


The VOICE of ŚĀṆKARĀ

śāṅkara-bhāratī

Volume FOURTEEN

Numbers ONE-TWO



May-Aug.

1989

esā śaṅkara-bhāratī vijagate
nirvāṇa-sandāyini

victorious is the voice of śaṅkara,
leading, as it does, to liberation

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V. R. Kalyanasundara Sastri

Editor
N. C. Krishnan

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HOMAGE TO ŚAÑKARA

[134]

योगप्रदायक जवान्ततमस्करिभ्यो
भोगप्रदाथ गृहिणामविरक्तिभाजाम् ।
कालस्मयापह विपापजनेड्यपाद
श्रीशङ्करार्य मम देहि पदावलम्बम् ॥

*yogaṣṭradāyaka javānntatamaskaribhyo
bhogaṣṭradātha gṛhiṇāmaviraktibhājām
kālasmayāpaha vipāpajaneḍyapāda
śrīśaṅkarārya mama dehi padāvalambam.*

Oh Ācārya Śrī Śaṅkara! You are yielding *yoga* to the ascetics quickly, as they bow unto you. Moreover, you are yielding *bhoga* (material pleasure) to the householders who have not gained dispassion. You have vanquished the pride of Yama (Kāla). People who are sinless prostrate at your pair of holy feet. Oh Śrī Śaṅkara! may you give me shelter under your lotus feet.

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छिन्नेऽपि शस्त्रनिचयैर्बहुधा शरीरे
 खेदं न कञ्चिदपि याति यथा मनो मे ।
 तद्वत्स्थिरां कुरु मतिं सुखचित्स्वरूपे
 श्रीशङ्करार्य मम देहि पदावलम्बम् ॥

*chinne'pi śastranicayaīrbahudhā śarīre
 khedaṁ na kañcidapi yāti yathā mano me
 tadvat sthirām kuru matim sukhacitsvarūpe
 śrīśaṅkarārya mama dehi padāvalambam.*

Oh Śrī Śaṅkara! may you kindly shower your grace on me so that my mind becomes rid of any trace of agony even though my body is cut into many pieces by a group of surgical instruments. Similarly let my thought be ever intent on the supreme Reality of the form of bliss and knowledge. Oh Śrī Śaṅkara! may you give me shelter under your lotus feet.

Jagadguru Śrī Saccidānanda Śivābhinava Nṛsimhabhāratī
 in *Śrīśaṅkarāryapadāvalambastava*

WHAT IS TRUTH?*

Jagadguru Śrī Candrasekharendra Sarasvatī

It is rather difficult for a majority of the public to understand the full implications of the Advaitic Truth that the world is a lie, a *māyā*, an illusion. Condemning such a statement, they begin to argue: "This world is very much a reality, tangible and verifiable by all our five senses. We enjoy or suffer according to our actions, good or bad. We see this law everywhere functioning, and only according to this law are we able to perform any task and reap the fruit. Why then call this world a falsity, *māyā*, illusion?"

Such a criticism has arisen out of a misunderstanding of the teachings of our Śrī Ādi Śaṅkara Bhagavatpāda, who only asserted that the phenomenal world is an illusion. He had never stated that it is *asat*, non-existent, unreal. This explanation is more disturbing to the lay public, making confusion worse confounded: for they exclaim: "How can this world be a lie and still not *asat*?"

* Courtesy: *Deyvattin Kural*, I, pp. 49-74 and II, pp. 81-101. Translated by ARGUS.

This bewilderment can only be solved when we understand that there are three distinctions made by Śrī Śaṅkara with regard to metaphysical deliberations about truth. These are: *satya*, *asatya* and falsehood. As regards the first, *satya* or truth, the great Ācārya affirmed that there is only the One, the ever-existing, Ātman. It can be thought of also as Brahman, which alone is the changeless, eternal, omniscient and omnipresent. But we see the world ever in a flux, changing in an endless tide of ebb and flow. Not only the things in the world but our minds too are ever-changing, flitting from one thought to another, like the monkey's leap from branch to branch. Then how can the Ācārya give the definition of *satya* (truth) to these fleeting changes? Nor would he define it as *satya* which would then mean that the world is non-existing. It is very much there, perceptible to our five senses. As the world is neither *satya*, meaning eternal truth, nor *asatya* or non-existent, the great Ācārya defined it as "*mīthyā*", a neutral ground of illusion, a phenomenal appearance.

Ācārya Śaṅkara conceived of three kinds of truth and that which did not belong to the three he dismissed it as *asatya*. The three are: (i) *pāramārthika-satya*, (ii) *vyāvahārika-satya*, and (iii) *prātibhāsika-satya*. Naturally *asatya* lies outside these three categories of truth.

Of these, the *pāramārthika-satya* alone is the non-dual Brahmic state of bliss. The *vyāvahārika-satya* refers to the everyday life of activity in the world. It is in this sense that worldly life is relatively true. When we mistake the tin foil shining in sunlight as silver. we call it *prātibhāsika-satya*. It is not true; so are our dreams. Other than these kinds of truth is *asatya*,

which does not exist like the horse's horns or the son of a barren woman.

When enlightenment dawns, both the *vyāvahārika-staya* and *prātibhāsika-satya* turn out to be false, even as the mistaken belief of a snake is known to be only a rope seen in twilight. Only the *paramārtha-satya* is eternally true, which the Lord Śaṅkara insists in all his writings and this is known as Advaita. It signifies there is "no other", no two, but only the Brahman, infinite, eternal, beginningless and endless, beyond time and space.

Utility of Philosophy

The question may be asked: Of what avail is this concept of Advaita in daily life? Every one in the world is trying to avoid hunger, poverty, distress, disgrace, disease, ill-will and conflict. But is there anyone who is void of these sufferings? If one kind of pain is removed by one's effort, another follows. But any amount of effort by man does not assure him of continued happiness. Yet everyone is trying to seek constantly some happiness or the other. By struggle and endeavour, one may obtain some kind of temporary peace, even as by taking medicine one is relieved of illness for the time being. But is not prevention better than cure? The great Ācārya affirms that Advaita alone can assure one of permanent peace and happiness, completely cured of all kinds of suffering.

Advaita teaches one to trace the source of suffering and once the source is removed, happiness results. It is the body that endures all pain and suffering. As our scriptures declare, the soul or *Ātman* passes physically through childhood, youth and old age, enduring

all the vicissitudes of life; but it is only the body that is affected by pleasure and pain, which are transient as they come and go. The soul remains apart unaffected. But man can reach a stage where any kind of suffering or joy does not affect him at all, when he treats both of them alike, which means that he is firm and wise, fit for immortality. It is only the finite body, that is the source of suffering, but the Ātman which uses the body is imperishable, infinite, and eternal. It is unborn, ancient, sempiternal; and it is not slain with the slaying of the body, as the *Bhagavad Gītā* puts it.

If the body is the victim of suffering, whence the body, it may be asked. It is the offspring of our sins destined to suffer for its lapses in the past. The cause of sin is our bad actions, and the source of the latter lies in desire. So, we come back to the root cause of all our suffering, which is *kāma* or desire. So the basic question is: how to kill out desire? Vedānta, which stands as the crest of all the *Vedas*, shows us the way to remove desire. Let us remember that desire, hatred, anger and envy arise only on those things or persons which are outside of us. We do not desire or hate ourselves. As desire is born of something other than us, is it possible to make that other section also part of ourselves? Then whence comes desire? If only we can bring everything in the world as part and parcel of us, there will be no other and therefore no more desire at all. Without desire, there is no bad action, and without the latter there is no sin whatsoever. Without sin, there is no body, and hence no suffering or sorrow. We have for several years tried to avoid sorrow and suffering with ever so many devices, but in vain. But now we have seen desire, born of the other, has built

our body, this tabernacle, and now this knowledge gives us the way out of suffering. And we find out that only when we realise there is no 'Other,' no 'Two', but the only One, the Eternal Brahman and that is we ourselves, there will be no more sorrow or suffering. And this conviction of "No Two" is called Advaita. which our great Ācārya taught us, several centuries ago. As there is nothing outside of us, there will be no fear, no desire, no hatred, no mental confusion, no sorrow. As the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* points out:

"*Dvītyadvai bhayam bhavati.*"

द्वितीयाद्वै भयम् भवति ।

Prapañca, a Dream

But still a doubt lingers in the mind: When there are so many millions of people in the world, how can you say there is no Two? And how can you make it that there is no Two? The answer is that what all we see and perceive with our senses are only phenomenal appearance, a lie; since everything in the world is only the form of Īsvara, says the Vedānta, either what we see is true or Vedāntic philosophy is true. Both cannot be true at the same time. If the former is true, there should be no suffering or sorrow. But we are all the victims of pain, illness, distress and disease. On the other hand, those sages who have taken to the Vedāntic philosophy, being full of compassion and peace, with no idea of the Other, have no sorrow or suffering and live happily. They live free from hate, desire, anxiety, lust or hunger and are happy without sin or fear, possessing nothing. Obviously, one should be convinced of the Vedāntic truth that all this — whatsoever is in the universes — is only the form of Īsvara. Advaita affirms that there is the only One, without the other; and whatever is perceived by the senses as

being varied and different is a falsity and that the underlying source of the many appearances is the One Truth. This Truth is called Brahman or *Ātman*, in the Advaitic philosophy.

If everything is *Īsvara*, are we different? No, we have to merge or dissolve ourselves in the *Īsvara*. Then there will be no two, when we cannot see differently but see all as the One, which alone is true sight or the inner sight when fleshy eyes are rendered blind to all illusion. Daily everyone is sleeping and waking up in the morning. During sleep we dream. The two stages of waking and dreaming are called *jāgrat* and *svapna*; and then there is a third stage of dreamless sleep, called *susupti*. While awake we are active and we sleep to take rest and refresh ourselves for the next day's work. Why then should we dream, is a natural question that arises. The Lord of the universe, *Īsvara* is pervading everywhere. That this *Ātma-svarūpa* is the Advaitic Brahman is proved by the fact of our dreams. For on waking, all the forms one has seen in dreams become unreal; so should be all the appearances we see while in the wakeful stage become unreal to the enlightened man. For the 'Many' is an illusion, and the One alone is the *paramārtha-satya*. The great *Ācārya* has taught us the means and ways by which we can wake ourselves up from the dream of this *prapañca* or the world. On waking up, which is Enlightenment, the *Ācārya* puts it beautifully in the first verse of the *Dakṣiṇāmurti-stotra* as:

यस्साक्षात्कुरुते प्रबोधसमये स्वात्मानमेव अद्वयं

“*yas-sākṣātkurute prabodhasamaye svātmānameva*

advayam”

meaning "To him who beholds, when awake, his own very Self as the secondless."

Beyond Speech and Mind

Seeing the 'Many' is *dvaitam*; and we see it as such in our dreams, and also in our waketul life. When we wake up from this state, it is the enlightened state of Advaita. It is not enough if we know this philosophy intellectually, but it has to be made practical, even as we know the city of Benares in the map is not sufficient. We have to take the ticket to Benares, travel in the train and reaching Benares bathe in the river Ganges. This experience alone is needed about the Advaita too. It is a stage where neither speech nor mind can reach, as the Vedic verse puts it:

यतो वाचो निवर्तन्ते अप्राप्य मनसा सह ।

"*yato vaco nivartante, aprāpya manasā saha*"

(*Taittirīya Upaniṣad*).

If the mind cannot reach this state, how then can one understand it? What is the meaning of this Upaniṣadic verse? What is the significance of the fact that the *advaita-satya* cannot be grasped by the mind? If the Paramātman can be thought of by the mind and therefore can be caught within the gambit of our understanding, then it becomes the Other, an object, a thing of mental activity. Here then is a duality of subject and object which is wrong; for obviously, there is only the One, without another. In the state of faultless vision, there is neither subject nor object. The seeker and the sought are one. A verse in the *Kenopaniṣad* stresses the truth that that which the mind thinks not and that by which the mind is thought is to be known as Brahman —

यन्मनसा न मनुते येनाहुर्मनो मतम् (I.6)

“*yan-manasā na manute, yenāhur-mano matam.*”

Continuing, the Upaniṣad says:

यस्यामतं तस्य मतं मतं यस्य न वेद सः। (II.3)

“*yasyāmatam tasya matam, matam yasya na veda saḥ*”

which means: “The Brahman is unknown to the discernment of those who discern of It; by those who seek not to discern of It, It is discerned.” What is not discernible signifies that It is not discerned as something apart from It. You do not bring another lamp to see a lamp. Likewise, Brahma-jñāna is self-effulgent. Wisdom itself is Brahman. All the scriptures affirm the identity of *jñāna* (wisdom) with Brahman, “*prajñānam brahma.*” This is reiterated in such Tamil sacred writings as the *Tēvāram*, the *Tiruvācakam*, the songs of Thāyumanavar, etc. by such statements as the Knower, the Known and Knowledge are all one. The *jīvātman* and Brahman are merged into One, like the dewdrop slipping into the shining sea.

All that is seen in dreams is a lie. That which sees it all is the truth. The seer himself has come as all the objects in the dream. Once the dream is over, what remains is the seer. Can the seer of dreams be seen? As both the seer and the dreams are one and not different, it cannot be thought of or expressed in words. Hence the Advaitic truth is stated to be beyond speech and thought.

Finally, we have come to the conclusion that Truth is One and all is Īśvara. The many things in the world appear as different due to *māyā* and our effort is to see them all as the One, including ourselves, as we have to merge into the One. The means for that

effort are the study of Śruti (the *Vedas*), Smṛti (*Dharmaśāstra*), and the *Purāṇas*, and such activities as temple-going, offering *pūjā*, philanthropic deeds and performing our *svadharma*. As we make many sacrifices to achieve our ends, nothing is too big a sacrifice to attain that permanent bliss, namely, the Advaitic state. King Janaka was prepared to give not only his kingdom but himself as well to the sage, Yājñavalkya, states a verse (IV, iv. 23) in the *Bṛhadāranyaka Upaniṣad* to know the truth -

विदेहान् ददामि मां चापि सह दास्यायेति । (IV.iv.23)

“*videhān dadāmi mām cāpi saha dāsyāyeti.*”

Aham Brahmāsmi

That Jīvātman and Paramātman are one is the assertion of Śrī Ādi Śaṅkara Bhagavatpada. That is to say, in simple words, ‘I am God’. But this is the same assertion made by the demon Hiraṇyakaśipu, who was destroyed by the Lord Viṣṇu appearing in the Avatāra of Narasiṃha (man-lion). Is the great Ācārya’s statement then identical with the demon’s version? No; for, when the demon made that statement, he meant that he alone is God, and there is none greater than him in the universe and that all should worship him. It was born of *ahaṅkāra*, arrogance and egotism.

On the other hand, Śrī Śaṅkara affirmed that there is nothing else but Īsvara in the universe and, therefore, we too are that Īsvara. When the *jīvātman* dissolves his egotism and identifies himself with the one Brahman, there is no individual ego; for the salt doll has merged into the sea. We appear to be a bubble in the waves; but where is the bubble or the wave, if not

all are merged in the one ocean? Even as the water in the ocean, transforming into clouds and falling as rain, fills the rivers, streams, wells and ponds, the one Brahman appears as so many millions of persons, animals and plants — each of them with its own degree of perception and power. Even as the H₂O is one and the same in all containers, so is the one Brahman shining in all creatures. This is the Advaita teaching of Śrī Śaṅkara Bhagavatpāda, quite different from the dogmatic assertion of the demon.

The same doctrine is given out by many of the Siddhas of whom the Tamil saint Tirumūlar is one. In simple terms that even a layman, not necessarily a philosopher, can grasp, he observes in a verse,

மரத்தை மறைத்தது மாமதயானை
 மரத்தில் மறைந்தது மாமதயானை
 பரத்தை மறைத்தது பார்முதற்பூதம்
 பரத்தில் மறைந்தது பார்முதற்பூதம்.*

A child looking at a wooden doll sees only the elephant, but the wise man sees only the wood and not the elephant. Likewise is the ignorant man, like the child, sees only the world and not the Īsvara pervading everywhere, but the wise man sees only the Brahman and not the world. He sees the One and not the Many, which is the cream of Advaita.

To those who do not fully grasp the significance of the Mahāvākyas, “*aham brahmāsmi*,” “*śivo’ham*,” etc. two kinds of answers are given by the Advaitins. According to the first, called the “*pratibimbavāda*” the example of the sun appearing as million images in every drop of water scattered in the ground or in run-

* For detailed commentary see *Voice of Śaṅkara*, Vol. VI, no. 4, pp. 316-18.

ing streams or ponds is cited. "Behold, how like the moon reflected in the tranquil waters, Īsvara is reflected by the small and the great, and is mirrored even in the tiniest atoms," says a verse. It is the one *caitanya* or Intelligence or Consciousness pervading throughout the universe in all creatures, varying only in its degree according to the capacity of the vessels, whether it be a spoon, a cask, a barrel, a pond, a stream or the sea.

The second kind of proof put forward by the Advaitins is called "*avaccheda-vāda*". According to this, the example of ether is given. The whole universe is pervaded by the *mahākāśa* (great ether) and each pot contains within it the small *ākāśa* (*ghaṭākāśa*). But when the pot is broken, the *ākāśa* within it is merged with the *mahākāśa*. Likewise is our little mind called *jīvātman*. But the *jīvas* are all part and parcel of the One Paramātman, the Brahman.

Advaita and Atomic Science

As stated earlier, it is only when there is the 'Other', fear, attachment, grief, hatred and anger arise; and the Advaitic philosophy of One alone helps man to get rid of them and be in unalloyed bliss with the Brahman. Salvation or Mokṣa is not to be attained after the death of the body, but it is here and now, once identification with the Absolute Brahman is realised. It is gratifying to note that what the ancient sages have insisted about the deceptive, illusory appearances of the 'Many' and the truth of the non-dual Reality, the Advaitic philosophy, is now clearly corroborated by the modern scientists. In the first decade of this century scientists were talking about the existence of more than a hundred elements, constituting the basis

of the physical world; but ever since the discovery of the atom with its proton, electron and neutron the tune is changed. Everything in the world, from minerals, plants, animals and man, is made up of atoms and nothing else. Furthermore, Einstein has proved that even matter from its smallest base, atom, is nothing else but energy, that the whole universe is nothing else than a whirlgig of energy, which is mathematically proved by his famous formula, $E = mc^2$. In short, there is no matter as such except the *śakti* or energy, which is the Advaitic truth. The scientists affirm that what we see as matter is only an illusion and the reality is only a vibration of energy, a Natarāja dance, pervading the universe everywhere. In short, Brahman (which they describe as energy or *śakti*) alone is the truth, the *pāramārthika-satya*, and what is seen in the world is nothing else than *vyāvahārika-satya*. Everything is relative and the absolute Truth is the One Reality, with its dual aspects in the conditioned world.

NATIONAL INTEGRATION AND BLISSFUL LIFE*

Jagadguru Śrī Jayendra Sarasvatī

1. *National Integration*

All of us speak of national integration in a secular way in these days. Śrī Śaṅkara Bhagavatpāda made his advent in this world as a true symbol of national integration. He was born in Kālaḍi (in Kerala) at the southern part of India; he met his teacher, Govinda Bhagavatpāda on the banks of the river Narmadā in central India; he went to Badarī Nārāyaṇakṣetra on the Himalayas and, renovated the temple of the Lord there; and he also went to Nepal and propagated the modes of divine worship there. Even now we come across the same modes of divine worship prevalent in Nepal as are found in South India. One can discern from this that Indian culture (or rather Hindu civilization) has been intact from very ancient times, even though there are a variety of languages, traditions and cultures found in different parts of India. Therefore

*Courtesy : *Amudamoli*, Śrī Ram Trust Publication, Madras-1, 1987, pp. 120-21 and 126-27. Free rendering by V. K. S. N. Raghavan.

we have to think of Śrī Ādi Śaṅkara as a beacon of Light with regard to national integration/universal solidarity.

As regards the schools of philosophy, we come across people discussing about one God or the other as superior or inferior. Śrī Śaṅkara felt that the divinities were but the different images of one and the same Brahman. "Brahman is supreme and one without a second; it permeates everyone and everything" — expatiating thus, Śrī Śaṅkara established the universal Vedāntic truth of Advaita, *viz.* the non-dual Brahman. He has thus coordinated the different modes of worship of innumerable Gods and Goddesses. One can find the means for national integration even in his Advaitic viewpoint of one and only eternal Self, *i.e.* Brahman.

Śrī Śaṅkara being an *avatāra-puruṣa*, has made yeoman service to our land, nay, to the whole world at large, by kindling the knowledge of the unique Brahman through his inimitable works and his choicest disciples. The powerful light (in the form of his works) that he has bequeathed to us shines brilliantly even now and is ready to remove all kinds of ignorance that is inherent in us. We should utilise such a lustrous light and make our life purposeful and luminous. Indeed, the philosophic thought of Śrī Śaṅkara, *viz.* Advaita, belongs to the whole world. Therefore, everyone of us must read his teachings, and follow his precepts. In this way we can ward off illusions, light up the lamp of wisdom in our mind, and live a life of calmness, comfort and unalloyed bliss.

