोऽत्र भवेद्यतः ।
 अनात्मादर्शनेनैव परात्मानमुपास्महे' ॥

[314]

इति वार्तिकवाक्यानुसारिणः केचिदूचिरे ।
 परिसंख्याविधिं त्वात्मश्रवणे चेति वर्ण्यते ॥

[315]

सुरेशानां वार्तिकेषु नास्त्येवं वार्तिकं क्वचित् ।
 नापि तेषां मतमिदं यैरात्मश्रवणे विधिः ॥

[316]

प्रयत्नाद्ब्रह्मदारण्यवार्तिके प्रतिषिध्यते ।
 वार्तिकोक्तयनुसारीति वदद्भिर्दीक्षितैरपि ॥

[317]

सुरेश्वराचार्यमतं नेदमित्येव सूच्यते ।
नैष्कर्म्यसिद्धावेतत्तु पद्यं संदृश्यते ततः ॥

[318]

वार्तिकाचार्यपद्यत्वाद्द्वार्तिकत्वेन कथ्यते ।
नैष्कर्म्यसिद्धावप्येतैरभ्युपेत्यैव बोध्यते ॥

[319]

परिसंख्याविधेर्वादो न सुरेश्वरसंमतः ।
सूत्रभाष्ये वार्तिककृन्नारायणसरस्वती ॥

[320]

उक्तपद्यानुसारेण परिसंख्याविधिं वदन् ।
वार्तिकोक्त्यनुसारी स्यात्तत्सिद्धान्तो भवेदयम् ॥

[321]

‘सर्वप्रत्ययवेद्ये’ति पद्यं यद्ब्रह्मसिद्धिगम् ।
तदप्युक्तं वार्तिकमित्यप्ययाध्वरिभिः क्वचित् ॥

[322]

ब्रह्मसिद्धिकृतः पद्यं वार्तिकत्वेन न क्वचित् ।
प्रसिद्धं किंतु तच्छ्लोकाः कीर्तिताः कारिका इति ॥

[323]

व्यक्तं विज्ञायते ब्रह्मसिद्धिवार्तिकयोर्भिदा ।
अप्ययदीक्षितैस्ताभ्यां सिद्धान्तानां गृहीतृभिः ॥

(to be continued)

ŚĀRĪRAKA-VYĀKHYĀ-PRASTHĀNA-BHEDAḤ

by

Ātmavidyābhūṣanam V. S. V. Gurusvāmī Śāstrī

Free rendering by

Dr. V. K. N. S. Raghavan

(Contd. from Vol. XI, No. 4)

[276 - 278]

The example cited earlier is with regard to the refutation of external objects, the refutation being a must even on the part of the author of the *Brahmasūtra* (Vyāsa). From the *Bhāṣya* which says: "In the mind are left over the *saṃskāras* generated by the knowledge which is devoid of external object; and from these *saṃskāras*, there arises the dream-cognition which is devoid of external object; that which is a witness to this cognition is called *taijasa*" the world is known to be of the nature of knowledge. This explains (i) the position of those who hold that objects exist as different from knowledge as dull; and (ii) the position of those who hold that there is no external object in addition to knowledge as superior.

[279]

The explanation of the *Bhāṣya-kṛt* (Śrī Śaṅkara) on the *sūtra* (II, ii, 28): "*nābhāva upalabdheḥ*" is quite acceptable and is in tune with the *śruti* and the *purport* of the *sūtra*.

[280 - 281ab]

Even Prakāśānandayati has discussed this topic very well. The author of the *Siddhāntaleśasaṅgraha* (Appayadīkṣita) has dealt with it at length, restating the views of Suresvara, by referring to his views as '*keṣāñcit*'.

[281cd - 283ab]

While making an exposition of the meaning of the terms, *pratyak*, *brahman* and *ātman*, Suresvara explains *jñāna* as the essence of *pratyak*, *Brahman* and *Ātman* which are actually synonyms — in his *Bṛhadāranya-vārttika*.

[283cd - 284ab]

The wise conclude that this is the view of Suresvara *viz.* the all-pervasive, pure, supreme consciousness alone is the locus of *avidyā*.

[284cd - 286]

Through the cognitions, "Brahman does not shine" "I do not know at all", it is ascertained that *jīva* is ignorant; and this is well known. Thus *jīva* is the locus of *avidyā* and Brahman is the content of *avidyā* — such a view may appear to be valid for some learned scholars. But only the view of Suresvara holds good.

[287 - 290]

Had the difference between *jīva* and Brahman settled before the establishment of *avidyā*, then this view could become valid. The difference between Brahman and *jīva* is dependent on the existence of *avidyā*. The work of *avidyā* is only in making things separate. None can, indeed, properly explain the position of *avidyā* without indicating its locus. Sarvajñāt-mamuni referred to this position alone as valid, and even Appayadīkṣita repeats the same in his work.

