

A QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ADVAITA - VEDĀNTA

# *The VOICE of* ŚĀṆKARA

śaṅkara-bhāratī

*Chairman, Advisory Board*

*V. R. Kalyanasundara Sastri*

*Editor*

*N. C. Krishnan*



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esā śaṅkara-bhāratī vijagate  
nirvāṇa-sandāyini

victorious is the voice of śaṅkara,  
leading, as it does, to liberation

The Voice of Śaṅkara

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## HOMAGE TO ŚAṆKARA

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[ 121 ]

विनिष्क्रासितानीश तत्त्वावबोधाक्षतानां मनोभ्यो ह्यनन्याश्रयाणि।  
रजांसि प्रपन्नानि पादाम्बुजातं गुरो! रक्तवस्त्रापदेशाद्भिर्षि ॥

*vinīṣkāsitānīśatattvāvabodhān-  
natānām manobhyo hyananyāśrayāṇi  
rajāṁsi prapannāni pādāmbujātam  
guro! raktavastrāpadeśād-biḥarṣi.*

Oh Guru (Śrī Śaṅkara) who has vanquished the opponents (*anīśa* — ungodly)! do you wear the red garment (which is made red) by the mass of dust (i) (pollens) of the red lotus feet, (ii) which has clung to the feet, because of no other refuge, (iii) which has come out of the minds of the people who have resorted to your feet, after they (the people) have realised the upreme *tattva*?

[ 122 ]

मतेर्वेदशीर्षाध्वसम्प्रापकायानतानां जनानां कृपद्रैः कटाक्षैः ।  
ततेः पापवृन्दस्य शीघ्रं निहन्त्रे स्मितास्याय कुर्मो नमःशङ्कराय ॥

*mater-vedaśirṣādhwosamprāpakāy-  
ānatānām janānām kṛpādraiḥ kaṭākṣaiḥ  
tateḥ pāpavṛndasya śīghram nihantre  
smitāsyāya kurmo namaḥ ṣaṅkarāya.*

We adore Śrī Śaṅkarācārya of similing face who, by his merciful side-glances, (i) makes the mind of his devotees gain the true import of the Upaniṣadic texts, and (ii) wards off the host of sins of his devotees quickly.

Jagadguru Śrī Saccidānanda Śivābhinava Nṛsimhabhārati  
in Śrī Śaṅkarācāryabhujāṅgaprayātastotra



## ĀDI ŚAṆKARA'S UNIQUE ACHIEVEMENT\*

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*Jagadguru Śrī Candrasekharendra Sarasvatī*

Discussion on religious issues has ever been considered as the exclusive field of the privileged few. They were confined to what is usually called the "Pandit's world". In this "world" was witnessed from the days of Udayaṇa and Kumārila down to Ādi Śaṅkara fierce polemical engagements with the Buddhist and Jain monks resulting in the latter's discomfiture. Not content with this accomplishment was Lord Śaṅkara who achieved something more vital a unique victory not compassed by any others.

Skilful dialecticians and Mīmāṃsakas had already driven out other contending religions half-way, and Ādi Śaṅkara gave them the *coup de grace* completing the task. The polemics of the Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika and Mīmāṃsā were confined to the learned few; and at no time could they provide a satisfactory philosophy to the commonalty of mankind. Likewise in one sense was the Advaitic philosophy of Lord Śaṅkara to be comprehended only by the *elite*. But more important than

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\*English rendering: ARGUS

a comprehension of the philosophy on a theoretical basis is its fulfilment in action. As Śaṅkarācārya puts it in the *Vivekacūḍāmaṇi* in various verses,

ब्रह्म तत्त्वमसि भावयात्मनि ।

“*brahma tat-tvam-asi bhāvayātmani*”

“To become THAT” is a possibility only for one in a lakh or a crore of the aspirants.

After refuting the other religions, Ādi Śaṅkara gave out the profound and abstruse Advaitic doctrine not only for the enlightenment of the few but to the common man as well. How could he effect this unique achievement? While for an intellectual understanding of Advaita one needs a sharp brain, Ādi Śaṅkara promulgated his philosophy for the grasp of even one who is without much learning or wisdom, by outlining a conception of God which is a part of the living Advaitic tradition. The worship of Īsvara is the first step insisted on by Ādi Śaṅkara for the fuller realisation of Truth or Brahman. Īsvara is the highest symbol of Brahman; and a symbol is the only way open to every layman to worship the Deity which is beyond the power of words. He gave out a simple religion which every man in our country, nay, the whole of humanity can pursue by following his prescribed system of worship and prayer, devoid of all the earlier crude and obscene forms. His code of dharmic life helped the growth of sincere honest brahmins, who not only led a life of spiritual progress but were devoted to the welfare of humanity. These formed the vanguard of society who helped in the spiritual development of others as well.

These are the leaders who did not lead a procession carrying a flag, to lecture from a platform and receive garlands and gifts, but were the silent ones, "unthanked and unperceived by men" described by Ādi Śaṅkara himself in his *Vivekacūḍāmaṇi* (39):

शान्ता महान्तो निवसन्ति सन्तो वसन्तवल्लोकहितं चरन्तः ।  
तीर्णाःस्वयं भीमभवार्षावं जनानहेतुनान्यानपि तारयन्तः ॥

*śāntā mahānto nivasanti santo vasantavallokaḥhitam*  
*carantaḥ*  
*tīrṇāḥ svayam-bhīmabhavarṣaḥvaṁ janān-ahetunānyānapi*  
*tārayantaḥ*

Such a leadership alone can confer true wealth to a people by regenerating them and turning them towards spiritual aspirations; which was the unique achievement of the great Ācārya. It was a great victory indeed when He revived this Āryāvarta by giving her the oxygen of Dharma, Devotion and Selfhood. As I have been reiterating time and again, the title of "Ācārya" will befit only the Lord Śaṅkara, as he insisted not only in the development of intelligence and wisdom for all men but in the growth of such factors as the evolution of the soul (*Ātman*), character and kindly affections. This was the important lesson he taught to India and the whole world.

In pursuit of this great mission, he travelled throughout the length and breadth of our country preaching the true doctrine of Advaita, refuting contrary beliefs and denouncing the wicked practices of Kāpālikas and others. The defeat of these opponents in logical debates and dialectical discussions cannot be considered as a victory for Vaidik Hindu *dharma*. For

what is gained by arguments is only a clever feat of the intellect. How can this be helpful in the moulding of character of the people or in the promotion of devotion (*bhakti*), or in Self-experience (*ātmānubhava*)? It is here that the great Ācārya's unique victory lies, for along with teaching wisdom (*jñāna*), he educated the people in devotion to Īsvara and in the need for leading a dharmic life. His real achievement consists not only in the defeat of the contrary faiths but in the establishment of the true doctrine of the *Vedas*. It is generally affirmed that our Ācārya founded the doctrine of Advaitic wisdom by preaching the three paths *Karma*, *Bhakti* and *Jñāna*. True, of course; but it is not so wellknown that it was this great Teacher who gave a new life to the first two paths of *Karma* and *Bhakti*. *Karma* and *dharma* are closely knit together. According to the Vedic teachings, each one's dharmic way of life is determined by the *Karma* of his caste by birth. The *Gītā* too affirms the doctrine of *svadharma* being of four kinds formulated outwardly in the action of *Karma* of the four orders of our social culture, namely, *cāturvarnya*. A man should devote himself to his own natural work in life, *svadharma*, and thus acquire purification of his *citta* (mind) by which he can have a single-minded devotion to Īsvara. This wholehearted devotion or *bhakti* leads him to identification with the one absolute Reality, having annihilated egotistic self in the process.

The *Smṛtis* affirm each one's *Karma* according to his *svadharma*. The *Purāṇas* teach the doctrine of *bhakti*. The *Upaniṣads* (or the Vedānta) give the Advaitic teaching; and they are called the *śruti*. The Ācārya is the refuge or the temple where reside the

*Śruti* for *Jñāna*, the *Smṛti* for *Karma* and the *Purāṇas* for *Bhakti*, as the following *śloka* confirms:

श्रुतिस्मृतिपुराणानामालयं करुणालयम् ।  
नमामि भगवत्पादशङ्करं लोकशङ्करम् ॥

*śruti-smṛti-purāṇānām-ālayam karuṇālayam  
namāmi bhagavatpadaśaṅkaram lokaśaṅkaram.*

Our great Ācārya is not only the *jñānācārya* for the elite, but the well-wisher for all — a *loka-śaṅkara*, a merciful Lord, says the *śloka*.

With his great wisdom and emphasis on the Advaitic doctrine, it was easy for him to defeat his opponents and bring back to his fold the brahmins who were addicted to *Karma-kāṇḍa* as a means of salvation. As according to the older system of teaching when *Jñāna* was fused with the doctrine of work (*Karma*), Ādi Śaṅkara too, while emphasising the doctrine of *Jñāna*, fused it with *Karma* and *Bhakti*. Work is not to be given up, but it is to be done constantly not for selfish aggrandisement, but for the welfare of all. He made his disciples lead an "ideal" life whereby all their activities were devoted for the benefit of the whole of humanity.

Whenever Ādi Śaṅkara went to a town, he did not remain content with defeating his contentious opponents and establishing his Advaitic doctrine, but gave a new life to the temples there, by performing the *Samprokṣaṇa* ceremony, and installing the auspicious *yantra* in the shrine, thus converting the harsh and cruel deity into a beneficent, gracious and merciful God.

The very mention of the name "Ācārya" implies the doctrine of "Vedānta." The glory of this system is that it can stand the test of the most severe logic. But while the theory is foolproof, its practice is most difficult and only a few can approach to exemplify it. However, our Ācārya is to be remembered more for a greater objective he had worked for. He had given the public a new scheme for purification of the mind by means of work to be performed according to the dictates of the *Śāstras*; he rededicated the temples for the worship of the public with true love and devotion. Everyone can follow his own method of worship and prayer to his "*Iṣṭadevatā*" without offending other gods. Ādi Śaṅkara has established the "*Sanmatas*" or six schools of worship. By this system, the devoted worshippers were made to feel that the other gods too are only different forms or allotropic modifications of his own "*Iṣṭadevatā*." They (the other gods) are five companions to his own god under the name of "*Pañcāyatanam*." By this means, the great Ācārya was able to do away with the conflicts found among the worshippers of various gods, an achievement by no means inconsiderable.

## THE GREATNESS OF LORD VINĀYAKA\*

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*Jagadguru Śrī Jayendra Sarasvatī*

The adoration of Lord Vināyaka, chiefly in the form of *praṇava (oṅkāra)*, yields much good. The following story illustrates this. Once the Saint-poetess Avvaiyār was doing the worship of Lord Vināyaka. At that time St. Sundaramūrtti-nāyanār and Cēramānperumāḷi-nāyanār were travelling to Mt. Kailāsa, riding on an elephant and a horse respectively. Both of them called the saint-poetess also to come along with them. But the poetess did not heed to their call as she was not ready to stop the worship of Lord Vināyaka abruptly. She continued the worship. After the worship was over, she thought about going to Mt. Kailāsa. Suddenly Lord Vināyaka appeared before her, carried Avvaiyār on his trunk and reached Mt. Kailāsa, even ahead of all others. Therefore, for one who worships Lord Vināyaka, there is nothing impossible.

It is no use crying when adversities come in multitude. At that juncture we are tested as to how we

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\*Courtesy: *Amudamoḷi*, Śrī Ram Trust, Madras-1, 1987. Free rendering: V.K.S.N. Raghavan

use our wisdom diligently and powerfully. In fact, difficulties alone make our life lovable. They make us avail the opportunity to show our innate virtues. The Lord has endowed us with knowledge. Through this we should conquer the obstacles. Whenever we begin to do a work, we pay our obeisance to Lord Vināyaka praying for strength to cross over the impediments. Indeed, Lord Vināyaka helps us overcome all the difficulties, through His benign grace. So, if we propitiate Him, nothing in this life is unobtainable. We can even procure through His grace the things which we have lost earlier.

In the temples of Lord Viṣṇu also, many devotees pray first to Lord Viṣvaksena who has Śrī Gajānana for his principal attendant. When one has bowed to Lord Vināyaka and obtained His grace, one need not approach any other god. For, Lord Vināyaka is of the divine form of *praṇava*. Let us progress in all our endeavour by worshipping Lord Vināyaka who removes all impediments.



THE FOUR INDISPENSABLE  
QUALIFICATIONS

(an extract from  
*Sarva-vedāntā-siddhānta-sāra-saṅgraha*)

*of Śrī Śaṅkara Bhagavatpāda*

Free rendering by  
*V. K. S. N. Raghavan*

*(Continued from Vol. XII, No. 1)*

THE FOUR INDISPENSABLE  
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Free rendering by

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(Continued from Vol. XII, No. 1)

[ 13 ]

ऐहिकामुष्मिकार्थेषु ह्यनित्यत्वेन निश्चयात् ।  
नैःस्पृह्यं तुच्छबुद्ध्या यत्तद्वैराग्यमितीर्यते ॥

To be free from desire towards fruits which may be gained here or hereafter — as they are transitory and so not everlasting — is called *vairāgya* (non-attachment).

[ 14 ]

नित्यानित्यपदार्थविवेकात्पुरुषस्य जायते सद्यः ।  
स्रक्चन्दनवनितादौ सर्वत्रानित्यवस्तुनि विरक्तिः ॥

When one is able to discriminate between eternal and non-eternal things, one gains non-attachment; and, hence one becomes averse towards all ephemeral objects like garland, sandal-paste, maiden, etc.

[ 15 ]

काकस्य विष्टावदसह्यबुद्धिर्भोग्येषु सा तीव्रविरक्तिरिष्यते ।  
विरक्तितीव्रत्वनिदानमाहुर्भोग्येषु दोषेक्षणमेव सन्तः ॥

Firm non-attachment results from disgust towards objects of enjoyment when one considers them as loathsome as the excreta of a crow. The learned point out that one acquires firm non-attachment when one is able to see the defects inherent in all objects of enjoyment.

[ 16 ]

प्रदृश्यते वस्तुनि यत्र दोषो न तत्र पुंसोऽस्ति पुनः प्रवृत्तिः ।  
अन्तर्महारोगवर्ती विजानन्को नाम वेश्यामपि रूपिणीं व्रजेत् ॥

One would never seek an object inherent with defects, for none is inclined to enjoy objects, though attractive, but found to have inner deformities.

[ 17 ]

'अत्रापि चान्यत्र च विद्यमानपदार्थसंमर्शनमेव कार्यम् ।  
यथाप्रकारार्थगुणाभिमर्शनं सन्दृशयत्येव तदीयदोषम् ॥

One should investigate into the nature of the objects — either of this world or of the other world. A thorough investigation alone brings to light the inherent defects of objects.

[ 18 ]

कुक्षौ स्वमातुर्मलमूत्रमध्ये स्थितिं तथा विट्क्रिमिदंशनं च ।  
तदीयकौक्षेयकवह्निदाहं विचार्य को वा विरतिं न याति ॥

Contemplating on one's own existence in one's mother's womb amidst excreta and urine, bitten by the germs of ordure and burnt by the digestive fire (of one's own mother), who, indeed, does not get the feeling of revulsion?

[ 19 ]

स्वकीयविष्णुमूत्रविसर्जनं तच्चोत्तानगत्या शयनं तदा यत् ।  
बालग्रहाद्याहतिभाक्च शैशवं विचार्य को वा विरतिं न याति ॥

Having thought over one's childhood during which (i) one has laid oneself with one's feet up amidst one's own filth and urine, and (ii) one has been subject to the ills caused by *bālagraha* (evil stars), etc., who, indeed, does not get the feeling of revulsion?

[ 20 ]

स्वीयैः परैस्ताडनमज्ञभावमत्यन्तचापल्यमसत्क्रियां च ।

कुमारभावे प्रतिषिद्धवृत्तिं विचार्य को वा विरतिं न याति ॥

As one thinks about one's boyhood during which one is (i) beaten up by friends and foes, (ii) ignorant, (iii) very much fickle, (iv) intent on doing wicked and prohibited acts, who, indeed, does not get the feeling of revulsion?

[ 21 ]

मदोद्धतिं मान्यतिरस्कृतिं च कामातुरत्वं समयातिलङ्घनम् ।

तां तां युवत्वोदितदुष्टचेष्टां विचार्य को वा विरतिं न याति ॥

Thinking over one's youthhood during which (i) one has been puffed up with pride, (ii) one has despised the adorable, (iii) one has been lustful, (iv) one has ignored the codes of conduct, and (v) one was full of such other vices, who, indeed, does not get the feeling of revulsion?

[ 22 ]

विरूपतां सर्वजनादवज्ञां सर्वत्र दैन्यं निजबुद्धिहैन्यम् ।

वृद्धत्वसंभावितदुर्दशां तां विचार्य को वा विरतिं न याति ॥

Contemplating on the pitiable state of one's own old age when (i) one's body becomes tattered, (ii) one gets only insult from all others, (iii) one becomes helpless everywhere, and (iv) when one's intellect gets weakened, who, indeed, does not get the feeling of revulsion?

[ 23 ]

पित्तज्वरार्शःक्षयगुल्मशूलश्लेष्मादिरोगोदिततीव्रदुःखम् ।  
दुर्गन्धमस्वास्थ्यमनूनचिन्तां विचार्य को वा विरतिं न याति ॥

Thinking about one's last stage of life during which one is prone to be affected by all sorts of illness like fever, pile, enlargement of spleen, colic, cough, etc., and when one is troubled with grief because of the bad odour of the body and ill health, who, indeed, does not become disgusted with one's life?

[ 24 ]

यमात्रलोकोदितभीतिकम्पमर्मव्यथोच्छ्वासगतीश्च वेदनाम् ।  
प्राणप्रयाणे परिदृश्यमानां विचार्य को वा विरतिं न याति ॥

Thinking over the fearsome state of one's being on the verge of death when one (i) sees Yama approaching, (ii) gets frightened, (iii) is shaken, (iv) feels miserable pains at all the vital parts, and (v) gasps for breath as one's vital air leaves the body, who, indeed, does not feel disgusted with one's life?

(to be continued)

## THE THEORY OF APPEARANCE IN ŚĀŅKARA VEDĀNTA\*

---

*Satya Deva Mishra\*\**

Identity of the individual soul with the supreme self constitutes the very corner-stone of Advaita metaphysics. Śaṅkara's approach to this central doctrine through three different standpoints<sup>1</sup> has led to the emergence of three theories in the post-Śaṅkara Advaita literature, viz. *avaccheda* (limitation), *pratibimba* (reflection), and *ābhāsa* (appearance). Of these, the first two views are respectively associated with the *Bhāmatī* and the *Vivarana* schools and the third one with the *Vārttika*. The theory of appearance has been accepted by Śaṅkara himself. It has been elucidated by Suresvarācārya and others in his line of thinking. But it is a matter of great concern that in spite of the guidelines<sup>2</sup> laid down by Sarvajñātman and other Advaitins to discriminate between the *ābhāsa* and the *pratibimba*, scholars<sup>3</sup> sometimes confuse between the two and wrongly ascribe some of the supporters of *ābhāsa* to the different camp. This misunderstanding

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\* Courtesy: *Indian Philosophical Annual*, vol. 5 (pp. 272-290) University of Madras, Madras-5, 1969.

\*\* Professor of Sanskrit, Birla Institute of Technology and Science, Pilani, Rajasthan.

generally arises from a tendency to identify the terms 'ābhāsa' and 'pratibimba' and translate them by a common term 'reflection', which is adequate to the latter but not to the former. The ābhāsa, on account of this misunderstanding, has remained long enshrouded in the web of *pratibimba*. Its outstanding contributions to the Advaita Vedānta have been sought to be brought out only recently in some works' centered in the study of Vedānta with special reference to the thinkers of *ābhāsavāda*. The purpose of this paper is to bring about the implications of *ābhāsavāda* explored by Śaṅkara and expounded by Suresvara and his followers. This paper also aims at bringing out in brief the distinctions between the *ābhāsa*- and the *pratibimba-vādas*.

