

A QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ADVAITA-VEDANTA


# The VOICE of ŚĀṆKARA

śaṅkara-bhāratī

Chairman, Advisory Board  
V. R. Kalyanasundara Sastri

Editor  
N. G. Krishnan

Vol. XII No. 4 -  
Vol. XIII No. 1



Feb. 1988

May 1988

esā śaṅkara-bhāratī vijagate  
nirvāṇa-sandāyini

victorious is the voice of śaṅkara.  
leading, as it does, to liberation

The Voice of Śaṅkara  
is published under the guidance of  
His Holiness Jagadguru Śrī Śaṅkarācārya  
of Kāñcī Kāmakoti Pīṭha  
by Ādi Śaṅkara Advaita Research Centre

*Registered Office:*

26, College Road,  
Nungambakkam,  
Madras-600 006.

*Subscriptions are to be sent to:*

The Administrative Officer,  
Ādi Śaṅkara Advaita Research Centre,  
26, College Road, Nungambakkam,  
Madras-600 006.

*Subscription Rates:*

	Indian	Foreign
Annual	Rs. 60/-	US Dollars 20
For two years	Rs. 100/-	US Dollars 36
Life	Rs. 500/-	US Dollars 200
Single copy	Rs. 20/-	US Dollars 6

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#### EDITOR'S NOTE

Due to unavoidable circumstances, Vol. 12, No. 4 of *The Voice of Śaṅkara* which was due in February, 1988 could not be brought out on time. Hence the present number has been brought out as a combined issue (Vol. 12, No. 4 - Vol. 13, No. 1).

N. C. KRISHNAN

## HOMAGE TO ŚAÑKARA

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[ 125 ]

नाकादिलोकविरतिः प्रभवेद् दृढा यद्-  
वाक्यामृतश्रवणतोऽप्यतिकामुकस्य ।  
स त्वं विरक्तिद ! जवात् पदनम्रपङ्क्त्यै  
श्रीशङ्करार्य ! मम देहि पदावलम्बम् ॥

*nākādilokaviratiḥ prabhaved dṛḍhā yad-  
vākyaṃṛta-śravaṇato'py-atikāmukasya  
sa tvam viraktida! javāt padanamra-paṅktyai  
śrīśaṅkarārya! mama dehi padāvalambam.*

Oh Master! Śrī Śaṅkara! indeed, even a very lustful person attains firm dispassion towards the enjoyment of the worlds beginning with *svarga* (*nāka*), merely by listening to your nectarine words. And, you are the swift bestower of *virakti* (dispassion) to the array of devotees that seek refuge under your pair of holy feet. So, Oh Master! kindly do give me shelter under your holy feet.

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अन्नासुचित्तमुखकोशविवेचनेन  
 तत्त्वं परं द्रुततरं प्रतिबोधयंस्त्वम् ।  
 मोक्षप्रदायक ! पदाम्बुजसंनतेभ्यः  
 श्रीशङ्करार्य ! मम देहि पदावलम्बम् ॥

*annāsucittamkuha-kośavivecanena*

*tattvam-param drutataram-pratibodhayamstvam  
 mokṣapradāyaka! padāmbuja-sannatebhyah  
 śrīśaṅkarārya! mama dehi padāvalambam.*

Oh Lord Śrī Śaṅkara! after making a thorough exposition of the *pañcakośas* — the sheaths of food, vital air, mind, intelligence and bliss — you are enlightening your devotees, who bow down to the lotus-like pair of your feet, about the *paratattva* (supreme Reality), and you are yielding to them *mokṣa* (Brahman-realization). Oh Great Preceptor! kindly give me shelter under your holy pair of feet.

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क्लेशान्निवार्य कृपया तरसाऽस्मितादीन्  
 पञ्चापि साधनचतुष्टयमाशु दत्त्वा ।  
 बुद्धिं विचारपरमां प्रविधाय सम्यक्  
 श्रीशङ्करार्य ! मम देहि पदावलम्बम् ॥

*kleśānnivārya kṛpayā tarasā'smitādīn*

*pañcāpi sādhanacatuṣṭayam āśu dattvā  
 buddhim vicāraparamām pravidhāya samyak  
 śrīśaṅkarārya! mama dehi padāvalambam.*



Oh Śrī Śaṅkara! I pray to you. Kindly, ward off quickly my five *kleśas*\* (evils) beginning with *asmitā* (*ahantā* - ego). Kindly endow me at once with the four indispensable qualifications (required of an aspirant of *mukti*). Kindly make my mind fit enough to enquire into the supreme Brahman very well. Thus, Oh Lord Śrī Śaṅkara! give me the support of your benign pair of feet.

Jagadguru Śrī Saccidānanda Śivābhinava Nṛsimhabhārati  
in *Śrīśaṅkarācāryapadāvalambastava*

---

\* Five *kleśas*: *avidyā*, *asmitā*, *rāga*, *dveṣa*, and *abhiniveśa* (ignorance, sense of ego, desire, aversion, and attachment).

## BASIC TEXTS OF HINDU DHARMA\*

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*Jagadguru Śrī Candrasekharendra Sarasvatī*

There is no end of books in the world. Each book is related to a particular subject. People of every religion hold a special book in high reverence, although there are many books available. They feel that their salvation lies in that book. They worship it, make prostrations before it, and there are a few religionists, like the Sikhs who build a temple for the scriptural text. They call that book in great reverence as "*Granth Sahib*". Thus it is noted that every religion has a specific book, which shows their followers the way for the salvation of their souls. Though they are named after the founders of their religions, they are regarded, all of them, as revelations from Heaven to their prophets. We, Hindus have no such single specific book; but we have our *Śāstras*, called "*Apauruṣeya*." What is made by man is "*Pauruṣeya*", but that which is made by the highest Divinity, Paramātman using man as the agent, is "*Apauruṣeya*."

Well, what then can we mention as our scripture? Whereas other religionists can give a definite reply to

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\*Courtesy: *Deyvattin Kural*, vol. II, pp. 193 ff. Translated by ARGUS.

this question, as the Christians their *Bible*, the Muhammedans their *Koran*, the Buddhists their *Tripitaka*, the Sikhs their *Granth Sahib*, and the Parsis their *Zend Avesta*, we, Hindus are at a loss to answer them. What is the reason for this predicament?

There is one reason which can be mentioned. Children born in other denominations are taught in their schools about their religions. It is only after they are familiar with their theological texts that they are taught the secular subjects like reading, writing and arithmetic. That is why they have imbibed religious knowledge even while young. Not so is the case now with regard to us, the Hindus; and what is the result of this ignorance? Whenever it is possible, missionaries recruit to their religions people from the Hindu fold. On the other hand other religionists do not get converted to any other faith. That is because they are all deeply rooted in the knowledge of their own religions from childhood onwards. We do not even have a glimmer of our religion in our young years. Not being taught them, we begin studying at an age when the knowledge about our religion does not get impressed on our brains. What is worse, we ridicule our own religion and even destroy our scriptures. Why is this so?

All our educational methods are based on the European system. We imitate the English people in our learning, speech, dress and behaviour and that glamour has not left us even after they have gone out of our country. And what is tragic is that we have become more immersed in Western civilisation than ever before. But, we have not stopped talking about the greatness of our ancient Indian culture, the age-

old Aryan civilisation, and the need for encouraging Svadeshi products. Of what avail is this hypocrisy of being basically a foreigner, *Paradeśī*, and talking Svadesī? If we are basically Svadesī, both inner and outer, we must have learnt and imbibed the spirit of our heritage, the backbone of our immemorial spiritual past even in childhood. There is no hope for this revival in a secular State; and hence the English system of education continues to prevail even today. And what is taught in that curriculum is the disregard and dismissal of our customs, methods and the “*śāstras*” as superstition and obscurantism. That is the reason why we are blinking when we are asked: “What is the basic text, which is common to all sections of the Hindus?”

From such a negative position, when we look at the positive side, we find that for the Hindus their religion is only “*dharma*”. Are we to know about our religion from the thousands of religious books crowding our libraries? But more than books, there are those who by practice and inner experience have reached a state of peace, bliss and compassion; and we have come to know of them (some through books and others in actual appearance) sages, seers and Mahāt-mās, whose number is legion. There is no other religion which can boast of so many saints. And with such a living faith amongst us, would there not be basic texts?

As religion is identified with *dharma* in Hinduism, the scriptural texts are called “*Dharma pramāṇas*”. *Pramāṇa* means Truth, the light of everlasting right and fitness of all things. As the basis for this *Sanātana Dharma*, there are fourteen *Śāstras*. These indicate

what principles and practices underlie this living faith called Hinduism which is both religion and *dharma* — theory and practice. The *Manu Smṛti* refers to these fourteen books thus:

अङ्गानि वेदाश्चत्वारो मीमांसा न्यायविस्तरः ।  
पुराणं धर्मशास्त्रञ्च विद्या हेताश्चतुर्दश ॥

*aṅgāni vedāḥ catvāro mīmāṃsā nyāyavistarah  
purāṇam dharmasāstram ca vidyā hyātāḥ caturdaśa.*

The *Yājñavalkya-smṛti* also reinforces this as:

पुराणन्यायमीमांसा-धर्मशास्त्राङ्गमिश्रिताः ।  
वेदाः स्थानानि विद्यानां धर्मस्य च चतुर्दश ॥

*purāṇa-nyāya-mīmāṃsā-dharmasāstra-aṅgamīśritāḥ  
vedāḥ sthānāni vidyānām dharmasya ca caturdaśa.*

From these verses we find that the basic texts of Hindu religion are fourteen in number. Although the root word “*vid*” means learning, it does not refer to the learning of secular subjects but only the understanding of spiritual issues, as the derivative words “*wit*” and “*wisdom*” testify. It is from the same root that the word “*Veda*” has been derived. These fourteen texts are called *vidyā-sthānas* signifying that they are the “*abode of wisdom*”. The fourteen texts are:

- (i) The four *Vedas*: *Ṛgveda*, *Yajurveda*, *Sāma-veda* and *Atharvaveda*;
- (ii) The six *Āngas*: *Śikṣā*, *Vyākaraṇa*, *Nirukta*, *Kalpa*, *Chandas* and *Jyotiṣa*; and
- (iii) *Mīmāṃsā*, *Nyāya*, *Purāṇa* and *Dharmasāstra*.

Although these fourteen constitute the basic texts of Hinduism, it is only the *Vedas* that stand foremost. Just as the *Bible*, the *Korān*, the *Zend Avesta*, the *Tripitāka* and the *Granth Sahib* are taken as the scriptures of the respective faiths mentioned earlier, even so with the four *Vedas* as the centre, and the other ten *Vidyās* as the radii, the fourteen *śāstras* together compose the integral part of Hinduism. These *śāstras* were taught to the Indians from times immemorial till the advent of the British.

We all know from the study of history that the two Chinese pilgrims, Fahien and Huan Tsang, visited India several centuries ago and had given account of their travel impressions in their books. They praised the achievements of the ancient Indian universities in Nalanda and Taxila, which had been confirmed by the account of the archaeologists who had made excavations in those places. These universities had reached their high noon glory during Buddhist times. And even in those days, the syllabus in the educational institutions consisted in the study of the fourteen Hindu texts, indicated above. Of course, the Buddhist *Tripitāka* and other texts were also taught. But they only followed the instruction in the *Dharma-śāstras*. It is obvious that along with intellectual learning the soul wisdom of the *śāstras* too formed part and parcel of the education of the universities in those ancient days.

The same educational syllabus seemed to have been followed in South India too by the *Cōḷa* rulers. In the colleges named *ghaṭikā-sthāna* and *vidyā-sthāna*, it is stated that in 868 B. C. the fourteen basic texts were taught at a place called Pagur, midway between

Cuddalore and Pondicherry. Similarly, records of the Rājendra Cōla I days indicate that the fourteen *vidyās* were studied at a place named Eṇṇāyiram, somewhere between Tindivanam and Villupuram.

But these halcyon days of education in our *vidyās* have gone with the wind, and our students do not know today what '*vidyā*' means except that it is "*ceppaḍi-vidyā*", *māntrikam*, necromancy or black magic.

"Oh, what a fall was there, my countrymen!" seems to be an appropriate epitaph on our present educational system.

## DEDICATE YOURSELF UNTO GOD\*

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*Jagadguru Śrī Jayendra Sarasvatī*

For the sake of warding off all miseries, one should ever contemplate on God; and, thus one can obtain peace of mind. Bliss is, indeed, twofold: divine and mundane. The mundane bliss is gained when one concentrates one's mind on easily obtainable, transient objects. But, the divine bliss is gained only when one meditates on the supreme Being which is beyond the comprehension of one's intellect.

Every human being is endowed with five sense organs. Every animal embraces death because of the urge of one sense organ or another. When such is the case, what to tell with regard to one endowed with five sense organs? Therefore, a person equipped with the sense of discrimination should make endeavour for gaining supreme divine bliss by meditating on the divine Being. One, endowed with five sense organs, should not suffer (from miseries) more than the

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\*Courtesy: *Amudamoli* by Jagadguru Sri Jayendra Sarasvati, Sri Ram Trust, Madras - 1, 1987, pp. 15-16. English rendering: Dr. V. K. S. N. Raghavan.



animals. When one does not contemplate on a particular object, mostly one's sense organs align with one's mind alone.

Each sense organ leads one either to a right path or a wrong path. Treading on the right path is good; whereas, treading on the wrong one is bad. Hence, one should inculcate the habit of fixing one's mind on the holy pair of feet of the supreme Being, one's organ of speech in reciting divine prayer, one's hands in worshipping the Lord offering flowers, one's ears in listening to His auspicious qualities, one's intellect in the contemplation of the supreme Being, and one's eyes in looking at the enthralling beatific form of the Lord (in shrines); thus, if one directs each and every sense organ to delve deep on the glories and worship of the supreme Being, then one will be freed from the miseries caused by evil thoughts, vision, etc. and will live happily.

Mind has two modes. When one loves others, one's mind becomes soft; but, when one hates others, one's mind becomes hard. Indeed, a devotee (poet-saint) prays to God as: "Oh God! if my mind is soft, use it as foot-wear for your soft pair of feet. But, if my mind is hard, Oh God! use it as the grind-stone (for *Saptapadi* rite) when you wed the Goddess." Let us dedicate our mind, nay, ourselves unto God, and thus enjoy supreme Bliss.

## A VEDIC INVOCATION

ॐ शं नो मित्रः शं वरुणः । शं नो भवत्वयंमा । शं न इन्द्रो  
 बृहस्पतिः । शं नो विष्णुरुरुक्रमः । नमो ब्रह्मणे । नमस्ते वायो ।  
 त्वमेव प्रत्यक्षं ब्रह्मासि । त्वामेव प्रत्यक्षं ब्रह्म वदिष्यामि । ऋतं  
 वदिष्यामि । सत्यं वदिष्यामि । तन्मामवतु । तद्वक्तारमवतु ।  
 अवतु माम् । अवतु वक्तारम् । ॐ शान्तिः शान्तिः शान्तिः ॥

Om. May Mitra be propitious to us. May Varuṇa be propitious to us. May Aryaman be propitious to us. May Indra and Bṛhaspati be propitious to us. May Viṣṇu, of long strides, be propitious to us. Salutations to Brahman. Salutations to you, O Vāyu. You are, indeed, the visible Brahman. You alone I shall declare Brahman perceptible. I shall call you righteousness. I shall call you truth. May That protect me. May That protect the teacher. May That protect me. May That protect the teacher. Om, peace, peace, peace.

*Taittirīyopaniṣad, I, 1*

THE FOUR INDISPENSABLE  
QUALIFICATIONS

*(An extract from Sarva-vedānta-siddhānta-sāra-saṅgraha  
of Śrī Śaṅkara Bhagavatpāda)*

Free rendering by

*Dr. V. K. S. N. Raghavan*

*(Contd. from Vol. XII. No. 3)*



[ 39 ]

आशापाशशतेन पाशितपदो नोत्थातुमेव क्षमः

कामक्रोधमदादिभिः प्रतिभटैः संरक्ष्यमाणोऽनिशम् ।

संमोहावरणेन गोपनवतः संसारकारागृहा-

न्निर्गन्तुं त्रिविधेषणापरवशः कः शक्नुयाद्रागिषु ॥

If someone's feet are fettered by the ropes of innumerable desires, with the result that he is not even able to stand, if he is ever keenly watched by the antagonists like lust, anger, pride, etc., and, if he is thoroughly blinded by the screen of delusion — such a person, among the *rāgins* (those who are attached to worldly enjoyments) overwhelmed by the three kinds of desire (avaricious to wife, children and wealth), can he be able to get out of the prison of *samsāra* (the cycle of birth and death) ?

[ 40 ]

कामान्धकारेण निरुद्धदृष्टिर्मुह्यत्यसत्यप्यचलास्वरूपे ।

न ह्यन्धदृष्टेरसतः सतो वा सुखत्वदुःखत्वविचारणास्ति ॥

One whose eyesight is blinded by the pitch darkness of lust becomes infatuated by even the unreal form (a picture) of a maiden. Indeed, one who is bereft of clear perception cannot discern pleasure and pain — whether existent or nonexistent.

[ 41 ]

श्लेष्मोद्गारि मुखं स्रवन्मलवती नासाश्रुमल्लोचनं

स्वेदस्रावि मलाभिपूर्णमभितो दुर्गन्धदुष्टं वपुः ।

अन्यद्वक्तुमशक्यमेव मनसा मन्तुं कचिन्नार्हति  
स्त्रीरूपं कथमोदृशं सुमनसां पात्रीभवेन्नेत्रयोः ॥

Finding the impure body of a woman — mouth exuding phlegm, nose with nauseating filth, eyes filled with tears; the whole physical frame filled with perspiration, dirt, and unbearably stinking, and difficult to describe its other conditions by words, impossible to endure as one thinks of it, and worthless to think about it at all at any time by mind — how can such a form of women be the object to be seen by great men?

[ 42 ]

दूरादवेक्ष्यामिशिखां पतङ्गो रम्यत्वबुद्ध्या विनिपत्य नश्यति ।  
यथा तथा नष्टदृगेव सूक्ष्मं कथं निरीक्षेत विमुक्तिमार्गम् ॥

Just as a moth — that looks at the glow of fire from a distance — falls into it considering it beautiful, and then perishes, even so a person who has no vision, cannot find out the path of freedom.

[ 43 ]

कामेन कान्तां परिगृह्य तद्वज्जनोऽप्ययं नश्यति नष्टदृष्टिः ।  
मांसास्थिमज्जामलमूत्रपात्रं स्त्रियं स्वयं रम्यतयैव पश्यति ॥

Even though the *śarīra* of a maiden is just an aggregate of flesh, bones, fat, ordure, and urine, a youth afflicted by passion considers her beautiful. Such a person who cannot perceive things aright courts disaster.

[ 44 ]

काम एव यमः साक्षात्कान्ता वैतरणी नदी ।  
विवेकिनां मुमुक्षूणां निलयस्तु यमालयः ॥

Therefore, lust (*kāma*) itself is the Lord of Death; and woman herself constitutes the river of hell, *Vaitaraṇī*. Yet, those who aspire for liberation should consider their house itself as the abode of death.

[ 45 ]

यमालये वापि गृहेऽपि नो नृणां तापत्रयक्लेशनिवृत्तिरस्ति ।  
किञ्चित्समालोक्य तु तद्विरामं सुखात्मना पश्यति मूढलोकः ॥

There is no freedom from the three kinds of suffering (*ādhyātmika*, *ādhibhautika*, and *ādhidaivika*) for men either in hell (abode of Death) or in their house itself (in this world). But the foolish people consider the small interval between birth and death as though full of bliss.

[ 46 ]

यमस्य कामस्य च तारतम्यं विचार्यमाणे महदस्ति लोके ।  
हितं करोत्यस्य यमोऽप्रियः सन्कामस्त्वनर्थं कुरुते प्रियः सन् ॥

If one compares Yama (Death) and *kāma* (lust) one can indeed, find a vast difference between them. Yama, though disliked by people, does good to them; whereas *kāma* (lust), though appearing dear, causes havoc to people.

[ 47 ]

यमोऽसतामेव करोत्यनर्थं सतां तु सौख्यं कुरुते हितः सन् ।  
कामः सतामेव गतिं निरुन्धन्करोत्यनर्थं ह्यसतां नु का कथा ॥

(It is also true that:) While Yama punishes the wicked, he helps the great men, being benevolent to them. But *kāma* (lust) impedes even the path of great men and hinders them. So what to tell (about the work of lust) in the case of the wicked?

[ 48 ]

विश्वस्य वृद्धिं स्वयमेव काङ्क्षन्प्रवर्तकं कामिजनं ससर्ज ।  
तेनैव लोकः परिमुह्यमानः प्रवर्धते चन्द्रमसेव चाब्धिः ॥

Desirous of perpetuating the human race, Nature has (first of all) created the lustful people as the founders (of human race). Being infatuated, the human beings are lured by lust, and grow in multitude, just as the ocean upsurges because of the moon.

[ 49 ]

कामो नाम महाज्जगद्भ्रमयिता स्थित्वान्तरङ्गे स्वयं  
स्त्रीपुंसावितरेतराङ्गकगुणैर्हासैश्च भावैः स्फुटम् ।  
अन्योन्यं परिमोह्य नैजतमसा प्रेमानुबन्धेन तौ  
बद्ध्वा भ्रामयति प्रपञ्चरचनां संवर्धयन्ब्रह्महा ॥

Lust, indeed, is the sole deluder of the world. It rests within the internal organ of beings and brings about the union of man and woman as a result of



gesticulative emotions, smiles, etc. between them. Thus it deludes the people by the bonds of love and keeps the world of creation to move on endlessly; and hence, it is the unique impediment to the rise of Brahman-knowledge.

[ 50 ]

अतोऽन्तरङ्गस्थितकामवेगाद्भोग्ये प्रवृत्तिः स्वत एव सिद्धा ।  
सर्वस्य जन्तोर्ध्रुवमन्यथा चेदबोधितार्थेषु कथं प्रवृत्तिः ॥

Therefore, owing to the fast work of lust that abides within one's internal organ, one naturally runs after worldly enjoyments. Certainly this is true of all living beings. Or else, how could one be mad after unknown fruits?

[ 51 ]

तेनैव सर्वजन्तूनां कामना बलवत्तरा ।  
जीर्यत्यपि च देहेऽस्मिन्कामना नैव जीर्यते ॥

Hence, the desire in all creatures is, indeed, very strong. Even when the body crumbles, the desire never decays.

[ 52 ]

अवेक्ष्य विषये दोषं बुद्धियुक्तो विचक्षणः ।  
कामपाशेन यो मुक्तः स मुक्तेः पथि गोचरः ॥

Only a learned person, with a discerning intellect, looks at the demerits of worldly objects, becomes freed from the chain of lust, and arrives at the right path of *mukti*.

[ 53 ]

कामस्य विजयोपायं सूक्ष्मं वक्ष्याम्यहं सताम् ।  
सङ्कल्पस्य परित्याग उपायः सुलभो मतः ॥

Let me tell the subtle means of conquering lust. To give up any attachment whatsoever is the easy means to conquer lust.

[ 54 ]

श्रुते दृष्टेपि वा भोग्ये यस्मिन्कस्मिश्च वस्तुनि ।  
समीचीनत्वधीत्यागात्कामो नोदेति कर्हिचित् ॥

When a person completely abandons the notion of desirability with regard to any object (in the world) — whether heard, seen, or enjoyable — to him alone, *kāma* (lust) does not manifest at all.

[ 55 ]

कामस्य बीजं सङ्कल्पः सङ्कल्पादेव जायते ।  
बीजे नष्टेऽङ्कुर इव तस्मिन्नष्टे विनश्यति ॥

The desire to attain an object is the seed of lust, *i.e.* desire gives rise to lust. If one destroys desire, lust also gets destroyed, just as when the seed is destroyed, there arises no more sprout.

[ 56 ]

न कोऽपि सम्यक्त्वधिया विनैव भोग्यं नरः कामयितुं समर्थः ।  
यतस्ततः कामजयेच्छुरेतां सम्यक्त्वबुद्धिं विषये निहन्यात् ॥

Without the comprehension of anything as desirable, none is capable of enjoying the same. Therefore one, in quest of rooting out lust, must first of all kill the desire for worldly objects.

[ 57 ]

भोग्ये नरः कामजयेच्छुरेतां सुखत्वबुद्धिं विषये निहन्यात् ।  
यावत्सुखत्वभ्रमधीः पदार्थे तावन्न जेतुम्प्रभवेद्धि कामम् ॥

Intent on destroying lust, a man should remove from his mind, the thought of worldly objects as pleasant. So long as there is the delusion that the worldly objects are pleasant, one cannot conquer lust at all.

[ 58 ]

सङ्कल्पानुदये हेतुर्यथाभूतार्थदर्शनम् ।  
अनर्थचिन्तनं चाभ्यां नावकाशोऽस्य विद्यते ॥

When one has right knowledge of things and knows the futility of worldly objects, one does not have any desire at all. There is no room for *sankalpa* when these two are absent.

[ 59 ]

रत्ने यदि शिलाबुद्धिर्जायते वा भयं ततः ।  
समीचीनत्वधीनैति नोपादेयत्वधीरपि ॥

If there arises the knowledge of stone in the case of a precious gem, or if one is afraid of it, then one has no sense of its worthiness or a desire for possessing it.

(to be continued)

## OBJECT-CONDITIONED BLISS\*

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*T. M. P. Mahadevan*

The *Viṣayānanda-prakarana*, the last chapter of the *Pañcadaśī*, speaks of the trace of *Brahman*-bliss that is found in the objects of sense, and describes the method by which that bliss can be discerned in them.

### 1. *Reflection of Bliss in Pure Mental Modes*

The happiness that is associated with the objects of sense is but an aspect of *Brahman*-bliss. Though in the case of the ignorant, it serves as an obstruction to the knowledge of the true, men of discrimination discern in it the reflection of the supreme bliss. "This which is of the nature of the impartite essence is the supreme bliss; all other beings enjoy but a fraction of that bliss."

The happiness that we find in the objects of sense is of the form of mental modification. Modifications are of three kinds, the pure, the virile, and the dull, answering to the three *guṇas*, *sattva*, *rajas*, and *tamas*. The pure modes are characterized by such elevating

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\* Courtesy: *The Pañcadaśī of Bhāratīrtha Vidyāranya* (pp. 227-230), University of Madras, Madras, 1975.

and ennobling qualities as renunciation, restraint, generosity, etc., the virile modes are marked by violent passions like thirst, intense attachment, aversion, anger, etc., and the dull modes have the attributes of delusion, fear, etc. In all these modes there is the reflection of the intelligence-aspect of self; but the happiness-aspect is reflected only in the pure modes. That the self is reflected in all things is evidenced by the *śruti* which declares: "As one fire having entered the world assumes forms according to the shapes of the different objects (it burns), so the one soul that exists in all the beings, appears in (different) forms according to the different objects (it enters), and (exists) also without. As the one air, having come into the world assumes (different) forms according to the different objects (it enters as breath), so the one *ātman* that abides in the heart of all the beings appears in different forms according to the different objects (it enters), and (exists) outside also" (*Kāthopaniṣad*, V, xix, 20). "The self of all, though one alone, resides in every being as one and many, just like the reflection of the moon in the water." (*Brahmabindūpaniṣad*, 12). As one, the reflection is *Īśvara*; and as many, the reflections are *jīvas*. Just as the reflection of the moon is dull in impure and muddy water, and bright and clear in pure and undisturbed water, even so, the reflection of the self is entire in pure modes while it is dull and disturbed in impure modes. This is the reason why we stated above that the virile and dull modes reflect the intelligence-aspect of the self, while the pure modes reflect the happiness-aspect also. In the virile and dull modes the happiness-aspect is obscured by impurity; and since there is a little purity in them, the intelligence-aspect is revealed. Water receives from fire the latter's heat and not its lumino-

sity; but a piece of wood receives from fire both its heat and luminosity. Similarly, while the pure modes reflect the intelligence and happiness-aspect of *Brahman*, the modes which are impure reflect the intelligence-aspect and not the happiness-aspect. Even among the pure modes, there is difference in the manifestation of happiness. When the *rajas*- and *tamas*- qualities overbalance the *sattva*, then the happiness-aspect is obscured totally, and there is the cognition of misery and pain. Desire for external objects brings misery along with it. There is the anxiety whether the desired object would be obtained or not. If it is not obtained, misery increases, and there arises aversion to those things that stand in the way. If the obstruction be difficult to be removed, then there is misery again; thus in those activities of the mind which are prompted by *rajas* and *tamas* there is not even a suspicion of happiness. When what is desired is obtained, there is the feeling of pleasure and satisfaction. When it is enjoyed, there is still greater happiness. But in the contact with what is gained there is only a little amount of happiness. The greater happiness, however, is not in the objects of sense; it is in non-attachment to objects. This is what we have called the happiness of knowledge. Thus, there are grades of happiness. The purer the mode, the clearer will be the reflection of happiness therein.

Scriptures define *Brahman* as reality-intelligence-happiness. In the inert there is the revelation of reality alone. Intelligence and happiness are not manifested in non-intelligent things. In the impure modes, as we have seen, there is the manifestation, besides reality, of intelligence also. In the pure modes, however, there is the manifestation of all the three. Because *Brahman* is mixed up with the pure modes, etc., it is called the

self with attributes (*miśram Brahma*). The attributeless *Brahman* is known through *jñāna* and *yoga* in the manner set forth in the earlier chapters of the *Pañcadaśī*.

## 2. *Meditation and Its Kinds*

*Māyā* is of the nature of unreality, inertness, and misery. Since the non-intelligent objects and the modes of the mind are products of *māyā*, the attributes of *māyā* are revealed in them. But the essential nature of *Brahman* is also made manifest in them in a greater or less degree. A man who wants to realize *Brahman* must carefully distinguish the real from the unreal, intelligence from non-intelligence, happiness from misery. Discarding name and form, he must meditate on the reality that is revealed in inert things like the stones and rocks. Relinquishing the misery that is associated with the impure modes, he must contemplate the reality and the intelligence which are revealed in them. But finally, he should concentrate his mind on all the three aspects of the essential nature of *Brahman* which are made manifest in the modes which are pure. These three kinds of meditation are prescribed for the benefit of those who are not capable of cognizing the attributeless *Brahman*. The fourth variety of meditation is on the reflection of *Brahman*-bliss in the residual impressions. Thus, four kinds of meditation are taught.

Strictly speaking, these are not mere meditations. When through meditation the mind is made one-pointed, knowledge sets in. In knowledge, reality, intelligence, and bliss do not appear as disjointed. The essential nature of *Brahman* is not split up there. Being conditioned by the mental modes, pure and impure, it appeared as if *Brahman* were threefold. But the truth

is revealed in knowledge that the self which is of the one consistency of intelligence-reality-bliss admits of no difference or distinction. When the self-luminous non-difference which is the real nature of the unconditioned *Brahman* is revealed in knowledge, there is no room for the distinctions and divisions of empirical usage. Hence, the infinite *Brahman* is called bliss. When the Infinite is intuited, all differences vanish and the supreme happiness is gained.



## KARMA AND FATALISM\*

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*S. S. Sūryanārāyaṇa Śāstrī*

My approach to this problem is that of an Advaitin. The conclusion that appeals to me is, I flatter myself, more in consonance with both common-sense and Advaita than the orthodox position. This latter position seems to be supported even by writers of eminence today; that is the justification, such as it is, for the attempt to state my own.

