

A QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ADVAITA - VEDĀNTA


The VOICE of ŚĀṆKARĀ

śaṅkara-bhāratī

Chairman, Advisory Board
V. R. Kalyanasundara Sastri

Editor
N. C. Krishnan

Volume THIRTEEN
Number THREE



November

1988

esā śaṅkara-bhāratī vijagate
nirvāṇa-sandāyini

victorious is the voice of śaṅkara,
leading, as it does, to liberation

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HOMAGE TO ŚAÑKARA

[130]

भट्टादिभास्करसितेतरकण्ठमुख्यान्
वादे विजित्य कुतुकाद्विदुषां वरेण्यान् ।
अद्वैतमार्गपरिरक्षणजागरूक
श्रीशङ्करार्य मम देहि पदावलम्बम् ॥

*bhaṭṭādi-bhāskara-sitetarakaṅṭha-mukhyān
vāde vijitya kutukād-viduṣām vareṇyān
advaita-mārga-parirakṣaṇa-jāgarūka!
śrīśaṅkarārya! mama dehi padāvalambam.*

Oh Śrī Śaṅkara! You have been very earnest in establishing and guarding the Advaita Vedānta from the onslaughts of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, Bhāskara and Nīlakaṅṭha after vanquishing the scholar-exponents of those schools in debate. Oh Śrī Śaṅkara! please give me the support of your pair of feet.

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श्रीमत्प्रणीतशुकतातमुनीन्द्रसूत्र -
 भाष्यादिपाठनविधावधिकम्पटुत्वम् ।
 दत्त्वापि शून्यपरिमाणजडत्ववार्धेः
 श्रीशङ्करार्य मम देहि पदावलम्बम् ॥

*śrīmat-praṇīta-śukatātamunīndrasūtra-
 bhāṣyādi-pāṭhanavidhāvadhikam-paṭutvam
 dattvāpi śūnyaparimāṇajaḍatva-vārdheḥ
 śrīśaṅkarārya! mama dehi padāvalambam.*

Oh Śrī Śaṅkara! Though you have endowed me — nothing but the ocean of mere dullness (stupidity) — with sharp intelligence to study and grasp the import of the *Bhāṣya* on the *Brahmasūtra* of Vyāsa — father of Sage Śuka — , I request you to lend me the support of your benign feet.

Jagadguru Śrī Saccidānanda Śivābhinava Nṛsimhabhāratī
 in *Śrīśaṅkarācāryapadāvalambastava*

THE VEDIC HERITAGE — THE ETERNAL UNCREATE*

Jagadguru Śrī Candrasekharendra Sarasvatī

The *Vedas*, which constitute the bedrock of our cultural heritage, are the chief four of the fourteen scriptures serving as the fountain-source of the religion and philosophy of India. They are the *Rg-*, *Yajur-*, *Sāma-* and *Atharva-veda* with their ancillary disciplines or *aṅgas* (limbs) and *upāṅgas* (subsidiary systems). Even as a human being has several limbs in his physical body, so is the Vedic *Puruṣa* (or call it, the Vedic Mother) constituted of six limbs and four companion branches, or *upāṅgas*, as they are called.

The *Vedas* have six ancillary disciplines or *aṅgas* which are: *Śikṣā* or phonetics, *Vyākaraṇa* or grammar, *Chandas* or prosody, *Nirukta* or etymology, *Jyotiṣa* or astronomy and *Kalpa* or ritual codes. Four more disciplines supplement the Vedic canon, and they are: *Mīmāṃsā*, *Nyāya*, *Purāṇa* and *Dharma sāstras*.

But of all these fourteen *Dharma Pramāṇas* (scriptures), the *Vedas* stand foremost. As the other ten are named limbs and auxiliaries, they are regarded as

* Translated by ARGUŚ from *Deivattin Kural*, Vol. II, pp. 211-225.

Vidyās or *Śāstras*. As the *vidyās* are counted as eighteen, four more have to be added to this list, and they are: *Āyurveda*, *Artha-śāstra*, *Dhanurveda* and *Gāndharva-Veda*.

The *Vedas* are to be studied along with the *Āngas* and *Upāṅgas*, mentioned above, and hence is the Vedic student stated to be learning "*sāṅgopāṅga-adhyayanam*". From this must have come the word "*sāṅgopāṅgam*" which signifies perfection in everything one learns. The word indicates excellence in the fourteen *Vidyās*. We might have forgotten these *Vidyās* completely in modern civilisation, but the term "*sāṅgopāṅgam*" still remains in currency to signify perfection in any form of learning. From this, it is evident that the study and practice of the precepts of the *Vedas*, their six divisions and four sub-divisions, were quite a common feature in Tamil Nadu in ancient times. It is a pity that not only have we forgotten this ancient heritage of ours, but even the significance of the word which carried its meaning.

That apart, one must remember that the *Vedas* are of prime importance. The Vedic culture is the pivot around which all the Hindu scriptures revolve and take their source. That is for the Hindus the *Bible*, the *Koran* and the *Granth Saheb*. Although I might ascribe these names of the scriptures of other religions to the *Vedas*, let it be remembered that the *Vedas* are of primary origin. All other religious faiths have sprung from some of the doctrines of the *Vedas*.* The word "*Veda*" itself signifies the prime source of authority. In that sense do I mention the authoritative scriptures like the Christian *Veda*, the Islamic

*For details see pages 125-133 of Vol. I of "*Daiyattin Kural*".

Veda, the Sikh *Veda*, the Zoroastrian *Veda*, etc. For that matter the Christians refer to their Holy Bible as “*Satya Veda*”.

To talk of the *Vedas*, one is at a loss where to begin or to end, as its glory is endless, even as it is beginningless. Just as the *Āpastambadharmasūtra* says “*pramāṇam vedāśca*”, the authority for all *dharmas* stems from the *Vedas*. Great souls of Tamilnadu have from ancient times referred to the *Manu-dharma-śāstra*, and given it the primary position among all their legal codes and rules. We have all known of the great king, Manu-nīti-cōlan who gave justice to a cow which had lost its calf under the wheels of his son’s chariot, by sacrificing his own son in a similar fashion by killing the prince under the chariot-wheels. As far as the rules of *Dharma* are concerned, we still hold on to Manu’s Laws.

But what does the *Dharma-śāstra* of Manu affirm? Has it asserted that it is the sheet anchor of all justice? No. It observes: “*Vedo’khilo dharmamūlam*”, meaning that for all *Dharmas*, the *Veda* is the source. These are the words of Manu himself who has reiterated the fact that Sanātana Dharma, the Eternal Law, has its *fons et origo* in the *Vedas*. Whatever the *Vedas* declare has to be followed implicitly, the reason being that they are the source and origin of all laws and regulations governing the Hindu way of life. That is why when one asks another to do a job without demur, the latter retorts: “Is it a *Veda-vāk*?” Yes, the Vedic word has remained for thousands of generations in this land as an unquestionable authority, being timeless, without a beginning.

Apauruṣeya and Anādi

What is meant by *Anādi* or without a beginning? The *Vedas* are eternal, beginningless. The word "*Veda*" means knowledge, not *apodictic* learning, but supreme Knowledge, or better to say the "Wisdom". The word "*Veda*" is only secondarily used to the four books, *R̥g-*, *Yajur-*, *Sāma-* and *Atharva Vedas*. For any book signifies an author; for the *Old Testament* was a compilation of the sayings or writings of several prophets and the *New Testament* comprises the teachings of Jesus Christ, composed by the four Apostles. Likewise, the *Koran* is a compilation of the revelations to Prophet Mohamed. All these great men have lived at one time and their teachings were not there before their births.

How then can one say the *Vedas* are "*anādi*", beginningless? There must have been a time, when the four *Vedas* were not there. These doubts must inevitably arise in one's mind. Yes, if one thinks of the *Vedas* being written by some saint or Ṛṣi at some time. That is how we have been thinking; and that is what we have learnt from the books. Not only that. When we look at the *Vedas*, they consist of several *Sūktas*, hymns, even as we see in Tirujñānasambandhar's *Tēvāram* many *padikams*, each consisting of ten verses. The term "*sūktam*", when split, consists of two words "*Su*" and "*Uktam*", meaning "good" and "sayings".

In reading the *Vedas* in the orthodox way, we commence by referring to the particular Ṛṣi who composed it, the metre (*chandas*) in which it is written and the deity (*devatā*) to whom it is addressed. As there are hundreds of *Sūktas* (hymns) the names of several

Ṛṣis who composed them, their parentage and *gotras* too are mentioned. For example, in a *Sūkta* there is mention of “Agastya-Maitrā-Varuṇi”, meaning that Agastya composed the hymn who was the son of Mitra and Vāruṇi. In another hymn is the mention of “Madhuchanda Vaisvāmitraḥ” signifying the fact that Madhuchanda ṛṣi belongs to *Viśvāmitra-gotra*. If this were so, it is obvious that the *Mantras* in the name of Agastya were not in the times of his parents, Mitra and Vāruṇi, nor that of Madhuchanda in the days of Viśvāmitra. How then can the *Vedas* be called “*anādi*” or timeless?

When such questions arise, it is better to go a little bit more deeply. We have been wrongly thinking that it is the respective Ṛṣi who composed the hymn in whose name it is titled. The *Vedas* embody the supreme Truth that could not be gained by any effort of the human mind; and hence they are called *Apauruṣeya*, that is, of non-human origin. If the Ṛṣis had composed those hymns, they would then be of human origin and hence “*pauruṣeya*”. The Ṛṣis would be called then as “*mantra-kartās*”. But really they are named “*mantra-draṣṭā*”, that is, those who have seen them. From this “*draṣṭā*” has come the word Ṛṣi. Hence, it is obvious that they did not compose those hymns.

Columbus discovered America; he did not make it. He only made known to the public a continent which was already there from the beginning of the world. Likewise, the scientists, Newton or Einstein did not make or create those laws which were all the time there; only they understood the nature of those laws and explained them to the public. It is in this fashion the great Ṛṣis *saw* those *mantras* and gave out to the

devotees. Those *mantras* were existing even long before their ancestors. This truth has been forgotten and we have begun to attribute those *mantras* to be invented by the Ṛṣis whose names are indicated in the Vedic books. But the public is grateful to those Ṛṣis who brought those *mantras* to the notice of the people and, therefore, they deserve our respect and obeisance.

Before Creation

If the Ṛṣis saw those *mantras*, where were they before they discovered them? When they are called *anādi* (beginningless), does it mean that they began with creation? Were they there before man came on the scene? Such and other questions remain: "How did they come into being? Where were they before the Ṛṣis saw them?"

If it were that they were at the beginning of creation, it would then signify that the Paramātman created the *mantras* along with the universe. Did He write them and put them in an unknown place? And did the Ṛṣis discover parts of them and give them out to the public? It would be wrong to say then that the *Vedas*, are "*anādi*" and point to the time of creation when they also came into being. We have calculations to indicate when the *Kalpa* or Brahmā's creation began. This Brahmā is now fifty years old, according to the reckoning given in the *śāstras*. The course of evolution is divided into four *yugas*, namely Kṛta, Tretā, Dvāpara and Kali and each has four, three, two and one respectively of a period of 432,000 years. A period comprising a thousand of a *catur-yuga*, i.e. the sum of the four *yugas* is a day of Brahmā and an equal period is a night of Brahmā. According to this calculation the present

Brahmā is stated to be fifty years old. We refer to the age of Brahmā, even as every legal document has a date on it, every time a *saṅkalpa* is made during each religious ceremony, stating at what age, year, month, date and *muhūrta* of the day the function is being celebrated.

So when even Brahmā's life is dated, he is not *anādi*; and naturally the world created by him is also not *anādi*. Then, when even creation is dated, how then can we say the *Vedas* are *anādi*? But the Paramātmān, the Absolute, was there even before Brahmā. We call that Absolute as Brahman, which alone is *Anādi*, without a beginning and without an end. As all creatures, all that lives and breathes and the universe were created by Brahmā, they too have an end like him. The absolute Brahman uses the instrumentality of Brahmā to create, Viṣṇu to preserve that creation and Rudra to destroy it. When Brahmā completes a hundred years, he will merge with the absolute Brahman, and another Brahmā will come to repeat the process once again.

It is evident that the *Vedas* were there before Brahmā, for it is stated that Brahmā started his creation of the universe only with the help of the Vedic *mantras*. The *Vedas* were there prior to the Ṛṣis who saw them, prior to the universe created by Brahmā and even prior to Brahmā; for it is affirmed in the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa* in the Sarga (creation) section that Brahmā was able to create the universe only with the help of the Vedic *mantras*.

Is it for this reason that the *Vedas* are called *anādi*? If so, we have two entities—*Īśvara* and *Veda*—

both as *anādis*. But on second thought, this also seems to be confusing. How is it possible for the *Vedas* to be apart from Īsvara, not being created by Him, and thus causing the existence of two *anādis*?

The answer is found in the *Vedas* themselves. In the *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* which is a part of the *Vedas*, is found this verse:

“As from a fire kindled with wet faggot diverse kinds of smoke issue, even so, my dear, the Rig Veda, Yajur Veda, Sāma Veda and Atharva Veda...are like the breath of the Infinite Reality. They are like the breath of the Supreme Self.” (II. iv. 10.)

The keyword is “*niḥśvasitam*” “the breath of the Supreme”. One cannot live without breath. So are the *Vedas* like the breath to the absolute Brahman. Even as the Absolute is *anādi*, the *Vedas* too are aspects of that *Anādi*, or breaths of the One, absolute principle, beginningless and endless. That is why one has to remember this truth that the *Vedas* are not the creation of Īsvara, the Paramātman. Can we affirm that we make our breath? The breath is there ever — as one’s life. Rather life is dependent on breath. So are the breath and Īsvara, ever eternal, without Īsvara making the *Vedas*. Vidyāraṇya Svāmi, who wrote a commentary on the *Vedas*, in one of the *Stotras* on his *Guru* says:

yasya niḥśvasitam vedāḥ —

यस्य निःश्वसितं वेदाः ।

which means “To whom the *Vedas* are the breath;”

and it is noteworthy that the commentator uses the same word “श्वसितम्” that comes in the *Upaniṣad*. Even here, it is not mentioned that Īsvara made the *Vedas*.

Also in the *Bhagavad Gītā* (XV. 15), it is said:

वेदैश्च सर्वैरहमेव वेद्यो वेदान्तकृद्वेदविदेव चाहम् ॥

“I am to be known by all the *Vedas*,” the Lord observes, and does not say “I am the *creator* of the *Vedas*” (वेदकृत्); but he adds: “I am the author of the Vedānta.” (“Vedāntakṛt” वेदान्तकृत्). I am only the creator of the philosophy, which is underlying the *Vedas*. Remember: he has only *understood* the *Vedas* not their creator. Even before the philosophy in the form of Vedānta was there for the benefit of the people, and even before the creation of the people, the *Vedas* were in the form of “breath” or vibrations along with the Absolute, Īsvara, the beginningless One.

The *Bhāgavata* also does not say that Bhagavān created the *Vedas*. It is stated only that the *Vedas* were shown to Brahmā by the Paramātman, the Absolute; for in the very first verse, it is stated:

जन्माद्यस्य यतोऽन्वयादितरतश्चार्थेष्वभिज्ञः स्वराट्
तेने ब्रह्म हृदा य आदिकवये मुह्यन्ति यत्सूरयः ।

This means that the *Vedas* are ever in the heart of Paramātman, which were not created, and the moment He thought about the *Mantras*, they were immediately shown to Brahmā; and with those sounds transmitted to him, Brahmā began to create the worlds.

In Tirujñānasambandhar's *Tēvāram*, the Īsvara is called 'வேதியா வேதகீதா'; 'சந்தேராக சாமம் ஒதும் வாயர்னை'; 'பொழியன் காண்,' etc. and it says that Bhagavān is singing. Here the singing refers to the Great Breath of Īsvara. Is not our breathing described as "*hamsa gīta*"? Thus the breath of Īsvara is the *Veda*.

According to the Vaiṣṇava *Āgamas* and *Purāṇas*, Mahāviṣṇu is referred to as the *svarūpa* or form of *Yajña* and the *Veda*. Garuḍa is also described as *Veda-svarūpa*, on whom is seated Viṣṇu; but nowhere is it stated that the *Vedas* were created by Viṣṇu.

Taking all scriptures in the Hindu canon into account, it is evident that the *Vedas* are *anādi*² and *apauruṣeya*, being the breath of *anādi* Īsvara.

DIVINE POWER AND DEMONIAC POWER*

Jagadguru Sri Jayendra Sarasvati

There is a proverb: "Rare to be born in this world, especially as a human being." Of course we have got such a rare human birth. Several kinds of beings are born in this world. But, not all of them do good or bad deeds. However, all of them enjoy happiness or suffer pain in accordance with their past deeds. Though man reaps the fruit of past *karma* (good or bad actions), he is still engaged in doing the same kind of actions. One can distinguish animals from human beings in the following way. If one keeps some grains of rice, a little poison and a currency note in a place (in the vicinity of an animal and a man), animal will eat the rice alone, and after smelling poison, it will move off; and the animal will be indifferent to the currency note, not having any idea about it. But, man would take the money and rice; and with regard to poison also, he would try to administer it to someone else. Thus one can find the cruelty of man and the innocence of animal.

* Courtesy: *Amudamoji*, Sri Ram Trust Publication, Madras - 1, 1967, pp. 36-38. Free rendering by V. K. S. N. Raghavan.

Animals don't go to school. They do not perform right or wrong actions and go to jail. Man can go to school and acquire knowledge. As one becomes learned, one can perform good actions, and then enjoy happiness. But, if one takes to the wrong path, one has to suffer in jail etc. So animals and men are quite different from one another. Only for self-defence, animals make noise, attempt to attack others through horns, etc., or trample (or strike) with their legs. But, when a man feels that he will be attacked by others, at once he will be worried and inflict pain on others as well. This is also a difference between animal and man.

Every animal has the power of self-defence. Some animals have horns. The dog bites others; elephants attack others after much deliberation. Wild animals like tiger, lion, bear, etc. kill human beings even when they sense the presence of the latter. God has given the animals their respective power of self-defence. However, He has also created men with power and intelligence to control the animals. Through this gift of intelligence and power man is able to protect himself from others. Even in this way one can find the difference between animal and man.

Although men are able to control the most cruel animals, only very few people are able to control themselves from sensual pleasures, mental distractions, etc. Only those who are endowed with self-control are called the great/the wise/the saints. So one should try to control oneself from passions, through one's intelligence. One should tread on the righteous path and avoid the wrong one.

