

A QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ADVAITA - VEDĀNTA

The VOICE of ŚĀNĪKĀRĀ


śāṅkara-bhāratī

Chairman, Advisory Board
H. R. Edgmontones Sastri

Editor
N. C. Krishnan

Volume FOURTEEN

Number THREE



November

1989

esā śaṅkara-bhāratī vijagate
nirvāṇa-sandāyini

victorious is the voice of śaṅkara,
leading, as it does, to liberation

The Voice of Śaṅkara
is published under the guidance of
His Holiness Jagadguru Śrī Śaṅkarācārya
of Kāñcī Kāmakoti Pīṭha
by Ādi Śaṅkara Advaita Research Centre

Registered Office:

26, College Road,
Nungambakkam,
Madras-600 006.

Subscriptions are to be sent to:

The Administrative Officer,
Ādi Śaṅkara Advaita Research Centre,
26, College Road, Nungambakkam,
Madras-600 006.

Subscription Rates:

	Indian	Foreign
Annual	Rs. 60/-	US Dollars 20
For two years	Rs. 100/-	US Dollars 36
Life	Rs. 500/-	US Dollars 200
Single copy	Rs. 20/-	US Dollars 6

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HOMAGE TO ŚAṄKARA

[136]

अन्यैर्भिषग्भिरनिवार्यमहामयं मे
यस्मात्त्वमाद्यभिषगस्यचिरान्निवार्य ।
अज्ञानसंज्ञमतिनिश्चलबोधदानात्
श्रीशङ्करार्यं मम देहि पदावलम्बम् ॥

*anyair-bhiṣagbhir-anivāryamahāmayam me
yasmāttvamādyā-bhiṣagasy-acirān-nivārya
ajñānasamjñam-atiniścalabodha-dānāt
śrīśaṅkarārya mama dehi padāvalambam.*

Oh Śrī Śaṅkara! being as you are the first and foremost doctor, prithee! after removing at once my serious disease known as nescience — which can never be removed by other doctors — by enlightening me with your extremely unchanging wisdom, kindly give me shelter under your feet.

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वातावधूतवरुणालयभङ्गगर्व-
 भङ्गप्रचण्डवचसः प्रभवन्ति यत्ते ।
 मूका अपि प्रणमनात्पदयोः सकृत्तत्
 श्रीशङ्करार्यं मम देहि पदावलम्बम् ॥

*vātāvadhūta-varuṇālaya-bhaṅga-garva-
 bhaṅga-pracaṇḍavacasah prabhavanti yatte
 mūkā api praṇamanāt-padayoḥ sakṛt-tat
 śrīśaṅkarārya mama dehi padāvalambam.*

Oh Śrī Śaṅkara! because of paying obeisance just once to your pair of feet, even the mutes become eloquent and make a thundrous lecture resembling the blast of the tempest which defeats the roarings of tidal waves of the ocean agitated by the wind.

Jagadguru Śrī Saccidānanda Śivābhinava Nṛsimha-bhārati
 in *Śrīśaṅkarācāryapadāvalambastava*

ĀCĀRYAS AND GURUS*

Jagadguru Śrī Candrasekharendra Sarasvatī

We use the two words "Guru" and "Ācārya" as synonymous terms; but according to pandits, there is a distinction without much of a difference. Etymologically considered, the word "Ācārya" comes from the root "cara" with its various sprouts like "ācāra", "ācaraṇa", etc. meaning conduct, character, the right way of life or following the rules laid down in the *śāstras*. Obviously, the Ācārya is one who shows the student how to conduct himself rightly through the rugged pathways of life. The following definition of Ācārya is given in this *śloka* (*Dvayopaniṣad*, 4):

आचिनोति हि शास्त्रार्थान् आचारे स्थापयत्यपि ।
स्वयम् आचरते यश्च तमाचार्यं प्रचक्षते ॥

This means that whoever has understood the value and significance of the *śāstras* has not only to teach them to his disciples and make them follow the precepts but he has to be an exemplar in his own life of

*Courtesy: *Deyvattin Kural*, Vol. II, 43-50; III, 21-35.
English translation by ARGUS.

those śāstraic injunctions. He should not stop with the precepts but practise them too. In the ancient times, the Ācāryas have taught the disciples arts and sciences; there are evidences in the epics where such names as Droṇācārya, Kṛpācārya and Bhīṣmācārya are mentioned, who taught their disciples not only the art of statesmanship but the arts of warfare such as archery, wrestling, etc.

But who is a *Guru*? Literally, the word means 'heavy', 'big' and naturally applied to one who is great and esteemed. He is a "Mahān", a master, who is big, not in size, but in intelligence, experience and grace. In one sense, it can be said that while the *guru* is great intrinsically, the Ācārya is so extrinsically. The latter has to teach mankind the right way of behaviour, conduct and course of life, even as he leads an ideal life.

Etymologically, the word "guru" is split into two syllables, of which "gu" means darkness and "ru" means removal. Hence the Guru is a remover of the darkness of ignorance of the disciple and leads him on to spiritual enlightenment. In this sense, he is greater than father and mother who had only given the disciple his physical mortal frame, while the Guru shows him the path to immortality. Hence the link between Guru and disciple is very strong and vital, like the electric wire which leads the current from the generator to the bulb for illumination. Quite unlike the Ācārya who teaches his students by oral instruction, the Guru does not instruct his disciple verbally, but initiates him into esoteric spiritual truths by his grace either by touch, sight or *mantras* (silently given by mouth to ear).

Several are the instances in the scriptures and theological literature of such initiations, of which Kabīrdās can be cited as a classic example. The boy Kabīr in whom the religious passion was innate, saw in Rāmānanda, the spiritual teacher whose reputation was then at its height, his destined Guru. But he was diffident how a Hindu *guru* would accept a Muslim disciple. He therefore hid himself in the night by lying upon the steps of the river Ganges, where St. Rāmānanda was accustomed to bathe, with the result that the Master, coming down to the water, stood upon his body unexpectedly, and exclaimed in his astonishment, "Rām, Rām" — the *bīja-mantra* by which he (Rāmānanda) worshipped the Lord. Kabīr then declared that he had received the *mantra* of initiation from Rāmānanda's lips, and was by it admitted to discipleship. In spite of the protests of both orthodox Hindus and Muslims, he persisted in his claim and Rāmānanda too accepted him thus proving in action the very principle of religious synthesis which Rāmānanda has sought to establish in thought.

Guru is Greater than God

Why is it stated that the Guru is greater than God, and devotion to Guru is preferable to devotion to God? The primary answer is that no one has seen God, but the Guru is a person visible to us; one who is confirmed in spiritual knowledge and who, like the tortoise, can draw in all his senses and restrain them from their wonted purposes. If one can get that peace and happiness from the Guru, why should one go in search of God then, feels the disciple. Hence is this *śloka* oft-repeated by the disciple:

गुरुर्ब्रह्मा गुरुर्विष्णुः गुरुर्देवो महेश्वरः ।
गुरुः साक्षात्परं ब्रह्म तस्मै श्रीगुरवे नमः ॥

The Guru is a visible God and if only the disciple is devoted to him, worshipping his feet, he would get all the benefits that he might hope to receive by devotion to God. This does not mean that he could afford to forget God. It is the Guru alone who has made the disciple's link with God. Without divine grace, how could he have met his Guru in the first instance?