It has been said that the law of karma is but the application of the law of causation to the moral sphere. Though the notion is repellent to western minds as a rule, there is no doubt that to us in the East it brings a great deal of comfort and consolation. It is our virtues that seem to be more self-stultifying than our vices; and those of us who because of inclination, discipline and so on have not the hardihood to kick over the traces and prefer a life of vice, derive much encouragement from the thought that the failure of our virtue is due not to its virtuousness but our earlier viciousness. Such a notion fits in with our attempts at a harmonious understanding of the natural world. In the desire to

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\*Courtesy: *Collected Papers of Professor S. S. Sūryanārāyaṇa Śāstrī*, University of Madras, 1961, pp. 233-238.

resolve the elusive problem of change we light upon the dogma of causality, that nothing occurs without a cause, that the same cause has the same effect and that the same effect has the same cause. Quite in conformity with this is the devout belief that virtue triumphs, while vice fails, and that any appearance to the contrary can and should be accounted for by tracing each triumph or failure sufficiently far back to our appropriate virtue or vice.

If we are justified in our acceptance of the causal dogma, there does not seem to be any legitimate way to avoid fatalism. If the present is determined by the past, so as to admit of an accurate prediction of the past (the failure of accuracy being due solely to our ignorance of the data), how can we avoid the conclusion that the future is similarly determined by the past and the present? Here too our failure at wholly successful prediction is due to our ignorance, not to an uncertainty in the scheme of things.

One line of escape points to my self and says that in the shaping of events I act and I count. The future is determined not mechanically, but also by what I do. It may be that on an apparently determinist scheme of things it will be different to make me responsible to a judge, for I may plead my past to extenuate, if not to account for, the present; and for that past I may indicate a remoter past and so on; so that there may seem little justification for reward and less for punishment. But considerations of reward and punishment, approbation and reprobation are foreign to the truly moral judgement; the only consideration here is whether I am responsible for my acts or not; and so long as it is I that act, not any one or anything else, it is impossible to avoid this responsibility *for*.

Now it is true that it is I who act; but it is also true that when a stone falls, it is that stone which falls, not any thing or any one other; yet the judgement "the stone is responsible for falling" would be considered figurative if not absurd, while the judgement "I am responsible for pushing the stone" would be considered sound. The reason for distinction is that in certain circumstances the stone cannot but fall, while I conceive myself capable of rising superior to circumstances, judging them, shaping them, and choosing from them what will be my motive, instead of being blindly impelled. It is, however, the propriety and accuracy of this conception of myself that is now in question. My heredity and environment, everything that can be classed as karmic fruit, do they account only for the circumstances or also for my re-action thereto? If the former, the karmic theory does not differ much from the views of many others who would readily grant that our surroundings are not accidental and that they are adjusted to the selves developing among them, even though they may not admit pre-existence and the deeds therein as determining causes. The advocates of karma hold, however, not merely that I am circumstanced as I am but that I am what I am, because of my prior karma. It is difficult to admit this and maintain at the same time the possibility of choice and freedom of determination.

It may be and has been maintained that what karma determines are only tendencies and that the fulfilment or frustration of such tendencies depends on me. This is a plausible view, but not in essence different from views which would claim universal validity for the causal law, while at the same time exempting the moral realm therefrom. What is the "I" which is free

to play with tendencies? Not the psychophysical organism, which is just the bundle of such tendencies in relation to environment. If it is some spirit, other than this organism and actuating it, either the actuation is absolutely undetermined (in which case we join hands with the moral indeterminists just mentioned) or that too is determined by karma (in which case we have no right to restrict karmic explanation to tendencies alone). Indeed we do in practice invoke karma for the explanation not of what is purely psychophysical (i.e., mechanical) but of the interaction of spirit and matter. Once we admit this, it seems necessary to sacrifice either freedom of choice or the rigidity of the causal (here, the karmic) law. The reply may be attempted that what are called tendencies are not merely material, but just the interplay of spirit and matter. If these are determined by karma, the freedom of the spirit has to be pushed back a stage further, in which we have the problem all over again, as to whether determinism or indeterminism prevails there. Or else, we have to admit that determinism prevails in the realms of both matter and spirit. The recognition of two realms does not help so long as interaction is admitted. To admit two and to deny interaction is to make an irrelevant ghost of the spiritual realm. The only way out seems to be to treat the spiritual as absolutely real, while the material is empirically real; the causal law obtains in the latter, but not in the former. This is the reply of the Advaitin. It goes far but in the usual way of understanding it, not far enough.

This is why. It seems subject to the same criticism as Kant's conception of freedom — that it consists in telling the prisoner there is freedom outside the prison bars. We live and think in the phenomenal world; it is

here that freedom would be meaningful to us; whereas we are told that freedom is noumenal. It is true that freedom can exist only outside the prison bars; it is idle to pretend that it is here even now, unless we recognise the non-reality of the here and now, the non-reality of the imagined prison. This is no doubt what the Advaitin does; but his recognition of two realms lends colour to the view of a discontinuous jump instead of a continuous progression from the empirical to the absolute. The latter may be difficult to understand but the former is as impossible of achievement as jumping out of one's own skin. The noumenon is meaningful to us because we ourselves are it, while we are also the phenomenal. The phenomenal is such not merely because it is on a lower plane, but because it is not and cannot be a closed system. Causality is no more real than any other relation; its assumptive reality consists in its working up to a certain stage. If it were throughout practically efficient, there could never be an occasion to suspect or sublate its reality. It does not in truth obtain, even where it appears to obtain; its success is not unqualified even in the empirical realm. This aspect of the truth gets little emphasis or recognition from the Advaitin, who is disposed to admit the full sway of dharmic and karmic laws even to the extent of accounting for Jīvanmukti on the basis of a residue of karma.

This is where modern science seems to come in as a useful auxiliary to Advaita with its principle of indeterminacy or uncertainty conformable alike to the wave and the particle theories of matter. It provides for the rigidity of the past, the uncertainty of the future, and the practical efficiency of the causal law. It does not claim to have proved indeterminacy, in

which case we may have just apprehensions about relying on one more illusion of science. It wisely throws the burden of proof on the opponent, since it is he who alleges something positive, the irrefragable and reversible law of causality. The scientist has not proved causality; the wise philosopher instead of profiting by this, proceeds to solve a problem which the scientist alone can set and has not succeeded in setting. The scientist admits plurality of causes: "We do not claim any intuition that the same effect may not spring from two alternative causes" (*Nature of the Physical World*, Dent, p. 286). "The scientific world" writes Prof. Davidson "is full of examples of the same effect proceeding from different causes." (*Freewill or Determinism*, Mr. Davidson, p. 44).

Plurality of causes is not a popular superstition resuscitated by unphilosophical scientists. It is a genuine defect of the causal concept, noticed by Advaitins down from the time of Maṇḍana. Fire is responsible for more than one effect; it can burn as well as bake. If you ascribe one to the burning capacity and another to the baking capacity, you are only reading the effect into the cause and restating it in words slightly different at all; your explanation is, as Eddington would put it, an "exercise in tautology." And this is just what happens even when by analysis you try to fix down particular causes for particular effects. Fire, for instance, may be produced by chemical action, as when a match is struck or by physical action, as in striking steel and tinder or in using a burning glass. We have three alternative causes, belonging to two different classes; yet, so far as we can see, there is no difference in the product fire; the practical efficiency is the same in all the three cases. We may seek to distinguish them

through their causes, just as we identify the caste of an uninvested dvija boy, through his dvija-parenthood; the son of brahmin parents is himself a brahmin. In the case of the fire, however, this comes to nothing more than the flagrant tautology "The match-produced fire is match-produced." Possibly, in the case of such a fire, a spent match-stick may be found beside it; and from this the use of a match may be inferred as extremely probable. But what we have with this is the accounting for a present spent match by the past striking of a match, not the accounting for a supposed difference, in the fire through the difference between physical and chemical action or among different types of the one and the other. Scientific laws, says Eddington, are cyclic, they come back to their starting point, though the cyclical procedure may be hidden by the number of intermediate steps. And Sullivan compares the procedure to that of the lexicographer who defined a violin as a small violoncello, and a violoncello as a big violin. It is just this reciprocal dependence which has been clear to all Advaita critics of the causal notion. How can the notion claim then, even empirical reality, if by empirical reality we mean a closed system? All that we can legitimately assume would appear to be that the causal principle is good enough to work with up to a stage, that our predictions of the past can be and are remarkably accurate, that our predictions of the future can never rise above a high grade of probability, and that this last is due not to our ignorance, but to the nature of things.

Thus, therefore, though man left to himself will in all probability stick to the wearying round of seed and fruit, the round is not inevitable. He has the freedom to exert himself and rise above it; whether he goes

full circle or not depends on him. If by merit or grace he acquires enlightenment he will, by stages more or less gradual, transcend *samsāra*. He will realise that transcendently cause is fictitious, since empirically it is not rigid and invariable. The empirical can lead to the transcendental, since the former is not a closed system but is continuous with the latter.

While for the most part Advaita speaks of release as real here and now and points to the Śruti, which declares our being Brahman, not one becoming Brahman in the future, the prejudice against the empirical is so strong that a complete breaking off from it is thought necessary for release. Instead of incarnating the real in the actual, there is a pronounced tendency to flee from the actual. Instead of glorifying Jīvanmukti, the Advaitin treats it as a problem to be solved, not itself the solution of all problems. Thus he achieves the strange result of viewing the whole of evolution as an unfortunate error and seeking refuge from life in death. The only corrective for this egregious position is to recognise the continuity of the empirical and the real, of science and metaphysics, of *vyavahāra* and *paramārtha*. The *brahmavid* cannot afford to turn up his nose even at "the freaks within the atom," for if matter is nothing but a superimposition of Brahman on Brahman, even the atomic physicist cannot but have a glimpse of brahmic freedom in his delvings into the ultimate constitution of matter. And for a vision such as his, the acceptance of karma and the avoidance of fatalism are alike possible, since karma is not rigid any more than other causes.



## THE LIBERATED-IN-LIFE

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*R. Balasubramanian*

### 1. *Immanent Metaphysics*

Advaita Vedānta exemplifies the unity of theory and practice, which is a salient feature of Indian philosophy, by integrating metaphysics and ethics. The metaphysics of Advaita has a bearing on the ethical discipline which leads to liberation; and the Advaita theory of liberation along with the means thereto becomes meaningful by virtue of the metaphysics to which it is integrated. It means that one cannot accept the metaphysics of Advaita without accepting its ethics as a whole. Advaita works out what may be called immanent metaphysics which is different from transcendent metaphysics. The Self, which the *Upaniṣad* calls *Ātman*, is the supreme reality. It is one and non-dual. It is no other than Brahman which is said to be the source of the world. The identification of "*Ātman*" and "*Brahman*" is explicitly stated by the *mahāvākya*, "This Self is Brahman," which occurs in the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad*. It means that metaphysics which is inquiry into the nature of the ultimate reality deals with the Self-in-man and explains the nature of the Self as well as that

of man. Considering the subject of inquiry, metaphysics may be called *Śārīraka-śāstra*, i.e. a treatise which inquires into the nature of the Self which is located as it were in the gross, subtle, and causal bodies of man.

## 2. *Inquiry into the Self-in-man*

The hyphenated expression, "the Self-in-man," conveys the idea that the Self which is the reality we are searching for is caught up in man's experience — waking, dream, and deep sleep — in association with the three bodies, gross, subtle, and causal, which serve as the adjunct (*upādhi*) of the Self. The metaphysical investigation as undertaken by Advaita centres round the analysis of the triple states of man's experience in which the Self is involved through its adjunct consisting of the gross, subtle and causal bodies. Following the teaching of the *Upaniṣad*, Advaita shows by means of elaborate analysis that the Self is essentially different from its adjunct. For the sake of clarity and clearcut distinction, the latter is called the not-Self (*anātman*). What holds good with regard to the adjunct of the Self also holds good with regard to the things of the external world. It means that everything other than the Self is not-Self. *Avidyā* which is the causal body (*kāraṇa-śarīra*) is the first adjunct of the Self; and the other two bodies, subtle (*sūkṣma*) as well as gross (*sthūla*), come into existence because of *avidyā*. Also, the entire physical universe is a product of *avidyā*.

The experience of the things of the external world is made possible because of the mind-sense-body complex constituting the psycho-physical organism of man. The constituents of the adjunct of the Self are also

spoken of as sheaths (*kośas*) by the *Upaniṣad*.<sup>2</sup> A sheath is a covering. Just as a sword which is kept in the scabbard has a covering, even so the Self during the empirical existence of man is covered by five sheaths — the sheath of matter (*annamaya-kośa*), the sheath of vitality (*prāṇamaya-kośa*), the sheath of mind (*manomaya-kośa*), the sheath of intellect (*vijñānamaya-kośa*), and the sheath of bliss (*ānanda-mayakośa*). Ramana Maharshi, a contemporary mystic and exemplar of the ancient Advaita tradition, points out that it is impossible for men to experience the external world in the absence of the body (gross, subtle, and causal) or the sheaths. He says: "The body is in the form of five sheaths: so, all the five are implied in the term 'body'. Apart from the body, is there a world? Say, are there people who, without the body, have seen the world?"

Like the other orthodox schools of Indian philosophy, Advaita holds that the mind is different from the five sense-organs. The functioning of the mind, which is the internal organ (*antah-karaṇa*), is necessary for a knowledge-situation. We know various kinds of objects both in our waking and dream states. It means that there is what may be called knowledge-situation both in waking and dream states. Knowledge-situation will not arise in these two states but for the functioning of the mind. It follows that the involvement of the Self with the various things of the world both in waking and dream states is due to the work of the mind. In other words, the world of duality in these two states of experience is perceived by the mind. Since the state of sleep provides a contrast to this, it will be helpful to consider the situation that prevails in deep sleep. Since the mind *qua* mind does not function in deep sleep, there is no perception of anything,

external or internal, during sleep; and so there is no knowledge-situation in deep sleep. The perception of the pluralistic universe is dependent on the functioning of the mind. Given the functioning of the mind, there is the experience of the world of duality; and in the absence of the functioning of the mind, there is no experience of the world of duality. Gauḍapāda, therefore, declares that "this world of duality is perceived by the mind" (*manodrśyam idam dvaitam*).<sup>4</sup> Applying the logic of *anvayavyatireka*, Ramana Maharshi concludes: "The world is of the form of the five (types of) sense-objects, and nothing else. Those fivefold sense-objects are the spheres of the five sense-organs. Since the one mind understands the world through the channels of the five sense-organs, say, is there a world other than mind?"

### 3. *Bodilessness and Embodiment of the Self*

Though the Self by its very nature has no body and has, therefore, no limitation whatsoever, it comes to be associated as it were with the body, suffers limitation, experiences the things of the world through the mind and other organs of knowledge and action, becomes the agent of action and enjoyer of the consequences of action, good and bad, the mind being the *sine qua non* of the entire gamut of experience, cognitive, affective and conative. Bondage is the involvement of the Self with the things of the world through a process of identification with the mind-sense-body complex as well as with the things of the external world. While the Self by its very nature is free, it becomes bound when it identifies itself with the body, and through the body with the external things. It may be noted that it is not the presence or continuance

of the body which is bondage for the Self; on the contrary, it is identification or attachment with the body and the things of the world which is bondage. And this identification or attachment is caused by *avidyā* which not only suppresses the truth about the Self, but also projects the not-Self as the object of attachment for man. When the Self which is non-relational (*asaṅga*)<sup>6</sup> comes to be related to the body and the world, it is no more the Self-in-the-body or the Self-in-the-world but becomes the Self-of-the-body, or the Self-of-the-world; and this "of-relation" with the body and the world symbolizes bondage. For attaining liberation, what is required is the knowledge of the Self. If ignorance causes bondage by bringing about false identification with the body and the things of the world, then it can be removed only by knowledge. If man can remain himself as the Self without any attachment to the body and the things of the world, *i.e.* if he can remain without the sense of "I" and "mine" even though he is, for all practical purposes, tenanted by the body, then he is free even while he is alive; he has no "of-relation" with anything. Such a person is called the liberated-in-life (*jīvanmukta*); and this state of freedom or liberation can be attained by knowledge and knowledge alone.

#### 4. *Knowledge : The Means to Release*

Śaṅkara's insistence on knowledge (*jñāna*) as the means to the attainment of liberation is based on a very simple, but profound truth with which we are familiar in our day-to-day experience. But it was given to a master-mind like Śaṅkara to evolve from it a theory of great significance taking his stand on the authority of the *Upaniṣads*. In all his numerous wri-

tings, whether they be his monumental commentaries on the *Upaniṣads*, or on the *Bhagavad-gītā*, or on the *Brahma-sūtra*, or in his celebrated "minor works," Śaṅkara sticks to this basic position with unswerving conviction. It is a matter of common knowledge that when we are ignorant about something we endeavour to remove that ignorance by gaining the true knowledge of that object. Take the familiar case of mistaking a rope which is in front for a snake. Not knowing the real nature of the object in front, a person perceives it as a snake and begins to run away in fear. His *ignorance* of the real nature of the object is the cause of his mistaking it as a snake and the subsequent reactions in him like sweating, running away in fear, etc. It is not enough if he is told that the object in front is not a snake. The statement that it is not a snake does not serve to remove his ignorance of the object in front. His ignorance can be removed only by attaining the knowledge of the object in front, *viz.* the rope. In short, it is knowledge and knowledge alone that removes ignorance in the same way as light removes darkness. Śaṅkara's contention that knowledge is the direct means to Self-realization which is release is thus based on what we experience in our day-to-day life. He has shown that this basic principle, *viz.* that knowledge is the antidote to ignorance, holds good not only with regard to removing our ordinary ignorance as exemplified in the rope-snake example, but also in overcoming the metaphysical ignorance from which we suffer.

In order to appreciate Śaṅkara's view that knowledge is the direct means to the attainment of Self-realization which is release, it is necessary to keep in mind the means-end relation. The means (*upāya*) that we

choose must be appropriate to the end which we want to attain. It is not the case that through any means any end can be attained. On the contrary, what means has to be chosen and how far it is appropriate to the end we have in view, must be considered from the point of view of the nature of the end which is to be attained. The means must be warranted by the end. In other words, the choice of the means as well as its appropriateness is determined by the end. This point must be borne in mind in understanding Śaṅkara's explanation of *jñāna-yoga*, *i.e.* knowledge as the means to release. Since in the ultimate analysis the problem is one of eradicating the foundational ignorance, Śaṅkara maintains in unequivocal terms that Self-knowledge (*i.e.* Brahman-knowledge) alone is the means to the attainment of the supreme end, *viz* liberation. Consider, for example, a text of the *Chândogya Upaniṣad* which says: "The knower of the Self goes beyond grief." The *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* declares: The knower of Brahman attains the highest." The *Śvetâśvatara Upaniṣad* says: "Only by knowing him one passes over death; there is no other way."<sup>10</sup> There is thus the support of the *Upaniṣads* for the view that knowledge is the means to liberation.

### 5. *Justification for Liberation-in-life*

Considering the nature of the Self as well as the cause of bondage Advaita holds that the possibility of attaining liberation here itself can never be denied. Śaṅkara's argument for liberation-in-life can be summarised in six steps.

1. Release is bodilessness (*aśarīratva*).
2. If a person can remain as the Self, then he is really bodiless, though he appears to be with the body

from the perspective of others. In support of this there is the *Chāndogya* text which says: "There is no freedom from pleasure and pain for one who is embodied. Verily, pleasure and pain do not touch one who is bodiless."<sup>11</sup>

3. Being free from body is the very nature of the Self.

4. The embodied condition of the Self is due to *avidyā*. The causal chain which binds the Self through embodiment starts from *avidyā*. The explanation of the several links of the causal chain has been given by Śaṅkara and his followers, sometimes very elaborately. Because of *avidyā* arise defects (*doṣa*) such as desire and aversion; and these defects in their turn lead to action (*pravṛtti*), good and bad; action leads to birth (*janma*); and birth is the cause of suffering (*duḥkha*).<sup>12</sup>

5. Since embodiment is due to wrong knowledge caused by *avidyā*, it follows, declares Śaṅkara, that a man of knowledge, *i.e.* one who has realized the Self, becomes bodiless even while he is alive.<sup>13</sup>

6. There is nothing which stands in the way of a person attaining the saving knowledge here, in this life itself.

There are *śruti* texts in support of liberation-in-life (*jīvanmukti*). Consider, for example, a text from the *Kāṭha Upaniṣad* which says: "Becoming freed, one becomes emancipated" (*vimuktaśca vimucyate*).<sup>14</sup> This text, according to Śaṅkara, speaks of freedom from desire and action as well as freedom from future birth. What binds a person is desire as well as the action which issues therefrom, caused by ignorance. When a person attains the right knowledge, he overcomes ignorance; consequently he is free from desire and desire-prompted-action, which constitute "perceptible



bondage" (*dr̥ṣṭa-bandhana*). He is, therefore, spoken of as "*vimuktaḥ*". Even though he is free from the bondage of desire and action here and now, will he be free from the bondage of birth in the future? The *śruti* text answers this question in the affirmative by saying "*vimucyate*"; *i.e.* he is emancipated from future bond (*bhāvibandhana*), *i.e.* he does not take up a body again when the present body falls off.<sup>15</sup> A text from the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* also lends support to the doctrine of *jīvanmukti*: "When all the desires that dwell in the heart are cast away, then does the mortal become immortal, then he attains Brahman here (in this very body.)"<sup>16</sup>

A person who has attained the saving knowledge and who is, therefore, free from the bondage of desire and action is referred to as the liberated-in-life (*jīvanmukta*), a man of steady wisdom (*sthītaprajñā*), one who is devoted to God (*bhagavad-bhakta*), one who has transcended the three *guṇas* (*guṇātīta*), one who has realised Brahman (*brāhmaṇa*), and one who is outside the system of *varṇāśrama* (*atīvarṇāśramin*).

## 6. Characteristics of the Liberated-in-life

The description of *sthītaprajñā* which occurs in Chapter II of the *Bhagavadgītā*<sup>17</sup> gives an account of the person, who has attained the saving knowledge, when he is in the state of *samādhi* as well as when he is in the state of *vyutthāna*, *i.e.* when he comes back to the day-to-day empirical life. Arjuna asks the Lord: "What, O Keśava, is the description of one of steady knowledge who is established in the state of *samādhi*? How does one of steady knowledge speak? How does he sit? How does he move?"<sup>18</sup>

Of the four questions raised by Arjuna, the first one is about the description of *sthitaprajña* when he is in the state of *samādhi*. The Lord answers the first question in v. 55: "When a man, satisfied in the Self alone by himself, completely casts off all the desires of the mind, then he is said to be one of steady knowledge." Since desires constitute bondage, it is said very significantly that a man who has attained the saving knowledge is one who is free from all desires of the mind (*sarvān manogatān kāmān*), and that he is satisfied in the Self. The following points which emerge from Śaṅkara's commentary on this text deserve careful consideration. (1) Desire, resolve, etc., are the characteristics of the mind, *i.e.* the *vṛttis* of the mind. (2) They are, therefore, not-Self. (3) If they are qualities of the Self, they can never be given up. (4) When the mind is given up, what belongs to the mind is also abandoned. (5) How, then, is the *sthitaprajña* delighted in the absence of happiness associated with the mind? (6) It is because he is satisfied with the Self. In the words of Śaṅkara, he is *ātmārāmaḥ*, *i.e.* one who delights in the Self; he is *ātmakrīḍaḥ*, *i.e.* one who plays with the Self. In other words, his delight is because of the Self and not because of the *vṛtti-viśeṣa* of the mind.<sup>19</sup>

The remaining three questions relate to the behaviour of the enlightened man when he is in the state of *vyutthāna*. The Lord answers the second question in vv. 56-57, the third question in vv. 58-63, and the last question in vv. 64-71. When the *sthitaprajña* reveals his experience at the time of instructing his disciples, his talk will be free from dislike and desire, and also free from attachment (*rāga*), fear (*bhaya*), and wrath (*krodha*) — which are *vṛttis* of the mind caused by delu-

sion. Even though he is in the *vyāvahārika* realm, he withdraws his senses from sense-objects and remains devoted to the Lord. Finally, since his mind is under control even though the senses do reach objects, he attains peace (*prasāda*).

What is said of the *sthītaprajña* holds good in the case of the *bhagavad-bhakta*, the *guṇātīta* and others. Such a person is a mystic, a god-man who lives in the world, but not of the world; and there are mystics in every religious tradition answering to the description of the *sthītaprajña* in *samādhi* and *vyutthāna* states.

### NOTES

1. "ayamātmā brahma." (2)
2. See *Taittirīya Upaniṣad*, Chapter II for a detailed elucidation of the five sheaths (*pañca-kośa*).
3. *Uḷḷadu Nārpaḍu*, v. 5; see T. M. P. Mahadevan, *Ramana Maharshi and his Philosophy of Existence* (Tiruvannamalai: Sri Ramanasramam, 1969), v. 5, p. 55.
4. Gauḍapāda, *Maṇḍūkya-kārikā*, III. 31: "manodṛśyam-idaṁ dvaitam yat-kiñcit sucārūcaram | mānaso hi amanībhāve dvaitam naiva upalabhyate||"
5. *Uḷḷadu Nārpaḍu*, v. 6; *Ramana Maharshi and his Philosophy of Existence*, v. 6, p. 58.
6. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, 4.3.15.
7. See Śaṅkara, *Ātma-bodha*, v. 3.
8. 7.1.3.
9. 2.1.1.
10. 3.8.
11. 8.12.1.
12. Śaṅkara in his commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra*, 1.1.4, quotes approvingly *Nyāya-sūtra*, 1.1.2 which reads:

“*duḥkha-janma-pravṛttidoṣa-mithyājñānānām uttarottarāpāye tad-anantarāpāyāt apavargah.*”

13. See Śaṅkara's commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra*, 1.1.4: “*mithyā-pratyayanimittatvāt saśarīratvasya, siddham jīvato'pi viduṣo aśarīratvam.*”

14. 2.2.1.

15. See Śaṅkara's commentary on *Kaṭha Upaniṣad*, 2.2.1. Also see Vidyāraṇya, *The Jīvanmukti-viveka*, ed. S. Subrahmanya Sastri and T. R. Srinivasa Sastri (Adyar: The Theosophical Publishing House), p. 15: “*jīvanneva drṣṭa-bandhanāt kāmāder-viśeṣeṇa muktaḥ san dehapāte bhāvibandhanāt viśeṣeṇa mucyate.*”

16. 4.4.7.

17. vv. 54-71.

18. v. 54.

19. See Śaṅkara's commentary on the *Bhagavad-gītā*, 2.55: “*tyaktaputravittalokaiṣaṇaḥ sunnyāsi ātmārāmaḥ ātmakriḍaḥ sthitaprajña ityarthah.*”

ŚRĪ ŚIVAKEŚĀDIPĀDĀNTAVARṆANA-  
STOTRA

*of Śrī Saṅkara Bhagavatpāda*

*Translated with notes by*

*Dr. N. Gangadharan*

*(Continued from Vol. XII, No. 3)*



[ 11 ]

न्यक्कुर्वन्नुवराभृन्निभघनसमयोद्घुष्टमेधौघघोषं  
 स्फूर्जद्वाध्युत्थितोरुध्वनितमपि परब्रह्मभूतो गभीरः ।  
 सुव्यक्तोऽव्यक्तमूर्तेः प्रकटितकरणः प्राणनाथस्य सत्याः  
 प्रीत्या वः संविदध्यात्फलविकलमलं जन्म नादः स नादः ॥

May the manifest sound of the dear consort of Satī (Pārvatī), possessing an incomprehensible form and being pleased, put an end to your birth that results in worthless fruit. It humiliates the sound of columns of thundering mountain-like clouds of the rainy season. (It also excels) the loud sound rising from the roaring ocean. It is of the form of the Supreme Brahman, and is deep.

The original reading *vyaktamūrteḥ* of the printed text has been emended as *avyaktamūrteḥ* agreeing in sense with *prāṇanātha* (Śiva).

[ 12 ]

भासा यस्य त्रिलोकी लसति परिलसत्केनविन्दूर्णवान्त-  
 व्यामग्नेवातिगौरस्तुलितसुरसरिद्वारिपूरप्रसारः ।  
 पीनात्मा दन्तभाभिर्भृशमहहकारातिभीमः सदेशं  
 पुष्टं तुष्टिं कृषीष्ट स्फुटमिह भवतामट्टहासोऽष्टमूर्तेः ॥

May the wild laughter of the Aṣṭamūrti certainly confer always on us our desired fruits and make us feel pleased. The three worlds are illumined by its lustre and hence appear to have been submerged inside the shining drops of the form of the ocean. It is extremely

white resembling the extensive cascade of the celestial Ganges. It is extensive with the radiance of the teeth. It is extremely terrible with the violent 'ha, ha, ha' sound.

The wild laughter of Lord Śiva known as *aṭṭahāsa* is described as white in colour according to poetic convention.

Lord Śiva is referred to as *aṣṭamūrti* as an embodiment of the five elements (earth, water, fire, air and ether), the sun, moon and priest.

[ 13 ]

सद्योजाताख्यमाप्यं यदु विमलमुदग्वर्ति यद्वामदेवं  
 नाम्ना हेम्ना सदृक्षं जलदनिभमधोराह्वयं दक्षिणं यत् ।  
 यद्वालार्कप्रभं तत्पुरुषनिगदितं पूर्वमीशानसंज्ञ  
 यद्दिव्यं तानि शम्भोर्भवदभिलषितं पञ्च दद्युर्मुखानि ॥

May the five faces of Lord Śambhu (Śiva) *viz.* Sadyojāta, that is white and facing the western direction, Vāmadeva, that is golden and facing the northern direction, Aghora, that is resembling the hue of the cloud and facing the southern direction, Tatpuruṣa, that is of the colour of the rising sun and facing the eastern direction and Īsāna, the divine one, confer on you the desired objects.

The five forms of Śiva referred to above are also denoted by the term Pañca-brahman. The *Līṅgapurāṇa* describes the origin of these five forms. The Vedic hymns extol these forms.



[ 14 ]

आत्मप्रेम्णो भवान्या स्वयमिव रचिताः सादरं सांवनन्या  
 मण्या तिस्रः सुनीलाञ्जननिभगलरेखाः समाभान्ति यस्याम् ।  
 आकल्पानल्पभासा भृशरुचिरतरा कम्बुकल्पाम्बिकायाः  
 पत्युः साऽत्यन्तमन्तर्विलसतु सततं मन्थरा कन्धरा वः ॥

May the large neck of the consort of Ambikā (Pārvatī), adorned with ornaments and looking beautiful like the conch and on which shine the three rays resembling the black collyrium as if they were made by Bhavānī (Pārvatī) Herself with the collyrium Sāmvananī on account of Her love, shine within you always.

The collyrium *Sāmvananī* is used to attract and captivate a person. The poet fancies here the natural folds on the neck of Lord Śiva as those made of the *sāmvananī* collyrium by the Goddess in order to captivate Her Lord.

[ 15 ]

वक्त्रेन्दोर्दन्तलक्ष्म्याश्चिरमधरमहाकौस्तुभस्याप्युपान्ते  
 सोत्थानां प्रार्थयन् यः स्थितिमचलभुवे वारयन्त्यै निवेशम् ।  
 प्रायुङ्क्तेवाशिषो यः प्रतिपदममृतत्वे स्थितः कालशत्रोः  
 कालं कुर्वन् गलं वो हृदयमलमयं क्षालयेत् कालकूटः ॥

May the *kālakūṭa* (the deadly poison), that makes the neck of the foe of Yama black, wash away the dirt in your heart. It has gained a position similar to that of the nectar as if conferring great prosperity on Pārvatī who was preventing its entry as it sought a

place near its brethren — the face, the moon, the teeth, the goddess Lakṣmī, the lip, the great Kaustubha.