(ix) *Both māyā and avidyā are same, and of existent nature*

[291 - 292]

Suresvara has pointed out in his *Vārttikas* the synonymous nature of *avidyā* and *māyā*. In the *Taittirīyakavārttika*, *avidyā* is said to be similar to *amitra* (enemy). In the *Naīṣkarmyasiddhi*, *avidyā* is said to possess the nature of *pidhāna* (concealment). Suresvara in his *Bṛhadāraṇyavārttika* has held the view that *avidyā* which is *bhāvarūpa* (of existent nature) and which carries the semblance of consciousness in it, is the cause of the world.

[293 - 294]

The reflection which is unreal is called *ābhāsa*. There will be the reflection in the existent object which is similar to a mirror (a reflecting medium). *Ajñāna* (nescience) is also *sābhāsa* and its existence is certain. This view is based on the authority of the *Bhāṣya* on the *sūtra* (I, iv, 3): '*tadadhīnatva*'.

(x) *The three states of jāgrat (waking), swapna (dream) and susupti (deep sleep) have again three more states individually*

[295 - 296]

The author of the *Vārttika* (Suresvara) has explained in detail that the three states of *jāgrat*, *swapna* and *susupti* have again three states individually. The author of the *Siddhāntabindu* has again described the same; and I presume that this description is only a re-statement of the said *Vārttika* (of Suresvara).

(ix) *Avidyā is present even in the state of deep sleep*

[297 - 301]

That *ajñāna* which manifests difference of name and form is not present during *susupti*. But it is said to be *bhedaśūnya* (devoid of difference). Suresvara has held the view that *avidyā* is present in the state of deep sleep. It is inferred that this view is based on the *Bhāṣya* (of Śrī Śaṅkara) on the *Māṇḍūkyaopaniṣad*. Explaining the word, '*prajñāna-ghana*', it is held that just as at night, owing to the indiscrimination produced by darkness, all (percepts) become a mass of darkness as it were, so also in the state of deep-sleep all objects of consciousness verily become a mass of consciousness. While explaining the word '*ānandamaya*', it is stated

that *ānandamaya* means 'endowed with an abundance of bliss' and not as pure *ānanda* itself. These two explanations of Śrī Śaṅkara will be applicable even here.

(xii) *Explanation of the existence and oneness of sākṣin*

[302 - 308ab]

Similarly, Suresvara has established the essential nature of *sākṣin* and its oneness through many arguments found in his *Vārttikas*. The awareness which arises in a person, viz. "I know myself," constitutes the essential nature of *sākṣin*; for all the modes of *buddhi* (intellect), the supreme Self alone is the seer, through the reflection of the *cit* — this view holds good based on the *śruti* text '*drṣter-draṣṭā...*' that imparts the unity of *buddhi* (intellect) and *draṣṭā* (seer). The various mental modes (of a person) — present, past, and future —, the entities which are near and far away, (to be brief) all one's nature in various states, places and time, shine (because of *sākṣin*); even one becomes aware of the non-existence of senses also through the presence of *sākṣin* alone. Without this *sākṣin* (witness-consciousness), no one can account for the awareness of each one of these states — even if he be Lord Indra. Therefore the wise have to accept the presence of witness-consciousness.

(to be continued)

VAIPHALYAM UPADEŚASYA NA ADVAITE
TAT PARATRA HI

by

Bhāṣyabhāvaḥṇa V. R. Kalyānasundara Śāstrī

FUTILITY OF INSTRUCTION — NOT IN
ADVAITA, BUT ONLY ELSEWHERE

with translation

by

Dr. R. Balasubramanian

(Contd. from Vol. XI, No. 4)

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किंचैवं ज्ञानैकाकारे आत्मनि उपदेशसम्पाद्यगुणाभावादुपदेशनि-
वर्त्यदोषाभावाच्चोपदेशोऽप्यपार्थः । न च निकृष्टोपाधित्यागः उत्कृ-
ष्टोपाधिस्वीकारश्च फलमुपदेशस्येति वाच्यं, मार्तिकघटोपाधिपरित्या-
गात्सौवर्णघटोपाधिस्वीकाराच्च गगनस्येवाविक्रियस्यात्मनोऽपि मनुष्यो-
पाधित्यागाद्देवोपाधिस्वीकाराच्च न कोऽपि लाभः । सति हि
देहात्मभ्रमे निकृष्टमनुष्यदेहापेक्षया उत्कृष्टदेवादिदेहलाभे त्वं हि मनुष्यः,
देवोऽहमिति यक्षोऽहमिति वा सन्तुष्येत्पुरुषः । प्रकृते तूपदेशेन

‘नाहं देहो नेन्द्रियाणि’