Man is swept by two kinds of attitude, viz., the divine and the demoniac. He possesses such an attitude as innate mental impression. The circumstances and the environment induce a person along one of the two kinds of attitude. Knowing this, one should try to keep oneself fit for divine attitude, by choosing the good diet, dress, friendship, good books, good company, and worship of God. Let us pray to Lord Kṛṣṇa to direct us on the right path and free us from the demoniac propensities.

THE HIGHER AND LOWER NATURE (PRAKṚTI)

भूमिरापोऽनलो वायुः खं मनो बुद्धिरेव च ।
अहंकार इतीयं मे भिन्ना प्रकृतिरष्टधा ॥

*Bhūmir āpo'nalo vāyuḥ kham mano buddhir eva ca,
ahaṅkāra itīyaṁ me bhinnā prakṛtir aṣṭadhā.*

My Nature is divided into eight categories—earth, water, fire, air, mind, ether, understanding, and I-sense.

अपरेयमितस्त्वन्यां प्रकृतिं विद्धि मे पराम् ।
जीवभूतां महाबाहो ययेदं धार्यते जगत् ॥

*Apareyam itastvanyāṁ prakṛtiṁ viddhi me parām
jīva-bhūtaṁ mahā-bāho yayedam dhāryate jagat.*

This, O mighty armed, is My lower nature. Know that, as different from it, is My higher nature forming the source of all jīvas and the support of the whole universe.

Bhagavadgītā, VII, 4-5

THE FOUR INDISPENSABLE
QUALIFICATIONS

*(An extract from Sarva-vedānta-siddhānta-sāra-saṅgraha
of Śrī Śaṅkara Bhagavatpāda)*

Free rendering by
Dr. V. K. S. N. Raghavan

(Contd. from Vol. XIII, No. 2)

THE HISTORY OF THE
CITY OF BOSTON

(An extract from the records of the Corporation of the City of Boston, from the year 1630 to 1800)

By SAMUEL JOHNSON
Author of the Dictionary of the English Language
(London: Printed by G. G. and J. O. 1791)

One feels worried as one does not get wealth. As one spends wealth, one becomes much worried. Even the scholars are very much worried when money is ill-spent.

[72]

नित्याहितेन वित्तेन भयचिन्तानपायिना ।
चित्तस्वास्थ्यं कुतो जन्तोः गृहस्थेनाहिना यथा ॥

Wealth is always harmful; it is always ridden with fear and anxiety. How can anyone have peace of mind from wealth? Wealth is ever harmful like the presence of snake in one's house itself.

[73]

कान्तारे विजने वने जनपदे सेतौ निरीतौ च वा
चोरैर्वापि तथेतैर्नरवरैर्युक्तो विमुक्तोऽपि वा ।
निःस्वः स्वस्थतया सुखेन व्रमति ह्याद्रीयमाणो जनैः
क्लिश्नात्येव धनी सदाकुलमतिभीतश्च पुत्रादपि ॥

When one is without wealth, one can lead a free and happy life; one rid of wealth is highly respected by all people, whether one lives alone or with others. One without wealth can live amidst thieves, wicked men or kings. One rid of wealth can lead a carefree life in a lonely jungle, town, village, beneath a bridge or in a trouble-free place. But rich people alone get agitated in mind, being afraid of their own children, and thus they are always full of anxieties.

[74]

तस्मादनर्थस्य निदानमर्थः पुमर्थसिद्धिर्न भवत्यनेन ।
ततो वनान्ते निवसन्ति सन्तः संन्यस्य सर्वं प्रतिकूलमर्थम् ॥

Therefore wealth produces only calamity. One cannot achieve any *puruṣārtha* (supreme value *viz.* *mokṣa*) through wealth. Therefore, the great men lead a life of solitude in forest, after they have renounced all their unfavourable wealth.

[75]

श्रद्धाभक्तिमतीं सतीं गुणवतीं पुत्रान् श्रुतान्संमता-
नक्षय्यं वसुधानुभोगविभवैः श्रीसुन्दरं मन्दिरम् ।
सर्वं नश्वरमित्यत्वेत्य कवयः श्रुत्युक्तिभिर्युक्तिभिः
संन्यस्यन्त्यपरे तु तत्सुखमिति भ्राम्यन्ति दुःखार्णवे ॥

Men of discerning wisdom understand, through the purport of Vedic texts and analytic reasoning, that all these — the virtuous wife of fidelity and devotion, obedient and learned children, everlasting land (property), palatial building endowed with enchanting beauty, and all material prosperity — are only transitory and impermanent, and they (the wise) renounce everything. But the others (the deluded people) consider the material prosperity as enjoyable and thus are drowned in the ocean of miseries and roam about precariously.

[76]

सुखमिति मलराशौ ये रमन्तेऽत्र गेहे
क्रिमय इव कलत्रक्षेत्रपुत्रानुषक्त्या ।

सुरपद इव तेषां नैव मोक्षप्रसङ्ग-
स्त्वपि तु निरयगर्भावासदुःखप्रवाहः ॥

People like the worms which sport in the heap of faeces, become attached to material welfare, *viz.* in looking after wives, houses and children, and enjoy their company, as though being in heaven. But these people do not aspire for *mokṣa* (the supreme bliss of liberation). Indeed, they suffer in hell and become bound in the *samsāra* (cycle of birth and death).

[77]

येषामाशा निराशा स्यादारापत्यधनादिषु ।
तेषां सिद्धयति नान्येषां मोक्षाशाभिमुखी गतिः ॥

Only those who gain *vairāgya* (become detached) towards wife, son, wealth,* etc. have access towards the right path of salvation; none else can have access to such a path.

[78]

सत्कर्मक्षतपाप्मनां श्रुतिमतां सिद्धात्मनां धीमतां
नित्यानित्यपदार्थशोधनमिदं युक्त्या मुहुः कुर्वताम् ।
तस्माद्दुत्थमहाविरक्त्यसिमतां मोक्षैककाङ्क्षावतां
धन्यानां सुलभं स्त्रियादिविषयेष्वशाशालताच्छेदनम् ॥

Only those fortunate people — who have destroyed their sins by their good deeds, who are well-versed

* Cf. *eṣaṇātraya: dāreṣaṇā, vittaṣaṇā, putreṣaṇā* (desire for wife, wealth and progeny).

with regard to *śruti* texts, who have gained the right knowledge of the Self, who are wise and able to dwell at length upon the enquiry towards the eternal (*nitya*) and non-eternal (*anitya*) quite often, (and in consequence thereof) who have sharpened the sword of dispassion, who are solely desirous of *mokṣa* (liberation) — find it easy to cut off the creeper of attachment to objects like women.

[79]

संसारमृत्योर्बलिनः प्रवेष्टुं द्वाराणि तु त्रीणि महान्ति लोके ।
कान्ता च जिह्वा कनकञ्च तानि रुणद्धि यस्तस्य भयं न मृत्योः ॥

In this world, there are three large main gates wide open to enter into the fierce world of life and death, *viz.* (i) woman, (ii) tongue, and (iii) gold. Whoever is able to close these gates fears not from death (Yama).

[80]

मुक्तिश्रीनगरस्य दुर्जयतरं द्वारं यदस्त्यादिमं
तस्य द्वे अरे धनं च युवती ताम्यां पिण्डं दृढम् ।
कामाख्यार्गलदारुणा बलवता द्वारं तदेतत्त्रयं
धीरो यस्तु भिनत्ति सोऽर्हति सुखं भोक्तुं विमुक्तिश्रियः ॥

To the holy city of *mukti* (*mokṣa* = eternal freedom), there is a main door that is highly invincible (hard to open). Woman and wealth form the two panels of this door which is firmly closed by both of them. This door is again strenuously closed by the

mighty lust forming the wooden bolt (cross-bar). But, the heroic warrior who is able to destroy the affliction of these three (woman, wealth and lust) is the one who deserves to enjoy the supreme bliss of eternal freedom.

[81]

आरूढस्य विवेकाश्वं तीव्रवैराग्यखड्गिनः ।
तितिक्षावर्मयुक्तस्य प्रतियोगी न दृश्यते ॥

That heroic warrior, *viz.* the man of discerning wisdom, rides on the horse of discrimination, wields the sword of staunch dispassion, and puts on the armour of fortitude — and hence he does not face any enemy at all.

[82]

विवेकजां तीव्रविरक्तिमेव मुक्तेर्निदानं निगदन्ति सन्तः ।
तस्माद्विवेकी विरतिं मुमुक्षुः संपादयेत्तां प्रथमं प्रयत्नात् ॥

The principal cause of *mukti* (liberation), according to great men is the pristine dispassion (*vairāgya*) born out of the right discrimination (of the eternal from the ephemeral). So, the one desirous of *mokṣa* should first of all try to acquire the discriminating knowledge (*vivekajñāna*) and then acquire *vairāgya*.

[83]

पुमानजातनिर्वेदो देहबन्धं जिहासितुम् ।
न हि शक्नोति निर्वेदो बन्धभेदो महानसौ ॥

The person who has not attained dispassion cannot abandon the bondage of *samsāra*. Dispassion, indeed, is the great vanquisher of kārmic bondage.

[84]

वैराग्यरहिता एव यमालय इवालये ।
क्लिश्नन्ति त्रिविधैस्तापैर्मोहिता अपि पण्डिताः ॥

Even the wise people, if they are bereft of dispassion, are afflicted by the threefold suffering (*ādhyāt-mika*, *ādhidāivika*, and *ādhibhautika*, i.e. physical, super-natural, and cosmic miseries) and suffer in this world as in hell.

Six Cardinal Virtues of Life

[85]

शमो दमस्तिक्षोपरतिः श्रद्धा ततः परम् ।
समाधानमिति प्रोक्तं षडेवैते शमादयः ॥

The six cardinal virtues of life are: tranquillity sense-control, forbearance, renunciation, faith and concentration of mind.

(to be continued)

ŚIVAPĀDĀDIKEŚĀNTAVARṆANASTOTRA*

Śrī Śaṅkara Bhagavatpāda

Introduction

This hymn in 41 verses composed in the Sragdharā metre describes the glory of the paraphernalia of Lord Śiva — the weapons adorning His person, Lord Vināyaka, Lord Kumāra, Goddess Pārvatī, the attendants of Lord Śiva and the sacred assembly hall of Lord Śiva in verses 1-15, the beauty of the different parts of the body from foot to head in verses 16-31, and other characteristics of Him in the remaining verses.

There are some beautiful poetic fancies such as the one in verse (10) describing the beauty of Goddess Pārvatī metaphorically without making reference to Her. The hymn is composed in simple lucid style and could be mastered with ease.

[1]

कल्याणं नां विधत्तां कटकतटलसत्कल्पवाटीनिकुञ्ज-
क्रीडासंसक्तविद्याधरनिकरबधूगीतरुद्रापदानः ।

*Translated by Dr. N. Gangadharan.

तारैर्हेरम्बनादैस्तरलितनिनदत्तारकारातिकेकी

कैलासः शर्वनिर्वृत्यभिजनकपदः सर्वदा पर्वतेन्द्रः ॥

May Kailāsa, the Lord of mountains, always confer on us auspiciousness. It has the environment that pleases Lord Śarva (Śiva). The Vidyādhara women sport in the bushes in between the groves of Kalpavṛkṣa lying on its slopes and sing the heroic deeds of Rudra (Lord Śiva). (The mountain) reverberates with the cries of the foe of Tāraka being agitated by the loud sounds of the Lord Heramba (Vināyaka).

Mt. Kailāsa denotes the peak of the Himālaya mountain and is believed to be the abode of Lord Śiva. The Vidyā-dharas are semi-divine beings proficient in arts. Tāraka is a demon killed by Lord Kumāra. Tārakārāti denotes Lord Kumāra.

[2]

यस्य प्राहुः स्वरूपं सकलदिविषदां सारसर्वस्वयोगं

यस्येषुः शार्ङ्गधन्वा समजनि जगतां रक्षणे जागरूकः ।

मौर्वी दर्वीकराणामपि च परिवृढः पूस्त्रयी सा च लक्ष्यं

सोऽव्यादव्याजमस्मानशिवभिदनिशं नाकिनां श्रीपिनाकः ॥

May that blessed bow (of Lord Śiva), that always removes the inauspiciousness of the celestials, protect us without any conceit. The form of that (bow) is said to be the union of all the best qualities of the gods. The wielder of the bow, Śārṅga vigilant in the protection of the world has become the arrow for that

(bow). The king of the serpents (has become) the string (of that bow). Those three worlds (*i.e.* the three demons in the form of the three worlds) have become the target (of that bow).

Pināka denotes the bow of Śiva. The bow of Lord Viṣṇu is called *Śārṅga*. The king of serpents denotes Vāsuki. The mighty demons Tārakākṣa and Vidyunmālin moved about in the form of three cities made of iron, silver and gold, and were destroyed by Lord Śiva with a single arrow.

[3]

आतङ्कावेगहारी सकलदिविषदामङ्घ्रिपद्माश्रयाणां
 मातङ्गाद्युग्रदैत्य-प्रकरतनुगलद्रक्तधाराक्तधारः ।
 क्रूरः सूरायुतानामपि च परिभवं स्वीयभासा वितन्वन्
 घोराकारः कुठारो दृढतरदुरिताख्याटवीं पाटयेन्नः ॥

May the axe of frightful form split asunder and destroy the forest of our firm sins. It removes the anxiety and grief of all the celestials resorting to the lotus feet (of Lord Śiva). It has its edge drenched with the blood dripping from the bodies of dreadful demons such as *Mātaṅga* and others. It is dreadful. It humiliates ten thousands of Suns with its lustre.

The term '*Mātaṅga*' meaning an elephant may denote *Gajāsura*, a demon killed by Lord Śiva. One of the weapons of Lord Śiva is the *paraśu* — axe. One of the epithets of Lord Śiva is '*Khaṇḍa-paraśu*' — meaning possessing a cloven axe. Śiva is usually described as a valiant hunter in the hymns. Hence it is quite appropriate that his weapon — the axe is referred to split asunder the forest in the form of our sins.

[4]

कालारातेः कराग्रे कृतवसतिरुरः शाणशातो रिपूणां
 काले काले कुलाद्रिप्रवरतनयया कल्पितस्नेहलेपः ।
 पायान्नः पावकार्चिःप्रसरसखमुखः पापहन्ता नितान्तं
 शूलः श्रीपादसेवाभजनरसजुषां पालनैकान्तशीलः ॥

May the trident (of Lord Śiva) bent on protecting those enjoying the pleasure of devotion of service be the blessed feet (of the Lord) protect us. It has the tip of the hand of the foe of Yama (Lord of Death) as the abode. It has been sharpened on the whetstone, namely, the chest of the enemies. It has been anointed by Goddess Pārvatī, the daughter of the foremost among mountains, now and then. It has its tip resembling the flames of fire. It destroys the sins completely.

'Kāla' denotes Yama, the god of death. Lord Śiva is known as the foe of Kāla, because He protected Mārkaṇḍeya from Yama. 'Kulāдри' denotes the principal mountains in the different directions. Himavān is the foremost among the mountains. Goddess Pārvatī is referred to as the daughter of Himavān. The chest of the enemies of Lord Śiva are fancied to be the whetstone on which Lord Śiva has sharpened his trident.

[5]

देवस्याङ्गाश्रयायाः कुलगिरिदुहितुर्नेत्रकोणप्रचार-
 प्रस्तारानत्युदारान्पिपठिषुग्वि यो नित्यमत्यादरेण ।
 आधत्ते भङ्गितुङ्गैरनिशमवयवैरन्तरङ्गं समोदं
 सोमापीडस्य सोऽयं प्रदिशतु कुशलं पाणिरङ्गः कुरङ्गः ॥

May the deer, that has the hand (of Lord Śiva) as the place for dancing, confer on us eternal happiness. It delights the heart of the Lord, having the moon on the head, by its limbs raised up because of curvatures always desirous of learning the side-glances of Goddess Pārvatī, the daughter of Himavān, seated on the lap of the Lord (Śiva) and bounteous in conferring blessings on Her devotees.

According to the *Purānas*, the *Vedas* are stated to be taking the form of a deer and resting on the hand of Lord Śiva. The deer is stated to be bending its body in different ways. It is fancied that it is learning to move its body for dancing according to the movement of the side-glances of Goddess Pārvatī, seated on the lap of Lord Śiva.

[6]

कण्ठप्रान्तावसज्जत्कनकमयमहाघण्टिकाघोरघोषैः

कण्ठारावैरकुण्ठैरपि भरितजगच्चक्रवालान्तरालः ।

चण्डः प्रोदण्डशृङ्गः ककुदकवलितोत्तुङ्गकैलासशृङ्गः

कण्ठेकालस्य बाहः शमयतु शमलं शाश्वतः शाक्वरेन्द्रः ॥

May the sacred bull, the vehicle of the black-necked (Śiva) remove the eternal sins. It fills the inner spaces of the wheel of the world by the terrible sounds of mighty golden bell hanging from the edge of the neck and the undiminishing bellowing sound. It is most dreadful. It has a frightening horn. It has conquered the Kailāsa peak by its lofty hump.

The word 'Śākvara' denotes a bull. The word Śākva-
rendra denotes the mighty bull, the vehicle of Lord Śiva.

[7]

निर्यदानाम्बुधारापरिमलतरलीभूतरोलम्बपाली-

झङ्कारैः शङ्कराद्रेः शिखरशतदरीः पूरयन्भूरिघषैः ।

शार्वः सौवर्णशैलप्रतिमपृथुवपुः सर्वविघ्नापहर्ता

शर्वाण्याः पूर्वसूनुः स भवतु नः स्वस्तिदो हस्तिवक्त्रः ॥

May that elephant-faced (God), the first son of (Goddess) Pārvatī, be the conferrer of prosperity. He fills the hundreds of caves in the hill of Lord Śiva with the loud sounds and with the humming of rows of bees attracted by the fragrance of the rut that flows (from him). That son of Lord Śiva has a stout body resembling the golden mountain (Meru). He removes all obstacles.

Lord Vināyaka, the elephant-faced son of Śiva and Pārvatī is the Lord of obstacles. He is implored in this verse for conferring prosperity on the devotees. He is fancied to be filling the caves of the lofty hills with His loud sound. On account of his elephant face, it is further fancied that columns of humming bees get attracted to the fragrant rut oozing out from his temples, and this humming sound also fills the caves.