The *kālakūṣa*, moon, Goddess Lakṣmī and the *kaustubha* had their common origin from the milky ocean along with the nectar. Although the poison desired to gain a place only on the lip, it was able to gain a place on the throat which is the honourable seat of the nectar. The word *Acala-bhūh* meaning the daughter of the mountain, denotes Pārvatī. Śiva is often referred to as the foe of Yama because he overpowered Yama and protected Mārkaṇḍeya.

The poet has employed a chain of metaphors in this verse.

[ 16 ]

प्रौढप्रेमाकुलाया दृढतरपरिर्मेषु पर्वेन्दुमुख्याः  
 पार्वत्याश्चारुचामीकरवलयपदैरङ्कितं कान्तिशालि ।  
 रङ्गन्नागाङ्गदाढ्यं सततमविहितं कर्म निर्मूलयेत्त-  
 दोर्मूलं निर्मूलं यद्दृदि दुरितमपास्यार्जितं धूर्जटेर्वः ॥

May the stainless and shining shoulder joints of Dhūrjaṭi (Śiva), having warded off your acquired sins, destroy the prohibited acts. They are adorned with the jingling armlet in the form of the serpents, and bear the mark of the beautiful golden bangles of Pārvatī, whose face resembles the full moon, and who embraces Lord Śiva with exuberant love.

The word Dhūrjaṭi, meaning one having matted hair is an epithet of Śiva.

[ 17 ]

कण्ठाश्लेषार्थमाप्ता दिव इव कमितुः स्वर्गसिन्धोः प्रवाहाः  
 क्रान्त्यै संसारसिन्धोः स्फटिकमणिमहासङ्क्रमाकारदीर्घाः ।

तिर्यग्विष्कम्भभृतास्त्रिभुवनवसतेभिन्नदैत्येभदेहा

बाहा वस्ता हरस्य द्रुतमिह निवहानंहसां संहरन्तु ॥

May the hands of Lord Hara (Śiva), the destroyer of the demon (Andhaka), destroy your multitudes of sins. They appear as if they are the water of the celestial Ganges stretching her arms in the sky to embrace her dear by the neck. They appear to be the long bridge made of crystal for crossing the ocean of mundane existence. They appear to be the beams put across the house, namely, the three worlds.

The term 'amhas' means sin.

[ 18 ]

वक्षो दक्षद्विषोऽलं स्मरभरविनमदक्षजाक्षीणवक्षो-

जान्तर्निक्षिप्तशुम्भन्मलयजमिलितोद्भासि भस्मोक्षितं यत् ।

क्षिप्रं तद्रूक्षचक्षुःश्रुतिगणफणरत्नौघभाभीक्षणशोभं

युष्माकं शश्वदेनः स्फटिकमणिशिलामण्डलामं क्षिणोतु ॥

May the chest of the foe of Dakṣa permanently and quickly destroy your sins. It shines with the besmeared holy ashes together with the sandal paste besmeared in between the breasts of the daughter of Dakṣa as she bent over on account of the weight of love. It has the perpetual splendour of the radiance of gems on the hoods of host of angry serpents. It resembles a huge crystalline slab.

The word *caṅṣuḥ-śruti* denotes a serpent as its eyes are supposed to be their ears. Dakṣadvit means the foe of Dakṣa, namely, Śiva. Dakṣajā denotes Sati, the daughter of Dakṣa.

V. 7

[ 19 ]

मुक्तामुक्ते विचित्राकुलवलिलहरीजालशालिन्यवाञ्चन्-  
 नाभ्यावर्ते विलोलद्भुजगवरयुते कालशत्रोर्विशाले ।  
 युष्मच्चित्त्रिधामा प्रतिनवरुचिरे मन्दिरे कान्तिलक्ष्म्याः  
 शेतां शीतांशुगौरै चिरतरमुदरक्षीरसिन्धौ सलीलम् ॥

May your mind ever sportively lie in the extensive belly of Lord Śiva, the enemy of Yama. That belly has three folds, resembles the milky ocean, and abounds with pearls. It has the wonderful continuous rows of waves in the form of the cavity of the navel having the moving foremost serpent (Vāsuki). It is the abode of ever fresh lustre (Goddess Lakṣmī). It is white like the moon.

The word Kāla denotes Yama, and Kālaśatru, the enemy of Yama. The poets usually describe the navel as a whirlpool. The poet aptly fancies the belly as the ocean and the navel as the whirlpool.

[ 20 ]

वैयाघ्री यत्र कृत्तिः स्फुरति हिमगिरेर्विस्तृतोपत्यकान्तः  
 सान्द्रावश्यायमिश्रा परित इव वृता नीलजीमूतमाला ।  
 आबद्धाहीन्द्रकाञ्चीगुणमतिपृथुलं शैलजाक्रीडभूमि-  
 स्तद्वो निःश्रेयसे स्याज्जघनमतिघनं बालशीतांशुमौलेः ॥

May the heavy hip of the crescent-crowned be for your beatitude. The tiger's skin covering it shines like a chain of dark clouds mixed with dense snow on the extensive low land at the foot of the Himālaya

(to be continued)

## THE LIFE AND WORK OF ŚRĪ ŚAṄKARA\*

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*P. Sankaranarayanan*

Among the renowned personalities celebrated in the hagiographies of the world, by far the most distinguished for all time is Śrī Śaṅkara, reverently referred to as Śrī Śaṅkara Bhagavatpāda, or simply as the Bhagavatpāda. Whether considered, as tradition and the *Purāṇas* would have it, as an incarnation of Lord Śiva Himself or only looked upon as a surpassing human being, either way, he is pre-eminent among the prophets and religious leaders of all times. His achievements during the little over three decades of his earthly life constitute a marvel of uncommon rate.

He was an intellectual prodigy who attained a phenomenal mastery over the scriptures even when he was less than eight years of age. Using the Sanskrit language with a felicitous clarity all his own, he wrote elaborate commentaries on the tripod of Hindu religion

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\*Courtesy: *Śaṅkara and Śaṅmata*, Souvenir published in connection with the Conference on "Śaṅkara and Śaṅmata" held in Madras from June 1 to June 9, 1969 (Section III: Śrī Śaṅkarācārya, article no. 1).

and philosophy evincing a dialectical skill which even to this day is the despair and envy of his adversaries. The original treatises that he produced on Advaita Vedānta ranging from a single verse to a thousand for all grades of mental comprehension live even to-day as fresh as ever, in the thoughts and tongues of men. His triumphal *digvijaya* to all parts of our land more than once had a double purpose, to vindicate the truths of Advaita Vedānta against the onslaughts of its disputants and to purify our religious theories and practices out of the accretions that had gathered round them by the lapse of time and the inroads of perverted minds. Mere sacerdotalism which went by the letter ignoring the spirit and the corruptions of designing people had for long fouled the clear springs of our pristine religion, resulting in the adoption of ways of worship which were neither civilised nor moral. All this had happened before Śrī Śaṅkara came on the scene. He accomplished the stupendous task of ridding our religion of its unfortunate excrescences and raised it to a pedestal of worshipful dignity. Buddhism, the rebel child of the Vedic religion and philosophy, denied God and the soul, laid the axe at the very roots of Vedic thought and posed a great danger to its very survival. This onslaught was stemmed betimes, compelling Buddhism to seek refuge in other lands. While the credit for this should go primarily to the Mīmāṃsaka Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, it was because of Śrī Śaṅkara's dialectical skill and irrefutable arguments that it ceased to have sway over the minds of the inheritors of Vedic religion.

Having thus enthroned our ancient religion and philosophy in the hearts and minds of his countrymen, Śrī Śaṅkara established in several parts of the country

guardians of his teachings to preserve and propagate it to countless generations of the future. While these should have been numerous when he established them, five stand to this day as pontificates bearing his name, and function at Kāñcī, Śṛṅgeri, Pūri, Dvārakā and Badarī, covering the whole of Bhārata Varṣa. There is not in legend or in history a life like Śrī Śaṅkara's; so short in years and yet so packed with achievements in the realm of the spirit and whose glory extends beyond the bounds of space and time. No wonder that even to-day, much as protagonists of other schools may regret and protest, Vedānta is identified with Advaita which Śrī Śaṅkara drew out of the *Upaniṣads*, distilled out of the *Bhagavad Gītā* and described in his commentaries on the *Brahma Sūtras*, and that this school of Vedānta has compelled the conviction and obtained assent of the thinking minds of the West.

It is unfortunate that no biography of Śrī Śaṅkara was written by his contemporaries. For details about his life, we have to depend on *Saṅkara Vijayas* composed at different times long after he lived. They do not agree in all particulars about his life. The traditional date of Śrī Śaṅkara varies from that assigned to him by modern historians. While the latter fix him as having lived from 788 to 820 A.D., the tradition determined by the pontifical succession in the celebrated *piṭhas* that he established take him to a time long before the Christian era. Be that as it may, we may glean from the different biographies extant today a generally accepted account of his life and work.

It is agreed on all hands that Śrī Śaṅkara belonged to a Nambūdiri Brāhmaṇa family of Kerala in the hamlet of Kālaḍi situated on the banks of the Churna

river. His father was a pious wealthy person called Śivaguru and his mother was Āryāmbā. Not blessed with a son for a long time, the devout pair went to worship Lord Śiva in the nearby celebrated temple at Trichur. The story goes that, pleased by their devotion, the God appeared before them in a dream and asked them to choose between a number of long-lived sons who would remain ignorant and stupid, and one who would live for eight years only, but would be possessed of phenomenal intellectual gifts. Śivaguru and his wife had no hesitation in choosing the latter. According to the legend, it was conveyed to them that Lord Śiva Himself would condescend to be born to them.

In fullness of time, Āryāmbā bore a child carrying such divine marks on its person that those who beheld it proclaimed it an incarnation of Lord Śiva himself. It was given the significant name of Śaṅkara, calculating by the season, the day and time of its birth and also as if to predict the great service the child was destined to render to the world. (*Śaṁ karoti iti Śaṅkaraḥ*: 'Śaṅkara' is one who does good.) As illluck would have it, Śivaguru passed away when the child was still very young. The child was then brought up with great affection by his mother. With the assistance of her kinsmen, Āryāmbā got the *upanayanam* ceremony performed for her precocious boy who then mastered all the *Vedas* and *Śāstras* which seemed to wait on his lips, eager to be uttered by him for their own sanctification.

The eight years of the boy's allotted life were drawing to a close. The fateful day dawned. On that day it happened that Āryāmbā and Śrī Śaṅkara went



to the Churna river to bathe. The mother finished her ablutions and was resting on the bank of the river. Suddenly she heard a cry of distress from her son telling her that a terrific crocodile had got his leg in its mouth and was eating him up. The agony of the mother was indescribable. Then Śrī Śaṅkara told her that he could free himself from the grip of the monster if, then and there, he assumed the *sannyāsa āśrama* bringing about thereby the 'death' of his former condition and the start of a new life. Else, the crocodile would devour him and, that would be the end of his physical life. "Choose" said he, "this instant; for there is no time to lose. Shall I pass away devoured by the crocodile or shall I live converting myself into a *sannyāsin*?" Āryāmbā was in a dilemma: but her maternal instinct made her consent to Śrī Śaṅkara to live as a *sannyāsin* if thereby she could keep him alive. Then and there, standing in the water, the boy Śaṅkara uttered the incantation which automatically admitted him into the holy order of mendicant *sannyāsins*. And, for a wonder, the crocodile loosed its grip and disappeared from water to appear again on the sky, so the story goes, as a celestial *gandharva* released from his erstwhile curse by which he was condemned to be an aquatic monster. Thus Śrī Śaṅkara 'died' as a Brahmacārī at the ordained age of eight and obtained a further lease of another eight years.

Upon Āryāmbā quite innocently bidding her son accompany her home, Śrī Śaṅkara reminded her that he had become a *sannyāsin*, that he had betaken to an itinerant life and must take leave of her. The mother was anguished at this, grieving as to who could take care of her son. She wailed in disappointment that it was not given to her to see her son grow up, marry

and raise a progeny for the continuation of his line. Śrī Śaṅkara consoled her by saying: "Mother dear! Do not grieve. The whole world will be my home hereafter. All those who will initiate me into the sacred lore will be my fathers. All women who give me *bhikṣā* (alms) will be my mothers. The peace that shall be mine by the realisation of the *ātman* will be my consort. All my disciples will be my sons." He however promised to be at her bedside in her last moments and speed her way to heaven by his presence.

Āryāmbā then gave him unwilling leave to depart. Śrī Śaṅkara travelled on foot from Kālaḍi to the Narmadā banks visiting many a sacred spot on the way. There, in a place called Śaṅkara Gaṅgā (identified by the present Śaṅkarācārya of Kāñcī), he met Govinda Bhagavatpāda who formally admitted him into the Sannyāsin order according to the prescribed rituals and imparted the Brahma Vidyā to him. After serving his Guru, for some time, obeying his command, Śrī Śaṅkara went to Kāsī (Banaras) and engaged himself in writing commentaries on the tripod of Hindu philosophy, namely, the *Upaniṣads*, the *Bhagavad Gītā* and the *Brahma sūtras*.

At this time an interesting incident happened in the life of Śrī Śaṅkara. One morning, he was returning to his monastery after a bath in the Gaṅgā. Leading four dogs and accompanied by his wife, an outcaste who should not approach him came along. He was bidden by Śrī Śaṅkara to go away from his path. Upon this, the outcaste queried him as to what he bade to go away, if it was the outcaste's body or his *ātman*. If it was the former, he said, it was composed of the same five elements as Śrī Śaṅkara's own body

and was not different. So it need not go away. If it was the *ātman*, then according to the Advaita that Śrī Śaṅkara taught, the *ātman* of all persons — brahmin or outcaste — was one only and, being identical and all-pervasive, it cannot move away. Śrī Śaṅkara immediately understood that his questioner was no ordinary outcaste, but a realised soul and broke forth into a pentad of verses acclaiming the outcaste's greatness. Śrī Śaṅkara said in the verse that he deemed a person of such spiritual realisation to be his Guru, be he an outcaste or a brahmin. According to the legend, it was Lord Śiva Himself who appeared as this outcaste. The dogs were the four *Vedas* and the outcaste's wife was Goddess Pārvatī Herself. The outcaste and his retinue vanished and Lord Śiva appeared and blessed Śrī Śaṅkara exhorting him to finish writing his commentaries.

Another incident occurred some time later. While Śrī Śaṅkara was instructing his disciples in his Vedāntic commentaries, an aged brahmin appeared before him with a request that he would be pleased to resolve some of his doubts. A vigorous discussion followed between the Master and the brahmin who disputed for a number of days with elaborate arguments (Śrī Śaṅkara's interpretation of one of the tersest of the *Brahma Sūtras*). The debate went on for 8 days, each side vindicating its stand and there was no prospect of its conclusion. At this time, one of Śrī Śaṅkara's disciples, Padmapāda by name, wondered who the doughty debater was. In an intuitive flash it struck him that he must be the great Bhagavān Vyāsa, the author of the *Brahma Sūtras*. He exclaimed:

“Śaṅkara is Śiva and Vyāsa is Nārāyaṇa Himself.

When these gods themselves dispute, what can a mere mortal like me do?"

Śrī Śaṅkara then realised who his disputant was. Prostrating before him he begged to be blessed. Sage Vyāsa thereupon lauded the fidelity of Śaṅkara's commentaries and gave them the imprimatur of his approval. Now the extended eight years of Śrī Śaṅkara's life were about to be over. Adding another sixteen years to the span of his life, Vyāsa bade him propagate the Advaita Śāstra in the far reaches of India.

### III

Then began the triumphant *digvijaya* of Śrī Śaṅkara. The first opponent of Advaita which is the philosophy of the *Upaniṣads* (known as the Uttaramīmāṃsā) was the Pūrvamīmāṃsaka who believed in the primacy and the immediacy of the Vedic Karmic rituals as the means to *mokṣa*. One of the staunchest protagonists of this school was Kumārila Bhaṭṭa who lay on the banks of the Gaṅgā at Prāyag (modern Allahabad) at the point of death, having immolated himself by fire for the sin of *gurudroha* (being a traitor to one's *guru*), which he acquired by furtively learning the tenets of Buddhism from a Buddhist savant in order to controvert them later. Kumārila, according to the legend, was an incarnation of Kumāra, son of Lord Śiva. He told Śrī Śaṅkara of his predicament which disabled him from debating with him. He bade him go to his own disciple, Maṇḍana Miśra living in Māhishmatī, saying that he (Maṇḍana) was a more uncompromising ritualist than himself.

Śrī Śaṅkara hastened to Maṇḍana's place. Arrived at the city, he was at a loss to discover Maṇḍana's house. He inquired of a woman who was passing by

and was told that in the verandah of a house two parrots would be chirping between themselves whether the *Vedas* were true in their own right or if their truth was derived. That, she said, was Maṇḍana's house. Arriving there, Śrī Śaṅkara found the door closed against intruders as a *śrāddha* ceremony was being then performed by Maṇḍana. The story is that Śrī Śaṅkara let himself in by his yogic powers. Parrying the abuses of the householder who was wroth at a *sannyāsin* interposing himself in a *śrāddha* ceremony, Śrī Śaṅkara said that he did not come there for *anna-bhikṣā* (alms of food) but made him agree to a *vādabhikṣā*, (alms of knowledge) after the *śrāddha* ceremony was over. The disputants agreed that Maṇḍana's wife Sarasavāṇī who was said to be an incarnation of the Goddess Sarasvatī (Maṇḍana being Brahmā himself) should act as umpire to the debate. The wager was that if either was defeated, he should adopt the *āśrama* of the other, that is, either Śrī Śaṅkara should become a householder or Maṇḍana should take to monastic discipline. Leaving them to debate between themselves, Sarasavāṇī went to attend to her domestic chores. Before doing so, she adorned each disputant with a garland of flowers saying that the person whose garland showed signs of fading must be considered to have been defeated. The debate went on for a number of days. At the conclusion of the sessions on a particular day, Sarasavāṇī invited both of them together for *bhikṣā* signifying that her lord Maṇḍana had become eligible for alms as only a monk is — in other words, that he had been defeated and should, according to the wager, become a *sannyāsin*. This he did, adopting the name Suresvara and thence forward accepted the supremacy of Advaita as a philosophy. He became one of the foremost disci-

ples of Śrī Śaṅkara who had earlier, when he was in Banaras, acquired a disciple in the person of Sanandana who came to be known as Padmapāda.

#### IV

Śrī Śaṅkara then travelled to Badarī on the Himalayas where his *guru* Govinda and *his guru* Gauḍapāda were living in the enjoyment of *nirvikalpasamādhi*. He made them revert to world-consciousness by singing the famous *Dakṣiṇāmūrtistotra*. He received their blessings and went to Kailāsa. According to the story, he was affectionately received by his Great Original, Lord Paramesvara who dowered him with five *spatika liṅgas* made of transparent crystals and a transcript of *Saundaryalaharī*, a century of hymns in praise of the Divine Mother. As ill-luck would have it, he lost the later fiftynine of these verses which he subsequently replaced by his own composition. The five *liṅgas* given by Śiva were known as Mokṣalinga, Varaliṅga, Bhogaliṅga, Muktiliṅga and Yogaliṅga.

Śrī Śaṅkara then repaired to Kedāra where he installed the Muktiliṅga and established one of his pontificates there. Proceeding thence to Nepal, he vanquished the Buddhists who denied the soul and God. He installed the Varaliṅga there which is even now in worship in the Paśupatinātha temple in Kathmandu, the capital city of Nepal.

Wending his steps southward the Bhagavatpāda went to Dvārakā in the Western corner of India, sacred to the memory of Śrī Kṛṣṇa. He established the Kālikā Pīṭha there and also a pontificate. Crossing the country travelling eastward, he came to Pūri where he founded the Vimalā Pīṭha after worshipping Lord Jagannātha. Thence he went to Śrī Śailam in the

Andhra country where he composed the famous hymn *Śivānandalaharī* and installed a Śrīcakra in front of the shrine of the presiding goddess Śrī Bhramarāmbikā. It was at this time that Śrī Śaṅkara vanquished the Kāpālikas and put down the homicidal practices to which they were addicted in their religious worship. Traversing thence to the Western Ghats, he worshipped Śrī Mūkāmbikā where he discovered the dumb prodigy who, on being cured of his defect, became his disciple and attained the name Hastāmalaka. Another of the disciples was one Giri by name, generally considered to be backward by his fellow-disciples. Receiving a special mark of grace from Śrī Śaṅkara, he broke forth into a soul-stirring hymn of eight verses in praise of his Guru, celebrated as the *Toṭakāṣṭaka*, he himself getting the *sannyāsa* name of Toṭakācārya.

Resuming his travels, Śrī Śaṅkara went to Karnāṭakadeśa and reached Rishya-Sringagiri (Sringeri). Here he erected a shrine to Śrī Śāradā, established another pontificate known as the Śāradā Piṭha and installed there the *bhogaliṅga* from among those that he had brought from Kailāsa.

## V

Meanwhile, Śrī Śaṅkara's mother was on the point of death. True to his promise to her, Śrī Śaṅkara hastened to her bedside and invoked the grace of Viṣṇu to take her to Vaikuṅṭha. As a *sannyāsin* should not engage in any kind of ritual, his kinsmen refused to permit him to perform the lady's obsequies himself. Upon his insisting that the duty of one to one's mother overrode all rules and that he would himself perform his mother's cremation, they all withheld their co-operation. Śrī Śaṅkara carried the dead body to the back-

yard of his house unaided by anybody and lighted the funeral pyre by invoking his spiritual prowess.

Śrī Śaṅkara went thence to Tirupati where he established the Dhanākarṣaṇa Yantra which, to this day, draws vast sums of wealth from pious devotees. Reaching Jambukesvaram in modern Tiruchirapalli, he tempered the ferocity of Akhilāṇḍesvarī, the presiding Goddess by installing a shrine to Śrī Vighnesvara in front of Her, and fixing on the ears of Her person two rings known as Tāṭaṅkas in the Śrīcakra pattern. He then went to the land's end in Rāmesvaram to worship Lord Rāmanātha in the *liṅga* that he celebrated in his *Dvādaśaliṅgastotra*. Returning, he visited Chidambaram and left the Mokṣaliṅga, another of those he got in Kailāsa to be worshipped there.

Travels through the length and breadth of the country over, Śrī Śaṅkara ultimately reached Kāñcīpuram near Madras. Kāñcī is known as one of the seven *mokṣapurīs* of our sacred land (places which confer Liberation) and has had, through the years, a memorable political, literary, cultural and religious history. Scholars and saints of all denominations and sects have either visited it in their time or taken permanent residence there. It has been the venue of philosophical disputations of all schools of thought. No religious leader considered his mission fulfilled or his victory complete unless he vanquished rivals of other faiths in that famous city. As its name signifies, Kāñcī is the waistline of the earth and its central part. It was but appropriate that Śrī Śaṅkara also should go to this place to proclaim the Advaita Vedānta vindicating it against other schools of religion and philosophy. Acclaimed by everyone as the supreme master



of all that is to know, Śrī Śaṅkara ascended before a large assembly the throne of omniscience known as the *sarvajñapīṭha* at Kāñcī.

He then mitigated the *ugrakalā*, the fierce aspect of the Goddess Kāmākṣī drawing it into a *Śrīcakra* which he placed in front of Her and consecrated it. After renovating the temple to Lord Viṣṇu in the person of Śrī Varadarāja, he asked the reigning king of Kāñcī to fashion the city in the form of a *Śrīcakra* giving the central place to the shrine of Śrī Kāmākṣī. A few things are noteworthy in this connection. Kāñcī is famous for its numerous temples in honour of Viṣṇu and Śiva. But all of them, howsoever distant they may be from the temple of Śrī Kāmākṣī, face it without exception. The processional idols of all these shrines are taken round this Kāmākṣī temple when their annual festivals are celebrated. In none of the Śiva temples of Kāñcī is there a shrine for Śiva's Consort, that of Kāmākṣī doing service for all of them. The city is famous in the *Purāṇas* as the place where Brahmā himself performed a *yajña* attended by all the celestials.

## VI

No wonder that Śrī Śaṅkara chose Kāñcī to establish a pontificate known as the Kāmakoṭi Pīṭha there. Of the five *liṅgas* which he got from Kailāsa, he reserved the Yogaliṅga for worship by himself here in the Kāmakoṭi Pīṭha. Entrusting the four *maṭhas* that he had established in the important religious centres of the country in charge of each of his four eminent disciples, Śaṅkara chose the fifth that he established in Kāñcī known as the Śāradāmaṭha, for his own stay

and ministration. These five *mathas* function to this day as bastions of our ancient Sanātana Dharma in general and of Advaita Vedānta in particular. They have had since Śrī Śaṅkara's time a long and illustrious line of pontifical successors who bear his haloed name and continue to discharge the great mission that he entrusted to them. The Math associated with the Kāñcī Kāmakoṭi Pīṭham has a special significance by reason of its being the place where Śrī Śaṅkara spent his last days and finally shed his mortal body merging thereafter into the beatitude of *Brahmānubhava*.

## VII

The text of the *Śrīmukhas* (pontifical epistles) granted by the Jagadgurus of the Kāñcī Kāmakoṭi Pīṭha since time immemorial refers to Śrī Śaṅkara as 'निखिलपापण्डुषण्डकण्टकोत्पाटनेन विशदीकृतवेदवेदान्तमार्गंषण्मत्प्रतिष्ठापकाचार्याः' *i.e.* describes him as "one who swept off the thorns that encumbered the various forms of worship of the six manifestations of God." Worship of these deities had waned in our land due to the inroads of Buddhism and Jainism. It was Śrī Śaṅkara who rescued them from oblivion and rid some of them of their unholy encrustations. Particular mention may be made of the Vāmācāra practices in the Śākta religion and the abhorrent rituals of the Kāpālikas. Hence Śrī Śaṅkara is gratefully spoken of as *Ṣaṅmata-pratiṣṭhāpakācārya*, which means, not one who *established* the six forms of worship for the first time, but one who *revived* and gave strength and stability to the existing ones. Nor were they to Śrī Śaṅkara six different, and much less opposed forms. They are six alternative ways in which the same supreme God is worshipped according to the preference of the worship-

per. Each chooses his *iṣṭa-devatā* among them, determined by his family tradition (*kulācāra*) and his inclination (*ruci*), and accommodates the rest in his pattern of worship. Thus Śrī Śaṅkara was a great integrator within the fold of the Vedic religion and he brought about intra-religious amity among all those who professed the Hindu faith.

Such was the life and work of the illustrious Śaṅkarācārya who packed within a brief period of 32 years a series of achievements which are unequalled both in their content and their variety. Judged by any test, as a writer, as a poet, as a thinker and debater, as a prophet and mystic, as a religious organiser, judged by any aspect of his diversified personality, Śrī Śaṅkara is unique among the great men of the world. He holds a pre-eminent position among the Master Minds that have shaped the thoughts and actions alike of their contemporaries and of posterity. Above all, the Advaita Vedānta that he expounded to such artistic perfection is the one and only philosophy that will effectively make for personal liberation from the shackles of life on the one hand, and for universal amity and peace liquidating social and national rivalries on the other. The Vedānta associated with his name belongs not to one section of the Hindus only. It is the philosophy of entire humanity and deserves to be carefully studied and scrupulously practised by men in every part of the globe. Most truly, Śrī Śaṅkara is referred to with love and devotion as *Lokaśaṅkara*,\* the most brilliant among the benefactors of mankind for all time and in all climes.

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\*Cf. श्रुतिस्मृतिपुराणानामालयं करुणालयम् ।  
नमामि भगवत्पादशङ्करं लोकशङ्करम् ॥

## PHILOSOPHY AS SELF-REALISATION\*

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*Sibajiban Bhattacharyya\*\**

### 1. *Introduction*

Philosophy has been conceived differently by different philosophers and it is difficult to find anything common to all these conceptions. We analyse here a few views about philosophy in order to find out their essential features.

(i) Philosophy is the art of living a tranquil and serene life — it is a skill to be acquired by prolonged training and rigorous practice. There may be a theory behind this art, as there is one behind every act and that theory too may be called philosophy but only in a derivative sense. Too much concern with theory may be an impediment to attaining the practical goal in philosophy as elsewhere. So theorising is discouraged and the emphasis is on practice. Patañjali, for example, in his celebrated theory of the eightfold method for attaining *samādhi* which consists in arresting the

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\*Courtesy: *Philosophy: Theory and Practice*, ed. T. M. P. Mahadevan, Centre for Advanced Study in Philosophy, University of Madras, 1974, pp. 478-93.

\*\*Director, Institute of Universal Spiritual Values, The Asiatic Society, Calcutta.

movement of the mind, includes moral practices (like non-violence, speaking the truth, non-stealing, abstinence, cleanliness, contentment, etc.), physical exercises (like physical postures, breath-control, etc.) and exercises of attention (like concentration, meditation, etc.) As a result of these practices, one attains a practical result. Patañjali, of course, asserts that these practices remove *avidyā* which is the root of all *kleśas* and ultimately lead to self-realisation, but this self-realisation is *automatically* achieved without any intellectual or cognitive activity. As soon as all movements of the mind are arrested, the self remains in its pure state and this staying in its pure state is what is meant by self-realisation. The point to be noted here is that although self-realisation is really a state of pure self-consciousness, yet in order to achieve this no specifically cognitive activity is needed. As a matter of fact, according to Patañjali even knowledge about empirical objects can be attained without any cognitive activity. Thus in giving details of the results of the various exercises, Patañjali mentions that by meditating on the sun, we attain knowledge about the world, by meditating on the navel we attain direct knowledge of the state of the body, by concentrating on the heart we attain direct knowledge of the mind — of our own as well as of others. But the results of all types of concentration are not cognitive; for example, by concentrating on the throat, we get rid of thirst and hunger, but do not attain any knowledge of objects, empirical or non-empirical. Thus concentration sometimes yields knowledge, sometimes non-cognitive powers. The knowledge attained through concentration on specified parts of the body or on special objects, although empirical, is still extra-ordinary in the sense that ordinary people

do not have this type of knowledge. This type of knowledge is empirical, not in the sense of being derived from sense-experience, but in the sense of being about spatio-temporal objects.

(ii) The Hegelians conceive philosophy as a form of knowledge, indeed, as the highest form of knowledge, a sort of super-science which is superior to science, just as science is superior to common sense. This highest knowledge is at once immediate and rational, all-comprehensive and concrete. Now reason has two aspects — a theoretical and a practical one. Kant, although admitting the unity of reason, still made a distinction between the pure theoretical reason and the pure practical reason. A cognitive act according to Kant, is an act of the theoretical reason and cannot be identified with a moral action which is the function of the practical reason. But according to the Hegelians this distinction is not ultimately valid. For anyone who attains philosophical knowledge also attains moral perfection. Now, it is not clear whether this identification is achieved only at the highest level or is present at lower levels also. For apparently, being moral, i.e. performing moral actions only, is not a way of knowing. It is not clear how at the highest stage morality and knowledge become identical. Reason which is the synthesis of sense and understanding in the sphere of knowledge seems to effect a harmony in the moral life of a person so that a philosopher necessarily leads a morally perfect life. This relation between theoretical knowledge and moral perfection needs to be explained; we may ask, for example: Is every morally perfect man a philosopher, i.e. does he possess the supreme knowledge of the Absolute which is the unity of subject and object, matter and mind, which

is, indeed, the highest synthesis? Or, is philosophising a way of becoming moral?