दुर्लभं त्रयमेवैतद् देवानुग्रहहेतुकम् ।
मनुष्यत्वं मुमुक्षुत्वं महापुरुषसंश्रयः ॥

The above *śloka* from the *Viveka-cūḍāmaṇi* (3) signifies that only by divine grace that man gets three gifts: first, his birth as a human being; secondly, the desire for spiritual enlightenment; and finally, getting a Mahāpuruṣa as his Guru.

Īśvara alone is the Guru for all humanity at all times; and He is the Lord Dakṣiṇāmūrti.

स पूर्वेषामपि गुरुः कालेनानवच्छेदात् ।

One's Guru must have attained wisdom from his Guru, and this goes on *ad infinitum* till we reach the ultimate *Guru* who is *Īśvara*. So one cannot afford to ignore the existence of *Īśvara*, in one's devotion to the *guru*.

When talking about the chief of the Gurus in Brahma Vidyā, namely, Sage Vyāsa, whose other name is Bādarāyaṇa, the following *śloka* is referred to:

अचतुर्वदनो ब्रह्मा द्विबाहुरपरो हरिः ।

अफाललोचनः शम्भुः भगवान् बादरायणः ॥

That is, Sage Vyāsa is described as Brahmā with one face (instead of four), as Lord Viṣṇu with two hands (instead of four), and as Lord Śiva with no third eye. There is none greater than the *guru*. If complete faith is reposed in him, truly and sincerely, feeling that Īsvara himself is incarnate in him, then there is no need to worship any other gods. That wisdom can be gained only by the grace of the *guru* is reiterated in the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* (VI. 14.2) by the phrase “*ācāryavān puruṣo veda*” meaning that only the person who has obtained a Guru can attain wisdom. This is illustrated by a story in the *Upaniṣad*. A person coming from Gāndhāra is blindfolded and left in a desert far away from his place. How desolate and miserable would be his position? Not knowing what is east, west, north or south, how can he return to his place? Likewise are we all blindfolded by *māyā*, not knowing the nature of Reality. He who unties our eye-bandage of *māyā* is the *guru*. Once the person’s bandage is removed, he is free to go back to his place in Gāndhāra. The *Chāndogyopaniṣad* points out that it is only by the Guru’s initiation that the disciple can know whence he came, whither he is going and return back to the high heaven from where there is no more return back to birth.

Śrī Ādi Śaṅkara Bhagavatpāda praises the greatness of the *guru* in several places, and chiefly in the *Gurvaṣṭaka* where he says: “Of what avail is man’s fame, wealth and greatness, if he does not bind his mind and place it at the feet of his Guru?” He does

not use the phrase "of what avail" once, but four times in each *śloka*.

ततः किं, ततः किं, ततः किं, ततः किम् ॥

Thus in the eight stanzas, he asks the same question thirty-two times.

In the last discourse, before he freed himself from his mortal coils, he made this important point about daily devotion and obeisance to the feet of the *guru* in this *śloka*:

सद्विद्वान् उपसृप्यताम् प्रतिदिनं तत्पादुका सेव्यताम् ।
ब्रह्मैकाक्षरम् अथ्यताम् श्रुतिशिरोवाक्यं समाकर्ष्यताम् ॥

"Thou shalt seek an excellent, virtuous Guru. Daily thou shalt offer worship to his feet. From him thou shalt obtain initiation about the *praṇava*, and about the *mahāvākyas* of the *Upaniṣads*."

The same idea is declared in the *Bhagavad Gītā* (IV. 34), by Bhagavān:

तद्विद्धि प्रणिपातेन परिप्रश्नेन सेवया ।
उपदेक्ष्यन्ति ते ज्ञानं ज्ञानिनस्तत्त्वदर्शिनः ॥

"The highest is self-knowledge, O Pārtha! Learn that by worshipping the feet of the teacher, by questioning and by service. The men of knowledge who have *seen* (not those who know merely by the intellect), the true principle of things, will instruct thee in knowledge."

The true foundation for the disciple's humility, self-restraint, and gradually devotion to *Īsvara*, and finally self-realisation lies in his *guru-bhakti*.

DISPASSION AND DUTY*

Jagadguru Śrī Jayendra Sarasvatī

(1) *Drive Away Desire and Develop Dispassion*

Desire is the root-cause of all misery. Inasmuch as one is not able to fulfil a desire, another desire springs forth. Desire grows more and more and becomes manifold. If one has an itching in the body, at once one scratches the body. At that time it may be quite comfortable. But later on the itching grows into a burning sensation. Similar is the case with desire which increases more and more, resulting in untold misery. With regard to the creeper-like desire, one should carefully nip it in the bud itself. One should destroy desire altogether; for this purpose one should inculcate dispassion and forbearance.

Forbearance eradicates desire. One should be free from pride and haughtiness; and one should refrain from committing sins. One should follow the

*Courtesy: *Amudamoli*, Sri Ram Trust, Madras-1, 1987, pp. 129-30 and 141-42. Free rendering in English: Dr V. K. S. N. Raghavan.

great men and speak truth alone. Company of the learned and virtuous people and honouring them will be surely beneficial to gain dispassion. (i) To be modest, and (ii) to refrain from doing wicked deeds are the salient virtues; and one should essentially follow these two noble virtues. One should always be merciful towards the weak and poor people who suffer very much. The above-mentioned principles are to be strictly followed; then only one can destroy the venom of desire. The great men always possess such good habits.

Some people, even in their old age when their hair become grey and their body becomes frail, do not give up desire. Their desire holds on to the youthful vigour. Aging gives rise to sleeplessness. Memory of the previous stages clings to a person even in old age. Therefore, to kill such passions one should contemplate on the supreme Being. One should inculcate the meditation of God even from childhood. Then only, one can have easy access to have steady remembrance of God during the old age. To root out desire, one must emulate good habits. Good habits and virtuous conduct are very much necessary even in one's young age.

If a person tries to think of God only in the fag end of one's life, one cannot succeed at all. If one wants to free oneself from the cycle of birth and death, one must incessantly think of God even at the last stage of life. If one thinks something else instead of God, at the death bed, then one has to suffer for it in the next birth. It is inevitable for us, therefore, to practise good habits and inculcate virtuous conduct from the virtuous people.

(2) *Adherence to Duty is All-important*

Duty differs from one individual to another. The duty of a person has no link with another's duty. One should strictly adhere to one's duty and need not bother about, and depend on, another's duty. After saying that one carries out the duties of another, one should not abandon one's own duties. Not bothering about others' activities, one should ever stick to one's own duties and should carry out them fully.

For instance, if a husband has not fulfilled his duty towards his wife, then for that matter, his wife should not refrain from the duties enjoined on her towards her husband. Giving up duties, generally the people talk about the rights alone very much now-a-days. However, if all the members of the society, as a whole, adhere to their respective duties, the crises and turmoils of the society will vanish altogether.

Now, generally we have given up the innate desire to lead a simple and sacred life. We have discarded discipline. Instead, we are prone to adjust ourselves to all and sundry, especially, a profane way of life. In our day-to-day activities, we seek luxury sacrificing simplicity. Though we possess the eternal, immutable Self, we do not care for realizing or even knowing It. Instead, we always bother about satisfying the craving of the corporeal, destructible physical body.

Tapas consists in regulating and controlling the mind to lead a righteous life. But, presently it is found that the word '*tapas*' has lost its import because of the

people's scant courtesy to think of it even. The main roots of "*ātma-śakti*" (the strength of every individual self) are: (i) disciplined mind and (ii) pure and perfect, moral life. But, today, we find these roots completely dried up. So, how can we derive "*ātma-śakti*" now? Therefore, practices for inculcating dispassion and adherence to duty are all-important now.