### I. Nature

Though the word 'ābhāsa' and its synonyms have been frequently used in the *Upaniṣads*,<sup>5</sup> *Gītā*,<sup>6</sup> and *Brahmasūtra*,<sup>7</sup> and its threefold divisions *viz.* *jātyābhāsa*, *calābhāsa*, and *vastvābhāsa* have been elaborated in the famous *Gauḍapāda Kārikā*,<sup>8</sup> yet the implication and philosophical significance of the term have been discussed and adumbrated by the celebrated Advaitin Śaṅkarācārya as long back as the eighth century, and by other prominent preceptors, who flourished still later in the successive centuries.

*Ābhāsa* or appearance, according to Śaṅkara, is a semblance of ultimate reality deeply enshrined in the mind. Indeed, this semblance or appearance is neither the Brahman itself, nor the mind, but a third entity arising from a contact of the two principles and galvanizing the latter constantly through its presence therein. This may be compared to an image of a face,



which comes into being at the time one is before a mirror. Śaṅkara in his commentary on the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad* explaining the nature of an image says, that it is always *acintya* or inexplicable.<sup>9</sup> The term '*acintya*' means that it is neither real nor unreal and nor both real and unreal. Indiscreetly, it is apt to be discarded as a self-discrepant notion, but it is not so. Just as an appearance of the face is different from the face carrying the influence for the mirror, similarly the appearance of the self is different from the self being the imitation of the conditions of its locus, the mind.<sup>10</sup> It is different from the self and so it is decidedly false;<sup>11</sup> but it appears as real as *ātman* or self like the image of a face, which appears as real.<sup>12</sup> *Avastu*<sup>13</sup> (unreal) *anātmā*<sup>14</sup> (non-self) and *cicchāyā*<sup>15</sup> (shadow of consciousness), according to Śaṅkara, are other epithets of the appearance, which reveal its character of falsity or illusoriness.

Śaṅkara discusses it at length in his *Upadeśasāhasrī* to affirm his above standpoint on the appearance and criticises other views regarding its nature. There are four alternative views about the nature of the appearance, which may be elucidated on the analogy of the appearance of a face — (a) it is a *dharma* or property either of the face or of the mirror, or (b) it is a property of the face, or (c) it is a property of both the face and the mirror, or (d) it is something real being other than the two. Śaṅkara considers all these alternatives as unsound. We shall deal with his criticism now.

The first alternative is not acceptable, as the appearance of the face, perceptible in the mirror is a property neither of the face nor of the mirror. More-

over, if it were a property of either of the two, it would continue even if the face were not in proximity of the mirror or the mirror were not in face of the face.<sup>16</sup> The second alternative, that the appearance of a face is a property of the face, because it is called after it i.e. *mukhāhbāsa*, is also not tenable; for it imitates the conditions of mirror and is certainly not perceptible when the face is present but the mirror is removed.<sup>17</sup> The third alternative suggesting it to be a property of both the mirror and the face like the *sandhyā-rāga* (red-lead) being so of both the sun and the cloud, is utterly groundless, as its existence is impossible even when the face and the mirror are present but transposed.<sup>18</sup> This imperceptibility even explained otherwise on the analogy of the black-pigment of eye will not help the situation, because no such proximity can be ascribed to it when the appearance is maintained to be a *dharma* of both the face and the mirror. The conditions of proximity etc. can in no case be upheld to be subsisting between a *dharma* and a *dharmin*.<sup>19</sup> Again if this non-perception of appearance is due to proximity, it ought not have appeared even earlier because of the said condition operating even then.<sup>20</sup> So the appearance cannot be regarded to be the property of both. The last alternative that the appearance of the face is something real but perceptible only when the mirror is placed in a particular position before it like *rāhu*, who is real but visible only during the eclipses, is similarly unacceptable, because the existence and reality of *rāhu* are supported by the scriptures irrespective of its prior or posterior perceptibility in the sun or the moon, but there is no such unquestionable evidence to prove the existence of appearance before or after the contact of face with the mirror. Moreover, there are others, who

hold that *rāhu*, too, is a shadow of the earth and as such unreal. On the ground of this latter view, the argument adduced to refute the first alternative will apply here also and establish the unreality of appearance on account of the unreality of *rāhu*. The argument of prohibition<sup>21</sup> regarding the crossing of such and other shadows of venerable teachers and parents etc. will not save the situation, as it cannot prove the reality of the shadow or appearance. A sentence after having expressed its meaning becomes incapable of expressing another sense. The prohibitory sentence is effective only in respect of prohibition, but not so with regard to establishing the reality of shadow or appearance.<sup>22</sup> To come to the main point, since the self, its appearance and the mind are comparable respectively to the face, its appearance and the mirror, it may be safely concluded that the appearance of the self is as unreal as the face inside a mirror. And this unreality of the appearance is also confirmed by the scriptures and reasoning.<sup>23</sup>

In some places, Śaṅkara describes appearance as the light of pure consciousness or self — *bodhātma-jyoti* or *ātma-jyoti* — because of its capacity to illuminate the mind and other objects. The mind illuminated by this light of the self masquerades itself to be consciousness.<sup>24</sup> The modifications of mind, too, pervaded by this light of the self, appear to be endowed with the perceptive power. Those, who think that the illumination of *bandhapratyaya* is possible owing to proximity of the *sākṣī-caitanya* itself and it is needless to accept the appearance as an extra category in this respect, are certainly mistaken, because the changeless *ātman* is of no utility in illumining the mind or its modifications.<sup>25</sup> And if we admit their contention, everything including inert

objects such as wood and lump of clay, etc. will also have mental modifications due to proximity of all-pervading self.<sup>20</sup> In order to avoid this unwelcome contingency in the universal set-up, and find worldly things in the eternally determined order, it is necessary to accept the existence of appearance between the self and the mind in pursuance of the scriptural texts such as "The individual soul and God — both are only appearances"<sup>21</sup> and "Brahman appears to be many because of adjuncts."<sup>22</sup>

Such informative and valuable discussions regarding the nature of appearance in the works of Śaṅkara clearly disprove the contention of those who hold that Śaṅkara favoured only the theory of *avacchedavāda*,<sup>23</sup> or *ekajīvanavāda*,<sup>24</sup> and strongly support the contention of Prof. A.C. Mookerji that "There is nothing central in Śaṅkara's philosophy than the theory of appearance."<sup>25</sup>

Sures'varācārya, the author of the *Vārtika* school elucidates the *ābhāsavāda* in his *Vārtikas* and *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi*. He observes in his *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi*<sup>26</sup> that the Advaita Vedānta knows no third category of being except the two — *ātman* and *anātman*. Thus the whole phenomenal objects of names and forms, visible or invisible from *māyā* to the tiniest thing fall into the category of *anātman*. And *anātman*, to him, is nothing but an appearance of one absolute reality, Brahman.<sup>27</sup> The appearance is neither real nor unreal and neither identical with nor distinct from Brahman<sup>28</sup> and it is therefore often defined by Sures'vara as one which appears to be real and established fact until the realisation of absolute reality. It cannot brook any kind of empirical enquiry, reasoning or proof, being naturally opposed

to all evidences and is therefore *avicāritasamsiddha* like *ajñāna*.<sup>31</sup> Though illusory in nature, it is *pratyakcāitanyarūpin*<sup>32</sup> or pure consciousness in essence and distinct from *ajñāna*. According to the *Vārtika*, it is one of the essential factors of the causality of universe. Suresvara advocates that Brahman appears in the form of *Īśvara*, *jīva* and the world only by being identified with its various appearances in its *ajñāna* and its various modifications.<sup>33</sup> It attributes also the characteristics of mind i.e. agency, enjoyment and other limitations to the changeless *ātman*. Suresvara holds that *ajñāna* and its objects are ever pervaded by the appearance<sup>34</sup> and hence they are called appearances of the consciousness.<sup>35</sup> As the relation between the *ajñāna* and the *ābhāsa* is of container and contained, the latter is sublated when the former along with its product like mind etc. is removed by the knowledge of the reality, as the appearance of the sun is removed when the water contained in the pitcher, etc. is removed.<sup>36</sup>

Sarvajñātman, who is said to be the disciple of Suresvarācārya, has tried to bridge the gulf between the two schools of thought, the *Vārtika* and the *Pañcapādikā* bringing the *ābhāsa* and the *pratibimba* nearer to each other and arguing the need of them in explaining the nature of God, the individual soul and the whole universe. He opines that four concepts constitute the primary (*vācya*) and the secondary (*lakṣya*) meanings of *Īśvara* and *jīva* denoted respectively as 'That' and 'Thou' in the *mahāvākya*, 'That Thou Art.' The four concepts or *padārthas* are (i) *upādhi* or adjunct, (ii) *aupādhi* i. e. the appearance of consciousness, (iii) *citpratibimba* (the reflection of consciousness and) (iv) *cidbimba* (consciousness or the prototype).

What Sarvajñātman means by *aupādhika cidābhāsa* is explained by Nṛsiṃhāśrama as follows “*aupādhikam upādhijanyaṃ—upādhyantargatam cidābhāsam caitanyasyopādhi-sannidhivaśādupādhiṣṭhatvannāma dharmo jāyate sa eva cidābhāso nāma.*”<sup>11</sup> Thus the *cidābhāsa* or appearance of consciousness is a characteristic called projectedness or locatedness of pure consciousness in the limiting adjuncts, *ajñāna* etc. owing to its proximity with the said adjuncts. It is *aupādhika* being produced by the adjunct and *āntara* i.e. innermost being immanent completely in the adjunct. Like adjunct, this *aupādhika* also is false and subject to gradual sublation in the process of *akhaṇḍa-vākyārthabodha*.

*Ajñāna, cidābhāsa, citpratibimba* and the prototype, *cit* are the constituents of *Īsvara* while the mind, *cidābhāsa, citpratibimba* and the prototype, *cit* are so of the *jīva*.<sup>12</sup> The view has been elucidated through a simile. Just as in an ordinary experience, a pot full of water is receptacle, the apprehended locatedness of the reflection in the said pot is appearance, the sun reflected in the pot and associated with the appearance is reflection, and unattached completely to the receptacle and the appearance is prototype,<sup>13</sup> so also in the case of *Īsvara* or the *jīva*, nescience or the mind is receptacle, locatedness in nescience or the mind is appearance, the consciousness appearing reflected in the nescience or the mind and associated with them is reflection and the pure consciousness unrelated to the above receptacles or appearances is prototype or *bimba*.<sup>14</sup>

A close analysis of Sarvajñātman's standpoint makes it clear that both the *ābhāsa* and the *pratibimba* are needed to explain the existence of *Īsvara* and the

*jīva* etc. The former is accepted to account for their characteristics known as *Īśvaratva* (godhood) and *jīvatva* (jīvahood) etc. and the latter for the accomplishment of their *Beings*. The appearance according to the author of *Saiṅkṣepaśārīraka* is, therefore a medium linking the terms *Īśvara*, the *jīva* and other worldly objects to their respective meanings.

Ānandagiri, who flourished in the 13th century A. D., also supports the *ābhāsa* view of Suresvarācārya. He has commented almost on all the works of Śaṅkara, Suresvara, Sarvajñātman and Ānandānubhava, and has also written some independent works. He is one of the chief exponents of the *ābhāsa* school. It has been his special attention to present comprehensively and clearly the philosophical and doctrinal implications of *ābhāsa* on the lines adopted and pursued by Suresvarācārya. He has defined *ābhāsa* in many ways. In his commentary on the *Chāndogyopanīṣadbhāṣya*, he defines it as “*ābhimukhyenāhamityāparoksyena bhāsata ityābhāsaḥ*.”<sup>13</sup> In the context of other preceding and succeeding lines, the definition may be put as “*ahamityākārapratyakṣapatītirūpeṇa bhāsamānatva-meva caitanyābhāsatvam*” Thus, according to this definition, the appearance of consciousness is a direct apprehension of I-ness is *ajñāna* and its products. The second definition — “*pratyakcīto’vamato ābhāso nāmābhāsaḥ*”<sup>14</sup> — is given in his *Śāstraprakāśikā*, a brilliant commentary on the *Bṛhadāraṇyakopanīṣadbhāṣyavārtika*. The definition literally means that ‘*Ābhāsa* is a depreciated semblance of pure consciousness’. In order to bring out the full implication of this definition we refer to a similar line from the *Bhāmatī* which explains the word — *avabhāsa*, used by Śaṅkara to define *adhyāsa*. The lines run as “*avasanno ‘vamato vābhāso’ vabhāsaḥ*.”<sup>15</sup>

The author of the *Kalpataru*, Amalānanda Sarasvatī explains the word — *avasādā* as *uccheda* and *avamāna* as *yauktikatiraskāra*.<sup>48</sup> Since these words and meanings are applicable to the word *avamata*, which explains the term *ābhāsa* or *avabhāsa*, the definition recorded in the *Śāstra-prakāśikā* will mean that ‘*Ābhāsa* is that semblance or false cognition of pure consciousness which is subject to sublation and logical discardment’. According to another definition of the *Śāstraprakāśikā*, it is the *mahimā* or glory of Brahman.<sup>49</sup> Explaining its nature in another way, Ānandagiri says in his commentary on the *Vākyasudhā*, it is a shadow of indeterminate, all-illuminating and all-conscious Brahman.<sup>50</sup> It appears generally as the attribute of adjunct, but in fact it is neither the attribute of adjunct, nor of consciousness, and neither of both nor any independent entity.<sup>51</sup> *Ābhāsa*, he says in his commentary on the *Māṇḍūkya-bhūṣya*, is ideal and false because of the non-intelligibility of its cause and effect and inscrutability of the nature.<sup>52</sup>

An objection generally levelled against the nature of *ābhāsa* has been referred to and criticised by Bodhanidhi in his commentary on the *Upadeśasāhasrī* as follows: Whether appearance is real or unreal? In the first case, is it real being other than the Brahman or being identical with the Brahman? If it is real being different from the Brahman, there is certainly a conflict with the scriptural texts which decisively declare that ‘Brahman is one and secondless’ — (*ekamevādvitīyam brahma* — *Chā. Up.* 6. 2. 1). If *ābhāsa* is regarded as identical with the supreme Brahman, both the appearance and Brahman would be synonyms of each other. Seeing that the reality of appearance is not possible in any way, if the Advaitins contend that it is unreal,



they have to answer again, whether it is nescience or its product? As the appearance, in the Advaita system, is not acceptable either as *avidyā* or its product, it cannot be taken as unreal too. Thus both the possible alternatives being untenable in establishing the existence of appearance, there can be no other reason in accepting its existence. Answering the opponent's objection, Bodhanidhī says that in the light of the above alternatives of reality or unreality, the existence of appearance cannot be denied. Just as inexplicable *avidyā* has been admitted on a permanent footing empirically as the cause of all inanimate objects in accordance with the scriptural passages and their implications, so also is to be admitted inscrutable and eternal *ābhāsa* of the self, figured as a transfiguration of consciousness.<sup>33</sup> The characterisation of appearance as a transfiguration or *vivarta* of Brahman does not militate against the Vedāntic truth, which asserts only one Brahman without any second entity, because the superimposed has no status apart from its substratum. Appearance of the self is certainly not different from the Self whether it is present or absent, just as the superimposed snake is not different from its substratum, rope, in both the alternative states of appearance or disappearance.<sup>34</sup> Though falsity constitutes its very nature, yet in the secondary meaning of reality, the reality of appearance, according to Ānandagiri, is unquestionable.<sup>35</sup>

Vidyāraṇya, who flourished after Ānandagiri,<sup>36</sup> also advocates the theory of appearance in his *Pañcadaśī*, *Anubhūtiprakāśa* and *Bṛhadāraṇyakavārttikasāra*. In the *Pañcadaśī*, he defines *ābhāsa* as a very partial manifestation of its prototype. Though it has no characteristics of prototype, yet it appears somewhat

like prototype.<sup>57</sup> The absence of the nature of the prototype in the appearance is its relatedness to the worldly objects and undergoing changes, and resemblance to the prototype is its capacity of rendering objects manifest.<sup>58</sup> This definition of appearance may be compared, as suggested by Rāmakṛṣṇa in his commentary on the verse, to the definition of *hetvābhāsa* or defective probans. *Ābhāsa* is a delusion (*bhrama*) which appears before us combining in itself the characteristics of mind i.e. activity, etc. as well as the characteristics of Self, i. e. luminosity.<sup>59</sup> Vidyāraṇya explains the illusory nature of *cīdābhāsa* on the analogy of the appearance of china-rose in a crystal and maintains that as the redness of a china-rose is only a fabrication in the crystal, so the appearance is a superimposition on the consciousness.<sup>60</sup> Citing a number of verses from the *Upadeśasūhasrī* and the *vārttikas* from the *Bṛhadāraṇyakoṇiṣadbhāsyavārttika*, he explains that the above false nature of appearance is totally in conformity with the views expressed by Śaṅkara and Śuresvara.<sup>61</sup> To sum up, in the words of T. M. P. Mahadevan, "According to the theory propounded in the *Pañcadaśī*, the *ābhāsa* is wholly illusory."<sup>62</sup>

Śaṅkarānanda in his commentary on the *Ṣaṭpadīstava* of Śaṅkara defines *ābhāsa* as "*tallakṣaṇarahitatve sati tadvadābhāsamānatvameva tadābhāsatvam.*"<sup>63</sup> This definition has been referred to in the *Vedāntasamjñāprakaraṇa* with a slight change as "*cīdvadavabhāsamānatve sati cillakṣaṇarahitatvāccīdābhāsaḥ iti ca vyapadiśyate.*"<sup>64</sup> According to these definitions, that semblance of consciousness is called *ābhāsa* which, though having no characteristics of consciousness, appears to be consciousness.

Brahmānanda in his commentary on the *Advaita-siddhi* explains *ābhāsa* as one, which cannot be cognised without the consciousness conditioned by it.<sup>63</sup>

To sum up this point of discussion, *ābhāsa* is a depreciated semblance of supreme Self in *ajñāna* and its products, appearing as real, intelligent and luminous till it is viewed through the valid means of knowledge or the cognitive process and exterminated by the true knowledge of Self.

### NOTES

1. (a) *pāra evātmā dehendriyamanobuddhyupādhibhīḥ paricchidyamāno bālaiḥ śarīra ityupacaryate. yathā ghaṭa-karakūdyupādhi-vaśādaparıcchinnamapī nabhaḥ paricchinnavadavabhāsate tadvat* (*Brahma-sūtrabhāṣya*, 1.2.6). Also *ibid.*, 1.2.20, 1.2.22. and *Taittirīyabhāṣya*, 2.7.

(b) *sarvadeśakālapuruṣādyavasthamekameva jñānam nāmarūpādyenkopādhibhedāt savitrāḍījalādipratibimbavadanekadhā'vabhāsata itī* (*Praśnabhāṣya* 6.2.)

See also *Aitareyabhāṣya*, 3.1.; *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*, 3.2.20; *Viveka-cūḍāmaṇi*, v. 500; *Muṇḍakabhāṣya* 2.7;4. 9; *Praśnabhāṣya*, 4. 9. and *Sarvavedāntasiddhāntasōrasaṅgraha*, v. 804.