(iii) The linguistic analysts deny that philosophy is knowledge; they identify philosophy with a particular method of thinking. To 'do philosophy' is to practice analysis which dissolves, rather than solves, the philosophical puzzles. The goal of analysis is thus a practical goal — getting rid of the philosophical puzzles which trouble the mind. Philosophical analysis is claimed to have a therapeutical value comparable to that of psycho-analysis. (Indian philosophers in general go a step further and claim that philosophy not merely rids the mind of puzzles, but puts an end to all types of worries, indeed, to all suffering.) The problem is: How can analysis achieve this practical result? The analysts say that the puzzles arise only when the rules of language are violated; and if we realise this by practising analysis of the philosophical problems, then we shall cease to ask these questions. That is, the mere knowledge that the puzzles are due to a mistaken use of language suffices to put an end to all philosophical questioning. The reason for this is that we cannot be genuinely puzzled by knowingly misusing language. No further explanation seems to be necessary; yet as we shall see, much clarification and even theorising will be necessary to explain this point.

(iv) The phenomenologists, too, identify philosophy with the phenomenological method, rather than with any particular result. The essence of this method consists in effecting a change in consciousness, in the common sense attitude to the world. To philosophise is not to theorise, but rather to 'see' the objects in an

essentially different way. The method of reduction involves suspension of belief in the existence that accompanies our everyday life and scientific thinking. Now this is not merely an intellectual act, but involves self-discipline for to suspend existential beliefs is to withdraw our commitment to them, to stop identifying ourselves with such beliefs. This ultimately amounts to a total transformation of the personality of the individual comparable to a 'religious conversion'. Yet it is not clear whether phenomenologically reduced consciousness is morally perfect. In religious conversion it is the moral life which is primarily transformed; a religious person is necessarily morally perfect, but does not appear to necessarily possess philosophical knowledge, whereas phenomenological reduction makes one a philosopher. Husserl, of course, has claimed that phenomenological reduction goes even beyond religious conversion and "has the significance of the greatest existential conversion that is expected of mankind" (Husserliana VI, 140; quoted by Spiegelberg. *The Phenomenological Movement*, Vol. I, p. 136, fn I). Yet the nature of this has not been revealed. Hence phenomenology has sometimes tended to become an esoteric practice not amenable to the uninitiated.

(v) The existentialist philosophers have emphasised the role of the self in experience. The self which tends to be overlooked and forgotten in the scientific attitude comes to the forefront in the realisation of crisis. It is only when we are deeply engaged, when we are in the world in the fullest sense, that *Dasein* is revealed. But if the function of philosophy is merely to make us aware of our authentic existence, then it does not involve any fundamental change in our personalities comparable to that of conversion. It merely



restricts our tendency to escape into a world of abstractions and imaginations, to avoid responsibility for our choice and to conform mechanically to social and ethical standard.

This brief survey of some concepts of philosophy shows that philosophy always involves a change in our consciousness, i.e., has a practical aspect according to all these views. Their difference lies in the appraisal of the nature of the change brought about by philosophy. Yoga and other systems of Indian Philosophy claim a total transformation of personality and cessation of all suffering as effects of philosophy; Hegel seems to come very close to such a theory claiming for philosophy the power to produce moral perfection in man; analytic philosophers claim only a limited therapeutic value for philosophy; Husserl claims a 'total personal transformation' as a prerequisite, not a consequence, of philosophy; but the nature of this transformation and its method remain yet to be explained; the existentialists urge us to eschew the palliatives of either socially directed responses or intellectualised acts in favour of responsibility and to live authentically.

The main problem which remains to be solved is:

How does philosophical knowledge produce a practical change in our consciousness or a personal transformation?

We shall not discuss the problem we found in Patañjali's theory — How can concentration produce sometimes cognitive, sometimes non-cognitive results? Patañjali himself states these results without offering any explanation and it is difficult for us either to dispute the truth of these statements, or to justify them.

We shall explain and examine two types of answers to this question, namely, that given by the Nyāya system and that given by Advaita Vedānta. As both these systems explain their answers only by explaining the nature of self-knowledge, we shall have to understand their theories of the self, the inner sense, the nature of false cognitions and wrong notions, and the nature of knowledge.

## 2. *The Nyāya Theory*

Nyāya postulates the existence of two types of selves; one supreme self which is identified with God, and a plurality of finite selves. Both these kinds of selves are conceived as substances possessing consciousness as a quality. Not merely the supreme self but even finite selves are eternal and omnipresent; the supreme self differs from the other kind of selves in being omnipotent and omniscient. By 'omnipotence' is meant not 'the power to create everything', but only 'the power to create whatever can be created'. The supreme self creates the universe, keeps it in existence so long as it exists, and then destroys it — all by one act of will. There is no need to postulate different acts of willing in the supreme self. This one act of will which is postulated is, of course, eternal. Just as one act of will is directed towards all created objects, so also the omniscience which is postulated in the supreme self is one eternal state of knowledge about everything. Although the supreme self and its consciousness or knowledge are both eternal, yet they are not identical. The self is never identical with consciousness.

Every finite self is eternal and also omnipresent. It is not identical with consciousness, nor is it essentially conscious. Consciousness is only an accidental quality of finite selves. A finite self happens to possess cons-

consciousness only when the following conditions are fulfilled; (a) in order to be conscious a finite self has to possess a body; (b) the self has to be related to the inner sense in a characteristic manner; (c) consciousness is always of some object. Let us explain these conditions.

(a) Every finite self is omnipresent. If in order to have consciousness or knowledge, a relation between the self and the object be sufficient, then every finite self being present everywhere will be related to everything and hence would have knowledge of everything i.e. every finite self would be omniscient. But it is not omniscient, so at least one more condition is necessary for consciousness. Moreover, consciousness is experienced to occur in the self as associated with the body, no one experiences that his knowledge belongs to the self beyond his body.

Now it may be objected that so far as the facts of consciousness are concerned, the finite self is not omnipresent. What do we gain by saying that the self is present everywhere, if we have to admit that consciousness belongs to the self as limited within the body? In order to understand the Nyāya position, it is necessary to know the Nyāya theories of eternal entities, and perception of things and their attributes.

According to Nyāya if a thing is eternal, it cannot be composite. For if a thing is composed of parts, then it is always possible for the parts to fall apart destroying the whole which, therefore, cannot be eternal. Nyāya postulates two types of simple entities, atoms (of earth, air, water and fire), and infinite substances. Infinite substances are necessarily eternal and hence cannot be composite. Now every self is eternal;

hence it must be either atomic or infinite. It cannot be an atom, for an atom cannot be perceived whereas a self is perceived in introspection. No attributes of atoms can be perceived, but we all internally perceive our happiness, sorrow and other internal states of the self. So the self is not an atom, yet it is eternal. Hence it must be infinite in magnitude, i.e. must be present everywhere.

Consciousness according to Nyāya is the same as cognition. The other states of the self, namely, feeling and willing, are not conscious states. But when they occur in the self they are immediately followed by their introspective awareness. So, for all practical purposes, there is no feeling or willing which goes unnoticed. But this introspective awareness of feeling or willing is not identical with the feeling or the willing.

Consciousness is neither the essence of the self nor is it identical with the self. In deep dreamless sleep we are wholly unconscious. This would be impossible if the self were identical with consciousness, or if consciousness were the essence of the self. The problem for Nyāya is, then, how to explain the nature of our cognition — that we slept well — which we have on getting up from sound sleep. According to Advaita Vedānta this cognition is memory, i.e. we remember on getting up from sleep that we slept well. But this memory will be impossible if we did not have direct consciousness of sleeping well, i.e. if we did not have experience of sleep during sleep. This implies that we are conscious even during deep sleep. But according to Nyāya this is impossible; we can never remember that we slept well. How then can we ever say that we slept well? According to Nyāya this is an inference,

not memory. We infer that we slept well from the feeling of freshness etc., which we have when we get up from sound sleep. If the self is thus unconscious in deep sleep, then there must be some other condition of consciousness than the body. For even when we are asleep, both the self and the body remain, still we are unconscious. This brings us to the Nyāya concept of inner sense (*manas* or *antaḥkāraṇa*).

(b) The concept of inner sense as distinct from the self is common to many systems of Indian philosophy. The inner sense, according to Nyāya as according to all systems which admit its existence, is material in nature. According to Nyāya it is also an atom. The function of the inner sense is necessary not merely for introspection, but for cognition, i.e. consciousness as such. In deep sleep, although the inner sense is there, yet it is not characteristically related to the self, does not perform any function and is at rest. This is why in such sleep there is no consciousness even though the self as restricted by the body is there.

The inner sense, according to Nyāya, must be an atom, not a composite, spread-out substance. For in that case it would have been related to the self at more than one point, thus giving rise to more than one cognition at the same time. But according to Nyāya only one cognition can originate in the self at one time. Sometimes we seem to have different cognitions at the same time, but according to Nyāya this is an illusion. What actually happens is that different cognitions quickly succeed one another producing in us the illusion of simultaneity.

(c) Consciousness is always directed towards some object. As we have already remarked, conscious-

ness according to Nyāya is cognition. Non-cognitive mental states like willing are unconscious states; they can be directed towards objects only through some cognitive state. Thus desire can be directed towards an object only because desire for an object involves the belief that the object is good, and that the object is attainable by me. These beliefs being cognitions have their objects, and the desire is directed to these objects of belief in a secondary sense. Only cognitions are directed towards objects in the primary sense.

This directedness towards objects takes different forms corresponding to the different forms of cognition. In perceptual knowledge, there is a real relation between three entities: (i) the self and the inner sense, (ii) the inner sense organs, and (iii) the sense organs and the objects perceived. We should note here that Nyāya does not find any difficulty in holding that the self can be directly related with material substances, like the inner sense. This threefold relation between the self and the object of perception is, of course, completely different from the epistemological relation of the knowledge to the object. Nyāya makes a distinction between the relation of the knower and the known and the relation between knowledge and its object. This is possible because according to Nyāya the self is not identical with consciousness; hence the relation of the self to the object is also different from the relation of the cognition to its object. Here we shall be concerned primarily with the relation of the cognition to its object. Single objects are known according to Nyāya in a way roughly akin to what Russell calls 'knowledge by acquaintance'. Here the knowledge is related to its object in one way which is completely different from the way in which knowledge of an objective complex is related

to the complex. According to Nyāya all ordinary cognitions are of relations holding between two terms. Thus when I see a jar, the knowledge is not of the single entity, but of the objective complex, the jar, the universal jar-ness, and their relation. So the objective complex can be schematically represented by 'aRb'. The first term of the relation known (here *a*) is *viśeṣya* of the knowledge, the second term, *b*, is the *viśeṣana* or *prakāra* of the knowledge. When we know a complex whole, then although there is one knowledge in the self, still this one knowledge is related to the different elements of the objective whole in different ways. The knowledge is related to the first term of the relation known, i.e. to *a*, in one way (*viśeṣyatā sambandha*), to the second term, *b*, in another way, (*viśeṣanatā* or *prakāratā sambandha*), and to the relation itself, i.e. to R, in a still different way (*samsargatā sambandha*). Conversely, the first term of the objective complex, i.e. *a*, is related to the knowledge in one way (*viśeṣyitā sambandha*), the second term, *b*, is related to the knowledge in another way (*prakāritā sambandha*) and the relation is related to the knowledge in a still different way (*samsargitā sambandha*). Thus the converse of *viśeṣyatā* is *viśeṣyitā*, of *prakāratā* *prakāritā*, and of *samsargatā* *samsargitā*. Apart from three relations and their converses, there is the fourth type of relation between knowledge and its object when the knowledge is acquaintance. Nyāya admits further types of complex cognitions involving relations of second order (*viśiṣṭa-vaiśiṣṭa buddhi*). In this type of knowledge we know that something as related by a certain relation to a second term is further related to a third term by another relation. For example, when we know a man wearing a red coat, we know that the coat which is related to the red colour

is again related to the man who wears it. But in this type of higher order knowledge, no new type of relation is involved between the knowledge and the object.

Now we come to the Nyāya theory of bondage and liberation. A man in bondage suffers pain; liberation is the cessation of pain forever. In deep sleep there is no suffering, but deep sleep is not liberation because the painless state ends when we wake up. According to Nyāya consciousness of objects is a necessary precondition of suffering. We suffer because we do not get the desired object, and desire for an object is caused by a cognition of objects together with other conditions. Thus objective consciousness is a necessary condition of desire, and desire is a necessary condition of suffering. Thus to be free from suffering it is necessary to destroy objective consciousness. But as according to Nyāya consciousness is consciousness of object, to remove objective consciousness is to become totally unconscious. Thus in the state of liberation the self becomes totally unconscious. We have already explained the Nyāya theory that a precondition of consciousness is the relation of the self with the inner sense. This relation is due to our ignorance of the true nature of our own selves. If we realise that the self is altogether different from the body, from the sense organs including the inner sense, then the self will cease to be related with the inner sense and thus cease to be conscious, and will escape suffering. We are ignorant about the true nature of the self, because we have wrong notions of the following objects: (i) the self, (ii) the body, (iii) sense organs, (iv) sensory qualities, (v) cognition, (vi) the inner sense, (vii) good and bad deeds, (viii) desire and aversion, (ix) rebirth, (x) suffering, (xi) pain and (xii) release. About these ob-



jects various types of false beliefs are usual. For example, about the self one may believe falsely that there is no self, or that the self is identical with the body, and so on. If all these beliefs are destroyed, the self stays in its pure state, without pain, and also without happiness and consciousness. These false beliefs are destroyed by knowledge about these objects and primarily of the self.

Now we come to the Nyāya explanation of how false beliefs are destroyed or rendered ineffective by knowledge. Nyāya does this by its theory of preventing (*pratibandhaka-pratibādhya-bhāva*). According to Nyāya, cognitions of a particular form are prevented from occurring by cognitions of another form. We have to note here at the outset that this relation of prevention obtains only between cognitions, beliefs, knowledge etc. only so long as they are actual states of the self, but do not belong between mere dispositions. We have already noted that the analytic philosophers of ordinary language hold that it is impossible to be puzzled by knowingly misusing language. But the term 'knowledge' is used by them only in a dispositional sense. It is not a fact that a mere disposition can prevent us from misusing language and being genuinely puzzled. There is for example, a controversy among philosophers whether anyone can think or believe in self-contradictory propositions. Eric Toms says: "That an object may be said, or *even believed* both to have and not to have a certain property, every one knows to be possible, alas! Thus there is no problem about the actual occurrence of contradictions in language." (Being, Negation and Logic, p. 3: italics mine). Arthur Pap, on the other hand, argues thus: "Thus explicitly self-contradictory sentences do not

express anything that could possibly be believed; that there are round squares, for example, is not something, that could possibly be believed, and the impossibility is not just *psychological*. That somebody should believe both (and at the same time) p and not-p is itself a contradictory supposition. The frequent claim that people, alas, are capable of holding self-contradictory beliefs notwithstanding the statement, 'X believes at t that p and not-p' is itself self-contradictory" (Semantics and Necessary Truth, p. 173; author's italics). According to Nyāya this controversy can be easily solved. When any one believes that p and also believes that not-p, at least one of the beliefs has lapsed into a disposition; that is, one has forgotten that one believes that p or not-p. Pap uses the term 'belief' not in the sense of a disposition but in the sense of an actual mental state. This is clear from his emphasis on 'believing at the same time'. If 'belief' or 'believing' is used in a dispositional sense, then one can, and very often does, hold self-contradictory beliefs. Thus according to Nyāya both Toms and Pap are right, only Toms uses the term 'believe' in a dispositional sense, whereas Pap uses it in an episodic sense. Nyāya uses the terms 'cognition' ('cognition' and 'consciousness' are synonyms) 'belief', 'knowledge' etc. only in their episodic sense. For dispositions they use other terms, like 'traces' etc. Every actual state, cognitive or non-cognitive, has three moments, of origination, of duration and of cessation. Nyāya bases its theory of prevention on the moments of origination and duration. We may note here the following points.

(i) When one cognition originates it prevents the origination of any other cognition. In the case of introspective cognition of a first order cognition of

objects, the objective cognition first originates, then passes into its second phase of duration; it is only then that the second order introspective cognition originates. Thus when the introspective cognition comes into being the first order cognition endures, and hence is directly known in introspection. But the two cognitions cannot originate at the same time, and cannot endure at the same time.

(ii) Nyāya then calculates the strength of the conditions of different types of cognition. In every moment of waking life, there are conditions which *can* produce perceptual knowledge; i.e. the conditions which suffice to produce perceptual knowledge are always present. Yet we have other types of cognition, inferential, memory, etc. This means that when we have inferential cognition, the conditions which suffice to produce this cognition prevail over the conditions for perception of some object or the other. For as we have already seen the conditions of perception are always present, so whenever we infer or have a different type of cognition, the conditions of inference etc. have to prevail over the conditions of perception. For example, when I infer that there is a man in the next room, instead of performing this act of inference I could have perceived the table in the room where I am sitting. As conditions sufficient for perceiving some object or the other are always present, these conditions have to be subjugated if we are to have any other type of cognition. Here Nyāya gives the following rule: In the case of the same objective complex the conditions of perception *normally* prevail over conditions of other types of cognition; in the case of different objects, the conditions of inference prevail over the conditions of perception. Let us explain this rule.

According to Nyāya we can know the same objective complex in different ways. For example, we can know that there is fire on the hill by perception, by inference, or even by hearing words spoken by others. Suppose we are standing in front of the hill from where we can perceive that there is fire on the hill, and also from the perception of smoke we can infer that. When conditions for perception and inference are thus simultaneously present, normally we shall have the perceptual knowledge. But if we *want to infer*, then we shall have the inferential knowledge, not perception. The desire to infer what can at the same time be perceived will produce the inferential knowledge. When this desire to infer is not operative, i.e. is not an actual mental state, then we shall have the perceptual knowledge. But when sufficient conditions for perceiving an object are present, and also sufficient conditions for inferring a *different* objective complex are present simultaneously, it is the inference which will always take place, not the perception. Suppose I am standing in front of the hill, and sufficient conditions for the perception of the hill are present, and also sufficient conditions for inferring that there is fire on the hill are present at the same time: then according to Nyāya, I shall not see that this is a hill, but shall have the inferential knowledge that there is fire on the hill.

(iii) Now we come to the theory of cognitions of contradictory propositions. The question here is: Supposing that I have a cognition that S is P, can I also cognise that S is not P? When will one cognition prevent the occurrence of the cognition of a contradictory proposition? Thus here there are two cognitions: one preventing cognition, the other the prevented cognition, i.e. the cognition which is prevented from occurring

or originating. Nyāya enumerates the different characteristics of the preventing and the prevented cognitions of contradictory propositions.

Characteristics of the cognition which is prevented from occurring:

- (i) The cognition can be either true or false.
- (ii) It may or may not be attended with belief.
- (iii) It must not be a supposition.
- (iv) It must not be an ordinary perception, or an illusory perception due to any psycho-physical defect.
- (v) The cognition must have as its object a complex of the form 'aRb'.

Characteristics of the preventing cognition:

- (i) The cognition must be attended with belief.
- (ii) It may be either true or false; if false, it must not be known to be false.
- (iii) It must not be a supposition.
- (iv) It must be about the proposition which is contradictory to the proposition cognised by the prevented cognition.

Let us now explain these characteristics.

We first note that we are dealing here with cognitions of contradictory propositions only. A mere supposition of a proposition can neither prevent nor be prevented by a cognition of the contradictory proposition [characteristic (iii) of both]. If we suppose that S is P, then this supposition even when it endures as an actual mental state cannot prevent us from cognising or even knowing that S is not P. So also even if we know that S is P, even this knowledge will not be able to prevent

us from supposing that S is not P. The supposition, in this case, will be a contrary-to-fact supposition. Then an illusory perception cannot be prevented from occurring by any cognition of the contradictory proposition. For example, if we are suffering from jaundice, then even though we know (in the episodic sense of 'know') that the wall is not yellow, yet we shall see that the wall is yellow. Thirdly, the preventing cognition can be either true or false, but it must not be known to be false. Suppose that it is false that S is P, but we firmly believe that S is P. This firm belief (when it is an actual mental state) will prevent us from knowing the truth that S is not P. But if we know that our belief is false, then of course, we shall no longer hold it, i.e. shall withdraw our conviction in it; then this cognition which has been known to be false will not be able to prevent the occurrence of any cognition of the form 'S is not P'.

These are the three ways in which, according to Nyāya, the occurrence of a cognition can be prevented. Now let us see how the knowledge about the true nature of the self destroys the false cognitions about it, and thus liberates the person who has it.

Suppose, we who are in bondage believe firmly that the self is identical with the body. This is a false cognition which has to be cured by knowledge of the self as it really is. Suppose also that the self is not really identical with the body. Destroying the false cognition that the self is identical with the body means nothing but preventing the occurrence of this cognition in the self permanently. The method prescribed by Nyāya to achieve this result is this. First of all, we have to learn from someone who knows that the self is

not really identical with the body. Then we shall have to strengthen our belief in it by argument, and finally know the truth. Then we shall have to constantly meditate on this truth. Meditating on it is nothing but keeping the knowledge of truth constantly in mind; any one who desires liberation cannot afford to forget the truth even for a moment. The knowledge of the truth must not lapse into a disposition, for as a disposition it will not be able to prevent the false cognition from occurring and deluding us. When the false cognition has thus been blocked from occurring, meditation on the truth results in illumination or intuition of the truth. Thought collapses yielding place to an immediate apprehension of truth. This immediate apprehension of the real nature of the self may be called self-realisation. Ordinary men do not have self-realisation, because even though they they know that the self is not really identical with the body etc., still most of the time they forget it, and behave as if the contradictory were true. But Nyāya goes a step further and claims that this intuitive knowledge of the self is not the final stage, but is the penultimate stage leading automatically to the cessation of all consciousness and suffering. For consciousness which is due to the relation of the self to the inner sense ceases as soon as this relation is broken. The relation which is due to false cognition is destroyed by the intuitive knowledge of the nature of the self, etc. If this state of unconsciousness be the state of self-realisation, then it is not a state of knowledge. Self-realisation as a state of knowledge has the following characteristics:

(i) It comes as the culmination of intellectual and rational activity, like arguing, inferring etc.

(ii) It is a constantly actual mental state, which is not allowed to lapse into a disposition.

(iii) It is held with the greatest conviction.

(iv) It transforms the entire personality of the individual by completely dissociating the self from the body, the sense organs, the inner sense, etc. This it can do only because the self's association with the body is due to false cognitions about the nature of the self, the body, etc. And this ignorance is beginningless, though it ends with the attainment of liberation.

Finally we note the following points about the Nyāya theory of liberation:

(i) The process of liberation is a personal process; when a person is liberated is his personality which is totally transformed, but nothing else in the universe is affected. For although the self can be associated with the inner sense, the sense organs and the body, and can have objective cognitions only because it is ignorant, still this transcendental ignorance which is at the very root of objective consciousness, cannot in any way affect the knowledge of the reality of other objects of the world. This transcendental ignorance makes one ignorant only about the twelve objects listed above, and the ignorance about these objects is the cause of bondage. When one attains liberation he is rid of the wrong notions, but this does not mean that *all* objects have been wrongly cognised, or that the entire world is unreal. Objective consciousness is destroyed, but not the objective world.

(ii) Nyāya has therefore no difficulty in explaining how if one person is liberated, others remain in bondage. For when a person is liberated, there has



been a transformation only within himself; others remain unaffected by his transformation.

### 3. *The Theory of Advaita Vedānta*

According to Advaita Vedānta, the self is identical with pure consciousness which is not essentially related to any object, for it cannot be really related with anything. It is eternal and beyond all change, and is the highest reality. Empirical consciousness, however, is of objects. In order to explain the nature of empirical consciousness it becomes necessary for Advaita Vedānta to introduce some principle which will explain what cannot be a real relation. This is thought to be done by *māyā*. Thus every knowledge of objects, as distinct from the pure, transcendental consciousness, is based on a transcendental illusion. Owing to this transcendental illusion the self-shining consciousness is 'reflected' in the inner sense. This inner sense is according to Advaita, material, being an evolute of *māyā*, and is spread out, and hence can assume modes which are images of objects. The inner sense with consciousness reflected in it is the empirical self. This reflection of consciousness in the inner sense is due to the transcendental illusion, i.e. a false identification of the transcendental self with the material, unconscious inner sense. According to Advaita Vedānta, in perception of an external object the inner sense goes out to the object through the outlet of the sense organ and assumes the shape of the object with which the sense organ is in contact. This shape or modification of the inner sense is the *vṛtti* of the *antahkaraṇa*. This mode is illumined by consciousness and is known. This means that the relation between consciousness and the external object is mediated on both the sides. Consci-

ousness itself is not related with the object, only the inner sense which is illumined by consciousness is thus related. But again it is not the object itself which is related to consciousness as reflected in the inner sense, but only its image in the inner sense which is directly illumined by consciousness. Thus the inner sense acts as the medium where the subject and the object meet.

Now we come to an analysis of the subject-object relation when the object is internal. According to Advaita Vedānta, only external objects need to be copied by the inner sense in order to be presented to consciousness, but the copies themselves are known directly by the witnessing consciousness. The copy theory of knowledge will lead to an infinite regress if the copies themselves have to be copied in order to be known. So the witnessing consciousness is postulated which can and does know the internal states without the mediation of images.

This witnessing consciousness which is sometimes the direct awareness of the internal states is also objectless at times. Thus in deep dreamless sleep there is consciousness of sleep, but there is no object of consciousness. For even the internal states do not arise in deep sleep. This direct awareness is independent of the images and witnesses the passing away of one image and the origination of a new image. The images succeed one another, they are discrete, yet the finite self even in its finitude is a unity. There is a consciousness behind the changing states of the inner sense which remains unaffected by the change and knows everything that goes on in the mind. No one can deceive this consciousness which is the witness of all our mental states.

The witnessing consciousness reveals not merely the mental states but all objects either as known or as unknown. This is why when one knows a new object for the first time, he has the feeling that he is knowing an object hitherto unknown to him. This is possible only because the object was not merely unknown to him, but was known to be unknown to him. The knowledge that the object was unknown to him is the function of the witnessing consciousness.

Now if the witnessing consciousness reveals everything, subjective and objective, is infallible and unerring, then how is it that a finite individual still remains ignorant of the true nature of the self? We have already seen that Nyāya also faces the problem of explaining why a finite individual should not be omniscient. This problem arises in Nyāya because Nyāya conceives a finite self as omnipresent, and to solve this problem Nyāya had to postulate a special function of the body in the production of knowledge. Now Advaita Vedānta admits that the witnessing self is omniscient in a sense, for it has direct knowledge of everything. But this direct knowledge is not sufficient to make one omniscient in the true sense of the term. Omniscience should cancel all ignorance, but the type of omniscience which the witnessing consciousness enjoys cannot do this. Ignorance, according to Advaita Vedānta, is not mere absence of knowledge, but is false cognition. This false cognition can be cancelled only by a true cognition which involves modes of the inner sense. We have seen that the witnessing consciousness is direct consciousness which does not involve any mode of the inner sense. Hence it is incapable of cancelling ignorance. In order to attain liberation it is necessary to have an image of the ultimate reality i.e.

a mode of the inner sense. This is the last mode which the inner sense presents to the consciousness of the finite individual. This awareness of the ultimate reality which is identical with the transcendental subject cancels *māyā*, the principle of finitude, and the individual is liberated.

#### 4. *Comparison of the Nyāya and the Advaita Theories*

We first note the points of similarities which are rather unimportant.

(i) According to both Nyāya and Advaita, consciousness of objects has to cease if the individual is to be liberated. According to Nyāya this means that the liberated self has no consciousness at all; according to Advaita Vedānta, this means that the liberated self merges itself totally with the pure transcendental consciousness.

(ii) Both prescribe the same method for attaining liberation, i.e. *śravaṇa*, *manana* and *nididhyāsana*. The self is realised in its true nature by intuition which is the culmination of intense rational activity.

Now we note the points of difference between these two theories which are fundamental.

(i) According to Nyāya, the finite self is eternal and omnipresent. It cannot be destroyed. According to Advaita Vedānta, the finite self is essentially a mystery; an irrational and unreal relation of the pure consciousness with the material inner sense is at the root of its being. Liberation is not a continuation of the finite self in any form but the release of the pure consciousness from its association with the not-self.

The finite self being a product of *māyā* is beginningless but comes to an end when the self is liberated.

(ii) According to Nyāya, liberation is merely cessation of suffering; according to Advaita, it is not a negative state, but a state of pure bliss.

(iii) According to Nyāya, the intuitive knowledge of the self cancels false cognition when it is kept continually as an actual mental state, whereas according to Advaita Vedānta this final knowledge consists in having an image of the ultimate reality. According to Nyāya, the inner sense being atomic, there can be no image of anything whereas according to Vedānta, the inner sense is like a plastic substance which can assume shapes of objects, i.e. can have images.

(iv) According to Nyāya, the process of liberation is purely a personal affair which leaves the rest of the world unaffected, but according to Advaita Vedānta, this is a cosmic process. The ignorance which is the cause of bondage is also the cause of the world. So the process of destroying bondage is also the process of the dissolution of the world. But this gives rise to a problem for Advaita Vedānta. According to this theory the ultimate reality is one transcendental consciousness, the finite selves are many, for *māyā* which is involved in the constitution of the individual, though one, is yet the principle of multiplicity thus giving rise to a plurality of finite objects and finite subjects. If liberation is the cancellation of this principle, then liberation is also the dissolution of the world. If *māyā* is cancelled, then all finite objects and also all finite subjects should be annihilated. That is, the liberation of one person will be the end of everything, and the liberation

of one person will be the liberation of all. It is interesting to note that Sri Aurobindo who differed radically in his interpretation of *māyā* from the Advaita interpretation, accepted this consequence of the Advaita theory. He admitted that the liberation of one person is the liberation of all persons, and it is Sri Aurobindo who will liberate all mankind, indeed all forms of life, by his own *sādhana*. If *māyā* is destroyed (transformed) then not only one person but all persons are liberated. If *māyā* is not destroyed, then none is liberated. Personal liberation is thus impossible. Advaita Vedānta solves this difficulty by distinguishing between two types of *avidyā*, *tūlāvidyā* and *mūlāvidyā*. There is a type of *avidyā*, which attaches to the individual and is different from the universal cosmic *avidyā*. For the liberation of the individual it is sufficient to destroy his personal *avidyā*, not the universal *avidyā*. If this explanation of the Advaita school is accepted, then on this point, the difference between Nyāya and Advaita is considerably diminished. For now according to both, liberation is personal, and when a person attains liberation, the rest of the world remains unaffected. On other points their differences remain.

## ADVAITA COSMOLOGY

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*T. P. Ramachandran\**

### 1. *The Significance of Cosmology*

Within our private universes we find the phenomenon of birth, growth, and death. On the analogy of this, we presume that the world as a whole also must be subject to these changes. The attempt to explain the origin, growth, and end of the world is cosmology. Advaita is not interested in cosmology for its own sake. If the world is a mere appearance, there is really no point in discussing how it came into being or how it will end. Only to those who are ignorant of the non-dual Brahman does the question of the origin, growth, and dissolution of the world assume any positive meaning. The cosmological discussion, therefore, belongs to *aparā vidyā*. The Advaitin, however, welcomes the discussion, because it enables him partly to show the limitations of the rational approach to reality and partly to reveal that, in truth,

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there is neither the creation nor the dissolution of the world, but only its illusory appearance.

There are, in India, three theories in the main regarding the origin of the world, the Nyāya, the Sāṅkhya, and the Vedānta.

## 2. *The Nyāya Theory*

From common observation we know that for a thing to be produced, two types of causes are required, material and efficient. For a pot to be produced, clay is required as well as the agency of a potter. The Nyāya theory recognizes the operation of both an efficient and a material cause in the creation of the world. God is the efficient cause, and the primeval atoms of earth, water, fire, and air constitute the material cause.