[8]

यः पुण्यैर्देवतानां समजनि शिवयोः श्लाघ्यवीर्यैकमत्या-

द्यन्नाग्नि श्रूयमाणो दितिजभटघटा भीतिभारं भजन्ते ।

भूयात् सोऽयं विभूत्यै निशितशरशिखापाटितक्रौञ्चशैलः

संसारागाधकूपोदरपतितसमुत्तारकस्तारकारिः ॥

May that foe of Tāraka be for (our) prosperity. He was born on account of the merits of the celestials

from the glorious union from the *vīrya* (energy) of Śiva and Pārvatī. The hosts of demon forces entertain great fear on hearing his name (being mentioned). He has pierced the *Krauñca* mountains with his sharp arrows. He is the rescuer of those who have fallen into the deep well of mundane existence.

Tāraka was the son of Vajrāṅga and Vajrāṅgī. He propitiated Lord Brahmā and got the favour that he could be killed only by a child seven days old. On account of this favour, he became oppressive and tormented the gods. Brahmā, being approached by the celestials, advised them that only the offspring of Śiva could vanquish him. The gods strove to achieve this end by bringing about the union of Śiva and Pārvatī. That child, Kumāra, born to Śiva and Pārvatī, led the forces of gods and was hence also known as Devasenāpti. He is popularly referred to as Skanda.

[9]

आरूढः प्रौढवेगप्रविजितपवनं तुङ्गतुङ्गं तुरङ्गं

चेलं नीलं वसानः करतलविलसत्काण्डकोदण्डदण्डः ।

रागद्वेषादिनानाविधमृगपटलीभीतिकृद्भूतभर्ता

कुर्वन्नाखेटलीलां परिलसतु मनः कानने मामकीने ॥

May the Lord of hosts of attendants (Bhūtas) shine forth in my mind forest performing the sport of hunting mounting a lofty horse that defeats the wind in its speed, wearing a black garment, having the shining bow in his hand and causing fright to hosts of different animals such as desire, hate and the like (in the mind-forest).

This verse describes Śāstā, otherwise known as Harihara-putra (son of Viṣṇu [Mohini form] and Śiva), clad in black garment and riding a horse. The mind is compared to a forest and the Lord is requested to sport therein always causing fright to hosts of wild animals such as desire, hatred and the like.

[10]

अम्भोजाभ्यां च रम्भारथचरणलताद्वन्द्वकुम्भीन्द्रकुम्भै-

र्विम्बेनेन्दोश्च कम्बोरुपरि विलसता विद्रुमेणोत्पलाभ्याम् ।

अम्भोदेनापि सम्भावितमुपजनिताडम्बरं शम्बरारेः

शंभोः सम्भोगयोग्यं किमपि धनमिदं संभवेत् सम्पदेनः ॥

May this indescribable wealth, belonging to the foe of Śambara, honoured by the pair of lotuses, the pairs of plantains, chariot wheels, creepers and the temples of the king of elephants, the moon's disc shining above the conch, the pearl, the pair of lilies and the cloud and fit for being enjoyed by Lord Śiva, be for our prosperity.

This verse describes metaphorically the beauty of the Goddess Umā without direct reference to the Goddess or Her limbs. Her beauty is described as the wealth belonging to Manmatha, the god of Love, the foe of the demon Śambara. Here the pair of lotuses denote the pair of lotus feet, the pair of plantains — the two thighs, the chariot wheels — the pair of hips, the pair of creepers — the two arms, the pair of temples — the lofty breasts, the conch — the conch-like neck, the disc of the moon — the face, the pearl — the lower lip, the pair of lilies — the eyes, and cloud — the lock of hair.

(to be continued)

AN ANALYSIS OF GAUḌAPĀDA'S PHILOSOPHY AND HIS PLACE IN ADVAITA*

T. M. P. Mahadevan

(1) The ultimate reality, according to Gauḍapāda, is Brahman. The Upaniṣads adopt a two-fold way of indicating the nature of Brahman, viz., the affirmative (*vidhimukhena*) and the negative (*niṣedhamukhena*). 'As illustrative of these two modes of presentation, the following texts, one from the *Chāndogya* and the other from the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, may be considered. A section of the *Chāndogya* called *Śāṅḍilya-vidyā*¹ identifies Brahman with all and defines it cryptically as *taj-jalān* which means 'that which generates (*ja*) the universe, reabsorbs (*li*) it, and sustains (*an*) it'. Then, Brahman is described as 'including all activities, all desires, all odours, all tastes, pervading all, speechless and unperturbed'; and it is identified with the individual self: 'This is my self within the heart, smaller than rice, or barley corn, or mustard seed or grain of millet or the kernel of a grain of millet; this is my self within the heart, greater than the earth, greater than the mid-region, greater than heaven, greater than all these

* Courtesy: *Gauḍapāda: A Study in Early Advaita*, University of Madras, 1975, pp. 241-248.

worlds. This is Brahman."³ The other text which is from the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, illustrating language of negation in which Brahman is taught, is the passage where Yājñavalkya gives his final answer to the persistent question about the basis of the universe put to him by the learned lady, Gārgi. As we saw in an earlier chapter, 'Gārgi was not satisfied with the answer that space is the support of all things; and enquired Yājñavalkya about the support of space. The sage could no longer withhold the final doctrine from her, and he said: This is the imperishable, O Gārgi, which wise people adore — not gross, not long, not red, not adhesive, without shadow, without darkness, without not short, not long, not red, not adhesive, without shadow, without darkness, without air, without space, unattached, without taste, without smell, without sight, without ears, without speech, without mind, without light, without breath, without mouth, without form, and without either inside or outside. Not that does anything eat; nor that does eat anything."⁴ The Reality which is thus described negatively is not a void. In order to teach this, Yājñavalkya immediately adds that it is at the behests of Brahman that all beings are what they are and do what they do.

Gauḍapāda follows the way of the Upaniṣads and teaches the nature of Brahman both affirmatively and negatively. As related to and inclusive of the world, Brahman is Īśvara. It is what is called the lower (*apara*) Brahman.⁵ As Īśvara, it is seated in the hearts of all.⁶ It is the all-pervasive lord, impelling all beings to activity.⁷ It is the beginning, middle, and end of all things.⁸ It remains the same in the three states of experience, viz., waking, dream and sleep.⁹ The higher

Brahman (*param brahma*),¹¹ i.e., Brahman *per se*, however, is not related to the world, because there is no world in reality.¹² It cannot be even expressed in words,¹³ for it is trans-phenomenal. The best way of indicating its nature is through a series of negations; for that is how the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* characterizes it as 'not this, not that.'¹⁴ There is nothing prior to it, nor anything after it. It has neither an inside nor an outside.¹⁵ It has no name and no form.¹⁶ It has no contents and no movement.¹⁷ It is devoid of sleep and dream; it transcends the three states of experience, and hence is called the fourth.¹⁸ Because Brahman is described in negative terms, it is not to be inferred that it is a blank or non-entity. In order to warn the student against the view which regards the void as ultimate, Gauḍapāda indicates the positive implication of the negative description. Brahman is eternal (*nitya*).¹⁹ It is all-light, pure consciousness. It is self-luminous, ever the same.²⁰ It is infinite bliss, unsullied peace.²¹ In short, it is *sat*, *cit*, and *ānanda*.

(2) The Brahman whose nature has been expressed above in halting words is non-dual (*advaita*). The non-duality of the supreme spirit is, in fact, the central teaching of Advaita Vedānta. Gauḍapāda expounds this doctrine through citing important scriptural passages, and through reasoning. In the *Advaita-prakarana*, he quotes well-known passages from the Upaniṣads with a view to show that Scripture teaches the non-duality of Brahman. The creation-texts, he says, should not be interpreted literally; they are to be understood in a figurative sense, and should be regarded as providing an introduction to the texts which teach non-duality. In the *Āgama-prakarana*, Gauḍa-

pāda gives an analysis of the three states of experience, following the *Māṇḍūkya* and concludes as a result thereof that the real self is not affected by the changing states, and that it is the constant unvarying non-dual reality. In the third and the fourth *prakaraṇas*, the doctrine of *ajāti* is set forth, which, again, is intended to show that non-duality is the supreme truth. By means of dialectical arguments it is shown that the concept of origination is unintelligible. That we believe in the origination of things, it is not the purpose of the dialectic to deny. But what it seeks to demonstrate is that the belief is such that it leads to contradictions when critically examined. The category of cause itself, which is the ground of the notion of origination, is unintelligible. Gauḍapāda gives a critique of causality in the *Alātaśānti-prakarana*. Nothing could come out of nothing; nor could anything issue out of anything else. *Asatkārya-vāda* and *satkārya-vāda* perish through mutual conflict, and point to the truth of non-origination, the truth that nothing whatsoever is born. Brahman, which is the eternal reality and is immutable, is neither an effect nor a cause. There is nothing other than it, either to produce it or to be produced by it.

(3) If the non-dual Brahman is the sole reality, the world of plurality must be an appearance, an illusion. Dvaita or duality is *māyāmātra*; advaita or non-duality is the supreme truth.²² The one self seems to be many through its own *māyā*.²³ The world with its things is an illusory projection of *Ātma-māyā*.²⁴ It is not a transformation either of an independent Primal Nature (*Prakṛti*) or of Brahman. It is a transfiguration (*vivarta*) of the Absolute.

Gauḍapāpa teaches the *vivarta-vāda*—or, to use his terminology, the *vaitathya* of the world—in various ways. In the second *prakaraṇa*, the world of waking is characterized to be illusory on the strength of its similarity to the dream-world. Just as the contents of dream are objects of consciousness and are found to be inconstant, so are the things of the waking world. It is to be noted here that unlike the subjectivist, Gauḍapāda recognizes the relative difference between waking and dream. Even the dream-contents have a measure of reality; they are unreal, judged from the standpoint of waking experience. The waking world has a greater degree of reality than the realm of dream; but from the standpoint of absolute experience, it is unreal.

Gauḍapāda explains the illusoriness of the world with the help of other illustrations also in the *Kārikā*. The well-known rope-snake analogy is employed by him. Just as a rope may appear as a snake in the dark, Brahman appears as the world due to *māyā*. The point to be noted in this and similar analogies is that even during the period of delusion there is no change in the substrate. The rope remains a rope even when it is mistaken for a snake. The world is compared also to *gandharva-nagara* or *fata morgana* and things created by magic.

Māyā which is the principle of illusion has not an independent ontological status. It is not an entity or reality having a subsistence of its own. As we have said several times, there is no reality other than Brahman. To the inquiring intellect *māyā* is a riddle. When the Absolute is realized, there is no *māyā* to be explained. As Gauḍapāda says, *māyā* is that which does not really exist.²⁵

(4) The individuality of the individual soul is part of the show put up by *māyā*. Shorn of the adjuncts such as the body and the mind, the *jīva* is non-different from Brahman. The *mahāvākyas* proclaim the truth of non-difference. There are, no doubt, Upaniṣadic texts which speak of difference. But they have not the primary purport; they have only a secondary sense; for, without superimposing on the self the attributes of the not-self, it is not possible to regard the self as finite and many.

In the *advaita-prakaraṇa*, Gauḍapāda explains the apparent finitude and plurality of souls on the analogy of pot-ether, etc. There are no real distinctions in ether. They are created by things like pots and pitchers. Because of the adjuncts we speak of pot-ether, pitcher-ether, etc. But in reality there is nothing like pot-ether as distinct from pitcher-ether, for ether is the same all over. Similarly, Brahman or the self which is pure consciousness is undivided and indivisible. The distinctions that are imported into it are all due to *avidyā*. The empirical usage relating to the birth and death of souls, their agency and enjoyership, is conditioned by the *avidyā*-generated bodies and minds. The self *per se* is unlimited and eternal.

The truth, according to Gauḍapāda, is that no *jīva* is ever born. There is neither destruction nor origination, neither the bound souls nor those who seek the means for release, neither *mumukṣu* nor *mukta*. As the empirical usage based on the world is included in *māyā*, so is the empirical usage based on Scripture. Just as birth and death are *māyika*, so are bondage and release.²⁶ The supreme self undergoes no change; it is ever pure and free.

(5) Since the goal as envisaged in the Advaita system is not something to be newly acquired or accomplished, *karma* cannot be the means to its attainment. In fact *mokṣa* is not what is attained (*sādhya*). It is said to be attained only in a figurative sense. What is called release is really the attainment of what is already attained. The path thereto is *jñāna*. Gauḍapāda defines it as *ātmasatyānubodha*, realization of the truth of the self.²⁷ It is through the un-born knowledge that the unborn self is realized.²⁸

Upāsanā or meditation is not the direct means to release. It is prescribed for the sake of those who are either dull-witted or middlings. The *upāsaka* reaches only the lower Brahman and not the higher.²⁹

In the highest experience there is no grasping and no leaving, there is no thought and no object.³⁰ All distinctions disappear. The self which is consciousness-bliss alone is. The *samādhi* of which Gauḍapāda speaks is self-realization which is the culmination of knowledge or *jñāna*.

(6) The system of *Advaita* in the view of Gauḍapāda, has no quarrel with any system of philosophy. While the pluralistic world-views are in conflict with one another, Advaita is not opposed to any of them. It recognizes that there is truth in each of them, but only that truth is not the whole. Hostility arises out of partial vision. When the whole truth is known, there could be no hostility. Gauḍapāda pleads for a philosophical peace when he says: '*avivādaṁ nibodhata.*'³¹

The Place of Gauḍapāda in Advaita

From the account of Gauḍapāda's teachings given in the preceding pages and from the analysis

of his thought given above, it should be evident that he is rightly regarded by tradition as the philosophical progenitor of Śaṅkara. It is true that the *Paramārthasāra* of Ādi Śeṣa is also an early Advaita work between which and the *Māṇḍūkyakārikā* there are, as we saw, significant points of identity. But there is no conclusive evidence to show that the *Paramārthasāra* is an earlier work than the *Kārikā*. Nor is there any evidence of Śaṅkara having been influenced by Ādi Śeṣa's work. It is even possible that the *Paramārthasāra* leans towards the view of *prasaṅkhyāna*, as it stresses the need for *abhyāsa* and *bhāvanā*. As it has been suggested, the *Paramārthasāra* was perhaps written on the analogy of Īśvarakṛṣṇa's *Sāṅkhyakārikā* to perform for Advaita the same function as the latter's work for Sāṅkhya.¹² It makes use, in a large measure, of Sāṅkhya concepts and terminology in its presentation of Advaita. The *Māṇḍūkyakārikā*, it is interesting to note, presents Advaita in a different mode. The concepts and terminology used here are in some measure borrowed from Bauddha idealism. It will not be wrong, therefore, to suggest that probably Gauḍapāda wrote his work on the analogy of Nāgārjuna's *Mūlāmadhyamaka-kārikā* with a view to make it occupy a position in Advaita similar to that of the latter in the Mādhyamika system.

Gauḍapāda lived and taught in an age when Mahāyānism was having a great hold on the minds of people. The task of a teacher of Vedānta at such a time would naturally be twofold — to convince the followers of the Upaniṣads that their path was sound, and to spread the knowledge of the Vedānta among the Bauddhas themselves. To secure this twofold objective, it would seem, Gauḍapāda adopted the logical

method of expounding the Vedānta and the Bauddha modes of expression and argumentation. The texts of the Upaniṣads are no doubt invoked. But it is well to remember that they are cited not too often, nor in a dogmatic manner. For the most part the appeal that Gauḍapāda makes is to reason, and, what is more, to experience. He speaks with a voice of authority derived from the intuitive experience of the Absolute; and he utilizes his logical discipline in expounding the truth of Vedānta. It is no wonder, then, that Ācārya Śaṅkara was drawn to his teachings and found in them the spring of eternal life. No reader of the *Kārikā* will go unimpressed by the genius of its author for spirituality. In the history of Advaita his name will ever remain as that of a great pioneer who combined in himself a deep mysticism with a penetrating philosophy, and a poetic vision with a logical mind.

NOTES

1. See Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya's *Gauḍapādīyabhāṣya-ṭīpāṇa* (Govt. Oriental Mss. Library, Madras), R-2911, p. 2: *vidhimukhena niṣedhamukhena ca brahmaṣratipādanam iti prakriyā-dvaividhyam.*

2. III, xiv.

3. M. Hiriyanna: *Outlines of Indian Philosophy*, p. 60.

4. III, viii.

5. III, viii, 8; M. Hiriyanna's translation. See *op. cit.*, p. 60.

6. *G.K.* I, 26.

7. *Ibid.*, I, 28.

8. *Ibid.*, I, 10.

9. *Ibid.*, I, 27.

10. *Ibid.*, I, 22.

11. *Ibid.*, I, 26 & III, 12.
12. *Ibid.*, IV, 75: *dvayam tatra na vidyate.*
13. *Ibid.*, IV, 60: *yatra varṇā na vartante.*
14. *Ibid.*, III, 26.
15. *Ibid.*, I, 26.
16. *Ibid.*, III, 36.
17. *Ibid.*, IV, 45.
18. *Ibid.*, I, 14, 16; III, 36; IV, 81.
19. *Ibid.*, III, 33.
20. *Ibid.*, I, 12; III, 36; IV, 81.
21. *Ibid.*, I, 29; IV, 93.
22. *Ibid.*, I, 17.
23. *Ibid.*, II, 12.
24. *Ibid.*, III, 10.
25. *Ibid.*, IV, 58.
26. *GK*, III, 48; II, 32.
27. *Ibid.*, III, 32.
28. *Ibid.*, III, 32.
29. *Ibid.*, III, 16; III, 1.
30. *Ibid.*, III, 38.
31. *Ibid.*, III, 17, 18; IV, 5.
32. *Paramārthasāra*, p. vii.

VĀCASPATI'S CRITICISM OF SPHOṬA-VĀDA*

S. S. Sūryanārāyaṇa Śāstrī

Even apart from the unsavoury and uncharitable criticism of Vācaspati by the Prakāṣārthakāra, it is abundantly evident from a study of the *Brahmasiddhi* of Maṇḍana's that whatever is distinctive in Vācaspati's Advaita teaching is inherited by him from Maṇḍana.¹ In the circumstances, one may not unreasonably expect Vācaspati to support Maṇḍana's Sphoṭa-vāda as well, especially since according to the latter the comprehension of that doctrine is in conformity with and aid to the comprehension of Advaita.² But strangely enough, Vācaspati restates the doctrine in the words of Maṇḍana and criticises it both in an independent work, the *Tattvabindu* and in the course of the Devatādhikaraṇa of the *Bhāmatī*.³ The former is referred to in the latter; the criticism is fuller and a little more trenchant in the former, while perhaps a shade more respect is shown in the latter by the mode of reference to the propounder of the theory as *ācaryadeśīyaḥ*. The substance of the criticism is about the same in both.