इत्युक्तदिशा देहाद्यात्मभ्रमनाशाद्देहातिरिक्तात्मज्ञानस्य संजातत्वा-
त्किमस्य देवादिदेहेन । न च देवादिदेहे आत्मीयत्वज्ञानात्सन्तुष्यति
पुरुष इति वाच्यं,

‘असङ्गो ह्ययं पुरुषः’ । ‘असंगो न हि सज्जते’ ।

इति श्रुत्या आत्मानमसङ्गं विद्वान् पुरुषः कथं देवादिदेहमात्मीयं मन्येत ॥

ननु असङ्ग इति श्रुतिरर्थान्तरपरा — पुरुषस्तु सदापि सूक्ष्मदेहवि-
शिष्टत्वात्ससङ्ग एव — ज्ञानैकाकारोऽपि पुरुषः सूक्ष्मदेहोपाधिवहुत्वा-
द्बहुविध एव; असावुपाधिः प्रलये मुक्तौ च न नश्यति — अतो जीवाः
परस्परं भिन्ना एव सर्वदा; उपदेशादीश्वरोपासनाच्चासीषामीश्वर-
वद्ज्ञानैश्वर्यादिसिद्धिरप्राकृतदिव्यमङ्गलविग्रहसिद्धिश्चेति चेत्, नैतदप्युप-
पद्यते । सदापि लिङ्गदेहविशिष्टस्य पुरुषस्य लिङ्गाकारवत्त्वेन ज्ञानैकाका-
रवत्त्वाभावात्, अपञ्चीकृतपञ्चभूतकार्यस्य लिङ्गस्य सदाप्यनादिपुरुषोपाधि-
त्वासंभवात्, प्रकृतिपुरुषेश्वराणां तव मते अनादित्वात्, लिङ्गस्य
प्रकृतिकार्यत्वेन सादित्वात्, मुक्तौ मनस्सत्त्वे तदनुभूतसंसारस्मरणप्रसङ्गेन
मनारदुःखसम्भवाल्लिङ्गभङ्गस्यैव मोक्षत्वाच्च । उपासनयैव सगुणमुक्ति-
क्षेत्रलाभे तत्त्वज्ञानोपदेशस्य तव मते वैयर्थ्याच्च । उपासनां विना
तदुपदेशमात्रेण तन्मुक्त्यलाभाच्च व्यर्थस्तव मते तत्वोपदेशः ॥

किंच सर्वेऽप्यास्तिका लौकिकास्तार्किकाश्च वेदानुमानादिना
स्वभिन्नमीश्वरं प्रतिपद्यमानाः तस्माद्विभ्यत्येव —

‘भीषास्माद्वातः पवते भीषोदेति सूर्यः ।

भीषास्मादग्निश्चेन्द्रश्च मृत्युर्धावति पञ्चमः ॥’

इति श्रुतेर्वायुसूर्यादयोऽपीश्वराद्विभ्यत्येव । एवं स्थिते अभयार्थ-
मात्मानं शरणं गताय शिष्याय यदि गुरुस्तमेव जीवेश्वरभेदं भयजन-
कमुपदिशेत्तर्हि तेन शिष्यः किं फलं प्राप्नुयात्, न किमपि, प्रत्युत
भयाधिक्यमेव ।

‘य उदरमन्तरं कुरुते अथ तस्य भयं भवति ।’

‘द्वितीयाद्वै भयं भवति ।’

‘मृत्योः स मृत्युमाप्नोति य इह नानेव पश्यति ।’

इति हि श्रूयते । तस्माद्भव्यर्थमेव भेदवादिगुरुरूपसदनं शिष्यस्य ॥

अथ यदप्युच्यते — अयमुपदेष्टा भगवान् वासुदेवः किमात्म-
याथात्म्यसाक्षात्कारेण निवृत्ताज्ञानः, उत न? आद्ये — निर्विशेषचिन्मात्रै-
कस्वरूपे आत्मन्यतद्रूपाध्यासासम्भवात् कौन्तेयादिभेददर्शनं, तान्प्रत्यु-
युपदेशादिव्यापाराश्च न सम्भवन्ति । अथात्मसाक्षात्काराभावाद्-
निवृत्ताज्ञानश्चेत्तर्ह्यज्ञानवादेवात्मज्ञानोपदेशासम्भव इति — तत्तुच्छम्;
य आत्मानं निवृत्ताज्ञानमनिवृत्ताज्ञानं वा मन्यते स मूर्ख एव ।
आत्मनि कालत्रयेऽप्यज्ञानाभावात् । अज्ञानप्रसक्तिं विना तन्नित्य-
योगाच्च । वासुदेवस्त्वात्मैवेति कृत्वा कथं तस्याज्ञानप्रसङ्गः, तन्नित्यत्वा-
यश्चैनं वासुदेवं कौन्तेयाय कमप्यर्थमुपदिशन्तं मन्यते स आत्मतत्त्व-
याथात्म्यगन्धशून्य एव । नहि निर्विशेषचिन्मात्र आत्मा कस्मैचित्कि-
मप्युपदिशेत् — वागाद्यभावात् । ‘अवागमनः’ इत्यादिश्रुतेः ।
यस्तूपदिशन् दृश्यते स कार्यकरणसङ्घात एव नात्मा । नहि ज्ञाता
परमात्मा केनचिद्दृश्येत । कार्यकरणसङ्घातस्य च चैतन्ययोगाद्भेद-
दर्शनोपदेशादिव्यापारा उपपद्यन्त एव । आत्मैकत्वेऽपि सङ्घाताना-
मनेकत्वात्परस्परं भेदात्करणादिमत्त्वाच्च । न च जडत्वात्प्रोपपद्यन्त
इति वाच्यं, आत्मप्रतिफलनेन चैतन्यलाभात् सङ्घातस्य । तस्माद्देहे

