

A QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ADVAITA - VEDĀNTA

The VOICE of ŚĀṆKARA

śaṅkara-bhāratī

Chairman, Advisory Board

V. R. Kalyanasundara Sastri

Editor

N. C. Krishnan

Volume TWELVE

Number THREE



November

1987

esā śaṅkara-bhāratī vijagate
nirvāṇa-sandāyini

victorious is the voice of śaṅkara.
leading, as it does, to liberation

The Voice of Śaṅkara

is published under the guidance of
His Holiness Jagadguru Śrī Śaṅkarācārya
of Kāñcī Kāmakōṭi Pīṭha
by Ādi Śaṅkara Advaita Research Centre

Registered Office:

26, College Road,
Nungambakkam,
Madras-600 006.

Subscriptions are to be sent to:

The Administrative Officer,
Ādi Śaṅkara Advaita Research Centre,
26, College Road, Nungambakkam,
Madras-600 006.

Subscription Rates:

	Indian	Foreign
Annual	Rs. 60/-	US Dollars 20
For two years	Rs. 100/-	US Dollars 36
Life	Rs. 500/-	US Dollars 200
Single copy	Rs. 20/-	US Dollars 6

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HOMAGE TO ŚAṅKARA

[123]

सुपर्वोक्तिगन्धेन हीनाय तूर्णं
पुरा तोटकायाखिलज्ञानदात्रे ।
प्रवालीयगर्वापहारस्य कर्त्रे
पदाब्जम्रदिम्ना नमः शङ्कराय ॥

*suparvoktigandhena hīnāya tūrṇam-
purā toṭakāyākhila-jñānadātre
pravālīya-garvāpahārasya kartre
padābjamradimnā namaḥ śaṅkarāya.*

Oh Lord Śaṅkara! I bow to you. Long ago, you have yielded instantaneously full-blown knowledge to Śrī Toṭakācārya who was thoroughly ignorant of (the knowledge of) the *Śāstras* (lit. Sanskrit=*suparvokti*). You have warded off the pride of the tender sprouts (about its softness) by the excessive softness of your lotus-like feet.

[124]

भवाभोधिमग्नान् जनान् दुःखयुक्तान्
 जवादुद्धिधीर्षुर्भवान् इत्यहोऽहम् ।
 विदित्वा हि ते कीर्तिमन्यादृशां भो
 सुखं निर्विशङ्कः स्वपिम्यस्तयत्नः ॥

*bavāmbhodhi-magnān janān duḥkhayuktān
 javād-uddidhīrṣur-bhavān ityaho'ham
 viditvā hi te kīrtim-anyādrśām bho
 sukhain nirviśaṅkaḥ svapimyastayatnaḥ.*

Oh! Preceptor! You are quite anxious to lift up the miserable people immersed in the ocean of *saṁsāra* (cycle of birth and death). Ah! thus knowing your unique fame, I feel comfortable (*lit.* sleep well), remaining quiet, free from worry.

Jagadguru Śrī Śaccidānanda Śivābhinava Nṛsimhabhārati
 in *Śrīsaṅkarācāryabhujāṅgaprayātastotra*

ANCIENT SYSTEM OF LEARNING*

Jagadguru Śrī Candrasekharendra Sarasvatī

It is worthwhile examining the ancient system of learning and teaching which was prevalent in the Vedic times. The hymns that constitute the collection called the *Vedas* are words of inspiration that reveal the truth perceptions of the Ṛṣi (the seer). They were *mantras*, divine revelations, carrying profound spiritual power appropriate to their sense and sound. These were taught to young boys, children of relatives and friends of the teacher, and thus was born the first 'school' in our ancient land. The subjects taught were *vidyās* and hence came the word '*Vidyārthī*' (seeker after knowledge), but they did not include the arts and sciences of later times. The secret of *vidyās*, known to the Ṛṣis, was imparted to the disciples who learnt them by practice and not by theory.

The origin of every *mantra* was sacred and profound. When the *antaḥkaraṇa* of the seer (Ṛṣi) was merged with the absolute, Paramātman during his

*English rendering by ARGUS. Courtesy: *Deyvattin Kural*, vol. iv, September, 1985 (ed.), pp.132 ff

dhyāna, the Vedic *mantras* were believed to have issued like breath from the lofty *ākāśa*. The method for putting the precepts to practical life too were revealed to the Ṛṣi, it is stated, by divine grace. Even as Yama, the Lord of *Dharma*, instructed Naciketas the *Kaṭhopa- niṣad*, and Sanatkumāra taught the sage Nārada, a Deva or Mahāpuruṣa with divine powers taught the *vidyā* to the Ṛṣi or to a disciple fit to be initiated into the secrets. Not only did Yama initiate Naciketas in 'Agni Vidyā', but he also gave a boon to him to have that *vidyā* named after the disciple.

Likewise are some other *vidyās* named after a few disciples (instead of the respective masters or the Upā- sanamūrttis described in the *mantras*) such as Upakosala Vidyā, Satyakāma Vidyā, and Maitreya Vidyā which are all mentioned in the Upaniṣads. From this system, it is evident that great esteem and respect was bestowed on disciples showing faith and devotion to the teachings. The *vidyās* are spiritual disciplines — *sādhanas* — by which the earnest disciple sets out to realise and live the truth as envisaged and taught to him by his teacher, usually named the Ācārya.

Of all *vidyās*, the foremost is Brahma Vidyā as it deals with the *jñāna* portion of the *Vedas*, as against the ritual section. It is also known as *Vedānta*, signifying the end of the *Vedas*, or the goal or gist of the *Vedas*. These are not mere philosophical speculations but the record of the spiritual experiences of the Indian sages for centuries, actual realisations of superconscious perceptions. The Upaniṣads dealing with the 'Brahma Vidyā' include such *Vidyās* as Pañcāgni Vidyā, Dahara Vidyā, Madhu Vidyā, Vaisvānara Vidyā, Antaryāmi Vidyā, etc. These *Vidyās* were taught by

the seers who disclosed what they had seen and not inferred by arguments and ratiocination. The instruction was by dialogue between an earnest disciple (who must be a qualified aspirant) and the seer. These occult teachings were imparted to the disciples only after testing the sincerity and strength of the student's mind.

The teaching was conducted in the own house of the master (Guru) and given to his descendents and intimate friend's children, and this was the genesis of the first school in ancient India. The sage's hermitage became the 'āśrama' of the students. Humanity's first schools were thus born in the Āśramas of the Ṛṣis (seers).

Starting as a family affair originally, the *vidyās* were handed down from generation to generation, and later, relationships between different *āśramas* began to develop. Thus more *Vidyās*, other than what was taught in an *āśrama*, were learnt by students, and what we know today as exchange of professorships was not an uncommon feature of the ancient times.

If the true history of humanity is the history of the few elect, as we measure the Himalayas by the height of Mount Everest, we must also evaluate the type of learning imparted in this country from the teachings of these sages to their disciples in their *āśramas*. What other instrument than language is available for teaching all over the world? That the nature of the language is dealt with in the *Vedas* itself is a gratifying feature to be noted. The ancient scholars knew that if the Vedic teachings were to be preserved intact, they had to be very cautious in giving importance to every letter and word giving the correct tone and accent, because any change in the

accent would bring about a change in the meaning of the same word. This subject of phonetics, syntax, accent and grammar was known as *Vyākaraṇa* then. Western grammarians are marvelling at the skill, erudition and scholarship displayed by the sages in formulating their *Vyākaraṇa* science, detailed in the *Vedas*. The Vedic accent occupies even today a very important position in Comparative Philology. Every Vedic hymn has its seer who saw it, its metre and the divinity who is prayed to. The students were taught how to pronounce every letter, and how every word had to be articulated in high, low or middling pitch.

It was because the sages took so much pain in imparting the sacred knowledge inherent in every Vedic hymn, dependent on its accent and phonetic sound, to the disciples that even after scores of invasion of the Indian sub-continent by foreigners, the *Vedas* are still preserved in their pristine purity. At early dawn everyday the *mantras* were got by heart through oral instruction by the Vedic teacher. The system of reciting by permutation and combination of the words of the hymn was taught to the disciples, and with patience and persistence the lesson was learnt. Thus originated the ancient system of learning in Indian schools and is followed today implicitly in our Veda Pāṭhasālās. It is a wonder that there are hundreds of students even today who could recite fluently their respective branches of the *Vedas* with remarkable memory and without error. Thus the texts of the *Vedas*, by the wonderful system of learning initiated in the days of yore, are kept intact through all these centuries down to us, for which gift, we must be thankful to our sages for having initiated a unique system of teaching.

DHARMA ALONE TRIUMPHS*

Jagadguru Śrī Jayendra Sarasvatī

There have been valour, scheming, etc., in political circles or in governments. We should carefully look at the main points of the 'story', especially the plot contents of the *Mahābhārata*, etc., to know whether valourous deeds and schemings were carried out for the purpose of establishing *dharma* or vindicating *adharma*.

In fact, there were many people, in both the parties, who were strong in *vīra* (valour) and *dhīra* (courage). Quantitatively Duryodhana had numerous followers. It is necessary that the valourous have to be defeated by men of valour alone. Also, a scheming plan can be averted by another of the same sort. In a way, there were many strong men in both the parties.

Dharmaputra (Yudhiṣṭhira) and the like-minded were ever following the path of (justice) and *dharma* (righteousness) from their early age. But Duryodhana

*Courtesy: *Amudamoli* (pp. 11-12), Śrī Ram Trust, Madras-1, 1987. Free rendering: V.K.S.N. Raghavan.

and such other persons followed only wrong and unjust paths. Duryodhana had avarice and jealousy; and, the divine will was also the cause of Duryodhana's resort to unjust acts. To explain: many times have the elders advised Duryodhana to do the righteous deeds only. Actually, Duryodhana once said, "Whatever you (the elders) say, I feel, is quite good. But my mind does not co-operate with me to do the good. Some unknown power obstructs me not to do so."

Moreover, whenever Duryodhana and the others bowed to the elders (inclusive of their parents), the latter blessed them saying, "Dharma alone triumphs." So, as we look at the main contents of the *Mahābhārata*, it is clear that wherever *dharma* prevails, there ensues victory, and there is no victory wherever there is valour and cunning alone. One may gain victory temporarily through mere valour and cunning alone. But to ensure permanent and everlasting victory *dharma* alone is the principal means.

THE FOUR INDISPENSABLE
QUALIFICATIONS

(an extract from
Sarva-vedāntā-siddhānta-sūtra-saṅgraha)
of *Śrī Śaṅkara Bhagavatpāda*

Free rendering by
V. K. S. N. Raghavan

(Continued from Vol. XII, No. 2)

[25]

अङ्गारनद्यां तपने च कुम्भीपाकेऽपि वीच्यामसिपत्रकानने ।
दूतैर्यमस्य क्रियमाणबाधां विचार्य को वा विरतिं न याति ॥

When one thinks of the sufferings of the departed soul, under Yama's orders, either in the boiling river of the burning charcoal or in the *kumbhīpāka* or in the *asīpatrakānana* (forest of swords), who, indeed, does not feel disgusted with one's life?

[26]

पुण्यक्षये पुण्यकृतो नभस्थैर्निपात्यमानान् शिथिलीकृताङ्गान् ।
नक्षत्ररूपेण दिवश्च्युतांस्तान् विचार्य को वा विरतिं न याति ॥

Is there anyone who does not become disgusted with one's life, as and when one realises that after one's merit (*punya*) gets exhausted, one is thrown away from heaven, just to fall down with one's limbs shattered to pieces, similar to the falling stars that get diminished with regard to their lustre?*

[27]

वाय्वर्कवह्नीन्द्रमुरवान् सुरेन्द्रान् ईशोग्रभीत्या ग्रथितान्तरङ्गान् ।
विपक्षलोकैः परिदूयमानान् विचार्य को वो विरतिं न याति ॥

Is there anyone who does not become averse to one's life, when one realises that even the gods of immense power, like the wind, sun, fire, Lord Indra, are afraid of the supreme Being (Brahman) and also afraid of their foes?*

*Cf. the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, V, x, 5

**Cf. the *Taittirīyopaniṣad*, II, viii, 1

[28]

श्रुत्या निरुक्तं सुखतारतम्यं ब्रह्मान्तमारभ्य महीमहेशम् ।
 औपाधिकं तत्तु न वास्तवं चेत् आलोच्य को वा विरतिं न याति ॥

Is there anyone not feeling a sense of disgust when he realises that the graded levels of bliss (as pointed out in the *śruti*) enjoyed by the persons beginning with Brahmā (the creator), down to the ruler (king) of the earth — proportionate to their acquirement of physical feature—must only be transient and hence unreal?

[29]

सालोक्यसामीप्यसरूपतादिभेदस्तु सत्कर्मविशेषसिद्धः ।
 न कर्मसिद्धस्य तु नित्यतेति विचार्य को वा विरतिं न याति ॥

Is there anyone not feeling disgusted with one's life when one is certain that anything gained could only be non-eternal, even if it be *sālokya* (dwelling in the same region), *sāmīpya* (being in the close company) *sārūpya* (possession of similar form), etc. of the supreme Lord (Brahman)?

[30]

यत्रास्ति लोके गतितारतम्यमुच्चावचत्वान्वितमत्र तत्कृतम् ।
 यथेह तद्वत्खलु दुःखमस्तीत्यालोच्य को वा विरतिं न याति ॥

Who, indeed, does not get disgusted with one's life, when one realises that the apprehension of the gradation of superior world, inferior world, etc. goes

*Cf. the *Muṇḍakopaniṣad*, I, iii, 10

hand in hand with sufferings, pains, etc. — because it is true with regard to such places as here on earth?*

[31]

को नाम लोके पुरुषो विवेकी विनश्वरे तुच्छसुखे गृहादौ ।
कुर्याद्रतिं नित्यमवेक्षमाणो वृथैव मोहान्म्रियमाणजन्तून् ॥

Would anyone with discrimination be attached to the impermanent things like house, etc., when he sees everyday that the deluded persons while away their time and die in vain?

[32]

सुखं किमस्त्यत्र विचार्यमाणे गृहेऽपि वा योषिति वा पदार्थे ।
मायातमोऽन्धीकृतचक्षुषो ये त एव मुह्यन्ति विवेकशून्याः ॥

One should think about what happiness is there in having a house or in the company of a young woman or in an object of enjoyment. Only people without discrimination get blinded due to ignorance and hence deluded.

[33]

अविचारितरमणीयं सर्वमुदुम्बरफलोपमं भोग्यम् ।
अज्ञानामुपभोग्यं न तु तज्ज्ञानां योषिति वा पदार्थे ॥

The *udumbara* fruit may be beautiful to look at, until one has not cared to observe it very well. Similar is the case with all other enjoyable objects which appear charming to the unwise, whereas worthless to the wise.

*Cf. the *Bṛhadāraṇyakoṇiṣad*, IV. iii, 33

[34]

गतेऽपि तोये सुषिरं कुलीरो हातुं ह्यशक्तो म्रियते विमोहात् ।
यथा तथा गेहसुखानुषक्तो विनाशमायाति नरो भ्रमेण ॥

Just as a crab resides within its hole, even though the water (in the hole) has already dried up, and perishes there itself because of attachment to the hole, even so the man attached to the happiness of the household, remains in the house and perishes there itself.

[35-36]

कोशकिमिस्तन्तुभिरात्मदेहमावेष्ट्य चवेष्ट्य च गुप्तिमिच्छन् ।
स्वयं विनिर्गन्तुमशक्त एव संस्ततस्तदन्ते म्रियते च लग्नः ॥

यथा तथा पुत्रकलत्रमित्रस्नेहानुबन्धैर्ग्रथितो गृहस्थः ।
कदापि वा तान्परिमुच्य गेहाद्गन्तुं न शक्तो म्रियते मुधैव ॥

Just as a silkworm drawing filaments from its body envelops itself again and again for protecting itself, and then not able to get out of its own web, dies there itself, —even so the householder (*grhastha*) becomes entangled by the attachment towards his family, friends and relation, and when he cannot free himself from this attachment perishes in vain.

[37]

कारागृहस्यास्य च को विशेषः प्रदृश्यते साधु विचार्यमाणे ।
मुक्तेः प्रतीपत्वमिहापि पुंसः कान्तासुखाभ्युत्थितमोहपाशैः ॥

Whether it be a prison or one's own house, is there any difference between them? If one reflects upon this, one can see no difference at all. With regard to a person, this is the impediment to get *mukti* (liberation), for he is bound by the illusion caused by the enticing conjugal joy (of women).

[38]

गृहस्पृहा पादनिबद्धशृङ्खला कान्तासुताशा पटुकण्ठपाशः ।
शीर्षे पतद्भूर्यशनिर्हि साक्षात्प्राणान्तहेतुः प्रबला धनाशा ॥

Attachment to the household is like the binding chains of the feet (for a person). Affections towards wife and children are like the halters (chains) round his neck. Insatiable thirst for money resembles the fall of thunderbolt on him bringing about his death.

(to be continued)

THE ADVAITAVIDYĀMUKURA*

S. S. Sūryanārāyaṇa Śāstrī**

Nīlakaṇṭha Dīkṣita, the famous litterateur, and minister of Tirumala Nāyaka, refers in his *Nala-caritra-nāṭaka*¹ to one of his ancestors, *Raṅga Rāja*, as the author of several works, such as the *Advaitavidyāmukura* and the *Vivaraṇadarpaṇa*. This Raṅga Rāja is none other than the son of Ācāṇ Dīkṣita and the father of the celebrated Appayya Dīkṣita. From the latter's acknowledgment of indebtedness to his father's instruction, it is evident that Raṅga Rāja was a scholar of no mean order; but the only reference to his works seems to be in the nāṭaka above-mentioned, and there is little direct knowledge of the works themselves. The Oriental Manuscripts Library at Mysore has the proud distinction of owning a fragmentary copy of the *Mukura*, under the title *Advaitamukura*²; and this shorter name would seem to have been applied to the same work as is evident from some manuscripts of the

*Courtesy: *Collected Papers of Professor S. S. Sūryanārāyaṇa Śāstrī*, University of Madras, 1961, pp. 302-16.

**A paper presented to the All-India Oriental Conference, Mysore, December, 1935.

Nala-caritra-nāṭaka. The *Vivaraṇadarpaṇa* of which there is a single manuscript in Nandināgarī script—again fragmentary—in the Tanjore Palace Library¹ is probably the work of Raṅga Rāja. It is here sought to give an account of the contents of the manuscript of the *Advaitamukura* as now available to us in the Mysore Library.

1a. The manuscript extends only to the end of the first pariccheda.² The first pages are wanting. In spite of what is thus missed, what is left forms a fairly self-contained whole. Like the *Advaitasiddhi* of Madhusūdana, it is an attempt to reestablish *advaita* by answering dualist attacks. The topics covered are almost the same as those treated in the *Siddhi*, in the first hundred pages (of the Kumbakonam edition). The arguments met are the same; and the similarity very often extends to the replies too. Such differences as there are belong to the order of treatment. The refutation of the superiority of perception, the application of the apaccheda-nyāya, etc., thus occur at the very end of Raṅga Rāja's exposition, while Madhusūdana finds a place for them early in his discussion. The pūrvapakṣin's position is stated in one lot by Raṅga Rāja, while Madhusūdana lets it develop gradually in answer to various replies of the Siddhāntin. But the nerve of the argument is the same in both writers. It is impossible to judge conclusively on the material before us, which of these is indebted to the other; while the agreement not merely in the pūrvapakṣa but also in the siddhānta precludes the position that each was absolutely independent of the other. It would appear necessary to postulate at least a common source of inspiration for both writers, a source we have so far not discovered.