(c) *ābhāsa caiṣa jīvaḥ parasyātmano jalasūryakāḍivat pratipattavyaḥ* (*Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*, 2.3.50). Cf. also *jīvo hi nāma devatāyā ābhāsamātram* (*Chāndogyabhāṣya* 6.3.2); *Laghuvākyaṣṭi*, v. 2. and *Bṛhadāraṇyakabhāṣya*, 2.4.2.)

These three different conceptions serve as the kernels of the above noted theories of Advaita Vedānta.

2. *upādharmaupādhikamāntaram cidābhāsanam citpratibimbakam ca. cidbimbamevam caturāḥ padārthān vivicya jñāhi tadarthabhūjah.* (*Samkṣepaśārīraka*, 3, 275). Cf. also *ibid.*, 3.276-81. See also "tasya ca pratibimbasya satyatvameveti pratibimbavūḍinaḥ, mithyāvatmevetyābhāsavūḍinaḥ." (*Siddhāntabindu*, GOS, p. 16)

and the commentary on the *Siddhāntabindu* by V.S. Abhyankar, p. 25.

3. Vidyāraṇya and Ānandagiri are both staunchest supporters of *ābhāsavāda*. But Mm. Vasudeva Sastri Abhyankara in his introduction to the *Siddhāntabindu* asserts that Vidyāraṇya has totally accepted the *pratibimbavāda*. Similarly Dr. B.K. Sengupta in his 'A Critique on the Vivaraṇa School' mistakes Ānandagiri as one of the supporters of the *Vivaraṇa* school (see. p. 270).

4. (i) T. M. P. Mahadevan: *The Philosophy of Advaita*. (ii) V. P. Upadhyaya : *Lights on Vedānta*. (iii) S. D. Mishra: 'A Critical and Comprehensive Study of the Different Sub-schools of Ābhāsavāda in Śāṅkara-Advaitism.'

5. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Up.* 1.4.7, 2.1.8, 2.1.9, 2.1.12, 2.5.19, 3.9.14, and 3.9.15. *Chāndogya Up.* 6.3.2; *Śvetāśvatara Up.* 2.14 and 3.17; *Praśna Up.* 3.3.; *Katha Up.* 2.10; and 2.12. *Nṛsiṃha Up.* 9.

6. See vv. 6.31, 7.7, 13.14 and 15.15.

7. See *sūtras* 2.3.47, 2.3.50, 3.2.15, 3.2.18. and 3.2. 19-21.

8. *jātyābhāsam'calābhāsam vastvābhāsam tathaiva ca* (*Māṇḍūkya Kārikā*, 4. 45).

9. *acintyāste yataḥ sadaiva* (3.4).

10. *mukhādanyo mukhābhāso yathādarśānukārataḥ* (*Upadeśasāhasrī*, 18.32)

11. *mukhābhāso yathādarśe ābhāsaścodito mṛṣā* (*Ibid.* 18.87) See also *ibid.* 18.114.

12. *mukurastham mukham yadvanmukhavat prathate mṛṣā. budhisthābhāsakastadvadātmavat prathate mṛṣā.* (*Advaitānubhūti*, v. 63).

13. "avastutvāccidābhāso..." (*Svātmaprakāśikā*, v. 37) and "ābhāsasyāpyavastutaḥ" (*Upadeśasāhasrī*, 18.44).

14. *Upadeśasāhasrī*, 18.108; *Vivekacūḍāmaṇi*, v. 165 and 220-22.

15. *Upadeśasāhasrī*, 12.6.

16. *mukhābhāso ya ādarśe dharmo nānyatarasya saḥ, dvayor-ekasya ceddharmo viyukte'nyatare bhavet* (*Upadeśasāhasrī*, 18.37).

17. *mukhena vyapadeśāt sa mukhasyaiveti cenmatam. nādarś-ānubidhānācca mukhe satyavibhāvataḥ* (Ibid., 18.38).

18. *dvayoreveti cettanna dvayorevāpyadarśanāt* (Ibid., 18.39)

19. *akṣisāmīpyāccakṣurgatāñjanāderiva tadanupalabdhiḥ syād-iti cennaivam ābhāsasyobhayadharmatvūbhyupagamād dharmasya ca dharmīnaḥ sāmīpyādi-viśeṣābhāvāt.* (Bodhanidhi's commentary on *Upadeśasāhasrī*, 18.39) [Govt. Oriental Manuscripts Library, Madras, Ms. No. R. 1961].

20. *yadi sāmīpyādanupalabdhiḥ pūrvamāpi mukhasāmīpyasya vidyamānatvūdanupalabdhiḥ syāttāsānubhayadharmāḥ.*

(Bodhinidhi's commentary on *Upadeśasāhasrī*, 18.39) [Govt. Oriental Manuscripts Library, Madras, Ms. No. R. 1961].

21. 'nākramet kāmataḥ cchāyām gurvūdeḥ' and 'devartvik-snātakācūryarājñām cchāyām parastrīyaḥ nākramet' (quoted by Rāmatīrtha in his commentary on *Upadeśasāhasrī*, 18.39).

22. See *Upadeśasāhasrī* 18, 40-41, and also — *yoy'am niṣedhaḥ sa lokataḥ praptāyāḥ cchāyāḥ lañghana-pratiśedhaparo pratiśedhaparo na cchāyāvastutvasādhaḥ* (Bodhanidhi's commentary on *Upadeśasāhasrī*, 18.41. (Govt. Oriental Manuscripts Library, Madras, Ms. No. R. 1961).

23. *Upadeśasāhasrī*, 18.43.

24. *bodhātmajjyotiṣā diptā bodhamātmani manyate. buddhir-nānyo'sti boddheti* (ibid. 16,60).

25. Ibid., 18.71.

26. *nādhyakṣe'nupakāritvūdanyatrāpi <sup>1</sup>prasaṅgataḥ* (ibid., 18.75).

27. 'jīveśau ābhāsenā karoti' (*Nṛsimha Up.* 6).

28. "rūpam rūpam pratirūpo babhūva" (*Bṛhadāraṇyaka Up.* 2.5.19).

29. Rāmakṛṣṇa T. Vyas: *bhagavatpāda śrīmacchaṅkarā-, cāryāṅām avacchedavāda evābhīpretah* (Sāmvid, Varṣa 2, Aṅka 1-2, 1965).

30. Notes on *Siddhāntabindu* by Sri Chandrasekhar Diwan, p. 94. Cf. also 'Maṅḍana, Sureśvara and Bhavabhūti' by Dinesh Chandra Bhattacharya. I.H.Q. 1931, Vol. VII, p. 302.

31. The Status of Appearance in Śaṅkara's Philosophy. (I.P.Q., 1931-32, Vol. vii. p. 217).

32. *iha ca padārthadvayam nirdhāritam ātmā ca anātmā ca* (chap. III, p. 104).

33. *tadanyat-yat-tadābhāsam...* (*Bṛhadāranyakopaniṣadbhāṣyavārttika*, 2.3.19).

34. *vāstavo'vāstavo vā na vyatireko na cānyataḥ* (ibid. 2.3. 21).

35. *avicāritasamsiddhatamovat syāttadudbhavam* (ibid. 1.4. 1329).

36. Ibid., 4.3.174.

37. *svābhāsaphalakārūḍhah tadajñānājabhūmiṣu. tatstho'pi tadasambaddhah īśvarādyātmatām gataḥ* (ibid. 1.3.53)

38. *api pratyaktamo nityam bhāsvaccaitanyabimbitam. bud-dhitavṛttayaccainām taptāyo viṣphuliṅgavat.* (ibid. 1.4.834). Cf. also vv. 3.4.15, 4.3.555, 4.3. 99.

39. *cidābhāsam tamojñeyam nājñāsiṣamiti kṣaṇāt* (*Br. Vārt-tika*, 1.4. 342), *ajñānādītrayam pratyagābhāsam.* (ibid., 3.3.41)

40. and 'kūṭasthātmacidābhē'sya pratyagdhvānte hi tad-bhavaḥ. viṣayantairbhavedbhrāntiḥ samānādhikaranyataḥ' (ibid. 4.3.393).

41. *buddhyādikāryasaṅhāre pratyakcaitanyarūpiḥ. cidbim-basyāpti saṅhāro jalārkapravalāpavat.* (ibid. 4.3.174).

See *Samkṣepaśūrīraka* with the *Tattvabodhinī*, 3.275, p. 977.

42. *upādhimaupādhikamāntaram cidābhāsanam citpratibimbakam ca. cidbimbamevam caturah padārthān vivicya jānīhi tadarthabhājah. tathā tvamarthe'pi catuṣṭayam tad vivecanīyam nipuṇena bhūtvā. matih cidābhāsanamevamasyām bimbam tadīyam pratibimbakam ca* (*Saṁkṣepa Śārīraka*, 3.275-76).

43. *appātramappātragatatvamevamappātrago'ppātragatādabhiṣca. divākaro divyavatiṣṭhamāno na śakyate'pohitumiddhatejāh'* (*ibid.*, 3.280).

44. *upādhirajñānamanādisiddhamasmin cidābhāsanamiśvaratvam, tadanvitā citpratibimbakam syādudīryate śuddhacideva bimbam, upādhirantahkaraṇam tvamarthe jīvatvamābhāsanamatra tadvat. tadanvitā citpratibimbamevamanavitām tāmīha bimbamāhuḥ.* (*ibid.* 3. 277-78).

45. See the commentary on 6.3.2, p. 297.

46. See the commentary on 2.1.216.

47. See *Bhāmatī*, p. 11.

48. See *Kalpataru*, p. 18.

49. *svasya pratīco mahimā tadābhāsaḥ* (*Śāstraprakāśikā*, 4.3.53).

50. 'cit' nirvikalpam sarvāvabhāsakam jñānam pratyagātmasvarūpam tasya 'cchāyā' ābhāsaḥ (commentary on v. 6).

51. *ābhāsaśca na bimbadharmo nā'pyupādhidharmo nāpi svatantra ityatra pratipāditam* (*ibid.*).

52. *ābhāsanam...kūryakāraṇatayā durvacanatvādābhāsaḥ sarvadaiva nirūpayitumaśakyatvānmāyāmayāḥ santo mithyaiva bhavantiyarthah* (4.51-52).

53. *yathā śrutitadarthāpattibhyāmavidyā'nirvacanīya jaḍavivartahetutvenānādirabhyupagamyate tathānirūpita-rūpa ātmābhāso'nādiścidvivaratūpatvenābhyupagantavyah.* (Commentary on *Upadeśasāhasrī*, 18.31). (Govt. Oriental Manuscripts Library, Madras, Ms. No. R. 1961).

54. *kalpitasarpasya rajjvatiriktasattvāsattvā'dṛṣṭerityarthah'* (*Śāstraprakāśikā*, 1.3.188).

55. *mithyātve'pi tallakṣyasya sanmātrasya satyatvamiti vyavasthetyarthah* (*Chāndogyabhāṣyaṭīkā*, 6.3.2. p. 298).

56. See T. M. Tripathi's Introduction to *Terkasaṅgraha*, p. xx.

57. *iṣadbhāsanamābhāsaḥ pratibimbaḥ tathāvidhaḥ, bimbalakṣaṇahīnaḥ san bimbavad-bhāsate sa hi.* (*Pañcadaśī* 8.32).

58. *sasaṅgatvavikārābhyam bimbalakṣaṇahīnatā, sphūrtirūpatvametasya bimbavadbhāsanam viduḥ* (*Ibid.* 8.33).

59. *kartṛtvādin buddhidharmān sphūrtyākhyām cātmarūpatām dadhadvibhāti purata ābhāso'to bhramo bhavet* (*Ibid.* 8.52).

60. *japākusumaraktatvam sphaṭike kalpyate yathā, cidābhāsa-praveśo'yaṁ cityadhyūropyate tathā* (*Anubhūtiprakāśa*, 13.9).

Cf. also *ibid.* 13.20, *Bṛhadāraṇyakavārttikasāra*. 1.4.437, 2.154 and 2.1.103.

61. *iti vārttikakāreṇa citsādṛśyam vivakṣitam. brahmacitphalāyorbhedah sāhasryām viśruto yataḥ.* (*Pañcadaśī* 8.12); see also *ibid.* 8.1; 6.87 to 99 and 7.280.

62. See *The Philosophy of Advaita* (with special reference to Bhāratīrtha Vidyāraṇya), Ch. vii. p. 225.

63. See Diamond Jubilee Commemoration Volume 1, Booklet No. 22, p. 25.

64. *Ibid.*, Booklet No. 14, p. 25.

65. See *Laghucandrikā*, p. 325.

(to be continued)



## THE SELF AND THE BODY\*

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*Śrī Sureśvarācārya*

[ 1 ]

वर्चस्कं त्वन्नकार्यत्वाद्यथा नात्मेति गम्यते ।  
तद्भागः सेन्द्रियो देहस्तद्वत्किमिति नेक्ष्यते ॥

Just as the excretion is not regarded as the Self since it is the product of food, why is it that the body along with the senses, also a product of food, is not viewed in the same way?

In the following verses Sureśvara adduces a number of reasons to show how the Self is different from the gross body (*sthūla-sarīra*).

Sureśvara argues that the body and the senses are on a par with the excretion (*varcaska - purīṣa*). If the latter is treated as not-Self, the former too must be treated as not-Self, because all of them are products of food (*anna-kāryatvāt*). The reasoning can be formulated in the form of an inference as follows:

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\* Extract from the *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi* II, 11-21. Translation and notes: Dr. R. Balasubramanian.

The body and the senses are not-Self.  
 Because they are products of food (*annakāryatvāt*).  
 Whatever is a product of food is not-Self, *e.g.* excretion.

[ 2 ]

आद्यन्तयोरनात्मत्वे प्रसिद्धे मध्येऽपि कः प्रतिबन्धः ?

प्राग्नात्मैव जग्धं सदात्मतामेत्यविद्यया ।

स्रगालेपनवद्देहं तस्मात् पश्येद्विविक्तधीः ॥

If what is in the beginning as well as what is at the end is obviously not-Self, what is the difficulty in admitting it to be such in the middle?

What is not-Self before gets the status of the Self after consumption, due to *avidyā*. So a man of discrimination should see the body like a garland and ointment.

What exists as food in the beginning becomes, after consumption, excretion at the end. Both food and excretion are not-Self. When the same food assumes the form of the body and the senses during the interval, people, due to ignorance, consider it as the Self, though in truth it is not-Self. The idea which Sureśvara wants to drive home is that what is not-Self in the beginning and in the end cannot be the Self in the middle. Sureśvara's point can be stated in the form of an *anumāna* as follows:

The body and the senses are not-Self.  
 Because they are of the nature of food (*annātmatvāt*).  
 Whatever is of the nature of food is not-Self, *e.g.* excretion.

In the second line of the verse Sureśvara gives another reason to show that the body and the senses are not-Self. A garland which a person puts on or an ointment which he

applies to the body is incidental or adventitious (*āgantuka*); likewise, the appearance of the body and the senses are incidental. If so, they must be treated as not-Self like a garland or ointment. The argument is as follows:

The body and the senses are not-Self.  
Because they are adventitious (*āgantukatvāt*).  
Whatever is adventitious is not-Self, *e.g.* a garland.

[ 3 ]

अथैवमपि मद्ब्रचनं नाद्रियसे, स्वयमेवैतस्माच्छरीरादशुचिराशेर्निराशो  
भविष्यसि ।

मन्यसे तावदस्मीति यावदस्मान्न नीयसे ।  
श्वभिः क्रोडीकृते देहे नैवं त्वमभिमंस्यसे ॥

Even though my word is not accepted, you will have, on your own, revulsion from this body, a heap of impurities.

As long as you are not taken out of this (body), you think "I am this (body)." You do not have this identification when this body is embraced by dogs.

A person identifies himself with his body so long as he is tenanting it. But he has to leave the body which is perishable. Since it has a beginning, it has an end, and whatever has a beginning must have an end. When a person leaves the body at the time of death, it is taken care of by dogs and other animals. Sureśvara's argument to show that the body is not-Self can be formulated as follows:

This body is not-Self.  
Because it goes away (*apāyitvāt*).  
Whatever goes away is not-Self, *e.g.* a pot.

[ 4 ]

शिर आक्रम्य पादेन भर्त्सयत्यपरान् शुनः ।  
दृष्ट्वा साधारणं देहं कस्मात् सक्तोऽसि तत्र भोः ॥

Standing on the head (of the body), one dog fights with other dogs. Having seen that the body becomes the common possession, oh, how is it you are attached to it?

A person claims that the body he is tenanting is "his". But the same body is claimed by dogs and other animals as "theirs". It is nothing but ignorance to be attached to the body which becomes the common property of both men and animals.

[ 5 ]

श्रुतिपरिप्रापितोऽयमर्थोऽनात्मा बुद्ध्यादिदेहान्त इतीदमाह ।  
बुसत्रीहिपलालांशैर्बीजमेकं त्रिधा यथा ।  
बुद्धिमांसपुरीषांशैरन्नं तद्वदवस्थितम् ॥

The following is stated to show that it is the view of *śruti* that everything from the intellect down to the body is not-Self.

Just as a seed changes into the three forms of chaff, grain, and bran, even so the food assumes the forms of intellect, flesh and excretion.

So far Sureśvara established on the basis of reasoning that the body and the senses are not-Self. He now shows that there is also the support of *śruti* for his view. The *Chândogya Upaniṣad* (6.5.1) says: "Food, when eaten, becomes threefold: its coarsest portion becomes the faeces; its middle

portion (becomes) flesh; and its subtlest portion (becomes) the mind.”

[ 6 - 7 ]

यथोक्तार्थप्रतिपत्तौ सत्यां, न रागद्वेषाभ्यां विक्रियते विपश्चिदित्यस्यार्थस्य प्रतिपत्तये दृष्टान्तः ।

वर्चस्के सम्परित्यक्ते दोषतश्चावधारिते ।

यदि दोषं वदेत्तास्मै किं तत्रोच्चरितुर्भवेत् ॥

तद्वत्सूक्ष्मे तथा स्थूले देहे त्यक्ते विवेकतः ।

यदि दोषं वदेत्ताभ्यां किं तत्र विदुषो भवेत् ॥

The (following) example is given in order to convey the idea that a man of knowledge, if what has been stated is understood (by him), will not be subject to desire and aversion.

When the faeces is excreted and when its impurity is known, how does it affect him when someone speaks about its impurity?

In the same way, when the gross and subtle bodies are discarded through discrimination, how does it affect the man of knowledge when someone speaks about their defect?

A person does not feel sorry when he knows, and also when others talk about, the impurity of faeces excreted by him. In the same way, a man of knowledge is not affected in any way when he knows that the gross and subtle bodies with which he identified himself earlier are not-Self. The expression “*dehe tyakte*” means *dehābhimāna-tyāge*, i.e. when the identification with the body, gross and subtle, is given

up. The idea is that a man of knowledge is free from *dehābhimāna*.

When a person realizes that the Self is different from the gross and subtle bodies, he is not afflicted by *rāga* and *dveṣa* (desire and aversion) which are the sources of evil. Freedom from *rāga-dveṣa* is the *dr̥ṣṭa-phala* of the attainment of the right knowledge.

[ 8 ]

एतावदेव ह्यहं ब्रह्मास्मीति वाक्यार्थाप्रतिपत्तौ कारणं यदुत बुद्ध्यादौ देहान्ते ह्यहंमेति निस्सन्धिवन्धनो ग्रहः । तद्व्यतिरेके हि न कुतश्चिद्विभज्यत, एकल एव प्रत्यगात्मन्यवतिष्ठत इत्याह ।

रिपौ बन्धौ स्वदेहे च समैकात्म्यं प्रपश्यतः ।

विवेकिनः कुतः कोपः स्वदेहावयवेष्विव ॥

The (false) notion of "I" and "mine" with regard to objects beginning with the intellect down to the body, which continuously clings to a person — it is this notion, indeed, that is the cause of the non-comprehension of the meaning of the sentence, "I am Brahman." If, on the contrary, (there is the right knowledge), a person is not separated from anyone else when he remains as the one inward Self (of all). So the following is stated.