There are two defects in this theory. (1) The relation between the efficient and the material causes is not properly conceived. Atoms are outside of God and co-exist with him. Īsvara has to work upon a given material. The clay is outside of, that is separate from, the potter. On the analogy of this, atoms are conceived as independent of Īsvara and co-eternal with him. If Īsvara were obliged to work upon a given material, his powers of creation would be limited. He cannot create according to his own plan. He cannot impose on the atoms any form he likes, but only those forms which the nature of the material admits of. Īsvara would not be infinite when face to face with an intractable material independent of him.

(2) The relation, again, between the material cause and the effect, as conceived by Nyāya, is not



satisfactory. According to Nyāya, the effect is non-existent in the cause and is produced newly. Origination of effects takes place by the conjunction of the parts, namely the atoms, in which the qualities of the effects are not already present. But how can something come out of anything if it is not already existent in that? And, if anything can come out of anything in which it is not already present, it amounts to disclaiming the need for a material cause for the production of an effect. The world certainly could not have been created even by God out of nothing.

### 3. *The Sāṅkhya Theory*

The Sāṅkhya theory of creation is an improvement upon the Nyāya in regard to the material cause. There must have been some primeval matter out of which the world evolved. The huge variety of the world must have been latent in that material cause before it was manifested. The Sāṅkhya calls this *mahat*, or *pradhāna*, or *prakṛti*. But Advaita calls it *māyā* for a reason which will be explained later. It is also called *avyakta*, or the unmanifest.

The merit of the Sāṅkhya theory is undermined by its denial of the need for an efficient cause. According to it, the world is born out of *pradhāna* without the agency of any intelligent being. This is unthinkable. How could insentient *prakṛti* by itself produce the world? In common life we observe that insentient things tend towards particular effects only when acted upon by intelligent beings. Clay does not become the pot without the agency of the potter, nor does a chariot move without being drawn by horses. From what is seen we determine what is not seen. The production of the world presupposes activity on the part of the

cause. And since a non-intelligent entity cannot act by itself, the cause of the world cannot be confined to the non-intelligent.'

Moreover, it is not observed in the world that things subserving the purposes of men, like houses, couches, etc., are made by any non-intelligent entity without being guided by an intelligent being. We observe, on the contrary, that such things having a design are made by workmen endowed with intelligence. Now, on the analogy of this, when we consider the vast and wondrous design of the world, 'of which most ingenious workmen cannot even form a conception in their minds,' it is clear how futile it is to argue that the world could have been created solely by a non-intelligent entity such as *pradhāna*.'

#### 4. *The Preliminary Advaita Theory:*

##### (i) *Brahma-pariṇāma-vāda*

The examination of the Sāṅkhya theory shows that the world requires an efficient cause for its production as much as a material cause. *Prakṛti* must have been acted upon by an intelligent being. Just as clay and similar substances are seen to fashion themselves into various forms if worked upon by potters and the like, so the *pradhāna* also is ruled by some intelligent principle.' What could have been the efficient cause of the world, except the universal consciousness which alone knows the whole world? This wonderful world, with all its order and arrangement, could not have come out of insentient *pradhāna* — or *māyā* as it is called in Advaita — without the agency of *Īśvara-caitanya*. Being insentient, *māyā* is dependent on the cosmic consciousness and cannot act of its own accord. Hence, according to Advaita, the complete

explanation of the world is to be found in *māyā* and *caitanya*.

At this stage, we have to make a departure from common experience. The clay is outside of, or separate from, the potter. But *māyā* cannot be separate from, *Īśvara-caitanya*. If it were separate from *caitanya*, the creative power of the efficient cause would be limited and contingent. But this is a consequence which directly goes against our conception of the universal consciousness. Thus, if we conceive of the material cause as separate from the efficient cause, the Advaita theory of creation would be subject to the same defect which vitiates the Nyāya theory of creation. Hence *māyā* is not separate from *caitanya*, but together with *caitanya* it constitutes the cause of the world. The universal consciousness in association with *māyā* is *Īśvara*, or *Saguṇa Brahman*.

In the *Bhagavad-gītā* (VII, 4-5) the Lord refers to these two aspects of his own nature. *Māyā* is called his lower nature (*aparā prakṛti*) and *caitanya*, his very life, his higher nature (*parā prakṛti*), because it is the latter which controls the former. *Māyā* is also called the *kṣetra*, because it is the matter on which he works, and himself, i.e. *caitanya*, the *kṣetrajña* because it is he who knows this entire *kṣetra*.

Since *māyā* is part of *Īśvara*, it is completely under his control just as the magician's spell is completely under his control and does not obstruct his knowledge. Again, since *māyā* is part of *Īśvara*, *Īśvara* is the whole and sole origin of the universe. Since *Īśvara* evolves the world out of himself, he is referred to in the Upaniṣads as the material and the efficient cause of the world rolled into one *Cabhinna-nimitta-*

*upādāna-kāraṇa*). To convey the idea, the example of the spider weaving its web out of its own body is given in the place of the potter making the pot.<sup>6</sup>

On the analogy of the creation of the things of common experience, we can conceive of three stages in the evolution of the world of names and forms out of the *māyā* element of Īsvara.<sup>7</sup> At one stage, the diversity of the world is unmanifest in *māyā*, as the pots and jugs are in the lump of clay or the branches, leaves, etc., of a tree are in the seed. At another stage, the diversity is fully manifest, i.e. all the latent possibilities have come into full view. There is also an intermediate stage, when diversity is partially manifest, or in the process of being manifested. When the diversity of the world remains unmanifest in Īsvara, we call it *māyā*. When it becomes manifest, we call it the world (*jagat*).

Any change in the adjunct is commonly attributed by us to the substratum to which it belongs. Since *māyā* is the adjunct of Saguna Brahman, the latter has been said to pass through the unmanifest, the partially manifest, and the fully manifest conditions. The passage of Īsvara through these three states has been compared to the passage of the *jīva* through the three states of deep sleep, dream, and waking. The first stage is when ultimate consciousness is in relation to unmanifest *māyā*. It is in this condition that ultimate consciousness is called Īsvara. It corresponds to Prājñā, which is the *jīva* in the state of deep sleep. The second stage is when consciousness is in relation to *māyā* in its partially manifest condition. Ultimate consciousness is then known by three names, Prāṇa, Hiraṇyagarbha, and Sūtrātman. This corresponds to

Taijasa, which is the name given to the *jīva* in the state of dream. Lastly, we have consciousness in relation to fully diversified *māyā*. This is known as Vaiśvānara and Virāj, and corresponds to Visva, or the *jīva* in the state of waking.<sup>9</sup>

Now on the analogy of the things of the world which have birth, we presume that if the world has a beginning, it must have an end also. Again, on the analogy of common things, we presume that the end of the world is reabsorption into the original cause. When gold ornaments are melted, they do not go into nothingness. On the contrary, they are reduced to the original mass of gold. According to the law of conservation of mass, matter is neither destroyed nor newly created. It is only changed from one form to another. In the same way, *māyā* goes from the unmanifest to the manifest condition and returns from the manifest to its original unmanifest condition. Therefore the world is not destroyed, but must eventually be reabsorbed in Brahman.<sup>9</sup>

The order in which the world is evolved is speculated upon in detail in the Upaniṣads. The subtle elements are first produced. Out of *māyā* evolves ether, from ether evolves air, from air fire, from fire water, and from water earth. Then, by a process of mixing up, these subtle elements become gross elements. The gross elements, again, become the various objects of the world including the bodies of living beings. The order of dissolution naturally will be the reverse of that of creation.<sup>10</sup> The details relating to dissolution are found in the Purāṇas. All living beings die, and their bodies break up into the gross elements. The gross elements then resolve into their corresponding

subtle elements. The subtle elements are then successively withdrawn. Earth is reduced to water, water to fire, fire to air, air to ether, and ether goes back to the original unmanifest condition, *māyā*.

These details relating to creation and dissolution by themselves are of no consequence to man's release from bondage. Śrī Śaṅkara says that it is neither observed nor is it heard from scripture that the goal of man in any way depends on these matters (*na hi tatpratibaddhaḥ kaścit puruṣārthaḥ drśyate śrūyate vā*).<sup>11</sup> That they are not intended for positive information is clear from the very conflicts from which the various accounts of creation suffer.<sup>12</sup> They are intended, on the contrary, to suggest the superiority of Īśvara over the created world. This is evident from the fact that, although the Vedānta passages relating to creation may be conflicting with regard to the order of the things created, they do not conflict with regard to the creator.<sup>13</sup> Hence Śrī Śaṅkara says that a conflict of statements regarding the world would not really matter, since the creation of the world and similar topics are not what scripture wishes to teach. (*bhaved-āpi kāryasya vigītatvaṁ apratipādyatvāt. na hi ayaṁ sṛṣṭyādi-prapañcaḥ pratipipādayiṣitaḥ*).<sup>14</sup> In whatever way we explain the process of evolution, the conclusion that follows inevitably from the fact of admitting the evolution of the world out of Īśvara is that Īśvara is eternal, unlike the world.

So far as our ordinary experience goes, we find that the evolutes of a substance have only a limited existence, whereas the source has a relatively permanent existence. For example, the ornaments created out of gold come into being at a particular time, and

at some time or other they are reduced to a mass of gold again. So the ornaments have a beginning and an end in time. On the contrary, gold as such continues to exist without either beginning or end whatever the changes that come upon it. When gold is made into ornaments, gold is not destroyed. It continues as the ornaments. Hence it is eternal in the sense that its identity is not destroyed, although it undergoes changes. This relative eternality is what is called *pariṇāmīnityatva*. Now, on the same analogy, the world which is evolved out of *māyā* and resolved into it has a beginning and an end in time. But, *māyā*, which is both the origin and the end of the world, neither begins to exist (*anādi*) nor ceases to exist (*ananta*) at any point of time. It continues to exist, though it repeatedly undergoes changes. The world is within the time-process, but *māyā* is outside of it, since time itself is a product of *māyā*. It is *pariṇāmīnitya*, i.e. eternal in the sense that its identity is not destroyed, although it undergoes changes.

Since *māyā* is part of *Īsvara* and is not outside of him, what applies to *māyā* must apply to *Īsvara* as a whole. So *Īsvara*, or Saguna Brahman, is beginningless and endless. As *māyā* in its distributive aspect is part of the *jīva*, the *jīva* too has no beginning or end in time, although it passes through several states. But neither *māyā* nor the *jīva* nor *Īsvara* is unrelated to time. *Māyā*, the *jīva*, and *Īsvara* are called eternal only in relation to the created world. *Māyā* comes to an end and the conceptions of *Īsvara* and the *jīva* get radically transformed when the timeless Nirguṇa Brahman is realized. Nirguṇa Brahman, which is the substratum of the notions of *māyā*, *Īsvara*, and the *jīva*, alone is eternal in the real sense of the term. Since it is free

from *māyā*, the categories of time and change do not apply to it at all. It is *kūṭasthanitya*, eternal without undergoing any change at all. Brahman is called *Kūṭastha*, or the immutable, because, like the anvil (*kūṭa*), it does not undergo any change though it serves as the support for changes.<sup>15</sup> As we shall see in the sequel, the ultimate purpose of all Vedānta texts relating to creation is to reveal the real nature of the 'cause' as the non-dual Brahman, the knowledge of which leads to release.<sup>16</sup>

### 5. *Difficulties of Brahma-pariṇāma-vāda*

In the traditional method of teaching Advaita, the theory of Brahman evolving the world out of itself is only preliminary to the theory of the appearance of Brahman as the world (*Brahma-vivartavāda*). *Pariṇāma-vāda* is offered as a concession to the ordinary mind in order to enable it to understand the real teaching through stages. One theory of creation may be more plausible than another, but none can overcome certain fundamental difficulties inherent in the very conception of change. Other theories are criticized and a relatively satisfactory theory is offered just to give provisional satisfaction. But once this end is achieved, the student is made to see the difficulties implied in the notion of the actual origin of the world. He is thereby led into the probability of the theory of the illusory appearance of the world.

(1) The distinction between cause and effect is relative. That which is the cause in the respect of its effect is itself an effect with regard to something else. An uncaused cause, or a first cause, is an unwarranted assumption. If Brahman is the cause of the world, Brahman too must have a cause. But if we posit a



cause to Brahman, it would take away from the infinite character of Brahman, and the process of tracing one cause to another would also be endless. On the contrary, if Brahman is uncaused, there is no reason why we should not think of the world also as uncaused.

(2) Let us waive the above objections. Let us assume that the world is an effect and that God is the cause of it. But, then, what is the purpose of creation? The answers usually given are not quite convincing.

In the first place, it may be said that to attribute a purpose to God is to make him finite. *Īsvara* is infinite. He has nothing left unachieved. To think that *Īsvara* is motivated by any unfulfilled desire in putting forth the world is to make him look finite. But, then, we do not find in the world any conscious activity without a proper motive. If *Īsvara* has no purpose, how do we explain creation.<sup>17</sup>

One answer is to say that although God has no purpose of his own, he creates the world for our sake. He creates it so that the souls of different grades may have a suitable environment where they will reap their proper rewards and punishments and get released from bondage. He thus creates the world with a high altruistic motive. (The same altruism is said to be present in the act of dissolution. In dissolving the world, *Īsvara* is actuated purely by the desire to give the transmigrating souls a spell of rest.) This is the view of those who regard *Īsvara* as the operative cause only, e.g., the *Māhesvaras*, the *Sāṅkhya-Yogins*, and the *Vaiśeṣikas*.<sup>18</sup>

The main objection that might be raised against this view is that even if the Lord is assumed to create

the world with an altruistic motive, he cannot be regarded as perfect. Every deliberate action, whether done for one's own sake or for the sake of someone else, springs from some imperfection, some feeling of non-fulfilment.<sup>19</sup>

To avoid this difficulty, Vedānta provisionally suggests that creation is the sport (*līlā*) of the Lord.<sup>20</sup> God does not create the world for the sake of any set purpose, either his own or that of the *jīvas*. Creation is simply the spontaneous self-expression of his nature and comes to him as naturally as breathing. This does not mean, however, that God creates the world in a desultory way. He creates it with due regard to moral justice.<sup>21</sup> He designs the world in such a way that it serves as the stage where the *jīvas* will reap their rewards and punishments at the proper time and in the exact measure.<sup>22</sup> He creates it with a moral *view*, though not with a moral *aim*. But this cannot be the final explanation, as there are other difficulties yet to be solved.

If it is said that the world is created with a view to requiting the *jīva's* deeds, the present creation must have been preceded by another in which the deeds were done. Similarly, that creation itself must have occurred with a view to requiting deeds done in a creation previous to it. Thus each creation presupposes a previous one. By the same logic, each creation necessitates a subsequent one also. At the time of dissolution, the *jīvas* could not have reaped all the rewards and punishments that are due to them. During the period of *laya*, or latency of the world, the *jīvas* lie in a state of rest. In order to provide for the arrears of requital, there is need for a fresh creation when the *jīvas* can body forth

as the different orders of living beings according to their respective remainders of moral merits. But the next creation, while requiting previous deeds, creates fresh opportunities of *karma*; and, since during the next dissolution there are unrequited remainders, there is, again, need for creation. Thus the creation of the world, which is closely connected with the transmigration of souls, is, like the latter, beginningless and endless.<sup>23</sup> Further, since the pattern of behaviour of the *jīvas* is the same in every cycle of creation, influenced as it is by past behaviour, it follows that the particulars in each creation are exactly the same as in previous creations.<sup>24</sup>

At *sūtras* II, 1, 35 and 36, the *Brahma-sūtra* employs the argument of a beginningless (and endless) creation against the opponent who questions the possibility of *karma* being the criterion for creation. The argument is of course useful in silencing the critic and is employed there for this specific purpose, but Vedānta does not regard this as the final explanation. The theory of a beginningless and endless series does not satisfy the human reason. It is the tendency of thought to search for the origin and end of every process.

There is another difficulty. The theory of beginningless and endless cycles of creation also involves the idea that creation and dissolution alternate with each other at regular periods. At the beginning of a world-period or *kalpa*, God creates the world, and at the end of it he resolves it. Why creation takes place at definite intervals is not explained by saying that the act of creation is sportive. The theory of sportive creation (*līlā-vāda*) is at best poetic and figurative and not logical.

Thus, if we regard the world as actually created, no convincing reason can be given as to why there is creation. We are, therefore, led on to conclude that creation must be illusory. We need not be worried over the problem of purpose, if we can understand the true import of the texts relating to creation. Hence in his commentary on *Brahmasūtra* II, 1, 33 Śrī Śaṅkara, after explaining the provisional answer that the creative act of the Lord is the spontaneous expression of his nature, finally remarks that we must not forget that the scriptural statement relating to creation does not refer to the highest reality; it refers to the world of activities, which is characterized by name and form called up by ignorance, and it is intended for propounding the truth that Brahman is the ground (self) of everything. (*na ca iyaṁ paramārthaviśayā sṛṣṭi-śrutiḥ avidyākalpita-nāmarūpa-vyavahāragocaratvāt, brahmātma-bhāva-pratipādanaparatvāt ca, iti etat api naiva vismartavyam.*)<sup>21</sup>

(3) If we acquiesce in the doctrine of creation, we shall have to face a further difficulty. What happens to Brahman when the world is evolved out of it? Is it affected in any way? The answer to this question depends on the relation between *caitanya* and *māyā*. We have to decide whether there is really a relation or not. If there is no relation, either external or internal, either conjunction (*saṁyoga*) or inherence (*samavāya*), then, of course what *māyā* undergoes cannot affect *caitanya*. But in the absence of a relation, *i.e.* if the two are simply juxtaposed, we cannot understand how *caitanya* can activate *māyā*. Our assumption that *māyācaitanya* makes *māyā* go forth into diverse forms necessitates our thinking of a relation between them. But, if we regard them as related, we cannot

escape the consequence that what affects *māyā* must certainly affect *caitanya*. Well, let us accept this consequence. But, then, if *caitanya* undergoes change, it cannot know *māyā* exactly as it is. An efficient cause must know its material fully in order to manipulate it. For, a subject in knowledge must remain identical with itself if it must know the object. The object may change; but if the subject also undergoes change, it can never be the witness of the change in the object. A changing subject is no subject at all. Apart from this, Brahman at any rate cannot be admitted to undergo change, for a changing Brahman cannot be infinite.

This is a serious problem that confronts all the advocates of Saguṇa Brahman as the ultimate reality. The answer that is uniformly advanced by them is though *māyā* undergoes change, *caitanya* which activates it somehow remains identical. The relation is represented as one of identity in difference. Various analogies are given to lend plausibility to this view. Śrī Rāmānuja, for instance, says that God is the soul of which the material objects and individual souls compose the body. Just as the soul controls the body from within, so God controls matter and souls. The soul, we know, is not affected by the bodily changes and imperfections. A man's body passes through different stages in life, like childhood, manhood, and old age, and is subject to disease and death; and yet he remains the same individual in life, and the soul retains its identity after death. Similarly, God is not affected by the changes in the universe. Another analogy employed by Śrī Rāmānuja is that of the king and his subjects. The king is not affected by the pleasures and pains suffered by the subjects consequent on their obeying or disobeying his laws."<sup>6</sup>

Now, although for ordinary practical purposes, we have to admit the co-presence of identity and difference in the same phenomenon, the concept of identity in difference does not stand to reason. We may speak of change in one thing and identity in another thing. But to say that that same phenomenon is both identical and changing is a contradiction. If, to avoid the difficulty, we say that one aspect of the object is identical and the other aspect is changing, the two would be strictly speaking, not two aspects of one and the same object, but two distinct objects merely juxtaposed. If they are to be regarded as aspects of one object, they should be in some way connected — in which case, any change in one aspect is bound to affect the other. Either we give up the notion of identity in difference or we cease to assert the unitary character of the phenomenon. We cannot have it both ways. We cannot maintain both change and identity in respect of a thing without driving a wedge in the character of the thing such that it is regarded as a conjunction of two things. Hence to the same Brahman the two qualities of being subject to modification and of being free from it cannot both be ascribed.<sup>27</sup>

The opponent of Vedānta may utilize this difficulty to question the claim that Brahman is the cause of the world. At *Brahma-sūtra* II, 1, 26 the objection occurs that Brahman cannot be the cause of the world; for, if the whole Brahman goes into the effect, we shall have to admit that Brahman consists of parts. But in his commentary on the next *sūtra* Śrī Śaṅkara points out that the aforesaid difficulty only indicates that creation cannot be real; it does not mean that Brahman changes as a whole or that it consists of parts. The Upaniṣads declare that Brahman is beyond change

and is also devoid of parts. As regards Brahman, scripture is the only authority. It is true that the Upaniṣads also speak of the creation of the universe out of Brahman. But whereas modification is a matter of sense perception, scripture denies Brahman being an object of the senses. Hence modification cannot belong to Brahman. It belongs only to the world of names and forms. Thus, as the alleged creation of the world does not touch the underlying reality, namely Brahman, creation is non-real; it is a figment of nescience. Brahman is supposed to become subject to modification only through ignorance. The texts relating to transformation are not meant to establish transformation as a fact, for no fruit is seen to result from such a knowledge. On the contrary, they are meant to establish the truth that Brahman, which is beyond all phenomenal processes, is the self of everything, that being an instruction which has a result of its own. (*na ca iyaṁ pariṇāma-śrutiḥ pariṇāma-pratipādanārthā, tat-pratipattau phalānavagamāt. sarvavyavahārahīna-brahmātma-bhāva-pratipādanārthā tu eṣā tat-pratipattau phalāvagamāt.*)<sup>23</sup>

## 2. *The Final Advaita Theory: (ii) Brahma-vivarta-vāda*

*Pariṇāma-vāda* assumes that *māyā* is somehow related with *caitanya*; for without a relation *māyā* cannot go forth into production, as it cannot act of its own accord. But we have just now seen that to admit a real relation between *māyā* and *caitanya* would be to stultify the very concept of Brahman by introducing into it the idea of change and division. Hence we are forced to conclude that there can be no real relationship between *māyā* and *caitanya*.

Now, if the relation between *māyā* and *caitanya* is illusory, it must be because one of the relata is illusory.

The question is whether *māyā* or *caitanya* is illusory. The test of non-contradiction will determine this question. Whatever is variable is non-real. That which persists alone is real. *Māyā* is the element of difference and *caitanya* that of identity. While *māyā* contains elements of diversity and undergoes modification, *caitanya* persists unaffected. Hence it is *māyā* which is non-real. Consciousness, or *caitanya*, emerges as the sole reality. It is because of its illusory character that the name *māyā* has been applied to the former. *Māyā* is that which (*yā*) is not (*mā*). The term *māyā* signifies that matter only appears, but is not real. But even an illusory appearance must have a real basis. Since the only entity other than *māyā* is *caitanya*, or consciousness, we conclude that *caitanya* is the basis for the appearance of *māyā*, or matter. The relation between *caitanya* and *māyā*, therefore, is not one of identity *in* difference, but identity *with the appearance of* difference. Identity alone is real. Difference is a non-real superimposition on identity. But, since the term 'identity' is relative to the term 'difference', strictly speaking, it is not correct to describe *caitanya* as identity. It would be more proper to refer to it as non-difference (*advaita*).

Brahman as pure consciousness (*cinmātra*) is unconnected with the idea of creation. It is only as associated with *māyā* that Brahman can be said to evolve the world out of itself. But, since the association is illusory, there is no actual evolution (*pariṇāma*) of Brahman into the world, as of milk into curd. There is only an illusory appearance (*vivarta*) of Brahman as the world, like the appearance of the rope as the snake. Hence Brahman is not in the least affected by the so-called evolution and reabsorption of the world. To quote Śrī Śaṅkara, 'The cause is not affected by the effect



and its qualities, because the latter are the mere fallacious superimpositions of nescience, and the very same argument holds good with reference to reabsorption also.' (... *kāryasya taddharmāṇām ca avidyādhyāropitāt tvāt na taiḥ kāraṇam samsrjyata iti, apītau apī saḥ samānaḥ*).<sup>29</sup>

The meaning of *māyā* also undergoes a revision at this stage. *Māyā* is not the material cause of the *jagat* but only the principle of its appearance. It is the ignorance which makes us think that the world is real and is actually created.<sup>30</sup>

*Māyā*, or the principle of appearance, falsely associates itself with pure consciousness both at the cosmic and at the individual levels. In association with the whole of *māyā*, pure consciousness appears as *Īsvara* and in association with parts of *māyā*, it appears as the different *jīvas*. By reason of association with *māyā*, both *Īsvara* and the *jīva* appear to undergo changes, which actually belong only to the adjunct, *māyā*. *Īsvara* is associated with the evolution, subsistence, and involution of the universe; and the *jīva* is connected with the parallel states of waking, dream, and deep sleep. The parallelism, to which we have already referred, has been worked out in great detail by some Advaita writers, Sadānanda for instance. The significance of the parallelism is that bereft of *māyā* the distinction between *Īsvara* and the *jīva* and between their respective experiences would disappear and that, therefore, the essence of the two entities is the same, viz. pure consciousness.

The theory known as *vivarta-vāda* brings out that the cosmic process, consisting of creation, subsistence, and dissolution, is not real. This, however, does not

mean that the cosmic process is unreal. Whatever is perceived cannot be unreal. It is true that the cosmic process is not open to the perception of human beings. But it cannot be argued that what cannot be perceived by men is not open to the perception of divine beings, or gods. *Śruti* and *smṛti* declare more than once that just as the obstruction to the manifestation of knowledge becomes successively less in the case of ordinary creatures from a clump of grass to men, knowledge, glory, etc. become increasingly manifest at each successive stage counting from men themselves to Hiraṇyagarbha. Hence, although the creation and dissolution of the universe are not perceived by human beings, they are known and remembered by gods, like Hiraṇyagarbha.<sup>11</sup> The world process continues to appear real and goes on unimpeded so long as one has not realized the truth that *caitanya* has simply nothing to do with *māyā*. For one who has overcome ignorance, however, there is no more creation and dissolution and no more birth in this world.

### 7. *The Rationale of the Two-Stage Explanation*

If the concept of Saguṇa Brahman and the acts of creation, etc. of the world is non-real, why does scripture describe this at length and discard it later? The answer to this consists first in denying the assumption that it is scripture which puts forward the doctrine of Saguṇa Brahman and creation. On the contrary, it is the common mind which, in ignorance, entertains the notion of a qualified Brahman evolving the world out of itself, sustaining it, and reabsorbing it into itself. There are of course other common notions — such as the world emanating from a blind *prakṛti* and that of God making the world out of a given material like

atoms — to which we have referred. But the evolution of the world out of Brahman itself, being relatively the most plausible of the common theories of the world's origin, scripture utilizes it as a stepping stone to the doctrine of Nirguṇa Brahman and the illusory appearance of the world.

That scripture does not intend to teach both the view of Brahman as actually producing the world and the view of it as the substrate of an illusion is evident from the fact that, while it declares that the cognition of Brahman as unchanging leads to release, no authority can be found to show that the cognition of Brahman as transforming itself into the world has such an independent result.<sup>22</sup> Moreover, the introductory and the concluding clauses (*upakrama* and *upasaṁhāra*) of the passages about creation and the like show that such passages are intended only to introduce the teaching of the real nature of Brahman.<sup>23</sup>

The notion of the non-dual Brahman appearing as the world of diversity is too unfamiliar to be understood in the first instance itself. Therefore in discussing the notion of the actual evolution of the world out of Brahman, scripture only intends to take the student carefully from the familiar to the unfamiliar. Śrī Śaṅkara says that scripture cannot speak about an unknown thing without having recourse to conventional words and their meanings. (*na ca laukika-pada-padārthāśrayaṇa-vyatirekeṇa āgamena śakyam ajñātaṁ vastvantaraṁ avagamayitum.*)<sup>24</sup> He draws attention to the sound principle that the conclusion should be stated after refuting the faulty standpoints. (*nirākṛtasya hi pūrvapakṣaṁ paścāt siddhāntaḥ vaktavyaḥ bhavati...*)<sup>25</sup>

The methodology of the Upaniṣads is summed up by Śrī Śaṅkara as follows. 'In all the Upaniṣads first

identity is broached, then by means of illustrations and reasons the universe is shown to be a modification or part or the like of the Supreme Self, and the conclusion again brings out the identity.' (*sarvāsu hi upaniṣatsu pūrvam ekatvam pratijñāya, drṣṭāntaiḥ hetubhiḥ ca paramātmanah vikārāmsāditvam jagataḥ pratipādyā, punaḥ ekatvam upasamharati.*)<sup>56</sup>

Hence *pariṇāma-vāda* is a necessary preliminary to *vivarta-vāda*.<sup>57</sup> No one can properly understand the theory of *vivarta*, or illusory appearance, without having thoroughly thought himself into the difficulties as well as the logical implications of *pariṇāma-vāda*. This is the justification for the discussion in Advaita philosophy of the theory of the actual evolution of the world.

*Pariṇāma-vāda* leads to *vivarta-vāda* in both a negative and a positive way. By showing up its own inner contradictions and paradoxes, it suggests that creation, after all, is an illusion. We have examined some of these contradictions. We cannot indeed resolve these contradictions at the rational level. But we do transcend them when we realize that the doctrine of creation is but a product of ignorance.

In a more direct way also *pariṇāma-vāda* leads to *vivarta-vāda*. The ultimate significance of the causal category (as we have said elsewhere) is that it shows that the effect is really non-different from the cause. Causation cannot imply any change in substance. Nor can a change in form be regarded as a real change. Hence the evolution of the effect is but an appearance. The cause alone is real. The effect is only a superimposition on the cause. Hence the effect has no existence apart from the cause. It cannot appear without its basis, the cause. So, even if we begin by regarding the

world as an actual evolute of Brahman, the ultimate implication of this view is that the world is an appearance and is non-different from Brahman, the only reality. Thus, by means of examples such as that of clay (as in the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, VI, 1, 4-6) scripture intends to teach that the world-effect is really non-different from Brahman, the cause, which is the only reality. An effect, being illusory, is non-different from its cause, not only before 'production', but even after that. Hence scripture declares that the world is non-different from Brahman before and after 'origination'.<sup>28</sup>

## NOTES

1. ...*pravṛtṭyamupapatteḥ api hetoḥ na acetanam jagat-kāranam anumātavyam bhavati: Brahmasūtra Śāṅkara Bhāṣya* (hereafter abbreviated as *BŚB*), II, 2, 2.

2. *tathā idam jagad-akhilam...sambhāvitatamaḥ śilpibhiḥ manasāpi ālocayitum aśakyam sat katham acetanam pradhānam racayet?: BŚB, II, 2, 1.*

3. *vide BŚB, II, 2, 1.*

4. Śrī Śāṅkara's *Bhagavadgītābhāṣya*, VII, 25.

5. *Bhagavadgītā*, VII, 6.

6. *vide Muṇḍaka Up. I. 1, 7; Bṛhadāraṇyaka Up., II, 1, 20; Svetāśvatara Up., VI, 10.*

7. *vide Sadānanda, Vedāntasāra* (ed. M. Hiriyanna), pp. 3-7.

8. *ibid.*,

9. *vide Pañcadaśī*, VI, 182-85.

10. *vide Brahmasūtra*, II, 3, 14 and Śrī Śāṅkara's commentary thereon.