2. *Blissful Life*

Everyone in this world wishes to lead a life of happiness, *i.e.* free from any trace of misery, free from any kind of painful experience. Not this much alone; everyone wants to enjoy permanent bliss, rather unalloyed eternal *ānanda*. Thus one thinks that it is one's birthright to experience supreme bliss incessantly without any kind of sorrow.

There is a self within every one of us; it controls, sustains and motivates our body. This self is, by nature, blissful. But this inherent trait of self, *viz.*, bliss, gets engulfed in a dense layer of darkness/ignorance. As we lead our life, we keep on doing innumerable jobs. Yet, we are experiencing untold misery throughout our life. Perhaps, we try to seek some small iota of pleasure once in a way.

As darkness vanishes, the resultant effects thereof, *i.e.* the difficulties also, come to an end. But to remove darkness light is needed. As one lights a lamp, darkness gets removed. Only the supreme Lord (Sarvesvara) is capable of showering His grace of light that removes the darkness/ignorance abiding in us. But we are bound in the whirlpool of *samsāra* in the form of darkness. The supreme Lord alone can relieve us from the peril of *samsāra*. As the great Tamil poet, Kambar puts it — “The supreme Lord has, indeed, immeasurable sport (*līlā*) which is His inseparable glory. Through his volition, He looks after the creation, sustenance and destruction of the whole universe.”

“உலகம் யாவையும் தாம் உளவாக்கலும்
நிலை பெறுத்தலும், நீக்கலும், நீங்கலா

அலகிலா விளையாட்டுடையார், அவர்
தலைவர் அன்னவர்க்கே சரண் நாங்களே.”

He is the supreme Being who is omniscient and omnipotent. Great sages and saintly devotees have realized Him through *ātma-sākṣātkāra* (self-realisation). With one-pointed devotion, they have completely dedicated themselves to the supreme Being. It has been their main aim to worship Him alone. Inasmuch as they kept on worshipping the Lord alone, (i) they gained the purpose of *ādhyātmika-sampat* or *āṇmikaccelvam* (spiritual sovereignty), and thus they got relieved of worldly miseries, and (ii) they experienced the supreme joy of life here itself.

ŚIVAPĀDĀDIKEŚĀNTAVARṆANASTOTRA
of Śrī Śaṅkara Bhagavatpāda

Translated by
Dr N. Gangadharan

(Contd. from Vol. XIII, No. 4)

संवीते शैलकन्यासुचरितपरिपाकायमाणे नितम्बे

नित्यं नर्नर्तुं चित्तं मम निखिलजगत्स्वामिनः सोममौलेः ॥

May my mind dance always on the hip (*nitamba*) of the Lord of the entire world having the (crescent) moon on the head. It (the hip) is bound by the auspicious golden waistlet encompassed by the rays of the numerous invaluable gems studded therein. It is covered by the Chinese silk cloth that eclipses the radiance of milk. It is like the strength of virtue of the daughter of the mountain (*Pārvatī*).

This verse describes the beauty of the hip of Lord Siva.

[21]

सन्ध्याकालानुरज्यद्दिनकरसरुचा कालधौतेन गाढं

व्यानद्धः स्निग्धमुग्धः सरसमुदरबन्धेन वीतोपमेन ।

उद्दीप्तैः स्वप्रकाशैरुपचितमहिमा मन्मथारेरुदारो

मध्यो मिथ्यार्थमध्यङ्मम दिशतु सदा सङ्गतिं मङ्गलानाम् ॥

May the glorious waist (*madhya*) of the foe of Manmatha which is likely to be conceived as an illusion, endow me with auspiciousness always. It (the waist) has the lustre of the red molten gold under the evening twilight. It is made of gold. It has been gracefully and densely bound by the strip of cloth tied on the belly. It is glossy and beautiful. It has its greatness enhanced by its own glowing lustre.

The word '*Manmatha*' denotes the God of Love as he agitates the minds of people.

[22]

नाभीचक्रालवालान्नवनवसुषमादोहदश्रीपरीताद्-

उद्गच्छन्ती पुरस्तादुदरपथमतिक्रम्य वक्षः प्रयान्ती ।

श्यामा कामागमार्थप्रकथनलिपिवद्भासते या निकामं

सा मा सोमार्धभौलेः सुखयतु सततं रोमवल्लीमतल्लो ॥

May the black circles of hair (*romavalli*), on the navel water-basin of the Lord Śiva, having the crescent moon on the head, make me always extremely happy. They grow upwards on the front side of the navel water-basin which abound with the wealth of manure of fresh lustre. After crossing the pathway of the belly they reach the chest. They shine as the letter denoting the purport of the science of love.

The expression 'lord having the crescent moon on the head' denotes Lord Śiva.

[23]

आश्लेषेष्वद्रिजायाः कठिनकुचतटोलिप्तकाश्मीरपङ्क-

व्यासङ्गादुद्यदकंच्युतिभिरुपचितस्पर्धमुद्दामहृद्यम् ।

दक्षारातेरुदूढप्रतिनवमणिमालावलीभासमानं

वक्षो विक्षोभिताघं सततनतिजुषां रक्षातादक्षतं नः ॥

May the beautiful chest of the foe of Dakṣa, that destroys the sin of those who always prostrate, guard us well. On account of the addition of the saffron paste from the hard breasts of the daughter of the mountain while embracing (the Lord), it appears to

compete with the lustre of the rising Sun. It is shining with the rows of the new jewel-necklaces worn on it.

The daughter of the mountain denotes Pārvatī, the consort of Lord Śiva. The foe of Dakṣa denotes Śiva.

[24]

वामाङ्गे विस्फुरन्त्या करतलविलसच्चारुरक्तोत्पलायाः
कान्ताया वामवक्षोरुहभरशिखरोन्मर्दनव्यग्रमेकम् ।
अन्यांस्त्रीनप्युदारान् वरपरशुमृगालङ्कृतानिन्दुमौले-
र्बाहूनाबद्धहेमाङ्गदमणिकटकानन्तरालोकयामः ॥

We see within (ourselves) one of the hands of Lord Śiva engaged in anointing the upper part of the left breast of His consort. She is gracefully adorning the left side (of the Lord) and holding the beautiful red lily in Her hand. (We) also (see) the other noble hands (of the Lord) adorned with the act of conferring, axe, deer, golden bracelets and jewelled bangles.

The word 'Indumaulī' denotes Lord Śiva as wearing the crescent moon on His head. This verse extols the hermaphrodite form of Lord Śiva and His consort.

[25]

सम्भ्रान्तायाः शिवायाः पतिविलयभिया सर्वलोकोपतापात्
संविग्नस्यापि विष्णोः सरभसमुभयोर्वारिणप्रेरणाभ्याम् ।
मध्ये त्रैशङ्कवीयामनुभवति दशां यत्र हालाहलोष्मा
सोऽयं सर्वापदां नः शमयतु निचयं नीलकण्ठस्य कण्ठः ॥

May the neck (*kaṅṭha*) of the Blue-necked (Lord Śiva) destroy the multitudes of all our misfortunes. The hot dreadful poison (*hālāhala*) in that neck experiences the state of Triśaṅku by being held up between the hasty expelling act of Śivā (Pārvatī, the consort of Śiva) being afraid that Her husband would die and the obstructing act of Lord Viṣṇu being afraid that the entire world would be burnt (if it is expelled).

When the milky ocean was churned by the *asuras* and *devas* for gaining nectar, there arose the dreadful poison *hālāhala*. Lord Śiva took it up and drank it. This verse adduces the reason why the poison is lodged in His neck.

Triśaṅku was an illustrious monarch of the Ikṣvāku race. He wanted to ascend to heaven with his mortal body. When all the sages refused to help him to achieve his goal, Viśvāmitra agreed to do him the favour. As a result of his rite Triśaṅku rose up to the heaven. But he was turned down to the earth. But Viśvāmitra arrested his downward move and carved out a place for him in the sky by his ascetic power.

[26]

हृद्यैरद्रीन्द्रकन्यामृदुदशनपदैर्मुद्रितो विद्रुमश्री-
 रुद्योतन्त्या नितान्तं धवलधवल्या मिश्रितो दन्तकान्त्या ।
 मुक्तामाणिक्यजालव्यतिकरसदृशा तेजसा भासमानः
 सद्योजातस्य दद्यादधरमणिरसौ सम्पदां सञ्चयं नः ॥

May this excellent lower lip (*adhara*) of Sadyojāta (Lord Śiva) bestow on us multitudes of fortunes. It bears the impression of the gentle bites of the lovely daughter of the Lord of the mountains. It has the

lustre of the corals. It is mixed with the brilliance of the extremely shining and white teeth. It shines with such a beauty resembling the association of pearls and rubies.

'Sadyojāta' is last among the five Brahman forms of Śiva, the others being Iśāna, Tatpuruṣa, Aghora and Vāmadeva. These had their origin in the Kalpas 29 to 33 namely, Śvetalohita, Rakta, Pītavāsas, Asita and Viśvarūpa. While Sadyojāta was of the colour of a *sphaṭika*, the other forms were white, red, yellow and black. These five forms represent the soul, *prakṛti*, *buddhi*, *ahaṅkāra* and *manas* (*Līngapurāna* I. 2, 16 and II. 14, 2 ff).

Adrīndra denotes Himavān. *Adrīndrakanyū* denotes Pārvatī.

[27]

कर्णालङ्कारनानामणिकररुचां सञ्चयैरञ्चितायां

वर्ष्यायां स्वर्णपद्मोदरपरिविलसत् कर्णिकासन्निभायाम् ।

पद्म्यां प्राणवायोः प्रणतजनहृदम्भोजवासस्य शम्भो-

नित्यं नश्चित्तमेतद्विरचयतु सुखेनासिकां नासिकायाम् ॥

May our minds always dwell happily on the nose (*nāsikā*) of Lord Śambhu (Śiva) dwelling in the heart-lotus of people making their obeisance to Him. It (the nose) appears handsome in the rays emanating from the multitudes of jewels on the ear-ornaments. It has the greatness to be lauded (by the poets). It resembles the lustrous pericarp inside the golden lotus. It is the pathway for the life-breath.

The word *Śambhu* meaning 'the conferer of auspiciousness' denotes Lord Śiva.

[28]

अत्यन्तं भासमाने रुचितरुचां सङ्गमात् सन्मणीना-
 मुद्यच्चण्डांशुधामप्रसरनिरसनस्पष्टदृष्टापदाने ।
 भूयास्तां भूतये नः करिवरजयिनः कर्णपाशावलम्बे
 भक्तालीभालसज्जज्जनिमरणलिपेः कुण्डले कुण्डले ते ॥

May the pair of ear-pendants of the destroyer of the mighty elephant be for our prosperity. They are extremely shining on account of their association with the lustrous jewels. They have their glory clearly perceived by dispelling the spreading rays of the rising sun. They are the circles encompassing the letters denoting the birth and death on the foreheads of lines of devotees.

Śiva is referred to as the destroyer of the mighty elephant, the demon Andhaka.

The shape of the pendants being circular they are conceived of as the mysterious circles having the potency to nullify the effects of 'Brahmalipi' or that has been written by Brahmā on the foreheads of people.

[29]

याभ्यां कालव्यवस्था भवति तनुमतां यो मुखं देवतानां
 येषामाहुः स्वरूपं जगति मुनिवरा देवतानां त्रयीं ताम् ।
 रुद्राणीवक्त्रपङ्केरुहसततविहारोत्सुकेन्दिन्दिरेभ्य-
 स्तेभ्यस्त्रिभ्यः प्रणामाञ्जलिमुपरचये त्रीक्षणस्येक्षणेभ्यः ॥

I make obeisance with my folded palms to the bees, namely, the three eyes of the three-eyed Lord,

interested in sporting on the lotus face of Rudrāṇī (Pārvatī) incessantly. The two periods of day and night for the beings are due to His two eyes (in the form of the Sun and the Moon). His third eye, namely, the fire, is said to form the face of the gods. These three (eyes) are described as the forms of gods by the foremost ascetics.

The word 'Rudrāṇī' denotes the consort of Rudra (Śiva). The third eye of the Lord is identified with Fire who is the conveyor of food for the gods.

[30]

वामं वामाङ्गगाया वदनसरसिजे व्यालगद्वल्लभायाः
 व्यानम्रेष्वन्यदन्यत् पुनरलिकभवं वीतनिःशेषरौक्ष्यम् ।
 भूयो भूयोऽपि मोदान्निपतदतिदयाशीतलं चूनत्राणे
 दक्षारेरोक्षणानां त्रयमपहरतादाशु तापत्रयं नः ॥

May the three eyes of the foe of Dakṣa — the left eye that rests on the lotus face of His consort Pārvatī seated on His left lap, the right eye that rests on those making obeisance to Him, and then the benign and cool third eye on the forehead that looks repeatedly at the God of love and which is now not at all cruel on account of rejoice — dispel quickly our three kinds of sufferings.

The word Dakṣāri denotes Lord Śiva as the foe of Dakṣa. The three kinds of sufferings are: *ādhyātmika* — sufferings relating to body; *ādhibhautika* — sufferings relating to the earth such as rain etc., and *ādhidaivika* — those due to the adverse influences of the planets, etc.

(to be continued)

AN INVOCATION TO THE NON-DUAL
BRAHMAN-ĀTMAN

नानागतमनैतिह्यं प्रत्यगेकमविक्रियम् ।
अनादेयमहेयं यन्नमस्तस्मै सदादृशे ॥

Salutation to Brahman, the eternal consciousness, which is present in the manifold things, which is not known, which is the innermost being, which is one and immutable, and which is neither to be secured nor avoided.

Sureśvara, the *Taittirīyopaniṣad-bhāṣya-vārttika*, II, 2.

THE FOUR INDISPENSABLE
QUALIFICATIONS

*(An extract from Sarva-vedānta-siddhānta-sāra-saṅgraha
of Śrī Śaṅkara Bhagavatpāda)*

Free rendering by
Dr V. K. S. N. Raghavan

(Contd. from Vol. XIII, No. 4)

[100 - 101]

स्मरणं दर्शनं स्त्रीणां गुणकर्मानुकीर्तनम् ।
 समीचीनत्वधीस्तासु प्रीतिः संभाषणं मिथः ॥

सहवासश्च संसर्गोऽष्टधा मैथुनं विदुः ।
 एतद्विलक्षणं ब्रह्मचर्यं चित्ताप्रसादकम् ॥

Brahmacarya (celibacy) contributes to serenity (peace) of mind. It consists in being thoroughly free from any type of contact with womenfolk. Contact with women is said to be eight-fold, *viz.* recollection, vision, praising women, considering them as enticing, love, conversation, companionship, and union.

[102 - 103]

अहिंसा वाङ्मनःकायैः प्राणिमात्राप्रपीडनम् ।
 स्वात्मवत्सर्वभूतेषु कायेन मनसा गिरा ॥

अनुकम्पा दया सैव प्रोक्ता वेदान्तवेदिभिः ।
 करणत्रितयेष्वेकरूपताऽवक्रता मता ॥

Ahimsā (Non-violence) consists in non-injury to any living being through one's speech, mind, and body. Those who are well-versed in Vedānta say that kindness to beings (*bhūtadayā*) consists in unbounded compassion towards all beings just as one would be truly sympathetic towards one's own self. Non-crookedness (*avakratā*) or straightforwardness is but the unity of thought, word and deed.

[104]

ब्रह्मादिस्थावरान्तेषु वैराग्यं विषयेष्वनु ।
यथैव काकविष्टायां वैराग्यं तद्धि निर्मलम् ॥

Nirmala-vairāgya (thorough dispassion) to sense-objects consists in one's being completely indifferent towards objects beginning from Brahmā (the Creator) and ending with grass, just as one would have no attachment to the faeces of a crow.

[105 - 106]

बाह्यमाभ्यन्तरं चेति द्विविधं शौचमुच्यते ।
मृज्जलाभ्यां कृतं शौचं बाह्यं शारीरकं स्मृतम् ॥
अज्ञानदूरीकरणं मानसं शौचमान्तरम् ।
अन्तःशौचे स्थिते सम्यग्बाह्यं नावश्यकं नृणाम् ॥

Sauca (purity) is twofold: external and internal. To cleanse the body, etc. with mud, water, etc. leads to physical or external purity. Internal purity consists in dispelling the darkness, ignorance (*avidyā*) of one's mind. It is not necessary for people to have external purity if they have a good internal purity.

[107 - 108 ab]

ध्यानपूजादिकं लोके द्रष्टर्येव करोति यः ।
पारमार्थिकधीहीनः स दम्भाचार उच्यते ॥
पुंसस्तथानाचरणमदम्भित्वं विदुर्बुधाः ।

If one performs meditation, worship, etc. without any knowledge of supreme Truth — just when someone else looks on, then that kind of activity is called *dambhācāra* (pseudo-orthodoxy). *Adambhitva* (to be free from deceit) consists in not following *dambhācāra* — thus the wise hold.

[108 cd - 109 ab]

यत्स्वेन दृष्टं सम्यक्च श्रुतं तस्यैव भाषणम् ॥
सत्यमित्युच्यते ब्रह्म सत्यमित्यभिभाषणम् ।

When one speaks about a thing, as it is, which is seen well by oneself, that is truth. As one realizes Brahman as Reality, that is truth.

[109 cd - 110 ab]

देहादिषु स्वकीयत्वदृढबुद्धिविसर्जनम् ॥
निर्ममत्वं स्मृतं येन कैवल्यं लभते बुधः ।

Nirmamatva (to be free from ego) consists in firm dissociation of the sense of 'mine' with regard to objects like one's body, etc. A wise man obtains *kaivalya* (freedom) from this *nirmamatva*.

[110 cd - 111 ab]

गुरुवेदान्तवचनैर्निश्चितार्थे दृढस्थितिः ॥
तदेकवृत्त्या तत्स्थैर्यं नैश्वल्यं न तु वर्ष्मणः ।

To have undisputed stand solely on the accepted truth as explained by the reputed preceptors with regard to Upaniṣadic passages constitutes firmness, and it is not the unchangeability with regard to body.

[111 cd - 112 ab]

विद्यैश्वर्यतपोरूपकुलवर्णाश्रमादिभिः ॥
संजाताहंकृतित्यागस्त्वभिमानविसर्जनम् ।

To sacrifice one's ego born of one's learning prosperity, penance, beauty, race, caste, stage of life, etc. constitutes the abandonment of pride.

[112 cd - 113 ab]

त्रिभिश्च करणैः सम्यग्धित्वा वैषयिकीं क्रियाम् ॥
स्वात्मैकचिन्तनं यत्तदीश्वरध्यानमीरितम् ।

It is said to be meditation on God when one contemplates on one's own self alone, after thoroughly setting aside all worldly activities through thought, word and deed.

[113 cd]

छायेव सर्वदा वासो ब्रह्मविद्धिः सह स्थितिः ॥

Good company consists in being ever in the company of *brahmavids* (those who have Self-realization).

[114]

यद्यदुक्तं ज्ञानशास्त्रे श्रवणादिक्रमेषु यः ।
निरतः कर्मधीहीनो ज्ञाननिष्ठः स एव हि ॥

He is said to be steadfast in the *jñānamarga* i.e. *jñānanisṭha* who invariably holds to the *śravaṇa* (Vedic study), etc. as explained in the scriptural texts of *jñāna* (knowledge) without any intention of resorting to *karmayoga*.

[115]

धनकान्तज्वरादीनां प्राप्तकाले सुखादिभिः ।
विकारहीनतैव स्यात् सुखदुःखसमानता ॥

The virtue of one's being free from vasillation even at the time of experiencing joy or sorrow due to wealth, consorts, fever, etc. is called *sukha-duḥkha-samānatā* (treating pleasure and pain on equal footing).

[116]

श्रेष्ठं पूज्यं विदित्वा मां मानयन्तु जना मुवि ।
इत्यासक्त्या विहीनत्वं मानानासक्तिरुच्यते ॥

Absence of self-glorification consists in (i) disregarding others' praise or censure about oneself, and (ii) not considering oneself as of repute based on one's birth, status or esteem.

[117]

सच्चिन्तनस्य सम्बाधो विघ्नोऽयं निर्जने ततः ।
स्थेयमित्येक एवास्ति चेत्सैवैकान्तशीलता ॥

Love of solitude consists in the decision to meditate on the supreme Lord in a secluded place, for it is not possible to have unalloyed contemplation of God in a crowded place.

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संसारबन्धनिर्मुक्तिः कदा झटिति मे भवेत् ।
इति या सुदृढा बुद्धिः ईरिता सा मुमुक्षुता ॥

One should try to accomplish thorough freedom from the worldly bondage. Such a firm feeling to free oneself from the clutches of bondage is itself the desire for *mokṣa*, i. e. *mumukṣutva*.