How can a wise man who sees the same Self in an enemy, in a kinsman, and in his own body be angry (with anyone), just as (one cannot be angry) with the organs of one's own body?

Sureśvara emphasizes the idea that one cannot understand the import of the *śruti* text, "*tat tvam asi*", so long as

one does not give up the false identification with the mind-sense-body complex. What separates a person from another is the mind-sense-body complex which serves as the adjunct (*upādhi*) of the Self. When a person realizes that the Self which is in all beings — a friend and a foe, a beast and a man — is one and the same (*ekala*), he cannot have hatred towards anyone.

[ 9 ]

इतश्चानात्मा देहादिः ।

घटादिवच्च दृश्यत्वात् तैरेव करणैर्दृशेः ।

स्वप्ने चानन्वयाज्ज्ञेयो देहोऽनात्मेति सूरिभिः ॥

For this reason also, body and other objects are not-Self.

Since the body, like pot, etc., is seen by the same sense-organs, and since it does not continue in dream, it should be known as not-Self by the wise.

Sureśvara argues in a different way to show that the body is not-Self. Here he makes use of *drśyatva* as the *hetu* which has been used by Gauḍapāda and Śaṅkara for proving the illusoriness (*mithyātva*) of the world which is not-Self. While the Self is knowledge (*jñāna*) by its very nature, pot, pan, and other things which are perceived by us are objects of knowledge (*jñeya*). The latter are different from the Self, because they are perceived (*drśyatvāt*) by one or more of our sense-organs; but the Self can never be perceived. Since I see my body in the same way as I see an external object such as a pot, the body, like a pot, must be not-Self. It may be mentioned here that the Self which is knowledge is never an object of knowledge. If it were an object of knowledge in the sense in which a tree or a table is an object of knowledge, it would cease to be the Self. So the body which

is seen and which is, therefore, an object of knowledge is not-Self. We may summarize this discussion in the following propositions.

(1) The body which is seen is *jñeya*. (2) The Self which is *svaprakāśa* is *jñāna* (*—caitanya*). (3) What is *jñeya* is different from *jñāna*, and *vice versa*. It means that *jñeya* can never be *jñāna*, and *jñāna* can never be *jñeya*. (4) Since the body is *jñeya*, it is different from the Self which is *jñāna*. So the body is not-Self.

The same idea can be conveyed in the form of an *anumāna*:

The body is not-Self.

Because it is seen (*dṛśyatvāt*).

Whatever is seen is not-Self, *e.g.* a pot.

In the second line of the verse Sureśvara adduces another reason to establish the same point. We have not only waking experience, but also dream experience. The body with which we identify ourselves at the waking level (*jāgrat*) and transact business through it does not continue during our dream experience (*svapna*). It is through some other body, *e.g.* the body of an angel or that of a beast, that business is transacted at that time. When a person moves from dream to the waking level, he has once again association with the same body of the waking experience which disappeared at the time of dream. In short, the body we are familiar with appears and disappears. The Self, on the contrary, is uniformly present in all the three levels of experience *viz.* waking, dream, and sleep; it persists all the time as the witness (*sākṣin*) to the presence as well as the absence of things. Since the body comes and goes away, it is not-Self. The argument can be formulated as follows:

The body is not-Self.

Because it appears and disappears (*āgamāpāyitvāt*).

Whatever appears and disappears is not-Self, *e.g.* a pot.



[ 10 ]

देहादिकार्यकरणसङ्घातव्यतिरेकाव्यतिरेकदर्शिनः प्रत्यक्षत एव विरुद्धं  
कार्यमुपलभ्यते ।

चतुर्भिरुह्यते यत्तत्सर्वशक्त्या शरीरकम् ।  
तूलायते तदेवाहंधियाघ्रातमचेतसाम् ॥

One who knows the Self as different or as non-different from the body, etc., which are the aggregate of factors which are effects as well as instruments, directly sees the contradictory results (which arise therefrom).

That body which is removed by four persons with all their strength is light like cotton to an ignorant person who is overcome by the sense of identification with it

The body is composed of several factors which are the effects of other things and which serve as instruments. It is, therefore, referred to as *kārya-kāraṇa-saṅghāta*. One and the same body, says Sureśvara, is viewed differently by different people. Consider the case of an ignorant man who identifies himself with his body. He does not feel the heaviness of his body, and is able to move about comfortably with his body as though it is flimsy like cotton. He has *mithyā-jñāna*, because he does not know that he is different from his body. But the pall-bearers who carry his body do not identify themselves with it, because they know that they are different from it. Consequently, these people who have the discriminating knowledge (*viveka-jñāna*) know how heavy the body is. The body which is light to one who has *mithyā-jñāna* is heavy to another person who has *viveka-jñāna*. The very fact that the body evokes responses which are mutually opposed (*viruddha-kārya*) depending on the situation — whether it

serves as the *upādhi* to the Self which is related to it or not — shows, declares Sureśvara, that it is not the self.

[ 11 ]

प्रसिद्धत्वात् प्रकरणार्थोपसंहारायाह ।

स्थूलं युक्त्या निरस्यैवं नमसो नीलतामिव ।

देहं सूक्ष्मं निराकुर्यादतो युक्तिभिरात्मनः ॥

Since this idea is well-known, by way of concluding the topic under discussion the following is said.

After differentiating the gross body (from the Self) through reasoning in this way, just as blueness is differentiated from the sky, the subtle body also should be differentiated from the Self through reasonings.

The distinction between the Self and the gross body is accepted by all schools excepting the Cārvāka. Sureśvara suggests that there is no need to labour on this point which will be obvious with a little reflection on the issue.

ELUCIDATION OF CONTENTMENT

by

*Dr. T. M. P. Mahadevan*

*(Contd. from Vol. XII, No. 1)*

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That there is a kind of *prārabdha* which is preceded by non-desire is evident from the conversation between Kṛṣṇa and Arjuna. Arjuna asks Kṛṣṇa: "Prompted by what does the *puruṣa* walk in sin, even without his desire, O Vārṣṇeya, as if impelled by force?" To this Kṛṣṇa replies: "It is desire, it is anger, born of the constituent of *rajas*: of great appetite and very sinful; know this here to be the foe."<sup>13</sup> It is the drive of desire which goads a man to action even without his will. It drags him to sinful ways and degrades his moral sense. Natural tendencies and propensities compel man to conform to them even against his wishes. Kṛṣṇa declares in the *Gītā*, "Bound, O son of Kuntī, by your own deeds, born of your own nature, you shall helplessly do out of delusion what you (now) desire not to do."<sup>14</sup>

The nature of the *prārabdha* which yields consequences due to the desire of another is as follows: when a particular act is neither desired nor undesired by the agent, it so happens sometimes that the agent is obliged to do that act in deference to the wishes of another person. This is a case of the *prārabdha* which is preceded by the desire of another. The deeds of the enlightened one fall under this category. He knows the defectiveness of the world, and yet he is obliged to act.

### 9. *Brahman-knowledge and Prārabdha*

"If desire due to *prārabdha* be natural even to the knower of truth, why then does the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* text deny the possibility of desire in his case in the words 'desiring what', etc. The text unambiguously declares the non-existence of desire in him who knows the truth. How can this assertion be reconciled with the fact that he comes to possess desires due to the

residual effects of his *prārabdha*?" To this objection the reply is: the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* text does not deny the existence of desires in the case of one who knows the truth. It declares only the sublation of desires. Desires there are even for the enlightened; but they are unproductive of further effects. Like fried grains, they are impotent to produce fresh shoots. The desire of the knower is unproductive because he knows the unreality of the object of his desire. Just as fried grains are useful for eating and not for sprouting, the desires of the knower of the truth give him a little enjoyment, but they do not entail in their train any more of their kind. The deeds which have begun to bear their fruit perish when they have borne their fruit. Since *prārabdha* is the cause only of enjoyment, it dies with the destruction of its product. There can be misery only when there is the delusion that the object of enjoyment is real. The person who possesses true knowledge is devoid of such delusion; and hence he is not worried by his *prārabdha*. The delusion that the object of enjoyment is real is of the form: "Let not this enjoyment perish. Let it increase more and more. Let there be no obstruction to it. On account of it I am, indeed fortunate." This delusion is overcome by the knowledge which enables a person to transcend both likes and dislikes. Though enjoyment is common to the enlightened and the ignorant alike, the latter come to grief while the former do not. The deluded people are very much grieved because they wish for impossible things. They desire the permanence of things which are impermanent. They wish to squeeze happiness out of the objects of enjoyment which are by nature the source of misery. The wise men, on the contrary, know the illusoriness of sense-enjoyment.

Withdrawing their desires from sense-objects, they enjoy only such of those which are the result of their *prārabdha* and do not come to grief. Observing the world to be of an impermanent and indeterminable nature, comparable to the dream and the *fata morgana*, how can the knower of truth be attached to it? Who, except those who are perverse, will drink poison after knowing its fatal consequences? The man who watchfully experiences both waking and dream should constantly ponder over the points of similarity between them. The world is no better than a dream. When the fictitious character of the world is well cognized, attachment to the objects of the world ceases, along with the cessation of the cognition of reality in them.

“If the knower of truth knows that the world is but an illusory appearance, if he sees no reality in the objects of sense, how is enjoyment possible to him? The enjoyment of a thing is dependent on the knowledge of the thing to be real. The cognition of the unreality of a thing and the enjoyment thereof are mutually incompatible.” The reply to this objection is that the enjoyment of an object is not dependent on the object being real. There can be the experience of illusion even after the knowledge of its illusoriness. The *fata morgana* appears equally to those who know its unreality and to those who take it to be real. The enjoyment born of *prārabdha* does no harm to him who does not forget that “this world of duality is, like the magician’s world, indeterminable in nature.” There is the restriction that true knowledge gives us the clear memory of the illusoriness of the world. But there is no rule that it is incompatible with the enjoyment of one’s *prārabdha*. The obstinacy of *prārabdha* is in compelling the *jīva* to enjoy pleasure and suffer

pain, and not in postulating the reality of the objects of enjoyment. Knowledge and *prārabdha* are not contradictories, since they have different contents, like the colour and taste of a substance. The magical feat is witnessed even by him who knows it to be fictitious. If *prārabdha* occasions the reality of the world and then produces enjoyment, it would be in conflict with knowledge. But mere enjoyment does not induce any sense of reality in the object enjoyed. *Prārabdha* originates enjoyment even without invoking the cognition of the reality of the object. Undiminished enjoyment is caused by the fictitious objects of the dream-world. Similarly, even the objects of waking experience are capable of effecting enjoyment without themselves being real.

Knowledge is not the destroyer of *prārabdha* because it does not effect the dissolution of the world. It reveals only the illusory nature of the world and by that the world is not dissolved. Just as the people of the world, while not denying the fact of magical feat, know it to be fictitious, the knower of truth, while not discarding the enjoyment generated by *prārabdha*, possesses the cognition of the illusoriness of the world.

“True knowledge is the cause of the dissolution of the world. Scripture declares: ‘Where indeed the world is his self, there who shall see whom and by what? What shall he smell? Or what shall he speak?’ It is evident from this statement that in the state of knowledge there is no empirical usage of the distinctions and divisions of the world. There are no seer and the seen, no doer and the deed. If this be the case, how can there be, for the knower of the truth, enjoyment generated by *prārabdha*? Knowledge



destroys duality, and without duality there can be no action and the enjoyment of its fruit." To this objection the reply is as follows: The *Brahmasūtra* (IV, 4, 17) declares: "(What scripture says about absence of all specific cognition) refers either to deep sleep or union (release), for this is manifested (by the texts)." What the texts say about the absence of specific cognition is said with reference to either the state of dreamless sleep or to the state of release. If this be not admitted and if it be asserted that true knowledge is incompatible with the appearance of duality, then Yājñavalkya and others would not have been preceptors. For if there be perception of duality, there would be no knowledge for them, and if there be non-perception of duality there would be no speech. Thus, this absurd position would lead to the contingency of postulating ignorance for the great preceptors like Yājñavalkya.

If it be said that Yājñavalkya and others who are entitled to preceptorship possess mediate knowledge and not the intuitive experience which is devoid of the perception of duality, then why should not sleep which is also bereft of the cognition of duality be the intuitive experience? If the non-cognition of duality be the differentia of intuitive experience, the state of dreamless sleep where there is no cognition of duality must be the intuitive experience of *Brahman*.

If it be asserted that in sleep there is not the cognition of the truth of the self, then the cognition of the self, and not the non-remembrance of duality, is the differentia of spiritual intuition. The cognition of the self alone is knowledge, not the non-cognition of duality.

The position of the opponent is in no way improved when he says that knowledge is a combination of the cognition of the self and the non-remembrance of duality. If both together constitute knowledge, then inert objects like pot, etc., would be entitled to half the knowledge, for they are entirely ignorant of the dualities of the world. Even a sage immersed in *samādhi* would not be so non-cognizant of the distinctions of the world as the pot, etc. Does it then mean that the inert things occupy a higher stratum in the evolution of spiritual knowledge than the best among saints? If it be said that the cognition of the self alone constitutes knowledge, it is a contingency of the acceptable. The knowledge of the self requires the control of the mind. When the mind is brought under control, self-knowledge is easily achieved. The control of the mind is required because it is only by the controlled mind that the illusoriness of the world is cognized.

The words of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* text 'desiring what, etc.' indicate that the knower of truth does not possess desires which are productive of further consequences. He has his mind under control and his desires are only those which come to him on account of his *prārabdha*. Certain texts of the sacred scripture declare that 'attachment is the mark of ignorance', and they say that the knower of truth is non-attached. "How can the tree be verdant, in whose hollow there is fire?" Certain other texts admit desire in the case of the man who possesses true knowledge. "Because the meaning of the sacred teaching is concluded, even by that there is release. Let attachment, etc., be as they are desired. Their existence is not transgressed." The two sets of scriptural passages seem to involve a contradiction. But in reality there is no conflict between them.

Desires which have their roots in ignorance and which are generative of further fruit are denied in the case of the enlightened person. But those desires which have lost their sting are not incompatible with the realization of the saint.

### 10. *Self is Non-attached*

It was shown above that the words 'desiring what' of the scriptural text indicate the illusoriness of the world. Now, it will be explained how the words 'for the sake of whose desire' are intended to inculcate the truth of the non-attachedness of the self. The words 'for the sake of whose desire' predicate the absence of enjoyership from the self. By the knowledge of the non-attached nature of the self its enjoyership is negated. The contention that as the negation of a thing must be preceded by its position, and as the self is by nature not an enjoyer, there can be no negation of enjoyership, can be refuted by the citation of the scriptural texts which attribute enjoyership to the self in the empirical sense. There are scriptural passages which say that husband, wife, son, etc., are not for the sake of their own enjoyment, but that they are for the sake of the enjoyment of the self.

Who is the enjoyer? Is it the immutable self? Or, is it the reflection of intellegence? Or, is it the combined form of both, the immutable and the reflection? The immutable does not attain enjoyership because it is non-attached. The transformation called the conceit of pleasure and pain is what is known as enjoyment. Hence the predication of enjoyership in the case of the self would be tantamount to the self-contradictory statement that the self is both immutable and changing.

Nor is it proper to predicate enjoyership of the reflection of intelligence. The reflection of intelligence is subject to transformation because it is dependent on the changing intellect. But since the reflection has no independence of its own, and since its prototype, the immutable self, is unchanging and not an enjoyer, the reflection also cannot be an enjoyer. Therefore the combined form of the immutable and the reflection is designated, in the world, by the word 'enjoyer'. Enjoyership is adventitious to the immutable. When scripture speaks of the self as the enjoyer, the reference is to the combined form of the immutable and the reflection. There is no real enjoyership for the immutable. This is the purport of all the scriptural statements.

Questioned by Janaka as to 'Which is the self', Yājñavalkya began his answer by describing the self of the nature of knowledge present in all the senses, and ended with the statement, 'This *puruṣa* is unattached.' All the scriptures which are engaged in the inquiry 'Who is this self?' commence with the combined form of the immutable and the reflection and culminate in the pure immutable self.

The empirical self, which is the enjoyer, induced by non-discrimination, superimposes on itself the reality of the immutable, and thinking its enjoyership to be absolutely real, it never desires to relinquish it. The scriptural texts which declare that "For the desire of the self everything is dear, etc." do not predicate enjoyership of the immutable, but only of the empirical self which is a mixture of the immutable and the reflection of intelligence. Scripture restates the empirical usage when it says that husband, wife, etc., are

for the enjoyment of the enjoyer himself. The objects of enjoyment are the complements, not of the absolute but of the empirical self. The restatement of the scripture is for enjoining the direction of one's love to the self, drawing it away from the sense-objects. Since the objects of enjoyment are subsidiary to the enjoyer, let there be no attachment to the objects, but only to the principal, the self. There is the traditional code which says: "That constant love of objects which is found in those who are devoid of discrimination, let it, O Viṣṇu, depart from my heart which is ever remembering you."<sup>10</sup> The purport of the code is this: with the intensity with which the ignorant love the objects of sense, the enlightened should love the self. Those who are attached to the self should give up their attachment to the sense-objects. The person who is desirous of discerning the self withdraws his love from the confluence of sense-objects and directs it to the self. Just as the vulgar rivet their attention on garland, sandal-paste, dress, damsel, etc., the man who desires release directs his attention to the enjoyer. He remains constant in the contemplation of the Self. Just as those who want victory in the warfare of words are immersed in the study of poetry, drama, logic, etc., the one who longs for liberation engages himself attentively in the quest for truth. Like the heaven-seeker who faithfully performs chanting, meditation, etc., he bestows supreme faith on the self. Even as the *yogin* who, desirous of spiritual powers, achieves one-pointedness of the mind after great effort, he exerts himself constantly in spiritual inquiry and establishes himself in the knowledge of the self. In the various fields of activity detailed above, practice produces skilfulness and the security of success. The *yogin* steadies his mind

and obtains spiritual powers. The student of literature gains mastery in his field of study as also victory over his opponents. The heaven-seeker gains his object through chanting and meditation. The *mumukṣu* likewise achieves through practice the lucidity and clearness of his power to discriminate. He discerns the distinction and disparity between the self and the not-self.

By him, who discriminates the real nature of the enjoyer from the aggregate of sense-objects through co-presence and co-absence, is ascertained the non-attachedness of the witness in the states of waking, etc. The objects which are experienced in the states of waking, dream, and deep sleep are distinct by themselves. Each of the states differs from the rest in the character of its content. The objects experienced in waking seem to be relatively permanent and coherent, whereas those perceived in dream are fantastic and fictitious. The dream is a carnival of images. Sleep is a unique experience where there is ignorance as well as bliss. In and through these distinct states and distinct objects there threads the one and the same self. "The self, whatever it sees there (in the different states), does not become conformable to it; for this *puruṣa* is, indeed, non-attached." "That or this (self) attached to the repose of sleep and moving therein merely sees merit and demerit and again according to the usual custom runs towards every sense." "That which manifests the universe of waking, dream, deep sleep, etc., that *Brahman* am I: knowing thus, (he) is released from all bondage." "The self is to be thought of as being single and the same in waking, dream, and sleep. The self which knows itself to be distinct from the three experiences has no more transmigration and no more

travail." "The object of enjoyment, the enjoyer, and the enjoyment, which are (to be found) in the three states (of experience), distinct from them I am, the bare intelligence, the ever-auspicious witness."