*Courtesy : *Collected Papers of Professor S. S. Sūryanārāyaṇa Śāstrī* University of Madras, 1961, pp. 291-301.

It will be remembered that the advocate of the Sphoṭa-vāda alleges the existence of the word or sentence as a single integral whole, because meaning cannot intelligibly be comprehended otherwise. Our understanding of the sense, we say, comes from the word (or the sentence). If we treat the word not as a unit but as a composite of the letters (of which one imagines it to be formed) then each letter by itself cannot manifest the sense, while a combination of the letters in cognition is impossible, for each such cognition perishes momentarily and there cannot be a combination of what exists, what has ceased to exist and what has not come into existence. If it be said that the letters may combine, not their cognitions, this is irrelevant; the letters being eternal and pervasive are always in combination and cannot explain the cognition of different words by different persons at different times; if the dogma of the eternality of letters be not subscribed to, the position is worse. The impressions or memory images of the letters may be invoked to explain the apprehension of meaning; but memory-images such as we ordinarily postulate can but recall their own cause; they cannot cause something new, a single composite memory of the whole word, much less the meaning of the word. It may be thought that the final cognition is of the nature of a single memory to the production of which the other memory-images contribute, that in this memory all the letters constituting a word are repeated together as it were and that from the letters thus cognised in combination there is apprehension of meaning. Apart from the difficulty already indicated that such a capacity is different from that already postulated for memory, that memory itself is a capacity of the self and the postulation of

another capacity in respect of a capacity will lead to infinite regress, there is the further trouble that in the final single memory image, all the letters are reflected together and not in sequence, while it is clear that cognition depends on the pronunciation of letters in a particular sequence. If the memory image theory were true, meaning should be apprehended even from letters pronounced without sequence (say by a number of people shouting each one letter simultaneously) or in a reverse sequence; 'tip' and 'pit' should have the same meaning. It seems, therefore, necessary to recognise meaning as something *sui generis*. It is not produced, but revealed by what we call successive elements of a word or sentence. As the student of Western Logic would say, while the verbal expression of judgement which is called the proposition may be said to be compounded of subject, predicate and copula, the judgement itself is a unity which is *revealed* in their elements; the judgement is not *produced* by other units; it is itself the unit of thought. In the same way, meaning which is manifested, sphaṭa as the grammarians and Maṇḍana Miśra call it, is a unit increasingly revealed by particular sounds uttered in certain sequences. The succeeding sounds make more clear what was less clearly expressed by the preceding sounds; the latter provides the substructure, the former the superstructure, while all of them together reveal the one design, which while prompting their utterance is certainly not produced by them. The knowledge thus revealed being perceptual, does certainly admit of degrees of clarity unlike other forms of knowledge. Neither sound nor sequence is futile, for while the sound is the tool of manifestation, the sequence provides the form thereof. The individual cognitions of letters are parts, as it

were, of the inspiring whole which is really partless. They correspond to the numerous reflections of the one face, as if possessing diverse colours and configurations. Sometimes meaning-units which are really different appear to be revealed by the same sound, *e.g.*, in the case of ambiguous words and sentences; this is conditioned by similarity of the place and effort required for the utterance of the requisite sounds. Nor is there any difficulty about what is of the nature of a reflection and so far illusory subserving the comprehension of truth. Our initial cognition of many things is erroneous and yet it is on the basis of these that we make further strides in our knowledge; many a false hypothesis has led to the extension of scientific knowledge; even in the case of an apparently mechanical whole like an arithmetical figure, the lower partial, defective and so far erroneous figures are means to the apprehension of the higher true figure.

The reader will not fail to note the marked resemblance of *sphoṭa* thus explained to the Advaitin's Brahman. Brahman is not compounded of the appearances. It is certainly revealed in appearances, partially. Not all appearances are of equal value in this task of manifestation, nor do they all come at the same time for all. If everything that is known or is ultimately for Brahman-knowledge, it is yet true that the acting or the knowing has to come in well-marked stages corresponding to the eligibility and perfection of the individual. All appearances are defective and illusory, yet they, all in different ways more or less perfect, are instrumental to Brahman-realisation. Brahman is not attained by any act just as meaning is not produced by any combination. Again, as Brahman is

neither known in the world nor yet unknown, the sphoṭa is neither revealed nor yet unrevealed; Brahman is known, as otherwise there would be no desire to know, Brahman is also unknown, hence the desire to know. Sphoṭa is revealed, hence the possibility of making it clearer; sphoṭa is unrevealed, else it would not need to be made clearer.

The position of the Sphoṭa-vādin and his opponent may be made clearer by comparison with the Associationist and Gestalt Schools of Psychology. The Associationist is all for the recognition of particular elements out of which wholes are compounded by some mysterious laws of association; while the Gestalt School recognising the futility of compounding which can result at best in an aggregate, not a unit, insists on the presence of a plan, form or configuration from the first. The Associationist cannot explain how a five rupee note comes to *mean* five rupees; for he wants to see and cannot see five rupees wrapped up in it.' The psychology of parts and elements is a static psychology which ignores and consequently fails to comprehend the dynamic aspect of life. No one reflecting on purposive activity, for instance, would fail to realise the existence of something revealed and yet unrevealed, realised, yet unrealised, an organised whole on which the parts depend, which is yet increasingly realised through the parts. Our individual acts do not *make* the purpose; they are caused, rather, by the purpose revealed in them.' The Gestalt Psychologist shows the need for recognising this whole as a unit in his account even of perception. The perception of motion cannot be explained on the basis of the perception of the facts that move or the various stages occupied in the

motion. In a motion picture, we have but a series of static pictures of various parts in various stages, yet we *see* the motion of the parts. Dynamic psychology no less than absolutist metaphysics would thus seem to support sphaṭa-vāda. It remains to see on what grounds Vācaspati rejects it.

“The particular sounds which manifest sphaṭa, are they” asks Vācaspati, “different from sphaṭa or non-different therefrom?” If non-different, then each sound would manifest the meaning* and the remaining sounds would be futile. If different, why the association of these sounds with the manifestation of that? Verily, the cognition of the cow is not coloured by the cognition of the pig! Such a question has little application to Maṇḍana’s doctrine. To him indeed sphaṭa is non-different from the sounds, as a whole from its parts; and yet it is different too, since the whole is neither each part nor a mere aggregate of the parts. The existence and functioning of such wholes can be denied only by defective psychology.

But any such theory discredits the reality of the parts, as partial and defective; they are treated as illusory; they are put on a par with the illusory manifold reflections of a single face in different media. Where is the justification for discrediting the reality of that whose cognition is unsublated? We do undoubtedly cognise individual letters. Why should we treat these cognitions illusory? The obvious reply is that not the existence of these cognitions but their significance is in question, just as in the case of the reflection. The reflection exist without doubt, but it is not real. And sublation in this case consists not in that presentation ceasing to be or giving place to another

presentation, but in that presentation *as such* failing to fulfil what is expected of it. If each cognition as an independent part could by combination with other such parts explain the whole, then it would be unsublated; since, however, it fails of its purpose, since it seems to fit in more naturally with a theory which treats it not as producer but as manifester, it is in so far forth sublated. The reflection is sublated not as a reflection, but as the face; the letter-cognition is sublated not as a letter-cognition but as an independent productive constituent of meaning. The sublation is by no means apparent on the surface and reveals itself only on analysis. But so is it with all the major issues of Advaita, bondage, difference, finitude. All these impinge on the empirical consciousness with the apparent weight of reality and are sublated only by philosophical analysis. And philosophical analysis, as has been shown brilliantly by Maṇḍana, reveals non-difference to be real, difference being superimposed thereon because of some extraneous adjunct.⁷

And here we came across a statement, extremely surprising in an Advaitin, that it is non-difference which is imposed because of some adjunct, on the differentials. Instances given are army, forest etc. Such terms are empirical designations for aggregates of units such as elephants, horsemen, infantry, chariots and so on or teak, ebony, bamboo and so on. "Nor with this does the army or forest come to be known as a single whole with the elephant etc., or campaka etc., as parts."⁸ There is nothing to prevent the application of the same reasoning even to concepts like tree, to all universals in fact, with the startling conclusion that this absolutist metaphysician is also a rank nominalist.

The question is insistent "Why should the Advaitin reverse his normal procedure here alone? Why should he treat difference as real and non-difference as superimposed, while the very opposite holds good for him as an ultimate metaphysical conclusion?" A likely reply is that the reality of Brahman does not annul the empirical reality of phenomena, and that what seems so startling in Vācaspati is but the expression of an intelligible and legitimate desire "to preserve appearances." The different statements are both true; their apparent contradiction is to be resolved by distinguishing their contents (*viṣaya-vyavasthā*). Such a reply, however, is far from satisfactory; for distinction of content is possible as between enquiries on a par,⁹ not as between a higher and a lower. The principles that determines final truth cannot be different from, much less opposed to, those which determine truth in a particular field. Much less is the possibility of contradiction when the two enquiries have almost the same sphere. The knowledge of the Word cannot run counter to the knowledge of the Real; for, is not all speech contained in the Oṅkāra, and has it not been said that *Om*, the imperishable, is all this, the past, the present and the future, as also what transcends all three times?¹⁰ A distinction of the kind mentioned tends to divorce Science from Philosophy and stultify both. If the Real is the one, imperishable, partless whole manifested in varying degrees in the world of appearances, this truth should be found to apply not in Metaphysics alone, but in the spheres of the other Sciences as well, so far as the limitations of their inquiry will allow. And the Science of the Word is no exception.

Starting with the premise that the unity of the word or sentence is due to an extraneous adjunct,

Vācaspati proceeds to define this adjunct as "being the content of a single cognition (*eka-vijñāna-viśayatā*)" or "being the cause of the cognition of a single thing denoted (*ekūbhidheya-pratyaya-hetutā*)." A natural objection would be that the external adjunct would not condition unless it be itself cognised, and that the cognition of such an adjunct depends on the cognition of the word as single, reciprocal dependence being thus involved. This consequence, however, Vācaspati denies: "for, the knowledge of the relation (of sound to sense) is not dependent on the determination of the word; rather is it the cognition of the word dependent on the former."¹¹ Dependence being thus one-sided, there can be no question of reciprocal dependence. But, we may ask, how is there the knowledge of the relation? When we say that the relation of sound to sense is known, do we not mean the relation of a word to what it signifies? And can this be cognised without the word being cognised *as a word*? Apparently it can be, according to Vācaspati who says that relation to sense is understood in the case of those letters which enter into a single memory-cognition. But this takes us nowhere, for we are against the old difficulty in another form: What is a single memory-cognition? Is the unity of the memory determined by its momentariness? If so, is this momentary cognition capable of comprehending a plurality of letters within itself? If not by its duration, then, by what other principle is the unity determined? If I recall "Cow horse" in my memory, is my cognition single or dual? So long as it is recalled by me without involving any recognisable double effort, should we not treat it as one? Shall we be justified then in treating what is cognised as one word? It is true that there may be really a multipli-

city of efforts though unrecognised. But on what ground are we to infer this unrecognised multiplicity? By what causes again are we to explain the need for the multiplicity? Is there in the last resort any explanation other than the unity of the word? Are we not forced to say albeit against our will that the memory is single because it is of a single word? And with this we are led back to reciprocal dependence. The logical difficulty is fundamental and to meet it we have but alleged psychological facts couched in stilted if cautious double negatives.¹² When *A* pronounces a word, we are told, and *B* is seen to react, the looker-on *C* has a single memory comprehending the letters pronounced by *A*, as related to *B*'s reaction. From *B*'s reaction he infers apprehension of meaning by him, which meaning *C* relates to the single memory he has; because of this relation to sense the letters comprehended in the memory understood to be a word. The psychology here presented is unfortunately too simple to be true. Let us assume for the moment the general validity of this behaviouristic explanation of language-learning. Even then, what is it that *A* pronounces, a word or sentence? If it is a sentence, *i.e.*, a combination of words, then what is associated in *C*'s mind with *B*'s reaction and the inferred cognition of sense is this combination, not a single word. How does *C* learn to discriminate the various words thereof? It may be said that the words are distinguished by their occurrence in different contexts in conjunction with other different words, that what is instrumental is a process of addition and subtraction (*āvāpa* and *udvāpa*). But for any such process of addition and subtraction words must first be apprehended as such. There is also the difficulty on the other side that if words are appre-

hended by discrimination from the wholes of which they are parts, the principle of the sentence as a single unit (*vākya-sphoṭa*) is admitted and this is more than sufficient to content the Sphoṭa-vādin. Let us then say that in the simple process mentioned, what *A* mentions is a word, not a sentence. How then can *B* react? The very least that *B* must do is to nod or show some other sign of comprehension, and this he can do, not in respect of a bare word-sense but only in respect of that sense as related at least to the activity of being. When *B* nods on hearing the word "cow", he does so because he takes the word to mean "a cow exists" or "that is a cow", and this is the apprehension which is inferred by *C*. If, on the contrary, there were no such sense even by implication, *B* would not react in any way and *C* would have nothing to infer or infer from. Nor may it be said that *B*'s passivity is itself the ground of inference; for, the passivity may result from what is not a word or what is not apprehended as a word. *B* may not react to a man saying "Coo" either because he does not take it to be a word or because he does not know it is "Cow" pronounced in the North of England way. The behaviouristic explanation, then, if it is to explain at all, must treat the sentence as a unit; and that is to give away the associationist case. And if it stops short of that unit, the apprehension of the relation of word to sense should necessarily depend on the apprehension of the word as such. The Prābhākaras were consistent behaviourists, maintaining as they did that words are significant only as related to what is to be done. Maṇḍana improving on them insisted on the need for words being understood *in relation*, but not necessarily in relation to an act. Vācaspati, while not rejecting

behaviourism outright, attempts to work it along with associationism, an exceedingly unfortunate procedure. The lead of Kumārila was less worth following than that of Maṇḍana Miśra.¹³

The psychology that sense is related to the letters entering into a single memory is defective in yet another way. If it be true that Cowness is associated with the three remembered letters 'C, O, W', that sense should not be recalled except when all the three letters are recalled. But not infrequently it happens that we have a valid cognition of cowness when the letters are defectively or incorrectly recalled. The printer may print 'Coe', the speaker may pronounce "Coo", and yet we have a valid apprehension of cow. The process is even more marked where a letter or sound is omitted in writing or speaking.¹⁴ This is explicable because in learning we do not pass from element to element, but apprehend the whole, filling up gaps wherever they occur. It is not the fact of recall that matters here, for that may be explained on the ground of association by similarity or partial identity; what does matter is that the sense recalled is the sense intended, not one that is similiar or defective or erroneous.

The Sphoṭa-vādin's difficulty about sequence in the single memory cognition is sought to be got over by Vācaspati. In the memory itself, he says, the letters have no sequences, being presented together; but memory follows experience and conforms to it; and the sequence in which the letters are experienced is repeated in memory. This would appear to be sound as far as it goes. The difficulty is that it does not go far enough. Letters, it is said, being eternal and pervasive, have no sequence belonging to them as such. What

sequence there is is determined by something else? What is that something other if it is not the meaning or purpose of the speaker, listener or reader? The letters *t*, *i* and *p* are arranged in one way or the other, according to the meaning we propose to express; in other words, the sequence varies with the word. Externally looked at, the letters in sequence constitute the word; for the psychologist, however, it is the word that determines the sequence. Is the word existent or non-existent prior to the letters apprehended in sequence? Empirically speaking, I may shelve the question by saying that though not present in my mind before I learn the sequence, it is present in the mind of another who instructs me; and thus, the process may be pushed back indefinitely, there being no authority for postulating the origin of language at any particular time. If, however, this empirical indeterminism does not content you and you press for metaphysical definiteness, it must be said that the word both is and is not prior to the apprehension of sequence. It is real, otherwise it could not be manifested in the sequence; it is not existent, otherwise there would be no need for manifestation.¹⁶ The solution of the problem is in line with the solution of the problems of human knowledge and activity in general. Knowledge is of the novel and yet not of the non-existent. Activity realises a purpose which is real yet not actual. This paradox is common to all aspects of human nature, indeed to all appearance; the only solution would seem to lie in taking these to be partial and therefore defective and illusory appearances of the Real that is one and partless. And what applies to the Real applies to the Word, for Oṅkāra is all speech and "Om is Brahman, Om is all this"¹⁶ "Oṅkāra alone is all this."¹⁷

NOTES

1. Prominent among the points of resemblance are the doctrine of Nescience as located in the Jiva, not Brahman, and the rejection of verbal testimony as of itself a cause of immediate knowledge. Instances of what one would in these days call verbal plagiarism are abundant; but in the days of palm leaves and instruction, such repetition should have been regarded more as a compliment than otherwise.

2. See Verse 36 of the *Sphoṭasiddhi* (p. 261, University of Madras edition) and the last three lines of the commentary thereon.

3. *Vedānta-Sūtra*, I, iii. 28.

4. Cf. the following from Woodworth, *Contemporary Schools of Psychology*: "..... the job of psychology is first to analyse these complex processes into their elements, and then to study how the elements are combined and the laws of their combination. First identify the elements, and then work up to larger and larger compounds. The Gestalt Psychologists called this a brick and mortar psychology, with emphasis on the brick, because the trouble was to find the mortar. The mortar problem has been a serious one for the associationists" (p. 101) ... "A form quality is a property possessed by a whole which is not possessed by any of the parts making up the whole. A melody, for example, is made up of the notes of the scale, but is not present in these notes taken singly but only when they are arranged in a certain sequence or pattern" (p. 102) ... "A mere sum, or pure sum, is one in which each item is independent of the others and simply counts for one in making up the sum. In arithmetic we have pure sums [Maṇḍana may not admit even this], but they are abstract. In the concrete, it is not so easy to be sure that an aggregate really consists of independent items" (p. 105) ... "The Gestalt Psychologists hold that the total

process controls the brain response to the separate items of stimulation" (p. 112).

5. The very first sentence of the *Bhāmatī* premises the purposiveness of all activity and yet it is a pity that Vācaspati shows no true grasp of the psychology or metaphysics of purpose; the lapse is all the more lamentable when he had the benefit of such a shining light as Maṇḍana.

6. Sphoṭa, here rendered as meaning, is really the cause of the ascertainment of meaning (arthā-'vasāya-prasavanimittam); but in the last resort this cause is the meaning itself; hence the rendering adopted here, since it has the merit of being more familiar and more suggestive to students of Western Psychology.

7. See the *Brahmasiddhi*, Chapter II. Part of the argument is re-stated briefly, almost in Maṇḍana's words, in the *Bhāmatī* on I, i, 4.

8. *Tattvabindu*, p. 11.