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ब्रह्मचर्यादिभिर्धर्मैः बुद्धेर्दोषनिवृत्ताये ।
दण्डनं दम इत्याहुः दमशब्दार्थकोविदाः ॥
तत्तद्वृत्तिनिरोधेन बाह्येन्द्रियविनिग्रहः ।
योगिनो दम इत्याहुः मनसः शान्तिसाधनम् ॥

The wise hold that *dama* or sense-control consists in the practice of *brahmacarya* (celibacy), etc. which eradicates the impurities of the intellect. The *yogins* consider *dama* as a means to the attainment of peace of mind, for it consists in the restraint of the external sense-organs from their respective *vṛttis* (modes).

(to be continued)

A NOTE ON "SĀDHANACATUṢṬAYA" IN
THE LIGHT OF SADĀNANDA'S
VEDĀNTASĀRA

*S. Ranganath**

The concept of liberation plays an important role in the system of Indian philosophy. There is a four-fold means for the concept of this liberation and they are:

नित्यानित्यवस्तुविवेकः, इहामुत्रार्थफलभीगविरागः,
शमादिषट्कसम्पत्तिः & मुमुक्षुत्वम् ।

Here, an attempt has been made to explain the four-fold means of liberation in the background of the *Vedāntasāra*** of Sadānanda.

1. नित्यानित्यवस्तुविवेकः (*Nityānityavastuvivekah*)

This is the first of the fourfold means for liberation. It is the power of discrimination between the permanent things and the transient things. The ques-

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tion which arises here is what is permanent and what is transient. Anticipating this question, Sadānanda defines it as:

नित्यानित्यवस्तुविवेकः तावत् ब्रह्मैव नित्यवस्तु, ततोऽन्यदखिल-
मनित्यमिति विवेचनम् ।

It means that Brahman alone is the permanent substance and all things other than it are transient. To substantiate that Brahman is *nitya*, there are many *śruti* and *smṛti* statements like

‘ न जायते म्रियते वा कदाचित् ’

Even the happiness which we derive from heaven is also impermanent; for, once our *punya* or merit gets exhausted, we will have to come back to this world again as the *Bhagavadgītā* puts it:

‘ क्षीणे पुण्ये मर्त्यलोकं विशन्ति । ’

The heavenly happiness may seem to be permanent from the point of view of earthly or this-worldly happiness, but from the point of view of Brahman which alone is permanent, even this heavenly happiness is transient. In the sentence, the word ‘*eva*’, used after ‘*brahma*’ viz., ब्रह्मैव नित्यवस्तु, stresses this point and this *nityānityavastuviveka* leads to the *vākya* ‘ब्रह्म सत्यं, जगन्मिथ्या’ which is one of the basic statements of Advaita Vedānta.

2. इहामुत्रार्थफलभोगविरागः (*Ihāmutrārthaphala-
bhogavirāgaḥ*)

This is the second means for the attainment of the ultimate happiness. The expression means total non-attachment from the fruit of this-worldly as well as the other-worldly action. This point is explained beautifully with an illustration by Sadānanda as follows:

ऐहिकानां स्रक्चन्दनवनितादिविषयभोगानां कर्मजन्यतया अनित्यत्वात्, आमुष्मिकाणामपि अमृतादिविषयभोगानाम् अनित्य-
तया, तेभ्यः नितरां विरतिः इहामुत्रार्थफलभोगविरागः ।

The objects of enjoyment pertaining to this world such as garland of flowers, sandal paste and sexual pleasures are temporary enjoyments as they are results of *karma* and as *karma* itself is temporary, they are also temporary. Similarly, the heavenly happiness such as nectar, etc. are also temporary. For, we can enjoy these things as long as the merits exist, and once they get exhausted, we will be deprived of that also. For the transient nature of this-worldly objects as well as the other-worldly objects, we have the sanction from the following statement of the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*:

‘तद्यथेह कर्मचितो लोकः क्षीयते, एवमेव अमुत्र पुण्यचितो लोकः क्षीयते ।’

“And as here on earth, whatever has been acquired by exertion perishes, so perishes whatever is acquired for the next world by sacrifices and other good actions performed on earth.” This renunciation or *virāga* has been enumerated as the second *sādhana* for without it the practice of the third one is not possible.

3. शमादिषट्कसंपत्तिः (*Śamādiṣaṭkasampattiḥ*)

The third *sādhana* consists in *śama* and five other essential traits. The word ‘*ādi*’ indicates: दम, उपरति, तितिक्षा समाधान and श्रद्धा ।

शमाद्यस्तु शम-दम-उपरति-तितिक्षा-समाधान-श्रद्धाख्याः ।
This is called शमादिषट्कसंपत्तिः. *Śama* is the restraining of the outgoing mental propensities. *Dama* is the restraint over the external sense organs; *uparati* is the withdrawing of the self. *Titikṣā* is forbearance.

Samādhāna is self-settledness. *Śraddhā* is faith. In this way Sadānanda defines all the six terms:

(i) शमस्तावत् श्रवणादिव्यतिरिक्तविषयेभ्यो मनसो निग्रहः ।

Sama is the curbing of the mind from all objects except hearing, etc. The term 'curbing' is to be understood as that particular *vṛtti* or function of the mind which keeps it in check, from the pursuit of worldly pleasures. The term '*śravaṇādi*' is to be taken in the sense of hearing of Scriptures, thinking of their meaning, meditating on it, etc.

(ii) *Dama* is the restraining of the external organs from all objects.

बाह्येन्द्रियाणां तद्व्यतिरिक्तविषयेभ्यो निवर्तनं दमः ।

The external organs are of two kinds such as those of action and of knowledge. The five organs of action are those of speaking, grasping, going, evacuating and generation. The five sense organs are those of hearing, touch, sight, taste and smell. Mind is the inner organ. The implicatory meaning of the word '*dama*' is that particular function of the mind which turns away the external organs from such objects as are other than hearing (study) of scripture, etc.

(iii) *Uparati* is that function of the mind which keeps the restrained organs from drifting back to the objects of the senses or it may mean *sannyāsa*.

निवर्तितानामेतेषां तद्व्यतिरिक्तविषयेभ्यः उपरमणमुपरतिः
अथवा विहितानां कर्मणां विधिना परित्यागः ।

(iv) *Titikṣā* is being unruffled by pleasure and pain arising from heat and cold which are all the inevitable associates of the body by meditating on the pure self which is also free from the dual thron:

‘शीतोष्णादि-द्वन्द्वसहिष्णुता तितिक्षा ।’

It is also defined as bearing all the afflictions without caring to redress them, being free from anxiety or lamentation which is forbearance:

सहनं सर्वदुःखानां अप्रतीकारपूर्वकम् ।

चिन्ताविलापरहितं, सा तितिक्षा निगद्यते ॥

(v) *Samādhāna* is the constant concentration of the mind restrained on hearing of the scriptural passages and virtues such as modesty, humility; or, it may also mean the service of the teacher, compiling of the Vedāntic books, their preservation, etc.:

निगृहीतस्य मनसः श्रवणादौ तदनुगुणविषये च समाधिः
समाधानम् ।

(vi) *Śraddhā* is the faith in the *Gītā*, the *Mahābhārata*, and other scriptures and scriptural practices being taught by the teacher:

गुरूपदिष्टवेदान्तवाक्येषु विश्वासः श्रद्धा ।

4. मुमुक्षुत्वम् (*Mumukṣutvam*)

The fourth and the ultimate means for salvation is *mumukṣutva* which is the earnest desire for *mokṣa*. It is the yearning for spiritual freedom. Even if one possesses the earlier three qualifications, and lacks the fourth, then also there is no use. Hence, the fourfold means of knowledge plays a vital role in the attainment of liberation.

ON THE CONCEPT OF THE KNOWLEDGE OF BRAHMAN

N. Veezhinathan

According to Advaita, the ultimate reality is the one immutably homogeneous, infinite, pure identity. It is of the nature of consciousness and bliss. *Māyā* or *avidyā* which is doubly evil as a disguising medium and as a distorting one conceals the true nature of reality by the former and reveals it as God, soul, and the world, by the latter. These three are thus only the seeming diversifications of the reality. Of these, God and soul are complex entities consisting of the sentient element of reality and the insentient element of *avidyā*, its products, and their characteristics. The true nature of God is the sentient element of consciousness which is referred to in the *Upaniṣads* as Brahman; the true nature of soul too is the sentient element of consciousness which is referred to in the *Upaniṣads* as Ātman. The world, on the other hand, is an illusory appearance of Brahman, just as shell-silver is only an appearance of the consciousness conditioned by the shell. Therefore no part of it is real. This is the distinction — an important one, between God and soul on the one hand, and the world, on the other, although the

three are only the seeming diversifications of the reality.

God is always aware of His identity with His essential nature, namely, Brahman and so He is ever-released. It is only the soul falsely identifying itself with mind, sense-organs, physical body and their qualities has lost sight of its identity with its essential nature, namely, Ātman and undergoes transmigration. It is in the failure to grasp this identity that the human tragedy has wholly consisted. The soul has to realize its essential nature, namely, Ātman as identical with the essential nature of God, namely, Brahman.

Śrī Śaṅkara in his commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra* (II.iii,30) says: "As long as the *jīva* (soul) is associated with the adjunct mind, so long only is the *jīva*, a *jīva*. In reality, however, there is nothing like *jīva*-hood apart from what is fancied to be such by reason of this adjunct."

He proceeds to point out: "This relation of reality with mind has but *avidyā* as its source, and this *avidyā* cannot be removed by anything other than the knowledge of self — that is, the identity of Ātman and Brahman. Hence this relation with such a limiting adjunct as the mind does not cease so long as the identity of *jīva* with Brahman is not realized."

Avidyā, therefore, is the source of all evil, and its removal would necessarily bring about the removal of the relation of mind to the so-called *jīva*. It would then manifest in its true nature of absolute bliss and consciousness. And this is liberation.

The concept of liberation thus has a vital bearing upon the removal of *avidyā*. *Avidyā* which is the

source of all superimpositions could be removed only by the direct knowledge of its content. Its content is the identity of Brahman and Ātman. Hence the direct knowledge of the identity of Brahman and Ātman would necessarily remove *avidyā*.

Śrī Śaṅkara in the preface to his commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra* states: "In order to achieve the direct knowledge of the identity of Ātman and Brahman, the Upaniṣadic texts are studied and their import is inquired into."³

We thus see that the formulation, by Śrī Śaṅkara, of Advaita in a systematic form and in alliance with the doctrine of *avidyā* has established the way of knowledge as the sole means to liberation. And in the passage cited above, Śrī Śaṅkara indicates that the *Upaniṣads* are the means to the knowledge that leads to liberation.

Karma cannot be the means to the removal of *avidyā*. It is because *karma*, in order that it may be achieved, depends upon *avidyā*. It is the soul having false identification with mind, sense-organs, physical body, etc., that performs *karma*. The false identification is due to *avidyā*. Thus *karma* fully depends upon *avidyā* to become significant. It is not, therefore, opposed to *avidyā* and hence could not remove it. Suresvara in his *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi* sums up this position thus:

"The fire in the form of right knowledge which arises from the Upaniṣads annihilates *avidyā* relating to the self. *Karma* does not remove *avidyā* because it is not opposed to it."⁴

It might be said that like *karma*, knowledge too depends upon *avidyā* for its rise. For, knowledge in order that it may arise in the case of an aspirant, requires the aspirant, a preceptor, and scriptural texts. This distinction is based on *avidyā* only. Hence knowledge of the self too, like *karma*, can be said to originate from *avidyā*; and, so it also is not efficacious in removing *avidyā*.⁵

Advaitins answer the above objection by saying that although both *karma* and knowledge are products of *avidyā*, yet there are vital differences which clearly distinguish the one from the other.

(1) Knowledge is always opposed to ignorance provided the content of the two is the same. Here knowledge of self and *avidyā* have identity of Brahman and Ātman as their content and so they are opposed to each other like the sun and darkness. This sort of opposition we do not find between *karma* and *avidyā*.⁶

(2) Moreover, knowledge depends upon *avidyā* for its rise only, and not for giving forth its fruit in the form of the removal of *avidyā*. *Karma*, on the other hand, depends upon *avidyā* not only for its rise but also in giving forth its fruits in the form of heaven, etc. The latter are significant only in the realm of *avidyā*.⁷

It is in view of these two vital differences between *karma* and knowledge, the former is not held to be removing *avidyā* while the latter is held to be so, although both are products of *avidyā*.

Śrī Vyāsātīrtha in his *Nyāyāmṛta* argues that, according to Advaita, *avidyā* and knowledge of the self are related to each other as cause and effect. It is be-

cause knowledge of self is only a modification of mind inspired by the reflection of pure self in it. Mind is an effect of *avidyā*. Hence modification of mind also should be treated as an effect of *avidyā*. Knowledge of self, being a modification of mind, is therefore an effect of *avidyā*. Being an effect of *avidyā*, knowledge of self cannot have any conflict with the latter. The result of the argument is that knowledge of self cannot remove *avidyā*.⁹

Śrī Madhusūdana Sarasvatī in his *Advaitasiddhi* rejects the above contention thus: *Avidyā* is known to be the material cause of knowledge of self too from the Upaniṣadic text, "Know *māyā* to be the primal cause."¹⁰ Here no affix is put before the expression 'primal cause' to qualify its meaning. Hence it is known that the word conveys the sense that *avidyā* is the primal cause of everything including the knowledge of self.¹⁰ Another Upaniṣadic text, "He who knows the self gets over the knot in the form of *avidyā*"¹¹ specifically states that the knowledge of self, the effect, removes *avidyā*, the cause. Although it is true that material cause and effect would not be opposed to each other, yet in the case of knowledge of self, the effect and *avidyā*, the cause, one must note that there is conflict between the two, on the authority of the Upaniṣadic text cited above.¹²

The objection that there could be no conflict between *avidyā* and the knowledge of self on the ground that they are related to each other as cause and effect is answered by Appayya Dīkṣita in the following way: in ordinary experience we find that knowledge removes ignorance if both refer to one and the same object.

From this we could derive a general rule that knowledge and ignorance would be opposed to each other if the two have the same content. In the present case knowledge and ignorance have identity of Ātman and Brahman as their content. Hence they are opposed to each other, although they are related to each other as cause and effect.¹⁸ It follows from the above that the knowledge of Brahman is the annihilating factor of *avidyā*.

Now the following questions arise as to the exact nature of the knowledge of Brahman:

(1) Is it *svarūpa-jñāna*, that is, the essential nature of Brahman or *vṛtti-jñāna*, that is, the modification of mind inspired by the reflection of Brahman? To either of the views there are difficulties. If the knowledge of Brahman were admitted to be *svarūpa-jñāna*, then since the latter is ever-existent, there will be the removal of *avidyā* always. This means there will be no transmigratory existence based on *avidyā* and as such there will be no need for the study of Vedānta with a view to put an end to transmigratory existence.¹⁹

If the knowledge of Brahman were admitted to be of the nature of a mental state, that is, modification of mind, then it might be asked whether it is real or non-real. If it were real, then its cause, namely, mind and *avidyā*, the cause of mind also must be held to be real. And being real, they cannot be removed at all.

If it were non-real, then it cannot remove *avidyā*. For, a non-real factor does not have any practical efficiency. If, however, the knowledge of Brahman which is non-real could remove *avidyā*, then even dream cognition which is non-real could remove ignorance.²⁰

(2) It might further be asked as to whether the knowledge of Brahman is determinate in character or indeterminate. It cannot be determinate in character; for, determinate knowledge in regard to Brahman cannot but be false. And, being false, it cannot remove *avidyā*. It cannot be free from all characteristics too; for, in ordinary experience, we find that only knowledge in the form "This is shell" removes ignorance relating to shell which has caused the illusion of silver. Here the knowledge 'This is shell' has shellness as its adjectival feature, and shell as its substantive feature; and as such it is determinate or *savikalpaka* or *saprakāra*. Never is it observed that a knowledge that is free from all characteristics removes *avidyā*.¹⁶

(3) What is the annihilating factor of the knowledge of Brahman? If it remains without being removed, then the non-dual nature of Brahman will be lost. If it is removed, then it is asked whether it gets removed by itself or through another factor. If it gets removed by itself, then we would be adopting the doctrine of momentariness advocated by the Buddhist schools. If it gets removed by some other factor, then, for the removal of that factor we must admit another; and so on, *ad infinitum*.¹⁷

(4) Is the knowledge of Brahman, mediate or immediate? It cannot be former; for, in that case it cannot remove *ajñāna* which is immediately known. It cannot be the later too; for, the *Upaniṣads* which, being sentences partake of the character of ordinary sentences, could give rise only to mediate knowledge. And mediate knowledge in respect of Brahman cannot but be false. It might be said that the *Upaniṣads* give rise to mediate knowledge of Brahman only, but

it becomes immediate through repeated meditation by mind. This, however, is wrong; for, in that case, the Upaniṣadic teaching that Brahman could be known only from the Upaniṣads will be contradicted.¹⁸ It follows from the above that the concept of the knowledge of Brahman does not stand to reason, and hence it cannot be held that it removes *avidyā*.

The objections raised against the concept of the knowledge of Brahman may be answered successively as follows:

(1) Knowledge of Brahman is not *svarūpa-jñāna*. Advaitins make a clear distinction between *svarūpa-jñāna* and *vṛtti-jñāna*. The former constitutes the essential nature of Brahman and hence eternal. The latter is only a mental state or the modification of mind and so non-eternal. It is only Brahman reflected in the mental state arising from the major texts of the *Upaniṣads*. Brahman which is pure consciousness or *svarūpa-jñāna* is not opposed to *avidyā*; it is its witness. And Brahman reflected in the mental state arising from the *Upaniṣads* is opposed to *avidyā*; and it is not its witness. Śrī Vidyāraṇya in his *Vārttikasūtra* explains the above view thus:

The rays of the sun normally illumine the grass; but they burn the very grass when they are reflected through a lense. In the same way, Brahman — the pure consciousness manifests *avidyā*; but when reflected in the mental state, it removes *avidyā*.¹⁹

Knowledge of Brahman is thus only the mental state inspired by the reflection of Brahman in it. It is not real; for in that case there would be two real enti-

ties, namely, Brahman which is knowledge and knowledge of Brahman. There would then result contradiction to the non-dual nature of reality. Knowledge of Brahman is non-real. It is argued that, being non-real, it cannot remove *avidyā*. This argument, however, is wrong. It is not an invariable rule that an object, if it should have practical efficiency, should be real. Reality is non-sublatability in the three divisions of time. What is required is that an object and practical efficiency in regard to it — these two must belong to the same level of reality. Knowledge of Brahman and practical efficiency in respect of it, namely, the removal of *avidyā* have the same level of reality, empirical reality.²⁰

Further, the *vṛtti*-element in the knowledge of Brahman is only a delimiting factor. It is, in the language of the Naiyāyika, an *anyathāsiddha* and hence is not admitted to be a cause. The limiting condition may be a non-real factor; but what is limited by it need not be non-real. In other words, reality of what is delimited by a limiting condition which is non-real would never be lost. The Naiyāyika admits that it is ether that comprehends sound. And the delimiting factor of ether is the outer part of the ear. The relation between the outer part of the ear and ether cannot be real; it is because ether is a partless entity. And the relation of the outer part of the ear would, therefore, pervade the entire ether. The result of the argument is that there would be auditory perception of sound always. This, however, is not the case. Hence it must be held that the relation between the outer part of the ear and ether is not real. It cannot be non-real or *anirvacanīya* according to the Nyāya school. It

is because the Nyāya school does not admit the concept of *anirvacanīyatā*. According to that school, if a particular factor is not real then it is unreal, that is, it is an absolute nothing. Hence the relation of the outer part of the ear and ether is an absolute nothing; and, although an absolute nothing it enables us to comprehend sound. For the Advaitins such a relation is non-real, or *anirvacanīya*; it is something different from being an absolute nothing. If an absolute nothing could be practically efficient according to the Nyāya school, then there is no valid reason to reject the contention that that which is different from an absolute nothing, namely, an *anirvacanīyapadārtha* or a non-real factor could be practically efficient.²¹

A younger contemporary of Śrī Śaṅkara derisively put it thus:

According to your desire, when an absolute nothing could give rise to some real result, why cannot an entity created by *avidyā* which is different from an absolute nothing produce some result possessing same level of reality? It is really strange to say that it cannot be so. Anyway you are highly qualified to assert so, while we are not competent.²²

It comes to this: Knowledge of Brahman, although non-real, could dispel *avidya*.

It has been argued that if knowledge which is non-real could dispel *avidyā*, then even dream-cognition which is non-real could remove some ignorance. This argument is wrong. Knowledge of Brahman is valid while dream cognition is not valid. And validity of knowledge consists in this that the content of that knowledge should be unsublatable. The content of the

knowledge of Brahman is Brahman which is unsublatable and hence it is valid. The content of the dream cognition is sublatale and hence it is not valid.²³ It comes to this: Knowledge in order to remove ignorance, need not be real; it should only be valid. Knowledge of Brahman which is a mental state satisfies this criterion, and hence it is held that it removes *avidyā*.