THE FOUR INDISPENSABLE
QUALIFICATIONS

*(An extract from Sarva-vedānta-siddhānta-sāra-saṅgraha
of Śrī Saṅkara Bhagavatpāda)*

Free rendering by
Dr V. K. S. N. Raghavan

(Contd. from Vol. XIV, No. 1-2)

THE FOUR IMPERIALS
OF THE EAST

THE HISTORY OF THE
EMPERORS OF CHINA

BY
H. H. DODD

TRANSLATED BY
H. H. DODD

[121]

इन्द्रियेष्विन्द्रियार्थेषु प्रवृत्तेषु यदृच्छया ।
अनुधावति तान्येव मनो वायुमिवानलः ॥

As, by chance, the sense organs move about towards the objects of senses, even the mind follows the objects of senses alone, just as the fire follows the path of the wind.

[122]

इन्द्रियेषु निरुद्धेषु त्यक्त्वा वेगं मनः स्वयम् ।
सत्त्वभावमुपादत्ते प्रसादस्तेन जायते ॥
प्रसन्ने सति चित्तेऽस्य मुक्तिः सिद्ध्यति नान्यथा ॥

When a person restrains the sense organs and controls them, the mind abandons its haste (speed) on its own; and, thus the mind becomes gentle and placid. The mind also attains equanimity. Only when the mind becomes calm and quiet, one can attain beatitude, and not otherwise.

[123]

मनः प्रसादस्य निदानमेव निरोधनं यत्सकलेन्द्रियाणाम् ।
बाह्येन्द्रिये साधु निरुध्यमाने बाह्यार्थभोगो मनसो वियुज्यते ॥

The fundamental cause of mental equipoise (serenity) is nothing but the total control of all senses (of action and knowledge). When a person controls well all the external senses, the mind gets freed from the enjoyment of external objects.

[124]

तेन स्वदौष्ट्यं परिमुच्य चित्तं शनैः शनैः शान्तिमुपाददाति ।
चित्तस्य बाह्यार्थविमोक्षमेव मोक्षं विदुर्मोक्षणलक्षणज्ञाः ॥

Therefore (inasmuch as the mind gets freed from the enjoyment of external objects), the mind abandons its own arrogance, and then it gains serenity (quietitude) slowly. The wise who know the definition of *mokṣa* (liberation) call the mind's disentanglement from (the attachment of) the external objects as *mokṣa*.

[125]

दमं विना साधु मनःप्रसादहेतुं न विद्मः सुकरं मुमुक्षोः ।
दमेन चित्तं निजदोषजातं विसृज्य शान्तिं समुपैति शीघ्रम् ॥

The aspirant of *mokṣa* can easily attain the serenity of mind through the control of senses (*dama*). There is no other way to get the serenity of mind. Because of the sense-control, the mind leaves off all its defects and quickly gets calmness.

[126]

प्रणायामाद्भवति मनसो निश्चलत्वं प्रसादो
यस्याप्यस्य प्रतिनियतदिग्देशकालाद्यवेक्ष्य ।
सम्यग्दृष्ट्या क्वचिदपि तथा नो दमो हन्यते त-
त्कुर्याद्धीमान्दममनलसश्चित्तशान्त्यै प्रयत्नात् ॥

The mind attains peace by the control of breath (*prāṇāyāma*). *Prāṇāyāma* is to be performed properly

in accordance with the *Sāstras* and with due regard to direction, place, time, etc. Thus one can restrain the sense organs well, and then attain *samyag-dr̥ṣṭi* (clear perception). And it (the right perception) does not fade away at all. So a wise person should carefully develop self-restraint with earnest interest for the sake of achieving the peace of mind.

[127]

सर्वेन्द्रियाणां गतिनिग्रहेण भोग्येषु दोषाद्यवमर्शनेन ।
ईशप्रसादाच्च गुरोः प्रसादाच्छान्तिं समयात्यचिरेण चित्तम् ॥

As a result of (i) thorough control of senses from flowing (towards objects), (ii) knowing the objects of enjoyment as ever full of evil, and (iii) the blessings of God (Īsvara) and those of the *Guru* (preceptor), very soon the mind attains peace (serenity).

Fortitude (Titikṣā)

[128]

आध्यात्मिकादि यद्दुःखं प्राप्तं प्रारब्धवेगतः ।
अचिन्तया तत्सहनं तितिक्षेति निगद्यते ॥

Fortitude consists in the endurance — devoid of any worry — of the threefold miseries* of life from which one has to suffer as a result of one's *prārabdhakarma* (actions that have started to yield fruit).

* The threefold miseries are: (1) *ādhyātmika*, related to body and mind; (ii) *ādhibhautika*, related to the evil influences of the animals and other beings, and (iii) *ādhidāivika*, the ills caused by supernatural forces like wind, rain, etc.

[129]

रक्षा तितिक्षासदृशी मुमुक्षोर्न विद्यतेऽसौ पविना न भिद्यते ।
यामेव धीराः कवचीव विघ्नान्सर्वास्तृणीकृत्य जयन्ति मायाम् ॥

Other than *titikṣā* (fortitude), there is no strong armour to an aspirant of *mokṣa* (liberation). This fortitude can never be destroyed by even the thunder-bolt (*pavi* or *vajrāyudha*). Because of this fortitude the wise are able to conquer *māyā*, after overcoming all obstacles — which are like straw for them —, just as a warrior who has put on an armour wins all his enemies.

[130]

क्षमावतामेव हि योगसिद्धिः स्वराज्यलक्ष्मीसुखभोगसिद्धिः ।
क्षमाविहीना निपतन्ति विघ्नैर्वर्तैर्हताः पर्णचया इव द्रुमात् ॥

Only those who have fortitude can obtain the success of *yoga*.* They alone can attain the bliss of self-realization. People without fortitude fail miserably (in all their endeavour) because of many impediments just as the leaves of trees get destroyed or blown away by the hurricane. (* Cf. *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, VII, xxv, 1).

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तितिक्षया तपो दानं यज्ञस्तीर्थं व्रतं श्रुतम् ।
भूतिः स्वर्गोऽपवर्गश्च प्राप्यते तत्तादर्थिभिः ॥

By means of fortitude, one can attain the fulfilment of anything like *tapas* (penance), offering of gifts (*dāna*), sacrifice (*yajña*), pilgrimage (*tīrtha*), austerities

(*vrata*), Vedic study (*śruta*), material welfare (*bhoga*), heaven (*svarga*), and even spiritual welfare (*apavarga*).

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ब्रह्मचर्यमहिंसा च साधूनामप्यगर्हणम् ।
पराक्षेपादिसहनं तितिक्षोरेव सिद्धयति ॥

Only a person who has gained fortitude, can get success (i) in the observance of celibacy (*brahmacarya*) and non-violence (*ahimsā*), (ii) in refraining from insulting pious men (saints), and (iii) in enduring the insult (*apavāda*) perpetrated by others against him.

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साधनेष्वपि सर्वेषु तितिक्षोत्तमसाधनम् ।
यत्र विघ्नाः पलायन्ते दैविका अपि भौतिकाः ॥

Among all the means to get *mokṣa*, *titikṣā* (fortitude) is invariably the foremost. In front of fortitude, all the miseries caused by the natural and even the supernatural agencies take to their heels.