The scriptural texts quoted above teach that the immutable self is without attachment, agency, enjoyership, etc. When the truth is discerned in this manner, it is clearly determined that enjoyership, etc., belong to the changing *cidābhāsa* which is indicated by the word *viññānamaya*. The reflection of intelligence is cognized to be illusory, through the testimony of scripture and the evidence of experience. "(Prakṛti) makes the *jīva* and the Lord as reflections." The world is compared to the magician's feat; and since the reflection of intelligence is a constituent of the world, it is also illusory like the magical show. The illusoriness of the reflection of intelligence is experienced by the witness in sleep where the reflection is non-existent. Thus through revelation and reason, the reflection of intelligence realizes its unreality. When such discrimination sets in, the reflection desires no more enjoyment. The person who has stretched himself on the ground with a desire to die will not long for his wedding. Similarly, the reflection which knows itself to be illusory, how can it desire for sense-enjoyment which is equally illusory? Unlike the ignorant, the enlightened man does not have conceit in objective enjoyment. He is ashamed of calling himself the enjoyer; and like the one whose nose is damaged, he reaps the results of his *prārabdha* without any gusto or relish. If he does not brook to think that enjoyership rests with him, need it then be said that he never imposes enjoyership on the witness-self? To declare the absence of enjoyership from the Absolute, the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* text employs

the words 'for the sake of whose desire.' If the superimposition of enjoyership on the self be removed, the objects of sense cease to lure us, and there is an end to the feverish pursuit of the ways of the body.

### 11. *Three Bodies: Three Fevers*

There are three bodies, the gross, the subtle, and the causal; and for each of them there is a peculiar fever. In the gross body there are innumerable kinds of diseases brought about by the three humours — wind, bile, and phlegm. Bad odour, wounds, thirst, etc., are also the fevers of the gross body. Desire, anger, etc., and calmness, restraint, etc., are diseases present in the subtle body. Like desire, etc., calmness, etc., are also fevers because while the former trouble men by their acquirement, the latter torment men by their non-acquirement. The fever present in the subtle body is set forth in the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* by Indra. In the causal body the self knows neither itself nor any other object, and remains as if annihilated. In that state there exists the seed of misery in the form of the impressions of impending acts. These fevers are thought to be natural to the bodies, since if the former be removed, the latter do not persist. As the thread is to the cloth, fur to the woollen shawl, and clay to the pot, so are the fevers indispensable to the bodies. The bodies are fever-made; fever is the stuff of the bodies.

In the reflection of intelligence there is no kind of fever natural to it, since for intelligence there is seen only the single nature of light. If fever be impossible even for the reflection, need it then be said that the witness is free from it? Although there be the absence of ailment from the reflection of intelligence, the



reflection identifies itself with the bodies through nescience and suffers from the heat of *samsāra*. Superimposing the absolute reality which is natural to the witness on itself and on the three bodies, the reflection deems the bodies to be its true form of existence. During the period of delusion, it suffers from the ills of the bodies, thinking that the fevers are innate in itself, just as the man with a family burns with agony, should any of its members fall seriously ill. This unnecessary travail is born of ignorance and attachment. When there is discriminative knowledge, the delusion is dispelled and feverish pursuit of the bodies comes to an end. The cognition of the illusory snake is the cause of fear, running, etc., whereas the knowledge of the real rope destroys the apprehension of the snake with the result that the previous agitation, etc., are regretted.

The reflection which has gained discriminatory knowledge expiates for its earlier association with the defect of illusoriness by taking refuge in the witness-self. Just as a sinner purifies himself by repeated baths in the sacred waters, the reflection becomes centred in the self by repeated meditation. It takes no pride in its former association and does not wish to return to them. The Crown-Prince who desires to rule over the kingdom acts according to the wishes of the King. The reflection whose goal of effort is release follows the way of the witness. Learning from scripture that "he who knows *Brahman* becomes *Brahman* alone," it makes its mind one-pointed and discerns *Brahman* only, and nothing else. Just as the man who desires to become a *deva* offers himself to be consumed by fire, the reflection loses itself to find itself.

12. *Residue of Prārabdha*

There is no release from reflection-ness till the present body is extirpated. The humanness of the man who desires to become a *deva* is not terminated indeed until his body is totally consumed. Even after the cognition of the rope, the palpitation of the heart, the shivering of the limbs, etc., are assuaged only by degrees; and when the rope is enshrouded in twilight, it appears as the snake again. Likewise the enjoyment which has already been commenced gets cooled only gradually, not all of a sudden or by force; and occasionally during the period of enjoyment there may be the cognition 'I am a mortal'. By this transgression, true knowledge is not destroyed. Knowledge is not *vrata* (ceremonial observance); hence it has not to follow rules and regulations. The residual impression of the prior experience may linger for a while, but that throws no impediment in the way of the knowledge of truth. The leader of the ten travellers, when he is informed that he is the tenth individual, stops from striking his head against the ground and weeping; but all the same the wounds which he has already received on his head heal only in the due course of time. The joy resulting from the cognition that the tenth man is not dead overpowers the pain caused by the wounds. Similarly, the gain of release lightens the burden of *prārabdha*.

Since there is not the rule that the individual who is released in embodiment will not have occasionally the cognition of humanness, he must discriminate whenever there occurs in him the apprehension of superimposition. Such repeated effort is seen, for example, in the case of a glutton who eats over and

over again. The wounds sustained by the tenth man heal when they are properly dressed and bandaged. In the same way, *prārabdha* perishes when it is exhausted and extinguished by enjoyment.

### 13. *State of Satisfaction*

So far the release from grief, the sixth state in the development of the *jīva*, has been explained as indicated in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* text by the words 'desiring what'. The seventh is the state of satisfaction which results as a consequence of *Brahman*-knowledge.

The satisfaction that results from sense-objects is dependent and limited, whereas the satisfaction consequent on *Brahman*-knowledge is without any limit and determination. When that supreme solace is gained, all obligations are fulfilled and all desires are quenched. Prior to the acquirement of true knowledge man has many duties to be performed and many desires to be satisfied. He works for the pleasures of the world and the happiness of heaven, and he strives for release from his earthly bonds. But when once he attains *Brahman*-knowledge, there is nothing else for him to do. Because he has accomplished his object, reached his journey's end, he contrasts his state of felicity and peace with the miserable condition of those who are struggling, and feels supremely satisfied. The ignorant men who wallow in the misery of the world pursue their desires in the hope of acquiring progeny, etc. But the man who has gained supreme happiness, what more should he desire, and why should he follow the way of the world? Those whose aim is the attainment of heaven tread the path of *karma*. But he who is the self of all the worlds, why

and wherefore should he engage himself in rituals and ceremonials? If it be asked whether the *jñānin* cannot indulge in activities for the sake of the welfare of the world, let those who are eligible for it do it by all means. Saviours like Sage Vyāsa and Śrī Śaṅkara come to the world with a mission to save it. They are, like huge ships, the carriers of innumerable anguished souls across the sea of *samsāra*. But the majority of those who are blessed with *Brahman*-knowledge are not eligible for this task. The *jñānin* is devoid of any kind of activity, be it good or bad. Even the activities like eating, drinking, bathing, etc., which are attributed as indispensable to him do not exist before his vision. The ignorant may speak of the *jñānin* that he is not free from activities, but that in no way affects him. The unenlightened look with the eye of ignorance, whereas to the divine vision of the seer there is no action, nor action-bred miseries. For the *jñānin* there is not even the obligation of study and reflection, since study is intended for those who do not know the truth, and reflection for those who are troubled by doubts. Nor has the *jñānin* to meditate, for he is rid of all notions of the contrary like conceit in the body, etc. The cognition 'I am a man,' etc., which occasionally he may get is not the result of any present perversity on his part. It is occasioned by the impression of his long practice, and it is not capable of obstructing his intuition. Meditation is not the remedy for the removal of this empirical usage, for empirical usage lapses of its own accord when *prārabdha* perishes. As long as the *karma* lasts, even a thousand meditations cannot dislodge empirical usage. If those who do not seek release-in-embodiment but who desire relative pleasures practise meditation, let them do so. But the *jñānin* who

understands that by his empirical usage there can be no harm to his realization, for what purpose should he meditate? Nor is there *samādhī* for him, since he has discarded already the projections of *māyā*. Both *samādhī* and projection are modifications of the mind; and a *jñānin* is one who has freed himself from the modifications of the mind. If it be said that *samādhī* is instrumental to the intuition of *Brahman*, then, for him who possesses already the intuition, of what use is the instrument? He has no obligation whatever, nothing to be apprehended or attained. He is centred in the self, and is supremely satisfied therein.

To the *jñānin* who is a non-agent and a non-enjoyer, there may occur activities which are scripturally enjoined or empirically occasioned; but by them he is in no way affected. His actions are conditioned by *prārabdha*, and he has no hand in them. Or, even though there is nothing for him to be accomplished in this world, he may act in accordance with scripture in order to save the world. His physical body may worship the deity, bathe in the holy waters, and take to the life of the mendicant. His speech-sense may repeat the Vedic *mantras* or study the system of the *Vedānta*. His intellect may meditate on the form of Viṣṇu or become merged in the bliss of *Brahman*. But he does nothing, nor does he cause others to do anything. He is the witness of all things and thoughts without any conceit in the way of the senses and in the functions of his mind.

There is no conflict between the man of works and the man of wisdom. They live in two different spheres which have nothing in common between them. They are like two seas separated by a vast stretch of

land. The man of works is tied down to the activities of his body, speech, intellect, etc., but not so the witness. The *jñānin* is unattached because he knows himself to be the witness, and has freed himself from the clutches of the body, senses, and mind. Those who do not know the truth that knowledge and works have different contents quarrel in vain, and become the targets of the ridicule of those who know. The man of works has no discernment of the witness; and the man who knows the truth realizes the witness to be *Brahman*. The two have nothing common to dispute about. The sphere of the *karmin's* activity is not-self, while that of the *jñānin's* contemplation is the self. The *jñānin* understands the body, speech, intellect, etc., to be impermanent and illusory, and relinquishes them. The *karmin* sticks to them like a leech, deluding himself with the notion that they are the instruments to the final values of life. For the *jñānin*, tendency towards, and turning away from, activity are on a par. *Nivṛtti* like *pravṛtti* is useless to him. If it be said that the turning away from activity is the cause of knowledge, then even the tendency towards activity is fruitful in the sense that it is helpful to the desire for knowledge. If it be maintained that there is not the tendency towards activity for the *jñānin* since he has no more desire for knowledge, then even because he is no more in need of knowledge, there is no necessity of *nivṛtti* for him. For the continued maintenance of his knowledge which is accomplished by non-sublation, no other means is required. Neither nescience nor its product is capable of sublating knowledge, since both of them are sublated prior to the acquirement of true knowledge. The products of nescience which have been sublated may appear to the senses, but by them knowledge is not

sublated. They appear to be alive, but in reality they are dead. If even a living rat be incapable of killing a cat, how can a dead rat be capable of that deed? He who does not fall a prey even to the *Pāśupatāstra*, how can he perish when pierced by fragile shafts? In the warfare between knowledge and nescience, the former has come out victorious. Now, how can the victor who is well-established be overpowered by the vanquished? Let the carcasses of nescience and its products remain. They are impotent to harm knowledge. Instead of causing fear, they stand as the symbol of the mighty strength of true knowledge. For the *jñānin* who is yoked to such knowledge which is the enemy of nescience, there is nothing to be gained from *pravṛtti* or *nivṛtti* which pertain to the body. The ignorant man who has not gained true knowledge has to be up and doing for the achievement either of heaven or of release. If the *jñānin* lives in the midst of the ignorant, he also acts like them. And when he finds himself amidst those who desire knowledge, he criticizes and eschews all activities in order to teach them the futility of works. That he should adapt himself to the level of the society in which he lives is but proper. By putting on the semblance of following the way of the ignorant, he in no way degrades himself. It is his mercy for those who are not as fortunate as he that makes him mingle with them. Like a father unto his children, he is compassionate unto them. When the child beats the parent and pushes him hither and thither, the latter is not angered; on the contrary, he feels a pride in being treated so by his darling. In the same way, the *jñānin* is not perturbed by the abuses of the ignorant; nor does he feel elated by their praises. He returns neither to them, but acts in such a way as to

arouse knowledge in them. His actions are governed by this one motive, that is, to give a lifting hand to those who struggle in the slough of misery. No other objective has he in this world than to help the ignorant to see the light. He feels satisfied because what has to be accomplished has been accomplished by him and what has to be attained has been attained by him.

He considers himself fortunate because he is blessed with the immediate vision of the eternal self. The bliss of *Brahman* is clearly manifest to him. His ignorance has taken to flight, and he knows no misery born of *samsāra*. He has achieved his life's end, attained the greatest human goal. There is nothing in the world to equal his contentment. His bliss knows no bounds. This is the state of him who has transcended the travails and turmoils of transmigration.

#### NOTES

13. *Gītā*, iii, 36-37.

14. *Ibid.*, xviii, 60.

15. An alternative meaning: "Let my love not depart from you!" Here the reading would be *mā apasarpātū*.



## मीमांसयोर्नैकशास्त्रयम्

भाष्य भावज्ञः चरहृत् कल्याणसुन्दरशास्त्री

अथेदं वेदान्तशास्त्रं किं धर्मशास्त्रात्पृथक्शास्त्रं, यद्वा उभयमपि मिलित्वैकं शास्त्रमिति संशयः । पूर्वोत्तरमीमांसाभेदभिन्नं काण्डद्वयात्मकवेदगोचरमेकमेव मीमांसाशास्त्रम्,

अङ्गानि वेदाश्चत्वारो मीमांसा न्यायविस्तरः ।

पुराणं धर्मशास्त्रं च विद्या होताश्चतुर्दश ॥

इति स्मरणादिति केचित् । मैवम्; अधिकारिविषयप्रयोजनभेदेन शास्त्रभेदस्यावश्यम्भावात् । तथाहि — 'अथातो धर्मजिज्ञासे'त्यारब्धस्य जैमिनीयस्य पूर्वमीमांसाख्यस्य धर्मशास्त्रस्य यज्ञादिकर्मचिकीर्षुस्स्वर्गादिफलकामी अधिकारी, ज्योतिष्टोमादिः कार्यभूतो धर्मो विषयः, कर्तव्यताज्ञानम् कर्मकरणद्वारा स्वर्गादिर्वा फलम्; 'अथातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासे'त्यारब्धस्य वैयासिकस्योत्तरमीमांसाख्यस्य वेदान्तशास्त्रस्य शमादिसाधनचतुष्टयसम्पन्नः मोक्षकामित्वेन निष्कामोऽधिकारी । अकार्यसिद्धं ब्रह्म विषयः, ब्रह्मज्ञानं मोक्षो वा फलमिति कृत्वा, साध्यधर्मप्रतिपादकात्साध्यक्षयिष्णुफलकात्सकामगृहस्थाधिकारिकाच्च पूर्वमीमांसाशास्त्रात्सिद्धब्रह्मप्रतिपादकं सिद्धनित्यमोक्षफलकं निष्कामसन्यास्यधिकारिकं चोत्तरमीमांसाशास्त्रं पृथग्भूतमेव । यदि तु मीमांसात्वेनैकमेव शास्त्रमित्युच्यते, तर्हि अङ्गत्वेन षण्णामप्यङ्गानामेकशास्त्रत्वमेव स्यात् । किं बहुना,

संस्कृतभाषात्मकत्वेनाष्टादशविद्यानामप्येकविद्यात्वमेव स्यात् । न चैवं भिन्नयोरेतयोः कथं पूर्वोत्तरत्वमिति वाच्यम्, जैमिनिना पूर्वं धर्मशास्त्रस्य कृतत्वाद्द्व्यासेन पश्चात्तारीरकमीमांसायाः कृतत्वाच्चेति । यद्वा, वेदपूर्व-भागमीमांसाया धर्मशास्त्रे कृतत्वात्तस्य पूर्वमीमांसात्वेन व्यवहारः । वेदोत्तरभागमीमांसाया वेदान्तशास्त्रे कृतत्वात्तस्योत्तरमीमांसात्वेन व्यवहारः । न चैवं स्वमीमांसयोर्येदंभागयोरेकवेदत्वेन मीमांसयोर-प्येकत्वमिति वाच्यम् । तथात्वे शिक्षाव्याकरणादीनामपि स्वविषयवेदै-क्येनैकत्वमेव स्यादिति । तस्माद्द्वैदिकाच्छब्दानुशासनादिव वैदिकात्कर्म-विचाराद्द्वैदिकोऽयं ब्रह्मविचारः पृथग्भूत एव । मीमांसा हि विचारः । विचारश्च विचार्यभेदाद्भिद्यत इति सम्प्रतिपन्नं यथारूपविचाराद्रस-विचारः इति ॥

ननु

सर्वे वेदा यत्पदमामनन्ति

इति श्रुतेः,

वेदैश्च सर्वैरहमेव वेद्यः

इति स्मृतेश्च वेदपूर्वोत्तरभागाभ्यामेकमेव ब्रह्म प्रतिपाद्यत इति प्रतिपाद्य-भेदाभावाद्भागद्वयात्मको वेदस्तावदेकमेव शास्त्रम् । तथा च, नियत-पौर्वापर्यभागद्वयात्मकवेदाख्यैकप्रबन्धव्याख्यानभूतयोः पूर्वोत्तरमीमांस-योरप्येकशास्त्रत्वमुचितमेवेति चेन्मैवम्,

‘यामिमां पुष्पितां वाचं प्रवदन्त्यविपश्चितः ।

वेदवादरताः पार्थ! नान्यदस्तीति वादिनः ॥

त्रैगुण्यविषया वेदा निस्त्रैगुण्यो भवार्जुन ।’

‘वेदान्तविज्ञानसुनिश्चितार्थाः’, ‘तं त्वौपनिषदं पुरुषं पृच्छामि’

इत्यादिशास्त्रवशादस्यैव वेदवेदान्तयोः प्रतिपाद्यभेदाच्छास्त्रभेदः । कर्म-देवतास्वरूपस्वर्गादिकं हि वेदेन प्रतिपाद्यते । वेदान्तेन तु सच्चिदानन्दं ब्रह्म । नापि पुरुषार्थैक्याद्देदवेदान्तैक्यमिति वाच्यम् । वेदगम्यपुरुषार्थस्य

स्वर्गादिरूपत्वेनानित्यत्वाद्देदान्तगम्यपुरुषार्थस्य परब्रह्मरूपत्वेन नित्यत्वाच्च नित्यानित्यपुरुषार्थप्रतिपादकयोस्तयोर्भेद उचित एव । यथा धर्मशास्त्रार्थशास्त्रयोर्भेदस्तद्वत् । यदि तु पुरुषार्थत्वमुभयत्र सममित्युच्यते, तर्हि वेदवेदान्तधर्मार्थशास्त्रादीनां सर्वेषामप्यभेद एव स्यात् । सर्वशास्त्रप्रतिपादितेष्वपि पुरुषार्थेषु परस्परं भिन्नेषु पुरुषार्थत्वस्याभिन्नस्य सत्त्वात् । तस्माद्व्याख्याययोः पूर्ववेदोत्तरवेदयोरेकप्रवन्वत्त्वाभावाद्द्व्याख्यानयोरपि पूर्वमीमांसोत्तरमीमांसयोर्नैकशास्त्रत्वमिति—सर्वेषां वेदानां ब्रह्मपरत्वं तु श्रुतिस्मृतिसिद्धं सर्वेषां शब्दानां ब्रह्मपरत्वमिव सङ्गच्छते । कथमितिचेदुच्यते—सर्वेषामप्यनात्मवस्तूनामात्मनि मायया रज्ज्वामिव सपदण्डधारादीनां कल्पितत्वेन, कल्पितस्याधिष्ठानानतिरेकात्तत्तदध्यस्तघटादिपदार्थवाचिनामप्यधिष्ठानब्रह्मपरत्वमेवेति । यद्वा, सर्वेष्वर्थास्सद्रूपतयैव प्रमाणविषया भवन्ति, नासद्रूपतयेति कृत्वा घटाद्यध्यस्तपदार्थानुस्यूतं सद्रूपं ब्रह्मैव घटादिशब्दवाच्यमिति । अथवा, विषयावच्छिन्नमज्ञातं ब्रह्मैव प्रमाणप्रमेयं भवति । न तु केवलं घटादिकमिति—एवं यद्यपि सर्वे वेदास्सर्वाणि शास्त्राणि सर्वाणि चक्षुरादिप्रमाणानि लौकिकानि च वस्तुगत्या ब्रह्मैव प्रतिपादयन्ति ।