Ib. Another tantalising problem set by the manuscript is that of Raṅga Rāja's identity with the Advaitavidyācārya mentioned so frequently by Appayya in the *Siddhāntaleśasaṅgraha*. The name might have been applied to Raṅga Rāja, either because of his authorship of the *Advaitavidyāmukura* or because Appayya got his Advaitavidyā from his father.⁵ The matter could be settled if one could trace to the *Mukura* any of the doctrines attributed distinctively to the Advaitavidyācārya. But the fragment we have of the *Mukura* does not treat any such topic and we are still left in the region of conjecture. The view of reflection propounded by the Advaitavidyācārya, as expounded in the second pariccheda of the *Siddhāntaleśa*, is said to conform to the position of Vidyāraṇya; it is that the reflection is a superimposition and not identical with the prototype, as the author of the *Vivarana* holds. The position of Raṅga Rāja on this topic would be conclusive; but unfortunately all that we have is an exposition and adoption of the *Pañcadaśī* view of Īśvara and the Jīva as both reflections.⁶ This amount of concurrence with Bhāratīrtha may be significant of the further concurrence needed for the Advaitavidyācārya's doctrine of reflection. What we have may be treated as upalakṣaṇa; but it is hazardous to guess the nature of the upalakṣita.

Ic. Among the authors and works mentioned are Ānandabodha, the *Brahmasiddhi*, Citsukha and his *Tattvapradīpikā*, the *Dakṣiṇāmūrtistava* (of Śaṅkara, referred to as the Ācārya), the *Dṛgdrśyaviveka*, the *Iṣṭasiddhi*,⁷ the *Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khāḍya*, the *Maṇḍūkya-kārikās*,⁸ the *Pratyaktattvaviveka*, Rāmānanda, Vācaspati,⁹ and the *Vivaraṇaparakāśa*.¹⁰ There is no reference to any writer who could have been closely related in time

to both Madhusūdana and Raṅga Rāja. Rāmānanda¹¹ is probably identical with the preceptor of Advaitānanda, the author of the *Brahmavidyābharāṇa*. Readers of the *Kalpataru* will have noticed several remarkable verbal similarities to the *Brahmavidyābharāṇa*. If Rāmānanda was old enough for Raṅga Rāja to cite, it is likely that Rāmānanda's pupil's work was old enough to be taken over here and there by Raṅga Rāja's son, Appayya. An interesting reference is to what is called *bhāvādvaita*. As Prof. Hiriyanna has pointed out¹² this view is attributed to Maṇḍana by Brahmānanda. It appears to consist in holding that the absoluteness of abhāva is not inconsistent with non-dualism, since this is interested in maintaining the unity only of positive entities. The available portion of the *Mukura* contains no ascription of the view to any particular writer. It does make it clear, however, that the view is different from that which would look upon abhāva as adhikarāṇa-svarūpa. The former is good enough as a preliminary answer to the objector, but the final position is sarvādvaita, according to which the true being of everything—positive or negative—is the Absolute Spirit, Brahman.¹³ The second position is just what is expounded by Maṇḍana in the *Brahmasiddhi*. It is so recognised by Appayya in the *Siddhāntaleśa*.¹⁴ It would be very interesting to know why and by whom the other doctrine was ascribed to Maṇḍana in the first instance. Brahmānanda, who is known to make the ascription,¹⁵ cites no authority.

2a. What we have of the first pariccheda is roughly divided into eleven sections. The first of these deals with the interpretation of scripture as favouring non-dualism. The well-known six marks of purport are mentioned and their consilience shown in respect

of non-dualism. Duality though perceived is not ultimate. Scriptural affirmation of what is in the scope of perception would be repetitive and purposeless. It is not as though a new duality is affirmed; for there is no novelty about this duality; and the cognition of duality is fraught with evil besides, as made clear in more than one unambiguous scriptural text. Non-dualist texts may be distorted by the opponents as in the notorious case of "Tat tvam asi" rendered as "Atat tvam asi."¹¹ But there is no point in reiterating this perceptually established difference; and if this difference be ultimate, how could the knowledge of *that* alone (tam eva) lead to release? Surely the consistent dualist must insist on full knowledge of both terms in the relation of difference, not of one term alone. And the Dvaitin's *tour de force* of construction can be easily paralleled by us too; the text "satyam bhidā satyam bhidā" which according to him is scriptural authority for the absoluteness of difference, really teaches non-dualism; for it says that satyam, *i.e.*, the world of sat and tyat, which is the world of difference, is unreal (on the construction bhidā + asatyam); the subsequent words "bhidā'satyam bhidā" emphasise this teaching by repetition; the word "asatyam" in this relates both forwards and backwards. While the Dvaitin's cleverness is thus not paralleled there is little to be said in favour of the interpretation he seeks to put on scriptural texts. Ātm-yam (in aitadātmyam idam sarvam) he would take to mean "belonging to that self;" but ātmyam in the text is really analogous to traividyam, trailokyam etc., where no possessive sense is intended or conveyed. To say that "secondless" means without a superior is unnecessarily to restrict the sense of that term; should it mean "not second" why should that be taken as equi-

valent to "first" and not "third"? To say that the words like "this" and "in the beginning" should be taken to imply the reality of time and the unity of God, not of the world, is to stress certain words unduly; when it is said "This man has no horns" it is not implied that other men have horns. And the denial of a superior or equal does by no means involve the reality of the inferior for an only son has neither elder nor younger.

2b. Nor has the Dvaitin's explanation of the vācārambhaṇa text anything to be said in its favour. It is not true that all other languages are derivatives of Sanskrit. Even if they were, they too would be illusory; for on the opponent's admission, Sanskrit alone is true, eternal. The *Māṇḍūkya-kārikās* are quite clear in stating the illusoriness of the world. The form of the verse "prapañco yadi vidyeta" etc. has misled the opponent into taking it for a tarka; but in truth it is no more a tarka than words like "Vedāḥ pramāṇam yadi". If it were a tarka, then the consequent "nivar-teta na saṁśayaḥ" should be capable of being denied. But there is no justification for denying it as much as even the opponent has to admit sublation, though not its implications.

2c. Nor may it be said that, if the illusoriness taught be real, there would be failure of non-dualism, while if it be illusory, scripture would have illusory content and so be non-authoritative. For illusoriness is equivalent to absolute non-existence and the absoluteness of non-existence does not conflict with, or detract from the absoluteness of Brahman. Should the opponent, however, say that scripture teaches Brahman to be the self of all, whether positive or negative,

with that he should give up his case that scripture has an illusory content; for Brahman is in that case the content.¹⁷

3. The pluralist seeks to establish the reality of the world on the ground of its being known, on the analogy of Brahman. The difficulty in all such arguments is that the *probans* "being known by a *pramāṇa* that apprehends absolute reality" is not established. Perception which apprehends the here and now cannot apprehend such reality as is unsublatable in all three times. That inference can apprehend it is yet to be proved. Scripture does apprehend it, but not as belonging to the world; further, it sublates any inferred absoluteness of the world. It is not as though Īsvara's immediate cognition of the world guarantees its reality; for His immediacy need be no more than that experienced by the juggler in respect of his tricks; knowing the illusory as illusory, He is not deluded.¹⁸ Nor does practical efficiency imply *pāramārthikatva*. On the contrary it implies indeterminability; for the absolutely real has nothing to realise and cannot be efficient, while the absolutely unreal cannot be efficient even because of not existing at all; *arthakriyā-kāritva* is unintelligible apart from *anirvacanīyatva*. It is true that Brahman as witness cognises the world; but since the witness is nescience-conditioned, his cognition does not involve the absolute reality of the cognised. This world again is cognised even when there is immediate presentation of the underlying intelligence which is said to be the sole reality; but the presentation of the real substrate is not inconsistent with the illusoriness of the world-manifestation; rather does the latter demand the former, just as darkness and its colour have to be

manifested by light. What removes the darkness of primal nescience is *vṛtti-jñāna*, not *svarūpa-jñāna*.

4. The next task attempted is the establishment of illusoriness by inference grounded on cognisability, inertness and finitude. The five definitions of illusoriness are mentioned and explained in much the same way as in the *Advaitasiddhi*.¹⁹ The discussion owes much to the *Tattvapradīpikā* and is much in the same style as the *Advaitasiddhi*. The following points are of some interest.

(a) In treating the definition “*pratipannopādhanau traikālikaniṣedha-pratīyogitvam*”, reference is made to the *Bhāvādvaita* view, since the definition seems to imply the absolute reality of negation. This, however, is not the final position, since in truth the negation is not real as different from the locus of negation, Brahman.

(b) The difference of the non-real from the unreal is sought to be explained in this way: in nacre-silver, etc. (which are non-real), because of similarity to the substrate and relation to it, the ignorance which is located in the substrate and has taken a visual form is transformed into the form of silver; and simultaneously the cogniser’s nescience is transformed into the cognition of that silver; but there is no reality other than that of the substrate. In *khapuṣpa*, etc., however, there are only the defects, *viz.*, the proximity of the two words, and a mediate psychosis of the intellect in the form of the two words taken together; there is no objective content and hence no immediacy.

(c) The Advaitin, so far as intellectual inquiry goes, is a sceptic, not a dogmatist. It is not our busi-

ness to demonstrate illusoriness or anything else. When we have demonstrated that every other position is untenable, we are left with the witness of the condemnation. The mention of definitions and proofs is only in order to conform to this intellect of our opponents. We do not base our final conclusion on the intellect, since non-dualist-realisation can come only through the grace of the Lord.²⁰ In this position our author closely follows the Khaṇḍanakāra.²¹

5. The illusoriness of illusoriness is treated at some length. The sublator need not always be real, as, in the case of a rope, the snake-delusion is sublatable by a stick-delusion. The self too is the substrate of illusory illusoriness inasmuch as the Bauddhas and others have the delusion that it is illusory. But with this the self is not reduced to the same level as the world, since the reality of the former is due to self-hood and self-manifestation, not to sublated illusoriness. Illusoriness is on a par with knowability, etc., in its capacity to cover both itself and that of which it is predicated. Illusoriness is part of the world; when the world is shown to be illusory because of cognisability, etc., illusoriness which is a part of the world is also shown to be illusory. The principle of excluded middle is of no service, since we do not seek to maintain that the illusoriness of illusoriness is real. Nor does the other alternative involve an infinite regress of mithyātva, since mithyātva, we have said, is analogous to prameyatva.

6. The three *probans* — cognisability, intertness and finitude — are examined in some detail. The discussion is not very different from that of the *Siddhi*. A point of some interest relates to yogic perception. The pūrvapakṣin says that cognisability cannot mean

pervasion by fruit, since this cannot apply to the past or to nityānumeyas, like merit, etc. The reply to this is that there may be pervasion by fruit even in this case when there is yogic perception. The Dualist is fond of exploiting this type of perception to cover cases of impossibility like the perception of the *tuccha*; our author is willing to concede this; yogins may perceive the *tuccha*, but they would perceive it as *tuccha*, *i.e.*, as not practically efficient, unlike nacre-silver, etc.; in this there is no detriment to Advaita. It is true Citsukhācārya seems to deny yogic perception, but that is only an *abhyupetya-vāda*; for we must admit an omniscient Īsvara to whom everything is immediate. His omniscience as the author of the Veda does not necessarily involve its *pauruṣeyatva*; for, as in our case, when we have learnt it, knowledge of the sense may coexist with utterance, without preceding and determining the latter. Even *pauruṣeyatva* is not unacceptable; it does not follow either that validity is extrinsic, since it is known through the same causal aggregate that apprehends the cognition. Nor is there reciprocal dependence in that the validity of the Vedas depends on Īsvara's trustworthiness while the latter has to be known from the Veda; for, the latter is known even from outside the Veda, from the words of well-wishers like one's parents.

7. The next section relates to the refutation of the allegation that the Advaitin's *probans* is affected by an adjunct. The matter covered is the same as that treated by the *Siddhi*, in the two sections on *sopādhikatva-bhaṅgaḥ* and *ābhāsa-sāmya-bhaṅgaḥ*.²² The arguments are almost identical, the only notable distinction being that the *Siddhi* mentions the *drṣṭi-srṣṭi-vāda*, which finds no mention in the available fragment

of the *Mukura*. Further, in refuting the two upādhis suggested,²³ the *Siddhi* urges two objections — that in the case of dehātmaikya, sublatale by Brahman-knowledge alone, the upādhi²⁴ is not pervasive of the *probandum* and that the qualification, as tending to exclude only sapakṣa, is on a par with pakṣetara; the *Mukura* mentions the latter objection in some detail, but not the former.²⁵

8. Are these *probans* themselves illusory or not? If not, there is failure of non-dualism. If they too are illusory, how can they establish anything? This discussion covers the same ground as two sections of the *Siddhi*²⁶ and employs nearly the same arguments. The similarity is very great indeed in the statement of the pūrvapakṣa, especially in the mention of instances to show that the practical efficiency of delusive cognition is due to the element of cognition which is real, not to the content which is unreal, and that though the latter defines the former, it is intelligible that it is passive and does not contribute to the causality of the cognition; to exhibit this passivity of the defining element, the pūrvapakṣin in the *Siddhi* cites eleven instances; the *Mukura* mentions only six of these: "Now, it would be an undue extension to say that the cause is what is undefined by a content; and if the cause is what is so defined, the content too would be a cause. If this be said, no; for though there is causality (1) for the prior non-existence of the pot in respect of the pot, (2) the non-existence of specific cognition in respect of delusion, (3) the non-observance of what is obligatorily enjoined in respect of sin (4) the desire for heaven in respect of sacrifice, (5) the knowledge of the past, etc. in respect of misery, etc., and (6) the mediate knowledge of the unreal content in respect of the empirical

usage about that, yet that which defines in each case — the pot, the cognition of difference, the observance of what is enjoyed, heaven, the past, etc., or the unreal — is not so (the cause). In all these cases it is intelligible that the thing which defines is different and non-causal like the qualification 'of the Kurus' in 'the land of the Kurus is real.'

9. The Advaitin seeks to strengthen his position by setting forth indirect arguments (tarkas) in favour of the illusoriness of the world. One such argument is that if the world were independently real there would be no possibility of the cognition thereof, since no real relation is intelligible between knowledge on the one side and an inert reality standing over against it on the other. This criticism of a real relation between *dṛk* and *dṛśya* occurs as a separate section in the *Siddhi*,¹⁷ but is treated with perhaps more justification as a part of the *anukūla-tarka-pratiphalana* in the *Mukura*. The *pūrvapakṣin* attempts every time to derive reality for the world on the analogy of Brahman, and *per contra* the unreality of the latter on the analogy of the world. Our author is never tired of pointing out that Brahman's reality is self-manifest; it does not depend on the illusoriness or non-illusoriness of relation to any thing else; and the illusoriness of the world follows not because its relation to knowledge is illusory, but because it is cognisable, inert and so on. This is the basic ground. Hence it is that no parity can be made out between Brahman and the world even on the ground of indeterminability. It is true that we cannot define Brahman as this or thus, yet it is real, since it is self-luminous and is not cognisable, inert or finite; the world, however is not thus. The rest of the treatment is almost identical with that of the *Siddhi*.

10. The manifestation of particular objects at stated times and through specific means is held by the opponent to be a difficulty the Advaitin cannot lightly get over. The Advaitin replies that since self-manifest intelligence is beginninglessly obscured by nescience, whose existence is not inconsistent with svarūpa-jñāna, it is necessary for defined intelligence to go forth through sense-channels in the form of a long ray of light as it were, in order to pervade and take on the form of each object so that the ignorance enveloping it may be destroyed. Since the generation, going forth and pervasion of the psychosis is spatially and temporarily determined, there may be pratikarma-vyavasthā. But the position is not free from difficulties. The relation between knowledge and the known is said to be one of super-imposition; but the object is not super-imposed on the psychosis-defined intelligence; and in any case if this destroys ignorance, why postulate an object-defined intelligence? And is the ignorance destroyed one or many? If the former, why does not every one see the pot, when Caitra sees it? If the latter, how can even Caitra see the pot at any time since the other ignorances will always obscure? In the statement and refutation of these objections, there is great similarity between the *Siddhi*²⁸ and the *Mukura*. The treatment in the former is a trifle more elaborate, discussing in some detail the nature of the psychosis, the analogues to the removal of ignorance, etc. The *Mukura* undertakes a justification in some detail of the position that darkness is positive and not the mere absence of light. The discussion comes in appropriately since the Advaitin has to use the analogies of physical light dispelling darkness by reaching upto the object, and of physical darkness re-obscuring when a lamp(etc.)

is withdrawn. The argument proceeds on the possession of colour by darkness; it is not even that it does not possess touch, since as in the case of smoke, touch may exist without being perceptible (the eye alone can sense the touch in smoke). The reasoning is reminiscent of the *Tattvapradīpikā*; for a fuller discussion the author refers us to his *Vivaraṇaparakāśa*.

11a. The pluralist too has recourse to tarka to disprove non-dualism. What he considers to be *reductio ad absurdum* is not really so. The consideration of the pratikūla-tarkas²⁹ constitutes the next section. The objections mainly relate to (1) the non-existence of similarity between Brahman and the world, while similarity is a cause of super-imposition, (2) the partlessness of Brahman, making it impossible for it to function as a substrate, which has to be partially manifest, (3) the non-existence of memory impressions as a cause of the super-imposition, there being no other real world to produce such impressions, (4) the negation of the world relating to an absolutely real world, on the analogy of the *Vivaraṇa* statement that the negation of silver relates to the absolutely real silver, (5) the need for the reality of cogniser, body, organs, defects, etc., (6) the reality of the sublating cognition, as otherwise there would be infinite regress, (7) the absolute non-existence of bondage calling for no effort for its removal, (8) the impossibility of what is removed by Brahman-intuition being super-imposed thereon, on the analogy of sin removable by Setudarsana not being super-imposed on the Setu, and so on. The reply consists in showing that all that the objector requires as real may be assumptive and yet discharge the functions required. Brahman has no parts; but nescience presents it as having parts. Nescience is itself a super-

imposition; the how of it is unintelligible and the unintelligibility is constitutive of its very nature; self-dependence etc., are not defects in the case of what is illusory. Nor is it that when Brahman is manifest ignorance is impossible; there may be presentation of illusory ignorance just as for owl etc., there is presentation of intense darkness even in the mid-day sun. It is not possible to argue that on the analogy of the unreality of causes like memory-impression, the substrate too may be unreal; for Brahman's reality (to repeat) is established by scripture, not by inference or presumption. The rest of the discussion is identical with that in the *Siddhi*.¹⁰ The reply of the *Mukura* to the analogy of sin and Setudarsana is interesting. It is apparently conceded that the world is removable by Brahman-knowledge, obtained through contemplation. But this removability by knowledge itself constitutes illusoriness. How then can there be established reality which is its opposite? And if the *probans* itself be not conceded, the *probandum* would still be non-established.