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तितिक्षोरेव विघ्नेभ्यस्त्वनिवर्तितचेतसः ।
सिद्धयन्ति सिद्धयः सर्वा अणिमाद्याः समृद्धयः ॥

When a person has got fortitude, he does not go back from the pursuit of *mokṣa* even while he has to face innumerable difficulties. Only such a person can obtain the supernatural powers of *aṇimā** etc.

* 1. *aṇimā* — ability to become subtle; 2. *mahimā* — ability to become gross or great; 3. *garimā* — ability to

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तस्मान्मुमुक्षोरधिका तितिक्षा सम्पादनीयेप्सितकार्यसिद्धयै ।
तीव्रा मुमुक्षा च महत्युपेक्षा चोभे तितिक्षासहकारिकारणम् ॥

Therefore a *mumukṣu* (seeker of liberation) should gain *titikṣā* in entirety to achieve success in his endeavour. Such a *titikṣā* results from a fervent longing of *mokṣa* and from an intense *vairāgya* (dispassion).

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तत्कालसमागतामयततेः शान्त्यै प्रवृत्तो यदि
स्यात्तत्परिहारकौषधरतस्तच्चिन्तने तत्परः ।
तद्विक्षुः श्रवणादिधर्मरहितो भूत्वा मृतश्चेत्ततः
किं सिद्धं फलमाप्नुयादुभयथा भ्रष्टो भवेत्स्वार्थतः ॥

If a renounced person (*sannyāsin* or saint) (i) gives up his prescribed duties (*dharma*) — *viz.* the study of the *Veda*, and austere way of life —, and (ii) whiles away his time in brooding over the various diseases (of his body) to which his body is heir, and so (iii) goes in search of medicines to get relief, then what is the purpose of life to such a renounced person? He will fail miserably both in this world and hereafter.

(to be continued)

become heavy; 4. *laghimā* — ability to get weightlessness; 5. *prāptih* — power of fulfilment of all desires; 6. *prākāmyam* — strength of unsurpassed will-power; 7. *īśitvam* — ability of ruling everything; 8. *vaśitvam* — supreme power of subjugation (*kāmāvusāyitvam* — power to reach the goal of suppression of all desires).

THE TAITTIRĪYOPANIṢADBHĀṢYA OF ŚRĪ ŚANKARA

R. Balasubramanian

1. *The Taittirīyopaniṣad: An Analysis*

The *Yajurveda* consists of two recensions, the *Taittirīya* and the *Vājasaneyī*. The *Taittirīyopaniṣad* belongs to the former recension, while the *Īśāvāsya* and the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* Upaniṣads belong to the latter.

The *Taittirīyopaniṣad* which forms part of the *Taittirīya Āraṇyaka* consists of three chapters called *Śikṣāvallī*, *Brahmavallī* (also known as *Ānandavallī* or *Brahmānandavallī*) and *Bṛguvallī*. The *Śikṣāvallī* is also referred to as the *Sāṃhitī Upaniṣad*, since the study of the *sāṃhitā* forms part of it. The remaining two chapters are together called the *Vāruṇī Upaniṣad*, because they deal with the knowledge of the highest Brahman (*Brahmavidyā*) as taught by Varuṇa. Each of these chapters is divided into sections (*anuvāka*). There are twelve sections in the *Śikṣāvallī*, nine in the *Brahmavallī*, and ten in the *Bṛguvallī*.

The *Śikṣāvallī* is mainly concerned with *saguṇa-vidyā*, the knowledge of the conditioned Brahman. It gives an account of the various meditations (*upāsanā*) to be practised by the spiritual aspirant for attaining concentration or one-pointedness of mind which is necessary for Brahman-realization. While the performance of *karma* disinterestedly in a spirit of dedication to God purifies the mind and creates a desire for knowledge (*vividiṣā*), the practice of meditation is conducive to the concentration of the mind or the development of the one-pointed intellect.¹ It is with a view to help the spiritual aspirant qualify for the *nirguṇavidyā*, the knowledge of the unconditioned Brahman, that the *Śikṣāvallī* proceeds to explain the different meditations.

Of the twelve sections of the first chapter, the first one contains a prayer to the gods for the removal of obstacles in the way of *saguṇa-vidyā*. The second section, which deals with the science of pronunciation (*śikṣā*), stresses that there should not be any slackness or indifference in the recital of the text. Meditation on the *samhitā*, which is taught in the third section, will secure fruits of this and the future world. If a person meditates on the *samhitā* without any desire for fruits such as cattle and heaven, he will attain purification of the mind, which is necessary for the attainment of Brahman-knowledge. The fourth section gives an account of the *mantras* which are to be recited and also of the oblations to be offered for attaining good memory, sound health, intelligence and wealth. The fifth section teaches meditation on the *vyāhṛtis*, which is conducive [to the attainment of independent sovereignty. The sixth section gives instruction on the

meditation of Brahman as located in the cavity of the heart (*hrdayākāśa*) and as possessed of such attributes as "formed of mind", etc., for mediocre students. Meditation on Brahman as endowed with perceptible qualities with a view to help aspirants who are inferior is taught in the seventh section. The eighth section teaches meditation on *Om* which is a means for attaining the supreme Brahman or the *Hiranyagarbha* in accordance with the manner in which it is meditated upon. This meditation is for the benefit of superior students. The ninth section stresses the importance of the duties enjoined by *śruti* and *smṛti* such as the study of Scripture, the performance of rites, the practice of ethical virtues, and the fulfilment of social obligations, along with the practice of *upāsanā*. The entire *mantra* of the tenth section is to be recited by the spiritual aspirant, as such a recital is conducive to the attainment of the purification of the mind and thereby of Brahman knowledge. Trisāᅅku gives expression in this *mantra* to his experience of Brahman-realization. The eleventh section contains the post-instruction of the teacher to the students returning home after the completion of their studies. It is intended to show that the performance of rites is conducive to the rise of knowledge. In the last section of the first chapter the disciple expresses his gratitude in the form of thanks-giving to the gods for protecting him and his teacher.

The *Brahmavallī* consists of nine sections. It teaches the knowledge of the unconditioned Brahman (*nirguᅅavidyā*), which alone can destroy ignorance, the root cause of bondage. The lapidary opening sentence of the first section, "The knower of Brahman attains

the highest," lays down that the knowledge of Brahman is the means to liberation. After defining Brahman as the real, knowledge, and infinite, the *Upaniṣad* proceeds to show in this section that Brahman is identical with the inward Self, which is concealed by the five sheaths (*pañca-kośa*) arranged in a telescopic manner, one inside another, the outer deriving its being from the inner. An account of the outermost sheath, the *annamaya-kośa*, which is a product of food, is also given in this section. The sheath of vitality (*prāṇamaya-kośa*), the sheath of the mind (*manomaya-kośa*), the sheath of the intellect (*vijñānamaya-kośa*), and the sheath of bliss (*ānandamaya-kośa*) are described respectively in the second, third, fourth, and fifth sections. These sheaths constitute the gross, subtle, and causal bodies of the individual and the cosmic being. The fifth section teaches that, as distinguished from these sheaths, there is Brahman-Ātman, which is the support of all these sheaths. The sixth section raises an important question whether Brahman, which is devoid of all distinctions, which is beyond all empirical relationships, exists or not. It also raises the further question whether the knower of Brahman or an ignorant man attains Brahman. The *Upaniṣad* proceeds to set forth in this section the existence of Brahman as the cause of the universe consisting of things with and without form. Further reasons for the existence of Brahman are given in the seventh section. Brahman, it is said, must exist as the source of joy enjoyed by all creatures, as the cause of all vital and organic functions of the *jīva*, and as the cause of fear and fearlessness of the men of ignorance and knowledge respectively. The eighth section, which contains a calculus of pleasure, describes Brahman as bliss *par excellence* of which worldly happiness enjoyed

by all creatures is a particle. Worldly happiness increases a hundredfold as one ascends to the different classes of celestial beings mentioned in this section. A person well-versed in the *Veda* and also free from desire and sin enjoys the highest bliss which is Brahman. It is also stated in this section that one who knows Brahman, the highest bliss, as non-dual, *i.e.* as the same both in the human person and in the sun, attains it by differentiating it from the not-Self. The concluding section of the *Brahmavallī* states that he who has realized Brahman, which is beyond the grasp of speech and mind, is not afraid of anything whatsoever. The knower of Brahman, who remains as Brahman, is not tormented by good and evil which are relevant only in the relative sphere of ignorance.