सर्वं खल्विदं ब्रह्म

इति श्रुतेर्ब्रह्मण एव सर्वात्मकत्वेन सर्ववाचित्वस्यैव ब्रह्मवाचित्वरूपत्वात्तथापि यावद्व्यवहारं तत्तत्प्रमाणप्रमेयादिभेदस्य सत्त्वाद्देदान्ता एव ब्रह्म प्रतिपादयन्ति । वेदास्तु कर्मादीनि प्रतिपादयन्ति । व्याकरणन्तु शब्दसाधुत्वं प्रतिपादयतीत्यादिव्यवस्था आस्थेया । यथा चक्षू रूपं प्रतिपादयति, श्रोत्रं तु शब्दमित्यादि तद्वत्: तस्माद्विषयाधिकारिप्रयोजनभेदस्य शास्त्रभेदप्रयोजकस्य सत्त्वात्पूर्वभागाद्देदस्योत्तरभागः पृथग्भूत एव । तद्व्याख्यानयोरपि पूर्वोत्तरमीमांसयोश्शास्त्रयोर्भेद उचित एव ॥

अत एव उत्तरभागस्य सिद्धब्रह्मप्रतिपादकस्य प्रामाण्यमसहमानस्सन्नाह जैमिनिः—

‘आम्नायस्य क्रियार्थत्वादानर्थक्यमतदर्थानाम्’

इति सूत्रम् । न च — व्यासशिष्यत्वाज्जैमिनिर्न वेदान्तप्रतिक्षेपक इति वाच्यम् । जैमिनिर्भवतु नाम वेदान्तार्थावलम्बी । तदुक्तं शास्त्रं तु वेदान्तार्थप्रतिक्षेपकमेव, वेदोक्तेषु कर्मसु लोकस्य श्रद्धातिशयजननार्थं जैमिनिना तथा शास्त्रस्य कृतत्वात्, न हि वेदान्तार्थं श्रुतवान् कोपि मेधावी कर्मसु प्रवर्तते, तस्माद्वेदान्तेषु सूक्ष्मार्थप्रतिपादकेषु पुरुषस्य मतिरादावेव न प्रवर्तत इत्यालोच्य कर्मसु प्रवर्तनद्वारा तस्य चित्तशुद्धिजनयितुं कर्मशास्त्रं विहितमिति न तयोरेकशास्त्रत्वम् । यद्यप्येवं कर्मशास्त्रमपि परम्परया ब्रह्मशास्त्रोपयोगि, तथापि न साक्षादिति कृत्वा अथशब्दस्य कर्मशास्त्राध्ययनानन्तर्यमर्थ इति नोक्तं शङ्कराचार्यैः । किंतु ब्रह्मविचारं प्रति साक्षात्साधनभूतसाधनचतुष्टयसम्पत्त्यानन्तर्यमेवार्थ इत्युक्तम् ॥

यदुक्तं कुत्रचित्

‘पूर्वोत्तरमीमांसयोर्नास्त्यर्थविरोधः’

इति तदुक्तं, सत्त्वादर्थविरोधस्य । तथाहि — कर्मैव फलप्रदम्, स्वर्ग एव परमपुरुषार्थः, मोक्षो नास्ति, ईश्वरो नास्ति, धर्म एव जगतः प्रतिष्ठा, क्रियापर एव वेदःसर्वं इत्यादि प्रतिपाद्यते पूर्वमीमांसायाम् । ईश्वर एव फलप्रदः कर्मसापेक्षः, मोक्ष एव परमपुरुषार्थः, स्वर्गः क्षयिष्णुत्वात्सातिशयत्वाच्च तुच्छसुखमेव, ईश्वर एव जगतः प्रतिष्ठा, वेदस्य पूर्वभाग एव क्रियापरः, उत्तरभागस्तु परब्रह्मपर एव इत्यादि प्रतिपाद्यते उत्तरमीमांसायामिति कथमुभयोरर्थविरोधाभावः । एतेनार्थैकत्वादेकं वाक्यमिति न्यायस्य नात्रास्ति प्रवृत्तिरिति सिद्धम् । यदि तु, कर्मणां चित्तशुद्धिजननद्वारा ज्ञानप्राप्तिहेतुत्वात्कर्मप्रतिपादकमपि मीमांसाशास्त्रं ब्रह्मज्ञानहेतुरेवेति पूर्वोत्तरमीमांसयोरुभयोरपि ब्रह्मज्ञानहेतुत्वेनैकशास्त्र्यमित्युच्यते, तर्हि तर्कादिशास्त्रान्तराण्यप्याकाशादिपदार्थावगतिद्वारा आत्मज्ञानोपयोगीन्येवेति तेषामप्युत्तरमीमांसया भवेदेवैकशास्त्र्यम् । जैमिनिवत्कणादगौतमादयोपि हि न वेदान्तविरुद्धाभिप्रायाः । यदुक्तमध्यायभेदवशात्पूर्वो-

त्तरमीमांसयोर्भेद इति केनचित् तदयुक्तम्, तर्कादिशास्त्रान्तराणामपि तथैव भेद इत्यतिप्रसङ्गापत्तेः। न च प्रधानप्रतिपाद्याभेदे सत्यवान्तरभेद-प्रतिपादकत्वमध्यायभेदप्रयोजकं, तत्पूर्वोत्तरमीमांसयोरेवास्ति, न तु शास्त्रान्तरेष्विति वाच्यम्, प्रधानप्रतिपाद्यभेदस्य पूर्वोत्तरमीमांसयोरपि सत्त्वात्। पूर्वमीमांसायां हि धर्मः प्रधानप्रतिपाद्यः, उत्तरमीमांसायां तु ब्रह्म प्रधानप्रतिपाद्यमिति भेदात्। तच्च स्फुटम् —

‘अथातो धर्मजिज्ञासा’, ‘अथातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा’

इति शास्त्रद्वयारम्भकसूत्रद्वयादेव। न च धर्मशब्दः कर्मब्रह्मोभयवाचीति वाच्यम्, तथा सति अथातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासेति पृथगारम्भायोगात्। एतेन पूर्वोत्तरमीमांसयोश्शास्त्रभेदे आरम्भकसूत्रभेदोऽपि प्रमाणमिति स्थितम्।

‘अथ योगानुशासनम्’, ‘अथ शब्दानुशासनम्’

इत्यारम्भकसूत्रभेद इव योगव्याकरणशास्त्रभेदकः। किञ्च, यदि मीमांसा-द्वयमेकमेव शास्त्रं तर्हि पूर्वमीमांसां कृतवान् जैमिनिरेवोत्तरमीमांसाम-प्यकरिष्यत्। यद्वा मया मीमांसाशास्त्रं कृत्स्नं कर्तुमारब्धं तत्रादृष्टादि-वैगुण्यादधर्ममेव कृतमवशिष्टमर्धं मद्गुरुः व्यासः करिष्यतीत्यवदिष्यत्। तथा व्यासश्च मच्छिष्येण शास्त्रस्याधर्ममेव कृतमवशिष्टमर्धं मया कियत् इत्यवदिष्यत् ॥

ननु यदि मीमांसयोर्नैकशास्त्र्यम्, तर्हि

मीमांसा न्यायविस्तरः

इति कथं मीमांसाया ऐकशास्त्र्यं स्मर्यत इति चेदुच्यते। तत्र मीमांसा-शब्देन ब्रह्ममीमांसैवोच्यते, धर्मशास्त्रमित्यनेन पूर्वमीमांसाया उक्तत्वत्। ‘अथातो धर्मजिज्ञासे’ त्यारब्धं हि धर्मशास्त्रम्। मन्वादिप्रणीतधर्मशास्त्राणा-मप्यत्रैवान्तर्भावः। यद्वा पुराणेष्विति न कश्चिद्दोषः। तस्मात्, स्वप्रतिपाद्य-कर्मब्रह्मभेदात्, स्वारम्भकजिज्ञासासूत्रभेदात्, स्वकर्तृजैमिनिवादरायण-भेदात्, स्वाधिकारिरागिविरागिभेदात्, स्वप्रयोजनस्वर्गमोक्षभेदात्, स्वमूलप्रमाणवेदवेदान्तभेदात्, स्वमतानुवर्तिमीमांसकवेदान्तिभेदाच्च पूर्वोत्तरमीमांसयोर्नैकशास्त्रत्वमिति घण्टाघोषः ॥

न च वेदवेदान्तयोरैकशास्त्र्यमेवेति वाच्यम्, विरुद्धार्थप्रतिपादकत्वेन द्वयोर्भिन्नशास्त्रत्वात् । तथा हि —

‘अक्षय्यं ह वै चातुर्मास्ययाजिनस्सुकृतं भवति’,  
 ‘अपाम सोमममृता अभूम’, ‘यात्रज्जीवमग्निहोत्रं जुहुयात्’,  
 ‘वीरहा वा एष देवानां योग्नीनुद्रासयति’,  
 ‘वसन्ते वसन्ते ज्योतिषा यजेत’, ‘ऋतौ भार्यामुपेयात्’,  
 ‘स्वाध्यायोऽध्येतव्यः’

इत्यादि वेदेन प्रतिपाद्यते ।

‘नास्त्यकृतः कृतेन’, ‘यदहरेव विरजेत्तदहरेव प्रव्रजेत्’,  
 ‘आत्मेत्येवोपासीत’, ‘आत्मा वाऽरे द्रष्टव्यः’,  
 ‘नानुध्यायाद्ब्रह्मन् शब्दान्’,  
 ‘शान्तो दान्त उपरतस्ति तिक्षुस्समाहितश्श्रद्धावित्तो भूत्वा  
 आत्मन्येवात्मानं पश्येत्’

इत्यादिवेदान्तैः प्रतिपाद्यते । अत एव —

त्रैगुण्यविषया वेदा निस्त्रैगुण्यो भवार्जुन ।

इति गीतम् । एवं वेदवेदान्तयोः परस्परविरुद्धार्थप्रतिपादकत्वेन अन्यतरस्याप्रामाण्ये सञ्जाते सत्येव आस्तिकानां तदन्यतराप्रामाण्यस्यानिष्टत्वेन अधिकारिभेदादिना कथंचित्तद्विरोधः परिहृतः । असंन्यासिन एवाग्निहोत्रादित्यागे दोषः, न तु संन्यासिनः, चातुर्मास्ययाजिसुकृतस्याक्षय्यत्वं च सुकृतान्तरापेक्षयाधिक्यमात्रमित्यादिव्यवस्थानुसारात् । एवं वेदान्तविरोधे सति वेदस्यैवान्यथानेयत्वाच्छ्रुतिविरोधे सत्यन्यथानेयायास्समृतेरपेक्षया यथा श्रुतिर्वलीयसी तथा वेदान्त एव बलवानिति सिद्धम् । एवं वेदवेदान्तयोर्दौर्बल्यप्रावल्याभ्यां च भेदस्सिद्धः ॥

अपि च अनधिगताबाधितार्थज्ञानं प्रमा, तत्करणं तु प्रमाणमिति स्थिते, अनधिगतस्यापि स्वर्गाद्यर्थस्य बाधितत्वेन तज्ज्ञानस्य प्रमात्वाभावज्ञ वेदः प्रमाणम् । ब्रह्मणस्तु अनधिगताबाधितार्थत्वेन तज्ज्ञानस्य प्रमात्वा-  
त्तत्करणं वेदान्तः प्रमाणमित्येवं प्रमाणत्वाप्रमाणत्वाभ्यां च वेदवेदान्त-  
योर्भेदः । न च स्वर्गादिरप्यबाधित एवेति वाच्यं, तस्य क्षयिष्णुत्वेन कालत्रयवर्तित्वाभावात् । कालत्रयवर्तित्वं हि कालत्रयाबाधितत्वम् । न च स्वर्गादेर्बाधितत्वेपि धर्मोऽबाधित इति वाच्यम् । धर्मस्यापि जन्य-  
त्वेन फलदानानन्तरं नश्यत्वेन च बाधितत्वात् । न च वेदोऽप्रमाणमिति वदन्भवात्तास्तिक एवेति वाच्यं, नास्तिकवदस्माभिर्वेदान्तोऽप्रमाणा-  
मित्यनुच्यमानत्वात् । वस्तुतोऽप्रमाणत्वेप्यविद्यादशायां प्रमाणत्वं वेद-  
स्याप्यस्माभिरिष्यमाणात्वाच्च । घटादिज्ञानमपि यावद्व्यवहारं प्रमा हि । तस्माद्वेदवेदान्तयोरैकशास्त्र्याभावात्तद्व्याख्यानयोर्मीमांसयोरपि नैक-  
शास्त्र्यमिति शिवम् ॥

ननु नैतच्छिवम् ।

अथातो धर्मजिज्ञासा

इत्यारभ्य

अनावृत्तिश्शब्दादनावृत्तिःशब्दात्

इत्यन्तं सङ्गतिविशेषविशिष्टक्रमं मीमांसाशास्त्रम् । तत्र च क्वचिद्भागे यजेतेत्यादिवेदबोधितयज्ञादिक्रिया विचारिताः, कुत्रचिद्भागे तु उपा-  
सीतेत्यादिवेदबोधितोपासनादिक्रिया विचारिताः । तथा च, कृत्स्नं शास्त्रं क्रियापरमेव । एवं प्रधानप्रतिपाद्याभेदात्सत्यप्यवान्तरभेदे नास्ति शास्त्रभेद इति; मैवम् । यद्येवमुपासनमपि मनोव्यापाररूपत्वात्क्रियेत्युच्यते, तर्हि ज्ञानमपि क्रियैव स्यात्, बाधात्वर्थो हि ज्ञानं घातुश्च क्रियावाची । न चेष्टापत्तिः, केवलकर्मणो न मोक्षः ज्ञानसहितात्कर्मणस्तु मोक्ष इति तव सिद्धान्तमङ्गप्रसङ्गात् । कर्म हि क्रिया ज्ञानं च क्रियैवेति कथं क्रियैव क्रियायास्समुच्चयः । न च ज्ञानं फलमेव न क्रियेति वाच्यम्, तथा सति आज्यपुरोडाशादिपदार्थज्ञानसहितमेव सर्वं कर्मापीति कृत्वा कथं

केवलकर्मसिद्धिः । न च ब्रह्मज्ञानरहितं कर्म केवलकर्ममिति विवक्ष्यतामिति वाच्यम्, ब्रह्मज्ञानसहितकर्मण एवाभावेन विशेषणार्थक्यात् । न च ब्रह्मज्ञानिना कृतं कर्म ब्रह्मज्ञानसहितकर्म, ब्रह्मज्ञानरहितेन कृतं कर्म केवलकर्ममिति वाच्यम्, ब्रह्मज्ञानिना कर्मण एवाक्रियमाणत्वात्कर्मकर्तारि ब्रह्मज्ञानित्वासम्प्रतिपत्तेः । उपरतस्यैव ब्रह्मज्ञानित्वश्रवणात्, न चोपरतिनं कर्मसंन्यासः, किन्तु चित्तविक्षेपाभाव इति वाच्यम्, देहादिक्रियायाश्चित्तव्यापारपूर्वकत्वेन चित्तस्यैवाविक्षिप्तत्वे कथं क्रियासद्भावः । तस्मात्पूर्वमीमांसायां प्रधानप्रतिपाद्यं कर्मैव, आत्मायस्य क्रियार्थत्वादिति जैमिनिना कण्ठोक्तत्वात् । यज्ञहस्तः पुरन्दर इत्यादिवाक्यानि तु क्रियाशेषभूतदेवतादिस्वरूपप्रतिपादकत्वेन सार्थकानि, तच्च स्फुटमर्थवादाधिकरणे । उत्तरमीमांसायां तु प्रधानप्रतिपाद्यं ब्रह्म,

### शास्त्रयोनित्वात्

इति कण्ठोक्तेः । उपासनानि तु सगुणस्य निर्गुणस्य च ब्रह्मणस्सम्बन्धीनि ब्रह्मज्ञानोपयोगितया विहितानीति प्रधानप्रतिपाद्यभेदान्न शास्त्रैक्यमिति संक्षेपः ॥



## THE TWO MĪMĀMSĀS — NOT ONE SCRIPTURAL AUTHORITY \*

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*Bhāṣyabhāvajña V. R. Kalyāṇasundara Śāstrī*

There is the doubt whether the treatise on the Vedānta is different from the treatise on *dharma*, i.e. the *Pūrvamīmāṃsā*, or whether both of them together form one scriptural treatise. Someone holds the view: “What are called the earlier and the later Mīmāṃsā related to the *Veda* consisting of two parts constitute one *Mīmāṃsā-śāstra*, for there is the *smṛti* text which says: ‘There are indeed fourteen kinds of knowledge – the six auxiliaries, the four *Vedas*, Mīmāṃsā, Nyāya, Purāṇa, and Dharma-śāstra.’ ” It is not correct. We have to say that the two treatises are different because of the difference in respect of the eligible person, subject matter and the result. In the case of the treatise on *dharma* called the *Pūrvamīmāṃsā* written by Jaimini commencing from, “Now, therefore, the enquiry into *dharma*,” the eligible person is one who is desirous of fruits such as heaven and also of doing rites such as sacrifices; *karmas* such as *jyotiṣṭoma* constitute the subject matter; and the result is the knowledge as to how it should be done, or heaven, etc., to be attained

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\* Translated by Dr. R. Balasubramanian

through the performance of rites. On the other hand, in the case of the treatise on Vedānta, called the *Uttaramīmāṃsā*, written by Vyāsa commencing from, "Now, therefore, the enquiry into Brahman," the eligible person is one, who being free from (worldly) desires, is desirous of liberation and who is equipped with the fourfold discipline comprising control of the mind, etc. The subject matter is Brahman which cannot be accomplished through action. The result is the knowledge of Brahman or liberation. Consequently the *Uttaramīmāṃsā* which expounds the existent Brahman, which has for its fruit the ever-existent liberation, and which has as the eligible person one who is free from desires and has renounced everything, is different from the *Pūrvamīmāṃsā* which expounds rites which have to be performed, which has for its fruit what is perishable and which has as the eligible person one who is a householder with desires. If it be said that both constitute one scriptural treatise since both are Mīmāṃsās, then it would be said that all the six auxiliaries, just because they are auxiliaries, constitute one scriptural treatise. Why more elaboration of this point? Then one should say that, since all the eighteen treatises are in Sanskrit, they constitute one scriptural treatise. It is no argument to say how these two treatises, if different, could be related as earlier and later. The answer is that Jaimini first of all wrote the treatise on *dharma*, and Vyāsa later on wrote the treatise, the *Śārīrakamīmāṃsā*. Or, since the enquiry into the earlier part of the *Veda* is contained in the *Dharma-śāstra* (of Jaimini), it is said to be 'Pūrvamīmāṃsā,' and since the enquiry into the later part of the *Veda* is contained in the *Vedānta-śāstra* (of Vyāsa), it is called 'Uttaramīmāṃsā'. It cannot be

said that since the two parts which are enquired into are parts of one and the same *Veda*, the two Mīmāṃsās are one scriptural treatise. If that were the case, *śikṣā*, (science of pronunciation), *vyākaraṇa* (grammar), etc., might be treated as one treatise, since their subject matter is in accordance with what is taught in the *Veda*. Therefore, the enquiry into Brahman, which is connected with the *Veda*, is different from the enquiry into *karma*, which is connected with the *Veda*, in the same way as it is different from grammar which is also connected with the *Veda*. Indeed, ‘Mīmāṃsā’ is enquiry. It is accepted that there is difference in enquiry due to the difference in what is enquired into, just as the enquiry into colour is different from the enquiry into taste.