9. *E.g.* in the case of Astronomy and Biology.

10. *Māṇḍūkya*, I.

11. *Tattvabindu*, p. 12.

12. See the *Bhāmatī*, p. 330 (Anantakṛṣṇa Śāstrin's edition).

13. Kumārila's view that the sentence-sense follows by implication from the word-sense is not necessary for Vācaspati's system though adopted by him in the *Tattvabindu* and less explicitly in the *Bhāmatī*.

14. The fact is not unknown to Advaitins. See for instance the *Siddhāntaleśasāṅgraha*, p. 303, Benares edition. For the Gestalt view of learning as filling up gaps, see Woodworth, *op. cit.* pp. 116-117.

15. The paradox is made much of in the *Tattvabindu*, p. 10, where it is said that according to the *sphoṭa-vāda*, "the unreal helps the unreal."

16. *Taittirīya Upaniṣad*, I, 8.

17. *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, II, 23, 3. For an exposition of Brahman as *akṣara* in this sense, see the *Brahmasiddhi*, pp. 17-19.

LIBERATION — ITS NATURE AND ITS MEANS IN ADVAITA

N. Veezhinathan

I. INTRODUCTION

The philosophy of Advaita, on its practical side, holds that *karma* when performed without any desire for its fruit paves the way for liberation through self-realization. The role of *karma*, therefore, centres round the nature of liberation according to Advaita.

According to Advaita, one and the same Brahman appears as *Īsvara*, *jīva* and the world. *Īsvara* always realizes His identity with Brahman, and so He is ever released. The world is an illusory appearance of Brahman. So it is only *jīva* who falsely identifying itself with body-mind-complex undergoes transmigration and strives after liberation. *Jīva* is Brahman itself appearing through the limiting adjunct — mind, which is a product of *avidyā*. Brahman, reflected in or delimited by *avidyā* and its product — mind, appears as *jīva* and thus there results the mutual identification of *jīva* with the qualities of mind like finitude, agency, etc. Further there is the mutual identification of *jīva* associated with mind and its qualities with sense-

organs, body, etc. Śrī Śaṅkara in his commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra* says: "As long as the *jīva* is associated with the adjunct - mind, so long only is the *jīva* a *jīva*. In reality, however, there is nothing like *jīva*-hood apart from what is fancied to be such by reason of this adjunct." He proceeds to point out: "This relation of Brahman with mind has but *avidyā* as its source, and this *avidyā* cannot be removed by anything other than the knowledge of the self. Hence this relation with such a limiting adjunct as the mind does not cease so long as the identity of *jīva* with Brahman is not realized".² *Avidyā*, therefore, is the source of all evils, and its removal would necessarily bring about the removal of the relation of mind and its qualities like finitude, agency, etc. *Jīva*, then, ceases to be a *jīva*, as it is manifest as Brahman in its true nature of absolute bliss and consciousness. And the self which is thus free from *avidyā* and which is unconditioned bliss is liberation. Liberation, therefore, is identical with Brahman-Ātman or the self and so it is ever existent and eternal. Yet, since in order that there may be the manifestation of the self in its true nature which is liberation, the removal of *avidyā* is necessary, and since the latter is effected by the knowledge of self, liberation also is spoken of by courtesy as being attained. And attainment is thus only figurative.

The concept of liberation thus has a vital bearing upon the removal of *avidyā*. *Avidyā* could be removed only by the direct knowledge of its content (*viṣaya*) of *avidyā* and hence its direct knowledge would necessarily remove *avidyā*.

The mental state which arises from the Upaniṣadic texts in the form of the self and which is inspired by

the reflection of the self in it is termed the direct knowledge of the self. The self as such cannot dispel *avidyā*; it is its witness. But when reflected in the mental state arising from the Upaniṣads, it removes *avidyā*, just as the rays of the sun normally illuminating the grass burn the very grass when reflected through a lense.³

The view that *avidyā* is removed by the direct knowledge of the self is based upon *śruti* and *śrutārthāpatti*. These two are valid proofs, and hence there is no reason that would disprove the above view.

(i) *Śruti*: The Upaniṣadic passages affirm that the direct knowledge of the self removes *avidyā*. We may cite two passages in this connection. The passage “Only by realizing the self, one overcomes *mṛtyu* (*avidyā*),”⁴ and the passage, “One who has the direct knowledge of the self (*Ātman*) overcomes *śoka* (*avidyā*),”⁵ state that the direct knowledge of the self is what annihilates *avidyā*.

(ii) *Śrutārthāpatti*: This is postulating something to account for what apparently clashes with the import of a sentence. The Upaniṣadic text⁶, “One who realizes the self (Brahman) remains as the self (Brahman),” states the direct knowledge of the self leads to the manifestation of the self in its true nature which is liberation. The manifestation of the self in its true nature would be impossible unless there is the removal of *avidyā* which veils it. The *Śruti* text “The self is veiled by *avidyā*”⁷ and the *Gītā* text “The true nature of the individual souls, that is, the self is veiled by *avidyā* and hence the individual souls experience phenomenal existence”⁸ convey that *avidyā* veils the true nature of the self. Hence the above Upaniṣadic

text 'one who realizes the self remains as the self' which states that the direct knowledge or realization of the self leads to the manifestation of the self implies the removal of *avidyā* by the direct knowledge of the self.

The direct knowledge of the self is opposed to *avidyā*, and hence it dispels *avidyā* by its mere rise. But there remains *avidyā-leśa* or *avidyā-saiṃskāra* which accounts for the continuance of the physical body in the case of one who has attained the direct knowledge of the self. This state is known as *jīvanmukti*. And after the removal of *avidyāleśa*, the so-called *jīva* remains as the self which is pure consciousness and absolute bliss and which is liberation.

To sum up this part of the discussion: the self which is non-dual bliss and consciousness is liberation when it is free from *avidyā*; and, it becomes free from *avidyā* when the latter is removed by the direct knowledge of the self. Knowledge of the self is, therefore, the sole means of liberation.

II. KARMA, NOT THE DIRECT MEANS OF LIBERATION

We must now consider whether *karma* is efficacious in bringing about liberation. This, however, requires the discussion regarding the fundamental distinction between *karma* and *jñāna* — the distinction which is essential for the doctrine of Advaita. *Karma* and *jñāna* differ in two ways both as regards their nature and their fruits. In the first place, *karma* is of the nature of action, and it can be either performed or not performed, or performed otherwise. It depends upon Vedic injunctions or on the choice of man; *jñāna*, on the other hand, is the result of means of knowledge.

Means of knowledge relate to things that are existent. So *jñāna* cannot be made, or not made, or made otherwise according to the choice of a man, but depends upon the nature of the thing in itself, and is thus always one and the same. In the second place, the fruit of *karma* is of the nature of happiness or misery to be achieved, and it admits of various degree or stages; these stages are the worlds of the upper, the intermediate and the nether worlds and the forms of life therein. But the fruit of *jñāna* is the inner self identical with the supreme self — the only partless ultimate which is real, consciousness, and bliss. It must be noted here that it is only by courtesy it is said that the fruit of *jñāna* is the inner self. Really the fruit of *jñāna* is only the removal of *avidyā*; and when *avidyā* is removed, the inner self manifests in its true nature. The nature of the self is summed up by Śrī Śaṅkara thus:

“It is the absolute reality, immutable, eternal, omnipresent as etheric space, free from all modifications, absolutely self-sufficient, not composed of parts, and self-luminous in its nature.”

The self of this nature when freed from *avidyā* is liberation; and it cannot be on any account, the fruit of *karma*. For, as we have said, the fruit of *karma* admits of various degrees, while the self is the same always. Further, the fruits of *karma* are classified¹⁰ by Śrī Śaṅkara into four divisions; (i) effected (*utpādya*), (ii) attained (*āpya*), (iii) ceremonially purified (*samskārya*), and (iv) modified (*vikārya*). If it is admitted that liberation identical with the self is the fruit of *karma*, then the self must be admitted to be either effected, or obtained, or ceremonially purified or modified.

None of these holds good in the case of the self which is identical with liberation.

It cannot be regarded as effected or modified. For, if these positions be admitted, then the non-permanence of *mokṣa* would certainly follow. In ordinary experience, we find sour milk and the like which are modifications, and jars and the like which are effects to be non-eternal.¹¹

Nor can liberation identical with the self be regarded as a thing to be obtained; for, being one's self, it is not something to be attained by one. Even if it is held to be different from one's self, still it would not be something to be obtained; for, as it is pervasive like etheric space, it must be understood to be ever present to everyone in its essential nature.¹²

Nor can liberation identical with the self be regarded as ceremonially purified, and therefore as depending on activity; for, ceremonial purification to an object is the result of addition of some excellence to, or removal of some blemish from that object. It cannot happen in the case of liberation through addition of excellence; for liberation identical with the self is absolute perfection and needs nothing to be added to it to make it more perfect; nor can it happen through removal of some blemish, for, liberation is identical with the eternally pure self.¹³

It follows from this that liberation which is identical with the self cannot be brought about directly by *karma*, and so we have to exclude *karma* as direct means of liberation.

The Pūrva-mīmāṃsā school, however, asserts that it is only *karma* and not the knowledge of the self that

is the sole means of liberation. This schools holds that the association of *jīva* with the body-mind complex constitutes bondage and to remain in its pure nature by being dissociated from the body-mind complex constitutes liberation. So what is to be achieved is only dissociation from body-mind complex; and it is possible by performance of *karma* alone."

How *karma* alone is efficacious in bringing about liberation is explained thus by the Pūrva-mīmāṃsā school: the causes of embodiment, that is, birth are merit and demerit. Of these, the former arises by performance of meritorious deeds, and the latter by committing interdicted actions and by non-performance of obligatory and occasional rites. If one succeeds in avoiding both merit and demerit, thereafter one will not be born. In order to avoid merit and demerit one must refrain from resorting to optional and prohibited rites. One should perform obligatory and occasional duties in order to avoid the sin of omission that would occur by their non-performance. The present body is caused by all the merits and demerits accumulated in the earlier births, and these will be exhausted by experiencing their fruits in the present life itself. Thus when the present body falls there is no fresh merit, because one has not performed optional deeds; no fresh demerit, because one has neither committed any interdicted action nor has refrained from the performance of obligatory and occasional duties. And all the merits and demerits are exhausted in the present life itself. Since there will be no cause for seizing another body for the *jīva* when the present body falls off, the *jīva* remains in its pure nature by being dissociated from body-mind complex; and, this constitutes liberation. When the liberation

could be attained through *karma* this way, the Pūrva-mīmāṃsā school does not find the need for the knowledge of the self.¹³

Śrī Saṅkara in his commentary on the *Taittiriyo-paniṣad* and Suresvara in his *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi* refute the above contention of the Pūrva-mīmāṃsā school. The present body is caused not by all the merits and demerits that are accumulated in the past but by certain merits and demerits only; for, it is not reasonable to hold that merits and demerits which bring forth different fruits like birth in heaven, or in hell, or as a human being give forth only one birth. So only a portion of the accumulated merits and demerits gives rise to the present body. The remaining accumulated merits and demerits would definitely give forth different bodies in future. It might be said that the remaining accumulated merits and demerits would be annihilated by the performance of obligatory and occasional rites. But it is wrong because such a performance may annihilate only the accumulated demerits and not the accumulated merits. The accumulated merits could be exhausted either by experiencing their fruits or by the knowledge of the self. Experience of the fruits of accumulated merits would be possible only in several births and not in one birth. All accumulated demerits also cannot be removed by performance of obligatory and occasional duties. They could be removed either by experiencing their fruits which would require several births or by the knowledge of the self. In the meantime, one would be accumulating fresh merits and demerits. So the annihilation of all merits and demerits by performance of obligatory and occasional duties alone is not possible. As a consequence of this

there cannot be any dissociation between the *jīva* on one hand and the body-mind complex on the other. The important result of this argument is that liberation — the state of the self being freed from the association of body-mind complex is not possible through *karma* alone.¹⁴

Śrī Śaṅkara and Suresvara further refer¹⁵ to the viewpoint of the Pūrva-mīmāṃsā school according to which knowledge of the self may be admitted to be the means of liberation not independently, but as associated with the performance of karmas. This view is held on the ground that the *Īśāvāsya*¹⁶ text “one who knows that *karma* (*avidyā*) and *jñāna* (*vidyā*) are to be performed by one and the same person, overcomes death by *karma* and attains immortality by *jñāna*,” speaks of the combination of *karma* and *jñāna*¹⁷ They further hold that this combination of *karma* and *jñāna* admits of three interpretations which are as follows: (i) *karma* is primary and *jñāna* is its auxiliary; (ii) both *karma* and *jñāna* are primary and have equal status; and (iii) *jñāna* is primary and *karma* is its auxiliary. Of these, the first interpretation is based upon the *Gītā* text¹⁸ “Janaka and others (who possessed the knowledge of the self) attained liberation (*samsiddhi*) by performing *karma* only.” The second one is based upon the text, “*jñāna* and *karma* are the means of self-realisation.”¹⁹ The third one is based upon the text “One who knows the self attains the supreme human end.”²⁰

Śrī Śaṅkara critically examines these views and proves them to be unsound; and, we shall set forth Śrī Śaṅkara's arguments against the three views successively:

(i) *Karma is Primary and Jñāna is Auxiliary*

It is admitted by the followers of the Pūrva-mīmāṃsā school, that the knowledge of the self is subsidiary to *karma* on the basis of the text which states that "One's own branch of Veda should be studied". Here the study of Veda has for its purpose the knowledge of the sense of the Veda. One who knows the sense of the Veda is entitled to perform *karma*. Here the expression 'the sense of the Veda' signifies the sense of the Upaniṣads, namely, the self. Thus the knowledge of the self is subsidiary to the performance of *karma*.

Moreover, the texts such as "one who knows the knowledge of the sense of the Veda performs sacrifices and assists others in performing them" state that the knowledge of the self which comes under the knowledge of the sense of the Veda is subsidiary to the performance of sacrifice. The *smṛti* text "Performance of sacrifice presupposes the knowledge of the sense of the Veda" also substantiates the above view.²⁵ When it is thus established that the knowledge of the self, that is, the knowledge of the sense of the Upaniṣads also is subsidiary to the performance of *karma*, then it comes to this that the entire Veda has for its purport the performance of *karma* only. And it is with this in view that Jaimini has said²⁶ that the entire Veda has performance of *karma* as its import. And, the texts which do not prescribe any *karma* like the text which conveys the nature of the self are to be treated as eulogistic in character. That is, they become valid by becoming one with the injunctive text through praising the agent of *karma*, that is, the self. From this it follows that knowledge of the self alone cannot be the means of liberation but only as associated with *karma*.

Śrī Śaṅkara points out that the view set forth in the foregoing paragraph is wrong. He states that the text "One must study one's own branch of the Veda", only means that one must learn by rote the Veda including the Upaniṣads. Later since one cannot perform *karma* without the knowledge of the sense of the injunctive texts which prescribe the sacrifices along with the *modus operandi*, those injunctive texts themselves presumptively imply the enquiry into the *Pūrvamīmāṃsā-sūtras* or *Jaimini-sūtras*. Thus since the text "One's own branch of Veda must be studied" does not relate to the knowledge of the sense of the Upaniṣads, that is, the self, the knowledge of the self is not subsidiary to *karma*.

It has been said: in the text "One who knows the knowledge of the sense of the Veda performs sacrifices and assists others in performing them," the expression "the sense of the Veda" conveys the sense of the Upaniṣads, namely, the self also. So knowledge of the self is subsidiary to the performance of *karma*. This contention also is wrong; it is because the expression 'one who knows the sense of the Veda' stands for 'one who has the knowledge of the several factors relating to the ritual' and not for the knowledge of the self; for, the knowledge of the self and the performance of *karma* are diametrically opposed to each other, and, this we shall explain later. On this ground we have to conclude that the *Jaimini-sūtra* referred to above relates only to the ritualistic section of the Veda. This means that when Jaimini states that the entire Veda has *karma* as its import, we have to understand by the expression "entire Veda" only the ritualistic section of the Veda and not the Upaniṣads. So the knowledge

of the sense of the Upaniṣads, namely, the self is not subsidiary to the performance of *karma*.

Even admitting that the knowledge of the self is subsidiary to the performance of *karma*, yet the view that *karma* is primary and being aided by *jñāna* it is the means to liberation is wrong; for, liberation being eternal cannot be the result of *karma*; whichever is the result of *karma*, is found to be non-eternal. It might be argued that liberation although effected by *karma* may yet be eternal on the strength of the latter's association with *jñāna*. This position is explained on the analogy of poison which by itself leads one to death but cures some diseases when ceremonially purified by sacred formulas. In the same way, an effect produced by *karma* aided by *jñāna* can be eternal.

This view does not hold good. It is admitted that there may arise an effect altogether new from a cause when it is associated with auxiliary causes. But this cannot be extended to the case of *karma* as giving rise to an altogether new effect, namely, liberation as eternal by being associated with the auxiliary cause, namely, the knowledge of the self. To say that liberation is effected by *karma* and yet it is eternal is a contradiction in terms.

It may be said that on the strength of the text of *Nirālambopaniṣad* "He does not return to the cyclic existence"²³ it would be maintained that liberation although an effect is yet eternal. This view is wrong, because the Upaniṣadic texts only make known an existent thing and are not productive factors. Even hundreds of Upaniṣadic texts cannot produce an eternal thing or cannot make a produced thing eternal.

So the view that *karma* aided by the knowledge of the self is the means of liberation is wrong.²⁴ The *Gītā* text cited in favour of this view means that Janaka and others attained purity of heart (*samsiddhi*) by performance of *karma*.

(ii) *Both Karma and Jñāna are Primary*

This view, namely, that both *karma* and *jñāna* are primary and they give rise to liberation is wrong on the ground that what is produced by *karma* cannot be eternal. Moreover, *karma* and *jñāna* are diametrically opposed to each other. Performance of *karma* would be possible only when there is the knowledge of difference among the deities to whom offerings are made, the agent who makes the offerings, and the instruments for making the offering. But the knowledge of the self, by its mere rise, annihilates all knowledge of duality. Moreover it has for its content — the self which is not an agent and experient. *Karma*, on the other hand, requires an agent who is the experient of the result of *karma*. In view of this conflicting nature between *karma* and *jñāna*, both cannot stand together. Therefore there arises no question of their being the means of self-liberation.²⁵ The text “*Karma* and *jñāna* are the means of realisation” means only *karma-samuccaya*.

(iii) *Jñāna is Primary and Karma is Secondary*

The argument set forth against the second view exactly applies with reference to this view also. So we have to conclude that this view is wrong.