There are ten sections in the *Bhṛguvallī*. Narrating the story of the dialogue between Bhṛgu, the disciple, and Varuṇa, his father, the opening section of this chapter defines Brahman as that from which the universe comes into being, that by which it lives, and that into which it is finally merged. How Bhṛgu was able to arrive at Brahman-Ātman as the cause of the creation, continuance, and dissolution of the universe as a result of his systematic inquiry into *anna*, *prāṇa*, *manas*, *viññāna*, and *ānanda*, is stated in sections II to VI. The *Upaniṣad* declares in the sixth section that any one who knows Brahman in the manner in which Bhṛgu did becomes firmly established in Brahman, *i.e.* he becomes Brahman itself. Sections VII to X explain certain meditations on food, which have not been dealt with earlier in the *Upaniṣad*. The tenth section concludes with an account of a *jīvanmukta*. The knower of Brahman, who has realized the oneness of

all things, proclaims his non-dual experience for the benefit of spiritual aspirants.

As one reads this *Upaniṣad*, one will be struck by the remarkable sequence, both chronological and logical, in the presentation of the subject matter. The *Śikṣāvallī* explains scriptural rites and meditations which are remote aids (*bahiraṅga-sādhana*) to the attainment of Brahman-knowledge. While the performance of rites in a spirit of dedication to God leads to the purification of the mind, the practice of meditation in the manner in which they are prescribed by Scripture without any desire for the fruits thereof helps one to have concentration of the mind. Only a person whose mind is purified and who is capable of concentration is eligible for the study of the *Vedānta*. Guided study (*śravaṇa*), rational reflection (*manana*), and repeated contemplation (*nīdīdhyāsana*) are the principal proximate aids (*mukhyāntaraṅga-sādhana*) to the attainment of knowledge. One should resort to the study (*śravaṇa*) of the *Vedānta* only after fulfilling the requirements of eligibility as stated above; for, otherwise, the study of the *Vedānta* will not be fruitful. To the eligible person the nature of Brahman-Ātman has been set forth through the study of the various *śruti* texts in the *Brahmavallī*. The transition from the *Śikṣāvallī* to the *Brahmavallī* is, therefore, both chronological and logical. The *Bhṛguvallī* purports to teach the method of reflection (*manana*) on the teaching of *śruti* texts. The discipline of *manana* should follow that of *śravaṇa*. Varuṇa did not tell Bhṛgu directly what Brahman is. On the contrary, he formulated a definition of Brahman and made Bhṛgu inquire in a systematic way into that definition with a view to find out Brahman by himself. The method of *anvaya-vyatireka*, which Bhṛgu

followed, enabled him to discriminate Brahman-Ātman from *anna*, *prāṇa*, etc., and finally attain the direct knowledge of Brahman-Ātman. So there is both chronological and logical sequence between the *Brahmavallī* and the *Bhṛguvallī*.

The *Taittirīyopaniṣad* is one of the important principal Upaniṣads. Śaṅkara's commentary on this *Upaniṣad* and Suresvara's verse commentary, which seeks to explain both the *Upaniṣad* and Śaṅkara's *Bhāṣya* thereon, enhance its importance. This *Upaniṣad* has become a classic for three of its outstanding teachings: (1) for the definition of Brahman in terms of its essential nature (*svarūpa-lakṣaṇa*) as real, knowledge, and infinite (*satyam jñānam anantam brahma*)² and also for the definition *per accidens* (*taṭsthalakṣaṇa*) of Brahman as the cause, etc., of the universe,³ (2) for the method of discrimination between the Self and the not-self through an inquiry into the fivefold sheath (*kośa-pañcaka-viveka*),⁴ and (3) for the calculus of pleasure (*ānandasya mīmāṃsā*) which points to Brahman as *par excellence*.⁵

2. Śaṅkara's Commentary on the Taittirīyopaniṣad

A commentary (*bhāṣya*) is expected to bring out the meaning of the cryptic or aphoristic statements of the original and also the meanings of the words contained therein.⁶ Śaṅkara's commentaries on the *Brahmasūtra* and the Upaniṣads are marvellous masterpieces serving as models of exegetical art, philosophical reasoning, and argumentative skill. Padmapāda speaks of his teacher, Śaṅkara, as *bhāṣyavittakaguru*⁷ as one who attained great celebrity by his commentary, and also as the bestower of happiness. As in his other

commentaries, Śaṅkara in his *bhāṣya* on the *Taittirīyopaniṣad*, too, explains the meanings of the words of the *Upaniṣad*, brings out the purport of the *śruti* passage, refers to the grammatical peculiarities and Vedic usages, introduces, where necessary, the sections (*anuvāka*) with a short explanation, explains the sequence of the sections and also of the chapters, and discusses at great length in certain places some of the important issues connected with the main problem. What Śaṅkara says of those teachers in the past who have explained the *Upaniṣads* is equally true of him. Before commencing his commentary on the *Taittirīya*, Śaṅkara writes: "I bow down ever before those teachers by whom all these *Upaniṣads* have been explained in the past, taking into consideration the words, the sentence, and the means of proof (*padavākya-pramāṇataḥ*).⁹ A commentary must pay attention to the words (*padāni*) used in the original, the sentences (*vākyaṇi*) which occur, and also the means of proof (*pramāṇāni*) such as inference suggested by the *śruti* itself in support of the view." Or, it may be said that a commentary must explain the original by taking into consideration the science of grammar (*vyākaraṇa*), the Mīmāṃsā system, and the principles of logic (*nyāya-śāstrā*).¹⁰ In his commentary on the *Taittirīya*, Śaṅkara pays due attention to these disciplines.