(2) It has further been argued that knowledge of Brahman could either be determinate or indeterminate in character. And difficulties have been suggested in the case of both the alternatives. Advaitins argue that a criterion for a knowledge to remove *ajñāna* is that knowledge must refer to the content of *ajñāna*. If the content of *ajñāna* is determinate in character, then what is required for the removal of that *ajñāna* is determinate valid knowledge. If the content of *ajñāna* is free from all characteristics, then what is required is valid knowledge which is *nirvikalpa*. Both these cases are covered by the criterion that valid knowledge in respect of the content of *ajñāna* removes *ajñāna*.²⁴

(3) To the question as to what is the annihilating factor of the knowledge of Brahman, Advaitins answer that knowledge of Brahman gets itself removed after removing *avidyā*. The destruction of the material cause would result in the destruction of the effect. In the language of Śrī Madhusūdana Sarasvatī the knowledge of Brahman in its aspect as a valid knowledge (*pramā*) removes *avidyā* and in its aspect as a known entity (*dr̥śyapadārtha*), it is removed.²⁵

(4) The question whether the knowledge of Brahman is mediate or immediate, and if it is immediate

what exactly is its instrument must be considered now. Vācaspatimisra is of the view that mind aided by meditation is the instrument of the direct knowledge of self. Amalānanda, the commentator of the *Bhāmatī*, argues that mind is well-known to be the instrument of the direct knowledge of the conditioned self in the form 'I'.²⁸ Hence mind must be considered to be the instrument of that direct knowledge of Brahman too. The Upaniṣadic text 'This self is subtle, that is, difficult to be perceived and is fit to be known only through mind'²⁹ states that mind is the instrument of the knowledge of Brahman. Vācaspati sums up his position thus:

The mind refined by meditation upon the import of the major texts of the Upaniṣads like '*tat tvam asi*' give rise to the direct knowledge of identity of the clarified senses of the term *tvam* with that of *tat*.³⁰

Prakāśātman, the author of the *Vivaraṇa* maintains the view that the major texts of the *Upaniṣads* are the instruments of the direct knowledge of Brahman. The *Chāndogya* text 'He (Śvetaketu) realized Brahman following the instruction of his father'³¹ and the text 'He has imparted knowledge of Brahman which is the substratum of *māyā*'³² speak of the attainment of knowledge of Brahman, immediately after the instruction by the preceptor. There is another text — 'They have well-ascertained the truth of Vedānta on the basis of the knowledge arising from the *Upaniṣads*.'³³ This text implies that after the rise of the knowledge from the Upaniṣadic text no other factor is required to confirm the truth learnt. This non-requirement of any other factor would hold good only when

it is admitted that immediate knowledge arises from the texts.

Prakāśātman argues³² that the above texts show that the *Upaniṣads* are the instruments of the direct knowledge of Brahman. He states further that the *Upaniṣads* not only show that the major texts are the instruments of the direct knowledge of Brahman but also deny that mind is the instrument of the knowledge of Brahman. The Upaniṣadic text 'The self is that which is not manifested by mind'³³ states that mind is not the instrument of the knowledge of Brahman.

It might be argued by the followers of the *Bhāmatī* school that in the above text the word 'mind' means mind that is associated with impediments, and the text means this much that the self is not manifested by the mind which is associated with impediments. The result of this interpretation is that the text cited above denies instrumentality of immature mind to the knowledge of Brahman and not of mature mind. Hence mind is the instrument of the knowledge of Brahman.³⁴

This position, however, is wrong. It is because in the complement of the above text 'by which mind is manifested,'³⁵ the word 'mind' stands for mind in general and not for 'mind' associated with impediments. For, it is not only the immature mind but mind in general that is manifested by Brahman. Hence in the earlier text³⁶ also the word 'mind' must be taken to stand for mind in general and the whole text would mean that 'Brahman is that which is not revealed by mind, but which manifests the mind.' Thus this Upaniṣadic text specifically denies the instrumentality of mind in respect of the knowledge of Brahman.

It might be said by the *Bhāmatī* school that the above consideration would precisely apply to the view that Upaniṣadic texts are the instruments to the knowledge of Brahman. The Upaniṣadic text 'Brahman is that which is not manifested words'²⁷ specifically denies instrumentality of verbal testimony in respect of the direct knowledge of Brahman. It cannot be said that the expression 'by words' in the text stands for words that are different from Upaniṣads and the whole text means that Brahman is manifested by words other than *Upaniṣads*. For in the complement of the above text 'by which words are manifested'²⁸ words in general including the *Upaniṣads* are said to be manifested by Brahman. Hence in order to have unity of sense, in the earlier part of the text too, the expression 'by words' must be taken in the sense of words in general. It comes to this that on the authority of the Upaniṣadic text cited above, we have to conclude that verbal testimony too is not the instrument of the direct knowledge of Brahman.²⁹

The *Vivaraṇa* school would say that, no doubt, the text cited by the *Bhāmatī* school denies instrumentality of verbal testimony in respect of the direct knowledge of Brahman. But it must be noted that it denies only this much, namely, that words primarily signify Brahman. It does not deny secondary signification of words in respect of Brahman. If it is said that the words of the *Upaniṣads* do not convey Brahman even through secondary signification, then the Upaniṣadic text 'I ask about Brahman which could be known only through *Upaniṣads*'³⁰ will be fully contradicted.

Moreover, to the *Bhāmatī* school, one may put the following dilemma: either Brahman is mediately

known or it is not. If it is not, then there is no question of meditation upon it with a view to attain its immediate knowledge. If it is, then it must be through the *Upaniṣads* only. And so it must be held even by the *Bhāmatī* school that the *Upaniṣads* convey Brahman and the text that 'Brahman is not conveyed by the *Upaniṣads*'⁴¹ must be understood in the sense that the *Upaniṣads* do not convey Brahman through primary signification and they convey Brahman through secondary signification. And the chief distinction between the *Vivaraṇa* and the *Bhāmatī* view as regards this is: according to the former, knowledge of Brahman which arises from the *Upaniṣads* is immediate, and according to the latter, it is mediate.

Hence if the *Bhāmatī* school interprets the text 'Brahman is that which is not manifested by words'⁴² literally to mean that Brahman is not conveyed by words either through primary signification or through secondary signification, then mediate knowledge of self would be impossible, and consequently there is no possibility of attaining immediate knowledge at all. Hence the *Bhāmatī* school has to interpret the text on the lines indicated by the *Vivaraṇa* school.⁴³

From the above discussion it follows that the major texts of the *Upaniṣads* give rise to the direct knowledge of Brahman and this view is in accordance with the teachings of the *Upaniṣads*.

It is now contended⁴⁴ that although the view that the *Upaniṣads* are the instruments of the direct knowledge of Brahman is not in consonance with the teaching of the *Upaniṣads*, yet it is not congruous to the very nature of verbal testimony. For verbal verbal testi-

mony being in the form of words must necessarily partake of the character of all verbal testimony and give rise only to mediate knowledge of an object.

The *Vivaraṇa* school holds¹³ that the question whether verbal statements give rise to mediate knowledge or immediate knowledge depends entirely upon the *prameya*. If the object is mediate, then a sentence would give rise to the mediate knowledge only. If it is immediate, it would give rise to immediate knowledge. Here Brahman, the unrelated absolute, is one without immediate self. Hence the major texts like *tat tvam asi* will definitely impart the immediate knowledge of it just as it is.

This leads us to the discussion regarding the definition of mediacy and immediacy of objects and knowledge of objects.

Nṛsiṃhāśrama in his *Vedāntatattvaviveka* defines immediacy of knowledge thus: immediacy of knowledge consists in having for its content an object that is immediate.¹⁴

Now this definition cannot be well understood unless we know the definition of the immediacy of an object. Immediacy of an object consists in the non-difference of the object from the consciousness conditioned by mind. In the *Vedāntaparibhāṣā*¹⁵ this definition is explicated thus: an object is immediate if it does not have any independent existence apart from the existence that constitutes the nature of consciousness conditioned by mind. To explain the above position a threefold classification of consciousness is advocated. Pure consciousness which is one when conditioned

by the object is known as *prameya-caitanya* or *viṣaya-caitanya*; and when conditioned by mind, it is *pramātrī-caitanya* or *jīva*.

In the case of the perception of an object (say) pot, when the sense of sight comes into contact with pot, mind, which is luminous, reaches the place of the pot and undergoes transformation into the form of pot. This modification is known as *vṛtti* or mental state.

Now immediacy of pot consists in the pot not possessing any independent reality apart from the reality of the consciousness conditioned by mind. It is thus: pot, etc., are superimposed upon the pure consciousness conditioned by pot, etc. The latter itself is the reality of pot, etc., because reality for the superimposed object over and above the reality of the substrate is not admitted. It comes to this that pot, etc., do not have any independent reality apart from the reality constituting the essential nature of the substratum, namely, the consciousness conditioned by pot, etc. Now when the sense of sight comes into contact with pot, mind also comes out through the sense of sight and assumes the form of pot. Here the limiting conditions, namely, the mind and pot are located in one and the same place. And so the consciousness conditioned by mind becomes non-different from the consciousness conditioned by pot. Thus since the consciousness conditioned by the pot is but the consciousness conditioned by mind — the latter is viewed to be the substratum of pot, etc. Hence the reality of consciousness conditioned by mind itself is the reality of pot. In other words, pot does not have any reality apart from the reality conditioned by mind. In the words

of Nṛsimhāśrama, pot is immediate as it is non-different from the consciousness conditioned by mind.

So far the immediacy of external objects. The factors like happiness, unhappiness, etc., which are modes of mind and which are therefore internal objects are always superimposed upon the consciousness conditioned by mind. And so their reality is only the reality that constitutes the essential nature of the consciousness conditioned by mind.

It follows that an object is immediate if it is identical with the consciousness conditioned by mind. We have already said that a cognition which has for its content an object which is immediate is immediate. In other words, immediacy of cognition is caused by immediacy of object. In the present case, Brahman is one with the consciousness conditioned by mind. It is the essential nature of the consciousness conditioned by mind. Hence it is immediate. When there arises a mental state in the form of Brahman which is immediate then the mental state or cognition which has Brahman — the immediate one — as its object, is also immediate. The mental state in the form Brahman arises from the major texts of the *Upaniṣads*. Hence the latter are considered to be the instruments of the direct knowledge of Brahman.

It must be noted here that the identity between the consciousness conditioned by mind and objects like pot, happiness, etc., is only a superimposed one. In the case of the identity between the consciousness conditioned by mind and Brahman, it is not a superimposed one; on the other hand, it constitutes the essential nature of the consciousness conditioned by mind.

To sum up:

1. Knowledge of Brahman is the sole means to liberation.
2. It is only the mental state inspired by the reflection of Brahman in it.
3. It is indeterminate in character.
4. It gets itself removed.
5. It is immediate.
6. And it arises from the major texts of the *Upaniṣads*.

NOTES

Abbreviations

<i>AS</i>	<i>Advaitasiddhi</i> with <i>Nyāyāmṛta</i> , 2 vols. (<i>Ṣaḍdarśanaprakāśanasthānam</i> , Varanasi, 1977).
<i>B</i>	<i>Bhāmatī</i> with <i>Kalpataru</i> and <i>Parimala</i> (Nirnaya Sagar Press, Bombay, 1917).
<i>Bṛh. Up.</i>	<i>Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad</i>
<i>BSB</i>	<i>Brahmasūtrabhāṣya</i> of Śrī Śaṅkara
<i>Chānd Up.</i>	<i>Chāndogyopaniṣad</i>
<i>K</i>	<i>Kalpataru</i> (See <i>B</i>)
<i>KU</i>	<i>Kenopaniṣad</i>
<i>LC</i>	<i>Laghucandrikā</i> published along with the <i>Advaitasiddhi</i> (Nirnaya Sagar Press, Bombay, 1917).
<i>Munḍ. Up.</i>	<i>Munḍakopaniṣad</i>
<i>Nmṛ</i>	<i>Nyāyāmṛta</i> (See <i>AS</i>)
<i>NS</i>	<i>Naiṣkarmyasiddhi</i> , Ed. by. M. Hiriyanna (Bombay Sanskrit and Prākṛit Series, No. XXXVIII, 1925)
<i>SLS</i>	<i>Siddhāntaleśasaṅgraha</i> (Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, Benares, 1916)

- SS* *San̄kṣepaśārīraka*, Ed. by N. Veezhinathan (Madras University Philosophical Series, No. 18, 1972).
- V* *Vivaraṇa (Pañcapādikā)* (Madras Government Oriental Series, Madras, Vol. CLV, 1958).
- VK* *Vedāntakalpalatikū* (The Princess of Wales Sarasvati Bhavana Texts, No. 3. Government Sanskrit Library, Benares 1920).
- VP* *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* (Sri Venkatesvara Steam Press, Bombay, 1950).
- VS* *Vārttikasāra* (Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, No. 205, Benares).
- VTV* *Vedāntatattvaviveka* (Oriental Research Institute Publications Sanskrit Series No. 96, 1955).

1. *BSB*, II, iii, 30.
2. *Ibid.*
3. *asyānarthahetoḥ prahāṇāya ātmaikatvavidyāpratipattaye sarve vedāntāḥ ārabhyante*, — *Adhyāsabhāṣya*.
4. *NS*, p. 9.
5. *Ibid.* pp. 23-24.
6. *Ibid.*
7. *Ibid.*
8. *Nmṛ*, p. 1288.
9. *Śvet. Up.*, IV, 10.
10. *nirupapadaprakṛtīpadāt kāryamātropādānatvam buddham*. *LC*, p. 886.
11. *Chānd. Up.*, VII, i, 3.
12. *AS*, p. 1288.
13. *SLS*, pp. 486-7.
14. *VK*, p. 29.
15. *Ibid.*
16. *Ibid.* p. 30.

17. *Ibid.* p. 32.
18. *Ibid.* p. 30.
19. *SLS*, p. 492; see *VS*, p. 296.
20. *SLS*, p. 359.
21. *VK*, pp. 50-51.
22. *SS*, II, 235.
23. *VK*, pp. 51-52.
24. *Ibid.* pp. 52-53.
25. *Ibid.* p. 62.
26. *K*, p. 56.
27. *Munḍ. Up.* III, i, 9.
28. *B*, p. 69.
29. *Chānd. Up.* VI, xvi, 3.
30. *Ibid.* VII, xxvi, 2.
31. *Munḍ. Up.* III, §ii, 6.
32. *V*, p. 403; *SLS*, pp. 456-7.
33. *KU*, I, 6.
34. *SLS*, p. 457.
35. *KU*, I, 6.
36. *Ibid.*
37. *Ibid.* I, 5.
38. *Ibid.*
39. *SLS*, p. 457.
40. *Bṛh. Up.* III, ix, 26.
41. *KU*, I, 5.
42. *Ibid.*
43. *SLS*, pp. 457-8.
44. *Ibid.* p. 458.
45. *V*, p. 403.
46. *VTV*, pp. 721-733.
47. *VP*, pp. 48-65.

THE ROLE OF SCRIPTURE AND REASON ACCORDING TO SUREŚVARA

R. Balasubramanian

Sures'vara emphatically declares that the saving knowledge can be obtained only through Scripture and not through other means of knowledge. He says: "Concerning the inmost Self, knowledge arises firmly from the text, 'Thou art that Being', which extinguishes all further enquiry. This knowledge cannot come from other sources of knowledge." Brahman is trans-empirical. Perception and other means of knowledge can convey the knowledge of empirical objects, but not that of the trans-empirical Brahman. Through perception we gain knowledge of the objects of the external world. Since Brahman-Ātman is the inner reality and not an object of the external world, it cannot be known through perception. Nor can it be known through inference. Since the Self is imperceptible, it is not possible to have the knowledge of the invariable relation (*vyāpti-jñāna*) between the Self and anything else; and in the absence of such a knowledge inference has to be ruled out.² Knowledge, as it is ordinarily understood, involves three factors, *viz.* the

the knower, the means of knowledge, and the object of knowledge (*pramātr-ḥ-pramāṇa-prameya-vyavahāra*), which relate to the objects of the external world. Consequently the inward Self does not fall within the scope of knowledge as other objects do. In the words of Suresvara: "As this entire mechanism of knowledge relates to the external world, however far we may examine, the ordinary modes of knowledge are only for gaining knowledge of external objects." Adducing several reasons to show why the Self cannot be known through perception and other means of knowledge, Suresvara sums up the position as follows: "As the Self is of the nature of eternal awareness, as it stands in need of no other proof, as it is without physical qualities like sound, as it is that about whose existence doubts can never arise, as it is the inmost Self, as it is an end to itself in itself, as it is not an object of knowledge, it is not cognized through ways of knowing like perception, by persons governed by worldly desires."

It should not be thought that Suresvara denies or underestimates the value of reason. He says in several places that reasoning must be made use of for discriminating the Self from the not-Self. To quote Suresvara: "A wise man, having determined the distinctive characteristics of the Self and the not-Self, must know through inference, as he knows fire through smoke, that all the factors up to the intellect are of the nature of the not-Self." There are different forms of reasoning like inference (*anumāna*), analogy (*upamāna*), argument based on *anvaya-vyatireka*, etc. Suresvara makes use of these forms of reasoning in his writings. Though reason is ancillary to Scripture, it is nevertheless important as it helps to clarify the issues raised

by Scripture and make the teaching of Scripture intelligible. In fact Scripture itself emphasizes the importance of reasoning as a valuable supplement to it. The *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, for instance, says: "The Self should be realized — should be heard of, reflected on, and meditated upon."⁷ *Śravaṇa* is guided study of Scripture through listening to the instructions from a teacher. *Manana*, which is to follow *śravaṇa* is reflection through reasoning on the teaching of Scripture. The *Taittirīya*, too, lays emphasis on the importance of rational reflection on the part of the spiritual aspirant after listening to the teacher. The teacher, for instance, instructs the disciple as follows: "If anyone knows Brahman as non-existing, he himself becomes non-existent. If anyone knows that Brahman exists, then the wise think of him as existing."⁸ After receiving this instruction from the teacher, the disciple, who is expected to be critical, asks questions with a view to clarifying certain difficulties involved in the teaching. Scripture refers to the questions raised by the disciple with the prefatory note, "Then, therefore, follow these questions."⁹ Commenting on this text, Suresvara says that "in the text *athāta* the questions of one who wishes to determine the final view will be stated."¹⁰ It may be stated here that reflection consists not only in the employment of arguments such as *anumāna*, *upamāna*, and *arthāpatti*, which will prove the thesis that the *jīva* in its essential nature is non-different from Brahman, but also in the use of arguments which will refute the standpoint of duality.¹¹ As a supplement to Scripture, reasoning will help the spiritual aspirant to ascertain whether the thesis of non-difference between the *jīva* and Brahman is tenable or not.

Reason, however, has its own limitations. For one thing, it can give us only mediate knowledge which has to be validated through some other knowledge as it lacks certitude. If this other knowledge is also mediate, we will require some other knowledge for its validation, and so on; and this will lead to infinite regress. Secondly, there cannot be any finality in respect of the findings of reason. What is reasonable when viewed from one point of view may be shown to be untenable from another point of view through the help of reason. Thirdly, reason gives us only relational knowledge involving subject-object, substance-attribute, cause-effect, and other distinctions. The Self which is inward and non-relational cannot be known through reason. Finally, reason may help us to discriminate the Self from the not-Self, but it cannot tell us what the Self is. It is only through Scripture that we can gain the knowledge of Brahman-Ātman. In the words of Suresvara: "To the inquirer who, after rejecting every phenomenon up to the vital breath as not-Self through the method of *anvaya-vyatireka*, asks, 'Who am I?' Scripture furnishes the answer, 'You are That.'"¹²

It is not enough to know what the not-Self is. The inquiry comes to an end only when the nature of the Self is known positively. The body, the senses, and the mind have all along been mistaken for the Self because of *avidyā*. As a result of discrimination, a person who undertakes the inquiry is able to realize that what he was seeing all along is not really the Self.¹³ It is quite probable that he entertains the doubt that he, too, has been eliminated, for he has not known the Self, and what was thought of as the Self has turned out to be the not-Self. Being accustomed to know

things through perception and other means of knowledge, he may endeavour to know the Self in the same way as he knows other things. Such an attempt is bound to result in disappointment. The Self which is trans-empirical cannot be known through the physical eye which is competent only in respect of empirical things. That is why Scripture declares that the Self is "not seen by the eyes,"¹⁴ and that "the Seer of the seeing cannot be seen."¹⁵ So, reason which plays a vital part in the initial stages by helping us to discriminate the Self from the not-Self must be followed by Scripture. While reason prepares the way, Scripture accomplishes the goal. The two are, therefore, related as what helps and what is helped. It only means that Scripture which is *the* source of the knowledge of Brahman-Ātman cannot be disregarded. Citing the case of the Buddhists who without accepting the authority of *śruti* depend on mere reason, Suresvara sounds a note of warning by saying that those who do not accept the authority of *śruti* in respect of the trans-empirical reality will not only fail to reach the goal, but will also run into the danger of accepting what is false.¹⁶

It is necessary at this stage to consider the validity of the Vedic testimony (*śruti*) as a source of knowledge. If there are reasons to show that the Vedic testimony cannot be accepted as a source of knowledge, we have to reject it. That which makes known what is otherwise unknown is a *pramāṇa*. In the words of Suresvara: "If a *pramāṇa* makes known an object, without being dependent on another *pramāṇa*, then that is truly a *pramāṇa*; there is no other definition of *pramāṇa*."¹⁷ Perception, inference, etc. are sources of knowledge in matters empirical.¹⁸ But in respect of

Brahman which is trans-empirical, the Vedic testimony is our only source of knowledge. Suresvara argues that the Vedic testimony will cease to be a source of knowledge (1) if what it conveys is otherwise known and is, therefore, not new, or (2) if what it says is opposed to the evidence of another *pramāṇa*, or (3) if what it says is doubtful, or (4) if it does not make known anything at all.¹⁹ Let us consider whether the validity of *śruti* as a source of knowledge can be questioned on any or all of the conditions stated above.