गच्छति सति अहं गच्छामीति यथा अज्ञानां भ्रमस्तथा सङ्गते वदति सति आत्मा वदतीति, सङ्गते शृण्वति सति आत्मा शृणोतीति चाज्ञानां भ्रमः संभवत्येव । एवमुपदेशके वसुदेवपुत्रे सङ्गातविशेषे, श्रोतरि च कौन्तेये सङ्गातविशेषे यस्यात्मेति भ्रमस्तस्य तत्र देहात्माभिमानिनः पाण्डित्यमहो!

ननु मास्त्वात्मन्युपदेशादिव्यवहारः, यस्सङ्गातविशेषमहमित्यभिमन्यते स वासुदेवः प्रमाता किमात्मयाथात्म्यसाक्षात्कारेण निवृत्ताज्ञानः ? उत न ? आद्ये -- भेददर्शनाद्यनुपपत्तिः । द्वितीये उपदेशानुपपत्तिरिति चेन्मैवमपि । आत्मैकत्वं प्रमातृभेदं च विदुषः कृष्णस्य भेददर्शनोपदेशाद्युपपद्यत एवेति । यदि प्रमातृभेदो न स्यात्तर्हि कौन्तेयादिभेददर्शनानुपपत्तिः स्यात् । यथात्मैकत्वदर्शनं न स्यात्तर्ह्यात्मोपदेशो न स्यात् । न त्वेतदस्ति । प्रमातृभेदस्य सत्त्वात्प्रमातृविशेषस्य च कृष्णस्यात्मैकत्वदर्शनसत्त्वादिति भावः ॥

ननु यः प्रमाता आत्मानं सच्चिदानन्दमद्वितीयं ब्रह्म पश्यति स विद्वान् कृष्णः पुनरात्मानं प्रमातारं कथं जानीयात् कथं वा कौन्तेयायोपदिशेदिति चेत्, मैवमपि । व्यवहारपरमार्थदशयोर्भेदेन तदुपपत्तेः । यथा तत्र समाधिव्यवहारदशयोर्भेदः, यथा वातिसूर्खाणामपि पामराणां निद्राव्यवहारदशयोर्भेदः, अथवा निद्राजागरणदशयोः । प्रमाता यदा आत्मानं साक्षात्करोति, सा हि परमार्थदशा । न तदा कोऽपि वक्ता कोऽपि श्रोता कश्चिदुपदेशो वा विद्यते । यदा तूपदेशादिव्यवहारं करोति सा हि व्यवहारदशाः तदा वक्त्रुश्रोतृशास्त्राणि सन्त्येवेति न काप्यनुपपत्तिः ॥

ननु व्यवहारदशायामपि विदुषः प्रमातुरहं ब्रह्मेति ज्ञानमस्ति वा ? न वा ? आद्ये -- अद्वितीयत्वाद्ब्रह्मण उपदेशानुपपत्तिः । द्वितीये -- अज्ञत्वादेवोपदेशानुपपत्तिरिति चेत्, मैवमपि । व्यवहारदशायां ब्रह्मात्मज्ञानस्य परोक्षकल्पत्वेन भेददर्शनोपदेशयोरुपपत्तेः । अपरोक्षत्वं एव भेददर्शनाभावः । परोक्षज्ञानस्याप्यभाव एवाज्ञत्वादुपदेशाभाव

इति हेतोः । न चापरोक्षतया दृष्टस्यात्मनः कथं पुनः परोक्षत्वमिति वाच्यं, यावद्विदेहकैवल्यमविद्याया दग्धपटवत्सत्त्वात् । अविद्याऽऽवरणाद्ध्यात्मनः पारोक्ष्यम् । न च प्रकाशरूपस्यात्मनः कथमज्ञानावरणमिति वाच्यं, अहमन्न इत्यनुभववलात् ,