What remains prominent is Śaṅkara's commentary on the *Śikṣāvallī* is his repeated emphasis on the importance of *karma* as a remote aid to the attainment of knowledge. Liberation, according to Śaṅkara is nothing else than remaining in one's own Self on the cessation of the material cause, viz. *avidyā*, etc., on account of which one resorts to *karma*.¹¹ Liberation by

its very nature is eternal. What is eternal can never be produced, and what is produced is impermanent. Śaṅkara, therefore, concludes that liberation can never be accomplished by *karma*.¹² But this does not mean that Śaṅkara has ignored the importance of *karma* in the scheme of practical discipline leading to the attainment of Brahman-knowledge, which is liberation. In his commentary on the ninth section of the *Śikṣāvallī*, Śaṅkara says: "From the statement that knowledge alone leads to the attainment of independent sovereignty it may follow that the duties enjoined by Vedas and Smṛtis are useless. In order to avoid such a contingency, the duties are being presented here, so that they may be shown as contributory to the attainment of the end of man." The disinterested performance of *karma* in a spirit of dedication to God purifies the mind, and the knowledge of Brahman will dawn only on one whose mind is purified.¹³ While one should pursue *karma* before the rise of knowledge, one must abstain from the same after the rise of knowledge. Śaṅkara observes: "Rites are to be undertaken so that knowledge may emerge... The absence of rites after the rise of knowledge will be shown in such passages as '(Whenever the aspirant) gets fearlessly established (in Brahman),'..."¹⁴

In his commentary on the tenth section of the *Śikṣāvallī*, Śaṅkara lays stress on the utility of the recitation (*japa*) of *mantra* as an aid to the rise of knowledge. It is accepted, says Śaṅkara, that knowledge arises in one whose mind is purified by recitation (*svādhyāya*) of the sacred text.¹⁵

Śaṅkara states that intelligence and prosperity, too, are indirectly helpful to knowledge.¹⁶ Comment-

ing on the significance of the prayer for prosperity in the context of knowledge, he says that such a prayer is "for the sake of wealth, which is needed for rites, and rites are calculated to diminish accumulated sins, on the exhaustion of which knowledge becomes revealed."¹⁷

Śaṅkara emphasizes in an equal measure the importance of the grace of God (*Īśvara-prasāda*), through which alone one can resort to the study of the *Upaniṣad*, the practice of austerity (*tapas*) and meditation (*dhyāna*) as well as non-injury (*ahiṃsā*) and celibacy (*brahmacarya*), as aids to knowledge; but the guided study of the texts (*śravaṇa*), rational reflection (*manana*), and repeated contemplation (*nididhyāsana*) are the immediate cause of knowledge.¹⁸ The highest good can be attained through knowledge alone.

Advaita teaches that Brahman, the ultimate reality, is non-dual, and is identical with the inward Self, and that the phenomenal world is illusory. This, according to Śaṅkara, is the central teaching of the *Brahmavallī*, the second chapter of the *Taittirīyopaniṣad*. He observes that the lapidary opening sentence, "The knower of Brahman attains the highest," brings out the purport of the entire *Brahmavallī*.¹⁹ The *mantra* portion which follows this aphoristic declaration is of the nature of a short commentary thereon. It seeks, according to Śaṅkara, (1) to set forth the nature of Brahman as real, knowledge, and infinite, (2) to show that Brahman has to be realized as non-different from one's own inward Self, and (3) to demonstrate that the realization of Brahman consists in attaining to the state of being the Self of all (*sarvātmabhāva*), i.e. in being Brahman which transcends the characteristics of trans-

migratory existence. Since Brahman has been defined as real, knowledge, and infinite, it must necessarily be non-dual. That Brahman is identical with the Self is clearly brought out, says Śaṅkara, by the text, "From that (Brahman), verily, i.e. from this Self, is ether born,"²⁰ where the word "Self" is used with regard to Brahman itself. Śaṅkara argues that the entire universe comprising ether, time, etc., is illusory because it is an effect. The non-dual Brahman is the cause of the universe. The latter, which is an effect and therefore illusory, has no being of its own apart from Brahman, which is the transfigurative material cause, on which it is superimposed. Apart from the cause, there is really no such thing as effect,²¹ as stated in the well-known *vācārambhaṇa* text of the *Chāndogya*, "The modification is only a name arising from speech, while the truth is that it is just clay."²²

Śaṅkara does not explain the manifestation of the world of name and form through the transformation of Brahman. He rejects, that is to say, *brahma-pariṇāma-vāda*. Brahman, which is immutable, illusorily appears as the phenomenal world, in the same way as a rope illusorily appears as a serpent. In the course of his commentary on the passage, "He desired, 'May I become many'..."²³ Śaṅkara says that the differentiation of name and form is the appearance of Brahman as many. In no other way, so he argues, can the partless Brahman become manifold and finite. The finitude and plurality of Brahman must be understood as similar to the delimitation and diversification of ether caused by extraneous factors. It is through name and form, which serve as limiting adjuncts, that Brahman, becomes many. It is through them alone that it enters as a factor in all our empirical dealings — as a knower

(*jñātā*), as knowledge (*jñānām*), as object known (*jñeyam*), etc.”

(to be continued)

NOTES

1. The *Kāthopaniṣad* (I, iii, 12) says: “By the seers of subtle things, He is seen through a pointed and fine intellect.”

2. *TU*, II, 1.

3. *Ibid.*, III, 1.

4. *Ibid.*, II, 1-5.

5. *Ibid.*, II, 8.

6. “sūtrārtho varṇyate yatra vākyaiḥ sūtrānukāribhiḥ, svapadāni ca varṇyante bhāṣyaṃ bhāṣyavido viduḥ.”

7. *Pañcapādikā*, invocatory verse:

“yadvaktramānasasaraḥ-pratilabdhanmā
bhāṣyāravinda-makarandarasaṃ pibanti,
pratyāśamunmukhavinītavineya-bhṛṅgāstān-
bhāṣyavittakagurūn praṇato'smi mūrdhnā.”

The term *bhāṣyavittakaguru* may be explained as: “bhāṣyena vittaḥ bhāṣyavittaḥ, kaṃ sukhaṃ tatpradaḥ guruḥ kaguruḥ, bhāṣyavittaḥ kaguruḥ bhāṣyavittakaguruḥ.”

8. *TUB*, I, 1:

“yairime gurubhiḥ pūrvam pada-vākya-pramāṇataḥ
vyākhyātāḥ sarvavedāntāstānityaṃ praṇato'smyaham”

9. See *TU*, II, 6, for the reasoning contained in the *śruti* itself when it says *so'kāmayata*, etc., with a view to establish the existence of Brahman.

See Acyutakṣṇānandatīrtha's *Vanamālā*, a commentary on *TUB* (Srīrangam: Srī Vani Vilas Press, 1913), p. 2: “so'kāmayata ityādau brahmasattva-sādhakatayā-vivakṣitānyanumānāni pramāṇāṃ.”

10. See *Vanamālā*, p. 2:

“yadvā padam vyākaraṇam tatsādhutva-vicārarūpatvāt, vākyam mīmāṃsā vedavākya-vicārarūpatvāt, pramānam nyāyaśāstram prādhānyena pratyakṣādi-pramāṇa-vicārātmakatvāt.”

11. *TUB*, I, 1:

“tasmādavidyādi-karmopādāna-hetunivṛttau svātmanyavasthānam mokṣaḥ.”

12. *Ibid.*, I, 1:

“na hi nityam kiñcidārabhyate loke, yadārabdham tadanityamiti, ato na karmārabhyo mokṣaḥ.”

13. *Ibid.* I, 11:

“saṃskṛtasya hi viśuddha-sattvasya ātmavijñānam-añjasaivotpadyate.”

14. *Ibid.*:

“ato vidyotpattiyarthamanuṣṭheyāni karmāṇi... uditāyām ca brahmavidyāyām ‘abhayaṃ pratiṣṭhām vindate’ ... ityādinā karmanaiḥkiñcanyam darśayiṣyati.”

15. *Ibid.*, I, 10:

“svādhyāyena ca viśuddha-sattvasya vidyotpattir-avakalpate.”

See also Śaṅkara’s commentary on *BS*, III, iv, 38.

16. *Ibid.*, I, 5:

“tadanu medhākāmasya śrikāmasya cānukrāntā mantrāḥ, te ca pāraparyeṇa vidyopayogārthā eva.”