11b. The pūrvapakṣin also mentions conflict with scriptural texts about creation of the world etc., by Īsvara. This is met, in the same way as in the *Siddhi*, by the analogy of the juggler, who resolves on and creates his magic world in a certain order and so on. The author of the *Mukura* brings in here a discussion of the relation of Īsvara and Jīva, adopting the view of the first section of the *Pañcadaśī*, which treats both as reflections. This is consistent with the possibility of Raṅga Rāja and the Advaitavidyācārya being identical; for we are told in the *Siddhāntaleśasaṅgraha* that the Advaitavidyācārya set forth the view of reflection consistent with the position of Vidyāraṅya.¹¹

12. The final section of the first pariccheda is concerned with the refutation of the validity of perception etc., in regard to absolute reality. Where there is perception of finites as real, it is the reality of Brahman that is manifest therein. Unsublatability in all three times cannot be known by perception which can tell us at best that sublation has not arisen so far, nor that it does not exist. Practical efficiency, as has been often said, is no warrant for absolute reality, as even the rope-snake causes fear and trembling. The difference between the empirically real and the merely apparent consists in sublatability by Brahman-knowledge alone or anything short of that. It cannot be made out that perception as a class is a superior pramāṇa; for if perception alone is effective in certain ways as in removing confusion of directions (dīn̄moha), inference alone can apprehend primal atoms. Nor can perception claim superiority on the ground of being first in the field; for the upakramanyāya would apply only where there is conflict; but since perception and scripture have different contents, the former relating to empirical and the latter to absolute reality, there is no conflict at all. For the same reason there is no upajīvyā-virodha either. Even if conflict be admitted, it is the earlier that should be sublated on the apaccheda-nyāya.²² We do not subscribe to the view that all scripture is superior to perception, but only that purportful scripture is so superior; purportfulness is determined by non-subsidiariness to any other purpose.²³ The realist cannot but admit that certain perceptions are delusive. This he sets down not to their sublatability, but to the ascertainment of defect. But the presence of defect is by no means patent; its existence has to be ascertained from the fact of sublation.

Ether is really colourless, though perceived as blue; the perception is not to be set aside on the ground that the defect of distance accounts for it; for it may well be that proximity too is a defect and that this accounts for the non-perception of blueness nearby." The invalidity of the perception has therefore to be ascertained through its sublation by revelation which teaches that ether is colourless. It is on the ground of this sublation that the perception is understood to be tainted by the defect of distance. Further his argument is not really helpful to the realist; "in your unholy anxiety to see that its sublatability by verbal testimony is remedied, you fall into the jaws of the sublatability of perception by inference; this conforms to the maxim of fearing the scorpion and falling into the mouth of the snake."¹³

13. Though the manuscript is fragmentary and the present account is but a meagre outline, enough has been said, it is hoped, to show the great interest of the work both from the historical and the doctrinal sides. It is not improbable that other fragments at least exist elsewhere. Though much of the dialectic survives in the monumental work of Madhusūdana, Raṅga Rāja's treatment has a directness and charm which make it worthy of being resuscitated and made better known. On the assumption that both derived from a common source of inspiration,¹⁴ the *Mukura* is likely to throw light on points that are obscure in the *Siddhi* despite Brahmānanda's voluminous comment. For this and other reasons, it is hoped that experts in the collection of manuscripts will bestir themselves to find a complete version of the *Advaitavidyāmukura*.

NOTES

1. See edition in the Bālamānoramā Series, p. 3.
2. No. 3353.
3. No. 7064, in the *Descriptive Catalogue* by P. P. S. Sastri. The present paper owes much to the information supplied by this scholar and by Mr. M. Hiriyanna.
4. It is called "pramāṇa-(bhāva)-pratīphaṇa".
5. The former alternative is more likely because of the use of the appellation "advaitavidyā-kṛtaḥ" in some places; see *Siddhāntaleśasaṅgraha* (Kumbakonam ed.), p. 272.
6. See pp. 152, 153 of the ms. (copy supplied to the Department of Indian Philosophy, University of Madras).
7. The tag "yāvanti jñānāni tāvanti ajñānāni" is attributed to the Iṣṭa-siddhikāra by both Madhusūdana and Raṅga Rāja. Though this doctrine is expounded in that work, it does not find expression in that particular form; see *Iṣṭasiddhi*, p. 63.
8. Curiously enough, the Kārikās cited, beginning with "prapañco yadi vidyeta" are referred to as Śruti: " 'prapañco yadi vidyeta nivarteta na saṁśayaḥ, māyā-mātram idam dvaitam advaitam paramārthataḥ', 'Indro māyābhiḥ puru-rūpa iyate' ityādeḥ spaṣṭam eva prapañca-mithyātvabodhikāyāḥ śruteḥ" (p. 58). Being a statement of siddhānta there is little likelihood of this being a mere anuvāda of the Madhva view that the āgamaprakaraṇa of the *Kārikā* is Śruti. The point is intriguing and requires explanation.
9. The reference to Vācaspati is made by both Madhusūdana and Raṅga Rāja in the same context and to the same statement about Advaita texts being non-subsidiary and hence purportful.
10. This appears to be another work of Raṅga Rāja's presumably identical with the *Vivaraṇadarpaṇa*. The referen-

ces to it are to be found on p. 74 and p. 135 of the manuscript.

11. The following quotation occurs on p. 140 of the manuscript.

“satye vastuni sarve'yam doṣā-'doṣanirūpaṇā |
nā'tmā-'śrayādidoṣāḥ syuḥ mithyā-bhūte-'tra vastuni” ॥

12. *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, 1923, p. 261.

13. Cp. the following passage from p. 75: “na hi trikālaniṣedhasya pāramārthikatva-svikāre advaita-hāniḥ, brahmā-'triekeṇa tāttvika-bhāvā-'naṅgikārāt. vastutastvasya trikālaniṣedhasya, tārkkikamate prāgabhāvā-'bhāvasya pratiyogi-svarūpā-'vyatirekavat, gurumate arthā-'bhāvasya adhi-karaṇa-svarūpā-'vyaktriekavac ca, brahma-svarūpād avyati-rekaḥ. tad uktam 'nivṛttir ātmā mohasya' iti”.

14. “atha ke'yam avidyā-nivṛtṭiḥ ātmaiveti brahma-siddhikārāḥ”, 4th pariccheda, p. 434.

15. See p. 112. *Laghucandrikā* (Kumbakonam edition).

Even the reference to bhāvādvaita in the *Siddhi*, p. 81, distinguishes it from sarvādvaita which goes with the doctrine of avidyā-nivṛtṭi as brahma-rūpa.

16. For the discussion of this topic by Madhusūdana, see *Advaitasiddhi* (hereafter referred to as *AS*), pp. 293-298 (Kumbakonam edition).

17. This section covers almost the same ground as *AS*, p. 10 and pp. 56-65. Remarkable similarities are found in several places, especially on pp. 60 and 61. The former says that apparent repetitiveness, as in dhārā-vāhika-jñāna, does not make for invalidity; the latter deals with the contention that when there is restatement for the sake of refutation there should be such marks as “yat tan na”. What is attempted in this paper is the barest outline of the main argument.

18. Cp. *AS.*, p. 101.

19. *AS.*, pp. 2-9.

20. "na hy asmābhir mithyātvam anyad vā kiñcin nirūpaṇīyam asti. param nirūpyamāṇa-prapañca-khaṇḍane-naiva vayam iha caritārthāḥ. tatra tatra lakṣaṇā-'bhidhānam tu para-buddhy-anurañjanāya. sati caivam sarva-khaṇḍane asmad-abhimata-cid-advaita-siddhiḥ. na cā 'trā'pi khaṇḍana-yukty-avakāśaḥ, antatas tatsākṣitayā'pi tatsiddhy-upapatteḥ. advaita-siddhau ca'smākam nā'tiva lakṣaṇa-pramāṇā-'daraḥ, Īśvarā'-nugrahaika-labhyatvāt tasya" (p. 78 of the ms.).

Such a position must be labelled scepticism, but it is scepticism of an even more rational type than what Bradley subscribes to. "I mean by scepticism the mere denial of any known satisfactory doctrine, together with the personal despair of any future attainment... Such a scepticism... may serve at least as a deliverance from spiritual oppression... For such a scepticism all our truths without exception are mere working ideas" (Bradley: *Essays in Truth and Reality*, p. 455). Where the Advaitin does better is in re-affirming "asmad-abhimata-cid-advaita-siddhiḥ".

21. See *Khaṇḍana*, para 163, verse 251.

22. *AS.*, pp. 19-20.

23. In the *Siddhi*; in the *Mukura* enumeration there are five upādhis; this is because its treatment includes matter that appears in the immediately subsequent section of the *Siddhi*.

24. svabādhakā-bhimatā-'bādhyā-doṣa-prayukta-bhānavam.

25. Can this be taken along with others as an indication of the *Mukura* being anterior to the *Siddhi*?

26. *AS.*, pp. 65-73; the sections are on asatas sādhatvo-papattiḥ and asatas sādhatvā-'bhāva-bādhakam.

27. *AS.*, pp. 73-77; anukūla-tarka-nirūpaṇa in this work covers pp. 77-86.

28. *AS.*, pp. 86-94.

29. Cp. *AS.*, pp. 94-102.

30. *AS.*, pp. 94-102.

31. advaitavidyā-kṛtas tu pratibimbasya mithyātvam abhyupagacchatām trividha-jīva-vādinām vidyāraṇya-guruprabhṛtīnām abhiprāyam evam āhuḥ (*Siddhāntaleśasaṅgraha*, pp. 272-273).

32. In this connection both the *Siddhi* and the *Mukura* cite Ānandabodha's verse

“tatparatvāt paratvāc ca nirdoṣatvāc ca vaidikam
pūrvasya bādhakam nā'yam sarpa ityādivākyavat ”

and the *Nyāyāmṛta* criticism thereof,

“tatparatvam asiddhatvāt paratvam vyabhicārataḥ
nirdoṣatā-'nyathā-siddheḥ prābalyam nai'va

sādhayet ”

But while the *Siddhi* gives them in this, the chronological order, the *Mukura* cites them in what is for the Advaitin the logical order, the latter appearing first as the pūrvapakṣa.

33. The treatment of the injunction to cook the golden grains (kṛṣṇaḥ śrapayet) is interesting. It is usual to say that the primary sense of cooking is abandoned here, because of the impossibility of performance (See *Siddhāntaleśa*, p. 246). But according to our author, there is no such abandonment since the word “cook” has different senses in different contexts; if it means mere heating in the case of golden grains, that is no other than its legitimate sense; see p. 161 of the ms: na khalu vikṛtiḥ śrapaṇa-śabdā-'rthāḥ, aīka-rūpyā-'bhāvāt. na hi śyāmākataṇḍulāḍau tāvat-kāla-śrapyamāṇe 'pi tathā vikṛtiḥ tāvatā kālena yathā vrihi-taṇḍulānaśrapitān śrapayati. kṛṣṇale tu tāvaty api yadi vikṛtir na syād auṣṇyam eva tu param tāvatā śrapaṇaśabdā-'rtho 'nuṣṭhita eveti na tātparyavad-veda-bodhita-svārtha-tyāga-śaṅkā”.

34. Cp. *AS.*, p. 43.

35. On the whole topic of this section, cp *AS.*, pp. 27-36, and 39-43.

36. Tradition and the *Catalogus Catalogorum* assign to Madhusūdana a commentary on Appayya's *Siddhāntaleśa*. This would make him a junior contemporary of Appayya's in which case he probably was familiar with and drew on the *Advaitavidyāmukura*. For this view of Madhusūdana's date, see *JORM*, II, pp. 97-104. The learned editor of the *Siddhāntabindhu* in Gackwad's Oriental Series holds Madhusūdana's date to have been roughly 1540-1633 A.D.; he arrives at this conclusion by a review of the evidence so far adduced, confirmed by Mr. Chintaharan Ghakravarti, a lineal descendant of an elder brother of Madhusūdana. The period of Appayya is variously fixed at 72 years from 1552 or 1558 (see P. P. S. Śastri's Introduction to the Vani Vilas edition of the *Siddhāntaleśa*). None of these data is inconsistent with Madhusūdana having been indebted to Raṅga Rāja's work. Mr. Divanji's opinion, that the *Siddhāntaleśa* probably mentions some of Madhusūdana's views, though not by name, is not very convincing; for there is no clear evidence of Appayya having been so much Madhusūdana's junior, if he was the latter's junior at all; and the *Siddhāntaleśa* must be taken to have been a very early work of Appayya's.

YOGA BLISS*

T. M. P. Mahadevan

The last five chapters of the *Pañcadaśī* are devoted to an exposition of the bliss-aspect of *Brahman*. The essential nature *Brahman* is defined in scripture as reality-intelligence-bliss. The first five chapters of the *Pañcadaśī* make out that *Brahman* is the absolute reality whereon the world of animate and inanimate objects is superimposed. The second five chapters characterize *Brahman* as pure intelligence which is the witness-consciousness of this world-drama. The aim of the last five chapters is to elucidate the third part of the definition, *viz.*, the bliss-nature of *Brahman*.

1. Classification of Bliss

Two different classifications of bliss are given here. *Sloka* 11 of the XI chapter of the *Pañcadaśī* speaks of *Brahman*-bliss, the happiness of knowledge, and the pleasure due to sense-objects. The chapters XI, XII and XIII expound the nature of *Brahman*-bliss; the XIV chapter explains what the happiness of

*Courtesy: *The Pañcadaśī of Bhāratīrtha Vidyāranya — An Interpretative Exposition*. Madras University Philosophical Series - No. 13, 1975, pp. 175-88.

knowledge is; and the final chapter is an exposition of the pleasure born of sense-objects. *Śloka* 87 of the 11th chapter substitutes the happiness due to the residual impression of bliss for the happiness of knowledge. The justification for this change is that the happiness of knowledge is included in the pleasure generated by sense-objects. "The happiness of knowledge is, like the happiness born of sense-objects, a modification of the intellect" (XIV, 2). Hence the classification of bliss into *Brahman*-bliss, the happiness which is the result of the residual impression of bliss, and the pleasure due to sense-objects, is shown to be valid and uncontradicted by the earlier classification found herein. In truth, however, there is only one bliss and that is *Brahman*. We delude ourselves by thinking that happiness rests in external objects, in the world without. But the real centre of happiness is the self. The self-luminous *Brahman*-bliss is the generator of even the other two kinds of happiness.

2. *Non-dual Bliss*

That *Brahman* is of the nature of bliss is clearly taught in the episode of Bhṛgu in the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad*. Bhṛgu approached his father Varuṇa, with a burning desire to know *Brahman*, and got a formula the application of which had to be worked out by himself. "From which all these beings arise, by which those that are born live, and into which dying, they enter, know that to be *Brahman*." This is the general enunciation with the help of which Bhṛgu had to find out the nature of *Brahman*. Through inquiry he decided that gross matter, vital airs, mind, and intellect cannot satisfy the conditions of the formula, and finally arrived at the truth that

Brahman is bliss, the prototype of the reflection found in the sheath of bliss. "From bliss, indeed, all creatures come into being; in bliss they live; and unto bliss they return. Hence, bliss is *Brahman*." Bhṛṅgu solved in this manner the fundamental problem of metaphysics. He was given by his father the qualification *per accidens* of *Brahman*; and with the help of this qualification he discovered the essential nature of *Brahman*, viz., bliss (*ānanda*) which is inseparable from reality and intelligence.

If *Brahman* be of the nature of bliss, it must be the only reality without a second, and it must also be self-luminous. The *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* reports a conversation between Nārada and Sanatkumāra where the latter instructs the former about the nature of the infinite (*bhūmā*) which is *Brahman*. Prior to the creation of the world there was the Infinite alone, since there were not the threefold distinctions of empirical usage viz., the cognizer, the thing cognized, and cognition. "That is the Infinite wherein nothing else is perceived, nothing else is heard, and nothing else is cognized." The sheath of the intellect which is a product is the cognizer; the sheath of the mind constitutes cognition, and the objects of sense, sound, etc., are the objects of cognition. These, verily, did not exist prior to their production. Hence the Infinite alone existed with nothing else as opposed to itself. The Infinite which is the "Full" (*pūrṇa*) is experienced in the states of sleep, *samādhi*, and swoon. Wherever there is the absence of empirical distinctions, there the non-dual self alone remains. That prior to creation the non-dual Infinite alone existed must be admitted because of the unintelligibility of the other alternatives. There could not have been then some-

thing which was neither dual nor non-dual, for such a thing is impossible, being self-contradictory. Nor could there have been the dual things, since they were not yet produced. Hence, by elimination, we must admit that the Infinite alone existed.

It cannot be said that the non-dual is established by reasoning and not by experience. Reasoning alone cannot establish the non-dual, because there is no illustration. It may be syllogistically argued thus: The state of dissolution is devoid of duality, since there is no apprehension of duality, as in the state of sleep. Here, the sleep experienced by another person cannot be the illustration. The inference, "The other person is sleeping because he is without activity, like me when sleeping", establishes the self-luminosity of the experience of sleep. Hence it is experience that makes known the reality of non-dual. That which is non-dual and self-luminous, we have said, is bliss. "That which is the infinite (*bhūmā*) is bliss; there is no happiness in the finite (*alpa*)." The objects of sense yield no unmixed happiness. Even the little pleasure that they seem to yield is shrouded in misery and pain. And so Sanatkumāra declares that there is no happiness in the finite.

3. *Evidence of Sleep-Experience*

"Now let there be no happiness in duality; but how is there happiness in the non-dual? If there were happiness, it would be apprehended; and if it were apprehended, there would be the empirical distinctions again which would negate the non-dual." If thus it be said, the reply is: let there be no bliss *in* the non-dual, because the non-dual itself *is* bliss. Nor

does this fact require any evidence; for in respect of the self-luminous no evidence is needed. That the infinite, non-dual *Brahman* is self luminous is evident from the experience of sleep. In sleep there is not the functioning of the senses. Nor can that experience be established through the inference from the sleep of another person. Means of valid knowledge like perception and inference are not able to establish the experience of sleep. But still we cannot but testify to the fact of such an experience; and hence it is self-luminous.¹

The experience of sleep which reveals the self to be non-dual and self-luminous indicates also that it is of the nature of bliss. In sleep there is no misery, no pain. Hence there remains in that state happiness or bliss. Scripture declares: "Crossing the bund of the experiences of waking and dream, *viz.*, the conceit in the body, the *puruṣa*, though blind, becomes one who is not blind, though wounded, becomes one who is not wounded, though suffering from disease, becomes one who is free from disease."² The non-existence of misery in sleep is testified to in many other passages of the *Upaniṣads*. Nor may it be said, by quoting the example of an inert object like the stone, that mere absence of pain does not guarantee the presence of happiness. In the case of stone, etc., there cannot even be the suspicion of misery or pain, and hence also of happiness. We do not infer the existence of happiness because of the non-existence of misery in the case of inert things. But in the case of beings which are subject to happiness and misery, we can say that when one of them is non-existent the other is present. Further, the non-existence or existence of misery or pain in the self is directly experienced, not inferred. Since in sleep the

non-existence of misery is experienced, we say that there is in that state the presence of happiness. If there were no happiness in sleep, why should men prepare their beds smooth and soft? Comfortable beds are not intended merely for the removal of pain; for, if that were so, only those who are suffering from such pains as are caused by disease, etc., should need them.