The Upaniṣadic text “One who knows the self attains the supreme human end” states that the knowledge of the self by itself is the means of liberation.

So far we have said that neither *karma*, nor *karma* and *jñāna* could be the means of liberation. The *pūrvapakṣin* has said that the *Īśāvāsya* text²¹ speaks of the combination of *karma* and *jñāna*. It is not so. That text simply means the combination of *karma* and *upāsanā* on the conditioned Brahman, and not *karma* and *jñāna*. From what has been said, it would have become clear that neither *karma* nor *karma* associated with *jñāna* is the means of liberation. It is only *jñāna* — the direct knowledge of the self, the mental state arising from the Upaniṣads — that annihilates *avidyā* by its mere rise. The supreme self shines then in its true nature of absolute bliss, and this is liberation.

Not all the Vedāntins admit that *jñāna* alone is the means of liberation. They admit that it is indispensable; yet, it should be combined with *karma* to attain *mokṣa*. It is the combination of *jñāna* and *karma* for this purpose that is known as *samuccaya*. There were two Vedāntins who held this view. One was Brahma-datta, and another, Maṇḍana.

Suresvara in his *Naiṣkarmya-siddhi* refers to the views of these two authors and briefly refutes them. Brahma-datta holds that the Upaniṣads like the ritualistic section of the Veda, are injunctive in character. The injunction, however, is not about ritual but about meditation which is referred to as *prasaṅkhyāna*, *bhāvanā* or *upāsanā*. The central teaching of the Upaniṣads is to be had from the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* texts like “*ātmetyeva upāsita*”²² which enjoins the meditation upon the self. The major texts of the Upaniṣads are subsidiary to the injunctive texts mentioned above. They are subsidiary in the sense that they signify the self which is the content of meditation. Thus it is not the knowledge

of the self that arises from the major texts that leads to liberation but only the meditation upon the self. Now according to the *yathā-kratu-nyāya* the aspirant who has the mediate knowledge of a particular deity can transform that knowledge into an immediate one by persistent meditation upon that deity. Moreover the aspirant would become united with the deity after the fall of his body provided he continues the meditation till the end of his life. Brahmadata argues that in the case of *mokṣa*, Brahman is the goal to be reached and continued meditation upon its true nature known mediately from the major texts of the Upaniṣads will help the aspirant to have the direct knowledge of Brahman and finally, that is, after the fall of the physical body to become merged in it.

The above is the theory of *mokṣa* according to Brahmadata. Knowledge of the self arising from the Upaniṣads and liberation are not simultaneous as in the school of Advaita. There is an interval between the rise of the knowledge of the self and the attainment of liberation. And in this period, the aspirant continues to be in the realm of *avidyā* and so he is not free from obligation to perform his allotted *karmas*. The non-performance of the latter would lead to sin, which in its turn would lead to fresh bondage. So the aspirant has to perform his *karmas* even after attaining the knowledge of the self in order to attain liberation¹¹

Maṇḍana's view is similar to that of Brahmadata. But it differs in one important respect. While Brahmadata holds that it is *prasaṅkhyāna* that leads to liberation, Maṇḍana holds that it is the direct knowledge of the self that leads to liberation. He argues that

the Upaniṣadic texts also, being in the form of words, could give rise to the knowledge of only what is related and mediate. But, since Brahman is supra-relational and immediate, the knowledge arising from the Upaniṣads must be transformed into immediate one referring to the supra-relational entity, that is the self. And it is *prasaṅkhyāna* or *bhāvanā* or *upāsanā* that would bring about such a transformation. It follows from this that the knowledge of the self is followed up by *prasaṅkhyāna* and only after this actual liberation results. Thus as in the view of Brahmādatta, according to this view also, there is an interval between the rise of the knowledge of the self and attainment of liberation.

In this interval, the aspirant is in empirical existence and so the obligation to perform *karma* remains.¹² Thus according to both Brahmādatta and Maṇḍana, there is no stage in a man's life where *karma* could be dispensed with.

Sureśvara refutes these views in his *Naiṣkarmya-siddhi*. He says that *Prasaṅkhyāna* (which can be referred to as *nididhyāsana*) is only helpful to remove certain impediments that stand in the way of the rise of the direct knowledge of the self. Thus the function assigned to *Prasaṅkhyāna* by both Brahmādatta and Maṇḍana is wrong. Moreover, Maṇḍana's view that the Upaniṣadic texts could give rise only to a mediate knowledge of the self is not accepted by all Advaitins. According to them, the question whether a sentence gives rise to mediate knowledge or immediate one and whether it refers to the related entity or a supra-relational one depends upon the object signified. In the present case the self is immediate and non-relational and so the Upaniṣadic texts would definitely

give rise to the immediate knowledge of the self provided there are no impediments. This knowledge would immediately annihilate *avidyā* and the one would be freed from *samsāra* immediately. Since the state of *samsāra* does not continue after the rise of the knowledge of the self, the obligation to perform *karma* also does not exist. So the contention that the knowledge of the self in combination with *karma* leads to liberation should be discarded.

It may be added here that Vācaspatimīśra holds that the Upaniṣadic texts give rise only to the mediate knowledge of the self, and it is only by pursuing *nididhyāsana*, there arises the immediate knowledge of self from mind. This leads to liberation through the removal of *avidyā*. It may be argued that according to Vācaspatimīśra's view also there is an interval between the acquisition of the knowledge of the self and liberation; and in this interval the obligation to perform *karma* remains. Thus there is the combination of *jñāna* and *karma*.

The above contention is wrong; for Vācaspatimīśra holds that performance of *karma* leads to what is known as 'cleansing of heart' which gives rise to intense desire for liberation. On the basis of Upaniṣadic text, he advocates the view of *karma-sannyāsa* after one gets purity of heart by performance of *karma*. Moreover, by the mediate knowledge of the self also, one becomes convinced that one is not an agent and enjoyer and so one cannot perform *karma* at this stage which involves the notion that one is an agent and enjoyer. So there arises no question of the obligation to perform *karma* after the rise of the mediate knowledge of the self from the Upaniṣadic texts.

Adhering for the moment to the stand-points of Brahmadaṭṭa and Maṇḍana, we may say that persistent meditation upon the nature of the self would be possible only when one is free from the obligation to perform *karma*. If not, the meditation would not be continuous. It must be noted here that neither Maṇḍana nor Brahmadaṭṭa holds the view that the immediate knowledge of the self leads to liberation in association with *karma*. Maṇḍana holds this much only that before the rise of the immediate knowledge of the self from *prasaṅkhyāna*, there is the combination of mediate knowledge of the self and *karma*. Brahmadaṭṭa, on the other hand, holds that before actual liberation results from *prasaṅkhyāna* there is the combination of the mediate knowledge of the self and the performance of *karma*. These two views are proved to be unsound. So, *jñāna* alone is the means of liberation.

NOTES

1. *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* of Śrī Śaṅkara (*BSB*), II, iii, 30.
2. *Ibid.*
3. *Siddhāntaleśasaṅgraha*, Chowkhamba Skt. Ser. 1916, (*SLS*) p. 492.
4. *Śvetāśvataropaniṣad*, III, 8.
5. *Chāndogyopaniṣad*, VIII, i, 3.
6. *Muṇḍakopaniṣad*, III, ii, 9.
7. *Chāndogyopaniṣad*, VIII, iii, 2.
8. *Gītā*, V, 15.
9. *BSB*, I, i, 4.
10. *Ibid.*
11. *Ibid.*
12. *Ibid.*

13. *Ibid.*
14. *Vanamālā* of Acyutakṛṣṇānanda Tīrtha, Śri Vāṇi Vilās Śāstra Series, Srirangam, 1913 (VM), p. 4.
15. *Ibid.*, pp. 4, 12.
16. *Ibid. Naiṣkarmyasidhi*, Bombay Skt & Pkt. Ser. 28, 1925 (NS) pp. 46-48.
17. *Śāṅkarabhāṣya* on *Taittirīyopaniṣad*, I, ii; NS, p. 15.
18. *Īśāvāsyopaniṣad*, 18.
19. VM, p. 72.
20. *Gītā*, III, 20.
21. SLS, p. 401.
22. *Taittirīyopaniṣad* I, ii; VM, p. 72,
23. *Śāṅkarabhāṣya* on *Taittirīyopaniṣad*, I, ii.
24. *Jamini Sūtra*, I, ii, 1.
25. *Nirālambopaniṣad*, 33.
26. *ŚB on Tait. Up.*, I, 11.
27. *Ibid.*
28. *Ibid.*
29. *Īśāvāsyopaniṣad*, 18.
30. *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad*, I, iv, 7.
31. NS, p. 38.
32. NS, p. 38; *vide* also: Mm. Kuppuswami Śāstri's Introduction to *Brahmasiddhi* (MGOS, 4, 1937) pp. xxxiii-xxxiv.

FROM VAIRĀGYAŚATAKA

आयुर्वर्षशतं नृणां परिमितं रात्रौ तदधं गतं
 तस्यार्धस्य परस्य चार्धमपरं बालत्ववृद्धत्वयोः ।
 शेषं व्याधिव्रियोगदुःखसहितं सेवादिभिर्नीयते
 जीवे वारितरङ्गचञ्चलतरे सौख्यं कुतः प्राणिनाम् ॥

The life of a man is limited to a hundred years; half of it passes away in the night; of the remaining half, one-half made up of its first and last one-fourths is occupied by youth and old age. The remainder is; passed in servitude etc. accompanied by disease and grief for the separation (of relations). Whence can there be any happiness for mortals in worldly life which is even more unsteady than a wave? (M. R. Kale, *The Nīti-and Vairāgyaśatakas of Bhartṛhari*, Motilal Banarsidas, Delhi, 1971).

The *Vairāgyaśataka* (50) of Bhartṛhari

ŚĀRĪRAKAVYĀKHYĀPRASTHĀNABHEDAḤ

by

Ātmavidyābhūṣaṇam V. S. V. Gurusvāmi Śāstri

with a free rendering by

Dr. V. K. S. N. Raghavan

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तस्मादस्य मते साक्षी जीवादीशाच्च विद्यते ।
 सुखादिव्यवहारो यो जैवस्तस्य प्रसिद्धये ॥
 उररीक्रियते साक्षी तत्त्वशुद्धिकृता पृथक् ।
 बृहदारण्यके षष्ठे 'तद्यथे'त्यत्र विद्यते ॥

[421]

पुरुषेतिपदाज्जीवबोधकाच्च विलक्षणः ।
 प्राज्ञशब्दस्तृतीयान्तः प्राह चैष परेश्वरम् ॥

[422]

जीवाद्विलक्षणतया सुषुप्त्युत्क्रान्त्यवस्थयोः ।
 'स वा एषे'त्येवमादिवाक्यशेषे यदस्ति तत् ॥

[423]

भूताधिपत्वेश्वरत्वाद्युच्यमानं न दुष्यति ।
 ज्ञेयब्रह्मप्रकरणान्निखिलं स्तावकं हि तत् ॥

[424 - 425]

तत्साक्षिण्येष संदर्भो बार्हदारण्यकः परः ।
 शारीरकेऽधिकरणे सुषुप्त्युत्क्रान्तिनामके ॥
 निर्णयो यः स चाप्यस्ति साक्षिण्येव च तत्परः ।
 इदमेवाखिलं मूलं मन्यते तत्त्वशुद्धिकृत् ॥

ईश्वरस्य सर्वज्ञतानिरूपणे प्रकटार्थकृत्तत्त्वशुद्धिकृतोः मतभेदः

[426]

सर्वज्ञातापीश्वरस्य प्रकटार्थकृता यथा ।
तथा मायामयोर्वृत्तीराश्रित्यैव समर्थ्यते ॥

[427 - 429 ab]

तथाप्यत्र विशेषोऽस्ति तत्त्वशुद्धिकृतां मते ।
प्रत्यक्षा विद्यमानेषु स्मृतिर्भूतेषु वस्तुषु ॥
भाविष्वनुमितिर्मायावृत्तिरेतैः समाश्रिता ।
मायोपाधिरिति प्रोक्तं मूलं पूर्ववदस्य च ॥
मतस्य सममेवास्ति विशेषः परमुच्यते ।

[429 cd - 431 ab]

प्रत्यक्षमखिलं ज्ञानं वर्तमानार्थगोचरम् ॥
एवमेवेश्वरज्ञानं वक्तुं मायामबोधयत् ।
प्रत्यक्षां वर्तमानेषु परोक्षां भूतभाविषु ॥
आपरोक्ष्यं ततो नास्ति मायायाः सर्ववस्तुषु ।

[431 cd - 433]

वेदान्तानामद्वितीये ब्रह्मण्येव समन्वयः ॥
भासमानः प्रपञ्चस्तु मिथ्यैवेत्येष निर्णयः ।
घटः सन्निति रूपेण घटतत्सत्त्वबोधिना ॥
प्रत्यक्षेण विरुध्येतेत्येवं शङ्का प्ररोहति ।
उन्मूलयति तामेवं तत्त्वशुद्धिकृदत्र च ॥

घटस्सन्निति प्रत्यक्षं सद्रूपब्रह्ममात्रगोचरः

[434 - 436 ab]

घटो वा घटसत्ता वा प्रत्यक्षस्य न गोचरः ।
 किं तु सन्मात्रविषयं प्रत्यक्षमिति बोधयन् ॥
 घटाद्यनुगतं सत्त्वमधिष्ठानतया खलु ।
 प्रत्यक्षमपि गृह्णातीत्येवं चेदं प्रसिद्धयति ॥
 प्रत्यक्षमपि सद्रूपब्रह्मसिद्धयेकसाधकम् ।

[436 cd - 437]

अन्वयव्यतिरेकादिरिन्द्रियस्यास्ति यश्च सः ॥
 उपक्षीणो ह्यधिष्ठानग्रहणे वर्तते यथा ।
 इदमंशे ह्यधिष्ठाने शुक्तिरूप्यभ्रमे ततः ॥

[438 - 441]

न तत्प्रत्यक्षमस्त्यत्र यद्विरोधि भवेदिह ।
 'त्रिषु कालेषु सत्त्वं न ब्रह्म व्यभिचरत्यपि ॥
 यथा तथाखिलं कार्यं सत्त्वेनैकान्तिकं भवेत् ।
 एकमेव पुनः सत्त्वं ततः कार्यस्य कारणात् ॥
 अनन्यत्वमिति प्राह सत्त्वाच्चेत्यत्र भाष्यकृत् ।
 इदं प्रदर्शितं भाष्यं मूलमत्र प्रतर्क्यते ॥
 तत्त्वशुद्धिकृतां पन्थास्तत्त्वशुद्ध्युक्तया दिशा ।
 निरधारि मया मूलमुपन्यासि च शाङ्करम् ॥

X. श्रीनृसिंहभट्टोपाध्यायः

[442]

कवितार्किकचक्रवर्तिभिर्नृसिंहाभिधभट्टपण्डितैः ।
विरुदोदितबुद्धिकौशलैर्लिखितैकापि न लभ्यते कृतिः ॥

[443]

सिद्धान्तलेशसंक्षेपे परमप्यदीक्षितैः ।
साक्षिचैतन्यभास्यत्वे चाहंकारस्य साधिते ॥

[444]

अहंकारानुसंधानं नित्यत्वात्साक्षिणः कथम् ।
इति प्रश्नसमाधानवर्णनान्ते निरूप्यते ॥

[445]

बाह्यार्थगोचरान्वक्षधीरज्ञाननिवर्तिका ।
इत्ययं नियमस्तस्य शुक्तिरूप्यभ्रमस्थले ॥

[446]

इदमाकारधीः पूर्वं ततो रजतधीरपि ।
जायतामिति सिद्धान्ते त्विदंमात्रधियेरिताः ॥

[447]

नियमव्यभिचारो यस्तस्य शङ्का समाहितः ।
अनन्तरं च सिद्धान्तभेदस्त्वेषामनूयते ॥

[448]

नृसिंहभट्टोपाध्याया इदंरूप्यभ्रमस्थले ।
धीद्वयं नानुमन्यन्ते धियमेकां तु मन्वते ॥

[449]

इदंपदार्थतादात्म्ययुक्तरूप्यार्थगोचरा ।
भवतीन्द्रियजन्या धीरेकैव भ्रमरूपिणी ॥

[450]

भ्रमवृत्त्यतिरेकेण रूप्योत्पत्तोः पुरा न हि ।
जायते त्विदमाकारा वृत्तिरन्येति निश्चयः ॥

भ्रमस्थले रूप्यज्ञानं चाश्रुपमेव न साक्ष्यात्मकम्

[451]

ऐन्द्रियं रजतज्ञानं न तु साक्ष्यात्मकं ध्रुवम् ।
पश्यामि चक्षुषा चेदं रजतं त्विति दर्शनात् ॥

[452]

अदुष्टा प्रतिबद्धाक्षसंबन्धाज्जायते तु या ।
वृत्तिः स्वकालसंजातरूप्येदंवस्तगोचरा ॥

[453]

स्वगोचरायां वृत्तावप्येतदेव हि कारणम् ।
स्वस्य वा स्यात्स्वतादात्म्यालम्बनस्यापि वा भवेत् ॥

(अनुवर्तते)

[419 - 420]

Therefore, according to Jñānaghanapāda *sākṣin* is different from both *jīva* and God. The author of the *Tattvaśuddhi*, viz. Jñānaghanapāda establishes the status of *sākṣin* for explaining the experience of happiness, etc. of the *jīva*. This is found in the sixth section of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Up.* under “tadyathā...” (4.3.18).

[421]

The term ‘*prājñā*’ (i) which is different from ‘*puruṣa*’ that refers to *jīva*, and (ii) which is used in the instrumental case, denotes the supreme Brahman.

[422]

Sākṣin is different from the *jīva*. It is the witness of the experience of the two states of *suṣupti* and *utkrānti*. This is spoken of in the remaining part of the text, “*sa vā eṣa...*” (*Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, 4. 13. 17)

[423]

It is erroneous to interpret *sākṣin* in the above text as referring to the ruler of *bhūta* and as having lordship. As the context is the exposition of *jñeya-brahman* (Brahman as that which is knowledge), the entire explanation of *sākṣin* is nothing but laudatory (*arthavāda*).

[424 - 425]

This explanation of the *sākṣin* is based on (i) the *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* (4. 3. 15-34) and (ii) the *adhikaraṇa* of *suṣupti-utkrānti* of the *Brahmasūtra* (1.3.42-43). Thus the author of the *Tattvaśuddhi*, viz. Jñānaghanapāda has these authorities for his view on *sākṣin*.