17. *Ibid.* I, 4:

“śrikāmo’smin-vidyāprakaraṇe abhidhīyamāno dhanam ca karmārtham, karma ca upāttaduritakṣayārtham, tatksaye hi vidyā prakāśate.”

18. *Ibid.*, I, 11:

“na hi ‘pratibandha-kṣayādeva vidyotpadyate, na tvīśvaraprasādatapo-dhyānādyanuṣṭhānāt’ iti niyamo’sti; ahimsā-brahmacaryādīnam ca vidyām pratyupakāra-katvāt, sākṣādeva ca kāra-katvācchravaṇa-manana-nidhidhyāsanā-dīnām.”

19. *Ibid.*, II, 1:

“brahma-vidāpnoti paramiti vākyaṁ sūtra-bhūtaṁ sarvasya vallyarthasya.”

20. *Ibid.* II, 1:

“tasmādvā etasmādātmanaḥ iti brahmaṇyeva ātmaśabda-prayogāt vediturātmaiva brahma.”

21. *Ibid.*, II, 1:

“sarveṣāṁ hi vastūnāṁ kālākāśādīnāṁ kāraṇaṁ brahma. kāryāpekṣayā vastuto’ntavatvamiti cet, na, anṛta-tvāt kāryavastunaḥ, na hi kāraṇavyatirekeṇa kāryaṁ nāma vastuto’sti...”

22. *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, VI, i, 4.

23. *TU*, II, 6.

24. *Ibid.*, 6.

“tad-etannāmarūpavyākaraṇaṁ brahmaṇo bahubhavanam; na-anyathā niravayavasya brahmaṇo bahutvāpat-tirupapadyate, alpatvaṁ vā, yathā ākāśasya alpatvaṁ bahutvaṁ ca vastvantarakṛtameva...tābhyāṁ ca upādhi-bhyāṁ jñātṛ-jñāna-jñeya-śabdārthādi-sarvavyavahārabhāg-brahma.”

(to be continued)

ŚRĪ ŚAṄKARA AND THE PŪRVAMĪMĀMSĀ SCHOOL

N. Veezhinathan

The search for truth which is the function of a philosopher is ultimately the search for the absolute Truth. In the struggle of human intellect to attain Truth there is a special need for revealed texts or revelation as the processes of the minds of the philosophers are likely to be frequently influenced by extraneous factors. The revealed texts on the basis of which the systems of Vedānta are founded are the *Upaniṣads*.

When it is said that the systems of Vedānta are based upon the revealed texts, it does not mean that these systems are closed at a particular historical epoch and are incapable of any further development. Indian philosophers employ reasoning or *yukti* while interpreting their philosophical positions either for the sake of enlightening the followers of their school or for meeting the objections that either suggest themselves or are raised by the critics. But the reasoning so employed must conform to the teachings of the *Upaniṣads*. It is because there is no end to ratiocination and there is

every likelihood of mistakes being made very easily on the grounds of personal temperament. Thus Indian philosophy is man's search for truth by the way of the discursive reason that conforms to the revealed texts. It is with this in view that Śrī Śaṅkara in his *Message to Mankind (Upadeśapañcaratna)* states that one must exercise one's reasoning in conformity with the Upaniṣadic teaching.

“*śrutimatatastarkāḥ anusandhīyatām.*”¹

In his commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra*, Śrī Śaṅkara states that in order to confirm the Upaniṣadic teaching, reasoning that is not contrary to the latter is admitted, and the *Upaniṣad* itself in its text —

“*śrotavyaḥ mantavyaḥ*”²

emphasizes the need for it.

“*satsu tu vedāntavākyaṣu jagato janmakaraṇavādiṣu tadarthagrahaṇadārḍhyāya anumānamāpi vedāntavākyaḥvirodhi pramāṇam bhavat na nivāryate, śrutyaiva ca sahāyatvena tarkasyābhyupetatvāt.*”³

In this respect enquiry into the nature of absolute Truth is vastly different from the one into the nature of *dharma* as the latter fully depends upon the scriptural texts only.

“*na dharmajijñāsāyāmiva śrutyaḍaya eva pramāṇam brahmajijñāsāyām.*”⁴

Further in his commentary on the *Kāthoṇiṣad*, Śrī Śaṅkara makes a fervent plea “to give up the perverse reasoning of the atheists and the false notion of dualism presented by the pseudo-logicians and to pursue with-

out prejudice the truth set forth in the *Vedas* which are thousand times more beneficial to us than even our parents.”

“*tasmāt nāstikakudṛṣṭim kutārkikabhedadrṣṭim ca
ujjhivā mātāpitr-sahasrebhyo’pi hitaiṣiṇā
vedenopadiṣṭam ātmaikatvadarsanam śāntadarpaḥ
ādarāṇyam.*”

From this it follows that according to Śrī Śaṅkara, scripture is the only means of knowing Brahman. In other words, scripture is the *pramāṇa* in respect of Brahman.

Scripture or *śāstra* consists of two sections — the ritualistic section and the Upaniṣadic section. The latter deals with meditative exercises or *upāsanas* upon the conditioned Brahman and with the nature of cosmic (*niṣprapañca*) Brahman. The word ‘*śāstra*’ occurs thrice in the *Brahma-sūtra*, once in the aphorism — *śāstrayonitvāt,*’ then in the aphorism — *śāstradrṣṭyā tu upadeśo vāmadevavat,*’ and again in the aphorism — *kartā śāstrārthavatvāt.*’ The word ‘*śāstra*’ in the last aphorism stands for the ritualistic section of the *Veda* consisting of the injunctive and the prohibitory texts. This aphorism rejects the contention of the Sāṅkhya school that intellect or *buddhi* alone is the agent of actions and not the soul who is only an experient on the following ground: the injunctive texts prescribe the means such as sacrifice and the like with reference to one who desires the ends like heaven, etc. It is the soul who desires these ends; or it is the experient of these ends. If it is said that the intellect alone is the agent and the soul is the experient, then there arises the defect, that the agent of actions does not

experience the fruits of actions, while the experient of the fruits of actions is one who has not performed any action. In this case it must be held that the injunctive texts prescribe the means with reference to one and convey the relation of fruits that ensue from those means to another. The result of this argument is that the injunctive texts are to be treated as not valid. So it is to be held that the injunctive texts prescribe the means like sacrifice, etc., with reference to the soul who desires heaven, etc. The meaning of the aphorism is that the soul is to be viewed as the agent in order that injunctive texts may become significant. The injunctive texts stand for the prohibitory texts too and these two constitute the ritualistic section of the Veda.'

The aphorism — '*śāstrayonitvāt*' is interpreted by Śrī Śaṅkara in two ways. According to the first interpretation, this aphorism means that Brahman is the cause of *śāstra*.¹⁰ Here the word *śāstra* stands for both the ritualistic and the Upaniṣadic section of the Veda, as the Veda in its entirety is admitted to be the manifestation of Brahman. According to the second interpretation, the aphorism means that *śāstra* is the *yoni* or *pramāṇa* of Brahman.¹¹ That is, it is the instrument or the knowledge of the true nature of Brahman.

Here, according to this interpretation, the word '*śāstra*' means the Upaniṣadic texts alone that treat of the nature of Brahman and not the ritualistic section too. It is because according to Śrī Śaṅkara, the ritual-actions prescribed in the ritualistic section of the Veda, when performed without any desire for their fruits, purify one's heart and make one fit to pursue a thorough enquiry into the import of the *Upaniṣads*. This view is based upon the text of the *Bṛhādāraṇyaka*¹² —

“Those who seek liberation desire to have the knowledge of Brahman by the study of one’s Veda, by the performance of sacrifice and the offering of gifts, and by austerity in the form of fasting (that consists in limiting one’s food, a religious performance).