‘अनृतेन हि प्रत्यूढाः’, ‘अज्ञानेनावृतं ज्ञानम्’

इत्यादिशास्त्रप्रामाण्याच्च आत्मनोऽज्ञानावरणाभ्युपगमात् । तस्माद्-व्यवहारदशायां गुरुशिष्यशास्त्रादिसर्वद्वैतसत्त्वाद्भेददर्शनादिकमुपपद्यत एव वसुदेवसूनोः प्रमातुः कृष्णस्येति स्थितम् ।

‘यत्र हि द्वैतमिव भवति तदितर इतरं पश्यति’

इति हि श्रूयते ॥

वस्तुतस्तु तव मत एवायमुपदेशानुपपत्तिदोषः, तथाहि जीवान्तर्यामी जीवशरीरकः परमात्मा शरीरं जीवं स्वात्मकं जानन् कथं तस्मा उपदिशेत् ? जीवोऽन्योऽहमन्यस्तस्मान्न जीवो मदात्मक इति ज्ञाने सति ह्युपदेश उपपद्यते । नहि मनुष्योऽहमिति मन्यमानः कोऽपि मूढः शरीराय स्वात्मकाय किमप्युपदिशति । देवदत्तोऽहमन्यः विष्णुमित्रोऽयमपरः, अतो नायं मदात्मक इति ज्ञानाद्धि देवदत्तो गुरुर्विष्णुमित्राय किमप्युपदिशति । न च जीवस्यान्तरात्मा अहं जीवादन्य इति ज्ञानादुपदिशतीति वाच्यं, देहादन्योऽहं देहस्यान्तरात्मेति च ज्ञानादपि जीवस्य देहं प्रत्युपदेशादर्शनात् । न च देहस्याचेतनत्वादुपदेशानुपपत्तिरिति वाच्यं, जीवे सति देहस्य चेतनत्वात् । कथमन्यथा चेतनाचेतनव्यवहारः? न हि गच्छन्तं वदन्तं वा देहं कोऽप्यचेतनं मन्यते । किन्तु सृत्पाषाणादिकमेव । नापि जीवः स्वान्तरवस्थितं स्वस्मै कमप्युपदिशन्तं स्वस्मादन्यं स्वस्य शरीरभूतं कञ्चन पश्यति, येन तदनुभववलाद्वा स्वशरीराय जीवाय शरीरीश्वर उपदिशतीत्यभ्युपगम्येत ॥

न च कृष्णार्जुनोपदेशदृष्टान्तवलादभ्युपगन्तव्यमिति वाच्यं, अर्जुनाद्बहिरुपलभ्यमानस्य कृष्णस्यार्जुनान्तःस्थितिप्रयुक्तान्तरात्मत्वायोगात् । न च य एव कृष्णशरीरान्तरात्मा स एवार्जुनशरीरान्तरात्मेति

वाच्यं, एकात्मवादप्रसङ्गात् । अनेकात्मवादी हि भवान् । न चार्जुन-
शरीरे अन्तरात्मतया स्थितो यस्त एव कृष्णशरीरे प्रमातृतया
स्थितस्तत्रार्जुनशरीरस्थप्रमात्रे उपदिशतीति वाच्यं, कृष्णशरीरप्रमातर्य-
प्यर्जुनशरीरप्रमातरीवान्तरात्मनोऽवश्यं स्थातव्यतया अर्जुनप्रमात्र-
न्तर्यामिणः कृष्णप्रमातृरूपत्वासम्भवात् । किंतु कृष्णप्रमात्रन्तर्यामिरूप-
त्वमेव तस्य । अन्यथा अन्तर्यामिणः प्रमातृरूपत्वेऽन्तर्यामित्वमङ्गप्रसङ्गात् ।
प्रमातुरन्तस्स्थित्वा प्रमातारं यमवतीति ह्यन्तरात्मेत्युच्यते ।
कृष्णप्रमातुरेवार्जुनान्तर्यामित्वे कृष्णप्रमात्रन्तर्यामिणोऽर्जुनान्तर्यामीति
प्राप्तत्वाच्च । न चेष्टापत्तिः, अन्तर्यामिणोऽप्यन्तर्यामिणोऽन्यस्य कल्पने
तस्याप्यन्यस्य कल्पनीयतया अनवस्थादोषात् । अन्तर्यामिब्राह्मण-
विरोधाच्च । तस्मादन्तर्यामिण ईश्वरस्य स्वशरीरभूतान् जीवानुद्दिश्यो-
पदेशो नोपपद्यते । जीवानां स्वशरीरत्वेन स्वाभिन्नत्वात् स्वस्य च
करणाभावादिति ।

‘यस्तूभयोः समो दोषः परिहारोऽपि तत्समः ।

नैकः पर्यनुयोक्तव्यस्तादृगर्थविचारणे ॥’