11. *BŚB I, 4, 14.*

12. *vide BŚB, I, 4, 14.*

13. *satyapi prativedāntam sṛjyamāneṣu ākāśādiṣu kramādi-dvārake vigāne na sraṣṭari kiñcit vigānamasti: BŚB, I, 4, 14.*

14. *BŚB, I, 4, 14.*

15. *vide Pañcadaśī, VI, 22.*
16. *vide Mūṇḍūkya-kārikā, III, 15 and Śrī Śaṅkara's commentary thereon.*
17. *vide Brahma-sūtra, I, 1, 32.*
18. *vide BŚB, II, 2, 37.*
19. *na hi kaścit adoṣa-prayuktaḥ svārthe parārthe vā pravartamānaḥ dṛśyate: BŚB, II, 2, 37.*
20. *vide Brahma-sūtra, II, 1, 33 and Śrī Śaṅkara's commentary thereon.*
21. *vide Brahma-sūtra, II, 1, 34 and Śrī Śaṅkara's commentary thereon.*  
*vide Svetāśvatara Up., V. 5.*
22. *asya jagataḥ ... prati-niyata-deśa-kāla-nimitta-kriyā-phalāśrayasya...: BŚB, I, 1, 2.*
23. *vide BŚB, II, 1, 35-6.*
24. *vide BŚB, I, 3, 30.*
25. *BŚB, II, 1, 33. cf. Śrī Śaṅkara's Bhagavadgītābhāṣya, IX, 10.*
26. *Śrībhāṣya, II, 1, 14.*
27. *na hi eksya brahmaṇaḥ pariṇāma-dharmatvaṃ tad-rahitatvaṃ ca śakyaṃ pratipattum: BŚB, II, 1, 14.*
28. *BŚB, II, 1, 27.*
29. *BŚB, II, 1, 9.*
30. *avidyātmikā hi bījaśaktiḥ...: BŚB, I, 4, 3.*
31. *vide BŚB, I, 3, 30.*
32. *na ca yathā brahmaṇa utmaikatva-darśanaṃ mokṣa-sādhanaṃ, evaṃ jagad-ākāra-pariṇāmitva-darśanaṃ api svatantrameva kasmaicit phalāyābhipreyaḥ, pramāṇābhāvāt: BŚB, II, 1, 14.*
33. *...upakramopasañhārābhyāṃ tatra tatra brahma-viśayaiḥ vākyaiḥ sūkamekavākyatāyā gamyamānatvāt: BŚB, I, 4, 14.*
34. *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣadbhāṣya, II, 1, 20.*
35. *Mūṇḍakopaniṣadbhāṣya, I, 1, 3.*
36. *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣadbhāṣya, II, 1, 20.*
37. *vivartavādasya hi pūrvabhūmiḥ vedāntavāde pariṇāma-vādaḥ: Sarvajñātmanamuni, Saṅkṣepaśārīraka, II, 61.*
38. *Chāndogyopaniṣad, III, 14, 1.*

## LANGUAGE, SENTENCES AND BRAHMAN IN ADVAITA VEDĀNTA

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### I

In view of the importance gained by the philosophy of analysis, we would like to enquire into the question: How are we to understand the meaning of the word 'Brahman', which is the principal theme of the *Brahma-sūtras* or *Vedānta-sūtras* of Bādarāyaṇa? We all know that there are many levels of language, and each level gives its own insight into the situation. The poetic language, the mystic language, the common-sense language, and the scientific language differ among themselves in describing a situation or an object. And all these descriptions are made in sentences or propositions. We know that Brahman of Vedānta is neither a situation (*paristhiti*) nor an object (*vastu*). If so, through what kind of proposition or sentence is it expressed and how do we know it?

Brahman, according to Śaṅkara, is not known by any other *pramāṇa* except through the *Veda*. The desire to know Brahman arises only by reading the

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*Veda*; and non-reading or non-acquaintance with the *Veda* does not lead to the desire to know Brahman. Why will then anyone desire to know Brahman? All the Vedāntins maintain that the word 'Brahman' conveys some meaning or the other, and the sentences in which the word occurs also conveys some meaning. In other words, all the Vedānta sentences, according to the Vedāntins, convey some meaning, just as the Vedic sentences convey some meaning to the Mīmāṃsakas. Its meaning becomes clearer when we observe the syntactical connection of this word with other familiar words in the Vedic and Vedāntic sentences. Etymology and grammar also come to our aid. Śaṅkara first adopts the etymological method, then attributes some meaning to the word Brahman, and then by the technique of amplification of the meaning (*viśr̥tārtha*) several attributes such as *sat*, *cit* and *ānanda* are predicated of it. Thus for example, when we come across the Vedic sentence "*satyam jñānam anantam brahma*," these attributes are first predicated of Brahman only for the purpose of our understanding it.

The main objection against this basic assumption of Śaṅkara is as follows. The conception so arrived at through etymology and amplification of it shows only that the existence of such a thing is possible (*sambavanā-mātrabuddhi*) and does not establish the existence of such a thing. But if we once know that the existence of such a thing is possible, then we can investigate into the nature of it (*pratīpanna-vastu-vicāra*). Non-assumption of its existence cannot lead to its enquiry. Similarly, enquiry cannot be made into the absolutely non-existent things. This has some bearing on the three-fold classification of *sattā* (*sattātraya*) — the absolute reality, the phenomenal reality and the illusory reality.



In the *Brahmasūtra-bhāṣya* Śaṅkara presents a very interesting discussion about the possibility and impossibility of Brahman-investigation (*brahma-vicāra*). He asks: (i) Is Brahman known? (ii) Is Brahman unknown? (iii) If Brahman is known, then there is no need to inquire about it. (iv) If Brahman is unknown, no enquiry can be made about an unknown entity and any attempt made in that direction would be futile.

Śaṅkara says that Brahman is an existent entity (*bhūta-vastu*) and it is not unknown (*aprasiddha*). It is *svataḥsiddha* (self-existent); and as 'ahampratyaya' — I am, it is self-evident to the whole world (*sarvaloka-pratyakṣa*). Scripture also declares, "Brahman is this self" (*ayam-ātmā brahma*). Since Brahman is not entirely unknown (*atyanta-aprasiddhi-abhāva*), it can become a topic for discussion.

Let us see to what extent Śaṅkara is aware of the modern viewpoint of philosophy. If philosophical analysis is intended and directed to "remove ambiguities, paradoxes, perplexities and clarify the concepts." Śaṅkara seeks to attain this goal. In this connection we would like to focus our attention on some of the important issues connected with the language — the propositions through which Brahman is expressed.

Is there any empirical anchorage of the word Brahman? For Śaṅkara, the *ahampratyaya*, or the self-awareness which everyone has, suggests some empirical base for the existence of Brahman. But, immediately Śaṅkara takes note of the special features of Brahman and says that there is nothing similar to Brahman and that Brahman is not different from anything. This is a paradox; and Śaṅkara is aware of this paradox; and the whole effort of his philosophical activity is to remove this paradox. The sentences in which

Brahman-Ātman identity is sought to be established are intended to remove the imagined differences due to nescience (*avidyā-kalpita-bhrānti*). The purpose of Vedānta, according to Śaṅkara, is to remove the difference among the knower, the known and the knowledge imagined by nescience and to establish Brahman-Ātman identity. Therefore the analysis of Brahman-sentences has a dual purpose: (i) it removes the false notions about the reality, and (ii) it establishes the identity of Ātman and Brahman.

### *Difference between 'Describing and Showing'*

Wittgenstein has shown us the distinction between 'describing' and 'showing' and let us see whether Śaṅkara has any awareness of such a distinction. Śaṅkara holds that Brahman can never be described, but can only be shown somehow approximately (*adūraviprakarṣeṇa*). While no description of Brahman, is possible, the task of Vedānta is to teach the unity of Brahman, and so logically speaking, it is an impropriety; but only in this way the Vedānta can emphasize the mystery of Brahman, which eludes all objective language; and yet it can be dealt with only in that way if Brahman has to be talked about intelligibly. While thus to talk of Brahman is a verbal impropriety, this impropriety is mitigated by means of qualifying epithets which attempt to reduce or remove spatio-temporal elements in experience, by either enlarging our conception or narrowing it down. The example of Arundhatī-nyāya, where showing only takes place, but not description is appropriate in this context.

### *Relation between Language and Brahman*

If Brahman cannot be described and any description constitutes impropriety, then the question arises

about the relation between language and Brahman. Brahman, according to Śaṅkara, is incapable of being related to words. Brahman cannot be described by 'is', nor by 'is not', for, as it is supersensuous, it is not the object of knowledge in the form 'is' and 'is not' (*ubhaya-buddhi-anugata-pratyaya-aviśayatvāt*). Empirical objects like pot, chair and such other things can only be apprehended in the form of 'is' and 'is not', but Brahman being supersensuous can be apprehended by means of scriptural passages.

The passage wherein Śaṅkara tries to explain the relationship between language and Brahman occurs in the *Gītā-bhāṣya*. "It is not said to be 'sat' or 'asat'." (*BG*, 13.12) Such kind of propositions are not contradictory for Śaṅkara, because (i) Śruti texts assert that there is a thing which falls neither in the class of known things, nor in the class of unknown things, and (ii) logic also asserts that Brahman cannot be dealt with by words such as being and non-being, etc.

*Adhyāropa-Apavāda and Neti Neti — The Special Methods of Vedānta*

To recapitulate the argument of Śaṅkara, when once Brahman is posited as the supreme Self, the problem of its description arises, and we know that any concept or word that falls within our experience is inadequate to describe Brahman. "*Yato vāco nivartante aprāpya manasā saha*" — says the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad*. But if one desires to know Brahman or as long as one inquires about Brahman, words have to be used. And in the process of this enquiry in order to overcome the limitations of the human concepts and to know what has been revealed through the odd and logically in-

appropriate language, certain false attributes are superimposed (*adhyāropa*) and then the same are negated (*apavāda*). From this Śaṅkara lays down the rule: Words used for describing Brahman are not to be understood univocally, according to the usual material mode of talking, for they at best attempt to describe a mystery which exceeds them, and we use them because "one cannot keep silent." Śaṅkara says that Brahman cannot be described even by the word 'knowledge', (*na jñāna-śabda-vācyamapi tad brahma*), for "knowledge" is a word which denotes the attributes or modifications of the intellect (*buddhi*). The word "knowledge" cannot signify Brahman directly, but can only imply it (*lakṣyate, na tu ucyate*). No words are applicable to Brahman which has no species, genus and internal and external differences. Śaṅkara says that even the word 'reality' cannot signify Brahman directly, but only imply it, because Brahman is devoid of all activities, and the word 'reality' signifies being in general.

Brahman, which is the foundation bed-rock of the philosophy of Śaṅkara, is so unique that no words are appropriate to denote it; but since somehow it must be spoken about, terms drawn from the common-sense and philosophical levels of language have to be used. *Sat, cit, ānanda* (existence, consciousness and bliss) are the terms drawn from language at the philosophical level, while terms such as 'cause' and 'source' are drawn from the scientific source. But as any one of these terms by itself is 'misleading' and does not give a complete idea, they are used conjunctively such that one term serves as an adjective of another or, in other words, qualifies the other. They either elevate our conception of Brahman or remove from our conception all finiteness or limitation. For example, 'infinite' (*anan-*

*tam*) is used in conjunction with 'knowledge' and 'knowledge' in conjunction with 'real'.

## II

In what follows I shall give the classification of the Vedānta *vākyas* and show whether they are meaningful or not. If they are meaningful, we shall determine in what sense they are meaningful.

The *Veda* contains Mantras, Brāhmaṇas, Āraṇyakas, and Upaniṣads. The Brāhmaṇas contain *vidhi* and *arthavādas* and the Upaniṣads, Vedānta-*vākyas*. *Arthavādas* are of three kinds: (i) *Guṇavāda* (ii) *Anuvāda* and (iii) *Bhūtārthavāda*. A *guṇavāda* is a sentence that contradicts what is known from other *pramāṇas*, e.g. "The sacrificial post is the sun." An *anuvāda* states something already known through other *pramāṇas*, e.g. "Fire is the antidote for cold." A *bhūtārthavāda* states something which is neither contradicted nor confirmed by other *pramāṇas*, e.g. "Indra raised his weapon against Vṛtra."

Among the Upaniṣadic sentences there are certain *arthavādas* which are not opposed to other *pramāṇas*; nor is the knowledge given by them obtained through other *pramāṇas*. Insofar as the meaning and purport of the Vedic sentences, the Mīmāṃsā position is clear. For the Mīmāṃsā school, *arthavādas*, even when they are not contradicted by other *pramāṇas*, are not authoritative in themselves as their sense is not complete in themselves, but lies in serving as auxiliaries to injunctions.

The Advaita view is that the validity of *pramāṇa* consists in its being uncontradicted and in its ability to

produce knowledge, not produced by other *pramāṇas*. *Anuvādas* and *guṇavādas* are, therefore, not *pramāṇas*, but *bhūtārthavādas* are *pramāṇa-vākyas*. So are Mantras according to Śaṅkara. Now, the status of the Vedānta sentences (*i.e.*, sentences about Brahman in the Upaniṣads) is a point of dispute between the Śaṅkara school of Vedānta and Mīmāṃsā. The Mīmāṃsakas say that *vākyas* explaining Brahman are *arthavādas* (subsidiary) to *vidhis* because in themselves they are meaningless as they teach nothing regarding *dharma*; and sentences which do not inculcate *dharma* have no use in obtaining the end.

But, Vedānta sentences, according to Śaṅkara, are both meaningful and purposeful, because it is through them only the ultimate end is to be realised. The pragmatic theory of meaning has some place in Śaṅkara. As the Vedānta sentences directly refer to the nature of Brahman, it is not proper to interpret them to mean something else, for that would be to reject the direct meaning and assume what is not stated. Though Brahman is a real thing (*pariniṣṭhita-vastu*), Śaṅkara says that since it cannot be the object of perception or inference, *Vedāntavākyas* give knowledge which is unobtainable otherwise; so they are independently authoritative.

## वेदान्तवेद्यम् अद्वैतम्

भाष्यभावज्ञः ब्रह्मश्री वरहृक् कल्याणसुन्दरशास्त्री

सच्चित्सुखात्मकं शान्तं जगतामेककारणम् ।  
मामव्यान्मामकं ज्योतिः आन्तरं सर्वदेहिनाम् ॥ १ ॥

विवक्षितार्थविज्ञप्त्यै वन्दे विज्ञानरूपिणीम् ।  
विद्वन्मानसहंसीं तां वाणीं वीणाविनोदिनीम् ॥ २ ॥

सदाशिवसमारम्भां शङ्कराचार्यमध्यमाम् ।  
अस्मदाचार्यपर्यन्तां वन्दे गुरुपरम्पराम् ॥ ३ ॥

भरद्वाजकुलादात्ताजन्मा कल्याणसुन्दरः ।  
वेदान्तवेद्यं विमृशन् शोधयत्यात्मनो मतिम् ॥ ४ ॥

मशको विहगाह्वाने पुरो नायान्निवार्यते ।  
यथा तथा प्रवृत्तोऽहं क्षम्यतां विबुधैरिह ॥ ५ ॥

तत्रादौ को हि नाम वेदान्तः, किं वा तत्प्रतिपाद्यम्, किञ्च  
वा तेन फलं प्राप्यमिति विचार्यते ॥

वेदस्य अन्तिमो भाग एव वेदान्त इत्युच्यते, येन जीवपर-  
मात्मनोः ऐक्यं सुस्पष्टमुपदिश्यते, यज्ज्ञानात् सांसारिकसर्वदुःख-  
निवृत्तिः सम्पाद्यते। तथा हि — विदितमेव हीदं आपण्डितपामर  
लोके सर्वो लोकः “सुखं मे भूयात्, दुःखं मे मा भूदिति” सुख-  
मेवाभिवाञ्छति, परिजिहीर्षति च दुःखम्। परन्तु परिदृश्यमानोऽयं  
विश्वो लोको दुःखमेवानुभवति, न सुखस्य लेशमपि। तथा संसार-  
स्वरूपवर्णने क्वचिदाहुः श्रीशङ्करभगवत्पादाः — ‘अव्यक्तादि-  
स्थावरान्तः संसारवृक्षः अविच्छिन्नजन्म-जरा-मरण-शोकाद्यनेक-अनर्था-  
त्मकः प्रतिक्षणम्-अन्यथास्वभावः मायामरीच्युदकगन्धर्वनगरादिवद्-  
दृष्टनष्टस्वरूपत्वात्, अवसाने च वृक्षवत् अभावात्मकः, कदली-  
स्तम्भवत् निःसारोऽनेकशतपाखण्ड-बुद्धिविकल्पास्पदः तत्त्वजिज्ञासुभिः  
अनिर्धारितेदंतत्त्वो वेदान्तनिर्धारितपरब्रह्ममूलसारः अविद्याकामकर्मा-  
व्यक्तबीजप्रभवः, अपरब्रह्मविज्ञानक्रियाशक्तिद्वयात्मकहिरण्यगर्भाङ्कुरः  
सर्वप्राणिलिङ्गभेदस्कन्धः तत्तत् तृष्णाजलासेकोद्भूतदर्पो बुद्धीन्द्रिय-  
विषयप्रवालाङ्कुरः श्रुतिस्मृतिन्यायविद्योपदेशपलाशो यज्ञदानतप-  
आद्यनेकक्रियासुपुष्पः सुखदुःखवेदनानेकरसः प्राण्युपजीव्यानन्त-  
फलः तत्तृष्णासलिलावसेकप्ररूढजटिलीकृतदृढबद्धमूलः सत्य-  
नामादिसप्तलोकब्रह्मादिभूतपक्षिकृतनीडः प्राणिसुखदुःखोद्भूतहर्षशोक-  
जातनृत्यगीतवादित्रक्ष्वेलित-आस्फोटितहसिताकुष्ठरुदित - “ हा हा मुश्च  
मुश्च ” इत्याद्यनेकशब्दकृततुमुलीभूतमहारवो वेदान्तविहितब्रह्मात्म-  
दर्शनासङ्गशस्त्रकृतोच्छेद ’ इत्यादि ॥

अन्यत्राप्याहुः — ‘संसारसमुद्रे महत्यविद्याकामकर्मप्रभवदुःखो-  
दके तीव्ररोगजरामृत्युमहाग्राहेऽनादावनन्तेऽपारे निरालम्बे विषयेन्द्रिय-  
जनितसुखलवलक्षणविश्रामे पञ्चेन्द्रियार्थतृणमारुतविक्षोभोत्थिता-  
नर्थशतमहोमौ महारौरवाद्यनेकनिरयगत-हाहेत्यादिकूजिताक्रोशनोद्-  
भूतमहारवे ’ इत्यादि। मोहमुद्गरेऽप्युक्तम् —

विद्धि व्याध्यभिमानग्रस्तं लोकं शोकहतं च समस्तम् ।

इति ॥



विद्यारण्यगुरवस्तु प्रकारान्तरेणाहुयथा —

अलभ्यमानस्तनयः पितरौ क्लेशयेच्चिरम् ।

लब्धोऽपि गर्भपातेन प्रसवेन च बाधते ॥

जातस्य ग्रहरोगादि कुमारस्य च मूर्खता ।

उपनीतेऽप्यविद्यत्वम् अनुद्वाहश्च पण्डिते ॥

यूनश्च परदारादि दारिद्र्यं च कुटुम्बिनः ।

पित्रोर्दुःखस्य नास्त्यन्तः . . . ॥

(ब्रह्मानन्दप्रकरणम् 65-67)

इत्यादि । गङ्गाधरेन्द्रसरस्वतीपादास्तु —

धर्मादेवत्वमेति व्रजति पुनरधः पातकैः स्थावरादीन्

देहान् प्राप्य प्रणश्यत्क्वचिदपि लभते मानुषत्वं च ताभ्याम् ।

कर्मज्ञानोभयेन व्रजति विधिपदं मुच्यते कोऽपि तस्मिन्

रागी प्रत्येति भूयो जनिमिति विषमं बभ्रमीतीह लोकः ॥

दुःखं स्वर्गात्प्रपाते बहुविधनरके गर्भवासेऽतिदुःखं

निःस्वातन्त्र्याशनायाग्रहगदरुदितैः शैशवे दुःखमेव ।

तारुण्येऽमर्षलोभव्यसनपरिभवोद्वेगदारिद्र्यदुःखं

वार्धक्ये शोकमोहेन्द्रियविलयगदैर्दुःखमन्तेऽतिदुःखम् ॥

इत्थं यः कर्मबद्धो भ्रमति परवशः प्राणभृज्जन्मसङ्घैः

दुःखस्यान्तं न वेत्ति स्मरति न च जनिव्रातमज्ञानयोगात् ।

इत्यादि । आह चास्थामेव प्रसक्तौ मर्तृहरिः —

संसारे रे मनुष्याः वदत यदि सुखं स्वल्पमप्यस्ति किञ्चित् ।  
इति ॥

तदेनमतिभयङ्करे तापत्रयाद्यभिभूते चास्मिन् संसारे प्रायो  
ह्यविवेकिनः

इदमद्य मया लब्धम् इमम् प्राप्स्ये मनोरथम् ।

इत्युक्तदिशा नश्वर एव वैदिके लौकिके वा वस्तुजाते स्वस्वपूर्वपूर्व-  
वासनानुरोधेन अतिमात्रशुष्के निःसारे मांसास्थनि शुनको इवाऽवशे-  
नैव स्वमनः प्रवर्तयन्तः तावतैव स्वजनिं कृतार्थामभिमन्यमाना बृथैव  
कालं यापयन्तोऽन्ते च ब्रह्मादिस्थावरान्तासु विभिन्नासु योनिषु

यथाकर्म यथाश्रुतं

पुनः पुनः जायन्ते म्रियन्ते च । स्पष्टश्चायमर्थो भगवद्गीतायाम् —

आशापाशशतैर्बद्धाः ।

गतागतं कामकामा लभन्ते ।

आब्रह्म भुवनाल्लोकाः पुनरावर्तिनोऽर्जुन ।

इत्यादौ । श्रुतिश्चाह —

स जायते कामाभिस्तत्र तत्र ।

इत्यादि । तदप्याहुर्विद्यारण्यगुरवः —

मा विनश्यत्वयं भोगो वर्धतामुत्तरोत्तरम् ।

मा विघ्नाः प्रतिबध्नन्तु धन्योऽस्म्यस्मादिति भ्रमः ॥

इत्यादि । किम्बहुना , श्रुतिरेवाह वैदिकस्यापि कर्मफलस्य नश्वरताम्—

अविद्यायामन्तरे वर्तमानाः स्वयं धीराः पण्डितं मन्यमानाः ।

दन्द्रस्यमाणाः परियन्ति मूढाः अन्धेनैव नीयमाना यथान्धाः ॥

( कठोपनिषत् )

अविद्यायामन्तरे वर्तमानाः वयं कृतार्था इत्यभिमन्यन्ति बालाः ।

( मुण्डकोपनिषत् )

यत्कर्मिणो न प्रवेदयन्ति रागात्तेनातुराः क्षीणलोकाश्च्यवन्ते ।  
इष्टापूर्ते मन्यमाना वरिष्ठं नान्यच्छ्रेयो वेदयन्ते प्रमूढाः ॥

नाकस्य पृष्ठे ते सुकृतेऽनुभूत्वेमं लोकं हीनतरं वा विशन्ति ।  
परीक्ष्य लोकान्कर्मचितान्ब्राह्मणो निर्वेदमायान्नास्त्यकृतः कृतेन ॥

प्लवा ह्येते अदृढा यज्ञरूपा अष्टादशोक्तमवरं येषु कर्म ।  
एतच्छ्रेयो येऽभिनन्दन्ति मूढा जरामृत्युं ते पुनरेत्यापियन्ति ॥

इत्यादि । भगवान् वासुदेवोऽप्याह —

‘ त्रैगुण्यविषया वेदाः निस्त्रैगुण्यो भवार्जुन । ’

‘ दूरेण ह्यवरं कर्म ’ ‘ कृपणाः फलहेतवः ’

‘ अनित्यमसुखं लोकम् ’ ‘ जन्म दुःखालयमशाश्वतम् ’

इत्यादि । न्यायश्चायं — यत्कृतकं तदनित्यमिति ॥

तदेवं श्रतिस्मृतिन्यायादिभिः निश्चितविनश्यत्फलेऽपि कर्मण्येव  
जनाः पुनः पुनः प्रवर्तन्ते । किमत्र कारणम् ? अतृष्णाक्षय एवात्र  
कारणम् । तृष्णा हि नाम कामः । स एव सपरिवारोऽविद्याकाम-  
कर्मवासना-दृढवासितान्तःकरणान् अविवेकिनो मोहयन् अनर्थमार्गं  
प्रवर्तयन् सम्पादयति तेषाम् उत्तरोत्तराविच्छिन्नान् अनर्थपरम्पराम् ।  
आह हि गीताचार्योऽपि —

काम एष क्रोध एष रजोगुणसमुद्भवः ।

महाशनो महापाप्मा विद्ध्येनमिह वैरिणम् ॥

त्रिविधं नरकस्येदं द्वारं नाशनमात्मनः ।  
 कामः क्रोधस्तथा लोभस्तस्मादेतत्त्रयं त्यजेत् ॥  
 इन्द्रियाणि मनो बुद्धिरस्याधिष्ठानमुच्यते ।  
 एतैर्विमोहयत्येष ज्ञानमावृत्य देहिनम् ॥

इत्यादि । आह च आह्वय तृष्णां भगवान् भर्तृहरिरपि —

भ्रान्तं देशमनेकदुर्गविषमं प्राप्तं न किञ्चित्फलं  
 त्यक्त्वा जातिकुलाभिमानमुचितं सेवा कृता निष्फला ।  
 भुक्तं मानविवर्जितं परगृहेऽप्याशङ्क्या काकवत्  
 तृष्णे जृम्भसि पापकर्मपिशुने नाद्यापि सन्तुष्यसि ॥

इत्यादि ॥

तदेवं विज्ञातं कामापरनामधेयायास्तृष्णाया एवायं प्रभावो  
 यत्सार्वजनीन-अनर्थपरम्परायाः प्राप्तिरिति । तदिमाम् अनर्थपरम्पराम्  
 आत्मनः परिजिहीर्षता तत्क्षये एव महान् यत्न आस्थेय इति कर-  
 तलामलकमेतत् । तृष्णाक्षयफलमाह हि भगवान् पाराशर्यः —

यच्च कामसुखं लोके यच्च दिव्यं महत्सुखम् ।  
 तृष्णाक्षयसुखस्यैते नार्हतः षोडशीं कलाम् ॥

इति । गीताचार्योऽप्याह —

विहाय कामान् यः सर्वान् पुमांश्चरति निःस्पृहः ।  
 निर्ममो निरहंकारः स शान्तिमधिगच्छति ॥

इति । भर्तृहरिप्याह —

आशा नाम नदी मनोरथजला तृष्णातरङ्गाकुला  
 रागग्राहवती वितर्कविहगा धैर्यद्रुमध्वंसिनी ।

मोहावर्तमुदुस्तरातिगहना प्रोत्तुङ्गचिन्तातटी

तस्याः पारगता विशुद्धमनसो नन्दन्ति योगीश्वराः ॥

इति । अयमेव हि तृष्णाक्षयो वैराग्यमित्युच्यते विवेकिभिः यद्-  
भयकारणम् । अन्यत्सर्वमेव लोके वस्तु भयकारणमेव । तदप्याह  
भर्तृहरिः —

भोगे रोगभयं कुले च्युतिभयं वित्ते नृपालाद्भयं

माने दैन्यभयं बले रिपुभयं रूपे जराया भयम् ।

शास्त्रे वादिभयं गुणे खलभयं काले कृतान्ताद्भयं

सर्वं वस्तु भयान्वितं भुवि नृणां वैराग्यमेवाभयम् ॥

इति ॥

अत्रेदं विचार्यम् — क इहोपायः तृष्णाक्षयसम्पादने इति ।  
किमिहात्र विचार्यम् ? तृष्णा हि नाम सङ्कल्पप्रभवा । यदाहुः —

‘ काम ! जानामि ते मूलं सङ्कल्पात्त्वं हि जायसे । ’

इति ।

‘ सङ्कल्पप्रभवान् कामान् ’

इति च । सङ्कल्पो हि नाम अप्राप्तविषयिणी, तत्प्राप्तीच्छा —

‘ इमम्प्राप्त्ये ... ’

इत्यादि । आह हि गीताचार्योऽपि —

ध्यायतो विषयान् पुंसः सङ्गस्तेषूपजायते ।

सङ्गात्सञ्जायते कामः कामात् क्रोधोऽभिजायते ॥

इत्यादि । अप्राप्तविषयोऽयमभिलाषोऽविवेकिनामेव भवति अनधि-  
गतसच्चिदानन्दाद्वयात्मस्वरूपाणां पराग्दृष्टीनाम्, न तु पुनरधिगत-  
आत्मस्वरूपाणां प्रत्यग्दृष्टीनाम् । प्रायश्च लोका पराग्दृष्टय एव, न

प्रत्यग्दृष्टयः । सहस्रेषु मनुष्याणां कश्चिदेव प्रत्यग्दृष्टिर्भवति विवेक-  
संपन्नः । यदाह काठकश्रुतिः —

पराचः कामाननुयन्ति बालास्ते मृत्योर्यन्ति विततस्य पाशम् ।  
अथ धीरा अमृतत्वं विदित्वा ध्रुवमध्रुवेष्विह न प्रार्थयन्ते ॥

पराञ्च खानि व्यतृणत्स्वयंभूः तस्मात्पराङ्पश्यति नान्तरात्मन् ।  
कश्चिद्धीरः प्रत्यगात्मानमैच्छत् आवृत्तचक्षुरमृतत्वमिच्छन् ॥

इत्यादि । तदुक्तं गीतायामपि —

मनुष्याणां सहस्रेषु कश्चिद्यतति सिद्धये ।

यततामपि सिद्धानां कश्चिन्मां वेत्ति तत्त्वतः ॥

इति । तदेवं लोकः यदि स्वात्मदर्शनसंपन्नो भवति विवेकी तदा  
स्वाप्राप्तविषयान्तरासम्भवात् सङ्कल्प-असम्भवे कथं तृष्णायाः  
सम्भवः । कथं वा तत्परिचारस्य क्रोधादेः सर्वानर्थमूलस्य सम्भवः ?  
नित्यानित्यवस्तुविवेकादिनापीयं सुशिक्षणीया ॥

ननु भोः! विदित एव स्वस्वत्मा सर्वैः लोकैः — देवदत्तोऽहं  
स्थूलोऽहं काणोऽहं कर्ताहं भोक्ताहं किञ्चिज्ज्ञोऽहं परिच्छिन्नोऽहं  
असर्वशक्तोऽहं असत्यसङ्कल्पोऽहं इत्यादिवहुप्रकारम् । किमतो-  
ऽत्रावशिष्यते स्वरूपाधिगमः यदज्ञानात् प्राणिनिकायोऽयं विषीदति ।  
सत्यम् । विदित एव सर्वैः आत्मा, परन्तु स्वरूपेण न विदितः,  
प्रकारान्तरेण तु विदितः रजतात्मनेव शुक्तिः, तलमलादिवत्त्वेनेव  
च नभः । शृण्वन्नेदं स्मृतिवचनम् —

योऽन्यथा सन्तमात्मानम् अन्यथा प्रतिपद्यते ।

किं तेन न कृतं पापं चोरेणात्मापहारिणा ॥

इति । श्रुतिस्त्वाह —

असुर्या नाम ते लोका अन्धेन तमसावृताः ।  
तांस्ते प्रेत्याभिगच्छन्ति ये के चात्महनो जनाः ॥

इति ।

अनन्दा नाम ते लोका अन्धेन तमसावृताः ।  
तांस्ते प्रेत्याभिगच्छन्ति अविद्वांसोऽबुधो जनाः ॥