The happiness that is afforded by soft beds, etc., is no doubt external and extrinsic. Tired of its avocations, the *jīva* seeks happiness in such objects of enjoyment as bed, etc. It experiences the reflection of its own bliss in the mode of the intellect. This is what is known as *viṣayānanda*; and it is not completely free from misery. It is only the semblance of bliss; and the semblance cannot be a substitute for the substance. In sleep there is the experience of happiness which is not the product of anything else. Scripture declares that the *jīva* in sleep experiences its identity with *Brahman* and the bliss thereof. By means of five examples they indicate what the *Brahman*-bliss experienced in sleep is like. Just as a bird which is tied by means of a thread flies in vain to various places in search of rest and returns at last to the abode to which it is bound, even so the mind, which is the adjunct of the *jīva* roams about in waking and dream in order to reap the fruits of its merit and demerit, and when its *karma* perishes it gets dissolved in its material cause, *viz.*, nescience; and when the mind ceases to function, the *jīva* becomes one with the supreme. Just as a falcon wings its way in the sky, gets exhausted and returns to its nest, even so the *jīva* runs to the experience of sleep longing for *Brahman*-bliss. Like a suckling child which is free from attachment and aversion, or like an emperor who has reached the highest limit

of human happiness, or like a knower of *Brahman*, learned in the sacred lore, who is at the helm of the happiness of knowledge, the *jīva* experiences unalloyed bliss in the state of sleep. Of all the persons in the world, only the infant, the emperor, and the enlightened can be said to be happy; and so they were cited as illustrations of the bliss experienced in sleep. The *śruti* compares the *Brahman*-bliss that is experienced in sleep to the happiness which a person experiences in company with his consort. In both the kinds of experience there is not the cognition of the objects which belong to the external and the internal worlds. Such passages of scripture which declare that in sleep a father becomes non-father, etc., show that the *jīva* loses its *jīva*-hood and hence also its transmigratory nature; and when *jīvatva* is removed in sleep, *Brahman* alone remains. The conceit in the body is the root-cause of all the sorrows of life; since that conceit is non-existent in sleep, the *jīva* is said to have transcended misery and pain. The *Kaivalya Upaniṣad* (13) says: "During the time of sleep when everything is dissolved, the *jīva* which is obscured by *tamas* attains the nature of happiness."

Scripture is not the only evidence for the existence of happiness in sleep. There is also the testimony of the experience of all who say after waking up from sleep: "Happily did we sleep; we knew nothing in our sleep." Thus there is the reflective cognition of happiness and nescience which were experienced in sleep. Reflective cognition is grounded in experience, for without the latter the former is not possible. Nor may it be said that since in sleep there are no recognized means of knowledge there can be no experience of happiness and nescience. As it was pointed out already,

the experience of happiness in sleep which is no other than *Brahman*-bliss requires no instrument of knowledge, because it is self-luminous; and nescience is revealed by *Brahman* which in so doing is not in need of any external channels of cognition.

That the self-luminous bliss experienced in sleep is *Brahman* is declared by the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* in the passage "*Brahman* is intelligence-bliss." Granting that the bliss experienced in sleep is *Brahman*, a question may be asked here as to who experiences the bliss. "The *jīva* which has the intellect for adjunct remembers that it slept happily without knowing anything. Since experience and the recognition thereof must have the same locus, the *jīva* conditioned by intellect must have experienced happiness and nescience in sleep." The statement is not valid, for in sleep the intellect and the mind which are the products of nescience get resolved in their cause; and since the adjunct, the intellect, is non-existent, there cannot be the *jīva* as conditioned by intellect. What experiences happiness and nescience in sleep is the *ānandamaya* self, and the remembrance of that by the *vijñānamaya* self is intelligible because the self is the same in both the states of experience, although adjuncts may vary.

In the moment immediately antecedent to sleep there is the mode of the intellect which is turned inward and wherein there is the reflection of bliss; and later, the same mode along with the reflection of bliss gets resolved in the form of sleep and comes to be called *ānandamaya*. *Ānandamaya* self has for its adjunct nescience which is associated with the residual impression generated by the inward-turned mode of the intellect; and it experiences in sleep *Brahman*-bliss which

is its true nature by means of the mode generated by nescience. In sleep there is not the conceit "I am experiencing happiness," etc., because the modes of nescience, unlike the modes of the intellect, are subtle and not clearly manifest.

The *Upaniṣads* like the *Māṇḍūkya* and the *Tāpanīya* set forth that the *ānandamaya* enjoys *Brahman*-bliss by means of the subtle modes of nescience. "The mass of intelligence which has become one in the state of sleep is the *ānandamaya*, which enjoys bliss through the channel of the modes possessing reflection of intelligence." The self which assumes many forms in the states of waking and dream becomes of a single consistency in sleep; and the intelligence which is reflected in nescience serves as the channel for the enjoyment of bliss. Again, due to the force of *karma*, the *jīva* awakes from sleep and gets involved in the troubles and turmoils of the transmigratory life. The *Kaivalya Upaniṣad* (13) says that awaking from sleep is caused by *karma*. "Again, due to conjunction with the *karma* of the previous life, the same *jīva* dreams and awakes."

An examination of the moment immediately succeeding the termination of sleep gives us intimation of the *Brahman*-bliss experienced during sleep; for there is then the persistence of residual impression of *Brahman*-bliss which is borne out by the fact that a person who has just got up from sleep remains calm and happy without any thought of external objects. But being prompted by *karma*, the *jīva* loses sight of its blissful nature and gets entangled once again in the vicious circle of *samsāra*.

We observed above that in the state of calmness there is the manifestation of *Brahman*-bliss in the form

of residual impression. Now, since the manifestation of *Brahman*-bliss is obtained in the state of calmness the need for the teaching of scripture and the preceptor may be questioned. The declarations of *śruti* can be meaningful only when it connotes something which is not established by any other means. This objection is not sound. A man who does not know a piece of precious stone to be such finds no use for it. Even so, although everyone experiences *Brahman*-bliss in sleep and its residual impression in the state of calmness, he does not recognize it to be *Brahman*-bliss or the residual impression thereof without the help of scripture and the preceptor. Nor may the opponent say that he has understood *Brahman* from the words of the Siddhāntin, for it is analogous to the instance of the man who hoped to win the prize for proficiency in the Vedas by merely saying that the Vedas are four in number. Even if the words which constitute such statements as "You are the impartite non-dual *Brahman*-bliss, etc.," be mastered and their meaning learnt, there remains to be acquired the intuition of *Brahman*. And this intuition can be got only through the declarations of scripture and the instruction of the preceptor.

So far we have seen how there is the experience of *Brahman*-bliss in the state of sleep, how it is self-luminous and non-dual, as also how there is the indication of the bliss immediately prior to sleep, and an intimation thereof in the form of residual impression immediately subsequent to sleep. The happiness which is the result of the residual impression of bliss is experienced whenever there is happiness which is not due to the objects of the external world. This is what we have called *vāsanānanda*. What is known as *viśayānanda* is the reflection of bliss in the mental mode which

has turned inward after the desire for external objects is destroyed through attaining them. As was remarked above, the latter two kinds of bliss are but products of *Brahman*-bliss, *vāsanānanda* being its residual impression and *viṣayānanda* being its reflection in the modes which cognize objects of sense. Both the latter kinds of bliss point towards their generator, viz., *Brahman*-bliss.

4. *Residual Impression of Bliss*

Through analysis of the state of sleep we found that there is every kind of evidence for the experience of *Brahman*-bliss. We shall now point out how the residual impression of bliss experienced during the state of waking serves as a ground for asserting the existence of *Brahman*-bliss. The *viññānamaya* self which is the agent in the state of waking experiences both pleasure and pain as also the balanced state where there is neither pleasure nor pain. The experience of pleasure and pain is the product of *karma*, while the state of indifference expresses the innate nature of self. In the enjoyment of external objects and in day-dreams there is the experience of pleasure and pain; and in the intervals between pleasures and pains there is the experience of the state of silence which is the expression of the real nature of the supreme bliss. In those moments of care-free indifference men very often say, "We are free from anxieties and worries; we are happy." It must be noted however that even these moments do not directly manifest *Brahman*-bliss; for what we have is only the residual impression of that supreme bliss. The direct manifestation of bliss is made impossible, because it is obscured by egoity. Coolness is felt on the outer surface of a pot containing cold water; but that coolness itself is not water. In the same manner, during

moments of indifference and silence there is the experience only of the residual impression of bliss. But just as coolness on the surface is the basis for inferring water inside the pot, even so the residual impression is the indicator of the existence of *Brahman*-bliss. And when through constant effort egoity is gradually quelled, the real nature of bliss is revealed in increasing degrees. The intellect becomes refined and culminates in the destruction of all modes of the form of not-self; and then there arises the cognition "I" in the internal organ which has become of the form of *Brahman*. This subtle state of intellect is not sleep, since there is not here the dissolution of the intellect. That *Brahman*-bliss is manifest in this state which is distinct from sleep and wherein there is cognition of duality is taught by Kṛṣṇa to Arjuna.

5. *Method of Yoga*

The method by which the intellect is to be refined so that the supreme bliss may be attained is described in the *Gītā* as *yoga*. *Yoga* is separation from contact with pain. It is to be achieved by constant and slow practice with a determined and untiring mind. Whatever drags the mind to the objects of sense and makes it waver and wander away should be regarded as an obstacle to the progress of a *yogin*. Renouncing all desires, and restraining with his mind all his senses, the *yogin* should gain tranquillity, and with a steady and steadfast purpose concentrate his mind on the supreme Self. When thus the mind is restrained and withheld from sense-objects, and the intellect is refined and tranquillity reached, the *yogin* experiences unexcellable bliss which is super-sensible and grasped only by the intellect.

The same method of tranquillizing the mind is taught in the *Maitrāyaṇi-śakhā* by sage Śākāyanya to king Bṛhadratha. Whatever the mind thinks that it becomes. When it is attached to the senses and the objects thereof, it gets muddled and mutilated; but when it is concentrated on *Brahman* it becomes of that form. That mind is impure which is in contact with desires; and that mind is pure which is completely free from the pestilence of desires, etc. Mind alone is the cause of the bondage and release of men; attachments to objects brings about bondage, while detachment from them effects release. The mind is to be purified and tranquillized by constant and vigilant practice. Just as the fire which is unfed by fuel cools down, even so when all the mental modes are destroyed, the mind gets dissolved in its source. When the channel of the mental flow is turned away from the objects of sense and directed towards *Brahman*, and when the mind gets attached thereto, then the bonds of *saṃsāra* break. Rid of its impurities through *samādhi*, the mind experiences unexcellable bliss which defies all description and which is grasped by the tranquil mind alone.

The mental equanimity cannot be maintained for long. *Samādhi* does not stay for a long time. But still it gives the *yogin* a lasting taste of the supreme bliss. Even when he is out of that balanced state of mind, he thinks longingly of that bliss with the same ardour and intense fervour with which a woman contemplates the lord of her heart. In the moments of indifference when there is manifest the residual impression of bliss, he discerns the supreme bliss itself and concentrates his mind thereon. That the *yogin* is able to fix his mind on *Brahman* and at the same time carry on the activities of the world can be illustrated by examples.

The crow which is said to see with only one eye directs its vision alternately through the two cavities. A man who is a master of two languages discerns meaning in both of them. One who stands in a river half-immersed, with the scorching sun above, experiences both the pleasure afforded by the cool waters and the pain inflicted by the piercing shafts of the sun. In the same manner, the *yogin* is able to bear the miseries of the world and yet at the same time centre his mind in *Brahman*. Thus, unlike the ordinary run of mankind which experiences *Brahman*-bliss only in sleep, the *yogin* perceives it even in the hours of waking and dream. To the yogic perception *Brahman*-bliss is revealed.

The method of *yoga* has been detailed in the concluding verses of the 11th chapter of the *Pañcadasī* as the means by which *Brahman*-bliss can be attained. *Yoga* is the method by which the mental current is arrested in its flow towards objects of sense and directed towards *Brahman*. *Yoga*, in short, is the concentration and the tranquillizing of the mind. This method was explained in greater detail in the *Dhyāna-dīpa* of the *Pañcadasī* where a secondary place was assigned to it, priority being given to the method of inquiry (*jñāna*). The author of the *Pañcadasī* dare not go to the extent of saying with Vācaspati that it is only through *prasaṅkhyāna* that *Brahman*-intuition is gained. Though following the *Vivaraṇakāra* he maintains that *śravaṇa* is the principal means to *Brahman*-knowledge, he concedes to mental concentration the position of being an auxiliary thereto. But he is firm on this point that knowledge is the only direct means to release, and that there can be no combination of knowledge and *karma*. The *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad* (iii. 8) says: "Knowing that,

he crosses death; there is no other path to release." There are some passages of scripture and the traditional code which seem to enjoin either *karma* or *jñāna* to be the means. "Doing *karma* here in this world, let him desire for living a hundred years; to you who desire thus there is no other way except that by which you will not be affected by *karma*." "He who knows both *vidyā* and *avidyā*, transcends death through *avidyā* and attains immortality through *vidyā*." "Through *karma* alone did Janaka and others attain *samsiddhi*." "Like the honey which is mixed with food or the food which is mixed with honey, *tapas* and *vidyā* together constitute a potent medicine." These texts, though they seem to enjoin either *karma* or a combination of *karma* with *jñāna*, are not really in conflict with those passages of the *śruti* which declare that there is no other path except knowledge. The word, "*samsiddhi*" connotes the purification of mind which is auxiliary to *Brahman*-knowledge. The word "*vidyā*" which is used in combination with the word "*avidyā*" or *karma* means *upāsana* and not knowledge. Thus it will be clear that none of the above that quoted passages prescribes *karma* to be the means, either alone or in combination with knowledge. There is evidence in abundance in the Upaniṣads for knowledge being the only direct means to release. The *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* says, "The knower of *Brahman* attains the highest." In the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, Nārada asks Sanatkumāra, "I have heard men like you that the knower of the self crosses sorrow; and I, who am versed in the scriptures, because of the lack of that knowledge, am in distress. Therefore, O Lord enable me to cross the bounds of sorrow." Gods like Indra, Varuṇa, Yama, and Agni are said to be in constant fear of the supreme, because

they are lacking in *Brahman*-knowledge. "Wherever there is duality, there is fear." He who knows *Brahman* which is bliss is never afraid." The *jñānin* is not affected by *karma* in the form of merit and demerit. "When the most high is seen, the knots of his heart are cut, all doubts are dispelled and all *karmas* are destroyed."

NOTES

1. The following inference establishes the self-luminosity of the experience of sleep : what is in dispute, viz., the experience of sleep, is self-luminous, because it is manifest even without the means of knowledge, like the self admitted by the Sāṅkhyas, or the *saṃvedana* of the Prābhākaras, or the cognitional self of the *Vijñānavādins*.

2. *Chāndogyopanīṣad*, VIII, iv, 2.

HOMAGE TO THE SUPREME PERSON

नारायणाय नलिनायतलोचनाय
 नामावशेषितमहाबलिवैभवाय ।
 नानाचराचरविधायकजन्मदेश-
 नाभीपुटाय पुरुषाय नमः परस्मै ॥

Obeisance to the supreme Person, Lord Nārāyaṇa, whose wide eyes are similar to the fullblown lotus, who has vanquished the haughty emperor Mahābali, and from whose lotus-like navel has sprung up the universe of varied moving and non-moving beings.

THE THEORY OF APPEARANCE IN
ŚĀṆKARA VEDĀNTA

by

Satya Deva Mishra

(Contd. from Vol. XII. No. 2)

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II. *Form*

Appearance of the Self has been divided into two forms by its chief exponents, Suresvara and Ānandagiri — (A) *Kāraṇa-ābhāsa* and (B) *Kārya-ābhāsa*.⁶⁶

(A) *Kāraṇa-ābhāsa*. Appearance or *ābhāsa* enshrined in *ajñāna* is called *Kāraṇa-ābhāsa*. Supreme Self is its prime cause and, therefore, it is said to be the product of only transcendental Self⁶⁷ or pure consciousness.⁶⁸ The involved sense of the word '*mātra*' or only — that nescience has no part to play in the figuration of this animating and manifesting appearance of *ātman* except to serve as its receptacle for the sake of its own capability of creating the series of animate and inanimate objects of this beginningless universe⁶⁹ — is although a fact *in toto*, yet the main standpoint of the Advaita cannot be set aside that it is only illusion about the supreme reality through which the appearance comes into existence and claims to be real, luminous and intellect. This primordial appearance being eternally present in *ajñāna*⁷⁰ rightly deserves the name of *kāraṇābhāsa*. "It is the perennial source or inexhaustible medium of all other manifold appearances answering to the multiple modifications or possible projections of *ajñāna*."⁷¹ In one of his *Vārtikas* Suresvara designates *kāraṇābhāsa* as *cetanābhāsa* or intelligent appearance and attributes to it the characteristics of *ātman*.⁷² But it must be noted here that the characterisation of *kāraṇābhāsa* as the *ātman* lies in its capability to manifest and illuminate *ajñāna* and other phenomenal objects appearing in uncountable names and forms, and not in the sense that it is the supreme *ātman*, which is certainly one and does not undergo any modification of any nature whatsoever. In some

Vārtikas, it has been viewed as *mohottha*⁷² or the product of illusion. This view seems in contradiction to the previous one stating it as the product of the pure intelligence. In fact, there is no contradiction between the two view-points. To explain, the consciousness (*cit*), nescience (*ajñāna*) are respectively the counter-positive (*pratiyogi*) and the adjunct (*anuyogi*) of *ābhāsa*. The former is the cause of *ābhāsa* being counterpart and the latter having associated itself with it (*ābhāsa*). Thus there is nothing wrong in delineating it as the product of both the counter-positive, Brahman, and the adjunct, *ajñāna*.

(B) *Kārya-ābhāsa*. Appearances underlying and pervading the multiple modifications of *ajñāna* are known as *kāryābhāsa*.⁷³ According to the *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi*, the whole universe consisting of the cognisers the cognised and the cognition is *kāryābhāsa*.⁷⁴ It is not related even slightly to the absolute reality and hence it is said to be the modification of *ajñāna*.⁷⁵ The entire world is manifested by the *kāryābhāsa*. As an object pervaded by the appearance, points out Ānandagiri, has no separate existence from the appearance,⁷⁶ the whole world would naturally go after its name. Non-conscious appearance or *acetanābhāsa* is its another name endowed with the nature of non-self.⁷⁷ But this non-selfness is meant only to distinguish it from the supreme self and, therefore, it would be certainly a mistake if we equate it with inert objects which not only owe their existence to it but also depend on it for their manifestation.

A comparative study of these two kinds of appearances would make it clear that *kāraṇābhāsa* is a primordial appearance connected invariably with the

ultimate world-cause, whereas *kāryābhāsa* is a subsequent display of *avidyā* diversified into multiple form by intervening adjuncts innumerably and incessantly arising from *avidyā*, filled with various forms of primordial appearance. The former's receptacle is *avidyā*, while the latter's worldly objects are projected out of *avidyā*. *Kāraṇābhāsa* is the life and blood of *ajñāna*, and *kāryābhāsa* of its entire ephemeral and non-ephemeral effects. The pure intelligence has been considered to be the material cause of the former, and the illusion of the latter. Both, therefore, resemble their respective causes and appear respectively like the self and the non-self. The selfness of *kāraṇābhāsa* is rendering of life and energy to *ajñāna*, whereas the non-selfness of *kāryābhāsa* is creating of the distinctions of pleasure, pain, and delusion in worldly objects in respect of relative experiences. These appearances, says Ānandagiri, are the two idealistic states or *māyā-mayī-vṛttis* of the transcendental self appearing in both *ajñāna*, the material cause of entire dualities, and its effects, ether and air, etc.⁷³ In fact, like the self, its appearance is also one, but seems to be divided, diversified and designated as *kāraṇa* and *kārya* indiscriminately identified with the cause and effect of the universe.

III. *Function*

Having discussed the nature and forms of *ābhāsa*, it is necessary to answer a question, which suggests itself: If the Brahman and *ajñāna* are enough to explain and establish all the doctrines of Advaita Vedānta, what does impel the Advaitins to admit this additional principle as *ābhāsa*? The real answer to this question is to bring into light at least the main functions assigned to *ābhāsa* by its adherents.