इति हि शास्त्रविदां नयः । स चेनेवादिमितं श्रुतः । श्रुतोऽपि वा
प्रस्मृत इत्याभाति । वस्तुतस्तु प्रतिवाद्येवात्र पर्यनुयोगार्हो न वयमि-
त्युपपादितमेव पुरस्तादित्यवधेयम् ॥

[Note: The translation of the above article continues from
next page]

Further, in respect of the Self which is of the nature of knowledge alone, instruction is useless, since there is no good quality to be attained nor any defect to be removed through instruction. It cannot be said that the abandonment of the inferior *upādhi* (adjunct) as well as the acceptance of the superior *upādhi* is the fruit of instruction. Just as there is no gain for the ether by the abandonment of the *upādhi* of a pot made of clay or by the acceptance of the *upādhi* of a pot made of gold, even so for the Self which is immutable, there is no gain as a result of the abandonment of the *upādhi* of a human being or by the acceptance of the *upādhi* of a divine being. If there is the false identification with the body, a person will be happy to say, when there is the gain of a divine body which is superior in comparison with the inferior human body, "I am a *deva*," "I am a *yakṣa*." However, in the present case when a person has attained the knowledge of the Self which is different from the body, etc., by removing the false identification with the body, etc., following the teaching, "I am not the body nor the senses," what is the benefit to him through the divine body, etc.? It cannot be said that a person is happy by knowing that the divine body, etc. are his. When a person knows through *śruti* texts such as "This *Puruṣa* (Self) is unattached" (*Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad*, 4.3.15), "What is unattached is not related to anything" (*Ibid.*, 3.9.26) that the Self is not related to anything, how can he think of the divine body, etc. as his?

It may be argued: "The *śruti* text which speaks of the Self as unattached has a different meaning. Since the *Puruṣa* (Self) is always qualified by the subtle

body, it is related alone. Though the *Puruṣa* is of the nature of knowledge alone, it is many since the subtle body which is its *upādhi* is many. This *upādhi* is not destroyed in the states of dissolution and liberation. Hence, the *jīvas* are always different from one another. These *jīvas*, like the Lord, attain knowledge and power as well as the divine body which is *apṛākṛta* (non-material) due to instruction and meditation on the Lord.” This argument too is untenable for the following reasons: if the *Puruṣa* is always qualified by the subtle body, then it is in possession of the subtle body; and so it cannot be of the nature of knowledge alone; the subtle body which is a product of the non-quintuplicated five elements will always be the *upādhi* of the beginningless *Puruṣa*; according to your view, *prakṛti*, *Puruṣa*, and *Īśvara* are without a beginning, but the subtle body, being the product of *prakṛti*, has a beginning; if the mind continues to exist in the state of liberation, there will be scope for the remembrance of *samsāra* experienced by it earlier, and so there is the possibility of suffering thereby; and liberation is the annihilation of the subtle body. Further, if through *upāsana* alone the state/place of *saguna-mukti* can be attained, the instruction about *tattva-jñāna* will become futile in your view.

Further, all the adherents of the *Veda*, ordinary people, and the logicians who try to establish *Īśvara* as different (from the *jīvas*) through scriptural authority and inference are afraid of *Īśvara*. As stated in the *śruti* text, “Out of His fear, the wind blows; out of His fear the sun rises; out of His fear runs fire, as also Indra, and Death, the fifth,” (*Taittirīyopaniṣad*, 2.8.1) the wind

and the sun and others are afraid of Īsvara. This being the case, if the preceptor teaches the difference between *jīva* and *Īsvara*, which is the source of fear, to the disciple who surrenders to him for the sake of being free from fear, what is the benefit that the disciple will get from him? Nothing whatsoever. On the contrary, he will get only excess of fear. There are *śruti* texts which declare: "Whenever the aspirant creates a little difference in Brahman, he is struck with fear" (*Taittirīyopaniṣad*, 2.7.1), "From the second alone fear arises" (*Bṛhadāranyakopaniṣad*, 1.4.2), "He goes from death to death, who sees difference, as it were, in it" (*Ibid.*, 4.4.19). Hence, it is of no use for a disciple to go to a teacher who is an exponent of difference.