इति च । अयमेव च विपरीतस्वरूपावगमोऽध्यास इत्युच्यते श्रुत्य-  
न्तेषु । तल्लक्षणं चोक्तं — 'अतस्मिंस्तद्विद्भिर्हि अध्यासः' इत्यादि ॥

तह्येवं, किं वात्मनस्तात्त्विकं रूपम्? नन्विदमेव तात्त्विकं  
स्वरूपं यत् — अकर्तृत्वम् अभोक्तृत्वं सर्वज्ञत्वं अपरिच्छिन्नत्वं सर्व-  
शक्तत्वं सत्यसङ्कल्पत्वं सच्चिदानन्दघनत्वम् अद्वयत्वञ्च । न  
चेयच्छृण्वदोऽपि —

यत्तदद्रेश्यम् अग्राह्यम् अगोत्रम् अवर्णम्

अचक्षुःश्रोत्रं तदपाणिपादं नित्यं विभु सर्वगतं सुसूक्ष्मम् ।

इत्यादि ॥

ननु अप्रमाणसिद्धोऽयमर्थो य आत्मस्वरूपतया भवता प्रतिपा-  
दितः । न ह्ययं प्रत्यक्षेणावगम्यतेऽर्थः । प्रत्यक्षं प्रमाणं हि सार्व-  
जनीनमेवार्थं पूर्वोक्तमवगमयति — कर्ताहं भोक्ताहमित्यादिरूपं न भवदु-  
क्तम् । नाप्यानुमानेन एतस्यार्थस्य सिद्धिः, ज्ञानाद्यधिकरणस्य कर्ता-  
त्मन एव तेनापि सिद्धेः । न चार्थापत्तिस्तादृशी, अनुपलम्भात् ।  
न वागमः त्वदभिमतार्थसाधकः, नित्यनैमित्तिककाम्यादिकर्मकर्तुः  
ऐहिकामुष्मिकफलभोक्तुरेवात्मनः तेनाप्यवगमात् ॥

सत्यमेवेदं उक्तम्भवता न तावदयमर्थः प्रत्यक्षेणावगन्तुं शक्यः  
इति । अशब्दोऽस्पर्शोऽरूपोऽरसोऽगन्धश्चायमात्मा कथं प्रत्यक्षेण  
परागर्थग्राहकेण विषयीक्रियते । तथा हि श्रुतिः —

न तत्र चक्षुर्गच्छति न वाग्गच्छति नो मनः

इत्यादि । नाप्यनुमानेनेति च युक्तमेवोक्तमायुष्मता । शुष्कतर्ककंश-  
हृदयैर्जन्मशतेनापि उक्तस्यात्मस्वरूपस्य अनुमातुमशक्यत्वात् ।  
तथा हि श्रुतिराह —

नैषा तर्केण मतिरापनेया प्रोक्तान्येनैव सुज्ञानाय प्रेष्ठ

इत्यादि । न चार्थापत्तिस्तादृशी इत्याद्यपि युक्तमुक्तं भवता । तस्या  
अप्रमाणत्वात् । प्रमाणत्वेऽपि वा तस्या अनुपलम्भोऽसिद्धः ।

तरति शोकमात्मवित्

इत्याद्युक्तस्य आत्मविदः शोकतरणस्य कर्तृत्वादिसत्यत्वेऽनुपपत्तेरा-  
त्मनि तदसत्यत्वोपपत्तेः । न चागमाभावः , सर्वप्रमाणराजस्य वेदा-  
न्तस्योपनिषदपरनामधेयस्य जागरूकत्वात् ॥

अथ कोऽयं वेदान्तो नाम । ननु भोः सम्प्रत्येव तः सन्देहनिर्णयो  
जातः कुतोऽयं भवतः प्रलाप इति । तर्ह्येवम् , अवधीयताम् ।  
विद्या हि द्विविधा — अपरा च परा चेति । तत्रापरा नाना-  
साधनैहिक-ब्रह्मलोकान्तामुष्मिकविचित्रफलविषयिणी ऋग्वेदादिरूपा,  
परा तु जीवात्मब्रह्मैक्यविषयिणी मोक्षफला ईशाद्युपनिषद्रूपा ।  
सैव च वेदान्तः । तथा ह्याह पुरा अङ्गिराः शौनकाय विधिवदुप-  
सन्नाय —

द्वे विद्ये वेदितव्ये इति ह स्म यद्ब्रह्मविदो वदन्ति —  
परा चैवापरा च । तत्रापरा ऋग्वेदो यजुर्वेदः सामवेदोऽथर्व-  
वेदः शिक्षा कल्पो व्याकरणं निरुक्तं छन्दो ज्योतिषमिति ।  
अथ परा यया तदक्षरमधिगम्यते ।

इत्यादि । तदेवं जीवब्रह्मैक्यबोधकशब्दात्मकत्वं वेदान्तस्य लक्षणमि-  
त्युक्तं वेदितव्यम् । तथा चोक्तं तत्त्वविवेकप्रकरणे विद्यारण्यगुरुभिः —



इत्थं सच्चित्परानन्द आत्मा युक्त्या तथाविधम् ।  
परं ब्रह्म तयोश्चैक्यं श्रुत्यन्तेषूपदिश्यते ॥

इति । इयञ्च मन्दमत्याश्वासोत्पादनायोक्तिः गुडजिह्विकान्यायेन श्रुत्यन्त एव जीवब्रह्मणोः ऐक्यम् उपदिश्यत इति । वस्तुगत्या तु सर्वो हि साङ्गो वेदस्तमेवार्थं प्रतिपादयति तात्पर्येण , अतात्पर्येण तु तदर्थोपयोगितया अन्यमन्यमर्थमिति सिद्धान्तरहस्यं वेदितव्यम् । तथा ह्युक्तं काठके — “ सर्वे वेदा यत्पदमामनन्ति ” इत्यादि । भगवद्गीतायामप्युक्तम् — “ वेदैश्च सर्वैरहमेव वेद्यः ” इति । तदस्मिन् पारमार्थिके पथि सर्वोऽपि वेदो वेदान्त एव , सर्वोऽपि वेदान्तो वेद एव, नातिरिक्तो वेदितव्यः ॥

अथ किं वैतत्प्रतिपाद्यम् । तदेतदुक्तप्रायमपि वैशद्याय पुनः किञ्चिद्विचार्यमेव । तथा हि — द्विप्रकारं हि वाक्यं श्रुत्यन्तेषूपलभ्यते — अवान्तरं किञ्चिन्महच्च किञ्चिदिति । तत्र यत् सृष्ट्यवस्थ-  
लयादिप्रतिपादकं तदवान्तरवाक्यमित्युच्यते । यथा —

यथोर्णनाभिः सृजते गृह्णते च तथाक्षरात्सम्भवतीह विश्वम् ।

(मुण्डक)

यथा सुदीप्तात् पावकाद्विस्फुलिङ्गाः . . . तथाक्षरात् विविधाः  
सौम्य भावाः ।

तस्माद्वा एतस्मादात्मन आकाशः संभूतः ।

तत्सृष्ट्वा तदेवानुप्रविशत् तदनु प्रविश्य सच्च त्यच्चाभवत् ।

( तैत्तिरीय )

स ईक्षत लोकान्नु सृजा इति स इमांल्लोकानसृजत ।

स एतमेव सीमानं विदार्यैतया द्वारा प्रापद्यत । (ऐतरेय)

सदेव सौम्य इदमग्र आसीत् । तदैक्षत बहुस्यां प्रजायेयेति ।

तत्तेजोऽसृजत । (छान्दोग्य)

द्वे वाव ब्रह्मणो रूपे मूर्तं चैवामूर्तं च । (बृहदारण्यक)

इत्यादि । अध्यारोपापवादाभ्यां ब्रह्मणो निष्प्रपञ्चत्वप्रतिपत्तिः सुसं-  
पादेति मन्यमाना श्रुतिः पूर्वमेवमवान्तरतात्पर्येण सृष्ट्यादिकं प्रति-  
पादयति अध्यारोपाय । अत्राहुः स्वाराज्यसिद्धिकाराः —

अक्षजादिबहिःप्रमाणसमेधितद्वयविभ्रमे  
जाग्रतिश्रुतिरद्वयप्रतिबोधने सहसा क्षमा ।  
व्यावहारिकवस्तुजातमिदं मृषेति विवक्षया  
प्रक्रियां रचयाम्बभूव विसृष्टिसंहतिलक्षणाम् ॥

इति । गौडपादैरप्युक्तम् —

मृच्छोहविस्फुलिङ्गाद्यैः सृष्टिर्या चोदितान्यथा ।  
उपायः सोऽवताराय नास्ति भेदः कथञ्चन ॥

इति । यच्च जीवात्मपरमात्मनोरैक्यं प्रतिपादयति तन्महावाक्यमि-  
त्युच्यते । तद्यथा —

ब्रह्मैवेदं विश्वम् (मुण्डक) । प्रज्ञानं ब्रह्म (ऐतरेय) ।  
अयमात्मा ब्रह्म (माण्डूक्य) । तत्त्वमसि (छान्दोग्य) ।  
अहं ब्रह्मास्मि (बृहदारण्यक) ।

इत्यादि ॥

षोडशात्मतया प्रभिन्नेषु बाधाध्यासविशेषणैक्यविषयेषु चतुर्षु  
सामानाधिकरण्येषु प्रकारान्तराणाम् अत्रात्यन्तमेवासम्भवात् — किमत्र  
अभेदसामानाधिकरण्यमुत बाधायाम् । किमिदं लक्षणया जीव-  
ब्रह्मणोरैक्यं प्रतिपादयति, आहोस्वित्तां विनैवेत्यादेः स्वयूथ्यकलहस्य  
अवान्तरस्याधिकारितारतम्यादुत्थितस्य विद्यमानत्वेऽपि जीवब्रह्मैक्य-  
विषयोऽखण्डार्थबोधोऽस्माज्जायत इत्यत्रिवादमेव । उपक्रमादिभिस्तात्पर्य-

निर्णायकैर्लिङ्गैः पूर्वापरपरामर्शं श्रुत्यन्तेषु सम्यक् क्रियमाणे जीव-  
ब्रह्मैक्यातिरिक्तोऽर्थो नैवोपलब्धुं शक्य इति घण्टाघोषोऽयम् । उप-  
क्रमादयश्च —

उपक्रमोपसंहारौ अभ्यासोऽपूर्वता फलम् ।  
अर्थवादोपपत्ती च लिङ्गं तात्पर्यनिर्णये ॥

इत्युक्तरूपः । यथा चायमर्थस्तथोक्तं स्वाराज्यसिद्धौ —  
यस्मादुत्पत्तिगुप्ती क्षतिरपि जगतां यच्च शास्त्रैकयोनिः  
सर्वज्ञं मायया यत्सहजसुखसदद्वैतसंवित्स्वरूपम् ।  
तद्ब्रह्म स्वप्रकाशं श्रुतिशिखरगिरां सैव तात्पर्यभूमिः  
स्वात्मासौ यं विदित्वा जनिमृतिजलधिं निस्तरन्तीह सन्तः ॥

इति ॥

अत्रैते शङ्कापरिहारसंग्रहश्लोकाः —

अभिधेयमत्र पदयोरसंगतं न विरुद्धधर्मियुगमैक्यमेति यत् ।  
उपयोगमूलघटनाद्ययोगतो न परस्परार्थघटितेऽपि लक्षणा ॥  
न च गाङ्गतीरमिव वाच्यसंगि वा प्रथितं तृतीयमिह योग्यमन्ये ।  
पदयोर्न चैकतरभागलक्षणाध्यवसानलिङ्गमुपपद्यतेऽपि वा ॥  
न तु मानसिद्धमपरं परोपमं निजरूपमस्य न च भाविनोऽस्तित्ता ।  
श्रुतहानिरश्रुतगतिश्च नोचितेत्युचिता द्वयोरपि भागलक्षणा ॥  
अपहाय धमनिचयं विरोधिनं तनुबुद्धिसाक्षि सदनन्तचिद्धनम् ।  
उपलक्ष्य सोऽयमिति वाक्यवत्ततो घटयेदखण्डविषये पदद्वयम् ॥

परोक्षानवाप्तत्वबुद्धिं परस्मिन्नपूर्णत्वदुःखित्वमोहं प्रतीचि ।  
 निहन्तुं निजालौकिकं चात्मतत्त्वं पदे वक्तुमन्योऽन्यतः साभिलाषे ॥  
 असंसर्गिसत्यार्थता स्यात्पदानामनन्यार्थता वाप्यखण्डार्थतात्र ।  
 प्रसिद्धा ह्यसौ चन्द्रमात्रप्रबोधोधात्प्रकृष्टप्रकाशः शशीत्यादिवाक्ये ॥  
 तदेवं स्वतः स्वयंज्योतिषोः सच्चिदानन्दात्मनोः ऐक्यबोधे बाधस्य  
 कस्याप्यसंभवादद्वैतमेव पर्यवसितः शास्त्रार्थं इति तदेव वेदान्त-  
 प्रतिपाद्यं इति ब्रह्मविदां समयः ॥

तत्र कर्तृत्वकिञ्चिज्ज्ञत्वादिधर्मवत्त्वेन सर्वैरनुभूयमानस्य जीवस्य  
 कथं अकर्तृत्वसर्वज्ञत्वादि स्वरूपावधारणमिति भवेदेव केषाञ्चिन्मन्दमती-  
 नाम् आशङ्का । सापि अवश्यापसारणीयेति किञ्चिदुच्यते । जीवा-  
 वस्थानां जाग्रत्स्वप्नसुषुप्त्याख्यानानां तिसृणामनुदिनं सर्वैरेवानुभूय-  
 मानानां क्रियमाणे किञ्चिद्धिमशं विनापि शास्त्रादेशं स्वयमेवायमर्थः  
 प्रतिभास्योऽपि तेषां न प्रतिभात इति शोच्या एव ते वैरोचना न  
 पुनरुदासितव्याः ॥

अत्राह श्रुतिरपि —

तद्यथापि हिरण्यनिधिं निहितमक्षेत्रज्ञा उपर्युपरि संचरन्तो न  
 विन्देयुः एवमेवेमाः सर्वाः प्रजाः अहरहर्ब्रह्म गच्यन्त्य एतं  
 ब्रह्मलोकं न विन्दन्त्यनृतेन हि प्रत्यूढाः ।

इत्यादि । न चेयद्बोधयित्वोपरता श्रुतिः । कारुण्यवती हि सा । अतः  
 स्वयमेव ता अवस्थाः प्रविविच्य तानुद्धरिष्यामीति मन्यमाना क्वचि-  
 दाह —

य एष स्वप्ने महीयमानश्चरत्येष आत्मेति

यद्यपीदं शरीरमन्धं भवति अनन्धः स भवति

नैवेषोऽस्य दोषेण दुष्यति ।

इति ।

तद्यत्रैतत्सुप्तः समस्तः संप्रसन्नः स्वप्नं न विजानात्येष आत्मा ।

इति च । अन्यत्राप्याह —

जाग्रत्येव स्वयंज्योतिष्ठं जीवस्य सूपपादम् ।

इति । स चायमर्थो बृहदारण्यके चतुर्थाध्यायस्य तृतीये ब्राह्मणे जनकयाज्ञवल्क्यसंवादमुखेन स्पष्टतरमुपपादित इति नेह वितन्यते । तदर्थसंग्राहकोऽयमाचार्यभगवत्पादानां श्लोकः परमत्रानुसन्धीयते । यथा —

किं ज्योतिस्तव भानुमानहनि मे रात्रौ प्रदीपादिकं  
स्यादेवं रविदीपदर्शनविधौ किंज्योतिराख्याहि मे ।

चक्षुस्तस्य निमीलनादिसमये किं धीर्धियो दर्शने  
किं तत्राहमतो भवान् परमकं ज्योतिस्तदस्ति प्रभो ॥

इति । तथा स्वप्नादिकमधिकृत्यापि —

तद्यथा महामत्स्य उभे कूलेऽनुसंचरति पूर्वं चापरं च, एवमेवायं  
पुरुष एतावुभावन्तावनुसंचरति स्वप्नान्तं च बुद्धान्तं च ।

तद्यथायमस्मिन्नाकाशे श्येनो वा सुपर्णो वा विपरिपत्य श्रान्तः  
संहत्य पक्षौ संलयायैव ध्रियते एवमेवायं पुरुषः ।

इत्यादि विस्पष्टमाचष्टे श्रुतिरित्यलं पल्लवितेन ॥

तदेवं सिद्धमद्वैतमेव वेदान्तवेद्यमिति । अत्राहुर्विद्यारण्याः —

ऐहिकामुष्मिकः सर्वः संसारो वास्तवस्ततः ।

न भाति नास्ति चाद्वैतम् इत्यज्ञानिविनिश्चयः ॥

अवज्ञातं सदद्वैतं निःशङ्कैरन्यवादिभिः ।  
 एवं का क्षतिरस्माकं तदद्वैतमवजानताम् ॥  
 आत्माभासस्य जीवस्य संसारो नात्मवस्तुनः ।  
 इति बोधो भवेद्विद्या लभ्यतेऽसौ विचारणात् ॥  
 सदा विचारयेत्तस्मात् जगज्जीवपरात्मनः ।  
 जीवभावजगद्भावबाधे स्वात्मैव शिष्यते ॥  
 नाप्रतीतिस्तयोर्बाधः किन्तु मिथ्यात्वनिश्चयः ।  
 नो चेत्सुषुप्तिमूर्च्छादौ मुच्येतायत्नतो जनः ॥  
 परमात्मावशेषोऽपि तत्सत्यत्वविनिश्चयः ।  
 न जगद्विस्मृतिर्नो चेत् जीवन्मुक्तिर्न सम्भवेत् ॥

इत्यादि । आचार्यगौडपादास्तु —

वैशारघं तु वै नास्ति भेदे विचरतां सदा ।  
 भेदनिम्नाः पृथग्वादाः तस्मात्ते कृपणाः स्मृताः ॥  
 स्वसिद्धान्तव्यवस्थासु द्वैतिनो निश्चिता दृढम् ।  
 परस्परं विरुद्धयन्ते तैरयं न विरुद्धयते ॥  
 भूतं न जायते किञ्चिदभूतं नैव जायते ।  
 विवदन्तो द्वया ह्येवम् अजातिं ख्यापयन्ति ते ॥  
 ख्याप्यमानामजातिं तैः अनुमोदामहे व्रयम् ।  
 विवदामो न तैः सार्धम् अविवादं निबोधत ॥

इत्यादि ॥

ननु सत्येवम्भूते वस्तुतत्त्वे किमयमतिविचित्रस्य मनसाप्य-  
चिन्त्यरचनात्मकस्य उच्चावचस्य अस्य प्रपञ्चस्योपलम्भः ? मायिको  
ह्येष सर्वो विलासः योऽयं विश्वप्रपञ्चोपलम्भो नाम ।

मायायां सर्वसम्भवात्

इति विद्यारण्याः ।

अघटनघटनापटीयसी माया

इति भगवत्पादाः ।

माया ह्येषा मया सृष्टा

इति तु भगवान् वासुदेवः ।

मायामात्रमिदं द्वैतम्

इति गौडपादाः ।

इन्द्रो मायाभिः

इति बृहदारण्यके ।

मायामात्रमतः समस्तमभवत् । तमसा विनिर्मितमिदं सकलम् ।

इति सर्वज्ञात्ममुनयः ।

आविद्यो ह्येष बन्धः । सम्भाव्येतरघटनापटीयसी सा  
संमोहं जनयति विभ्रमेण माया ।

इति गङ्गाधरेन्द्रसरस्वतीपादाः ॥

अथ केयं माया नाम यद्धीनोऽयं विश्वप्रपञ्चोपलम्भः ? उच्यते ।  
निस्तत्त्वा कार्यगम्या आत्मशक्तिर्माया अग्निशक्तिवत् ।

न निरूपयितुं शक्या विस्पष्टं भासते च या ।  
सा मायेतीन्द्रजालादौ लोकाः सम्प्रतिपेदिरे ॥

इति ।

माया अनिर्वचनीयमेव तु तमः ।

इति सर्वज्ञात्ममुनयः । परं परस्तात् इति शम् ॥



## NON-DUALITY IS WHAT IS KNOWN THROUGH THE VEDĀNTA\*

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*Bhāsyabhāvajña V. R. Kalyāṇasundara Śāstrī*

May my inward Light which is in all beings, which is of the nature of existence, knowledge, and bliss, which is tranquil, which is the sole cause of the world protect me. (1) I salute the Goddess of Learning, who is the embodiment of wisdom, who is the royal swan sporting in the minds of the learned, and who enjoys playing *vinā*, for conveying to others what I intend to present. (2) I salute the succession of preceptors starting from Sadāśiva through Śaṅkarācārya down to my teacher. (3) I, Kalyāṇasundaram, belonging to the lineage of Bharadvāja, clarify for my own understanding, what is known through the Vedānta after reviewing (its teaching). (4) Just as a mosquito, which comes in front when birds are called in, cannot be prevented, even so do I enter (for commencing this work). I may be pardoned by the learned in this regard. (5)

Here first of all the following is taken up for inquiry: “What is *Vedānta*? What does it teach? And, what is the fruit obtained therefrom?”

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\* Translated by Dr. R. Balasubramanian

The end-portion of the *Veda* is called *Vedānta*. The identity of the individual self and the supreme Self is clearly taught by it. By knowing this one gets liberated from the suffering of transmigrating existence. To explain. It is well-known to all, from the learned to the common man, that everyone is desirous of attaining pleasure and avoiding pain by saying: "Let me have pleasure and no pain." But all the people in this world experience pain alone; they do not experience even a trace of happiness. It is thus. In the course of the explanation of the nature of transmigratory existence Śrī Śaṅkarabhagavatpāda says in one place: "This tree of the world, comprising everything from the unmanifested to the immovables, has its root above. It is called *vrkṣa* (tree) because of being felled. It consists of many evils such as birth, old age, death, sorrow; it changes itself every moment, because no sooner is it seen than its nature is destroyed like magic, water in a mirage, a city in the sky, etc., and it ceases to exist ultimately like a tree; it is without strength like the stem of a plantain tree; it is subject to hundreds of doubts in the minds of sceptics; the nature has not been ascertained by those who are desirous of knowing it; its essence lies in its root, the supreme Brahman, which is known through the *Vedānta*; it has come out of the seed of ignorance, desire, action and the unmanifested; it has for its sprout, *Hiranyagarbha*, the lower Brahman, possessing the two powers of knowledge and action; it has for its trunk the diverse subtle bodies of all creatures; its vigour of growth results from the sprinkling of the water of desires; it has for its tender sprouts the objects of the senses and the intellect; its leaves are the *Vedas*, the *Smṛtis*, logic, learning, and instruction; its beautiful flowers are the many

deeds such as sacrifice, charity, austerity, etc.; its various tastes are the experience of happiness and sorrow; its infinite fruits are the means of subsistence of beings; it has its secondary roots well-developed, entwined and firmly fixed through the sprinkling of the water of desire; it has for its nests the seven worlds beginning from the one called *satya*, built by the birds which are the living beings from *Brahmā* downwards; it has its uproar, rendered tumultuous through the various sounds arising from dancing, singing, instrumental music, disport (such as play, jest, etc.), clapping, laughing, pulling, crying, exclaiming 'Alas, alas! leave me, leave me' caused by mirth and grief arising from the enjoyment and pain of living beings; and it is filled by the weapons of detachment consisting of the realization of the identity of Brahman and Ātman as instructed by the *Vedānta*." (*Kaṭhōpaniṣadbhāṣya*, 2.3.1)

Elsewhere also Śaṅkara says: "Into the vast ocean of transmigratory existence, which is like a vast ocean filled with the water of sorrow arising from ignorance, desire and action; that is infested with huge sharks in the form of acute disease, old age and death; that has no beginning and end, no shore and no support; that affords only momentary respite through the little joy arising from the contact of the senses and objects; that is full of the high waves in the form of hundreds of evils stirred up the gale of hankering for the objects of the five senses; that resounds with the voice of cries and shrieks of 'Alas, alas,' etc. issuing from the beings condemned to various hells like *mahāraurava*." (*Aitareyopaniṣadbhāṣya*, 2.1) It has also been stated in the *Mohamudgara*: "Know the entire world as afflicted by the disease of conceit and overwhelmed by sorrow."

In a different way, the preceptor Vidyāraṇya says: "When a married couple desire to have a son and do not have one, they are miserable. After conception, a miscarriage or the labour pain causes sorrow. When a son is born, he may suffer from disease or from planetary positions at his birth; or he may be stupid, or obstinate; or after the investiture of sacred thread, he may study nothing; or if he is learned, he may remain unmarried. Again, he may start pursuing the wives of others; or having a big family, he may be in poverty; or he may be wealthy and yet he may die in his youth. There is no end to the sorrow of the parents." (*Pañcadaśī*, 12.65-67) Gaṅgādharendra Sarasvatī observes: "Due to merit one attains the body of a deity. Again, due to demerit one goes to the nether world; and then attains an immovable body (such as plants). In the process of attaining bodies, one occasionally attains the body of a human being, because of them (*i.e.* merit and demerit). Both by action and meditation (the soul) reaches the world of *Hiranyagarbha* where one gets liberated (after attaining the knowledge of Brahman). Thus, one who has attachment is born again and again and wanders around this world of misery." (*Svārājyasiddhi*, 1.52) "There is misery in falling from heaven to the manifold hell, and also unbearable misery in remaining in the womb. There is also suffering in childhood due to dependence, hunger, evil, demons, disease and crying. There is suffering in youth because of anger, lust, desire, disgrace, anxiety and poverty. In old age also there is suffering due to grief, loss of memory, and weakening of the senses. And there is unbearable misery at the time of death." (*Ibid.*, 1.43) "Thus, due to association with ignorance the *jīva* is bound by *karma*, is overwhelmed by the senses and

wanders through many births. It does not know when the suffering will end. Nor does it remember the innumerable births.” (*Ibid.*, 1.54) With reference to this, Bhartṛhari also says: “Oh, men, tell, is there an iota of happiness in worldly existence?” (*Vairāgyasataka*, 38) Thus, thinking, “Now this has been attained by me, this desire I shall attain,” (*BG* 16.13) those who are free from discrimination pursue perishable objects, scriptural as well as secular, in accordance with the latent impressions in their mind, overwhelmed by the frightening threefold suffering in transmigratory existence in the same way as a dog goes after excessively dry and useless bones, get absorbed in them without control, consider that they have attained their goal in life, and waste their time; and finally “according to their *karma* and *upāsanā*,” they are born in different wombs again and again as *Brahmā* down to immovable objects and die. This idea has been conveyed clearly in the *Bhagavad-gītā* (16.12) when it says: “Bound by hundreds of bonds of hope ...” “They attain birth and death in accordance with their desires,” (9.21) “All worlds including the world of *Brahmā* are subject to returning again, Oh Arjuna,” (8.16) and so on. *Śruti* also says: “One is born in different forms through desires,” etc.

The preceptor, Vidyāraṇya also conveys this idea: “Let not my enjoyment be cut short; let it go on increasing; let not obstacles stop it; I am blessed because of it — such is the nature of that delusion.” (*Pañcadaśī*, 7.167) No need to say more: *śruti* itself speaks about the perishable nature of the results of scriptural rites as follows: “Living in the midst of ignorance and considering themselves intelligent and enlightened, the senseless people go round and round, following crooked courses, just like the blind led by the blind.” (*Kaṭha*,

1.2.5) "Continuing in the midst of ignorance, the unenlightened take airs by thinking, 'We have attained the fullest achievement.' Since the men engaged in *karma* do not understand (the truth) under the influence of attachment, thereby they become afflicted with sorrow, and are deprived of heaven on the exhaustion of the results of *karma*." (*Muṇḍaka*, 1.2.8) "The deluded fools, believing the rites inculcated by the *Vedas* and the *Smṛtis* to be the highest, do not understand the other thing that leads to liberation. Then, having enjoyed (the fruits of actions) on the heights of heaven that are the abodes of pleasure, enter this world or an inferior one." (*Muṇḍaka*, 1.2.10) "A *brāhmaṇa* should resort to renunciation after examining the worlds acquired through *karma* with the help of the idea, 'There is nothing here that is not the result of *karma*; so what is the need of (performing) *karma*? ...'" (*Muṇḍaka*, 1.2.12) "Since these eighteen constituents of a sacrifice, on whom the inferior *karma* has been said to rest, are perishable because of their fragility, therefore those ignorant people who get elated with the idea, 'This is bliss,' undergo old age and death over again. (*Muṇḍaka*, 1.2.7) The revered Vāsudeva too declares: "The *Vedas* deal with the triad of *guṇas*; Oh Arjuna, be free from the three *guṇas*," (*BG*, 2.45) "Indeed, action is far inferior to *buddhi-yoga*," (2.49) "Wretched are they whose motive is the fruit," (2.49) "The world is impermanent and miserable" (9.33) "Birth is the abode of sorrow and is evanescent." (8.15) This is also supported by reasoning, *viz.* whatever is produced is impermanent.

Though it has been established through *śruti*, *smṛti* and reasoning that the fruits (of *karma*) are perishable, yet, people get involved in *karma* again and again.

What is the cause therefor? The non-destruction of desire alone is the cause here. Desire is what is called *kāma*. With its retinue, it deludes the unenlightened in whose internal organs the impressions of *avidyā*, *kāma*, and *karma* firmly dwell, leads them on to the path of evil and makes them get the series of evil, one following the other, without any break. The Gītācārya too declares (3.37): “It is desire; it is wrath born of the energy of *rajas*, all-devouring, all sinful; that, you should know, is the foe here,” “Triple is this, the gate to hell, destructive of the self: desire, wrath, and greed. So these three, one should abandon.” (16.21) “The senses, mind and reason are said to be its seat; concealing wisdom through these it deludes the embodied,” (3.40) and so on. Addressing desire, the revered Bhartṛhari declares: “I wandered over the country rugged with numerous impassable tracts, but did not gain anything: giving up the proper pride for race and lineage, I served but to no purpose; banishing all sense of self-respect, I dined in strange houses, fearing like a crow; still, you wax, Oh desire! delighting in wicked deeds and you are not satisfied.” (*Vairāgyaśataka*, 4).

The attainment of the series of evil by all — this, we know, is the glory of *trṣṇā*, which is another name for *kāma*. It is thus obvious like the *āmalaka* fruit in the hand that one, who is desiring or avoiding the series of evil, has to work hard towards its destruction. The revered Vyāsa, son of Parāśara, speaks of the fruit of the destruction of desire as follows: “That pleasure in this world which is the result of desire, that great pleasure in heaven — these cannot be worth even one sixteenth of the happiness arising from the destruction of desire.” Also, the Gītācārya says: (2.71) “That man attains peace, who abandoning all desires, moves

about without attachment, without selfishness, without vanity." Bhartṛhari, too, declares (*Vairāgyaśataka*, 11): "Desire, indeed, is a river, with the objects of desire for its water, agitated by waves in the form of hankerings, having for sharks the passions, and for birds the misgivings (of the heart), destroying the tree of fortitude, difficult to cross on account of eddies in the form of infatuation, very deep and having anxiety for its steep banks. The great ascetics of pure heart who have crossed it enjoy felicity." The enlightened call the destruction of desire, *vairāgya* (detachment) which is the cause of fearlessness. Everything else in the world is the cause of fear. Even this is stated by Bhartṛhari as follows (*Vairāgyaśataka*, 32): "Enjoyment is accompanied with fear of disease; noble birth is liable to a fall; wealth is exposed to danger from the king; dignity to misfortune; an army to fear from the enemy; beauty to danger from old age; knowledge of scripture to controversy; merits to danger from the wicked; and body to the fear of death. All objects are thus beset with danger. Detachment alone is invulnerable to fearlessness."