The first condition does not hold good. The knowledge of the non-dual Brahman conveyed by the *Vedānta* texts is otherwise unobtained. The trans-empirical reality does not fall within the scope of *pramāṇas* like perception. So the *Vedānta* texts which convey the knowledge of Brahman cannot be dismissed as restatements (*anuvāda*). A basic difference between a scriptural statement and the statement of a trustworthy person may be noted here. The information conveyed by the statement, "There are fruits on the bank of the river," uttered by a trustworthy person can also be known through perception. One who hears this statement can verify the truth of the statement by means of perception. The knowledge conveyed by a scriptural text like '*tat tvam asi*', however, cannot be confirmed by *pramāṇas*, like perception, for what is taught by the Upaniṣads does not fall within the scope of perception and other *pramāṇas*.²⁰ As Suresvara puts it, "On what grounds can *śruti*, which reveals the real Self, free from misery and inaccessible to other sources of knowledge, be judged as not being a source of knowledge?"²¹ It may be stated here that Suresvara, disagreeing with the

Niyogavādin who argues that *anuvādas* which restate what is already known do not have validity independently of injunctive text, maintains that even *anuvādas* have validity on their own.³³ Suresvara says: "As in the case of (assertive) *śruti* texts which have the power to convey (the knowledge of Brahman), the validity of *anuvādas*, too, cannot be snatched away by the crows (of Mīmāṃsakas), by connecting them with injunction."³⁴

We shall now consider the second condition. Is it the case that the evidence of *śruti* goes against that of perception and other *pramāṇas*? Critics of Advaita answer this question in the affirmative. They try to substantiate their view in several ways which deserve careful examination. While Scripture affirms the truth of non-duality, perception and other sources of knowledge lend support to the existence of a plurality of things which are different from one another. That we experience a world of diversity in our day-to-day experience, is a matter which does not require philosophical defence through dialectics. How can *śruti* be a valid source of knowledge when what it affirms is patently opposed to the unquestionable evidence of *pramāṇas* like perception? Further, while *śruti* declares that the Self is free from sorrow and suffering, perception testifies to the contrary. There is yet another point for consideration. Everyone from infancy onwards depends upon perception, but *śruti* is thought of only subsequent to perception. It means that perception comes first, and *śruti* comes later. If so, when the evidence of *śruti* comes into conflict with that of perception, either *śruti*, the critics urge, must be declared invalid or its meaning must be construed in accor-

dance with the evidence of perception. In other words, when the Vedic testimony is at variance with that of perception, it becomes weaker.

According to Suresvara, the basic assumption involved in the several points raised above is wrong. The argument as a whole proceeds on the assumption that there is conflict between *śruti* and other sources of knowledge. There is, however, no justification for this assumption. The scope of *śruti* is entirely different from that of perception and other sources of knowledge. It means that the nature of validity claimed for the Vedic testimony is different from that claimed for perception and other sources. Perception is a source of knowledge in empirical matters. It gives us a knowledge which accords with our experience of things. If the knowledge it gives does not stand the test of practical efficiency, if its evidence runs counter to our experience, then it has no validity at all. Perception has, therefore, only empirical validity (*vyāvahārika-prāmānya*). What is true of perception is also true of inference and other *pramāṇas*. The Vedic testimony, on the contrary, is the means of our knowledge of the ultimate reality. Its claim to validity centres round the trans-empirical. Just as perception does not have any validity in respect of the trans-empirical, even so *śruti* does not claim any empirical validity. There is thus a clear demarcation of the spheres of application and authority of *śruti* and perception. Consequently, the possibility of any conflict between them is ruled out. In the words of Suresvara: "A *pramāṇa* is that which makes known what is new. If it does not do this function, it ceases to be a *pramāṇa*. So no conflict is conceivable (between *śruti* and other sources of knowledge)

as they relate to mutually distinct spheres."¹¹ Suresvara drives home his point by an illustration. We perceive colour through the visual sense, and we hear sound through the auditory sense. Since the scope of each sense-organ is restricted to its own sphere, the validity of the one cannot be denied by means of the other. There is no discord at all between them. Generally speaking, to say that two *pramāṇas* are mutually contradictory is self-discrepant. The absurdity of the argument, "This is no sound, because I see colour through the visual sense,"¹² is so patent that it calls for no comment. So the testimony of *śruti* cannot be set aside on the ground that perception proves something else as there is no conflict between them.

Scripture, it was argued, is at variance with perception, because while the former affirms the truth of non-duality, the latter that of duality. Here again the argument proceeds on the untenable assumption that perception proves the existence of a plurality of things. Suresvara argues that perception does not reveal difference. Only if it is proved that we get the knowledge of difference or plurality through perception can we say that the evidence of perception goes against the teaching of *śruti*. Perception, according to Suresvara, can only reveal an object. It cannot distinguish one object from another.¹³ The visual sense, for example, can reveal a pot; but it cannot distinguish a pot from another object, say a table. The work of perception consists only in the manifestation of an object and not in revealing or proving the reality of difference. So long as the reality of difference is not proved, it is not possible to maintain that there is a plurality of things which are different from one another.

In order to show that the work of perception is no more than the manifestation of an object, let us consider the different possibilities regarding the function of perception. There are three possibilities here. One can argue that (1) perception reveals an object, or that (2) it reveals difference, or that (3) it manifests an object and also reveals difference. Of these, only the first alternative is tenable.

It cannot be said that perception reveals difference, that is to say, distinguishes or excludes one object from another. because difference, Suresvara argues, cannot be a content of perception. What is real alone can be the content of *pramāṇa*. Difference, being illusory like the rope-serpent, cannot be the content of a *pramāṇa*, and so does not fall within the scope of perception.²⁷

Difference, it is said, is *anyonyābhāva*. When we say that a cow is different from a horse, there is mutual non-existence (*anyonyābhāva*) of the one in the other, *i.e.* there is the non-existence of the horse in the cow as well as the non-existence of the cow in the horse. So difference in the sense of mutual non-existence is *abhāva*. If so, perception, Suresvara argues, has nothing to do with what is non-existent. There can be relation between an existent object and perception, since the non-existent which is devoid of being cannot serve as the basis of any relation.²⁸ The point here is that *abhāva* cannot be known through perception which requires sense-object contact. Since difference is viewed as *abhāva*, it cannot have any relation with the sense-organ. If it cannot be known through perception, it cannot also be known through *anumāna* and other *pramāṇas* which are all dependent on perception. Suresvara argues that difference, which is said to be

negative, cannot also be known through non-cognition (*anupalabdhi*). The term *anupalabdhi* may mean either the absence of *pramāṇa* or the absence of knowledge. It is absurd to say that the absence of *pramāṇa* is the *pramāṇa* by which *abhāva* is known. Nor is it possible to say that the absence of knowledge is the means for knowing *abhāva*. Knowledge alone reveals an object, but not the absence of knowledge.²¹

Since it cannot be shown that difference falls within the scope of perception, the third alternative according to which perception not only reveals an object, but also differentiates it from others is equally untenable. All that perception can do is just to manifest an object. If so, there is no justification for the contention that the evidence of perception goes against the teaching of *śruti*.

Suresvara observes that there is no conflict between the teaching of *śruti* and the evidence of perception. If it appears that there is conflict between the two in a particular instance, it is necessary for us to show that the alleged conflict is not genuine. For example, while *śruti* teaches that the Self is intrinsically free from sorrow and suffering, the evidence of perception is to the contrary. This seems to be a clear case of conflict between Scripture and perception. However, the conflict here is only apparent and not real. Pleasure and pain belong to the internal organ (*antah-karṇa*) which is subject to modifications. On account of non-discrimination between the Self and the internal organ, what is true of the latter is erroneously ascribed to the former. So if one says that the *jīva* is subject to misery as evidenced by perceptual experience, it should not be taken in the primary sense, but

only in the secondary sense.²⁰ In other words, what *śruti* says is true of the Self from the absolute standpoint, while the evidence of perception in respect of it is from the relative standpoint. In view of the difference in the standpoints, there is no conflict at all between *śruti* and perception.

Let us assume for the sake of argument that there is conflict between *śruti* and perception. The question, then, arises whether the testimony of *śruti* should be accepted as valid or that of perception. Suresvara maintains that Scripture alone should be accepted as final for two reasons. First, Scripture being impersonal (*apauruṣeya*) is free from defect and distortion, and so the teaching of Scripture can never be doubted.²¹ But the same thing cannot be said of perception and other sources of knowledge. Every one of these source of knowledge is dependent on the mind and the senses of the person, which are liable to defect and distortion. Cases of error in perception are not wanting. If it is found that the evidence of perception goes wrong in one particular instance, one may be sceptical about the reliability of perceptual evidence as a whole. Secondly the experience of deep sleep corroborates the Scriptural testimony that the Self is intrinsically of the nature of bliss. It follows that what is bliss by its very nature is wrongly imagined as subject to suffering due to its association with the mind and so perception must yield to Scripture in this regard.²²

The argument which seeks to prove the supremacy of perception on the ground that everyone from the beginning depends upon perception, and that the knowledge conveyed by *śruti* which comes later cannot, therefore, sublimate the knowledge conveyed by percep-

tion, is suicidal. Far from strengthening the case of perception, it really undermines its position in relation to *śruti*. The very admission that perceptual knowledge is prior, while the Scriptural knowledge is subsequent, weakens the former and strengthens the latter. It is well-known that the subsequent knowledge of shell becomes stronger by sublating the earlier cognition of silver. In the same manner, the knowledge conveyed by Scripture which is subsequent cannot help sublating the earlier cognition obtained through perception. Since perception and Scripture are independent of each other, and since the Scriptural knowledge is subsequent to the perceptual knowledge, we must, by adopting the principle of the subsequent sublating the earlier (*apaccheda-nyāya*), declare the earlier cognition through perception invalid. Kumārila explains the *apaccheda-nyāya* as follows: "Where two (sources), being related as prior and posterior, convey their knowledge independently of each other, the posterior is stronger of the two."¹¹ In fact, one need not resort to the *apaccheda-nyāya* for the purpose of vindicating the final authority of Scripture if the issue as stated here involves the problem of Scripture *versus* perception. The issue has to be decided in favour of Scripture simply on the ground that Scripture, being impersonal and therefore being completely free from any possible defect, will always supersede perception, which is liable to defect, when their evidences on any problem are conflicting. The superiority of Scripture rests on its impersonal character.¹²

The third condition also does not hold good. The authority of Scripture cannot be set aside on the ground that what it conveys is open to doubt (*samśaya*). Suresvara says that there is no scope at all for

doubt with regard to Scripture. There are two points to be considered here. First of all, we must consider the nature of the *pramāṇa* at issue. There is room for doubt in respect of a *pramāṇa* like perception which is dependent on the human agency. But since *śruti* is impersonal (*apauruṣeya*), one cannot raise doubts about it as a source of knowledge. When the not-Self which is the root cause of all possible doubt is removed through reasoning, there cannot be any room for doubt about the teaching of *śruti*.²⁵ Secondly, we must also consider the nature of the object to be known. Here it is the Self that is to be known through Scripture. That about which doubts may arise, Suresvara remarks, is not the Self according to the wise. "With regard to the Self there could be no doubt, for it is of the nature of awareness itself."²⁶ Suresvara argues that with regard to objects like pot there may be ignorance, error, and doubt, but "not in respect of the cognizer, the cognition, and the Witness-consciousness."²⁷ As a cognition takes place, the knower knows it directly. So one cannot entertain any doubt about it; nor can one be ignorant or mistaken about it. Since the cognizer (*jñātā*) is directly illumined by the Witness-consciousness, neither ignorance, nor doubt, nor error is possible with regard to the cognizer. If none of those is possible even with regard to both the cognition and the cognizer, one can argue *a fortiori* that they are not possible with regard to the Witness-consciousness, which reveals both the cognition and the cognizer.²⁸

Is it possible to say that Scripture does not convey any knowledge whatever and that it is not, therefore, a source of knowledge? Suresvara says that one who is incapable of comprehending the Scriptural instruc-

tion about the self-luminous Self deserves to be treated contemptuously as a figure of clay in the human form.”

A basic objection is very often raised against Scripture being a source of knowledge on an entirely different ground. If everything other than Brahman is non-real or illusory as argued by Advaita, Scripture, too, which is different from Brahman is illusory (*mithyā*). According to Advaita, it is the non-real Scripture that intimates the real which is Brahman. Suresvara, for instance, says: “The *Vedānta*, though in itself *mithyā*, may enable one to know the real, like the idol of God, or like a drawing, or like a reflection.”¹⁰ The critic argues that since Scripture, according to Advaita, is *mithyā*, it cannot be the source of knowledge of Brahman.

This objection is wrong. If Advaita holds the view that the illusory character of Scripture is not prejudicial to its being a source of valid cognition, it is because of the fact that the criterion of illusoriness is different from that of a valid cognition. What suffers contradiction is illusory.” Judged by this criterion everything other than Brahman — *Īśvara*, the *jīva*, Scripture, and the cognition produced by Scripture — is illusory, for all of them cease to exist as soon as there is Brahman-realization. The paradox here is that it is through Scripture which is itself *mithyā* that we come to know not only of the illusoriness of everything other than Brahman, but also of the reality of Brahman.¹¹ There is, for example, the *śruti* text which says that “Everything else but this (Self) is perishable”¹² and therefore *mithyā*. Though Scripture is *mithyā*, it is nevertheless a *pramāṇa*. What gives rise to a valid cognition is a *pramāṇa*. Non-sublatibility of the content

is the criterion of a valid cognition: a valid cognition, that is to say, is one whose content does not suffer contradiction at any time." The cognition of a rope-serpent is not valid, because its content, *viz.* the rope-serpent, suffers contradiction by the subsequent cognition. On the contrary, the non-relational cognition which reveals Brahman is a valid cognition, because its content, *viz.* Brahman, is ever-existent and does not suffer contradiction at any time. Scripture which gives rise to this valid cognition is, therefore, a *pramāṇa*. It means that Scripture, though non-real or illusory, is at the same time a *pramāṇa* as there is no incompatibility between its illusory character and its being a source of knowledge. It may be stated here that perception and other alleged sources of knowledge are strictly speaking not *pramāṇas* at all as the cognitions produced by them do not fulfil the criterion of a valid cognition. What is known through them gets sublated when the non-dual Brahman is realized. However, for all practical purposes they are accorded the status of *pramāṇas* as the cognitions produced by them remain uncontradicted till the rise of Brahman-knowledge. Though the cognition produced by Scripture is *pramā*, it is *aṣaramārtha*, *i.e.* it is not real. The reason for this is obvious. Whatever is produced is not real, and since this knowledge is produced by Scripture it is also not real. The non-dual knowledge which is Brahman is the only thing which is eternal and which is not produced.

Though the knowledge produced by Scripture is not real, it nevertheless removes the cognition of diversity, which is also not real, in the same way as the cognition of a stick, which is not real, removes the earlier cognition of a snake which is also not real.⁴⁵ In fact, Scripture does not purport to teach Brahman; its

purport is only in the removal of the erroneous cognition of difference caused by *avidyā*. The view that the Scripture-produced cognition which is not real (*ayathārtha*) removes the cognition of diversity which is equally not real is both intelligible and sound. So according to Advaita, though Scripture is *mithyā*, it is undoubtedly a *pramāṇa*. The ontological status of the cognition produced by Scripture is no doubt *mithyā*; nevertheless, the cognition which Scripture produces is *pramā*, for Brahman which is made known by this cognition through the removal of the cognition of diversity is real.

According to Suresvara, the knowledge that we get from *śruti* texts like “*tat tvam asi*” is immediate (*aparokṣa*) as well as non-relational (*asamsrṣṭa*). To construe the meaning of the text, “That thou art,” we must take into consideration (1) the co-ordinate relation (*sāmānādhikaranyā*) between the two terms “that” and “thou”, (2) the substantive-attribute relation (*viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣya-sambandha*) in which the two terms are placed, and (3) the implied meaning of the terms (*lakṣyārtha*).⁴ The connotations of the two terms “that” and “thou” are different. The word “that” refers to Brahman which is infinite, omniscient, omnipotent, and so on. The word “thou” signifies the individual self which is finite, parviscient, etc. Since the connotations of the two words are different, one may be inclined to think that they refer to two different objects. But this is not possible because of the co-ordinate relation (*sāmānādhikaranyā*) between the two words “that” and “thou”. Words which are placed in co-ordinate relation as in the expression “the blue lily” (*nīlam-utpalam*) refer to one and the same object. Though the connotations of the two words “blue” and “lily” are

different, they nevertheless refer to one and the same object because of the co-ordinate relation between them. At this stage we construe the meaning of the expression "the blue lily" in terms of the substantive-attribute relation as this will help us to do justice to the different connotations of, and the co-ordinate relation between, the two terms. The expression "the blue lily" denotes an object which, while being a lily, has also the attribute of blue colour. We have construed the meaning in such a way that though the two terms have different connotations they have the same denotation. This way of construing the meaning of words is known as *abheda-samsarga*, i.e. identity which involves relation. There is, however, difficulty in adopting this mode of explanation through substantive-attribute relation in the case of the text "*tat tvam asi.*" When we consider the mutual qualification of the two terms, i.e. the qualification of the meaning of the word "that" by "thou", and the qualification of the meaning of the word "thou" by "that", we find that a simple and direct identification of the one with the other as outwardly conveyed by the sentence is logically untenable. As stated earlier, the explicit meaning of the word "that" is Brahman as determined by infinitude, omniscience, remoteness, etc., and that of "thou" is the individual self as determined by finitude, parviscience, immediacy, etc. It is absurd to identify "that" with "thou" in view of the fact that the determinants of the two terms are mutually incompatible. In other words, this text cannot be treated as an attributive judgement. The import of the text as indicated by the co-ordinate relation between the words therein is in identity (*abheda*). But it is not relational identity, i.e. identity which involves the relation of

substance and attribute; rather it is non-relational identity. The non-relational unitary sense (*akhaṇḍ-ārtha*) of the text is brought out by recourse to the implied sense (*lakṣyārtha*). By removing the determinants of each term, which are incompatible with those of the other term, *i.e.* by removing the characteristics such as omniscience and parviscience, omnipotence and helplessness, and so on which arise because of the limiting adjuncts, and by retaining the common element, *viz.* consciousness, it is shown that the text “*tat tvam asi*” conveys the sense of identity, *i.e.* a unitary, non-relational content. To quote Suresvara: “According to us, the relations such as *sāmānādhikarānya* (connecting words and their meanings) bring out directly the non-verbal import of ‘That thou art’ like the identity of ether through the cancellation of the different adjuncts.”¹⁷ The point to be emphasized here is that according to Suresvara (a) the immediate knowledge of Brahman-Ātman is obtained from the Upaniṣadic text, “*tat tvam asi*,” and that (b) this knowledge is non-relational.

The non-dual Brahman is made known by Scripture only through implication (*lakṣaṇā*). Words can signify a class characteristic, or a quality, or an action, or a relation.¹⁸ Since none of these factors which occasion the usage of words are present in Brahman, the latter cannot be known by the primary meaning (*vācyārtha*) of words. It is for this reason that *śruti* says that words along with the mind return without reaching Brahman.¹⁹ Since the ultimate reality cannot be stated to be such-and-such, the Upaniṣadic texts like “*neti neti*”²⁰ seek to teach Brahman negatively by stating what it is not, by negating what is gross as well as what is subtle from it. Even

the affirmative Upaniṣadic texts like "Brahman is real, knowledge, and infinite" do not set forth the nature of Brahman positively. As in the case of the text, "That thou art," the text which says that Brahman is real, knowledge, and infinite has to be interpreted in the secondary sense as stating that Brahman is other than the unreal, the insentient, and the finite. Since the things to be eliminated are unreal, insentient, and finite, there is the need for the use of three different words, *viz.* real, knowledge, and infinite. Even this text according to Sures'vara, conveys a non-relational, non-verbal content.³¹ What cannot be designated by words must necessarily be undifferentiated and non-relational.