1. The first and foremost function of *cidābhāsa* is involved in the world-causality. The causality of the universe that consists of not only the inert and inanimate objects, but also the macrocosmic and microcosmic *Beings* is neither to be attributed to the Brahman, declared as secondless and devoid of cause and effect, nor the *ajñāna*, equated with delusion and darkness.¹⁰ Despite this fact, the Brahman associated with *ajñāna* has been held as the prime cause of the universe in the Advaita Vedānta.¹¹ But when the immutable nature of Brahman and the non-conscious character of *ajñāna* are deadly against this association, the doctrine of causality, conceived in the Advaita system, would surrender to the Sāṅkhya doctrine, if a third factor, viz. *cidābhāsa* were not accepted as a link which not only unites these cosmic principles but also remains as an assisting factor in the creative process of universe. Emphasising its importance in the causality, Suresvarācārya says that not only the Brahman and the *ajñāna* but the triad, i.e. *Brahman*, *ajñāna* and *ābhāsa*, united together are the cause, the witness and the controller of the universe.¹² To illustrate this viewpoint: As the all-pervading ether associated with jars and tumblers etc. becomes to be of diverse forms, even so the supreme self, because of its *ābhāsa* linked with its own *ajñāna*, and mind etc., appears as the world of duality.¹³

2. The second important function of *ātmābhāsa* (appearance of the self) is rendering of existence and intelligence to non-intelligent *avidyā*, and its products. *Ajñāna*, according to Suresvarācārya, is neither accidental, nor self-established nor established by some other factor. It is only appearance which substantiates and establishes it. The experience 'I know nothing' is an evidence in support of the establishment of *ajñāna*

through appearance.⁵¹ Both *ajñāna* and its products derive their vitality from, owe their respective functions to, and depend on this active, perennial and enlivening factor. Considering the viewpoints shown in the above and similar *Vārtikas*, Ānandagiri explains that *ajñāna* is established, enlivened and energised by the two principles — pure consciousness (*cit*) and appearance of pure consciousness (*cit-ābhāsa*), whilst the products of *ajñāna*, say, *pramātā*, etc. are substantiated and vitalised by the triad — pure consciousness (*cit*), appearance (*ābhāsa*) and nescience (*ajñāna*).⁵² To put in other words, it is because of manifold appearances that the supreme consciousness is able to account for the existence of *ajñāna* or its modification, as an eternal substrate, on which these are pitched up like the snake on a garland or rope. The appearance of consciousness is the factor that imparts manifestation to *avidyā* and its effects. The contribution of *ajñāna* to the existence of *pramātā*, etc. is involved in the power of producing their respective adjuncts like mind and so on, in conformity with its own nature, without which the *ābhāsa* would remain only in a primordial form and never appear in forms of *pramātā* and other worldly objects.

3. Its another importance lies in the illumination of objects. It is known from the *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad*,⁵³ that the self-luminous *ātman* is the illuminator of objects. But illumination is certainly a kind of activity and cannot be attributed to Brahman, declared by the scriptures to be without any activity or attribute. In order to reconcile these contradictory passages of *Śrutis*,⁵⁴ Śaṅkara, Suresvara and other exponents of *ābhāsa-vāda* recognise the appearance as an eternal

light, through which the supreme self illumines not only the mind, the sense-organs and their objects, but the whole universe consisting of causes and effects."¹³

4. Refutation of the Buddhistic doctrine, which forbids the existence of witness (*sākṣi*) is also impossible unless we accept appearance. The Buddhists maintain that the modifications of minds are themselves perceivers as well as perceived and thus preclude the necessity of their illumination by a witness. Criticising the Buddhists, some Vedāntins contend that though a persistent knower or *anvayigrāhaka* must be admitted, apart from the modifications of mind, for revealability, of their presence and absence, yet it is not essential to admit the appearance of self for illumination of these modifications. But this contention, says, Śankara in his *Upadeśasāhasrī*, is not better than the modifications themselves; for, the said cogniser, different from the modifications will be equally non-intelligent. (Because if it itself is the cogniser — an agent of cognition — it is not better than the non-self). Argument of other Vedāntins, that the presence and absence of modifications will be cognised on account of proximity of the permanent cogniser even in the absence of *ābhāsa* is also illogical, because if it is taken for granted, not only the mind but other objects, like the piece of wood and the stone, etc., will also have mental modifications, as these are lying similarly in proximity of all-pervading knower. Thus the refutation of the Buddhistic view is possible only if the appearance is admitted in and between *ajñāna* and its products, on the one hand, and self, on the other, not only to cause their mental modifications but also to cognise their absence and presence."¹⁴

5. The line of distinction, too, between various products of *ajñāna* has been drawn by *ātmābhāsa*. In the course of perception, we come across daily two types of objects, one animate and the other inanimate. If all objects are the modifications of one and the same *ajñāna*, why are some endowed with intelligence and others with non-intelligence? Answering to this question, *Ābhāsavādins* say that such a distinction between worldly objects depend totally upon the appearance pervading these objects and not on the Brahman or *ajñāna*. The luminous receptacles, such as the *ajñāna* and the mind, etc. with appearance of consciousness transparently and directly enshrined therein turn into intelligent objects, while the non-luminous receptacles, such as earth and stone, etc. with appearance of consciousness murkily and indirectly engrossed therein remain non-intelligent entities of the universe.¹⁰

6. The last important role unanimously pleaded by the *Ābhāsa-vādins* lies in establishing the Advaita doctrine of bondage and liberation in a more intelligible manner. If the appearance were not admitted, the teachings of *Upaniṣads* says Śaṅkara, would become meaningless in the absence of a medium.¹¹ The teaching is purposeful, when it is meant for a listener. *Aśrotā* Brahman or non-intelligent mind cannot be the subject of listening. As the authoritative statements of *śrutis* cannot be without purpose, a listener different from the Brahman and the mind has to be admitted. This listener, according to Śaṅkara and the *Ābhāsavādins*, is the appearance of supreme self in the mind.¹² This very appearance has been called *jīva* or individual soul, and recognised as the knower (*pramātā*), the enjoyer (*bhoktā*) and the doer (*kartā*) in relation to the triple functions of mind. Though the

consciousness, the mind and the appearance are totally different from one another, yet on account of non-discrimination the soul identifies itself with the mind and experiences bondage. On the other hand, when the truth of the above Upaniṣadic statement is realised due to discrimination or dawning discernment between the afore-said triad, the soul realises its own nature, ever free from bondage.

It is now fairly certain that in the interpretation of the doctrines of Advaita Vedānta, be it the unaccountable relation of Brahman to *māyā*, or the complicated causality of universe, or the inexplicability of *māyā*, and its effects, or the non-difference between the individual and supreme self, the contribution of *ābhāsa* or appearance, is always there as a sound and original doctrine.

IV. *Ābhāsa and Pratibimba*

Lastly, we point out basic differences between the *ābhāsa* and the *pratibimba* to dispel a general confusion prevailing about their nature.

1. Appearance, as we have said, is a depreciated semblance of the pure consciousness, but the reflection (*pratibimba*), as Sadānanda says in his *Advaita-brahmasiddhi*, is externally existed image of the prototype itself (*bahihsthitavarūpa*), appearing in the adjunct and being totally free from the limitations of adjunct.²² Though the pure consciousness is undoubtedly a prototype of both the *ābhāsa* and the *pratibimba*, yet the distinction between the two becomes markedly prominent in as much as the former is distinct from, and the latter is identical with, the pure consciousness.

2. Reflection, in the words of Padmapādācārya, is not distinct from the prototype essentially, and on

the contrary, nothing but that only," while the appearance is not so and cannot be deemed to be either different from or identical with the prototype.

3. *Pratibimba* as identical with the prototype is always real, and its distinct appearance being due to *avidyā*. But the *ābhāsa* partaking of some common characteristics of *avidyā*, is totally unreal, and its reality is recognised only in the secondary sense. In the light of this difference, the *pratibimbavādins* uphold '*abhede sāmānādhikranya*' or the principle of apposition or co-ordination resulting in oneness," and the *Ābhāsavādins* that of sublation resulting in oneness technically called '*bādhāyām sāmānādhikaranya*'."

4. *Ābhāsa*, being different from the pure consciousness, gets divided into two worldly forms — the cause and the effect, but the reflection remaining ever non-different from reality is actually indivisible by adjuncts. According to *ābhāsavāda*, the Brahman, therefore, transcends both these appearances," but in the *pratibimba* school, it cannot transcend the reflection, which is essentially nothing but itself.

5. The *Ābhāsavādins* accepting uniformity between the appearance and the adjunct advocate the non-existence of adjuncts in the absence of appearance and hold that all adjuncts, including *ajñāna* are appearances; but the *Pratibimbavādins*, who admit the *pratibimba* to be totally identical would never propound their adjuncts as reflection.

6. The last point of the difference as marked out by Mm. Vasudeva Sastri, is that according to the *ābhāsavāda* the adjunct covers the *upādeya* totally and, according to the *pratibimba-vāda* it does so only partly."

In other words, according to the former the relation between the *ābhāsa* and the prototype is seeming, while the relation in the *pratibimba* school is that of identity-cum-difference, the former being essential and the latter only apparent.

V. Conclusion

The *Ābhāsavādins* who resort to the inscrutable appearance for interpreting faithfully the Advaita doctrine of absolute Monism expounded by Ācārya Śaṅkara give a lead to its basic doctrine known as *anirvacanīyatāvāda*, by measuring the supreme soul or the God, the individual self or the *jīva* and the universe, with the same scale of inexplicability, and declaring all of them equally as appearances either as the *kāraṇābhāsa* or as the *kāryābhāsa*.

NOTES

66. *ātmbhāso'pi yo'jñāne tatkārye cāvabhāstate, kāryakāraṇatūropah...* (*Br. Vārtika* 4.3.1330 and see also *Śāstraprakāśikā* thereupon).

67. *kūṣasthātmaikahetūtthacidbimbo mohagastu yah* (*Br. Vārtika* 4.3.415).

68. *pratyakprajñotthitābhāsasambandhāt...* (*ibid.* 2.4.390).

69. *na cābhāsavyāptiā vinā avidyā kāryāpteti* (Ānandagiri's commentary on Sarvajñātman's *Pañcaprakriyā*, p. 50).

70. *api pratyaktamo nityam bhāsvaccaitanyabimbitam.
buddhitadvrttayaś caiva taptāyoviṣphuliṅgavat.*

(*Br. Vārtika*, 1.4.834).

ghaṭādyābhāsavattasmānmohāderabhyupeyatām.

cidābhāso'pi sarvatra na vedmītyanubhūtitah (*ibid.* 4.3.99). Cf. also *ibid.* 4.3.355 and 3.4.5.

71. Dr. V. P. Upadhaya : *Lights on Vedānta*, p.41.

72. *cetanācetanābhāsah ātmānātmatvilakṣaṇah.*
kāryakāraṇarūpeṇa mitha'pekṣāśrayam tamah
 (Br. Vārtika 2.4.424).
73. *na tu mohotthacidbimbahetuvrttavyapekṣayā* (ibid.
 4-3-414).
74. See Note, no. 66.
75. *na cāyam kriyākōrakaphalātmakah ābhāsah iśadopi parā-*
mārtha vastu spṛṣati tasya mohamātropādānatvāt. (ch. 2, p. 76).
76. *pariṇāmi hi mohādeḥ cidābhāsah sadesyate* (Br. Vārtika
 4.3. 324).
77. *na cābhāsyābhāsino'nyatra sattvam* (Śāstraprakāśikā,
 1.4.508).
78. See Br. Vārtika. 2,4.424.
79. *kṛtsnasya dvaitasya mūlakāraṇamajñānam tasya kāryam*
viyadādi tatrobhayatra vrttirābhāsastadrūpōpādhyavaṣṭambhōdasaṅ-
gasyāpi nayamayī dvayī vrttiḥ (Śāstraprakāśikā, 1.4.636).
80. *dhvāntādiviṣayāntārtho jaḍattvātmāsiddhikṛt.* (Br.
 Vārtika, 4.3.59) and also 'na ca jādyaṅtirekeṇa hyavidyā kācidisyate'.
 (ibid 1.4.2).
81. *asya dvaitendrajālasya yadupādānakāraṇam ajñānam*
samupāśritya brahma kāraṇamucyate (ibid. 1.4.371) and also
 'sarvāsūpaniṣatsvevam kāraṇam nānyadātmanah śrūyate'taḥ parāt-
 māiva jagataḥ kāraṇam param.' (ibid. 2.1.395).
82. *Kūṭasthādrṣṭitanmohau drṣṭyābhāsaśca tattṛayam. kāra-*
ṇam jagataḥ sākṣi niyanteli ca bhānyate. (Br. Vārtika. 3.4.86) and
 also 'cidābhāsam svāmajñānam sannipatyā tadakṣaram. kāraṇam
 sat svakāryeṣu niyantrtoam prapadyate.' (ibid. 3.9.3.).
83. *svābhāsavartmanaivetat svātmājñānabhūmiṣu. itaḥ*
bahutvamekam sadviyadyadvadghatādiṣu (ibid... 1.2.127).
84. See ibid., 1.4.340-41 and 1.4.361 and also *ajñāna-*
sya dvidhā'pyasiddhāvasiddhireva na hi vidhāntareṇa tatsiddhiḥ...
ityāśaṅkyāha — cidābhāsamiti cito yasiminnābhāsah tattamah tat-
prasādūdeva jñātavyamahirvacanīyasyānyathā'yogādityarthah. ābhā-

savaśāttamaḥsiddhirityatra anubhavam pramāṇyati. (Śāstraprakāśikā on 1.4.341).

85. *cidābhāsaikamātreṇa tamaḥsiddirna mūttah saṁvittanmo-
hacit-bimbaiḥ prātyakṣyam kartṛrūpiṇah* (Br. Vārtika, 4.1305
and 'caitanyatadābhāsābhyamajñāna-siddhi-muktoḥ mātṛsiddhipra-
kāramāha — saṁviditi... caitanyatadābhāsājñānairāparokṣyam
māturityartha'. (Śāstraprakāśikā, 3.4.105).

86. *kim jyotirevāyam puruṣaḥ ityātmaivāsya jyotirbhavatītyā-
tmanaivāyam jyotiṣā'ste palyate karma kurute vipalyeci.* 4.3.9).

87. See Br. Upaniṣad, 3.8.8. and 3.8.11. Cf. also Gītā, 13.31.

88. See Upadeśasāhasrī, 16.60 and 18.71; Bṛhadāraṇyako-
paniṣadbhāṣya, 4.3.30, p. 595; Br. Vārtika, 43.86, 4.3.89; and
Śāstraprakāśikā on 4.3.860: and 'jyotiṣṛtvam bhāsā-katvam
syūccidābhāsamukhena tat. upapannamasāṅgasya bhānvādivadanugr-
hāt.' (Bṛhadāraṇyakavārtikasāra, 43.8.6). Cf. also Anubhūtipra-
kāśā, 18.138.

89. See Upadeśasāhasrī, 18.72-75.

90. *cetanācetanabhidā kṛtasthūtmakṛtā na hi kintu buddhi-
kṛtā'bhāsakṛtaivetyaavagamyatām.* (Pañcadaśī, 6.45) *tamaḥpradhū-
naḥ kṣetrāṇām citpradhānaḥ cidātmānam|paraḥ kāraṇatāmeti bhāvanā-
jñānakarmabhiḥ* (Br. Vārtika, 1.4.342). Cf. also Ātmabodha, v.
16.

91. *tattvamityupadeśo'pi dvārābhāvādanarthakaḥ* (Upadeśa-
sāhasrī, 18.110).

92. *ibid.*, chap. 18, vv, 87, 89 and 90; *akāryakāraṇo'py-
ātmā buddhipraṇādihetuḥ. avidyāyā cidābhāsaḥ saṁsārīvāvabhāsate*
(Br. Vārtika, 4.3.406). See *ibid.*, 1.4.560. 'ātmāvastu'odyvo'pi
*svavidyayā buddhyādau saṁsārahetau sthitaḥ svābhāsadvārā saṁsā-
ritvābhāsam anubhavati*' (Śāstraprakāśikā on 4.3.406); Cf. also
Chāndogyabhāṣyaṭikā on 6.4.3. p. 298, *Advaitabrahmasiddhi*, p.
303 and *Siddhāntabindu*, pp. 219-20.

93. *pratibimbatvam tu-upādhyantargatatve sati aupādhika-
paricchedaśūnyatve ca sati bahiḥsthita-svarūpatvam*'. (chap. VI, p.
202).

94. 'bimbādiva pratibimbam na brahmaṇo vastvantaram; kintu tadeva tat' (*Pañcapādikā*, varṇaka, 1, p. 104).

See also Nṛsimhāśrama's *Advaitadīpikā*, pp. 162-193.

95. See Ātmasvarūpa's commentary, *Praveśapariśodhinī* on the *Pañcapādikā*, p. 108.

96. See *Śāstraprakāśikā* on 1.4.383, *Chāndogyabhāṣyauṭīkā*, on 6. 4. 3, p. 298, *Kena-vākyaivaraṇavyākhyā* on 3. 1. 4.1, p. 31 and *Advaitasiddhi*, pp. 202-3.

97. See *Br. Vārtika*, 4. 3. 1320.

98. *cidābhāsam tamo jñeyam...* (ibid., 1. 4. 131) and *ajñā-nāditrayam pratyagābhāsam...* (ibid, 3. 3. 3. 41). And, 'pratyag-ābhāsam yadakhṇḍam tamah' *Śāstraprakāśikā*, 1.4.30.

99. *tathā cābhāse upādhiḥ svaguṇena samagram upōdheyam vyāpnotīti pratibimbane tu upādhirbhāgēcchūdito bhavati* (Introduction to the *Siddhāntabindu*, p. 18).

ŚRĪŚIVAKEŚĀDIPĀDĀNTAVARṆANA- STOTRA*

Śrī Śaṅkara Bhagavatpāda

This hymn on Śiva in 29 verses composed in the Srag-dharā metre describes the beauty of the Lord from the head to foot. There are some beautiful and novel comparisons such as the one in the third verse describing the beauty of the third eye of the Lord.

[1]

देयासुर्मूर्ध्नि राजत्सरससुरसरिपारपर्यन्तनिर्यत्
प्रांशुस्तम्बाः पिशङ्गास्तुलितपरिणतारक्तशालीलता वः ।
दुर्वारापत्तिगर्तश्रितनिखिलजनोत्तारणे रज्जुभूता
घोराघोर्वीरुहालीदहनशिखिशिखाः शर्म शार्वाः कपर्दाः ॥

May the matted locks of Śarva (Śiva) confer happiness on you. They adorn the head (of the Lord) in whose tall reddish brown shrubs circles the beautiful celestial river (Ganges). They resemble a creeper with ripe red *sāli* (grains). They are the ropes which rescue

*Translated by Dr. N. Gangadharan

all the people got stuck up in the pit of unsurmountable misfortunes. They are the flames of the fire which burn the hidden columns of worldly dreadful sins.

Śarva denotes Lord Śiva in one of his eight forms as sustaining the entire world. *Śālī* denotes a variety of paddy.

[2]

कुर्वन्निर्वाणमार्गप्रगमपरिलसद्रूप्यसोपानशङ्कां
 शक्ररीणां पुराणां त्रयविजयकृतस्पष्टरेखायमाणम् ।
 अव्यादव्याजमुच्चैरलिकहिमधराधित्यकान्तस्त्रिधोद्य-
 ज्जाह्वव्याभं मृडानीकमितुरुडुपरुक्पाण्डरं वस्त्रिपुण्ड्रम् ॥

May the triple lines (on the forehead) of the beloved of Mṛḍānī (Lord Śiva) protect you. They cause a doubt whether they are the shining silvery steps on the path of liberation. They appear to be the visible marks made on the conquest of the three cities (demons), which are the foes of Śakra (Indra). By nature they resemble the three courses of Jāhnavī (Ganges) on the high Himalayan tableland in the third eye. They are white with the splendour of the moon.

The word Śakra denotes Indra, perhaps a contraction of the word Śatakratu meaning the performer of hundred sacrifices.