On the proof of God's Omniscience, Jñānaghanapāda differs from the view of Prakāṣārthakāra

[426]

Prakāṣārthakāra establishes the omniscience of God, only through the *vr̥ttis* which are verily full of *māyā*.

[427 - 429 ab]

Jñānaghanapāda holds the following view. With regard to the omniscience of God, in respect of the cognition of present objects, there is *pratyakṣa-māyā-vr̥tti*; in respect of past objects, there is *smṛti*; and with regard to objects in future, there is *anumiti*. Thus the *vr̥tti* of *māyā* in the above instances is nothing but an adjunct of *māyā*. Thus far, the basis of the two views remains the same. But, Jñānaghanapāda holds as follows, in addition to the above tenets.

[429 cd - 431 ab]

All perceptual cognition has for its object what exists at present. Similarly, to speak of the knowledge belonging to God, one must posit *māyā* as the adjunct. God has the immediate knowledge of present objects through *māyā*; but in respect of past and future objects, He has mediate knowledge through *māyā*. So He does not have immediate perception through *māyā* in respect of all objects.

[431 cd - 433]

The Vedānta texts, on the whole, have their purport in the non-dual Brahman alone; further, they conclude that the world, which is an appearance, is nothing but illusory. The above conclusion, it may be doubted, is contrary to the perception of pot, etc. and their existence, in the form of '*san-ghaṭah*' (the pot

is *sat*), etc. The author of *Tattvaśuddhi* (Jñānaghana-pāda) clarifies the doubt in the following way.

The Perception, 'san-ghaṭah', has Brahman alone as its object

[434 - 436 ab]

Neither pot nor its existence is the object of perception. But Brahman alone, which is pure *sat*, is the object of perception. Perception comprehends existence which is invariably present in pot, etc. as their locus alone. Consequently, even perception establishes only Brahman as '*sat*'.

[436 cd - 437]

It is said that the *indriya* (sense organ) is the basis of the apprehension of locus, through presenting the presence or absence of the thing, it is not so; for, the function of the sense organ terminates as it leads one to the locus. To explain: it is similar to the apprehension of *idam-anśa* (the knowledge of 'this') in the case of the illusory cognition, 'This is silver' in respect of a shell (*śukti*).

[438 - 441]

Therefore, perception is not contradictory to the conclusion, 'Brahman alone is *sat*'. "There is no contradiction to the reality of Brahman in all the three periods of time. In the same way, all objects are invariably related to the supreme Reality. Further, Reality is one only. Therefore the effect is nondifferent from its cause." — this is what Śrī Śaṅkara has said in his *Bhāṣya* on the *sūtra* "*sattvācca ..*" (BS. 2. 1. 16). So, I hold that this passage of Śrī Śaṅkara's *Bhāṣya* forms the source of the contention of Jñānaghana-pāda.

(to be continued)

NA MĀYĀ BHAGAVATPRAJÑĀ

by

Bhāṣyabhāṣajña V. R. Kalyāṇasundara Śaṣtrī

with

Māyā Is Not the Lord's Intelligence

(Translated by Dr. R. Balasubramanian)

VI. THE BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

by
The Bureau of Investigation
of the Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

तदेवं लक्षणप्रामाणाभ्यां सिद्धे मायावस्तुनि तत्स्वभावविचारणा तावत् प्रवर्त्यते । तथा हि — प्रकृतिर्हि नाम सच्चिदानन्दाद्वय-स्वप्रकाशात्मनिष्ठा सत्त्वरजस्तमोगुणानां साम्यावस्था इत्युक्तम् । सा चेयं सत्त्वस्य शुद्ध्यशुद्धिभ्यां मायेति अविद्येति च द्वेषा निगद्यते । तदुक्तं विद्यारण्यमुनिभिः —

चिदानन्दमयं ब्रह्म प्रतिबिम्बसमन्विता ।

तमोरजःसत्त्वगुणा प्रकृतिर्द्विविधा च सा ॥

सत्त्वशुद्ध्यशुद्धिभ्यां मायाऽविद्येति चोच्यते ।

इति ।

अज्ञानमावरणम् , आवरणञ्च माया

इति सर्वज्ञानमुनयः ॥

तत्र मायायां प्रतिबिम्बितं मायया अवच्छिन्नं वा चैतन्यं ईश्वर-शब्दव्यवहार्यम् । अविद्यायां प्रतिबिम्बितं अविद्यया अवच्छिन्नं वा चैतन्यं जीवशब्दव्यवहार्यम् । अयमेव च एकजीववादाभिमतो विभागः । नानाजीववादस्तु अविद्याकार्यान्तःकरणरूपाणां नाना-रूपाणाम् उपाधित्वाङ्गीकारात् उपपादनीयः । तत्रापि उपाधि-गतमेव नानात्वं चैतन्ये उपचर्यते, न स्वतो नानात्वम् । एत-देव अस्याः जीवेशाभासकारत्वं यत् तत् तादृशाखण्डचैतन्य-प्रतिबिम्बग्राहकत्वं तदवच्छेदकत्वं वा । एतन्मूल एव च जीवे-शयोः बिम्बप्रतिबिम्बवादः अवच्छेद्यावच्छेदकतावादश्च प्रवृत्तः । विवस्वदाकाशदृष्टान्ताभ्यां वादद्वयप्रवृत्तिः । तत्र उभयत्र यथा वैयासिकं सूत्रम् —

अत एव चोपमा सूर्यकादिवत्

इति ।

वृद्धिहासभावत्वम् अन्तर्भावात् , उभयसामञ्जस्यत् एवम्

इति च । पञ्चदश्यामण्युक्तम् —

मायाख्यायाः कामधेनोः वत्सौ जीवेश्वरौ उभौ ।

यथेच्छं पिबतां द्वैतं तत्त्वं तु अद्वैतमेव हि ॥

इति ॥

यतश्चेयं श्रुतौ

‘ते ध्यानयोगानुगता अपश्यन् देवात्मशक्तिं स्वगुणैर्निगूढाम् ।’

‘परास्य शक्तिः विविधैव श्रूयते स्वाभाविकी ज्ञानबलक्रिया च ।’

इति ब्रह्मणः परमात्मनः शक्तिरिति निर्दिश्यते, अतः असौ न स्वरूपेण केनापि कुत्रापि उपलब्धुं शक्यते । अतिमात्रविचित्रेणः अस्याः कार्यवर्गेणैव उपलभ्यमानेन परमनुमेया । न हि लोके वह्न्यादिनिष्ठा दाहकत्वादिशक्तिः दह्यमानेन तृणादिना विना तता पूर्वं केनापि वह्न्यादेः पृथगुपलब्धा दृश्यते । न चेयमसती, प्रतिभासमानत्वात् । नापि सती,

‘नेह नानास्ति किञ्चन’, ‘नेति नेति’

इत्यादिना श्रुतिजालेन विद्वदनुभवेन च सकार्यायाः एतस्याः बाध्यमानत्वात् । न्यायो ह्ययं सार्वलौकिकः यत् ‘असत् चेत् न प्रतीयेत, सत् चेत् न बाध्येत’ इति । न चापि सदसती, विरोधात्-सावयवत्वनिरवयवत्वादिभिरपि असौ एवं दुर्निरूपैव । तथा हि — नेयं सावयवा, दृश्यत्वापत्तेः । नापि निरवयवा, जगदनुपादनत्वापत्तेः । न चापि उभयात्मिका, विरोधादेव । तथा न चेयं ब्रह्मणः भिन्ना, तथा अनुपलब्धेः । नापि अभिन्ना, अनिवृत्तिप्रसङ्गात् । न च उभयरूपा, विरोधादेव । अतः निस्तत्त्वैव इयम् उपगन्तव्या । तत् ब्राह्मण्येव अस्यां भासमानापि सत्ता न स्वतः । तदेतत् सर्वमुक्तम् अभियुक्तैरपि —

निस्तत्त्वा कार्यगम्या अस्य शक्तिः मायाभिः शक्तिवत् ।

न हि शक्तिः क्वचित् कैश्चित् बुध्यते कार्यतः पुरा ॥

न सद् वस्तु सतः शक्तिः न हि बह्वेः स्वशक्तिता ।
सद्विलक्षणतायां तु शक्तेः किं तत्त्वमुच्यताम् ॥

इति । यतः असौ एवं न परमार्था, तत एव अस्य अद्वैतदर्शनस्य
औपनिषदस्य अनया कापि हानिरिति निःशङ्कैः भाव्यम् ॥

अत्राहुः विद्यारण्यगुरवः —

अत एव द्वितीयत्वं शून्यवत् न हि गण्यते ।
न लोके चैत्र-तच्छक्तयोः जीवितं लिख्यते पृथक् ॥
सर्वथा शक्तिमात्रस्य न पृथक् गणना क्वचित् ।
शक्तिकार्यं तु नैवारित द्वितीयं शङ्क्यते कथम् ॥
तुच्छाऽनिर्वचनीया च वास्तवी चेत्यसौ त्रिधा ।
ज्ञेया माया त्रिभिः बोधैः श्रौतयौक्तिकलौकिकैः ॥

इत्यादि ॥

सा चेयं मायाभिधाना पारमेश्वरी शक्तिः आवारिका विश्लेष्वी
चेति पुनः द्वेधा व्यवस्थिता सती, पूर्वं वस्तुतत्त्वम् आवारयन्ती,
तत्रैव तस्य वस्त्वन्तरात्मतां च विक्षिपतीति सुशिक्षणीयापि अशि-
क्षणीया वर्तते इति किं क्रियताम् ? तदुक्तं सङ्क्षेपशारीरके —

‘ अज्ञानम् आवरणविभ्रमशक्तियोगात् ’

इति.

‘ आच्छाद्य विक्षिपति संस्फुरदात्मतत्त्वम्
जीवेश्वरत्वजगदाकृतिभिः मृषैव ॥ ’

इति च । न चेयत्, पश्यत पञ्चदश्याम् अस्याः लीलोपवर्णनम् —

अस्य सत्त्वमसत्त्वं च जगतः दर्शयत्यसौ ।
साप्ररणात् च सङ्कोचात् यथा चित्रपटस्तथा ॥

अस्वतन्त्रा हि माया स्यात् अप्रतीतेः विना चितिम् ।
 स्वतन्त्रापि तथैव स्यात् असङ्गस्यान्यथाकृतेः ॥
 न कृत्स्नब्रह्मावृत्तिः सा शक्तिः किन्तु एकदेशभाक् ।
 घटशक्तिः यथा भूमौ स्निग्धमृद्येव वर्तते ॥

इति । सुरेश्वरैरप्युक्तम् —

अभूताभिनिवेशेन स्वात्मानं वञ्चयत्ययम् ।
 असत्यपि द्वितीयेऽर्थे सोमशर्मपिता यथा ॥
 अहो धाष्टर्यमविद्यायाः न कचिदतिवर्तते ।
 प्रमाणं वस्त्वनादृत्य परमार्थेव तिष्ठति ॥
 अभ्रयानं यथा मोहात् शशभृत्यध्यवस्यति ।
 सुखित्वादीन् धियो धर्मान् तद्वदात्मनि मन्यते ॥
 दग्धृत्वञ्च यथा वह्नेः अयसो मन्यते कुधीः ।
 चैतन्यं तद्वत् आत्मीयं मोहात् कर्तारि मन्यते ॥

इत्यादि । सांशत्वमपि ब्रह्मणः 'विरजं ब्रह्म निष्कलम्' इत्यादिना
 निष्कलत्वेन उक्तस्य श्रुतावेव उक्तमिति किमस्माभिः अतीन्द्रिये अर्थे
 करणीयमिति विद्याविद्ये एव तत्र शरणीकर्तव्ये ? सांशत्वोक्तिः यथा —

‘ पादोऽस्य विश्वा भूतानि त्रिपादस्यामृतं दिवि । ’
 ‘ स भूमिं विश्वतो वृत्वा अत्यतिष्ठत् दशाङ्गुलम् । ’

इत्यादि । स्मरत स्मृतिमपि —

यद्यत् विभूतिमत् सत्त्वं श्रीमदूर्जितमेव वा ।
 तत्तादेवावगच्छ त्वं मम तेजोऽसम्भवम् ॥

‘ विष्टभ्याहमिदं कृत्स्नम् एकांशेन स्थितो जगत् । ’

‘ ममैवांशो जीवलोके जीवभूतः सनातनः ॥ ’

इत्यादिकाम् । विष्टशत च वैयासिकमिदं सूत्रं ‘ विकारावर्ति च ’
इत्यादि ॥

न च इयता भेतव्यम् अद्वैतिभिः, यतः अस्य श्रुत्यादेः
तात्पर्यम् उद्घाटितं विद्यारण्यैरेव —

निरंशोऽप्यंशमारोप्य कृत्स्नेंशे वेति पृच्छतः ।

तद्भाषयोत्तरं ब्रूते श्रुतिः श्रोतृहितैषिणी ॥

चोद्यं वा परिहारो वा क्रियतां द्वैतभाषया ।

अद्वैतभाषया चोद्यं नास्ति नापि तदुत्तरम् ॥

स्वप्रकाशे कुतोऽविद्या तां विना कथमावृतिः ।

इत्यादितर्कजालानि स्वानुभूतिः प्रसत्यसौ ॥

स्वानुभूतौ अविश्वासे तर्कस्याप्यनवस्थितेः ।

कथं वा तार्किकम्मन्यः तत्त्वनिश्चयमाप्नुयात् ॥

विना क्षोदक्षमं मानं तैर्वृथा परिकल्प्यते ।

श्रुतियुक्तचनुभूतिभ्यः वदतां किं नु दुःशकम् ॥

...

...

दुर्घटैकविधायिन्यां मायायां का चमत्कृतिः ॥

चोद्येऽपि यदि चोद्यं स्यात् त्वच्चोद्ये चोद्यते मया ।

परिहार्यं यतश्चोद्यं न पुनः प्रतिचोद्यताम् ॥

विस्मयैकशरीरायाः मायायाः चोद्यरूपतः ।

अन्वेष्यः परिहारोऽस्याः बुद्धिमद्भिः प्रयत्नतः ॥

इत्यादि । स च अस्माभिः अद्वैतवादिभिरेव अन्विष्टः परिहार इति, न तत्रापि अपरैः असूयितव्यमिति आचार्याणां हृदयम् ॥

इयतापि अतृप्याः द्वैतिनः प्रति यदाहुः, तदपि इह अनुसन्धेय-
मिति किञ्चिन्द्द्यते —

मायात्वमेव निश्चेयमिति चेत् तर्हि निश्चिनु ।

...

न निरूपयतुं शक्या विस्पष्टं भासते च या ।

सा मायेतीन्द्रजालादौ लोकाः सम्प्रतिपेदिरे ॥

इति । तत् तादृग्भूतैव इयमपि तथैव अभ्युपेयापि न अभ्युप-
गम्यत इति अपारं मौख्यं द्वैतवादिनामिति आचार्याणां हृदयम् ॥

किञ्च 'त्वच्चोद्ये चोद्यते मया' इति यत् पूर्वमुक्तं, न तत्
वाचारम्भणमिति उपपादयन्तः तानेवं प्रतिचोदयन्ति —

देहेन्द्रियादयो भावाः वीर्येणोत्पादिताः कथम् ।

कथं वा तत्र चैतन्यम् इत्युक्ते ते किमुत्तरम् ॥

वीर्यस्यैव स्वभावश्चेत् कथं तत् विदितं त्वया ।

अन्वयव्यतिरेकौ यौ तौ भग्नौ बन्ध्यवीर्यतः ॥

न जानामि किमप्येतत् इत्यन्ते शरणं तव ।

अत एव महान्तोऽस्य प्रवदन्तीन्द्रजालताम् ॥

इति,

एतस्मात् किमिवेन्द्रजालमपरं यत् गर्भवासस्थितं

रेतश्चेतति हस्तमस्तकपदप्रोद्भूतनानाङ्कुरम् ।

पर्यायेण शिशुत्वयौवनजरावेषैरनेकैर्वृत-

म्पश्यत्यत्ति शृणोति जिघ्रति तथा गच्छत्यथागच्छति ॥

इति च ।

देहवत् वटधानादौ सुविचार्य विलोक्यताम् ।

क धानाः कुत्र वा वृक्षः तस्मात् मायेति निश्चिनु ॥

इति । तदयमत्र निर्गलितोऽर्थः । द्वैतदर्शनमेव स्वोपपादानाय अज्ञान भवतः शरणयति, न अद्वैतदर्शनमिति तत् तदेव त्वं शरणम-
न्विच्छेति ॥

तदयमत्र निर्गलितोऽर्थः —

निद्राशक्तिः यथा जोवे दुर्घटस्वप्नकारिणी ।

ब्रह्मणि एषा स्थिता माया सृष्टिस्थित्यन्तकारिणी ॥

इति । तदेतस्याः अनिवृत्तौ न जन्मशतेनापि वा कर्मशतेन वा दुःखप्रहाणमिति तन्निवृत्तौ यत्न आस्थेयः । तन्निवृत्तिश्च न शास्त्रा-
चार्योपदेशजन्यायाः श्रवणमनननिदिध्यासनप्रभवायाः विद्यायाः
अन्यतः सुसम्पादा । यतश्च श्रुतिरेव एवमाह —

‘ ज्ञात्वा देवं सर्वपाशापहानिः । ’

‘ तमेवं विदित्वा अतिमृत्युमेति । नान्यः पन्थाः विद्यते
अयनाय । ’

‘ स एनम् अविदितो न भुनक्ति । ’

यदा चर्मेवदाकाशं वेष्टयिष्यन्ति मानवाः ।

तदा शिवमविज्ञाय दुःखस्यान्तो भविष्यति ॥

इत्यादि । स्मृतिरपि —

‘ ज्ञात्वा मां शान्तिमृच्छति । ’ ‘ ततो मां तत्त्वतः ज्ञात्वा ’