The meaning intended to be conveyed (*tātparyaviṣaya*) by a sentence in a given context is its import. Though a sentence is a group of words which are related to each other according to certain conditions like expectancy, fitness, etc., it does not mean that the meaning of every sentence is relational (*samsr̥ṣṭārtha*). There are sentences which signify a relational sense. To find out whether a sentence conveys a relational or non-relational sense, we have to ascertain the meaning intended to be conveyed by it. For example, the sentence, "This is that Devadatta," conveys the sense of identity of the person concerned. We do not include the different sets of occasions, times, and places in which Devadatta was seen as constituting the import of the sentence. Excluding all these factors which are not intended to be conveyed by the speaker, we lay stress on the identity of the person as constituting the import of the sentence. Let us consider another example. A person, let us say, does not know the moon, though he has been told that it is a heavenly

body to be seen at night. When he asks another person, "Which is the moon?" he is told, "The most resplendent one is the moon." It is obvious that this sentence does not intend to convey any relational content, but only to convey *which* is the moon by identifying it to the inquirer who put the question. Since only the meaning intended to be conveyed must be taken as the import of a sentence, it is wrong to say that every sentence whether scriptural or secular, conveys a relational sense through the construction (*anvaya*) of the different meanings of words.

According to the Niyogavādin, the knowledge which arises from the Upaniṣadic text is mediate (*parokṣa*) and involves relation (*samsr̥ṣṭa*). Brahman which is immediate and non-relational cannot be the content of the verbal cognition (*śābda-jñāna*) which arises from the assertive *Vedānta* text, for the latter can convey only a relational sense. When the indirect, relational knowledge conveyed by the *Vedānta* text is constantly meditated upon, there arises therefrom the immediate, non-relational knowledge. There is, therefore, the need for meditation (*upāsana* or *prasaṅkhyāna*) on the content of the verbal cognition for obtaining "another cognition" which has the immediate, non-relational Brahman as its content. Making out a case for meditation in this way, the Niyogavādin argues that the assertive Upaniṣadic text must be construed along with the injunctive text which enjoins meditation."²

Suresvara rejects the argument of the Niyogavādin on several grounds. When, following the hearing of the *Vedānta* texts, there is rational reflection (*manana*) through the method of *anvaya-vyatireka* on the

teaching of the *Vedānta* texts, there arises the unitary, non-relational, mental cognition (*akhaṇḍākāra-vṛtti-jñāna*) from the texts like 'that thou art.'³³ Suresvara says: "As in the case of the ether in a pot and the ether outside it, so also because of the co-ordinate relation of the words 'that' and 'thou' (in the *śruti* text 'That thou art'), by the removal (of the incompatible factors denoted by them) the direct non-relational sense takes place to us (from the text)."³⁴ Since the verbal cognition even as it arises from the text is both immediate and non-relational, there is no need for meditation on the content of the verbal cognition for obtaining "another cognition" as argued by the Niyogavādin. Further, a cognition is required for the purpose of knowing something. Since the non-dual Brahman is made known by the verbal cognition even as it arises from *śruti*, there is no need of "another cognition" to be obtained from meditation for the purpose of knowing Brahman-Ātman. What is known once through a *pramāṇa* does not require to be known again by some other source. What the other cognition is expected to do has already been done by *śruti*.³⁵ It cannot be said that the other cognition is required for knowing Brahman in a clear and definite way free from doubt. The knowledge that we get from *śruti* which is a *pramāṇa* is clear, definite, and free from doubt, and so there is no need for the other cognition. If the verbal cognition that arises from *śruti* is not clear, definite, and free from doubt, *śruti* will cease to be a *pramāṇa*. Moreover, if the right knowledge of the desired type, *i.e.* knowledge which is both immediate and non-relational, is not obtained from the *śruti* text in the first instance itself, it can never be obtained by means of meditation practised for any length of time. In the

words of Sures'vara, "If reasoning and *śruti* do not give rise to direct apprehension of reality previously, how can this unprecedented result issue from their mere repetition?"⁵⁶ Nor can it be said that the other cognition, which meditation is supposed to give rise to, is required for the sake of overcoming the mediateness of the Self. The Self is the most direct and immediate reality, and so the question of removing the mediateness of the Self does not arise.⁵⁷ It is no argument to say that the other cognition different from the one which arises from *śruti* is required for destroying the primal ignorance. Sures'vara maintains that to an eligible person the comprehension of the meaning of the Scriptural texts destroys the primal ignorance at once without any need of repetition.⁵⁸

It should not be thought that Sures'vara does not provide any place for meditation in the scheme of spiritual discipline. Sures'vara admits that there is scope for meditation with regard to the hearing of the texts and rational reflection. Since *śravaṇa* and *manana* are actions which can be enjoined, he is prepared to admit that there is scope for injunction thereto; but neither the Self which is ever-existent nor the knowledge of Self which takes place from *śruti* independently of injunction can be enjoined.⁵⁹ By meditation, hearing is perfected.⁶⁰ Repeated inquiry into the meanings of the words "tat" and "tvam" through *anvaya-vyatireka* and other methods of reasoning facilitates a clear understanding of the teaching of *śruti*.⁶¹ An eligible person, as a result of *śravaṇa* and *manana*, obtains Brahman-knowledge which is non-verbal, non-relational, and immediate straightway from Scripture.

NOTES

1. *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi*. (NS) III, 67
2. *Ibid.*, III, 51.
3. *Ibid.*, III, 52.
4. *Ibid.*, III, 47-48.
5. *Ibid.*, IV, 5.
6. *Taittirīyopaniṣadbhāṣyavārttika* (TUBV), II, verse 368, p. 255; II, verse 413, p. 281; II, verse 674, p. 418; II, verse 658, p. 409; II, verses 656-657, p. 409.
7. *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* (BU), II, iv, 5.
8. *Taittirīyopaniṣad* (TU), II, vi.
9. "athāto'nupraśnāḥ".
10. TUBV, II, verse, 363, p. 252.
11. "mananam nāma pratyagbrahmaikyasādhaka-adbheda-bādhakayuktibhīḥ sadā'dvītiya-brahmātmaikya-anusandhānam."
12. NS, III, 53.
13. *Ibid.*, IV, 11.
14. *Kena Upaniṣad*, I, 7.
15. BU, III, iv, 2.
16. NS, III, 34.
17. *Sambandhavārttika* (SV), 683.
18. TUBV, II, verse 70, p. 99.
19. NS, sambandhokti to III, 35.
20. TUBV, II, verse 610, p. 382.
21. NS, III, 35.
22. TUBV, II, verses 687-701, pp. 426-433.
23. *Ibid.*, II, verse 693, p. 430.
24. NS, III, 83.
25. *Ibid.*, III, 84.

26. *Sambandhavārttika*, 920.
27. *Ibid.*, 921.
28. *Ibid.*, 923.
29. *TUBV*, II, verses 703-704, pp. 434-435.
30. *NS*, III, 96.
31. *TUBV*, II, verse 245, p. 187.
32. *NS*, III, 94.
33. *Tantravārttika* (Benares Sanskrit Series, 1903), p. 819.
34. See *Śrī Śaṅkarāśaṅkara-bhāṣya-vimarśah.*, p. 124:
 “*tasmācchāstrasya cakṣurūdeśca avidyādi-sādhāraṇadoṣa-taulyeṣi bhrama-pramādādi-puṁdoṣa-taulyābhāvāt na tulyadoṣatvam-evaṁ asādhāraṇadoṣavattvāt cakṣurādīpramāṇānām pramāṇābhāsate-venā durbalatvam; tadrahitatvācca śāstrasya prābalyam.*”
35. *NS*, III, 36.
36. *Ibid.*, III, 37.
37. *TUBV*, II, verse 660, p. 411.
38. *Ibid.*, II, verses 660-663, pp. 411-412.
39. *NS*, III, 38.
40. *Mānasollāsa*; see A. Mahadeva Sastri, *The Vedānta Doctrine*, verse 11, p. 153.
41. “*mithyātvaṁ nāma bādhyatvaṁ samyagjñānodaye sati.*” See Mahadeva Sastri, *The Vedānta Doctrine*, v. 10, p. 153.
42. Rāmānuja restates the standpoint of Advaita in this regard as follows: “The teacher who imparts knowledge is *mithyā*. The knower is also *mithyā*. Scripture also is *mithyā*. The knowledge arising out of Scripture is also *mithyā*. All this is known from Scripture itself which is *mithyā*.” See *The Vedārtha-saṅgraha of Rāmānuja*, Ed., S. S. Raghavachar (Mysore: Sri Ramakrishna Ashrama, 1956), p. 5.
43. *BU*, III, iv, 2.

44. See *Śrī Śaṅkarāśaṅkara-bhāṣya-vimarśaḥ*, pp. 123-124:

“*abādhitārthaviṣayaṁ jñānam hi pramā...evam pramā-janakat-vādeva śāstram mithyābhūtamapi pramāṇamityucyate...evam paramārthabhūta-brahmapratipādakatvena param pramāṇamapi śāstram, vyāvahārikatvena aparamārtha-bhūtameveti.*”

45. *Ibid.*, “*mithyābhūtam śāstram mithyābhūtameva pramā-jñānam janayatīti nā kaściddoṣaḥ.* (p. 123) “*na caivam doṣamūlatvāt ayathārtha-bhūtena brahmajñānena katham dvaitajñānasya bādha iti vācyam, daṇḍabhramena sarpaḥbhramasya bādhadarśanāt.*” (p. 129).

Also see *Śaṅkarabhāṣya* on the *Brahmasūtra*, II, i, 14 for a discussion on this issue.

46. *NS*, III, 3.

47. *Ibid.*, III, 9.

48. *Ibid.*, III, 103.

49. *TUBV*, II, verses 595-596, p. 375.

50. *BU*, III, ix, 26.

51. *SV*, 705; *TUBV*, verses 99-100, p. 112.

52. *TUBV*, II, verses 639-647, pp. 399-404.

53. *Ibid.*, II, verses 656-657, p. 409.

54. *Ibid.*, II, verse 658, p. 409.

55. *SV*, 792.

56. *NS*, III, 124.

57. *SV*, 793.

58. *NS*, I, 67.

59. *TUBV*, II, verse 667, p. 414.

60. *NS*, III, 125.

61. *TUBV*, II, verses 714-715, pp. 439-440.

RENUNCIATION: A SURE MEANS TO LIBERATION

*Godavarisha Mishra**

The idea of renunciation has played an important role in the history of Indian thought. Renunciation is necessary for the attainment of liberation which is regarded as the supreme human end. Liberation is defined as the absence of misery or the presence of absolute happiness. The *Upaniṣads*, however, proclaim that this could be achieved by the knowledge of identity between the individual self and supreme Self. The Advaita tradition lays special emphasis on this point by stating the fact that the essential nature of *jīva* which is self-luminous consciousness is non-different from the essential nature of *Īsvara* which is non-dual consciousness and bliss. When *avidyā*, the obstructing factor, is removed, the essential nature of *jīva* remains as Brahman which is liberation. And, *avidyā* could be removed by the direct knowledge of the Self. A twofold means has been prescribed for this knowledge of identity to dawn, namely, (i) *karmayoga*, as the remote means, and (ii) *sannyāsa* along with *śravaṇa*,

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manana, *nididhyāsana* as the proximate means. In the following pages, an attempt is made to evaluate the role of *sannyāsa* as a means to the understanding of the supreme Self or to attain the state of liberation.

Even though Buddhism does not believe in the individual self and the supreme Self, it advocates renunciation. It does not propound renunciation as a quest for the realisation of Brahman but as a means to the elimination of misery, which is considered as the greatest evil.' Besides Buddhism, all Indian philosophical systems agree that it is possible to attain the state which is free from misery. Renunciation, according to many a school, is indispensable for reaching such a state. whether it is called *mokṣa* or *kaivalya* or *nirvāṇa*.

Śaṅkara, all through his *bhāṣyas*, has given much importance to the concept of *sannyāsa* as a means for the knowledge of the Self. The texts, "One should have control of the mind and external senses," "The sages expounded the knowledge of the Self to the holy ascetics," and "It is not by progeny or by wealth but by renunciation, some have realised the Self,"⁴ reveal the fact that *sannyāsa* is indispensable to acquire the knowledge of the Self. Vidyāraṇya, in his celebrated work, the *Jīvanmuktiviveka*, has given special emphasis to this concept of *sannyāsa* as the foremost means to attain liberation. He defines liberation as follows. "Bondage of a living being is an attribute of the mind which is characterised by doership and enjoyership, pain and pleasure, etc. and is recognised as painful existence. Freedom from this is liberation."⁵

With regard to the concept of *sannyāsa*, there is a *prima facie* view as follows. In the scriptures it has

been argued that there is no stage in the life of a man when *karma* could be given up. The texts like "If one desires to live for a hundred years, one should perform *karma* unceasingly,"⁶ "Perform sacrifice till life lasts,"⁷ the mention of three debts in the *Taittirīyasamhitā*,⁸ and the *Gītā* text, "Janaka and others attained liberation by the performance of *karma* only,"⁹ affirm that the performance of *karma* should not be given up at any point of time in the life of a person. Hence a person, having right values and insight into the scriptures, cannot take up *sannyāsa* which favours abandonment of *karmas*.

Śaṅkara answers this objection by referring to the fact that the obligation to perform *karma* is valid in the case of those who do not have desire for liberation. On the authority of the *Jābālopaniṣad*,¹⁰ Śaṅkara emphatically points out that the obligation to perform *karma* does not exist before one enters into married life, and, therefore, one may embrace *sannyāsa* from the *brahmacarya* stage itself. Rāmānuja too emphasised this point on the basis of the *Jābālopaniṣad* text, while commenting on the *sūtra*, "*vidhīrvā dhāraṇavat.*"¹¹

As to the objection that renunciation is intended for those who are unfit to pursue ritualistic practices by reason of some physical defect or loss of wife, Śaṅkara replies that whatever may be the condition "The day one is disgusted with the world, the same day he may renounce."¹² This passage gives eligibility for all to take to the state of *sannyāsa*. But in all the cases, Śaṅkara points out that the non-attachment is the main criterion of eligibility. This state of *sannyāsa* is known as *vividiṣā-sannyāsa* wherefrom at any stage of life one can take up renunciation as a means for the knowledge of the Self.

Sannyāsa: A Means to Jīvanmukti

So far we have seen that *sannyāsa* is a means to liberation. Now how it serves the purpose of getting one liberated needs to be examined. The post-Śaṅkara Advaitins have advocated two theories on this issue. One school opines that *sannyāsa* is useful for the rise of the knowledge of the Self by giving rise to merit which is invisible (*apūrva*). Some others say that it gives rise to visible result which is conducive to the attainment of the knowledge.¹³ On the first view, Saravajñātman is of the opinion that the rise of the knowledge is usually prevented by sin and the accumulated sin could be removed by an invisible result arising from *sannyāsa*.¹⁴ He points out that if a person has already taken the life of an ascetic in the previous birth, he attains the knowledge of the Self in the next life even if he happens to be a house-holder, etc.¹⁵ In the case of King Janaka, who got the knowledge of the Self without being a *sannyāsin*, it is inferred that he has taken the life of an ascetic in an earlier life. Some others opine that the merit arising from taking up *sannyāsa* makes one eligible for pursuing *śravaṇa*, *manana* and *nididhyāsana*. This idea is emphasised by Śaṅkara in his commentary on the opening *sūtra* of the *Brahmasūtra*. Herein, Śaṅkara takes the quality called *uparati* in the sense of *sannyāsa* as the necessary prerequisite to pursue Vedāntic study.¹⁶ So those who argue in favour of this view say that *sannyāsa* gives rise to an invisible merit which is conducive to the dawning of knowledge.

II

Prakāśātman, the author of the *Vivarana*, advocates the view that *sannyāsa* generates a visible result

which is helpful to the rise of the knowledge of the Self. He is of the opinion that it is clear from the emphatic declaration of the *Upaniṣads* that *śravaṇa*, etc. are the direct means to liberation. In order to pursue *śravaṇa*, etc. continuously, one needs adequate leisure which can be had when one is a *sannyāsin*. Thus the injunction on *śravaṇa*, etc. implies *sannyāsa* which gives rise to a visible result in the sense of abstinence from duties of the householder and having adequate leisure to pursue the means like *śravaṇa*, etc.¹⁷

Vidyāraṇya takes *vidvat-sannyāsa* as the external means, and *vāsanākṣaya* and *manonāśa* as the internal means to *jīvanmukti*. The famous examples found in the *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* (*Yājñavalkya-Maitreyī-brāhmaṇa* and *Kahola-brāhmaṇa*) are cited to substantiate this point. In this context the *sannyāsa* of Yājñavalkya is cited as a case of *vidvat-sannyāsa*. The other type of liberation expounded by *śruti* is *videhamukti*, i.e. liberation after the fall of the body. The Vedāntic schools like Viśiṣṭādvaita and Dvaita which favour this type of liberation hold *jīvanmukti* to be practically untenable. The Advaitins, on the other hand, strongly hold that it is possible to get liberated while alive. Vidyāraṇya gives altogether a different definition of the term *videhamukti* in the context of explaining *vividiṣā-sannyāsa*, i.e. renunciation of the seeker. His contention is that *videhamukti* takes place the very moment when knowledge arises.¹⁸ In order to clarify his position, Vidyāraṇya explains the term “*videha*” in two ways. As to the first definition, the word “*deha*” (body) has been understood as referring to all kinds of bodies (that are the results of *sañcita-karma*, *prārabdhakarma* and *āgāmi-karma*). According to the second explanation given by Vidyāraṇya, the word ‘*deha*’ in the

term "*videhamukti*" has been used only in the limited sense of future body (embodiment after the decease of the present body).¹⁹ It is because the dawn of knowledge prevents the future embodiment alone which is the result of *sañcita-karma* and *āgāmi-karma*. The present body, being the result of *prārabdha-karma* cannot get affected by the knowledge, and hence *prārabdha-karma* is to be exhausted for the body to fall off. In the sense of being freed from the contingency of having future bodies as soon as the knowledge dawns, the state of *videhamukti* is spoken of even before the fall of the present body. Vidyāraṇya states, in this regard, that *videhamukti* in the sense of elimination of future bodies is simultaneous with the attainment of knowledge.²⁰

To conclude this part of the discussion: there is only one liberation in the true sense of the term. By the advent of *jñāna*, one is liberated. Strictly speaking, a *jñānin* (a person having the knowledge) cannot identify himself with his body like that of a snake to its slough. Since the body continues, there is the distinction as stated above between *jīvanmukti* and *videhamukti*.

III

Once the renunciation of the seeker (*vividiṣā-sannyāsa*) has reached the state of the knower (*vidvat-sannyāsa*) there need be no effort on the part of the person to accomplish anything more. This point has been well pointed out by Madhusūdana Sarasvatī in his *Gūḍhārtha-dīpikā*, a celebrated commentary on the *Bhagavad Gītā* while commenting on the line

"*sarvaṃ karmākhilam-pārtha jñāne parisamāpyate.*"

(IV. 33). Madhusūdana explains the two etymologi-

cally synonymous words used in this verse like 'sarva' and 'akhila' in a different way.²¹ He holds that the word, 'sarva' means the ritualistic actions and the word, 'akhila' means actions like *upāsanā* including *śravaṇa*, *manana* and *nididhyāsana*. So the dawn of knowledge destroys all the products of both types of *karmas* as enumerated above, and brings about liberation. The scheme of liberation can be better explained as:

karmaphalasannyāsa → *vividiṣāsannyāsa* → *sarva-karma-sannyāsa* → *vidvatsannyāsa* → *mukti*.

Vidyāraṇya points out that the obliteration of impressions and the dissolution of mind are the internal means to *jīvanmukti*. For a *vividiṣā-sannyāsin*, knowledge is principal and the other two factors are taken to be subordinate. For a *vidvat-sannyāsin*, both the obliteration of impressions and the dissolution of mind are principal, and knowledge is subordinate. The continuation of pure *vāsanās* is also made ineffective like fried seeds by the practice of *karmayoga* and the right knowledge of the empirical objects. Thus such a person, without having any *vāsanā* whatsoever can very well work in the world without being affected by pleasure or pain, success or failure.

By the performance of eight limbs of *yoga* and through equanimity of the mind, the person gains the knowledge which enlightens the aspirant about the illusory nature of the world and self-effulgent nature of the Self. This is the stage when the mind rests in its own source dropping the values for the unreal. This is called dissolution of the mind (*manonāśa*). Vidyāraṇya emphasises these two states of *vāsanākṣaya* and *manonāśa* as the necessary conditions for any Sannyāsin for understanding his own Self.