'*Puratraya*' denotes the three cities of sons of Maya — Kamalākṣa, Tārakākṣa and Vidyunmāli. Mṛḍānī denotes the consort of Mṛḍa (Śiva).

The river Ganges is known as Jāhnavī because it emerged from the ear of sage Jahnu.

[3]

क्रुध्यद्गौरीप्रसादानतिसमयपदाङ्गुष्ठसंक्रान्तलाक्षा -

विन्दुस्पर्धि स्मरारेः स्फटिकमणिदृषन्मग्नमाणिक्यशोभम् ।
मूर्धन्युद्यद्विव्यसिन्धोः पतितशफरिकाकारि वो मास्तकं स्ताद्
अस्तोकापत्तिकृत्त्यै हुतवहकणिकामोक्षरूक्षं सदाक्षि ॥

May the third eye on the head of the enemy of the god of love be ever for the cutting off of manifold misfortunes. It is arid on account of sparks of fire emanating from it. As the Lord prostrates before the angry (Goddess) Gaurī in order to appease her, it (the eye) vies with the drops of red lac besmeared on the big toe (of the Goddess). It has the lustre of the ruby embedded in the crystalline stone. It resembles the fish fallen from the divine river (Ganges) rising from the head (of Lord Śiva).

[4]

भूत्यै दृग्भूतयोः स्याद्यदहिमहिमरुग्बिम्बयोः स्निग्धवर्णो
दैत्यौघध्वंसशंसी स्फुट इव परिवेषावशेषो विभाति ।
सर्गस्थित्यन्तवृत्तिर्मयि समुपगतेऽतीव निर्वृत्तागर्वं
शर्वाणीभर्तुरुच्चैर्युगलमथ दधद्विभ्रमं तद्भ्रुवोर्वः ॥

May the charming elevated pair of eye-brows of the Lord of Śarvāṇī (Pārvatī) be for your prosperity. It belongs to the two eyes made up of the discs of the sun and the moon. It has an attractive colour. It shines as the remnant of the attractive halo clearly

announcing the destruction of the multitudes of demons. (That halo) exists during (the periods of) creation, existence and destruction. (The pair of eye-brows) shed their harshness when I approach it.

[5]

युग्मे रुक्माब्जपिङ्गे ग्रह इव पिहिते द्राग्ययोः प्राग्दुहित्रा
 शैलस्य ध्वान्तनीलाम्बररचितवृहत्कञ्चुकोऽभूत्प्रपञ्चः ।
 ते त्रैनेत्रे पवित्रे त्रिदशवरघटामित्रजैत्रोग्रशस्त्रे
 नेत्रे नेत्रे भवेतां द्रुतमिह भवतामिन्द्रियाश्चास्त्रियन्तुम् ॥

May the holy pair of eyes of the Three-eyed Lord be here quickly as the guide to control your horses, namely, the senses. When the golden lotus-like yellow pair of eyes (of the Lord) was covered in the past by the daughter of the mountain as in an eclipse, the universe had become a big apparel made of the black cloth of darkness. The two eyes are the mighty victorious weapons against the hosts of enemies of (Indra), the foremost among the thirty three gods.

The words *ghaṭa* and *amitra* may also be taken to denote the elephant and its rival lion comparing suitably with the gods and demons. The senses are often referred to in the philosophical works as the horses. Only a strong and capable person could control the horse.

[6]

चण्डीवक्त्रार्पणेच्छोस्तदनु भगवतः पाण्डुरुक्मपाण्डुगण्ड-
 प्रोद्यत्कण्डूं विनेतुं वितनुत इव ये रत्नकोणैर्विघृष्टिम् ।

चण्डार्चिर्मण्डलाभे सततनतजनध्वान्तखण्डातिशौण्डे

चाण्डीशे ते श्रिये स्तामधिकमवनताखण्डले कुण्डले वः ॥

May the ear-pendants of Caṇḍīśa (Lord of Caṇḍī) be for your abundant prosperity. As he desired to place his cheeks close to the face of Goddess Caṇḍī, they (the pendants) appeared to descend down to remove the itching sensation on the moon-like pale cheek of the Lord by scratching with the edges of the gems. They have the splendour of the orb of the sun. They are extremely skillful in destroying the ignorance of the people who always worship him. They are bowed to by Indra.

Akhaṇḍala means Indra.

[7]

खट्वाङ्गोदग्रपाणेः स्फुटविकटपुटो वक्त्ररन्ध्रप्रवेश-

प्रेप्सूदञ्चत्फणोरुश्वसदतिध्वलाहीन्द्रशङ्कां दधानः ।

युष्माकं कम्प्रवक्त्राम्बुरुहपरिलसत्कर्णिकाकारशोभः

शश्वत्राणाय भूयादलमतिविमलोत्तुङ्गकोणः स घोणः ॥

May that extremely bright and lofty edged nose of (the Lord) holding the club (*khatvāṅga*) in his hand pointing upwards be always able to protect you. It has the prominent large holes. It causes a doubt that it is the exceedingly white, foremost serpent (*Ādiśeṣa*) having its raised hood and hissing, desirous of gaining entry into the hole, namely, the face. It has the grace of the shining pericarps of the lotus, namely, the beautiful face.

The nose of Lord Śiva is fancied here to be the Ādiśeṣa desirous of gaining entry into the hole namely the face of the Lord. 'Khaṭvāṅga' denotes a club or shaft with a skull at the top as one of the weapons of Lord Śiva.

[8]

क्रुध्यत्यद्वा ययोः स्वां तनुमतिलसतोर्बिम्बितां लक्षयन्ती
 भर्त्रे स्पर्धातिनिम्ना मुहुरितरवधूशङ्कया शैलकन्या ।
 युष्मांस्तौ शश्वदुच्चैरबहुलदशमीशर्वरीशातिशुभ्रा-
 वव्यास्तां दिव्यसिन्धोः कमितुरवनमञ्जोकपालौ कपोलौ ॥

May the two cheeks of the Consort of the divine river (Ganges) bowed to by the gods protect you. The daughter of the mountain (Pārvatī) overcome by jealousy becomes extremely angry towards the Lord beholding the reflection of her own shining form in them (the cheeks) suspecting another spouse (of her Lord). The two cheeks are extremely white like the moon on the tenth day of the bright fortnight.

Sarvarī denotes the night and *sarvarīśa* denotes the moon.

[9]

यो भासा भात्युपान्तस्थित इव निभृतं कौस्तुभो द्रष्टुमिच्छन्
 सोत्थस्नेहान्नितान्तं गलगतगरलं पत्युरुच्चैः पशूनाम् ।
 प्रोद्यत्प्रेम्णा यमार्द्रा पिबति गिरिसुता संपदः सातिरेका
 लोकाः शोणीकृतान्ता यदधरमहसा सोऽधरो वो विघत्ताम् ॥

May that lower lip, which with its lustre has spread redness in the world, confer on you unlimited prosperity. It shines with its splendour as if it is the *kaustu-bha* itself quietly stationed nearby, desirous of beholding

the distinguished posion on the throat of (Śiva) the Lord of the flock, on account of intense brotherly affection.

The *hālāhala* (deadly poison retained by Lord Śiva at the throat) and *kaustubha* (gem adorning the Lord Viṣṇu) had their origin from the milky ocean when it was churned. It is fancied here that the *kaustubha* has taken the form of the lip of Lord Śiva in order to see his brother (*hālāhala*) on account of affection. Lord Śiva is usually referred to as Paśupati — the Lord of the beings.

[10]

अत्यर्थं राजते या वदनशशधरादुद्गलच्चारुवाणी-
 पीयूषाम्भःप्रवाहप्रसरपरिलसत्फेनविन्द्यावलीव ।
 देयात्सा दन्तपङ्कतिश्चिरमिह दनुदायाददौवारिकस्य
 द्युत्या दीप्तेन्दुकुन्दच्छविरमलतरप्रोन्नताग्रा मुदं वः ॥

May that row of sharp-edged exceedingly shining teeth (of the Lord) having the progeny of Danu as the gate-keepers confer eternal happiness on you. They are like the lustrous rows of drops of foam floating on the nectarine lovely speech issuing forth from the moon-like face (of the Lord). By its lustre it has the beauty of a radiant moon or jasmine.

Danu was a handsome daughter of Dakṣa. She was cursed by Indra to become a monster as she offended him. As Śiva is the Cord of the *bhūta-gaṇas*, He is referred to as having the progeny of Danu as the door-keepers. *Śaśadhara* denotes the moon on account of the hare-like mark on the surface of the moon.

(to be continued)

ŚĀRĪRAKA-VYĀKHYĀ-PRĀSTHĀNA-BHEDAĪ

by

Ātmavidyābhūṣaṇam V. S. V. Gurusvāmi Śāstri

Free rendering by

Dr. V. K. S. N. Raghavan

(Contd. from Vol. XII. No. 2)

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VIII. VIMUKTĀTMAN

[344]

Among the preceptors of Advaita, there was one by name Vimuktātman. He went through the works (of Maṇḍanamisra and Suresvara) — the *Brahmasiddhi* and the *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi* (respectively). Then he prepared a work, the *Iṣṭasiddhi* incorporating his stand-points. So, let us analyse his views herein.

[345 - 347]

He has divided his *Iṣṭasiddhi* into eight chapters. He has discussed about the various *khyātis* (theories of error) elaborately. He has established that the theory of 'indefinable-cognition' (*anirvacanīya khyāti*) alone is the most valid one. When he refutes the other theories of error beginning with '*anyathā-khyāti*' (cognition otherwise), one finds his arguments to be lucid, profound, spontaneous and full of reason.

[348 - 349]

In his *Iṣṭasiddhi*, Vimuktātman has quoted profusely from the *śruti* (*Vedas* and *Upaniṣads*), *smṛti*, the *Brahmasūtras* (of Bādarāyaṇa), the *Bhagavadgītā*, the *Bhāgavata*, the *Yogasūtra* (of Patañjali), the *Mahābhārata*, and the works of Śrī Gauḍapāda and Suresvara. But he does not quote much from the works of Śrī Śaṅkara Bhagavatpāda.

[350]

But in one place, he has quoted the viewpoint of Śrī Śaṅkara while explaining the maxim of '*Yakṣānurūpo baliḥ*' (the quantity of the offering is in conformity

with the power of the respective *yakṣa*) as found in the *Chāndogyopaniṣadbhāṣya*, and substantiates his own view.

[351 - 353]

Śrī Maṇḍana's views were: (i) *Śabdādvaita* (the view of *śabda* as the non-dual reality), (ii) *karmakṣaya* through Brahman-knowledge (*i.e.* the knowledge of Brahman destroys all kārmic bondage), (iii) the removal of *avidyā* consists in the essential form of Ātman, etc. In his *Iṣṭasiddhi*, Vimuktātman restates the above views of Maṇḍana, and then refutes them in detail before pointing out his own views. Mostly Vimuktātman has reiterated the views of Suresvara while substantiating them. However, he differs from Suresvara in a few places.

The Removal of Avidyā is of the Fifth Order

[354 - 356]

The removal of *avidyā* cannot be said to be real, for such a view would stultify Advaita; nor is it unreal, for it will not be purposeful in establishing *jñāna*; nor is it both real and unreal, for it is contradictory; nor is it indefinable (*anirvācya*), for if it is so, it would persist even in *mukti* — as it originates *jñāna* — , and is not removable by *jñāna*. After refuting these four alternatives, the author of the *Iṣṭasiddhi*, Vimuktātman has concluded that the 'removal of *avidyā*' is of the fifth order.

[357 - 358]

Appayyadīkṣita, in his *Siddhāntaleśasaṅgraha*, has held that this view (*avidyānivṛttiḥ*) is that of Ānanda-bodha. However, this view, in fact, is established only

by Vimuktātman. Appayyadīkṣita's contention can also be justified.

[359 - 360]

Sarvajñātman, in his *Saṅkṣepaśārīraka*, has referred to this view as that of *mukti-kovida*. Madhusūdana, while commenting on it (the *Saṅkṣepaśārīraka*), has said that the author of the *Iṣṭasiddhi* is the one who is referred to as *mukti-kovida*.

[361 - 362]

Ānandabodha has referred to Vimuktātman in his work and has quoted his verses. Appayyadīkṣita has referred to this view as that of Ānandabodha, because Ānandabodha has explained that view in his work. Ānandabodha has explained his teacher's view alone.

[363 - 364]

What the Bhāṣyakāra (Śrī Śaṅkara) has explained in his commentary on the sixth section of the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* — “just as the object of enjoyment, *viz.*, world is unreal, even so the agent of enjoyment, *viz.*, *jīva* is also unreal, giving the example of ‘*yakṣānurūpo baliḥ*’ — seems to be the source of this view of Vimuktātman.

[365]

Vimuktātman considers ‘*avidyā-nivṛtti*’ to be only *mithyā* (unreal), citing the example of ‘*yakṣānurūpo...*

[366]

The indefinability — which is of the form of 'removable by *jñāna*', and is spoken of to belong to *ajñāna* — is denied in respect of removing *ajñāna*.

[367]

The above view as untenable is, indeed, what is accepted. Therefore, after refuting such a view, he substantiates the same (refutation).

[368]

If the view — that *avidyā-nivṛtti* is indefinable — is not accepted, then undoubtedly, the inference with regard to the *mithyātva* of *avidyā-nivṛtti* will be stultified.

[369 - 370]

Therefore, that *avidyā-nivṛtti* is of the fifth order (*pañcama-prakārā*) is ultimately certain. *Vimuktātman* accepts the view that there are as many kinds of *ajñāna* as those of *jñāna*; and, this is also restated by the authors of the *Siddhāntabindu* (Madhusūdana) and the *Saṅkṣepaśūtraka* (Sarvajñātman).

(to be continued)

अथशब्देन शान्त्यादेरेवानन्तर्यमुच्यते

भाष्यभाष्यज्ञः वरहृत् कल्याणसुन्दरशास्त्री

अधिकारिभेदात्पूर्वोत्तरमीमांसयोर्नैकशास्त्र्यमित्युक्तमधस्तात्प्रति-
ज्ञामात्रेण । अधिकारिभेदश्च न

अथातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा

इति सूत्रस्थाथशब्दार्थनिर्णयमन्तरा लभ्यत इति तन्निर्णयार्थमथशब्दार्थ-
विचार इदानीम्प्रस्तूयते ॥

तत्र अथशब्दस्यानन्तर्यमर्थ इति सम्प्रतिपन्नम् । परं तु शमादि-
साधनचतुष्टयसम्पत्त्यानन्तर्यमिति शङ्करः, धर्मशास्त्राध्ययनानन्तर्यमिति
केचित् । तत्रान्यतरस्य समीचीनत्वनिर्णयायायं विचारो विधीयते ।
तथाहि — कर्मज्ञानं विना ब्रह्मणो ज्ञातुमशक्यत्वाद् ब्रह्मजिज्ञासुना
तावत्कर्मज्ञानाय पूर्वमीमांसाध्ययनं कर्तव्यमिति किमाशयः ?
किं वा अज्ञातकर्मणः पुरुषस्य ब्रह्मजिज्ञासोरपि ब्रह्मज्ञाने नास्त्यधिकार
इति ब्रह्मज्ञानाधिकारसिद्धयर्थं कर्मज्ञानाय पूर्वमीमांसाध्ययनं कर्तव्य-
मिति ? यद्वा पूर्वमीमांसान्यायानामेवोत्तरमीमांसायां दर्शनात्तदवगमाय
पूर्वमीमांसाध्ययनं कर्तव्यमुत्तरमीमांसाध्ययनं चिकीर्षुणेति ? अथवा
कर्मभिश्शुद्धचित्तस्यैव ब्रह्ममीमांसायामधिकार इति कृत्वा कर्मकरणार्थं
कर्मज्ञानाय पूर्वमीमांसाध्ययनं कर्तव्यं ब्रह्ममीमांसुनेति ?

नाद्यः — कर्मज्ञानब्रह्मज्ञानयोरुपजीव्योपजीवकभावाभावात् । न हि

अङ्गुण्

इत्यादिमाहेश्वरसूत्रज्ञानं विना अणित्यादिप्रत्याहारज्ञानाभाववत्कर्मज्ञानं विना ब्रह्मज्ञानाभाव इति वक्तुं शक्यते, ज्योतिष्टोमपौण्डरीकवाजपेयादिकर्मज्ञानविधुराणामपि ब्रह्मज्ञानसत्त्वात् । न द्वितीयः — ब्रह्मज्ञान-कर्मज्ञानयोरधिकार्याधिकारकभावाभावात्, कर्मज्ञानविधुराणामपि बहूनां ब्रह्मज्ञानेऽधिकृतानां सत्त्वादुपनीतस्यैव द्विजस्य विवाहेऽधिकार इतिवत्कर्म-ज्ञानिन एव ब्रह्मज्ञानाधिकार इति क्वाप्यदर्शनात् । न तृतीयः — तथा-त्वेऽन्वयव्यतिरेकानुमानादिपदार्थानां तर्कशास्त्रे दृष्टानामेव वेदान्त-शास्त्रेऽपि दर्शनेन तज्ज्ञानार्थं तर्कशास्त्रस्याप्यध्येयत्वेनाथशब्दस्य तर्क-शास्त्राध्ययनानन्तर्यमर्थ इत्यपि वक्तव्यत्वात् । न चेशापत्तिः, विनापि तर्कादिशास्त्रान्तराध्ययनं बहूनां वेदान्तशास्त्राध्ययनाल्लब्धब्रह्मज्ञानानां सत्त्वात्; प्रबलतरतर्कादिशास्त्रान्तरवासनापिशार्चीग्रासवशाद्बहुवारं श्रुतवेदान्तशास्त्राणामप्यलब्धब्रह्मज्ञानानां च बहूनां सत्त्वात् । वेद-वेदाङ्गाध्ययनादेव अर्थावबोधसहितादापातप्रतिपन्नब्रह्मज्ञानस्य वेदान्त-शास्त्राध्ययनं सुकरमिति कृत्वा ब्रह्मजिज्ञासोर्वेदवेदाङ्गाध्ययनस्यार्थ-सहितस्यावश्यकत्वस्योभयसम्प्रतिपन्नत्वात् । न चतुर्थः — कर्मभिश्शुद्ध-चित्त एव ब्रह्म जिज्ञासति ।

तमेतं वेदानुवचनेन ब्राह्मणा विविदिषन्ति

यज्ञेन दानेन तपसाऽनाशकेन ।

इति श्रुतेः । न ब्रह्मजिज्ञासुना पूर्वमीमांसाध्ययनं कर्तव्यं, पूर्वमीमांसाध्य-यनात्पूर्वमेव तस्य ब्रह्मजिज्ञासाया जातत्वात् । न च पूर्वमीमांसाध्ययनं विना न कर्मज्ञानं, कर्मज्ञानं विना न कर्माचरणं, कर्माचरणं विना न चित्तशुद्धिः, चित्तशुद्धिं विना न ब्रह्मजिज्ञासेति ब्रह्मजिज्ञासायाः कथमुदयः पूर्वमीमांसाध्ययनरहितस्येति वाच्यम्, अधीतस्वाध्यायेन मीमांसाशास्त्रवासनाशून्येनापि परोपदिष्टविधया कृतनिष्कामकर्मणा चित्तशुद्धेर्लभ्यमानत्वात्, न ह्यनधीतवेदस्येवानधीतमीमांसाशास्त्रस्य ज्योतिष्टोमादौ नास्त्यधिकार इति वक्तुं शक्यते ॥