Now, this is what has to be inquired into. What is the means for the destruction of desire? Desire, indeed, is produced by *saṅkalpa*. It is stated as follows: "Oh, *kāma*, I know your source. You arise from *saṅkalpa*," "*Saṅkalpa* produces *kāma*." (*BG*, 6.24) It is the desire to attain what has not been attained; it will be in the form, "I will attain this," (*BG*, 6.13) etc. The Gītācārya also observes (2.62): "When a person thinks of objects, attachment for them arises. From attachment arises desire, from desire arises wrath." This desire for objects unattained arises only for the unenlightened, whose vision is outward and who do not, therefore,



know the non-dual Self which is of the nature of existence, knowledge, and bliss; it does not, however, arise for those whose vision is inward and who have known the nature of the Self. Generally, people see outward, and not inward. Inward vision takes place only for one in a thousand, who is endowed with discrimination. This is stated in the *Kāthopaniṣad* (2.1.1-2): "The self-existent Lord destroyed the outgoing senses. So one sees the outer things and not the inner self. A rare discriminating man, desirous of immortality turns his eyes away and then sees the indwelling Self. The unintelligent people follow the external desires. They get entangled in the snares of the widespread death. So, the discriminating people, having known what true immortality is, in the midst of impermanent things, do not pray for anything more." It has also been stated in the *Bhagavad-gītā* (7.3): "Among thousands of men, one perchance strives for perfection," etc. Thus when a person has attained self-realization and has become enlightened, then since there is nothing unattained for him, there is no possibility for *saṅkalpa*; then how can desire arise? How, then, can its retinue such as wrath, the source of all evil, arise? This can be well understood through the discipline of discrimination between the eternal and the ephemeral, etc.

It may be argued: "The nature of the Self is known to everyone in many ways such as — 'I am Devadatta; I am stout; I am blind; I am an agent; I am an enjoyer; I have limited knowledge; I am finite; I have limited power; I make volitions which always do not come true.' What is it that remains to be known about the nature of the Self?" It is true that the Self is known to everyone. However, it is not known in its essential nature, but only differently, in the same way as shell is known

as silver, as sky is known as characterised by surface, dust, etc. Please listen to a statement of *smṛti* in this context: "If a person knows the Self in a way different from what it is, has he not, having stolen the Self, committed sin?"

*Śruti* also declares: "Those worlds of devils are covered by blinding darkness. Those people that kill the Self go to them after going up from this body." (*Īśāvāsya*, 3) "Those worlds covered with blind darkness are called joyless. To them after death go those people who have not knowledge, who are not awakened." (*Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, 4.4.11) This way of knowing a thing differently from what it is, is called *adhyāsa* (superimposition). It is defined as "Cognition of something in something else is *adhyāsa*," etc.

If so, what is the real nature of the Self? This is the real nature of the Self, *viz.*, non-agency, non-enjoyership, omniscience, infinitude, omnipotence, of the nature of true volition, existence, knowledge, bliss, and non-duality. Not this much alone; listen to this also: "It is that which is not seen and grasped; it has no genus and qualities; it has no eyes and ears, no hands and feet; it is eternal and all-pervasive; it is everywhere; it is very subtle," (*Muṇḍaka*, 1.1.6) and so on.

It may be objected: "What you have stated as the nature of the Self is not supported by *pramāṇas*. This (nature of the Self) is not apprehended by perception. Indeed, perception as a *pramāṇa* apprehends that which has been stated earlier and known to everyone: "I am an agent, I am an enjoyer," and so on — this you have not stated as the nature of the Self. Nor is it established by inference; only the agent-self which is the locus of knowledge is established by it. It cannot also be

established by postulation, for it is not known at all that way. Nor can verbal testimony establish what is held by you, the reason being that the Self is known from the verbal testimony as an agent who performs obligatory, occasional and desire-prompted deeds, etc. and also as an enjoyer of the fruits, here and hereafter."

What you have stated is true, *viz.* that this nature (of the Self) cannot be known through perception. How can the Self, which is not sound, or touch, or colour, or taste, or smell, be the object of perception which apprehends only external objects? Indeed, it is in this way that the *śruti* text says: "Neither visual sense, nor speech, nor mind, etc. comprehends it." (*Kena*, 1.3) That it cannot also be known through inference has been stated correctly, for it is impossible to infer the nature of the Self as set forth (in the *Vedānta*) by those whose minds have become hard by dry logic even in hundreds of lives. *Śruti* says thus: "The wisdom that you have now, O dearest one, which leads to sound knowledge when imparted only by someone else (*i.e.* other than the logician) is not to be attained through argumentation," etc. (*Kāthoṇiṣad*, 1.2.9) Also, it has been stated by you that it cannot be known through postulation, the reason being that it is not accepted as a *pramāṇa*. Or, if it be accepted as a *pramāṇa*, its nature can be known, for, the overcoming of sorrow by the knower of the Self, as stated in the text, "The knower of the Self overcomes sorrow," (*Chāndogya*, 7.1.3) is untenable, if agency etc. (of the Self) are real, and so it is tenable to say that they are not real in the case of the Self. It cannot be said that there is no verbal testimony in support of it, for the *Vedānta* which

is another name for the *Upaniṣad* and which is the highest *pramāṇa* is fully wakeful (in doing its work).

Now, it may be asked: "What is *Vedānta*?" We understand at this point of clarification why you have prattled like this. So it should be understood in this way. Knowledge is of two kinds — lower and higher. Of these two, the lower knowledge has for its object the variegated fruits of this world and also of the other world such as *Brahmaloka* attained through many means, as taught in the *Ṛg-veda*, etc. Higher knowledge, on the contrary, has for its object the identity of *jīva* and Brahman, *i.e.* liberation, as taught in the *Īśāvāsya* and other *Upaniṣads*. It alone is *Vedānta*. Thus, once upon a time, Aṅgiras told Śaunaka when approached duly (for instruction): "There are two kinds of knowledge to be acquired — the higher and the lower. This is what, as tradition goes, the knowers of the import of the *Veda* say. Of these, the lower comprises the *Ṛg-veda*, *Yajur-veda*, *Sāma-veda*, *Atharva-veda*, the science of pronunciations, etc., the code of rituals, grammar, etymology, metre, and astrology. Then there is the higher knowledge by which is realized that Immuta-ble," (*Muṇḍaka*, 1.1.4-5) and so on. So, it should be understood that the *Vedānta* is the verbal testimony which teaches the identity of *jīva* and Brahman. The preceptor Vidyāraṇya conveys this idea in this manner in the "Tattvaviveka-prakaraṇa" (of the *Pañcadaśī*, 1.10): "In this way it is established by reasoning that the individual Self is of the nature of existence, knowledge, and bliss. Likewise is the supreme Brahman. identity of the two is taught in the *Upaniṣads*." It has been stated that the identity of *jīva* and Brahman is taught only in the *Upaniṣads* for the sake of comforting medi-

ocre persons by following the method of offering sugar-coated pills. The real position is that the entire *Veda* along with its auxiliaries conveys this as its final import. If the final import is kept aside, it teaches many other things as a means to the final import. This secret point of view should be carefully noted. This has been conveyed in the *Kāthopanīṣad* (1.2.15) "That goal which all the *Vedas* propound," and so on. It has also been stated in the *Bhagavad-gītā* (15.15), "I alone am known through all the *Vedas*," and so on. So, from the absolute standpoint, the entire *Veda* is *Vedānta*, and the entire *Vedānta* is *Veda*, and not different from it.

Now, what is it that is taught by it? Though this question has already been answered, it is necessary to inquire into this a little more for the sake of clarity. It can be explained as follows: There are two kinds of sentences in the *Upaniṣads* — some are subsidiary texts, and some are principal texts. Of these, the sentences which set forth creation, etc., the triple states of experience, etc. are called subsidiary texts. For example, there are the following texts: "As a spider spreads and withdraws (its thread), as on the earth grow the herbs (and trees), and as from the living man issues out hair on the head and body, so out of the Immutable does the universe emerge here." (*Muṇḍakopaniṣad*, 1.1.7) "As from fire, fully ablaze, fly off sparks in their thousands ... similarly, from the Immutable originate different kinds of creatures and into it again they merge." (*Ibid.*, 2,1,1) "From that Brahman, which is the Self, was produced ether ..." (*Taittirīyopaniṣad*, 2,1,1) "That Brahman, having created (that), entered into that very thing. And having entered there, it became the formed and formless ..." (*Ibid.*, 2,4,1) "He thought: let me create the worlds. He created these worlds ... Having

split up this end, he entered through this door." (*Aitareyopaniṣad* 1,1,1 and 1,3,12) "In the beginning my child, there was being alone ... It thought: may I become many. It sent forth fire." (*Chāndogyopaniṣad*, 7,2,1-3) "Verily, there are two forms of Brahman — the formed and the formless ..." (*Bṛhadāraṇyakoṇiṣad*, 2,3,1) Thinking that one should attain the knowledge of the acosmic nature of Brahman through the method of superimposition and subsequent negation, *śruti*, first of all, teaches creation, etc. in a subsidiary way through superimposition.

In this connection, the author of the *Svārājyasiddhi* (2.18) says: "Śruti cannot impart the knowledge of the non-dual Self at once, when the illusory cognition of duality arising from perception, etc., and supported by external proofs, is prevailing. Thus, *śruti* with a view to show that the whole class of empirical objects is illusory, has set forth the theory of creation and destruction." Gauḍapāda also (*Māṇḍūkya-kārikā*, 3.15) has stated as follows: "The creation that has been multifariously set forth with the help of the examples, earth, iron, sparks, etc. is merely by way of generating the idea (of oneness); however, there is no plurality in any way." That which sets forth the identity of the individual self and the supreme Self is called the principal text such as "Brahman alone is this universe," "Consciousness is Brahman," "That self is Brahman," "That thou art," "I am Brahman."

Among the sixteen kinds, excepting the four kinds of grammatical coordination, viz. *bādhāyām sāmānādhikarānya*, *adhyāsa-sāmānādhikarānya*, *viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣya-sāmānādhikarānya*, and *aikya-sāmānādhikarānya*, all other kinds have no relevance at all here.

So, the question whether grammatical coordination in the sense of oneness or in the form of sublation is to be accepted, the question whether the identity of *jīva* and Brahman is established through implication or without implication — though there is difference of opinion among the Advaitins in answering these questions, mainly because of *adhikāribheda*, there is no difference of opinion at all among them in their view that the identity of *jīva* and Brahman, *i.e.* the impartite sense, is obtained from them. When the Upaniṣadic texts are properly reviewed by means of “purport-ascertaining marks” such as the beginning and the end, it will not be possible, so it is emphatically declared, to ascertain any other meaning than that of the identity of *jīva* and Brahman. The beginning and the end (which are the purport-ascertaining marks) are mentioned as follows: “The beginning and the end, repetition, novelty, fruit, commendation, and intelligibility in the light of reasoning are the marks for ascertaining the purport.” What is stated here has been conveyed in the *Svārājyasiddhi* (1.15) as: “Brahman is that from which the world originates, in which it remains, and into which it merges. It is the only source of scripture (and for which scripture is the only *pramāṇa*). It becomes omniscient through *māyā*. Its essential nature is eternal bliss, existence and non-dual consciousness. This Brahman is self-luminous. This alone is the purport of all the *Upaniṣads*. By realizing the true nature of this (Brahman), those who have controlled their minds transcend completely the ocean of birth and death.”

In this context the following verses (*Svārājyasiddhi*, 2.39-44) answer briefly the problem at issue. “Here (in the *mahāvākya* — *tat tvam asi*), the primary

meanings of the two words do not fit in together, because two contradictory entities are not fit to attain identity. Also the secondary signification is not (possible) for the meaning of each word associated with the other, (since there is) absence of effect (and) in accordance with the beginning (and the concluding) section of the *Upaniṣad*, etc. (39) Here also (in the 'tat tvam asi'), there is not even the appropriate third meaning like: 'The bank of the Ganges' which is related to the primary meaning (of the words in the sentence: 'A hamlet on the Ganges' and) which is fit for the relation. Further, there is indeed no indication, which can be intelligible in ascertaining exclusive-cum-non-exclusive secondary signification in any one of the two words. (40) For this (*jīva*) there is no form of its own, established by proof, which is other than, but similar to that of God; and there is no existence at present of what is to come in future. It is not proper to abandon that which is heard and to assume what is not heard. Thus exclusive-cum-non-exclusive secondary signification is of course suitable in respect of both (words — *tat* and *tvam*). (41) After leaving out the aggregate of contradictory qualities (and) taking the secondary meaning, *viz.* the witness of body-mind and that whose nature is truth, infinitude and consciousness, one should relate (the meanings of) the two words to the partless ultimate, just as in the sentence: 'This is that Devadatta.' (42) The two words require each other in order to remove the notion of mediacy and non-attainment about Brahman, and the delusion of limited nature and misery in respect of the inner Self, and (also) in order to affirm Ātman's own real nature which is transcendental, (*viz.* not established by mundane proofs. (43) Here (in the *mahāvākya*, the



meaning 'partless (ultimate)', of the words is to be taken to mean supra-relational (and) true (*i.e.* unsublatable), or to mean that the one is not different from the other. Such (a meaning), indeed, is well-known, since there is the knowledge of the mere moon when the sentence: 'The moon is abundant light', etc. (is uttered)." (44)

Thus, since there is nowhere sublation of the sense of identity of the individual self and the supreme Self, which are self-luminous, which are existence, knowledge, and bliss by their very nature, the teaching of scripture culminates in non-duality alone; and this is, according to the standpoint of the knowers of Brahman, what is set forth by the Vedānta.

In this context there is an objection raised by the mediocre persons: "How can the *jīva*, known by all as something qualified by agency, parviscience etc., be established as non-agent, omniscient, etc. by its very nature." Since this objection has to be answered, something more has to be said. This point (regarding the nature of *jīva*) will become obvious even without the instruction of scripture, if one reviews a little the triple states of waking, dream and deep sleep, experienced by all daily. Those like Virocana to whom this idea does not dawn have to be pitied, and not despised.

In this connection, *śruti* also says: "Just as those who do not know the field, walk again and again over the hidden treasure of gold and do not find it, even so all creatures here go day after day into the Brahman-world and yet do not find it, for they are carried away by untruth." (*Chāndogyopaniṣad*, 8.3.2) *Śruti* which does not stop after giving this instruction is, indeed,

compassionate. After elucidating the triple states, it on its own says elsewhere with a view to rescue them: "He who moves about happy in a dream, he is the Self, said he; he is the immortal ... Even though this Self is not blind when the body is blind, is not lame when the body is lame, though he does not suffer defects from the defects of the body." (*Ibid.* 8.10.1) "When a man is asleep, composed, serene, and knows no dreams, that is the Self." (*Ibid.* 8.11.1) This idea has been stated elsewhere also. The self-luminous nature of the Self of the *jīva* even in the waking state has been elucidated well. Since this point has been expounded very clearly in the *Bṛhadāraṇyakoṇiṣad*, 4.3 in the dialogue between Janaka and Yājñavalkya it is not elaborated here. However, a verse from Ācārya Śaṅkarabhagavatpāda, which summarises it, is recalled. It is this: "Which is your light? During the day, the sun (is my light). During night? Lamp, etc. What is the light for seeing the sun, the lamp etc.? My eyes. When you have closed them, what is your light? My mind. What is the light for seeing the mind? For that purpose, I am. So you are that supreme light. Oh Lord, I am that." The same thing holds good in the state of dream. "Even as a large fish moves along both banks of a river, the hither and the further, so also this person moves along both these states, the state of dream and the state of waking. As a falcon or any other bird having flown around in the sky becomes weary, folds its wings and is borne down to its nest, even so this Person.. " (*Bṛhadāraṇyakoṇiṣad*, 4.3.18-19) — thus *śruti* states the position very clearly, and so there is no need for further elaboration.

Thus, it is established that non-duality alone is what is known through the *Vedānta*. In this connection,

Vidyāraṇya, in the *Pañcadaśī* (6.240), says the following: “The ignorant are convinced that the happiness and grief which the world and heaven offer are real; so they do not perceive non-duality, nor think it exists.” “There are philosophers who, holding an opposite view disregard the real non-dual entity. That does not harm us, who have no regard for their conclusion.” (2.101) “It is the *jīva*, a semblance of the Self, which is affected by the pain and pleasure of this worldly life but not the real Self. This understanding is called knowledge. It is achieved through discrimination.” (6.11) “So, one should always enquire into the nature of the world, the individual self, and the supreme Self. When the ideas of *jīva* and the world are negated, the pure *Ātman* alone remains.” (6.12) “By negation it does not mean that the world and the *jīva* cease to be perceptible to the senses. It means the conviction of their illusory character. Otherwise, people would be automatically liberated in deep sleep or in a faint.” (6.13) “‘The supreme Self alone remains’ means a conviction about its reality and not non-perceiving of the world. Otherwise, there would be no such thing as liberation-in-life.” (6.14) The preceptor Gauḍapāda (in the *Māṇḍūkya-kārikā*) says the following: “There can be no perfection for people who have proclivity for multiplicity, and tread forever the path of duality and talk of plurality. Hence they are traditionally held to be pitiable.” (4.94) “The dualists, confirmed believers in the methodologies establishing their own conclusions, are at loggerheads with one another. But this (non-dual) standpoint finds no conflict with them.” (3.17) “A thing that already exists does not pass into birth; and a thing that does not pre-exist cannot pass into birth. These people, while disputing thus, are indeed

non-dualists; and they thus reveal the absence of birth.” (4.4) “We approve the birthlessness that is revealed by them. We do not quarrel with them. Understand this philosophy which is free from dispute.” (4.5)

If the reality is such, how are we to understand this extremely variegated world which reveals an order beyond comprehensions even by the mind and which comprises objects, higher and lower? The entire world known to us is, indeed, the manifestation of *māyā*. “Everything is possible in *māyā*,” declares Vidyāraṇya. “*Māyā*,” says Bhagavatpāda, “is competent to accomplish what cannot be accomplished.” Vāsudeva observes: “This is, indeed, *māyā*, what is projected by *māyā*.” Gauḍapāda says: “This duality is nothing but *māyā*.” The *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* says: “The self-luminous reality, through its powers of *māyā*, assumes many forms.” According to Sarvajñātmamuni, “Everything took place being but *māyā*. All this is manifested through darkness (*i.e. māyā*).” Gaṅgādharendra Sarasvatī declares: “This bondage is, indeed, *avidyā*. *Māyā*, which is capable of accomplishing what cannot be accomplished, is the cause of delusion through false cognition.” Now, it may be asked: “What is this *māyā* by depending on which this world is seen?” The reply is as follows: *Māyā* has no reality; but it is a power of the Self which is inferred from the effort, like the power of fire. “People understand that to be *māyā* which, though clearly seen, is at the same time beyond all determination, as in the case of magic.” (*Pañcadaśī*, 6.141) “This darkness (*māyā*) is indeterminate,” says Sarvajñātmamuni. More about this later.

ŚĀRĪRAKAVYĀKHYĀPRASTHĀNABHEDAḤ

by

*Ātmavidyābhūṣaṇam V. S. V. Gurusvāmī Śāstri*

*with a free rendering by*

*Dr. V. K. S. N. Raghavan*

*(Contd. from Vol. XII, No. 3)*

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հրատարակւում է Մ. Մ. Գրառույթի Գրառույթի Կենտրոնի կողմից:

Կազմակերպիչ և խմբագիր  
ԸՄՄԿԻ Կ. Մ. Գրառույթի

(Կենտրոնի հասցե: Կ. Մ. Գրառույթի)

## VIII श्रीप्रकटार्थकारः

[ 371 ]

विवरणे प्रकटार्थकृता कृते  
 निगदितान्विषयान्प्रविवेचयन् ।  
 विमलशङ्करभाषितभूषितं  
 ह्युपहरामि मतं विदुषां मुदे ॥

[ 372 ]

प्रकटार्थकृतः प्रायः प्रकाशात्मानुयायिनः ।  
 प्रकाशात्मयतेः पक्षं कक्षीकुर्वन्ति किञ्च ते ॥

भामतीकारमतनिराकरणम्

[ 373 ]

प्रतिक्षिपन्ति पक्षं च वाचस्पतिविवक्षितम् ।  
 परायत्ताधिकरणपर्यन्ते ते बभाषिरे ॥

[ 374 ]

प्रेरकत्वे परेशस्य जीवस्य भ्रान्तिकर्तृता ।  
 जीवभ्रान्त्या परेशस्य प्रेरकत्वं सुदुर्घटम् ॥

[ 375 ]

इदं किलाधिकरणं दुर्योजं भामतीकृतः ।  
 इति साटोपया वाचा तथाधिकरणान्तरे ॥

[ 376 ]

‘सहकार्यान्तरविधिः पक्षेणे’त्यत्र चापि ते ।  
वाचस्पतिमधिक्षेपरोषपर्याकुलाक्षरम् ॥

[ 377 ]

वाचस्पतिर्मण्डनस्य पृष्ठसेवाधुरंधरः ।  
निराचकार श्रवणे विधिमीर्ष्यासमाकुलः ॥

[ 378 ]

भाष्यभावानभिज्ञोऽयं यतिद्वेषीत्यदूषयन् ।  
वाचस्पतिपरामर्शः प्रकटार्थकृतो यथा ॥

[ 379 ]

प्रकटार्थपरामर्शस्तथा वाचस्पतेर्न हि ।  
वाचस्पतेस्तदेते स्युः समनन्तरकालिकाः ॥

[ 380 - 381 ab ]

प्रकटार्थकृतां पक्षममलानन्दयोगिनः ।  
कटाक्षयन्ति कुहचित्तेन तत्पूर्वकालिकाः ॥  
क्वचिद्भास्करमुख्यानां मतान्युन्माथयन्ति ते ।



“ शुद्धचिदाश्रया माया ” ईश्वरस्य भूतभाविपदार्थेष्वपि ,  
अपरोक्षरूपा मायावृत्तिः

[ 381 cd - 382 ]

चिन्मात्रालम्बना माया तद्विवर्त इदं जगत् ॥  
चितश्च प्रतिबिम्बोऽस्यां सर्वज्ञो भवतीश्वरः ।  
सर्वज्ञता चेश्वरस्य मायावृत्तिभिरिष्यते ॥

[ 383 ]

ज्ञातृत्वमिव जीवानामन्तःकरणवृत्तिभिः ।  
वर्तमानेष्विवातीतानागतेष्वपि वस्तुषु ॥

[ 384 ]

अपरोक्षमयी माया वृत्तिरेतैरुपेयते ।  
इत्थमेते वदन्त्यस्य मूलमेतत्प्रतर्क्यते ॥

[ 385 ]

‘मायोपाधिर्जगद्योनिः सर्वज्ञत्वादिलक्षणः’ ।  
इति भाष्यकृतां सूक्तिर्वाक्यवृत्तिगता तथा ॥

[ 386 ]

‘ईक्षतेने’त्यत्र भाष्ये बहुधा भगवत्पदैः ।  
मायावृत्तिभिरीशस्य सर्वज्ञत्वं समर्थ्यते ॥

[ 387 ]

इदं तु परमं मूलमेषां बुद्ध्यामहे वयम् ।  
विक्षेपावृत्तिमद्भागा मायायाः सन्ति तेऽखिलाः ॥

[ 388 ]

अविद्येत्यभिधीयन्ते ह्यज्ञानपदबोधिताः ।  
एषु चित्प्रतिबिम्बा ये तेऽनन्ता जीवसंज्ञिताः ॥

[ 389 ]

जीवभेदं जीवरूपं कथयन्त्यनया दिशा ।  
'आभास एव चे'त्येतत्सूत्रभाष्यं तथा पराः ॥

[ 390 ]

'न तं विद' अथ 'अविद्यायामन्तरे'त्येवमादयः ।  
श्रुतयः स्मृतिरप्येषा 'तेन मुह्यन्ति जन्तवः' ॥

[ 391 ]

प्रत्येकाज्ञानसम्बन्धबोधिन्यो या भवन्ति ताः ।  
तासां भाष्याणि चाप्यत्र मूलमूहामहे वयम् ॥

[ 392 ]

आनुमानिकसर्वत्रद्यम्बाद्यायतनादिषु ।  
तथाधिकरणेष्वहुर्मूलं भाष्यकृतो बहु ॥

श्रवणे अपूर्वविधिरिति प्रकटार्थकृतां पक्षः

[ 393 ]

आत्मज्ञानश्रवणयोः साध्यसाधनतामतिः ।  
प्रमाणान्तरतो नैव सम्भवत्यागमैर्विना ॥

[ 394 ]

अतः श्रोतव्य इत्यस्मिन्नत्यन्ताप्राप्तिसम्भवात् ।  
अपूर्वविधिमेवाह श्रवणे प्रकटार्थकृत् ॥

[ 395 ]

‘सहकार्यान्तरविधिः पक्षेणेत्यत्र भाष्यकृत् ।  
पाण्डित्यवदपूर्वत्वान्मौने विधिमबोधयत् ॥

[ 396 - 397 ab ]

पक्षेऽप्राप्तत्वकथनं विनापूर्वत्वबोधनम् ।  
अप्राप्तिमात्रे दृष्टान्तदार्ष्टान्तिकतयाकरे ॥  
विवक्षितं भाष्यकृद्भिरिति तन्मूलमुच्यते ।

जीवनानात्ववादः, मायाऽविद्याभेदः

[ 397 cd - 398 ]

दग्धा हि विद्ययाविद्याबीजशक्तिर्यदा भवेत् ॥  
मुक्तानां पुनरुत्पत्तिर्न कथञ्चन सम्भवेत् ।  
इति भाष्यकृतो वाक्यं जीवनानात्वबोधकम् ॥

[ 399 - 400 ab ]

आनुमानिकसूत्रस्य भाष्ये व्यक्तम्प्रदृश्यते ।  
अदृश्यादिकरणभाष्येऽप्यव्याकृतं तथा ॥  
ईशाश्रयञ्च तस्यैवोपाधिभूतमिनीरितम् ।

( अनुवर्तते )

## IX. PRAKAṬĀRTHAKĀRAH

[ 371-372 ]

Let me please the learned by dealing with the important tenets enunciated by the prolific writer, Prakaṭārthakāra and by pointing out how he has expatiated the views of the Bhāṣyakāra, Śrī Śaṅkara. Prakaṭārthakāra follows mostly the views of Prakāśātmayati.

[ 373-374 ]

(i) *Refutation of the Views of Bhāmatikāra*

Prakaṭārthakāra has refuted the views of Vācaspatimisra, while commenting on the 'Parāyattādhikaraṇa'. Prakaṭārthakāra holds that 'When the supreme Lord is *preraka* (one who directs), *jīva* acts as the agent (in an action) out of illusion' is untenable; and that 'because of the *jīva's* illusion, the supreme Lord has the agency' is also untenable.

[ 375-378 ab ]

According to Prakaṭārthakāra, the commentary — *Bhāmatī* on the *Parāyattādhikaraṇa* is quite inappropriate. Even while commenting on another *sūtra*, "*sahakāryantaravidhiḥ pakṣeṇa*" (BS, III, iv, 47), Prakaṭārthakāra refers to the views of Vācaspatimisra as improper. "Vācaspatimisra, following Maṇḍana, has denied the scope of *vidhi* (injunction) with regard to *śravaṇa* (Vedic study) out of jealousy. Therefore he has not understood the main purport of the *Bhāṣya* of Śrī Śaṅkara." — thus Prakaṭārthakāra has criticised Vācaspatimisra.

[ 378 cd - 379 ]

There is only the criticism made by Prakāṣārthakāra against Vācaspati; and, there is no criticism by Vācaspatimīśra against Prakāṣārthakāra. So, it is concluded that Prakāṣārthakāra is a successor of Vācaspatimīśra.

[ 380 - 381ab ]

Amalānandayogin has cited the views of Prakāṣārthakāra, in a few places. So, the latter is a predecessor of the former. Prakāṣārthakāra has refuted the views of Bhāskara and others, in a few places.

(ii) *World is but a projection of māyā, the locus of pure cit; Īśvara's omniscience is only a vṛtti of māyā.*

[ 381 cd - 384 ]

According to Prakāṣārthakāra, *māyā* has its basis in consciousness (*cit*) alone, and this world is only a *vivarta* (projection) of that (*māyā*). The reflection of *cit* in *māyā* is the omniscient *Īśvara*. The omniscience of *Īśvara* is tenable because of the *vṛttis* of *māyā*. Just as the *jīvas* have the knowership with regard to objects of the present time through the *vṛttis* of the internal organ, even so *Īśvara* has immediate perception of objects of all the three periods of time through the *vṛttis* of *māyā*. The source for these views of Prakāṣārthakāra seems to be the following texts of Śrī Śaṅkara.

[ 385-387 ab ]

“The cause (origin) of the world is *Īśvara* whose limiting adjunct is *māyā* and who is characterised by omniscience” – this is a passage from the *Vākyaṅgī* (45) of Śrī Śaṅkara. It is also found that *Īśvara* has

omniscience, etc. owing to the *vṛttis* of *māyā* — according to the commentary of Śrī Śaṅkara on the *sūtra* “*īkṣater-na.*” (BS, I, i, 5) It is surmised that the above two passages of Śrī Śaṅkara form the basis for the viewpoints of Prakāṣārthakāra.

[ 387 cd - 388 ]

*Māyā* has many characteristics like *vikṣepa* (projection), *āvṛti* (concealment), etc. It is also called *avidyā* (nescience), *ajñāna* (ignorance) and so on. Among the many aspects of *māyā*, those which constitute the reflections of consciousness (in *māyā*) are referred to as *jīvas* which are infinite in number.

[389-392 ]

In this manner, Prakāṣārthakāra explains the difference and nature of *jīvas*. The source for his views are the following, *viz.* (i) Śrī Śaṅkara has dealt with *jīvas* while commenting on “*ābhāsa eva ca*” (BS II, iii, 30); (ii) there are *śruti* texts like, “None knows Him” (*Rgvedā*, X, 82, 7), (iii) “In the midst of *avidyā* (nescience)” (*Kāthopanīṣad*, I, ii, 5); (iv) there is also the *smṛti* text, “*tena muhyanti jantavaḥ*” [by *māyā* are the creatures deluded] (*BG*, v 15). The several texts explaining every *jīva* to be obscured by ignorance and the commentaries on these texts form the basis for the views of Prakāṣārthakāra. Even the Bhāṣyakāra (Śrī Śaṅkara) has dealt with the nature of *jīva*, in his commentary on many *adhikaraṇas* of the *Brahmasūtra* like *Ānumānika* (BS, I, iv, 1-7), *Sarvatra* (BS, I, ii, 1-8), *Dyubvādi* (BS, I, iii, 1-7), etc.

(to be continued)

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*samsārādhvani tāpabhānukiraṇaprodhbhūtadāhavyathā-*  
*khinnānāṃ jalakāṅksayā marubhuvi bhrāntyā*  
*paribhrāmyatām*  
*atyāsannasudhāmbudhiṃ sukhakaraṃ brahmādvayaṃ*  
*darśayaty-*  
*eṣā śaṅkarabhārati vijayate nirvāṇasandāyini.*

To those who are afflicted, in the way of the world, by the burning pain given rise to by the scorching sun-shafts of misery, and who through delusion wander about in the desert (of worldliness) seeking water — showing the felicitous ocean of nectar, which is very near, the non-dual *Brahman*, this — the Voice of Śaṅkara — is victorious, leading, as it does, to liberation.