Coming to the practical side of Advaita, preceptors like Suresvara speak of asceticism as a necessary condition for attaining the knowledge of Brahman. They hold that the remote means like the performance of rituals including the optional ones lead to the desire to know Brahman, and when this end is achieved, the remote means need not be pursued.²²

In fine, the concept of *sannyāsa* aims at showing the way to a wholesome living and to stand above the world's sorrowful existence. By analysing one's involvement in the worldly activities one is led to the attainment of an inward freedom from dependance upon the empirical objects. This state is called *jīvanmukti*, and it is only by *sannyāsa* one can hope to attain this state of liberation.

NOTES

1. K.N. Tiwari, *Dimensions of Renunciation in Advaita Vedānta* (Delhi, 1977), p. 17.
2. *Bṛhadāraṇyakoṇiṣad*, IV. 4. 23.
3. *Śvetāśvataroṇiṣad*, IV. 21.
4. *Kaivalyoṇiṣad*, 2.
5. *Jīvanmuktiviveka* (Theosophical Society, Adyar, 1978), p. 10.
6. *Īśāvāsyoṇiṣad*, 2.
7. *Aitareyoṇiṣad-Śāṅkarabhāṣya* (tr. by D. Venkata-ramaiah), p. 18.
8. *Taittirīya-saṁhitā*, VI. 3.
9. *Bhagavad-gītā*, III. 20.
10. *Jābūloṇiṣad*, 6.
11. *Brahmasūtra-Śrībhāṣya*, III. iv. 20; also refer Thibaut's translation, p. 696.

Rāmānuja points out that the texts enjoining the performance of *agnihotra* up to the end of life are not universally binding, but concern only those who do not get release from worldly life.

12. *Jābālopaniṣad*, 4.
13. *The Voice of Śaṅkara* (August 1976), p. 173.
14. *Ibid.*
15. *San̄kṣepaśārīraka*, N. Veezhinathan (tr.) — III. 58, 59, (Madras, 1985).
16. *Brahmasūtra-Śāṅkarabhāṣya*, I. i.1.
17. *Siddhāntaleśasaṅgraha*, p. 431, Chowkamba Sanskrit Series. Also refer *Aitareyopaniṣad* (tr. by D. Venkataramaiah) — Introduction p. 10.
18. *Jīvanmuktiviveka*, *op. cit.*, p. 246.
19. *Ibid.*, p. 248. Also refer *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi*, tr. by R. Balasubramanian (Madras, 1988).
20. *Jīvanmuktiviveka*, *op. cit.*, p. 250.
21. *Gūḍhārthadīpikā on the Gītā*, IV. 25 (Calcutta. 1975).
22. *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi*, *op. cit.*, p. 150.

SANNYĀSA : A NOTE

स वा एष पुरुषः पञ्चधा पञ्चात्मा येन सर्वमिदं प्रोतं
 पृथिवी चान्तरिक्षं च द्यौश्च दिशश्चावान्तरदिशाश्च स वै सर्व-
 मिदं जगत्स समूतं स भव्यं जिज्ञासकलृप्त ऋतजा रयिष्ठाः
 श्रद्धा सत्यो महस्वान्तमसोपरिष्ठात् । ज्ञात्वा तमेवं मनसा
 हृदा च भूयो न मृत्युमुपयाहि विद्वान् । तस्मान्न्यासमेषां
 तपसामतिरिक्तमाहुः

He by whom all this universe is pervaded—the earth and mid-region, the heaven and the quarters and the subquarters—that Person is fivefold and is constituted of five substances. He who has attained supreme knowledge through *sannyāsa* is, indeed, this Person. He is all that is perceptible at present, was in the past and will be in the future. Though apparently human, his true nature is that which is settled by the enquiry into the Vedas and what is attained by his new birth in right knowledge. He is firmly established in the richness of knowledge imparted by his *guru*, as also in his faith and in Truth. He has become the self-resplendent. Being such a one he remains beyond the darkness of ignorance. O Āruni, having become one possessed of knowledge by realizing Him, the Supreme, through *sannyāsa*, and with your mind fixed in the heart, do not again fall a prey to death. Because *sannyāsa* is thus the supreme means of realization, therefore wise men declare that to be above all other means of liberation.

Mahānārāyaṇopaniṣad, 79.16

NAHAMBHĀVAS-SUPTIMUKTYOH

by

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अथ मोक्षदशायां किमहमर्थोऽनुवर्तते उत नेति विचार्यते । अनुवर्तत इति केचिन्मन्यन्ते । तथा हि — न अनुवर्तत इति त्वपेशलं, तथा सति आत्मनाश एवापवर्ग इति प्रकारान्तरेण प्रतिज्ञातः स्यात् । अहमर्थो ह्यात्मा इति, नैष युक्तः, अहमर्थस्याहङ्कारस्यानात्मत्वात्, अहङ्कारग्रन्थिरूपबन्धनाशस्यैव मोक्षत्वात्, आत्मनो मुक्त्यन्वयित्वेन स्वनाशाभावाच्चेति । नन्वहमर्थ एवात्मनस्स्वरूपं, ज्ञानं तु तस्य धर्म इति मुक्तावहमर्थनाशे आत्मनः स्वरूपनाश एवेति । मैवम् — ज्ञानमेवात्मनस्स्वरूपमिति बहुशः श्रुतत्वान्नाहमर्थ आत्मनस्स्वरूपं, धर्मभूतं ज्ञानं तु जन्यं वृत्तिज्ञानमेव । तच्चान्तःकरणधर्म एव तस्य च न मुक्तौ स्थितिः । अहं जानामीति ज्ञानं मे जातमिति च प्रतीतिरिदं ज्ञानमेतदाश्रयमहंकारं च साभासमाश्रित्य प्रवृत्ता । तस्मादहमर्थधर्मतया प्रतीतज्ञानं वृत्तिज्ञानमेव । तज्ज्ञानाश्रयतया प्रतीतोऽहमर्थोऽहंकार एवेति नात्मधर्मो ज्ञानं, नित्यज्ञानं चैतन्यं तु नात्मधर्मो नाप्यनात्मधर्मः किन्त्वान्मनस्स्वरूपमेवेति ॥

यदुक्तं तैरेव — अहं दुःखीति य आत्मानमनुसन्धत्ते स एव दुःखनिवृत्तये तत्साधनानुष्ठाने प्रवर्तते । यद्यहमेव न भविष्यामीत्यवगच्छेत्तर्हि मोक्षकथाप्रस्तावादपसर्पेदेवासाविति मोक्षशास्त्रमप्रमाणं स्यादिति, नैतद्युक्तम् । अधिष्ठानं कूटस्थचैतन्यं तत्र कल्पितोऽहङ्कारस्तत्र चित्प्रतिबिम्बश्चेत्येतत्त्रयमहमर्थो जीवस्संसारी । तथा च दुःखविशिष्टो दुःखनाशायैव साभासाहंकारविशिष्टस्साभासाहंकारनाशाय यतत इत्येकः पक्षः । अधिष्ठानचैतन्यं तत्र कल्पितोऽहंकारश्चेत्येतद्द्वयमेवाहमर्थो जीवः । तथा च अहंकारविशिष्टोऽहंकारनाशाय यतत इत्यन्यः पक्षः । अहंकारस्तत्र चित्प्रतिबिम्बश्चेत्येतद्द्वयमेव जीवः । स चाहंकारविशिष्ट आभासस्वस्य बिम्बसायुज्यार्थमहंकारनाशाय यतत इत्यपरः पक्षः । अत्रैव साभासाहंकारो जीवस्वस्याधिष्ठानचैतन्यात्मनावस्थानार्थं यतत इति मतान्तरम् । न चायमेव पक्षस्वनाशरूपदोषाक्रान्त इति वाच्यं, उत्पत्तेः प्रागधिष्ठानचैतन्यात्मना स्थितस्याहङ्कारस्य पुनरधिष्ठानचैतन्यात्मनावशेषवाञ्छा युक्तैवेति ।

ब्रह्मैव स्वाविद्यया जीवभावमापन्नं सज्जीवभावविगमाय यतत इति परः पक्षः। एवमादयः पक्षाः प्राचीनग्रन्थेषु सन्ति, ते च विस्तरभिया नेह प्रपञ्चिताः। सर्वथापि जीवस्याहङ्कारतादात्म्याध्यासप्रयुक्तोऽहम्भावो बन्धः। विद्यया समूलस्य तस्य निवृत्त्या स्वाभाविकब्रह्मभाव एव मोक्षः। न च जीवस्य जीवभाव एव स्वाभाविको न ब्रह्मभाव इति वाच्यं, व्याधकुलवर्धितराजकुमारदृष्टान्तेन ब्रह्मण एव देहे प्रविश्य जीवीभूतत्वेन जीवस्य ब्रह्मभाव एव स्वाभाविक इति। तथा च श्रूयते —

अनेन जीवेनात्मनानुप्रविश्य

इति ॥

ननु व्याधकुलवर्धितस्य राजकुमारस्य स्वजन्मापरिज्ञानाद्व्याध-
बुद्धिस्वप्निन् भवतु, कथं पुनर्ब्रह्मण जीवभाव इति चेत्कात्रानुप-
पत्तिस्सत्त्वाद्ज्ञानस्य। यावद्व्यवहारमज्ञानावच्छिन्नं हि ब्रह्म। भवतु
ब्रह्मणो जीवभावापत्तिरनुपपन्ना, तथापि नास्माकं क्षतिः। न हि
वयं वस्तुतो ब्रह्मणो जीवभावं ब्रूमः, किन्तु मायया। सा हि स्थाणोः
पुरुषत्वमिव रज्जोस्सर्पत्वमिव गगनस्य नीलत्वमिव सुप्तस्य मनुष्यस्य
विपिनसञ्चारिव्याघ्रत्वमिव च ब्रह्मणो जीवत्वं कल्पयति। अत एव
मायामयस्य जीवत्वस्य विद्यया विनिर्मुक्तिः सम्भवति। न हि सत्यं
निवर्तते, निवर्तमानं वा न ज्ञानेन। न चैवं बन्धस्य मिथ्यात्वे
मोक्षोऽपि मिथ्यैव भवेदिति वाच्यम्, इष्टापत्तेः। तस्माज्जीव आग-
न्तुकजीवभावविनाशपूर्वकस्वाभाविकब्रह्मभावापत्तये यतत एवेति नास्ति
शास्त्रस्याप्रामाण्यमिति ॥

यदुक्तं तैरेव — स च प्रत्यगात्मा मुक्तावहमित्येव प्रकाशत
इति तदयुक्तम्, सुपुण्यादावेवाहमिति प्रकाशाभावे तस्य कथं मुक्तौ
तत्प्रसङ्गः। अहङ्कारो हि संस्कारात्मना स्वापादावस्ति मुक्तौ तु
सकारणस्य तस्य नाश एवेति। किञ्च केवलाहङ्कारः कदापि
नास्त्येव सर्वत्रापि 'अहं जानामि' 'अहं पश्यामि' 'अहं

शृणोमि ' इति विशिष्टाहङ्कारस्यैव दर्शनात् । स च मुक्तौ नास्त्येव देहेन्द्रियादिवैशिष्ट्याभावात् । अपि च यदि मुक्तावहमर्थस्स्यात्तर्हि स स्वेनानुभूतं संसारदुःखं स्मरेदेवेति मुक्तेरपुरुषार्थत्वमेव भवेत् । किञ्च मायाख्यबीजवत्यां सुषुप्तावेवाविद्यमानस्याहङ्कारस्य कथं निर्वीजमुक्तौ सत्त्वप्रसङ्गः । न च सुषुप्तावस्त्वहङ्कार इति वाच्यं, यावत्पर्यन्तमहङ्कारो वर्तते तावत्पर्यन्तं सुषुप्तेरेवानुदयात् । अत एव अहमिदमकरवम् , इदं पुनः करिष्यामीति चिन्तयितुर्निद्रानुदयः । तस्मात् प्रत्यगात्मा मुक्तौ प्रकाशते केवलं, न त्वहमिति प्रकाशते; अहमिति इदमिति वा प्रतीचः प्रकाशाभावात् । अहङ्कारस्यैवाहमिति प्रकाशः, मनसस्तु इदमिति प्रकाशः, उभयमप्यन्तःकरणमेवेति ॥

ननु प्रत्यगात्मा मुक्तावहमित्येव प्रकाशते स्वस्मै प्रकाशमानत्वात् ; यो यः स्वस्मै प्रकाशते, स सर्वोऽहमित्येव प्रकाशते, यथा संसार्यात्मा ; यः पुनरहमिति न भाति नासौ स्वस्मै प्रकाशते, यथा घट इति । मैवम् । अहङ्कारविशिष्टो हि संसार्यात्मा अहमिदं जानामीति विशेषाकारेण सर्वं वेत्ति । अत एव तस्य स्वसंबद्ध-सर्वाभासकत्वं, न तु सर्वं स्वस्मै बोधयति, स्वं वा स्वस्मै बोधयति । चतुर्थ्यन्तप्रथमान्तपदार्थयोरैक्यायोगात् । न हि गुरुशिश्यायार्थं बोधयतीत्यादौ चतुर्थ्यन्तप्रथमान्तपदार्थयोरैक्यमस्ति । किंचायं बोधनात्प्रागेवात्मानं विदितवानिति व्यर्थं बोधनम् । न चाविदितवानिति वाच्यं, तथा सति बोधनस्यैवासम्भवात् ॥

ननु स्वस्मै प्रकाशमानत्वं नाम स्वार्थं प्रकाशमानत्वम् दीपादिस्तु न स्वार्थं प्रकाशते किन्तु परार्थमेवेति चेत्, नैतदपि । किमिदं प्रकाशमानत्वं तेजोधर्मभूतं, यद्वा ज्ञातृधर्मभूतम् ? नाद्यः, नीरूपत्वादात्मनः । द्वितीये तु दीपादेर्जडस्य नास्ति परार्थमपि ज्ञातृत्वम् । यदि तु दीपादेः प्रकाशमानत्वं तेजोधर्म एव, आत्मनस्तु प्रकाशमानत्वं ज्ञातृत्वमित्युच्यते, तर्हि किमयं स्वार्थं स्वं जानाति ? यद्वा परम् ? नाद्यः, ज्ञानकर्तृज्ञानकर्मत्वायोगात्, स्वज्ञानात्प्रागेव स्वस्य सिद्धत्वाच्च । द्वितीये किं परमात्मानं जानाति, यद्वा प्रकृतितत्कार्य-

जातम् ? नाद्यः । स्वस्यैव परमात्मत्वेनोक्तदोषानतिवृत्तेः । न द्वितीयः । प्रकृतितत्कार्यजातज्ञानजन्यस्य कस्यचिदर्थस्यात्मनोऽभावात् । प्रत्युत तज्ज्ञानस्यानर्थावहत्वात् ॥

ननु स्वस्य सुखाद्यर्थं संसार्यात्मा स्रक्चन्दनादिकं जानातीति चेन्मैवम् — स्रक्चन्दनादिज्ञानमात्रेण तस्य तदलाभात् । भवतु नाम संसार्यात्मनस्स्वस्वरूपसुखालाभाजन्यसुखार्थं तद्धेतुभूतस्रगादिवस्तुसम्भवः । मुक्तात्मनस्तु स्वस्वरूपसुखाविर्भावात्तास्त्येव विषयसुखापेक्षा । नास्ति च तत्र विषयसुखं, नाप्यस्ति विषयजातमिति । तस्मादात्मसुखार्थं विषयानुभवितृत्वरूपस्य स्वस्मै प्रकाशमानत्वस्य संसार्यात्मनि सत्त्वेऽपि न मुक्तात्मनि तत्सत्त्वमिति पक्षे हेत्वसिद्धिः । य एवं स्वस्मै प्रकाशते स संसार्यात्मा तु अहमित्येव प्रकाशते, अहमिदं जानामीति प्रतीतेस्तस्याहङ्कारविशिष्टत्वात् । घटादिस्तु नैवं भासते । तस्याहङ्कारवैशिष्ट्याभावात् । प्रत्यगात्मा च नैवं भासते, तस्याहङ्काराभावात् । किञ्च प्रत्यगात्मा परार्थमपि भासते, प्रत्यगात्मभानेनैव परस्य भानसम्भवात् ।

तस्य भासा सर्वमिदं विभाति ।

इति श्रुतेः । मुक्तात्मा तु न परार्थं भासते — परस्याभावात् । नापि स्वार्थं स्वस्य पूर्णकामत्वेन भानसम्पाद्यार्थाभावात् । तत्सत्त्वे चा अकृतकृत्यत्वेनामुक्तत्वादिति ॥

It is now enquired whether the "I" continues in the state of liberation or not. Some hold the view that it continues (even in that state). They argue like this: "It is not right to say that it does not continue. If that were the case, it would amount to saying in another way that the destruction of the self itself is liberation, because the "I", indeed, is the Self." This is not tenable. Since the "I", which is *ahaṅkāra*, is not-Self, liberation is the destruction of bondage alone which is in the form of the knot of *ahaṅkāra*; also, since the Self continues in liberation, there is no destruction of it. It may be argued: "The "I" alone constitutes the nature of the Self; but knowledge is its attribute; and so the destruction of the "I" in liberation is the destruction of the Self alone." It is not so. Since it is stated repeatedly in *śruti* that knowledge alone constitutes the nature of the Self, the "I" does not constitute the nature of the Self. However, the knowledge which is the attribute of it is modal cognition (*vṛtti-jñāna*) which is produced. Also, it is the characteristic of the internal organ; and it does not exist in liberation. The cognition, 'I know; I also have the knowledge that cognition has arisen in me' — this knowledge and the *ahaṅkāra* which is its locus, come into existence depending upon the reflected consciousness. So, the knowledge which is known to be the attribute of the "I" is modal cognition alone. The "I" which is known to be the locus of this knowledge is *ahaṅkāra* alone; and so knowledge is not the attribute of the Self; the eternal knowledge, *i.e.* consciousness, is not the attribute of the Self; nor is it the attribute of the not-Self; on the contrary, it is the very nature of the Self.

It is also maintained by them: "A person who thinks of himself as 'I am subject to suffering' goes after the means for the removal of suffering. If he knows that he will not be there (in liberation), he will run away the moment the story about liberation is commenced; thus, scripture which enunciates liberation will cease to be authoritative." This argument is not tenable. The immutable consciousness is the locus; the *ahaṅkāra* is superimposed thereon; therein is the reflection of consciousness — all these three taken together constitute the "I", the *jīva*, who is the *samsārin*. If so, just as a person associated with suffering endeavours for the removal of suffering, even so one who is associated with the *ahaṅkāra* which carries the reflection of consciousness endeavours for the destruction of the *ahaṅkāra* in which consciousness is reflected. This is one view. There is another view according to which the consciousness which is the locus and the *ahaṅkāra* which is superimposed thereon together constitute the "I", *i.e.* *jīva*. If so, one who is associated with *ahaṅkāra* endeavours for the destruction of *ahaṅkāra*. *Ahaṅkāra* and the reflection of consciousness therein — these two alone constitute the *jīva*. The reflection qualified by the *ahaṅkāra* endeavours for the destruction of the *ahaṅkāra* for the purpose of becoming one with the original; this is, yet, another view. In this view itself, there is another version according to which the *jīva* which is *ahaṅkāra* carrying the reflection endeavours to remain as consciousness which is its locus. It cannot be said that this view alone is vitiated by the defect of seeking one's own destruction, for it is only proper that the *ahaṅkāra* which was only the locus-consciousness before its origination desires to remain once again as the locus-consciousness.

There is another view which holds that Brahman alone which has attained the status of *jīva* through its *avidyā* endeavours to be free from the status of *jīva*. Views such as these are there in the ancient treatises they are not set forth here for fear of length. In all cases, the "I"-sense, which arises because of the false identification of consciousness with the *ahaṅkāra*, is bondage. When it is removed along with its root through knowledge, the attainment of the status of Brahman alone, which is its own nature, is liberation. It is no argument to say that the status of *jīva* is the inherent nature of the *jīva* and not the status of Brahman, for it has been shown by the example of a prince grown up in the family of hunters that Brahman alone, having entered into the body, is in the form of the *jīva* and so the inherent nature of the *jīva* is Brahman alone. It has been stated in that way in *śruti* also: "Having entered into it through the *jīva*, the Self..." (CU, 6, 3, 2).

It may be asked: "Let it be that the prince who has grown up in the family of the hunters, being ignorant of his birth, thinks of himself as a hunter; but how can Brahman assume the status of *jīva*." We reply: what is the untenability here, since there is *ajñāna*? So long as there is *vyavahāra*, Brahman, indeed, is delimited by *ajñāna*. Let it be that there is untenability in Brahman assuming the status of the *jīva*; even then, there is no damage to our position. We do not say that Brahman *really* assumes the form of the *jīva*, but only through *māyā*. That *māyā* illusorily superimposes the form of the *jīva* on Brahman in the same way as it falsely superimposes the form of a man on a post, that of a snake on a rope, that of

blueness on the sky, and that of tiger wandering in a forest on a person who is asleep. Indeed, what is real can never be removed; nor can it be removed through *jñāna*. If it be said that, if bondage is illusory, liberation, too, is illusory, it is acceptable to us. So, the *jīva* endeavours for regaining its inherent nature as Brahman by destroying the status of the *jīva* which has come into existence in the meantime; and so the scriptural treatise does not become futile.