It may be argued: “One and the same Brahman is taught by the earlier and the later parts of the *Veda* as stated by the *śruti* text, ‘That goal which all the *Vedas* propound’ and the *smṛti* text, ‘By all the *Vedas* I alone am known;’ since there is no difference in what is taught (by the *Veda*), the *Veda* which consists of two parts is one scriptural authority. Thus, it is but proper to say that the *Pūrvamīmāṃsā* and the *Uttaramīmāṃsā*, which are commentaries on the two parts of the *Veda*, which are related as earlier and later, are one scriptural authority.” This argument cannot be accepted. Since there are scriptural texts such as “No conviction of a resolute nature is formed in the mind of those who are attached to pleasures and power, and whose minds are drawn away by that flowery speech which the unwise — enamoured of Vedic utterances, declaring there is nothing else ... — utter,” “The *Vedas* treat of the triad of the *guṇas*. O Arjuna, be free from the triad of the *guṇas*,” “Their

the *Pūrvamīmāṃsā* and the *Uttaramīmāṃsā*, which are explanations thereof, are different from each other.

That is why, Jaimini who could not tolerate the authority of the later part of the *Veda* which teaches the existent Brahman has stated in the aphorism: "Since the *Veda* has its purport in action, whatever does not have its purport therein is not valid." It is no argument to say that since Jaimini was a disciple of Vyāsa, he would not be opposed to the *Vedānta*. Let it be that Jaimini was a follower of the teaching of the *Vedānta*. But the scriptural treatise written by him is surely opposed to the teaching of the *Vedānta*. Thinking that no intelligent person who has heard (and comprehended) the meaning of the *Vedānta* would be drawn towards *karma* and that the understanding of a person at the outset is not able to comprehend the subtle sense conveyed by the *Vedānta* texts, the scriptural treatise on *karma* was prescribed by him for the purpose of producing the purification of the mind through the performance of *karma*, and so the two treatises do not constitute one scriptural authority. Though it could be said in this way that the treatise on *karma* also is helpful indirectly to the study of the treatise on Brahman, still it is not directly helpful; and so Śaṅkarācārya did not say that the word "atha" means "after the study of the treatise on *karma*." On the contrary, he said that the word means "after the possession of the fourfold means of eligibility which is the direct means to the inquiry into Brahman."

It has been stated somewhere: "There is no conflict between the *Pūrvamīmāṃsā* and the *Uttaramīmāṃsā*." This is not correct, since there is conflict between them. It has been taught in the *Pūrvamīmāṃsā*

said that since the two parts which are enquired into are parts of one and the same *Veda*, the two Mīmāṃsās are one scriptural treatise. If that were the case, *śikṣā*, (science of pronunciation), *vyākaraṇa* (grammar), etc., might be treated as one treatise, since their subject matter is in accordance with what is taught in the *Veda*. Therefore, the enquiry into Brahman, which is connected with the *Veda*, is different from the enquiry into *karma*, which is connected with the *Veda*, in the same way as it is different from grammar which is also connected with the *Veda*. Indeed, 'Mīmāṃsā' is enquiry. It is accepted that there is difference in enquiry due to the difference in what is enquired into, just as the enquiry into colour is different from the enquiry into taste.

It may be argued: "One and the same Brahman is taught by the earlier and the later parts of the *Veda* as stated by the *śruti* text, 'That goal which all the *Vedas* propound' and the *smṛti* text, 'By all the *Vedas* I alone am known;' since there is no difference in what is taught (by the *Veda*), the *Veda* which consists of two parts is one scriptural authority. Thus, it is but proper to say that the *Pūrvamīmāṃsā* and the *Uttaramīmāṃsā*, which are commentaries on the two parts of the *Veda*, which are related as earlier and later, are one scriptural authority." This argument cannot be accepted. Since there are scriptural texts such as "No conviction of a resolute nature is formed in the mind of those who are attached to pleasures and power, and whose minds are drawn away by that flowery speech which the unwise — enamoured of Vedic utterances, declaring there is nothing else ... — utter," "The *Vedas* treat of the triad of the *guṇas*. O Arjuna, be free from the triad of the *guṇas*," "Their

aims in life were well directed by their knowledge of the *Vedānta*," "I ask of the *Puruṣa* taught in the *Upaniṣad*," the subject matter of the *Veda* and the *Vedānta* is different, and so they are different scriptural authorities. The nature of *karma*, the nature of Gods, heaven, etc. are, indeed, taught by the *Veda*. On the contrary, Brahman which is of the nature of *sat*, *cit*, and *ānanda* is taught by the *Vedānta*. Nor can it be said that the *Veda* and the *Vedānta* are one on the ground that the goal to be attained is one. The goal to be attained by the study of the *Veda* is heaven, etc. which are impermanent, whereas the goal to be attained by the study of the *Vedānta* is the supreme Brahman which is eternal;" and since they teach goals which are perishable and ever-lasting respectively, it is but proper to say that they are different in the same way as *Dharma-śāstra* and *Artha-śāstra* are different. If it be said that the goals (viz. heaven and Brahman) in both the cases are identical, then one must say that the *Veda*, the *Vedānta*, the *Dharma-śāstra*, the *Artha-śāstra*, etc. are not at all different, inasmuch as they agree by being conducive to an end which is of the nature of a *puruṣārtha*, even though the end taught by all these authorities are different from one another. So, since the earlier and the later parts of the *Veda* which are explained are not one scriptural authority, the *Pūrvamīmāṃsā* and the *Uttaramīmāṃsā* which are explanations thereof are not one scriptural authority. That all the *Vedas* have their purport in Brahman is supported by both *śruti* and *smṛti*; it is like all words having their purport in Brahman; and this is quite tenable (if we consider the final import of them). If it be asked, "How?" we reply as follows. All objects which are not-Self are superimposed on the

Self by *māyā* in the same way as a snake, a stick, a water-line, etc. are superimposed on a rope; since what is superimposed is not different from its substratum, words which denote objects such as pot that are superimposed have their purport in Brahman which is the substratum. It can be explained in another way also. All things in the form of *sat* (being) become objects for *pramāṇas*, but not as *asat* (non-being); it is Brahman in the form of *sat* that is uniformly present in objects such as pot which are superimpositions. Yet another explanation can be given. Brahman alone, which is delimited by objects and which is not known, is the object to be known by *pramāṇa*; but not mere objects such as pot. Thus, all the *Vedas*, all scriptures, all empirical means of knowledge such as the visual sense, in reality, establish Brahman alone. Since there is the *śruti* text, "All this, indeed, is Brahman," Brahman is all; so, words which refer to all objects refer to Brahman. However, so long as there is *vyavahāra*, there is the distinction among *pramāṇas*; also there is the distinction among the objects revealed by them. Consequently, we say that the *Vedānta* alone teaches Brahman. On the contrary, the *Vedas* teach *karma*, and so on; grammar teaches the correctness of words; thus the difference among the various treatises has to be accepted in the same way as we say that the visual sense perceives colour, the auditory sense perceives sound, and so on. Therefore, since there is difference in respect of the subject matter, the eligible person, and the result leading to the difference between the two scriptural treatises, the later part of the *Veda* is surely different from its earlier part. It is, therefore, proper to hold that the scriptural treatises,

the *Pūrvamīmāṃsā* and the *Uttaramīmāṃsā*, which are explanations thereof, are different from each other.

That is why, Jaimini who could not tolerate the authority of the later part of the *Veda* which teaches the existent Brahman has stated in the aphorism: "Since the *Veda* has its purport in action, whatever does not have its purport therein is not valid." It is no argument to say that since Jaimini was a disciple of Vyāsa, he would not be opposed to the *Vedānta*. Let it be that Jaimini was a follower of the teaching of the *Vedānta*. But the scriptural treatise written by him is surely opposed to the teaching of the *Vedānta*. Thinking that no intelligent person who has heard (and comprehended) the meaning of the *Vedānta* would be drawn towards *karma* and that the understanding of a person at the outset is not able to comprehend the subtle sense conveyed by the *Vedānta* texts, the scriptural treatise on *karma* was prescribed by him for the purpose of producing the purification of the mind through the performance of *karma*, and so the two treatises do not constitute one scriptural authority. Though it could be said in this way that the treatise on *karma* also is helpful indirectly to the study of the treatise on Brahman, still it is not directly helpful; and so Śaṅkarācārya did not say that the word "atha" means "after the study of the treatise on *karma*." On the contrary, he said that the word means "after the possession of the fourfold means of eligibility which is the direct means to the inquiry into Brahman."

It has been stated somewhere: "There is no conflict between the *Pūrvamīmāṃsā* and the *Uttaramīmāṃsā*." This is not correct, since there is conflict between them. It has been taught in the *Pūrvamīmāṃsā*



that *karma* alone is the giver of fruit, that heaven alone is the highest end, that Īsvara does not exist, that *dharma* alone is the support of the world, that the entire *Veda* has its purport only in action, and so on. On the contrary the *Uttaramīmāṃsā* teaches that Īsvara alone is the giver of fruit in accordance with *karma*, liberation alone is the highest end, that heaven is an inferior pleasure alone since it is perishable and surpassable, that Īsvara alone is the support of the world, that only the earlier part of the *Veda* has its purport in action, while the later part has its purport in Brahman, and so on. If so, how could it be that there is no conflict between them? By this it is established that there is no scope for the application of the principle here which says: "There is syntactical unity because of one and the same subject matter."

If it be said: "*Karma*, by producing the purification of the mind, is the cause of the attainment of knowledge; and so the treatise on Mīmāṃsā, though it teaches *karma*, is certainly the cause of the attainment of the knowledge of Brahman; consequently the two Mīmāṃsās, inasmuch as they lead to the knowledge of Brahman, constitute one scriptural authority," then one could as well maintain that other treatises on Logic, etc., by conveying the knowledge of ether and other objects, are useful to the attainment of the knowledge of the Self; and so, they too, along with the *Uttaramīmāṃsā*, constitute one scriptural authority. Indeed, Kaṇāda and Gautama, like Jaimini, do not intend to teach what is opposed to the Vedānta. Someone may argue that, just as there is difference between the chapters, there is difference between the *Pūrvamīmāṃsā* and the *Uttaramīmāṃsā*. It is not correct. In that case, the same kind of difference might be said to

exist between other treatises on Logic, etc., on the one hand, and the *Uttaramīmāṃsā*, on the other. It may be argued: "While agreeing on the main topic which is taught, intermediate difference in the exposition of the content leads to difference in chapters; this kind of difference exists only between the *Pūrvamīmāṃsā* and the *Uttaramīmāṃsā*, and not among other treatises." This argument is untenable, because there is difference between the earlier and the later Mīmāṃsās even in respect of the main topic of exposition. This is obvious by the two opening aphorisms of the two treatises, "Now, therefore, the enquiry into *dharma*," and "Now, therefore, the enquiry into Brahman." It cannot be said that the word "*dharma*" refers to both *karma* and Brahman. If that were the case, it is not proper to make a separate beginning with the aphorism "Now, therefore, the enquiry into Brahman." Thus it is settled that the difference in the opening aphorism proves that the *Pūrvamīmāṃsā* and the *Uttaramīmāṃsā* are different, just as the difference in the opening aphorisms, "Now, the instruction about *yoga*," "Now, the instruction about word," proves the difference between *Yoga-sūtra* and *Vyākaraṇa-sūtra*. Further, if the two Mīmāṃsās are one scriptural authority, then Jaimini who wrote the *Pūrvamīmāṃsā* should also have written the *Uttaramīmāṃsā*. Or, he should have said: "I started to write the entire *Mīmāṃsā-sūtra*; however, only half of it has been written for want of luck. The remaining half of the work will be written by my teacher, Vyāsa." In the same way, Vyāsa too should have said: "Only half of the treatise has been written by my disciple; and the remaining half is written by me."

It may be argued: "If the two Mīmāṃsās do not constitute one scriptural authority, why is it said that

Mīmāṃsā is one scripture in the *smṛti* text, 'Mīmāṃsā, Nyāya ..' ” The reply is as follows. Here the word 'Mīmāṃsā' refers only to 'Brahma-mīmāṃsā' (*i.e.* Uttaramīmāṃsā), because 'Pūrvamīmāṃsā' is referred to by the word "*dharma-śāstra*": the *Dharma-śāstra* is, indeed, begun with the aphorism, "Now, therefore, the enquiry into *dharma*." The *Dharma-śāstra* written by Manu and others come under this category. Or there would not be any defect if it is brought under the category of 'Purāṇas.' Therefore, we proclaim that the earlier and the later Mīmāṃsās do not constitute one scriptural authority because of the difference between *karma* and Brahman which are taught by them, because of the difference in their opening aphorisms about the subject of inquiry, because of the difference between Jaimini and Bādarāyaṇa, who are their authors, because of the difference between one-with-desire and one-free-from-desire, who are the eligible persons, because of the difference between heaven and liberation, which are their fruits, because of the difference between the *Veda* and *Vedānta*, which are their basic authorities, and because of the difference between the Mīmāṃsakas and the Vedāntins, who are their followers.

It cannot be said that the *Veda* and *Vedānta* are but one scriptural authority; they are two different treatises, since the subjects taught by them are opposed to each other. This can be explained as follows. There are the following Vedic texts which say: "To one who performs *cāturmāsya* a result which is permanent takes place," "We drank *soma* juice and have become immortal," "So long as one lives, one should do *agnihotra*," "One who neglects the sacrificial fire is guilty of *vīrahatti-doṣa*," "During every spring one should do the

sacrifice called *jyotiṣṭoma*," "One should approach one's wife during proper time," "One should study one's *Veda*," and so on. It is said by the *Vedānta* texts: "That which is not made is not won by what is done," "On whatever day one has the spirit of renunciation, that very day let one renounce," "The Self is to be meditated upon," "The Self, indeed, is to be seen," "Let him not meditate on many words....," "One should see the Self in the Self by possessing control of the mind, control of the senses, renunciation, endurance, concentration of the mind and faith."

That is why it has been said in the *Bhagavadgītā* that "The *Vedas* are about objects made up of the three *guṇas*; O Arjuna, be free from the three *guṇas*." Thus, since the *Veda* and the *Vedānta* teach subjects which are opposed to each other, it becomes necessary for us to say that one of them is not authoritative; however, since for the believers in the *Veda* it is not desirable to reject the authority of one of them, the conflict between them is reconciled by means of the difference in the eligible person for their studies, etc. Only for a person who has not renounced, the abandonment of *agnihotra*, etc., is a sin, but not for one who has renounced. The permanence of the result accruing to one who has performed *cāturmāsya* is only relative as it is more permanent than the one accruing from some other good deed: thus we have to make the distinction. In the same way, when there is conflict with the *Vedānta* texts, it is the *Vedic* text that has to be interpreted otherwise. Just as *śruti* is stronger than *smṛti* which has to be interpreted otherwise when it comes into conflict with the former, even so the *Vedānta* alone is strong (when compared with the *Veda*). Thus, there is difference

between the *Veda* and the *Vedānta* due to their being weak and strong (when there is conflict between them).

Further, *pramā* (knowledge) is that cognition of an object which is not otherwise known and which is unsublated; and the instrument of this knowledge is called *pramāṇa*. Though heaven, etc., are not otherwise known, they get sublated; and so the knowledge of these is not *pramā*; consequently, the *Veda* is not *pramāṇa*. On the other hand, since Brahman cannot otherwise be known and sublated, the knowledge of Brahman is *pramā*; and the *Vedānta* which is the means thereto is *pramāṇa*. Thus, the *Veda* and the *Vedānta* are different due to their being *apramāṇa* and *pramāṇa* (respectively). It cannot be said that heaven, etc., do not get sublated, because, being impermanent, they do not exist in all the three periods of time. Indeed, what exists in all the three periods of time is what remains unsublated in all the three periods of time. It is no argument to say that, even though heaven, etc., are sublated, *dharma* is not sublated. Since *dharma* too is what is produced and goes away after producing its fruit, it gets sublated. If it be said that we are only *nāstikas* since we say that the *Veda* is *apramāṇa*, the reply is that we do not say that the *Vedānta* (also) is *apramāṇa* like the *nāstikas*. Though in truth the *Veda* is *apramāṇa*, we do accept that it is also a *pramāṇa* in the state of *avidyā*, just as the knowledge of pot and other objects is accepted as *pramā* so long as there is *vyavahāra*. Therefore, it is correct to say that, inasmuch as the *Veda* and the *Vedānta* do not constitute one scriptural authority, the two Mīmāṃsās also which are explanations thereof do not constitute one scriptural authority.

It may be objected that the above argument is not tenable for the following reason: "Starting from the aphorism, 'Now, therefore, the enquiry into *dharma*,' till the last aphorism, 'There is no return, there is no return (for these released souls)...' there is one related subject matter arranged in a sequence constituting the *Mīmāṃsā-śāstra*. Here, in one part there is enquiry into *yajña* and other rites which are taught by the *Veda* through its injunction such as 'yajeta' (one must sacrifice). But in another part there is enquiry into acts such as *upāsanā* taught by the *Veda* through its injunction 'upāsita' (one must meditate), etc. Thus, the entire scripture has its purport in action alone. So, since there is no difference in the main topic which is propounded, even though there is intermediate difference, there is no scriptural difference (*i.e.* there is no difference in the two *Mīmāṃsās*)." This objection is not tenable. If it be said that *upāsanā* too, being a mental function, is an act, then knowledge also can be said to be an act, because "*jñāna*" is the meaning of the root "*jñā*" and the verbal root conveys action. This, however, will not be helpful to the opponent as it will be detrimental to his position, *viz.*, that liberation cannot be attained by *karma* alone, but only through *karma* combined with *jñāna*. *Karma* is, indeed, action; and if *jñāna* also is action, then how could there be combination of action with action? If it be said that *jñāna* is not *kriyā*, but *phala*, then since all scriptural rites are performed with the knowledge of objects such as ghee, oblation, and so on, how could it be said that liberation is attained through *karma* alone? If it be said that *karma* without the knowledge of Brahman is called mere *karma* (*kevalakarma*), then inasmuch as there is no *karma* at all which is associated

with the knowledge of Brahman, the qualification is useless (*i.e.* it makes no sense to speak of “*jñānasahita-karma*”). It cannot be said that the *karma* which has to be done by one who has the knowledge of Brahman may be called *karma* in association with the knowledge of Brahman and that the *karma* which has to be done by one who does not have the knowledge of Brahman may be called mere *karma*, because there is no action at all to be done by the knower of Brahman, and one who does action is not said to be a knower of Brahman. Only that person who has renounced is said to be a knower of Brahman. It is no argument to say that only a person who has renounced is called a knower of Brahman and that renunciation is not abandonment of *karma*, but is absence of mental function. Since the actions of the body, etc. are due to the functions of the mind, how could there be any action at all, if there are no functions of the mind at all? So, *karma* alone is the principal subject matter propounded in the *Pūrvamīmāṃsā*, because Jaimini has loudly declared that scripture has its purport in action. Sentences like “Indra wields the thunderbolt in his hand” are meaningful inasmuch as they propound the nature of the gods who are connected with rites; and this has been made clear in the section on “*Arthavāda*.” The central topic propounded in the *Uttaramīmāṃsā* is Brahman, as it has been boldly stated in the aphorism, “Because scripture is the means of the knowledge (of that Brahman).” Since the *upāsanās*, both *saguṇa* and *nirguṇa*, which are connected with Brahman, are enjoined as they are useful to the origination of the knowledge of Brahman, they are different from the chief topic (*viz.*, Brahman) and so there cannot be one scriptural authority (combining all these).