It may be argued: "Is Lord Vāsudeva who is the instructor, having realized the real nature of the Self, free from *ajñāna* or not? If the former, inasmuch as *adhyāsa* involving false cognition is not possible in the Self which is of the nature of knowledge alone devoid of distinction, cognition of difference such as the son of Kuntī and others, activities such as instruction to them, etc., cannot take place. If, on the contrary, it be said that He is not free from *ajñāna* as He has not realized the Self, then since He is ignorant, instruction about the knowledge of the Self is not possible." This argument is not satisfactory. One who thinks of the Self as free from *ajñāna* or as not free from *ajñāna* is, indeed, stupid, for there is no *ajñāna* in the Self in all the three periods of time. Also, unless there is scope for *ajñāna* the question of its removal is inappropriate. Since Vāsudeva is the Self itself, how can there be the possibility of *ajñāna* in Him or of its removal? If a

person would think of Vāsudeva as instructing the son of Kuntī' he is, indeed, totally ignorant about the real nature of the Self. Indeed, the Self which is knowledge alone devoid of distinction cannot instruct anything to anyone, because of the absence of the organ of speech, etc. There are *śruti* texts such as "It is speechless and mindless" (*Subālopaniṣad*, 3.2.). One who is seen as instructing is the aggregate of body and organs and not the Self. The supreme Self who is the knower cannot, indeed, be seen by anything. In respect of the aggregate of body and organs which is not knowledge (*i.e.*, the Self), activities such as cognition of difference, instruction, etc. are tenable. Though the Self is one, there are many aggregates which are different from one another, and each of them is endowed with organs. It is no argument to say that, since they are material, instruction is not possible for them; the aggregates which carry the reflection of the Self become sentient. Therefore, when the body goes, the ignorant have the illusion, "I go;" in the same way, when the aggregate speaks, the ignorant think that the Self speaks; when the aggregate hears, the ignorant think that the Self hears. If a person wrongly thinks of one particular aggregate which is instructing and which is identified as the son of Vasudeva as the Self and another aggregate which is hearing and which is identified as the son of Kuntī as the Self, one should really wonder at the scholarship of such a person who erroneously thinks that the body is the Self.

It may be argued: "Let it be that there is no activity such as instruction in the Self. But is Vāsudeva, the knower, who thinks of himself as a specific

aggregate, free from *ajñāna* on account of the realization of the real nature of the Self, or not? If the former, it is not possible for him to have the cognition of difference. If the latter, instruction is untenable." Even this argument does not hold good. In the case of Kṛṣṇa, the enlightened, oneness of the Self as well as difference as a knower hold good for the purpose of cognition of difference and instruction. If there is no difference as a knower, the perception of difference such as the son of Kuntī and others will be untenable. If there is no realization of the oneness of the Self, then instruction about the Self will not be possible. But it is not so. In other words, there is difference as a knower; and Kṛṣṇa, who is a specific knower, has the knowledge of the Self.

It may be argued: "How can Kṛṣṇa, the enlightened and the knower, who perceives the Self, *i.e.* the non-dual Brahman which is *sat*, *cit*, and *ānanda*, also think of himself as the knower? Also, how can he give instruction to the son of Kuntī?" This argument too is not satisfactory, for the distinction that is objected to can be made intelligible by the difference between the *vyāvahārika* and *pāramārthika* states. Just as for the opponent there is difference between the states of *samādhi* and *vyāvahārika*, just as even for the most stupid among the ordinary people there is the difference between the states of sleep and *vyāvahārika*, even so there is this difference (between *pāramārthika* and *vyāvahārika*). When the knower realises the Self, that is the *pāramārthika* state. In that state, there is neither the speaker nor the hearer, nor any teaching whatsoever. However, when there is the activity of instruc-

tion, etc., that is the *vyāvahārika* state. In that state there is the speaker as well as the hearer, and scripture too exists then; there is thus nothing inappropriate.

There is again the objection: “Does the knower who is enlightened possess in the *vyāvahārika* state the knowledge ‘I am Brahman’ or not? If the former, instruction will be untenable because Brahman is non-dual. If the latter, instruction will be untenable since the person is ignorant.” This argument too does not hold good. In the *vyāvahārika* state, the knowledge of Brahman-Ātman is only mediate (*parokṣa*), and so perception of difference as well as instruction is quite tenable. Only when the knowledge is immediate (*aparokṣa*), there is the absence of the perception of difference. When the mediate knowledge (of Brahman-Ātman) is absent, there cannot be instruction because the person is ignorant. It is no argument to say how the Self which has been realized as immediate can become mediate once again. So long as the release from the body (*videhakaivalya*) has not taken place, there is *avidyā* like a burnt up piece of cloth. There is mediacy for the Self only because of the concealment by *avidyā*. It is no argument to say how there could be concealment by *avidyā* when the Self is of the nature of light (*i.e.* knowledge). On the basis of the support of experience, “I am ignorant,” and also on the basis of the scriptural authority such as “They are deceived by the false” (*Chāndogya-ōpaniṣad*, 8.3.2), “Knowledge is concealed by *ajñāna*” (*Bhagavadgītā*, 5.15) it is accepted that there is concealment of the Self by *ajñāna*. So, since all kinds of dis-

inctions such as the teacher, the disciple, and scripture exist in the *vyāvahārika* state, there is justification for the perception of difference by Kṛṣṇa, the son of Vasudeva, who is the knower. There is, indeed, the *śruti* text, "Where there is duality as it were... there one sees another" (*Bṛhadāraṇyakoṇiṣad*, 2.4.14).