It is stated by them: "The inward Self appears as the "I" in liberation." This is untenable. When it does not appear as the "I" in sleep, etc., how can it appear that way in liberation? The *ahaṅkāra*, indeed, exists in the form of *samskāra* in sleep, etc.; but in liberation it is destroyed along with its cause. Further, nowhere is there mere *ahaṅkāra*; at all times *ahaṅkāra* is seen as something qualified such as "I know," "I see," "I hear," and so on. It ("I") is not at all present in liberation, because there is association with the body and the senses. Further, if the "I" were to be there in liberation, then it would remember the suffering of bondage at that time; in that case, it would cease to be a *puruṣārtha*. Also, how can *ahaṅkāra* which is associated with the seed called *māyā* and which exists in sleep alone can exist in liberation which is devoid of the seed? It cannot be said that there is *ahaṅkāra* in sleep, for as long as there is *ahaṅkāra* there is no rise of it. That is why one thinks, "I did this," "I will do this again," before the rise of sleep. Therefore, the inward Self alone is there in liberation; it does not appear as the "I", for there is no appearance for the Self in the form of "I" or "this." Only the *ahaṅkāra* appears as the "I";

but the mind appears as "this," — both of them are the internal organ.

There is yet another argument. "The inward Self shines forth as the "I" in liberation, for it appears to itself. The general principle is that whatever appears to itself appears as the "I", *e.g.* the transmigrating self. On the contrary, whatever does not appear as the "I" does not appear to itself, *e.g.* a pot." This argument cannot be accepted. The transmigrating self which is, indeed, associated with the *ahankāra* knows everything in a specific way in the form, "I know this." That is why it knows everything as related to it. It does not know everything for its sake; nor does it know itself. The meanings of the words which are in the fourth and the first cases are not the same. In sentences such as "The teacher teaches the meaning to the student," there is no identification of the meanings of words which are in the fourth and the first cases. Further, since prior to the instruction itself the person knows himself, the instruction is useless. It cannot be said that he did not know himself; if that were the case, instruction itself cannot take place.

Let us consider another argument: "Appearing to oneself means appearing for the sake of oneself; lamp, etc., do not shine for their own sake; on the contrary, they shine for the sake of others." This argument cannot be accepted. Is this shining an attribute of the light or of the knower? It cannot be that of the former, for it is partless. If it be of the latter, then, there is no knowing for the sake of others in the case of lamp and other objects which are material. If it be said that while the shining of lamp, etc., is the attribute of the light, the shining of the Self is knowing,

then does it know itself for its own sake or does it know some other thing? The former is untenable, for the subject of knowledge cannot at the same time be the object of knowledge; and also because of the fact that it exists before it is known. If the latter, does it know the supreme Self or does it know *prakṛti* and its products? Not the former, because the Self itself is the supreme Self, and so the defect mentioned earlier cannot be escaped. Not the latter, for there is nothing which can produce for the Self the knowledge of *prakṛti* and its products. Such knowledge, on the contrary, is useless.

If it be said that the transmigrating self knows the garland, sandal paste, etc., it is not so; for it cannot attain it merely through the knowledge of the garland, sandal paste, etc. Let it be that for the transmigrating self there are objects for attaining the produced-happiness, since it is not able to realize its inherent happiness. But for the released Self there is no need of object-produced happiness, since there is the manifestation of one's own happiness. In that state there is no object-produced happiness; nor are there objects. Therefore, even though for the transmigrating self there is the appearance of the object for its sake for getting happiness, there is no reason for saying that this is also the case in respect of the released Self. That for whom something appears is the transmigrating self. That for whom something appears is the transmigrating self which shines as the "I". The cognition, "I know this," is that of the *ahaṅkāra* associated with it. Objects such as pot do not appear like this for they are not associated with *ahaṅkāra*. Also, the inward Self does not shine in this way, for it has no *ahaṅkāra*.

Further, the inward Self shines for the sake of others, for the shining of other objects takes place only through the shining of the inward Self. There is the *śruti* text, "Through Its shining, other objects shine." (*MU*, 2, 2,10) However, the released Self does not shine for the sake of others, for there is no "other" for it. Nor does it shine for its own sake; since all its desires are fulfilled, there is nothing to be attained through shining. If that were the case, since there is something yet to be accomplished, it is not released.

ANNA STUTI

याभिरादित्यस्तपति रश्मिभिस्ताभिः पर्जन्यो वर्षति पर्जन्ये-
 नौषधिवनस्पतयः प्रजायन्त ओषधिवनस्पतिभिरन्नं भवत्यन्नेन प्राणाः
 प्राणैर्बलं बलेन तपस्तपसा श्रद्धा श्रद्धया मेधा मेधया मनीषा
 मनीषया मनो मनसा शान्तिः शान्त्या चित्तं चित्तेन स्मृतिः स्मृत्या
 स्मारः स्मारेण विज्ञानं विज्ञानेनात्मानं वेदयति । तस्माद्दन्नं ददन्सर्वा-
 ण्येतानि ददात्यन्नात्प्राणा भवन्ति भूतानां प्राणैर्मनो मनसश्च
 विज्ञानं विज्ञानादानन्दो ब्रह्म योनिः ॥ *Mahānārāyaṇopaniṣad*, 79.15.

Those rays by which the sun gives heat, the same rays transform water into rain-cloud which showers the rain. By the rain-cloud herbs and trees come into existence. From herbs and trees food is produced. By the use of the food the breaths and senses are nourished. When the life-breath is nourished one gets bodily strength. Bodily strength gives the capacity to practise tapas. As the result of such tapas, faith in scriptural truths springs into existence. By faith mental power comes. By mental power sense-control is made possible. By sense-control reflection is engendered. From reflection calmness of mind results. Conclusive experience of Truth follows calmness. By conclusive experience of Truth, remembrance of It is engendered. Remembrance produces continuous remembrance. From continuous remembrance results unbroken direct realization of Truth. By such realization a person knows the Ātman. For this reason, he who gives food gives all these. For, it is found that the vital breaths and the senses of creatures are from food, that reflection functions with the vital breath and the senses, that unbroken direct realization comes from reflection, and that bliss comes from unbroken direct realization of Truth. Thus having attained bliss one becomes the Supreme which is the source of the universe.

ŚARĪRAKAVYĀKHYĀPRASTHĀNABHEDAḤ

Ātmavidyābhūṣaṇam V. S. V. Gurusvāmi Śāstri

*with a free rendering by
Dr V. K. S. N. Raghavan*

(Contd. from Vol. XIII. No. 4)

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सहेन्द्रियेण संयोगो न धर्मिज्ञानमीदृशम् ।
तद्धेतुत्वे च तद्धेतोर्मध्ये किं तेन साध्यते ॥

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इति नीत्या धर्मिधियोऽप्यस्ति यः कारणं स हि ।
धर्मिधीहेतुसंयोगः कारणत्वेन कल्प्यते ॥

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भाष्यटीकाविवरणैर्धर्मिधीहेतुतापरैः ।
विरुद्धमिव भासेत चक्रवर्तिमतं त्विदम् ॥

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सत्यमेवं तथाप्यस्ति भाष्यमस्यापि साधकम् ।
'दृश्यते'त्विति सूत्रस्य भाष्ये धर्मेण केनचित् ॥

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प्रपञ्चब्रह्मणोरस्ति सादृश्यमिति भाष्यकृत् ।
वभाषे यद्भवेन्मूलं चक्रवर्तिमतस्य तत् ॥

XI. श्रीप्रकाशानन्दयोगी

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मुक्तावळीप्रणेतारः प्रकाशानन्दयोगिनः ।
मुक्तावळ्यामुदाजहुः सिद्धान्तान्मुख्यतां गतान् ॥

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एकजीवं दृष्टिसृष्टिं सत्ताद्वैविध्यमेव च ।
केवलादेव वेदान्ताद्ब्रह्मसाक्षात्कृतिं तथा ॥

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सद्योमुक्तयुररीकारं जीवन्मुक्तावनादरम् ।
अविद्यायाः केवलाया जगत्कारणतामपि ॥

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सुरेश्वरं च सर्वज्ञमुनिं वासिष्ठमाश्रिताः ।
एते प्रसाधयामासुर्मुख्यसिद्धान्तवादिनः ॥

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सिद्धान्तसंग्रहीतारः श्रीमदप्पयदीक्षिताः ।
सिद्धान्तभेदमेतेषां समगृह्णन्कचित्स्थले ॥

जगदुपादानत्वं मायाया एव मुख्यं ब्रह्मणस्त्वौपचारिकम्

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मायैव जगतो योनिर्नैव ब्रह्म तथा भवेत् ।
कूटस्थत्वाद्ब्रह्म कार्यकारणाभ्यां विलक्षणम् ॥

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जगतः कारणं ब्रह्म बोधयन्ती श्रुतिस्तु या ।
सा जगद्योनिमायाया ह्यधिष्ठानसदात्मनः ॥

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औपचारिकमेवाह कारणत्वमितीदृशः ।
प्रकाशानन्दसिद्धान्तो भगवत्पादसंमतः ॥

[467]

तथा हि भगवत्पादा भाष्ये शारीरके मुखे ।
उपादानं निमित्तं चाप्यभिन्नं वादिनोऽपि ते ॥

[468]

‘जन्मादिसूत्रोपन्यस्तमनुमानं हि केवलम्’ ।
इति कस्यचिदाशङ्का विनिवर्तयितुं च ताम् ॥

[469]

शास्त्रयोनित्वसूत्रस्य प्रवृत्तिं प्रत्यबोधयन् ।
‘संसारिव्यतिरिक्तेशविद्यमानत्वसाधनम् ॥

[470]

एतदेवानुमानं स प्राह चेश्वरकारणी ।’
इत्यप्यवोचन्नेतेन भावो भाष्यकृतामयम् ॥

[471]

अनुमानस्य विषयः स्वरूपं कारणस्य यत् ।
विशिष्टं तन्निमित्तं तु चैतन्यांशोऽभिलष्यते ॥

[472]

उपाधिभूतमायैव ह्युपादानं भवेद्भ्रुवम् ।
मायानिष्ठं कारणत्वं ब्रह्मण्यप्युपचर्यते ॥

[473]

इमं भावं वार्तिककृत्प्राह स्वीये च वार्तिके ।
'अस्य द्वैतेन्द्रजालस्य यदुपादानकारणम् ॥

[474]

अज्ञानं तदुपाश्रित्य ब्रह्म कारणमुच्यते ।
तदिदं वार्तिकं भाष्यं मतस्यास्य हि साधकम् ॥

XII. ग्रन्थोपसंहारः

[475]

प्राचीनगुर्वष्टकसूक्तिसिद्धान्
सिद्धान्तभेदांश्च विमृश्य तेषाम् ।
प्रमाणभूतं भगवत्पदाना-
म्प्रादर्शयं भाष्यवचो विशुद्धम् ॥

[476]

पायासुराचार्यपदाम्बुजोत्थाः
परागभाराः परिधूतपापाः ।

समानतस्वान्ततमोन्तरायाः

कल्याणकल्पद्रुमकन्दला नः ॥

[477]

प्रबन्धमेतं विबुधा महान्तः

पश्यन्तु भावं कथयन्तु नैजम् ।

दोषो यदि स्यादपि तं प्रबोध्य

सन्तोऽनुगृह्णन्तु च मां सुशीलाः ॥

[478]

अयं गुरुस्वामिकवेः प्रबन्धः

साहित्यवेदान्तशिरोमणेः सः ।

पद्यैश्च हृद्यैर्ग्रथितः प्रवीणान्

प्रीणातु जीयाच्च चिरं धरायाम् ॥

[479]

शिवान्प्रकाशानानन्दान्गिरीन्नत्वा यतीश्वरान् ।

प्रबन्धमेतं भक्त्याहमर्पये तत्पदाब्जयोः ॥

[480]

चोलाभिधाने प्रथिते प्रदेशे कवेरजानीरपवित्रतीरे ।

अस्त्यग्रहारो वरहूरभिख्यः श्रियःपतिर्यत्र चकास्ति नित्यम् ॥

[481]

तत्राभवत्सङ्कृतिगोत्ररत्नं भक्ताग्रणीःशङ्करवैद्यनाथः ।
धर्माम्बिका तद्वयिता सुशीला तयोर्गुरुस्वाम्यभिधस्तनूजः ॥

[482]

षड्दर्शनीसारविदाञ्च शास्त्ररत्नाकराणां करुणानिधीनाम् ।
श्रीवैद्यनाथाभिधसद्गुरूणामनुग्रहात्प्राप्तपरात्मविद्यः ॥

[483]

निलिम्पवाण्यां निखिले च तन्त्रे निनान्तनिष्णात इतीममस्मै ।
सम्माननापत्रमदात्सभायां वी. वी. गिरिभारतराष्ट्रपालः ॥

[484]

प्राध्यापकोऽनन्तपुरे सुपर्व-

विद्यालये वेदशिरोविभागे ।

विनीय नैकान्सुचिरं विनेयान्

विश्रान्तिभाग् मद्रपुरीं श्रितोऽद्य ॥

॥ ओं तत् सत् , ब्रह्मार्पणमस्तु ॥

[453]

Even with regard to the illusory cognition of "This is silver," the mode of cognition of 'illusory silver' has the sense-object contact as its cause. Whether the cognition of it or the *tādātmyajñāna* of it — both have only such a cause.

[454-455]

The contact of the sense-organ (with the object) does not give rise to such a kind of *dharmijñāna* (knowledge pertaining to the substrate). "If it were the cause, because of such a cause, what sort of effect would result? Nothing would result." — following such a rule, a cause is postulated even in the case of *dharmijñāna*. This cause is fancied to be the contact of *dharmijñāna* and its basis.

[456]

This view of Cakravarti (Nṛsiṃhabhaṭṭa) presumably, contradicts the *Vivarāṇa* view, viz., *dharmidhihetutā* (cognition has for its cause the content alone).

[457-58]

There is, indeed, such a discrepancy. However, even the view of Cakravarti has its basis on the explanation of Śrī Śaṅkara, in his commentary on "*drśyate tu*" (BS. II. i. 6). According to Śrī Śaṅkara, the world and Brahman have some similarity with regard to certain features (*dharma*).

XI. PRAKĀŚĀNANDAYOGIN

[459]

The author of the *Muktāvali*, viz. Prakāśānandayogin has dealt with some important doctrines of Advaita in his work.

[460 - 62]

He has mainly followed the views of Suresvara, Sarvajñātmamuni and the *Yogavāsishtha*, viz. *ekajīva-vāda*, the theory of one *jīva* alone; *dr̥ṣṭisr̥ṣṭivāda*, the theory of 'what is seen is created'; *sattādvaividhya*, twofold nature of *sat*; Brahman-realization is possible only from Vedānta; the tenability of *sadyomukti*; indifference or disregard towards *jīvanmukti*; and, mere *avidyā* alone constitutes the cause of *jagat*.

[463]

In the *Siddhāntaleśasaṅgraha*, Appayyadīkṣita has enumerated the salient views of Prakāśānandayogin in one section.

Māyā alone forms the *upādānakāraṇa* of *jagat*; Brahman's causality is only *aupacārika* (secondary)

[464]

The cause of the world is *māyā* alone. Brahman is not the cause. For, Brahman is ever immutable, and hence it is absolutely distinct from being a cause or an effect.

[465 - 66]

The view of Prakāśānandayogin viz., "The Vedic text that speaks of Brahman to be a cause of the world

purports to imply: (i) *māyā* is the main cause of the world; (ii) the locus of *māyā* is *sat* (Brahman), and (iii) hence Brahman's causality is only *aupacārika* (secondary)" — is based on the accepted view of Śrī Śaṅkara.

[467 - 70]

In the introductory section of the *Brahmasūtra-bhāṣya*, Śrī Śaṅkara has said that the material as well as the efficient cause are identical and non-different. In the commentary on the second *sūtra*, "*janmādyasya yataḥ*", he proceeds to say that the *kevala-anumāna* of the second *sūtra* has its purpose mainly to emphasize the purport (*tātparya*) of the third *sūtra*, viz. "*śāstrayonitvāt*". "This *anumāna* (inference), which provides the basis for establishing the existence of God as clearly distinct from *jīva* (*samsārīn*), establishes God as the ultimate reality" — saying thus, Prakāśānanda refers to the accepted view of Śrī Śaṅkara.

[471 - 72]

Because the content of the inference relates to the essential feature of the ultimate reality, it is held that the consciousness (or the sentient one, *i.e.*, *jīva*) is qualified. Indeed, *māyā* (the illusory principle), being a limiting adjunct, constitutes the material cause of the world. The causality (*kāraṇatva*), which belongs to *māyā* alone, is superimposed on Brahman.

[473 - 74]

The author of the *Bṛhadāraṇyavārttika*, Suresvara has declared this view-point as: "The material cause of this dualistic *indrajāla* (illusion), *i.e.* the world, is

nothing but *ajñāna* (nescience). Attributing this nescience to Brahman, Brahman is spoken of to be the cause." So, this *Vārttika* and Śrī Śaṅkara's *Bhāṣya* corroborate the view of Prakāśānandayogin.

XII. CONCLUSION

[475]

Having pointed out the important and a few subtle differences prevalent in the views of eight preceptors, *viz.* Padmapāda, Maṇḍanamisra, Suresvara, Vimuktātman, Prakāṣārthakāra, Jñānaghanapāda, Nṛsiṃhabhaṭṭopādhyāya and Prakāśānandayogin from their works, I have shown the relevant passages of Śrī Śaṅkara's commentaries which provide the basis for the views of the eight important post-Śaṅkara preceptors.

[476]

May the blemishless, abundant mass of dust — (i) risen from the lotus-feet of Śrī Śaṅkara, (ii) which destroys completely the ignorance of his earnest devotees, and (iii) which resembles the sprouts of the wish-yielding (Kalpaka) tree, as it yields auspiciousness alone — protect all of us.

[477]

May the great learned scholars go through this work and express their opinions. If there are some defects, then, let the wise and good scholars point out the same to me and bless me.

[478]

This is the work of Gurusvāmī Śāstrī who is a Śiromaṇi in both Sāhitya and Vedānta. May this work embodying sweet verses please the versatile scholars and flourish triumphant on this earth always.

[479]

Having prostrated at the lotus-feet of the preceptors — Śrī Śaṅkara, Prakāśānandayogin, Ānandagiri and others, let me dedicate this work, with unalloyed devotion, at their lotus-like feet.

[480]

Lord Śriyaḥ-pati — Viṣṇu, shines gloriously ever at the village Varahūr, an *agrahāra* on the holy banks of the river Kāverī in the well-known region of Cōla country.

[481]

There dwelt the scion of devotees, Śrī Śaṅkara Vaidyanātha, a gem of Saṅkṛtgotra; and his wife was the virtuous Dharmāmbikā — and their son is called Gurusvāmī Śāstrī.

[482]

Gurusvāmī Śāstrī has studied Vedāntasāstra at the feet of the most compassionate Śrī Vaidyanātha Śāstrī, well-versed in all the six systems of Indian Philosophy and an ocean of Śāstraic learning (Śāstraratnākara).

[483]

The former President of India, Śrī V. V. Giri honoured Gurusvāmī Śāstrī, in an assembly of well-versed scholars, with a certificate of merit for his erudite scholarship in all branches of Sanskrit learning and the versatility in Vedāntic lore.

[484]

Gurusvāmī Śāstrī has been Professor of Vedānta at the Trivandrum *Sanskṛta Vidyālaya*; and, after teaching many a modest students there, he is now retired and presently living in Madras.

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 खिन्नानां जलकाङ्क्षया मरुभुवि भ्रान्त्या परिभ्राम्यताम् ।
 अत्यासन्नसुधाम्बुधिं सुखकरं ब्रह्माद्वयं दर्शय-
 त्येषा शङ्करभारती विजयते निर्वाणसन्दायिनी ॥

*samsārādhvani tāpabhānukiraṇaprodhbhūtadāhavyathā-
 khinnānāṃ jalakāṅkṣayā marubhuvi bhrāntyā
 paribhrāmyatām
 atyāsannasudhāmbudhiṃ sukhakaraṃ brahmādvayaṃ
 darśayaty-
 eṣā śaṅkarabhārati vijayate nirvāṇasandāyini.*

To those who are afflicted, in the way of the world, by the burning pain given rise to by the scorching sun-shafts of misery, and who through delusion wander about in the desert (of worldliness) seeking water — showing the felicitous ocean of nectar, which is very near, the non-dual *Brahman*, this — the Voice of Śaṅkara — is victorious, leading, as it does, to liberation.