भवतु वा पूर्वमीमांसाशास्त्राध्ययनशून्यस्य कर्मस्वनधिकारः ।
न तावतास्माकं कापि शक्तिः, येन केनाप्यदृष्टादिना हेतुना जातायां
ब्रह्मजिज्ञासायां पुरुषेण वेदान्तशास्त्राध्ययनमेव कर्तव्यं, न तु मीमांसा-
ध्ययनं, तस्य दर्शितविधया जिज्ञासांप्रत्येव हेतुत्वात् । न हि नीरे
लब्धे सति नीरलाभाय कूपः खननीयः । तस्मात्कर्मजिज्ञासुनैव मीमांसा-
शास्त्रमध्येतव्यं, ब्रह्मजिज्ञासुना तु वेदान्तशास्त्रमध्येतव्यम्, यथा
शब्दसाधुत्वजिज्ञासुना शब्दानुशासनं, पदार्थजिज्ञासुना तर्कशास्त्रं
तद्वदिति ॥

ननु ब्रह्मजिज्ञासुना कर्मशास्त्राध्ययनानन्तरं कर्मज्ञाने सति ब्रह्म-
मीमांसा कर्तव्येति न वयं ब्रूमः : किं तर्हि, कर्मजिज्ञासुना कर्मशास्त्रा-
ध्ययनं कर्तव्यं, ततः कर्मज्ञाने लब्धे सति तस्य ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा जायते,
तेन चोत्पन्नब्रह्मजिज्ञासेन ब्रह्ममीमांसा कर्तव्येति ब्रूमः, अतो न दोष
इति चेत्, मैवम् । न हि कर्मज्ञानलाभादेव ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा जायते पुरुषस्य,
किंतु निष्कामकर्मानुष्ठानद्वारा चित्तशुद्धिलाभादेव । न हि कर्माणि
ज्ञातमात्राण्येव चित्तशुद्धिं जनयन्ति, तथा सति सर्वस्यापि विधि-
शास्त्रस्य,

वसन्ते वसन्ते ज्योतिषा यजेत ।

इत्यादेरानर्थक्यप्रसङ्गात्, अर्थावबोधसहितात्स्वाध्यायाध्ययनादेव
कर्माणि ज्ञातानीति कृत्वा कर्मशास्त्रस्याप्यानर्थक्यप्रसङ्गात् । न हि
कर्मज्ञानाय जैमिनिना शास्त्रं कृतम्, किंतु तदनुष्ठानविधिप्रदर्शनायेति ।
एवञ्च द्विजस्य तावदुपनीतस्यार्थज्ञानपूर्वकं साङ्गवेदाध्ययनं, ततो
मीमांसाध्ययनं पश्चात्कर्मानुष्ठानं, तदुपरि चित्तशुद्धौ सत्यां ब्रह्मजिज्ञा-
सोदयेन वेदान्तशास्त्राध्ययनमिति क्रमः । अत एव

अथातो धर्मजिज्ञासा

इत्यत्र अथशब्दस्य वेदाध्ययनानन्तर्यमर्थं इत्युक्तम् इति ॥

ननु भवतु परोक्तार्थो दुष्टः, कथं पुनश्शङ्करोक्तार्थो भवेदपङ्क इति चेदुच्यते — शमादिसम्पत्तेरेव चित्तशुद्धिशब्दवाच्यत्वादिति । नच ब्रह्मजिज्ञासोदयानन्तर्यमथशब्दार्थं इति वक्तव्यमिति वाच्यं, ब्रह्मजिज्ञासुरेव ब्रह्ममीमांसायां प्रवर्तते, न त्वन्य इति तस्यावचनादपि सिद्धत्वेन तद्वचनस्यानर्थकत्वात् । अत एव

अथातो धर्मजिज्ञासा ।

इत्यत्राप्यथशब्दस्य कर्मजिज्ञासानन्तर्यमर्थं इति नोक्तम् । नापि कर्मानुष्ठानानन्तर्यमर्थं इति वाच्यम्, कृतकर्मणामपि केषांचिच्चित्तशुद्धयनुदयेन कर्मानुष्ठानानन्तरं ब्रह्ममीमांसायाः कर्तव्यत्वासिद्धेः इति ॥

ननु पुरुषेण शमादिसम्पत्तिरूपायां चित्तशुद्धौ सत्यां वेदान्तशास्त्राध्ययनं कर्तव्यमिति स्थापितम् । तत्र संशयः, किं चित्तशुद्धौ सत्यामेव वेदान्तशास्त्राध्ययनं कर्तव्यमिति नियमः ? किं वा चित्तशुद्धौ वेदान्तशास्त्राध्ययनमेव कर्तव्यमिति? किमुत चित्तशुद्धौ सत्यां वेदान्तशास्त्राध्ययनं कर्तव्यमेवेति? नच नायं नियमविधिः कित्वपूर्वविधिरेवेति वाच्यं, ब्रह्मजिज्ञासोर्ब्रह्मज्ञानार्थं ब्रह्मप्रतिपादकवेदान्तशास्त्राध्ययनस्य प्राप्तत्वेनापूर्वविधित्वाभावात् । अत्रोच्यते — त्रिविधोऽप्ययं नियमः पूर्वाचार्यैरभ्युपगत एव । अत एव चित्तशुद्धिरहितानां न वेदान्तशास्त्रेऽधिकारः, कथंचित्कुतूहलितया प्रवृत्तानामपि तेषां ब्रह्मसाक्षात्कारानुदयश्च, शुद्धचित्तानामप्यनधीतवेदान्तशास्त्राणां प्रबोधचन्द्रोदयादिग्रन्थाध्येतॄणां ब्रह्मज्ञानालाभश्च इति ॥

ननु शमाधिसाधनसम्पन्न एव ब्रह्मज्ञानेऽधिकरोतीत्यत्र श्रुतिप्रमाणाभावादयुक्तश्शङ्करोक्तार्थं इति चेन्मैवम् —

शान्तो दान्त उपरतस्तिक्षुस्समाहितश्चरद्भावित्तो भूत्वा
आत्मन्येवात्मानं पश्येत् ।

इति श्रुतेस्सत्त्वात् । एतेन परोक्तार्थश्रुत्यनुग्रहाभावादुष्ट इति सिद्धम् । नहि श्रुतौ कर्मज्ञानी ब्रह्म पश्येदिति क्वापि श्रूयते । ननु न परैरर्थशब्दस्य धर्मशास्त्राध्ययनानन्तर्यमर्थ इत्युक्तम्, किंतु कर्मज्ञानानन्तर्यमिति । तथा च कर्मफलं क्षयिष्णु सातिशयं चेति ज्ञानानन्तरमिति फलतीति चेत्तर्हि नित्यानित्यवस्तुविवेकरूपं तत्कर्मज्ञानं साधनचतुष्टय एवान्त-
भवंतीति कुतो दूष्यते शङ्करोक्तार्थः ? न च नेदं कर्मज्ञानं नित्यानित्य-
वस्तुविवेकरूपं, किंतु अनित्यवस्तुज्ञानरूपमेवेति वाच्यम्, तथा सति ब्रह्मज्ञानफलं नित्यं निरतिशयं चेति ज्ञानाभावे ब्रह्ममीमांसायां प्रवृत्त्य-
योगात्, आपाततो ब्रह्मज्ञानसत्त्वस्य सम्प्रतिपन्नत्वाच्च ॥

किञ्च अस्याधिकारिणो जातं त्वदुक्तमिदं कर्मज्ञानं किमर्थावि-
गतिपूर्वकाद्वेदाध्ययनादेव, यद्वा मीमांसाध्ययनात् ? नाद्यः — वेदान्त-
शास्त्रमधिजिगीषुणा पूर्वम् पूर्वमीमांसाशास्त्रमध्येतव्यमिति त्वदभीष्टा-
सिद्धेः । न द्वितीयः, कर्ममीमांसकैरक्षय्यस्यैव कर्मफलस्याभ्युपगतत्वा-
न्नित्यब्रह्मणोऽनभ्युपगतत्वाच्च । कर्मब्रह्मवादिनो हि मीमांसकाः । एतेन
साधनचतुष्टयसम्पन्नस्यैव ब्रह्ममीमांसायामधिकार इतिवदधीतपूर्वमीमांसा
शास्त्रस्यैवोत्तरमीमांसायामधिकार इति नियम इति परास्तम् । पूर्वो-
त्तरमीमांसयोरुपजीव्योपजीवकभावाभावात्, प्रत्युत तत्रस्तेजसोरिव
विरोधात् । साधनचतुष्टयसम्पत्तिब्रह्ममीमांसयोस्तूपजीव्योपजीवकभावो
भिद्यते । कामक्रोधादिविक्षिप्तचित्तस्य हि स्थूलोपि पदार्थो न बुद्धि-
मधिरोहति, किंपुनरणोरणीयाधिहितो गुहायां ब्रह्मात्मा । अत एव

‘दृश्यते त्वग्रथया बुद्ध्या सूक्ष्मया सूक्ष्मदर्शिभिः’

इति श्रूयते । बुद्धेरग्रथत्वं सूक्ष्मत्वं च शमदमादिसंस्कारवशलब्धमेका-
ग्रत्वं सूक्ष्मवस्तुदर्शनसामर्थ्यं हि । तस्माद्यस्साधनचतुष्टयसम्पन्नस्तस्य
दृढा ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा जायते । स च जिज्ञासुः ब्रह्ममीमांसायां प्रवर्तते
इति कृत्वा साधनचतुष्टयसम्पन्न एवेहाधिकारी, न तु कर्ममात्रज्ञानवान्,
नापि मीमांसाशास्त्रमात्राचगतिमांश्च । नैतावतास्माभिरनधीतमीमांसा-
शास्त्रस्यैव ब्रह्ममीमांसायामधिकार इत्युच्यते, किंतु तर्कादिशास्त्राध्ययन-
तुल्यमेव मीमांसाध्ययनमपीत्युच्यते । तेन अनुमानादिपदार्थपरिज्ञानाय

यथा तर्कादिशास्त्रान्तरं किञ्चिदपेक्षितं, तथा मीमांसाशास्त्रमपि अप-
च्छेदोपक्रमसन्दंशादिन्यायावगतये किञ्चिदपेक्ष्यतां नामः नैतावता अधीत-
मीमांसस्यैव ब्रह्ममीमांसायामधिकार इति वयं ब्रूमः । अन्यथा
अधीततर्कादिशास्त्रान्तरस्यैव ब्रह्ममीमांसायामधिकार इति वक्तव्यत्वा-
पत्तेः । तस्मात् दृढतरब्रह्मजिज्ञासोदयात्प्रागेव न्यायमीमांसादिशास्त्रा-
ध्ययनं, ततः पश्चात्तु ब्रह्ममीमांसैवाध्येतव्या । यथा कर्मजिज्ञासोदया-
त्प्रागेव तर्काध्ययनं, ततः पश्चात्तु मीमांसैवाध्येतव्या तद्वदिति ॥

ननु अधितसाङ्गस्वाध्यायस्यैव नित्यानित्यवस्तुविवेकादिना ब्रह्म-
जिज्ञासा उदेतीति कृत्वा साङ्गस्वाध्यायानन्तर्यमथशब्दार्थ इति वक्तव्य-
मिति चेत्, मैवम् । साङ्गस्वाध्यायानन्तर्यस्य धर्ममीमांसायामतिव्या-
प्तत्वात्, साङ्गस्वाध्यायानन्तरमेव हि धर्ममीमांसायामधिकरोति पुरुषः ।
किञ्च साङ्गस्वाध्यायानन्तरमवश्यं शमादिसाधनसम्पत्तिर्भवतीति
वक्तुं न शक्यते, बहूनामापि वेदविदामिदानीं शमादिसम्पत्तिरहि-
तानां दृश्यमानत्वात् । दृढतरब्रह्मजिज्ञासा तु शमादिसम्पत्तिं
विना नोदेतीति शमादिसम्पत्त्यानन्तर्यमेव वाच्यम् । शमदमोपरति-
तितिक्षाश्रद्धासमाधानानि षडेकं साधनं, नित्यानित्यवस्तुविवेक
एकं, इहामुत्रफलभोगविराग एकं, मुमुक्षत्वमेकं — मिलित्वा चत्वारि
साधनानि । तत्र तीव्रमुमुक्षत्वमेव साधनं, न मन्दमुमुक्षत्वं तस्य
ब्रह्ममीमांसायामप्रवर्तकत्वात् । यद्यपि यस्यैतानि साधनानि न सन्ति
सोपि ब्रह्म जिज्ञासतीतीदानीं प्रत्यक्षं, तथापि तस्य सा ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा
न दृढा, किंतु मन्दैव । तस्मात्साधनचतुष्टयसम्पत्तिवशादेव ब्रह्मजिज्ञा-
सोदेति पुरुषस्य । यथा माहेश्वरसूत्राध्ययनवशादेव प्रत्याहारज्ञानं
तद्वदिति कृत्वा, अथशब्दस्य साधनचतुष्टयसम्पत्त्यानन्तर्यमेवार्थः ।

तदुदितस्स हि यो यदनन्तरः

इति न्यायाद्घटस्य दण्डव्यापारजन्यत्वेन दण्डव्यापारानन्तर्यदर्शनाच्च
इति ॥

ननु इच्छाया दृढत्वं नाम इष्यमाणविषयप्रवर्तकत्वम् ।

काश्यां तु मरणान्मुक्तिः ।

इत्यादिशास्त्रात्सर्वोप्यास्तिकः काशीं जिगमिषत्येव, किंतु यस्य दृढा काशीजिगमिषा स एव काशीं गच्छति, यस्य त्वदृढा स गमिष्यामीत्येव सर्वदा मन्यते, नतु गच्छतीति दर्शनात् । तथा च, यस्येप्यमाणविषये प्रवृत्तिस्तस्य दृढेच्छा इत्येवं स्वीकर्तव्यम् । इदानीं च बहवः पुरुषाः विनैव वेदवेदाङ्गाध्ययनं, विनैव साधनचतुष्टयसम्पत्तिं, विनैव च मीमांसादिशास्त्राध्ययनं, संस्कृतभाषापरिज्ञानमात्रादेव ब्रह्ममीमांसायां प्रवृत्ता दृश्यन्त इत्यमीषां दृढजिज्ञासां प्रत्यन्वयव्यतिरेकव्याप्तिसिद्धहेतुत्वमिति चेदुच्यते, इच्छाया दृढत्वं नाम नेष्यमाणविषयप्रवर्तकत्वं किंतु इष्यमाणविषयप्राप्तिपर्यन्तत्वम् । इच्छा हि विषयसिद्धौ निवर्तते, तदसिद्धौ तु नैव निवर्तते । तथा च यस्य ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा ब्रह्मज्ञानप्राप्तिपर्यन्ता, ब्रह्मज्ञाने सत्येव निवर्तते, न तु तस्मिन्नसति, स एव दृढब्रह्मजिज्ञासावानित्युच्यते । अस्यैव ब्रह्मज्ञानलाभः । इयं च दृढब्रह्मजिज्ञासा साधनचतुष्टयसम्पन्नस्यैव भवतीति कृत्वा दृढब्रह्मजिज्ञासां प्रति साधनचतुष्टयसम्पत्तेरस्यैवान्वयव्यतिरेकव्याप्तिसिद्धहेतुत्वम् । अयमर्थः — साधनचतुष्टयसम्पन्न एव ब्रह्मजिज्ञासया ब्रह्ममीमांसायां प्रवृत्त्य ब्रह्मज्ञानं लभते, न त्वन्य इति । अत एवानधिकारिणो बहवोऽद्य वेदान्तशास्त्रं ब्रह्मधीत्यापि संसारिणश्शोचन्त उपलभ्यन्त इति ॥

ननु मास्तु साधनचतुष्टयसम्पत्तिः, पदवाक्यप्रमाणपरिज्ञाने सति पण्डित उत्तरमीमांसायां प्रवृत्त्य स्वतो गुरूपदेशाद्वा ब्रह्मज्ञानं प्राप्नुयादेव । सति साहित्ये शब्दश्रवणादर्थज्ञानं नोदेतीति साहसमात्रमिति चेन्मैवम्, साधनचतुष्टयसम्पत्तिरहित उत्तरमीमांसाध्ययनवशाद्ब्रह्मज्ञानो याथात्म्यं नैव जानीयात्, यद्वा परोक्षमेव जानीयाद्यथा

वज्रहस्तः पुरन्दरः ।

इत्यादिवाक्यात्पुरन्दरादीन् परोक्षमेव जानाति, तद्वत्

सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्म ।

इत्यादिवाक्यादपि ब्रह्मेति । न च साधनसम्पन्नोऽपि शब्दाद्ब्रह्म परोक्षमेव जानीयाच्छब्दस्य परोक्षजननस्वाभाव्यादिति वाच्यम्, साधनशून्यस्य विचारासम्भवात् । विचारो हि चित्तैकाग्र्यसाध्यः, न हि शमादिरहितस्य कामादिभिर्विक्षिप्तचित्तस्य विचारस्सम्भवति । अत एव ब्रह्ममीमांसायां साधनसंपन्नस्यैवाधिकार इत्युक्तम् । मीमांसा हि विचारः । विचारेण ह्यसम्भावनानिवृत्तिः । न च मास्तु ब्रह्मापरोक्ष्यमात्मसाक्षात्कारस्स्यादेव शब्दात्केवलादिति वाच्यम्, ब्रह्माभिन्नत्वादात्मनः, भिन्नत्वेपि संसार्थात्मनिश्चयनिराकरणपूर्वकाऽसंसार्थात्मसाक्षात्कारस्य केवलशब्दादसम्भवात्तत्राप्यावश्यक एव विचारः । एवं साधनसम्पत्त्यभावेनात्मविचाराभावादेव वेदान्त्याभासानाम्बहूनामिदानीमसंसार्थात्मनिश्चयाभावः । तदेवं साधनसम्पत्त्यानन्तर्यंवाच्ययमथशब्दः समर्थयत्यधिकारिणमपेक्षितमिति सिद्धम् ॥

‘ATHA’ MEANS THE IMMEDIATE
CONSECUTION OF ‘MIND-CONTROL’, ETC.*

Bhāsyabhāvajña V. R. Kalyāṇasundara Śāstrī

It was resolved earlier that the *Pūrvamīmāṃsā* and the *Uttaramīmāṃsā* do not constitute a single *śāstra* because of the difference of the respective eligible inquirer. The difference of *adhikāri* (eligible person) (with regard to the two *mīmāṃsās*) cannot be known without the proper knowledge of the meaning of the word ‘*atha*’ found in the first aphorism — ‘*athāto brahma-jijñāsā*’ of the *Brahma sūtra*; therefore, to determine its meaning, the following inquiry into the meaning of the word ‘*atha*’ is made herein.

It is accepted that the word ‘*atha*’ means ‘immediate consecution’. But, according to Śaṅkara, it means immediately after the acquisition of the four-fold *sādhanas* like *śama*, etc. However, according to others, it means after the study of the *Dharmaśāstra* (*Pūrvamīmāṃsā-śāstra*). The following study is undertaken in order to determine which of these two views is correct. (1) Is it the contention that Brahman cannot be known without the knowledge of *karma*; and

* Translated by Dr. R. Balasubramanian

that therefore one who wants to inquire into Brahman should study Pūrvamīmāṃsā for the purpose of attaining *karmajñāna*? (For *Brahmajñāna*, *karmajñāna* is needed, and for *karmajñāna*, the study of Mīmāṃsā is needed.) (2) Or, is it the case that a person who desires to know Brahman is not qualified for *Brahmajñāna*, if he has no knowledge of *karma*? If so, is it that he should have the knowledge of *karma* for being qualified for the knowledge of Brahman, and that for *karmajñāna*, he must study Pūrvamīmāṃsā (hereafter abbreviated as *PM*)? (3) Or, is it that, since the principles of the *PM* alone are employed in the Uttaramīmāṃsā (hereafter abbreviated as *UM*) a person who wants to study *UM* must first study *PM* with a view to know the principle enunciated therein? (4) Or, is it that, since one is qualified for the study of Brahmanmīmāṃsā only if one has a pure mind through the performance of *karmas*, one must acquire the knowledge of *karmas* through the study of *PM*, in order to perform the *karmas*? (Let us now examine one by one, the four views mentioned above.)