इत्याद्या । विद्वद्वाक्यमपि —

मुक्तिस्तु ब्रह्मतत्त्वस्य ज्ञानादेव न चान्यथा ।

स्वप्रबोधं विना नैव स्वस्वप्नः हीयते यथा ॥

अज्ञात्वा शास्त्रहृदयं मूढो वक्त्यन्यथाऽन्यथा ।

मूर्खाणां निर्णयस्तु आस्तां अस्मत्सिद्धान्त उच्यते ॥

कामादेः वशमापन्नः सञ्चरन् विषयादिषु ।

अवशात् मोहमापन्नः जीवो ब्रह्मैव नापरः ॥

इति । रामरायकविभिरेवमुक्तम् —

नो वेदाध्ययनं न शास्त्रकलनं नो वा पुराणश्रुतिः

नो सङ्गीतमुखाः कला अपि नृणां शोकाब्धिसन्तारकम् ।

ब्रह्माहं मतिरेव केवलमियं वेदान्तजन्या ततः

वेदान्तश्रवणाय ना गुरुमयेत् स्कन्दं यथा नारदः ॥

इति ॥

सा चेयं द्विप्रकारा, विद्या परोक्षा च अपरोक्षा चेति । तत्र आद्या सृष्ट्याद्यवान्तरवाक्यविचारजन्या, द्वितीया तु तत्त्वमसीत्यादि-महावाक्यजन्या । तामिमाम् आत्मविद्यां गुरूपदेशतः सम्पाद्य, प्रणाश्य च तया महाविद्यां मायां स्वे महिम्नि प्रतिष्ठिता भवत यूयमिति एष आदेशः, एष उपदेशः, एषा वेदोपनिषत् । तदेवं वेदान्तविचारफलमपि उक्तं वेदितव्यम् ॥

किं शब्दात् परोक्षमेव ज्ञानं जायेत, उत अपरोक्षमपीत्यादि तु विचारान्तरत्वात् अनवसरत्वाच्च अत्र उदास्यते । अत्रैते सङ्-ग्रहश्लोकाः —

अस्ति ब्रह्मेति यत् ज्ञानं तत्परोक्षमिति स्मृतम् ।
 अहं ब्रह्मेति यत् ज्ञानं अपरोक्षमितीरितम् ॥
 तच्च अपरोक्षविज्ञानं वेदान्तादेव जायते ।
 तेन माया प्रणाश्येयं दुराधर्षा मुमुक्षुभिः ॥
 वैदिकं निखिलं कर्म अनुष्ठेयं चित्तशुद्धये ।
 काम्यवर्जं शमादिश्च साधनीयो विवेकिभिः ॥
 इत्ययं शस्त्रसिद्धान्तः सङ्गृहीतः यथामति ।
 यदि स्यात् उत्पथं किञ्चित् क्षन्तव्यं तत् बुधैरिह ॥
 आक्षेपाः सम्भवन्तोऽन्ये विवरीतुं न पारिताः ।
 समाधयस्तथा तेषां पुटसङ्ख्यानियन्त्राणात् ॥

तदेतस्यां परिस्थितौ,

मात्सर्यमुत्सार्य विचार्य तत्त्वम्
 आर्याः समर्यादमुदाहरन्तु ।
 द्वैतं किमासेव्यम् इहातिभीदम्
 अद्वैतमाहो नु अभयं प्रयत्नात् ॥

इति शम् ॥

Now, the inquiry into the nature of *māyā* is undertaken after establishing it through definition and authority. Thus, it has been said that *prakṛti*, indeed, is located in the self-luminous Self which is real, consciousness, bliss, and non-dual, and is in the state of equilibrium composed of the triple *guṇas* of *sattva*, *rajas*, and *tamas*. It is spoken in two ways as *māyā* and *avidyā* in respect of the pure and impure aspects of its *sattva-guṇa*. It has been stated by the sage Vidyāraṇya: “*Prakṛti* is that in which there is the reflection of Brahman, that is pure consciousness and bliss, and is composed of *sattva*, *rajas*, and *tamas*” (*Pañcadaśī*, I, 15). Sarvajñātman has stated that “ignorance is the veil (of consciousness) and *māyā* conceals consciousness” (*Saṅkṣepaśārīraka*, III, 108).

Here, the consciousness reflected in, or delimited by, *māyā* is referred to by the word “*īśvara*”. The consciousness reflected in, or delimited by, *avidyā* is referred to by the word “*jīva*”. This is the distinction accepted by those who advocate the theory of one *jīva*. But the theory of many *jīvas* is formulated by accepting the *upādhi* of manifold internal organs which are the products of *avidyā*. Here also, the plurality of the *upādhi* is figuratively applied to consciousness; but there is no plurality in consciousness *per se*. That which is the cause of the appearance of *jīva* and *īśvara* carries the reflection of the impartite consciousness or is that which delimits it. This is the source of the theory which speaks of *īśvara* and *jīva* as the original and the reflection respectively, or as that which is delimited and that which delimits. The two theories have been explained by the examples of the sun and the ether. In respect of these two theories there is the support of the *sūtras* of Vyāsa: “So, examples like the images of the sun, etc.

are also there (in respect of Brahman)" (BS. III, ii, 18) and "On account of Brahman being inside (its adjuncts), it appears to participate in their increase and decrease. On account of this similarity in the two cases (mentioned in *sūtra* 18) it is thus (*i.e.* the comparison is not defective)" (BS. III, ii, 20). It has also been stated in the *Pañcadaśī* (VI, 236): "*Māyā* is said to be the desire-fulfilling cow. *Jīva* and *īśvara* are its two calves. Drink as much as you like milk of duality. But the truth is non-duality alone." Since it has been stated in the *śruti* texts, "Those who followed after meditation and contemplation saw the self-power of the Divine hidden in its own qualities" and "His higher power is revealed to be various, indeed. The working of his intelligence and strength is inherent in him" (*Śvetāśvatara*, I, 3; VI, 8) that *māyā* is the power of Brahman-Ātman, no one by any means can comprehend its nature. It has to be inferred by knowing the variegated world of effects. Indeed, no one in the world is able to know the power of burning, etc., inherent in fire, etc. in the absence of grass, etc., which are burnt, by seeing earlier fire, etc., separately. This (*māyā*) is not non-real, because it is sublated along with its effects as evidenced by *śruti* texts such as "There is nothing whatsoever here", "Not this, not this," and also by the experience of the man of wisdom. There is the well-known principle, *viz.*, that which is non-real can never be seen and that which is real can never suffer sublation. Nor can it be both real and non-real because of contradiction. Its nature cannot be determined even as having parts or without parts, etc. Thus, it cannot be with parts, for in that case it must be open to perception. Nor can it be without parts, for in that case it cannot be the material cause of the world. It cannot also be

with and without parts because of contradiction. Therefore, it should be known that *māyā* has no existence (or reality) of its own. Its existence belongs to Brahman alone, and is not of its own. All this has been stated by the learned as follows: "This power (of Brahman), like the power of fire, has no existence of its own (independent of Brahman) and is inferred from its effect. Before the appearance of the effect, the power inherent in a thing is not (directly) known by anyone anywhere. The power of a substance is not the substance itself, as, for example, the power to burn is not the fire itself. If power is something other than Brahman, then define its nature" (*Pañcadaśī*, II, 47-48). Since it is not real, it should be understood without any doubt that *māyā* does not jeopardize the standpoint of Advaita of the *Upaniṣads*. In this connection the preceptor Vidyāraṇya says: "That is why *māyā* is not reckoned as a second entity like nothingness. In our daily life too, an able man and his ability are not considered two, but one." (*Pañcadaśī*, II, 51) "Here, power is considered to be independent of its substratum. Before creation, no effects of power existed. What, then, is the reason for assuming a second entity?" (II, 53) "*Māyā* is looked upon in three ways as non-real by scripture, as indescribable from the standpoint of reasoning, and as real by the common people." (VI, 130).

This power of the supreme Lord called *māyā* which is distinguished in two ways as concealment and projection, first of all conceals the reality and then projects something else therein alone. Thus, what are we to do with this *māyā* which remains incorrigible, though it deserves to be severely dealt with? It has

been said in the *Saiṅkṣepaśārīraka* (I, 20): “*Ajñāna* possesses the twofold power — concealment and delusion;” and also, “Having concealed the self-luminous Self, it projects *jīva*, *Īśvara*, and the world, which are illusory.” Not this much alone: see the description of its *līlā* in the *Pañcadaśī*: “*Māyā* shows the appearance and disappearance (in waking and sleep respectively) of the world, just as by unrolling and rolling a picture on a canvas it is manifested and withdrawn. *Māyā* is dependent, for in the absence of cognition the effects of *māyā* cannot be experienced. Again, it is independent too, for it can make the unattached Self appear to be attached.” (VI, 131-132) “This power does not exist in the whole Brahman, but only in a part of it. Earth’s power of producing pot is not seen in all earth, but only in a portion of it, *i.e.* in earth mixed with water” (II, 54). Suresvara too has stated as follows (*Naiṣkarmyasiddhi*, II, 51; III, 111; II, 101-102): “Even though there is no second entity, this (*jīva*) deceives itself by imagining what does not exist, like the father of Somasarman.” “Oh, no one is beyond the impudence of *avidyā*. Disregarding *pramāṇa* and the reality, it exists as if it were the supreme Self.” Just as the movement of clouds is superimposed on the moon due to delusion, even so the qualities of the intellect such as pleasure are thought of (as inherent) in the Self. Just as an ignorant man ascribes the burning nature of the fire to the (red-hot) iron, even so consciousness which belongs to the self is ascribed to the agent (*i.e.* the internal organ) due to delusion.” *Śruti* itself which says that Brahman is devoid of parts, *e.g.* “Brahman is without stain and without parts” (*Muṇḍaka*, II, ii, 10), also says that it has parts; if so, what is it we could do in respect of the reality which is beyond the scope of the sense organs

excepting to take refuge in the distinction between *vidyā* and *avidyā*. In the following *śruti* texts, Brahman has been described as having parts: "All mortal beings are only a fourth part of Him. The three other parts are immortal and in heaven;" "He encompasses the earth in all directions and transcends it beyond a span." (See *Puruṣasūkta*). Also remember the *śmṛti* texts such as the following: "Whatever being is glorious, prosperous, or strong, you know that to be a manifestation of a part of my splendour." (*BG*, X, 41). "Encompassing this entire world by a fragment of my power, do I abide eternally." (*BG*, X, 42) "An eternal part of myself alone has become the *jīva* in the world of living beings." (*BG*, XV, 7) Also, recall the *Vyāsa-sūtra* (IV, iv, 19): "And (there is a form of the supreme Lord) which is beyond all created things, because scripture declares (His) existence (in a twofold form)."

What has been stated so far should not frighten the Advaitins, for the purport of the *śruti* texts has been brought out by Vidyāraṇya himself in the following way: "*Śruti* the well-wisher of the questioner, being asked whether *māyā* pervades the whole or a part of Brahman, speaks of the partless as having parts in order to explain the non-dual nature of Brahman, by means of illustrations." (*Pañcadaśī*, II, 58) "Objections are raised and answered from the standpoint of duality. From the standpoint of non-duality, neither questions nor answers are possible." (II, 39) "The opponent may raise such questions as: 'How could there be ignorance in the self-luminous consciousness? And without it how could there be obscuration?' Such arguments are falsified by one's experience." (VI, 28) "If one disbelieves one's own experience, and since reasoning is

not final, how can one know the truth of anything by mere reasoning?" (VI, 29) "(Doubt:) The logicians have assumed the truth of this theory without any proof. (Reply:) We assume it on the ground of *śruti*, experience and reasoning: then, why should it be improper?" (VI, 56) "It makes the impossible look possible. How astonishingly powerful *māyā* is!" (VI, 134) "By raising objections to the mystery of *māyā* we do not solve the mystery. Further we can also raise serious counter objections. We should remove *māyā* (by inquiry). Further arguments are useless." (VI, 138) "*Māyā* is an embodiment of wonder and doubt. The way of removing it must be found with effort by the wise." (VI, 139) On the ground that the way of removing it has been found only by the Advaitins, others should not be jealous of them: this is the central idea which is sought to be conveyed by the Preceptor.

Dissatisfied even with this, the Dvaitins ask the Advaitins the following questions. Since these have to be considered, they are restated as follows: "If it be said that the illusoriness of *māyā* has to be established, then, try to do that. Even though it clearly appears, it cannot be established. The common people understand it to be *māyā* as in the case of magic, etc." (VI, 140-41) As in the case of magic, here also it has to be accepted. However, the Dvaitins do not accept this. That the obstinacy of the Dvaitins is insurmountable, is the point which the Preceptor seeks to convey.

Further, what was stated earlier, *viz.*, "We can also raise counter objections," should not be taken as a mere assertion. We, therefore, ask them the following questions: "Tell us, if you can, how the body and

the senses come out of the semen, or how consciousness comes out of the foetus. What is your answer to these questions? (The opponent's answer:) It is the nature of the semen to evolve into the body with the sense organs and so forth. (Question:) How do you say this? You will perhaps say that the logic of *anvaya-vyatireka* provides the answer. But it is not confirmed because in a barren women semen produces nothing. In the end you will have to say, 'I don't know.' So the wise declare this world to be like a magic show. What can be more magical than the fact that the semen in the uterus becomes a conscious individual, that it develops head, hands, feet and other organs, that it passes through the states of childhood, youth, and old age, and that it perceives, eats, smells, hears, comes, and goes? Like the human body, carefully consider also a tiny fig seed. How different the tree is, from the seed from which it grows! So know all this to be *māyā*." (VI, 144-148) This is the idea that becomes explicit. It is only the Dvaita view that has to surrender itself to your *ajñāna* for its elucidation, but not the Advaita view. So you have to take refuge in it.

Here, what is obvious is this: "Just as in the sleeping state the power inherent in the *jīva* gives rise to impossible dreams, even so the power of *māyā* inherent in Brahman projects, maintains, and destroys the universe." (XIII, 86) So long as it is not removed, there can be no cessation of suffering through hundreds of lives or through hundreds of rituals; for its removal, one should endeavour. And its removal cannot be attained through anything other than knowledge, which can arise only through the discipline of *śravaṇa-manana-nididhyāsana* following the study of scripture and the instruction of the teacher. The

reason for this is that *śruti* itself declares as follows: "Knowing the luminous Being, there takes place the destruction of the entire bondage." (*Śvet.* I, 11) "Knowing that alone, one overcomes death. There is no other way for this." (*Śvet.* III, 8) "It, being unknown, does not protect him." (*Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, I, iv, 15). When people could roll the sky, as they do a skin-mat, then there will be the termination of suffering without knowing Śiva." (*Śvet.* VI, 20) Also, there are *smṛti* texts such as "Knowing me one attains peace," (*BG*, V, 29) "Then, knowing me in reality" (*Ibid.* XVIII, 55) and so on.

There is also the utterance of the wise in support of this: "Liberation, however, can be obtained through the knowledge of reality and not otherwise. Dreaming does not end unless the dreamer awakes." (*Pañcadaśī*, VI, 210) "Not knowing the purport of scripture, the stupid one says different things. Let the stupid man hold any view he likes. This is indeed our (Advaita) standpoint." (VI, 275) One who is under the control of lust, etc., is engrossed in the sensuous objects; and having no control over himself, he is under delusion. The *jīva* is no other than Brahman. Rāmarāyakavi has said this: "Neither the study of *Veda*, nor that of scripture, nor the hearing of the *purāṇa*, nor the proficiency in arts such as music, can help human beings to cross the ocean of suffering, but only the knowledge that 'I am Brahman,' produced by the *Vedānta* texts (can help). So let the human beings approach the teacher for the hearing of the *Vedānta* texts, in the same way as Nārada approached Skanda."

This knowledge is of two kinds — mediate and immediate. Of these two, the first one is produced by

the enquiry into the subsidiary *Vedānta* texts which deal with creation, etc. But the second one is produced by the principal texts such as "That thou art". After acquiring the knowledge of the Self through the instruction of the teacher, and after destroying the primal *avidyā-māyā* through that knowledge, you remain established in your greatness (*i.e.* the greatness of Self): this is the command; this is the instruction; this is the teaching of the *Upaniṣad*, the concluding part of the *Veda*. Thus, one should understand also the fruit of the enquiry into the *Vedānta* texts which has been elucidated.

Since the question whether mediate or immediate knowledge arises from verbal testimony will take us to a different enquiry, and since it does not fall within the scope of this study, it is not taken up for consideration. In this connection, the following verses epitomize the position.

The knowledge that "Brahman exists" is known as mediate. But the knowledge "I am Brahman" is called immediate. And this immediate knowledge arises only from the *Vedānta* texts. This unassailable *māyā* has to be destroyed through this immediate knowledge by the seekers after liberation. The entire *karma* enjoined in the *Veda* should be practised for getting the purification of the mind. Desire-prompted *karmas* should be given up and control of the mind, etc., should be practised by the discerning persons. According to my understanding, I have summarised the final teaching of scripture. If there is any mistake, it may be pardoned by the learned. Though there are many other objections, it is not possible to elabo-

rate them or to answer them here because of the restriction of space.

This being the case, let the noble-minded people, adhering to propriety and enquiring into the truth, after great care declare without malice -- whether duality which produces fear or whether non-duality which gives fearlessness should be accepted.

ŚRĪ ŚAṄKARA ON NEGATION

Impossible to be negated, the Self is left over on the authority of the *Śruti*, 'Not this, not this.' So, the Self becomes clearly known on the reflection, 'I am not this, I am not this.'

The consciousness of egoism (*i.e.*, the mistaken identity of the Self with the body etc.) has its origin in the intellect and has for its object what is based on words only. As its very nature and origin are both negated (by the *Śruti*, 'Not this, not this'), egoism can never again be regarded as founded on any evidence.

A following knowledge does not arise without negating the previous one (*e.g.*, the knowledge of the rope does not come without destroying that of the snake in a rope-snake). Pure Consciousness, the Self, only has an independent existence and is never negated as It is the result of evidences.

One attains one's own innermost Self by crossing the forest of this body infested with ferocious beasts of grief, delusion, etc., like the man of the country of Gāndhāra who crossed the forest and reached his own country.

From the *Upadeśasāhasri* (Part II, Chapter II)

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संसाराध्वनि तापभानुकिरणप्रोद्भूतदाहव्यथा-

खिन्नानां जलकाङ्क्षया मरुभुवि भ्रान्त्या परिभ्राम्यताम् ।

अत्यासन्नसुधाम्बुधिं सुखकरं ब्रह्माद्वयं दर्शय-

त्येषा शङ्करभारती विजयते निर्वाणसन्दायिनी ॥

*samsārādhvani tāpabhānukiraṇaprodhūtadāhavyathā-
khinnānām jalakāṅkṣayā marubhuvi bhrāntyā
paribhrāmyatām
atyāsannasudhāmbudhiṁ sukhakaram brahmādvayam
darśayaty-
eṣā śaṅkarabhārati vijayate nirvāṇasandāyini.*

To those who are afflicted, in the way of the world, by the burning pain given rise to by the scorching sun-shafts of misery, and who through delusion wander about in the desert (of worldliness) seeking water — showing the felicitous ocean of nectar, which is very near, the non-dual *Brahman*, this — the Voice of Śaṅkara — is victorious, leading, as it does, to liberation.