## THE SYLLABLE OM

चत्वारि शृङ्गा त्रयो अस्य पादा  
 द्वे शीर्षे सप्त हस्तासो अस्य ।  
 त्रिधा बद्धो वृषभो रोरवीति  
 महो देवो मर्त्याँ आविवेश ॥

The syllable *Om* conceived as the Bull possesses four horns, three feet and two heads. He has seven hands. This Bull connected in a threefold manner eloquently declares the Supreme. The Self-luminous Deity has entered the mortals everywhere.

An allegoric stanza of the *R̥gveda*, IV, 58, 3.

*Mahānārāyaṇopaniṣad*, XII, 10.



ŚĀRĪRAKA-VYĀKHYĀ-PRASTHĀNA-BHEDAḤ

by

*Ātmaśāstrī* V. S. V. Gurusvāmī Śāstrī

(Contd. from Vol. XII, No. 1)

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कथमेवं स्थिते ब्रह्मसिद्धिपद्यं तु वार्तिकम् ।  
इति चेद्वार्तिककृतः पद्यत्वेनैव वार्तिकम् ॥

[ 325 ]

इत्येव रोतिरत्रापि साध्वी बोध्या सुधीवरैः ।  
अन्यथा भ्रान्तिरेव स्यादीक्षितानां प्रकल्पिता ॥

[ 326 ]

न भिन्नानेकसिद्धान्तसंग्रहे जागरूकता ।  
इति तत्र प्रकल्प्या स्यान्न युक्तं विदुषामिदम् ॥

[ 327 ]

तद्वार्तिककृदेव स्याद्ब्रह्मसिद्धिविनिर्मिता ।  
इत्येव दीक्षिताश्चापि मन्यन्तेऽयं ममाशयः ॥

[ 328 ]

नैष्कर्म्यब्रह्मसिद्धी च बृहदारण्यवार्तिकम् ।  
एककर्तृकमित्येतत्सिद्धं पूर्वोक्तयुक्तिभिः ॥

[ 329 ]

परस्परविरुद्धार्थकथनं ग्रन्थयोर्द्वयोः ।  
न साधयेत्कर्तृभेदं कर्त्रेकत्वेऽपि तद्ववेत् ॥

[ 330 ]

भाष्येऽपि भगवत्पादैर्विरुद्धा प्रक्रिया क्वचित् ।  
दर्शितेति सदृष्टान्तमस्माभिः पूर्वमीरितम् ॥

[ 331 ]

यथा हेत्वन्तरैश्चायं साधीयान्विषयो भवेत् ।  
तथा प्रदर्शयिष्यामस्तयोरैक्यविवेचने ॥

(xv) आभासवादः

[ 332 ]

अज्ञानोपहितो यः स्याच्चिदाभासः स ईश्वरः ।  
बुद्ध्या तूपहितो जीवश्चिदाभासः स इष्यते ॥

[ 333 ]

एवमाभासवादोऽयं वर्ण्यते वार्तिकेषु तैः ।  
सिद्धान्तविन्दुसिद्धान्तलेशसंग्रहकर्तृभिः ॥

[ 334 ]

तत्र तत्र मतं चैतस्वग्रन्थेष्वप्यनूयते ।  
आभासश्चापि मिथ्यात्मा प्रतिबिम्बोऽभ्युपेयते ॥

[ 335 ]

छान्दोग्यषष्ठे खण्डे तु तृतीयस्मिंश्च भाष्यकृत् ।  
'जीवात्मनानुप्रविश्य व्याकुर्यां नामरूपवत् ॥

[ 336 ]

इति सङ्कल्पयामास देवतेत्यर्थकम्पुनः ।  
मन्त्रं व्याख्याय तत्रैव विचारावसरेऽब्रवीत् ॥

[ 337 ]

'देवताभासमात्रं तु जीवो नाम भवेद्यदि ।  
छायामात्रश्च जीवोऽसौ तदा प्राप्तो मृषा ध्रुवम् ॥

[ 338 ]

तथेहपरलोकादी'त्येवं शङ्कानिषेधने ।  
'नामरूपादि सर्वं च भवेत्सत्यं सदात्मना ॥

[ 339 ]

स्वतस्त्वनृतमेवेष्टं वाचारम्भणवाक्यतः ।  
एवं जीवोऽपि यक्षानुरूपो हि बलि'रित्यमुम् ॥

[ 340 ]

भाष्यसंदर्भमेवेह मूलमूहामहे वयम् ।  
अतिविस्तरभीत्या तु नाधिकं लिख्यते मया ॥

[ 341 ]

सुरेश्वराचार्यवचो विशुद्धं मूलं नु सर्वज्ञगुरोर्मतस्य ।  
तथा प्रकाशात्मयतेः पथस्तद्बुधैरुपादेयमुदारसत्त्वैः ॥

[ 342 ]

कायं सुरेश्वरगुरुर्बुधचक्रवर्ती  
काहं नितान्तजडधीः क्व च वार्तिकानि ।  
तेषामपि क्व च विमर्शवचो मदीयं  
तन्मामकीनमतिशुद्धिफलोऽत्र यत्नः ॥

[ 343 ]

सिद्धान्तभेदानिह संग्रहेण  
नैष्कर्म्यसिद्धेरथ वार्तिकेभ्यः ।  
प्रादर्शयं भाष्यवचोऽपि तेषां  
मूलं यथाबुद्धि विमृश्य किञ्चित् ॥

## VII ॥ श्रीविमुक्तात्मा ॥

[ 344 ]

विमुक्तात्मनामा प्रसिद्धो यतीन्द्रः  
 परामृश्य च ब्रह्मनैष्कर्म्यसिद्धी ।  
 चकारेष्टसिद्धिं जगादेष्टतत्त्वं  
 तदालोचयामोऽस्य सिद्धान्तभेदान् ॥

[ 345 ]

अध्यायैरष्टमिश्वेष्टसिद्धिः स्वाभीष्टसिद्धये ।  
 विभक्तात्रभवद्भिः श्रीविमुक्तात्मसुधीवरैः ॥

[ 346 ]

ख्यातीरेवाधिकृत्यात्र विचारः सुमहान्कृतः ।  
 एतेऽनिर्वचनीयाख्यख्यातिमाहुर्गरीयसीम् ।

[ 347 ]

अतिप्रसन्नगम्भी रैर्वाग्गुम्फैर्युक्तिनिर्भरैः ।  
 अन्यथाख्यातिमुख्यान्यख्यातयस्तैर्निराकृताः ॥

[ 348 ]

श्रुतिं स्मृतिं ब्रह्मसूत्रं गीतां भागवतं तथा ।  
 योगसूत्रं भारतं श्रीगौडपादसुरेश्वरौ ॥

[ 349 ]

प्रमाणयन्ति बहुशो विमुक्तात्मयतीश्वराः ।  
 न तथा भगवत्पादं मानयन्ति क्वचित्पुनः ॥

[ 350 ]

यक्षानुरूपो बलिरित्येतन्न्यायवचः परम् ।  
छान्दोग्ये भाष्यकृत्प्रोक्तं प्राह स्वेप्सितसिद्धये ॥

[ 351 ]

शब्दाद्वैतं ब्रह्मधिया सर्वकर्मक्षयस्तथा ।  
आत्मरूपा त्वविद्याया निवृत्तिरिति यन्मतम् ॥

[ 352 ]

आचार्यमण्डनस्येष्टमिष्टसिद्धावनूद्य तत् ।  
दूष्यते विस्तरेणैव स्वाशयोऽप्यत्र बोध्यते ॥

[ 353 ]

प्रायः सुरेश्वराचार्यसिद्धान्तानुपबृंहयन् ।  
नातीव सिद्यते तस्मात्कचिदाह विलक्षणम् ॥

अविद्यानिवृत्तिः पञ्चमप्रकारा

[ 354 ]

अविद्याया निवृत्तिर्नाद्वैतहानेः सती भवेत् ।  
नासती ज्ञानसाध्यत्वायोगान्नाप्युभयात्मिका ॥

[ 355 ]

विरोधान्नाप्यनिर्वाच्या सा ज्ञानोत्पत्तिकत्वतः ।  
मुक्तावप्यनुवर्तेत निवृत्ता न भवेद्धिया ॥

[ 356 ]

इति प्रकारांश्चतुरः प्रतिषिध्येष्टसिद्धिकृत् ।  
सा पञ्चमप्रकारैव भवेदित्यन्वबोधयत् ॥

[ 357 ]

अयमानन्दबोधस्य पक्ष इत्यप्याध्वरी ।  
स्वग्रन्थे प्राह सिद्धान्तलेशसंग्रहनामके ॥

[ 358 ]

वस्तुतः किल सिद्धान्तो विमुक्तात्ममुनेरयम् ।  
दीक्षितेन्द्रानुवादश्च कथंचिदुपपद्यते ॥

[ 359 ]

सर्वज्ञात्ममुनिर्मुक्तिकोविदानामिदं मतम् ।  
इति शारीरकोक्तार्थसंक्षेपे समवर्णयत् ॥

[ 360 ]

इष्टसिद्धिकृतो मुक्तिकोविदा इति निश्चयम् ।  
ग्रन्थं तदीयं व्याकुर्वन्नब्रवीन्मधुसूदनः ॥

[ 361 ]

आनन्दबोधमुनिना स्वग्रन्थे स्वस्य बोध्यते ।  
विमुक्तात्मविनेयत्वं तत्पद्यग्रहपूर्वकम् ॥

[ 362 ]

गुरोर्मतस्य तद्ग्रन्थे सुतरामुपबृंहणात् ।  
तदीयं मतमित्येवं दीक्षितैरप्यनूद्यते ॥

[ 363 ]

भोग्यस्य भुवनस्येव भोक्तुर्जीवस्य भाष्यकृत् ।  
'यक्षानुरूपो बलि'रित्येवं दृष्टान्तयन्स्फुटम् ॥



[ 364 ]

छान्दोग्यषष्ठे मिथ्यात्वं यज्जगाद तदेव हि ।  
विमुक्तात्ममतस्यास्य मूलं शङ्कामहे वयम् ॥

[ 365 ]

विमुक्तात्मा च यक्षानुरूप इत्याद्युदाहरन् ।  
अविद्याया निवृत्तिं स मिथ्येत्येवाभिमन्यते ॥

[ 366 ]

या तु ज्ञाननिवर्त्यत्वरूपानिर्वचनीयता ।  
अज्ञानस्येऽपि सैव तन्निवृत्तेर्निषिध्यते ॥

[ 367 ]

निरूपणासहत्वं यद्वस्तुतस्तदुपेयते ।  
अत एव हि तस्यास्तत्खण्डयते मण्डयतेऽपि तैः ॥

[ 368 ]

यद्यनिर्वाच्यता तस्या नेह स्वीक्रियते तदा ।  
मिथ्यात्वस्यानुमानं यत्तद्व्यज्येत न संशयः ॥

[ 369 ]

तत्पञ्चमप्रकारेयं मिथ्येत्यस्ति सुनिश्चितम् ।  
ज्ञानानि सन्ति यावन्ति तावन्त्यङ्गीकृतानि तैः ॥

[ 370 ]

अज्ञानानीत्येतदपि विमुक्तात्ममुनेर्षतम् ।  
सिद्धान्तविन्दुसंक्षेपकाराभ्यामप्यनूद्यते ॥

(अनुवर्तते)

## HOMAGE TO HARI

खानिलग्न्यब्धरिव्यन्तं  
 स्वकफणीवोद्गतं यतः ।  
 ध्वान्तच्छिदे नमस्तस्मै  
 हरये बुद्धिसाक्षिणे ॥

I offer obeisance to Hari, the destroyer of darkness and the witness to the intellect, from whom the world consisting of ether, air, fire, water, and earth has arisen like a snake from a garland.

Sureśvara, *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi*, I, 1.

ŚĀRĪRAKA-VYĀKHYĀ-PRĀSTHĀNA-BHEDAḤ

by

*Ātmavidyābhūṣaṇam V. S. V. Gurusvāmī Śāstrī*

Free rendering by

*Dr. V. K. S. N. Raghavan*

*(Contd. from Vol. XII, No. 1)*

ÉÉRIR / K. LAZARUS / PR. STRENGTHENING

or

Amendments to the Constitution of the State

For reading by

Dr. V. K. M. Reddy

(Contd. from Vol. VII, No. 11)

[ 308 cd - 311 ]

Every worldly object is known by consciousness. If not known by the latter, then everything would merely be similar to dance in the dark-room. Suresvara has dealt with this in detail in his *Vārttikas*. This is also evident from the *Bhāṣya* of Śrī Śaṅkara on the Upaniṣadic texts, “*nainad-devā āpnuvan*” (*Īśāvāsyopāniṣad*, 4), and “*sākṣī cetā kevalaḥ*” (*Śvetāśvataropāniṣad* VI, 11). But what the Naiyāyikas hold as *anuvyavasāya-ātma-jñāna* is nothing else but the witness-consciousness.

(xiii) *Jīva's agency-in-creation*

[ 312 ]

Suresvara is of the view that *jīva* has agency with regard to creation because *jīva's* creatorship can be established through its being located in the mind (*manas*).

(xiv) *Śrī Appayyadīkṣita's view on the single authorship of the Naiṣkarmyasiddhi, Brahmasiddhi and the Vārttika*

[ 313 - 317 ab ]

In the beginning of his *Siddhāntaleśasaṅgraha*, Appayyadīkṣita has quoted a verse, “*niyamah, parisāṅkhyā ...*” ‘The injunctive sense (here) must be that of restrictive or exclusive injunction, for we contemplate on the supreme Self by excluding the perception of the not-Self.’ Some persons interpreted the above verse bringing in another text as, ‘*parisāṅkhyāvidhiṃ tu ātmaśravaṇe ca.*’ The above-quoted verse, ‘*niyamah, parisāṅkhyā ...*’ is not found as a *vārttika* text in any one of the *Vārttika* works of Suresvara. Even he did not hold such a view. With regard to the instruction (study) of the *Ātman*, *vidhi* is squarely refuted in the *Bṛhad-*

*āranyakavārttika*. Appayadīkṣita who counts himself as the follower of the *Vārttika* indicates that this is not the view of Suresvara.

[ 317 cd - 320 ]

But the above-mentioned verse forms part of the *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi* (I, 88); and, since it is by an Ācārya who wrote *Vārttikas*, the verse was named a *Vārttika*. Even Suresvara mentions this point in the *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi* only as an *abhyupetya-vāda*. The theory of *parisaṅkhyāvidhi* in this context is not acceptable to Suresvara. One, Nārāyaṇasarasvatī has composed a *Vārttika* commentary on the *Brahmasūtra-Śāṅkara-bhāṣya*. He has upheld the view of *parisaṅkhyāvidhi* following the above-quoted verse, in his *Vārttika*. So such a contention may belong to him.

[ 321 - 323 ]

There is a verse, '*sarvapratyayavedya- ...*' forming part of the *Brahmasiddhi*. Even this verse is cited as *Vārttika* by Appayadīkṣita. The verses of the *Brahmasiddhi* are only called *kārikās* and not as *vārttikas*. Appayadīkṣita, who has followed the views of both *Brahmasiddhi* and *Vārttika*, knows clearly the different standpoints. 'When this is the case, how can the verse of the *Brahmasiddhi* be treated as *vārttika*?' — if such a question is asked, (the reply is:) as it is the verse of the *Vārttikakāra*, it is known as *vārttika*. This position should be taken as right by the wise men. Otherwise Dīkṣita's view would become erroneous. And it will also be contingent that while collecting different standpoints, one lacks wakefulness — but this is not acceptable to the learned scholars. So, the author of the

*Brahmasiddhi* is also the *Vārttikakāra* — thus, indeed, does Appayyadīkṣita contend.

[ 328 - 331 ]

This is my contention: From what has been said above, it is established that the *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi*, the *Brahmasiddhi* and the *Bṛhadāraṇyavārttika* are the works of one and the same author. If two different standpoints are set forth in two works, it cannot be said for that matter that the two works should have been written by two different authors; for, it may be possible even in the case of one and the same author. Even Śrī Śaṅkara has established contradictory viewpoints in the *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* and this has been illustrated in the beginning of this monograph by us. This point can be derived even by other reasons. Let us show it when we discuss the unity of both of them.

(xv) *Ābhāsa-vāda* (the theory of *Ābhāsa*)

[ 332 - 340 ]

That reflection of consciousness which is delimited by *ajñāna* (nescience) is called *Īsvara*. But, the *cidābhāsa* (reflection of consciousness) which is delimited by *buddhi* (intellect) is called *jīva* (individual self). Thus he (Suresvara) has expounded the theory of *ābhāsa* in his *Vārttikas*. The authors of the *Siddhānta-bindu* and the *Siddhāntaleśasaṅgraha* have also restated the same view in their works. That reflection of illusory nature is called the *pratibimba*. While commenting on the *Chāndogyopaniṣad* (VI, iii 2) "The Deity made the resolve, 'Let me enter into them as *jīvātman* and make them distinct with name and form'," the author of the *Bhāṣya* explained that, 'if the *jīva* be the mere reflection of the Deity, then it amounts to saying

that the *jīva* is merely a shadow; and then it is also certain that this world and the other world are only unreal.' — thus the doubt was cleared. We surmise that the source of the above explanation is the following passage of the *Bhāṣya*: based on *sat* (the one Reality), all those beginning with name, form, etc. will be regarded as real; but following the purport of the *vācārambhaṇa* text (*Chāndogyopaniṣad*, VI, iv, 1), one should conclude that everything (other than Brahman) is only unreal. Similarly, *jīva* is also unreal following the maxim of '*yakṣānurūpo hi baliḥ*' "Indeed, the offering of *bali* is made in proportion to the '*yakṣa*' invoked." Because of the fear of the fallacy of over-elaboration, I have not dealt with this further.

[ 341 - 343 ]

The pure and serene texts of Suresvara form the basis of the views of Sarvajñātman and even those of Prakāśatmayati; so the learned scholars have to accept their views generously. Suresvara, indeed, has been a great exponent; but I am not at all competent enough to comment on his valuable *Vārttikas*; however, I hope that this attempt is fruitful enough to purify my mind. In this attempt, I have gathered some main points of view discussed in the *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi* and the *Vārttikas*; in addition to that I have shown their source texts from the *Bhāṣya* of Śrī Śaṅkara. I have made this critical study according to my understanding.

(to be continued)



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 त्पेषा शङ्करभारती विजयते निर्वाणसन्दायिनी ॥

*saṁsārādhvani tāpabhānukiraṇaprodhbhūtadāhavyathā-  
 khinnānām jalakāṅkṣayā marubhuvi bhrāntyā  
 paribhrāmyatām  
 atyāsannasudhāmbudhiṁ sukhakaram brahmādvayaṁ  
 darśayaty-  
 eṣā śaṅkarabhāratī vijayate nirvāṇasandāyini.*

To those who are afflicted, in the way of the world, by the burning pain given rise to by the scorching sun-shafts of misery, and who through delusion wander about in the desert (of worldliness) seeking water — showing the felicitous ocean of nectar, which is very near, the non-dual *Brahman*, this — the Voice of Śaṅkara — is victorious, leading, as it does, to liberation.