The first view is untenable. *Karmajñāna* and *Brahmajñāna* are not related as the support (*upajīvaka*) and the supported (*upajīvyā*). Just as the knowledge of *pratyāhāra* like 'an', etc. is not possible without the knowledge of *Śivasūtras* beginning with 'a-i-u-ṇ,' it cannot be said that without *karmajñāna*, *Brahmajñāna* is not possible. There is *Brahmajñāna* even in the absence of the knowledge of *karmas* like *jyotiṣṭoma*, *paundarīka*, *vājapeya*, etc. The second view is also not acceptable. *Karmajñāna* and *Brahmajñāna* are not related as qualification and that which requires qualification, for there are many who are devoid of *karmajñāna*, but who are endowed with *Brahmajñāna*. Just as only a twice-born

who has gone through the *upanayana* ceremony is qualified for marriage, it is not the case that only a *karmajñānin* is qualified for *Brahmajñāna*. The third alternative, too, is untenable. Principles such as *anvaya-vyatireka anumāna*, etc., which are used in the Nyāya system are also used in Vedānta; and for getting the knowledge of them, one has to study the Nyāya system. If so, we will be compelled to say that the word "atha" means after the study of *tarka-śāstra*. This, however, is not helpful, for even without the study of Nyāya and other disciplines, many have attained *Brahmajñāna* by the study of Vedānta. There are many who do not have *Brahmajñāna* even after the study of Vedānta, even though they have knowledge of *tarka* and other branches of learning. By studying the *Veda* and the *Vedāṅgas* alone and by understanding what he studies, a person has some (outline) knowledge of Brahman; for such a person, the study of Vedānta is easy. Both of us admit the importance of the study of the *Veda* and the *Vedāṅgas* along with their meaning by one who wants to inquire into the nature of Brahman. The fourth view also cannot be accepted, for only a person who has pure mind through the performance of *karmas* inquires into the nature of Brahman, as declared by *śruti*: "Those well-versed in the *Veda* desire to know that (Brahman) through the practice of the chanting of the *Veda*, sacrifice, charity, penance and fasting." A person who wants to inquire into Brahman is not required to study *PM*, for he has the desire to inquire into Brahman even before the study of the *PM*. It cannot be argued: "*Karmajñāna* is not possible without the study of *PM*, that the practice of *karma* is not possible without *karmajñāna*, that without the practice of *karma* there is no purification of the mind, and that

without the purification of the mind there is no desire to know Brahman, and so how could one have the desire to know Brahman, if one does not study the *PM*?" A person who has studied the *Veda*, even though he has not studied the *PM*, attains the purification of the mind by doing his *karma* without desire, as counselled by others. Also, it cannot be said that as in the case of one who has not studied the *Veda*, one who has not studied the *PM* is not eligible for the performance of *jyotiṣṭoma*, etc.

Let it be that one who has not studied the *PM* is not qualified for the performance of *karmas*. However, it does not hinder us in anyway. If a person has a desire for inquiry into the nature of Brahman due to some unseen reason (*adrṣṭa*), he has to study the *Vedāntaśāstra*, and not the *Mīmāṃsā*, as it is the cause of the desire to know in the way indicated. When there is already water in hand, there is no need to dig a well for getting water. Therefore, the *Mīmāṃsā* has to be studied only by one who has a desire for inquiry into *karma*, but one who wants to inquire into Brahman should study the *Vedānta*, just as one who wants to inquire into the correct usage of *śabda* should study the science of grammar, and one who wants to inquire into the categories should study *tarkaśāstra*.

The opponent may argue in a different way: "We do not say that a person desirous of knowing Brahman should study *UM*, after getting the knowledge of *karmajñāna*, after a study of *PM*, but we maintain that *karmaśāstra* should be studied by one who wants to inquire into *karma*, and if he has *karmajñāna*, he will have a desire for inquiry into Brahman; having the desire to inquire into Brahman, one should study the

Vedānta; and there is nothing wrong in this argument."

But even this argument is wrong. A person does not come to have the desire to know Brahman merely on account of his having *karmajñāna*, but he has *brahmajijñāsā* only if he attains the purity of mind through the performance of *karma* without desire. The *karmas* do not give rise to the purity of mind merely on account of their being known. If that be the case, the entire *vidhi-sāstra* comprising texts such as "one should perform *jyotiṣṭhoma* during every spring" etc. will become futile. The *karmas* come to be known by the study (*adhyayana*) of the *Vedas* with their meaning and this will render the *karmaśāstra* futile. The *karmaśāstra* has not been written by Jaimini for attaining *karmajñāna* but for explaining the rules relating to the performance of *karmas*. Thus the sequence is that for a twice-born who is invested with the sacred thread, there is the study of the *Veda* and the *Vedāṅgas* along with their meaning, then he has to study the *Mīmāṃsā*, then he has to perform the *karmas*, and then if he attains the purity of mind, getting the desire to inquire into the nature of Brahman, he will study the Vedānta. That is why, the word "*atha*" in the *sūtra* "Then, therefore, the inquiry into *dharma*" means after the study of the *Veda*.

Let the meaning given by the opponent be defective. How is the meaning given by Śaṅkara not defective? The reply is as follows. The possession of the spiritual requisites like *śama*, etc., is what is referred to by the expression *cittaśuddhi*. It should not be said that the meaning of the word "*atha*" is "after the rise of the desire to know Brahman" for it is only a *brahma-*

jijñāsu who undertakes the study of the Vedānta, but not others. So even without mentioning it, it must be taken for granted; it means: it is futile to mention it. That is why the meaning of “*atha* in the *sūtra*, “*athāto dharmajijñāsā*” is not explained as “after the desire for inquiry into *karma*.” Nor should that be explained as meaning “after the performance of *karma*;” For, even after the performance of *karma*, in some cases there may not be the rise of the purity of mind with the result that after the performance of *karma* the study of the *UM* will not be possible.

It has been established that the study of the Vedānta has to be undertaken only if there is *cittaśuddhi* in the form of the possession of certain spiritual requisites like *śama*, etc. Here is a doubt to be cleared. Is it the ruling that only if there is *cittaśuddhi*, the study of the Vedānta has to be undertaken? Or, is it the ruling that, if there is *cittaśuddhi*, the study of Vedānta alone has to be undertaken? Or, is it the ruling that, if there is *cittaśuddhi*, the study of Vedānta has necessarily to be undertaken? It is not an *apūrvavidhi*, for the study of the Vedānta which sets forth the nature of Brahman is already given (or known) to the *brahma-jijñāsu* for attaining Brahman-knowledge.

The following is the reply to the doubt raised above. This *niyama* (restriction) in all the three ways has been accepted by the earlier teachers. So, those who do not have *cittaśuddhi* are not competent for the study of the Vedānta; for those who enter into the study of the Vedānta by way of entertainment or merriment, there is no attainment of Brahman-realization. Some may have *cittaśuddhi*, but if they have not studied the Vedānta, even though they study the

works like *Prabodha-candrodaya*, there is no attainment of *Brahmajñāna*.

If it be said that the view of Śaṅkara — according to which only a person who is in possession of the spiritual requisites like *śama*, etc. is competent for *Brahmajñāna*, — is not sound, as there is no scriptural support for it, it is wrong. There is the *śruti* text: “One should see the Self in the Self by possessing control of the mind, control of the senses, renunciation, endurance, concentration of the mind and faith.” Thus the view of the opponent which has no scriptural support is defective. It is nowhere said in *śruti* that one who knows *karma* must realize Brahman. The opponent may argue that the meaning of “*atha*” is not “after the study of the *dharmasūtra*,” but ‘after getting the knowledge of *karma*’ that is, after knowing that the fruit of *karma* is temporary, and surpassable. In that case, this *karmajñāna* which is in the form of what is eternal and what is not eternal is subsumed under the fourfold means (*sādhana-catustaya*). If so, why should the explanation given by Śaṅkara be objected to by the opponent? It should not be said that this *karmajñāna* is not the knowledge of what is eternal and what is not eternal, but it is the knowledge of what is perishable alone. If it is not known that the fruit of *Brahmajñāna* is eternal and unsurpassable, there will be no undertaking of the study of the Vedānta. Also it is accepted that there is already some (outline) knowledge of Brahman.

Further, does this *karmajñāna* which the aspirant has, as pointed out by you (the opponent), take place only because of the study of *Veda* along with its meaning? Or, does it take place due to the study of

Mīmāṃsā? The first alternative is not acceptable to you, for it is your contention that one who desires to study the Vedānta should first study the *PM*. The second one is not acceptable, for according to the Mīmāṃsakas, the fruit of *karma* is not perishable; and also the eternal Brahman is not acceptable to them. The Mīmāṃsakas are those who look upon *karma* as Brahman. Thus, the view that, a person who has studied the *PM* alone is qualified for the study of *UM* is refuted. Not only is the relation between *PM* and *UM* not one of the support and the supported, but, on the contrary, they are opposed to each other like light and darkness. The relation of the support and the supported obtains between the possession of the fourfold *sādhana* and *Brahmamīmāṃsā*. Even a gross object cannot, indeed, be comprehended by a mind which is overwhelmed by desire and anger. What more to be said in the case of Brahman which is subtler than the subtlest and which is lodged in the cavity of the heart? That is why it is said in *śruti*: "The Self... can be seen by those subtle seers through their sharp and subtle intellect." (*KU*, 1.3.12) The sharpness and the subtleness of the intellect are, indeed, the concentration and the ability to comprehend a subtle object obtained through the impressions left over by the practice of *śama*, *dama*, etc. Therefore, a firm desire to know Brahman arises in a person who has the fourfold means. Such a *jijñāsu* undertakes the study of *Brahmamīmāṃsā*. And so, one who has the fourfold means alone is the person qualified here, and not one who has the knowledge of mere *karma*, or one who has the knowledge of *Mīmāṃsā-śāstra* alone. By this it should not be thought that one who has not studied the *PM* alone is qualified for the study of the Vedānta. But what

we maintain is that the study of the *Mīmāṃsā* is on a par with the study of the *Tarka* and other *śāstras*. Just as the study of *Tarka*, etc., is required for understanding *anumāna*, etc., so also the study of the *PM* is needed for understanding *apaccheda-nyāya*, *upakramanyāya*, etc. We do not maintain on this account that one who has studied the *PM* alone is qualified for the study of the *UM*. Otherwise, one may even argue that only a person who has studied *Tarka*, etc., is qualified for the study of the *UM*. Therefore, the study of the *Nyāya*, *Mīmāṃsā*, etc., must have preceded the rise of a firm desire for inquiry into the study of Brahman; thereafter, the *Vedānta* alone should be studied in the same way as the study of *Tarka* should have preceded the rise of desire for inquiry into *karma* and thereafter the study of the *PM* has to be done.

The opponent may argue that only a person who has studied the *Veda* and the *Vedāṅgas* will have the desire for inquiry into Brahman through getting the knowledge of what is eternal, and what is not eternal; and so, he may argue the word “*atha*” means “after the study of the *Veda* and the *Vedāṅgas*.” But this is not correct, for this will result in the fallacy of ‘too wide definition’ — for it is only after the study of the *Veda* and *Vedāṅgas* that a person is qualified for the study of the *PM*. Further, there is no guarantee that after the study of the *Veda* and the *Vedāṅgas* a person will come to have the fourfold means like *śama*, etc. for there are many people who have studied the *Veda*, but who are not in possession of the fourfold means. A firm desire for inquiry into Brahman does not take place without the fourfold means, and so the desire for inquiry into Brahman must be only after the possession of the fourfold means. 1. Control of the mind

(*śama*), control of the senses (*dama*), not thinking of the things of the senses (*uparati*), forbearance (*titikṣā*), faith (*śraddhā*), and constant practice to fix the mind in God (*samādhāna*) — these six constitute one means. 2. Discrimination between things permanent and transient — this is one means. 3. Renunciation of the enjoyment of the fruits of action in this world and in the next — this is one means. 4. Desire for liberation — this is one means. So all these together constitute the fourfold means. Here, an intense desire for liberation alone is the means and not the one which is not intense, for the latter will not impel one to the study of the Vedānta. It may be that we find a person who does not have the fourfold means but still desires to know Brahman; but his desire for Brahman-inquiry is not firm, but only mild. Therefore, only on account of the possession of the fourfold means does the desire for Brahman-inquiry arise, just as only by the study of the *Māheśvarasūtra* does a person come to have the knowledge of *pratyāhāra*. So, the word “*atha*” means after the possession of the fourfold means. This is in accordance with the principle “*taduditaḥ sa hi yo yad-antaraḥ*” (What follows another is produced by that) as seen in the case of a pot which is produced by the operation of the stick, and which is seen to take place after the operation of a stick.

It may be argued that an intense desire is one which impels the person towards the object of desire. Since it is said that if a person dies at *Kāśī* he attains *mokṣa*, all the *āstikas* desire to go to *Kāśī*; but only that person who has an intense desire to go to *Kāśī* actually goes there; but he whose desire is not intense will always think of going to *Kāśī*, but does not go. In the same way we have to conclude that if a person

is impelled towards the object of desire, then his desire is intense. There are many persons who, even without the study of the *Veda* and the *Vedāṅga*, without the possession of the fourfold means, without the study of the *Mīmāṃsā*, pursue the study of the *Vedānta*, by just possessing a knowledge of Sanskrit language. So these persons must be said to have an intense desire for Brahman-inquiry. If so, how can it be said that the possession of the fourfold means is the cause of Brahman-inquiry by applying the principle of *anvaya* and *vyatireka*? (i.e., if *sādhana-catuṣṭaya* is present, *Brahma-jijñāsā* is present; and if it is absent, the latter is also absent.) The above argument is not sound. An intense desire is not one which just impels a person who has it towards the object of desire, but an intense desire is one which moves a man towards the attainment of the object of desire. A desire is fulfilled only when its object is realized; if it is not realized, it does cease to exist. Thus, the desire for Brahman-inquiry impels the person towards the attainment of the knowledge of Brahman. It ceases to exist only if *Brahmajñāna* is attained, and not when it is not realized. Only that person can be called as one who has an intense desire for *Brahma-jijñāsā*; only that person attains Brahman-knowledge. The intense desire for Brahman-inquiry arises only in him who is in possession of the fourfold means. So the possession of the fourfold means is the cause of intense desire for Brahman-inquiry; for, if this is present, the other one is present, and if this is absent, the other one is absent. So, only a person who is in possession of the fourfold means has the desire for Brahman-inquiry, and undertaking the study of the *Vedānta* he attains *Brahmajñāna*, and not others. Ultimately, today many people

who are not qualified for the study of the Vedānta, continue to suffer in the state of bondage, in spite of their study of the Vedānta.

It may be argued: "Leave alone the fourfold means. A scholar who has the knowledge of word (*pada*), sentence (*vākya*) and means of knowledge, (*pramāṇa*) and who studies the *UM*, attains *Brahmajñāna* by his own effort or through the *upadeśa* of a *guru*. It is, indeed, strange to say that a person who has studied *sāhitya* (literature) does not get at the meaning of words when he hears those words." But this argument is wrong. A person who studies the *UM*, without being in possession of the fourfold means cannot understand the true nature of Brahman. Or, he will have only an indirect (*parokṣa*) knowledge of Brahman, as from the expressions, "*vajrahastaḥ purandaraḥ* (Lord Indra wields the thunderbolt)" etc., one understands their meaning only indirectly. In the same way from the *śruti* texts "Brahman is real, knowledge and infinite," etc. he will know Brahman only indirectly. It should not be said that even a person who is in possession of the fourfold means will have only an indirect knowledge from the text, for *śabda* by its very nature is capable of giving life to only indirect knowledge. For, even though *śabda* ordinarily can give rise to only indirect knowledge, it does give rise to direct knowledge when it is aided with inquiry. The same thing cannot be said of one who is devoid of the fourfold means: that is, it cannot be said that even a person who is devoid of the fourfold means attains direct knowledge from the text aided by inquiry, for to a person who is devoid of the fourfold means, inquiry (*vicāra*) can never take place at all. Inquiry is, indeed,

what is accomplished by the one-pointed concentration of mind. To one who has no control of the mind and whose mind is overwhelmed by desire, inquiry is impossible. That is why it is said that only one who has the fourfold means is qualified for *Brahmamīmāṃsā*. *Mīmāṃsā* is, indeed, inquiry. Only, through inquiry *asambhāvanā* is removed. If it is argued: "Let there be no inquiry. One can have 'immediate perception of Brahman'/'Ātman-realisation' just by mere (reading of) scripture (*śabda*)," this does not hold good. For, Brahman is non-different from Ātman; and, even if it is different, by mere *śabda*, it is not possible (i) to remove the knowledge of *ātman* as *samsārin*, and then (ii) to realize *Ātman* as *asamsārin* (without bondage); and hence, even there is the necessity of inquiry. Thus, without the possession of the fourfold means, there is no inquiry of Ātman; and, without inquiry, now, many pseudo-Vedāntins cannot conclude Ātman as without bondage. In this way, it is concluded that the word '*atha*' — meaning 'subsequent to the possession of the fourfold means' — establishes the required eligible person (for Brahman-inquiry).

HANUMĀN AS GURU

दर्पोदग्रदशेन्द्रियाननमनोनक्तञ्चराधिष्ठिते
 देहेऽस्मिन् भवसिन्धुना परिगते दीनां दशामास्थितः ।
 अद्यत्वे हनुमत्समेन गुरुणा प्रख्यापितार्थः पुमान्
 लङ्कारुद्धविदेहराजतनयान्यायेन लालप्यते ॥

Like Sītādevī crying in Laṅkā in her imprisonment, having been informed at that time of the whereabouts of Śrī Rāma by Hanumān, Puruṣa is confined in the body surrounded on all sides by the sea of *saṁsāra*, with the mind swayed by the ten senses, like the proud Rākṣasa with ten heads tormenting him, and has reached a pitiable state, being taught the great truths of spiritual life by a *guru* of the calibre of Hanumān, and cries his heart out.

M. R. Rajagopala Ayyangar (tr.) the *Śaṅkalpasūryodaya* of Vedāntadeśika — *The Dawn of the Divine Will*, I, 72 (p. 78), Tirupati, 1965.

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संसाराध्वनि तापभानुकिरणप्रोद्भूतदाहव्यथा-
 खिन्नानां जलकाङ्क्षया मरुभुवि भ्रान्त्या परिभ्राम्यताम् ।
 अत्यासन्नसुधाम्बुधिं सुखकरं ब्रह्माद्वयं दर्शय-
 त्येषा शङ्करभारती विजयते निर्वाणसन्दायिनी ॥

samsārādhvani tāpabhānukiraṇaprodhūtadāhavyathā-
khinnānām jalakāṅkṣayā marubhuvi bhrāntyā
paribhrāmyatām
atyāsannasudhāmbudhiṃ sukhakarain brahmādvayain
darśayaty-
eṣā śaṅkarabhārati vijayate nirvāṇasandāyini.

To those who are afflicted, in the way of the world, by the burning pain given rise to by the scorching sun-shafts of misery, and who through delusion wander about in the desert (of worldliness) seeking water — showing the felicitous ocean of nectar, which is very near, the non-dual *Brahman*, this — the Voice of Śaṅkara — is victorious, leading, as it does, to liberation.