The truth is that instruction will be untenable only in the opponent's system. This can be explained as follows. How can the supreme Self which is the inner controller of the *jīva*, which has *jīva* as its body, instruct the *jīva*, having made the *jīva*, which is the body, its own? Indeed, instruction will be tenable only when there is the knowledge, "The *jīva* is different (from me) and I am different (from the *jīva*), and so the *jīva* is not mine." No stupid person who thinks "I am a man" gives instruction of any kind to the body which is his. "I, Devadatta, am one person; This Viṣṇumitra is another person (different from me); so he is not mine" — it is only when there is such knowledge that Devadatta who is the teacher gives some instruction to Viṣṇumitra. It cannot be said that by this knowledge, "I, the inward Self of the *jīva*, am different from the *jīva*," one gives instruction. Even when a person has the knowledge, "I am different from the body; I am the inward Self of the body," there is no instruction to the body of the *jīva*. If it be said that, since the body is material, instruction to that body is untenable, the reply is that the body is sentient so long as the Self is in it. How, then, can there be the distinction between the sentient and the insentient? No one thinks of the body which is moving and speaking as insentient. On the contrary, one thinks of ob-

jects such as clay and stone alone as insentient. Nor does the *jīva* see someone who is located within him, who is different from him who is his *śarīrin* giving him instruction whatsoever. If this were the case, on the strength of this experience it can be accepted that Īsvara, who is the *śarīrin*, gives instruction to the *jīva* who is His body.

It is no argument to say that the tenability of instruction could be accepted on the strength of the example of Kṛṣṇa instructing Arjuna, for Kṛṣṇa who is seen outside Arjuna cannot be the inward Self of Arjuna by being located within him. If it be said that He who is the inward Self in the body of Kṛṣṇa is also the inward Self in the body of Arjuna, then it will result in the theory of one Self. The opponent is an advocate of the theory of many selves. It may be argued: "He, who is located as the inward Self in the body of Arjuna, being the same as the knower in the body of Kṛṣṇa, instructs the knower who is located in the body of Arjuna." This argument is not satisfactory. As in the case of the knower in the body of Arjuna, it is necessary to admit the existence of the inward Self in respect of the knower in the body of Kṛṣṇa; if so, the inner controller of the knower in Arjuna cannot be the same as the knower in Kṛṣṇa. On the contrary, it must be the inner controller of the knower in Kṛṣṇa. Otherwise, if the inner controller itself is of the nature of the knower, it will cease to be of the nature of the inner controller. It is, indeed, called "inner controller" (*antaryāmin*) for the reason that remaining inside the knower it controls the knower. If the knower itself in Kṛṣṇa is the inner

controller of Arjuna, then it will result in the following position *viz.*, the inner controller of the knower in Kṛṣṇa is also the inner controller of the inner controller of Arjuna. This, however, is not desirable. If it is admitted that there is an inner controller of an inner controller, then another inner controller for that has to be suggested, leading to the defect of infinite regress. Also, it will go against the teaching of the "Antar-yāmi-brāhmaṇa". Therefore, the view that Īsvara who is the inner controller gives instruction to the *jīvas* who are its body is untenable, for the *jīvas* which are its body are not different from it, and also it has no instruments. The principle accepted by those well-versed in scripture is: "If both the views have the same defect, then the remedy also must be the same. In the matter of investigation into their position, one of them should not be refuted." This principle has not been heard by these disputants. Even if they have heard about it, it looks as if they do not remember it. The truth is that the standpoint of the opponent alone deserves to be set aside and not our standpoint; and this has been explained earlier.

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 खिन्नानां जलकाङ्क्षया मरुभुवि भ्रान्त्या परिभ्राम्यताम् ।
 अत्यासन्नसुधाम्बुधिं सुखकरं ब्रह्माद्वयं दर्शय-
 त्येषा शङ्करभारती विजयते निर्वाणसन्दायिनी ॥

*saṁsārādhvani tāpabhānukiranaṁ prodbhūta-dāhavyathā-
 khinnānām jalakāṅkṣayā marubhuvi bhrāntyā
 paribhrāmyatām
 atyāsannasudhāmbudhiṁ sukhakarāṁ brahmādvayaṁ
 darśayaty-
 eṣā śaṅkarabhārati vijayate nirvāṇasandāyini.*

To those who are afflicted, in the way of the world, by the burning pain given rise to by the scorching sun-shafts of misery, and who through delusion wander about in the desert (of worldliness) seeking water — showing the felicitous ocean of nectar, which is very near, the non-dual *Brahman*, this — the Voice of Śaṅkara — is victorious, leading, as it does, to liberation.