In the above text, the expressions ‘study of one’s Veda,’ ‘performance of sacrifice and the offering of gifts,’ and ‘austerity in the form of fasting’ respectively signify the duties relating to the stage of the celibate, the house-holder and the hermit. And, the relation between the duties pertaining to one’s stage of life and the desire to have the knowledge of Brahman is set forth in this Upaniṣadic text,

Śabara in his commentary on the *Pūrvamīmāṃsā-sūtra* states that the existent entities like sacrificial substances are subordinate to sacrifices, etc., which are to be achieved.¹³ In the Upaniṣadic section, however, sacrifices, etc., which are to be achieved are subordinate to the existent entity, Brahman only indirectly. The *Upaniṣads*, however, constitute the direct means of knowing Brahman. Here too, the texts that prescribe meditative exercises or *upāsanās* on conditioned Brahman are useful in affording concentration of thought necessary for pursuing *nididhyāsana* upon the truth learnt from the Upaniṣadic texts that speak of the nature of Brahman as identical with the essential nature of the soul. It is these texts that are referred to by the word *śāstra* according to the second interpretation of the aphorism, *śāstrayonitvāt*.

In the aphorism — *śāstradr̥ṣṭyā tu upadeśo vāma-devavat*,¹⁴ the word *śāstra* stands for the *Upaniṣads* that speak of the nature of Brahman as identical with one’s

self. This aphorism discusses the import of the text of the *Kauṣītakyupaniṣad* wherein we find the instruction of Indra to Pratardana. The latter requested Indra to impart him the knowledge of that which he considers to be highly beneficial to human beings. Since the knowledge of Brahman alone is highly beneficial to human beings, and since Indra, being a realized soul, is one with Brahman, he asked Pratardana — 'Realize Me' (*māmeva vijānīhi*). Here the word *mām* does not refer to the soul; on the other hand, it refers to Brahman which is the true nature of the soul, which is the substratal reality of every being in this world and which Indra has realized. Like Vāmadeva who, having realized Brahman, expressed that he is the Manu and the Sun¹³ as the latter are only the manifestations of his true nature, Indra too gave expression to his true nature which is all-pervasive. This he did on strength of his realization of his true nature which is Brahman — the realization he attained from the *śāstra* — the *Upaniṣads*. Thus in the aphorism — *śāstradrṣṭyā tu upadeśo vāmadevavat*¹⁴ the word *śāstra* stands for the true nature of Brahman.

When the Advaitin thus makes clear his position that the *Upaniṣads* constitute the *pramāṇa* in respect of Brahman, the Pūrvamīmāṃsā school raises the following objections:

(i) Verbal statements whether Vedic or secular can never convey existent things. The final import is *niyoga* or *sādhyā* or *kārya* or *dharma* or *kriyā* or *vidhi*. *Niyoga* is the sense of the endings of the imperative mood, potential mood and gerundives present in the secular statements such as *gām ānaya*, or in the scriptural statements such as '*jyotiṣṭomena svargakāmo yajeta*.'

In order that a *niyoga* may become significant two elements are necessary; and, they are: (i) the person to whom it is addressed (*niyojya*), and (ii) its content (*viṣaya*). That is, a *niyoga* should indicate who is to obey it and what particular act one should do to obey it. In the case of secular injunction, it is the servant who is to obey and he fulfils the *niyoga* when he brings the cow. In the case of the Vedic injunction too, the form *yajeta* consists of a root and a potential suffix. The potential suffix conveys the *niyoga* and the root points to the sacrifice as the content of the *niyoga*. It is this *niyoga* that is to be primarily achieved. The word *svargakāma* refers to the person who is directed. The *niyoga*, in order that it may be achieved prompts the *niyoga* towards its content. When the content is performed, the *niyoga* is achieved and then the fruit ensues as a matter of course.

The exact nature of *niyoga* must be considered at this secular and the scriptural injunction. In the case of the secular injunction, the master's direction is carried out by bringing the cow which is the sense of the root. It is this act that is the *niyoga* here and the result in the form of the gratification of the master follows directly from it. In the case of the sacrifice in scriptural injunction, the fruit, namely, the heaven is to be attained in a future life involving a long interval between the performance of sacrifice — the sense of the root and the result. Hence there must be some link between the performance of sacrifice and the fruit. And the link is *apūrva* or the extra-empirical merit which results from the performance of sacrifice and which abides in the soul of the sacrificer. This *apūrva* which is an additional element and which is not the mere act that is the *niyoga*. Thus while in secular

injunction, the endings of potential mood, etc., signify the act which is the sense of the root and which is termed *niyoga*, in the Vedic injunction, *niyoga* is that which results from the act — the sense of the root.¹⁷

Thus according to the Pūrvamīmāṃsā school, it is *niyoga* or something that must be achieved is the import of every sentence, especially the Vedic sentence. The *niyoga*, being the one that is to be achieved, depends upon the activity of the individual. Hence the entire *śāstra* is intent upon conveying activity only and not an existent entity.¹⁸

The *Pūrvamīmāṃsā-sūtra* — ‘*āmnāyasya kriyārthatvāt ānarthakyam atadarthānām*’¹⁹ states that the logical significance of the Veda is *kriyā* and so any sentence that does not point to *kriyā* is not valid. Now the question arises in regard to the validity of recommendatory passages (*arthavāda-vākyas*) which do not point to any *kriyā*. Jaimini in the aphorism — *vidhinā tu ekavākyatvāt stutyarthena vidhīnām syuḥ*²⁰ states that assertive propositions found in the *Veda* are significant by being construed with an appropriate injunction or prohibition found in the particular context in the *Veda* itself. This means that the *arthavāda-vākyas* which are descriptive sentences become one with the injunctive text by praising the act or the agent of the act. They are never to be treated as independent by themselves.

Śabara in his commentary on the *Pūrvamīmāṃsā-sūtra* states: (i) *dr̥ṣṭo hi tasyārthaḥ karmāvabodhanam*,²¹ and (ii) *codaneti kriyāyāḥ pravartakam vacanam*.²²

The meaning of the first passage is: ‘the visible fruit (*dr̥ṣṭaḥ arthaḥ*) of the Veda (*tasya*) indeed (*hi*) is the

knowledge of *niyoga* (*karmāvabodhaḥ*). As has been said, the *niyoga* is to be achieved and so it is dependent upon activity for its accomplishment. In the ultimate analysis, the *Veda* which speaks of *niyoga* points to activity. This is what is meant when it is said that *śāstra* is *kriyāpara*.

The meaning of the second passage is: the word *codanā* in the *sūtra*—*codanālakṣaṇo'rtho dharmah*²³ means the statement that prompts one toward some activity through giving rise to the knowledge of *niyoga*.

The Pūrvamīmāṃsā school concludes that the import of a text could only be *niyoga* or *kārya* which is to be achieved (*sādhya*), and not Brahman — the existent entity — *siddha*. Hence the *śāstra* is not a *pramāṇa* in respect of Brahman.

(ii) The second objection to the view that *śāstra* is the *pramāṇa* in respect of Brahman is the logical outcome of the first objection. If the *Upaniṣads* give rise to the knowledge of Brahman the latter would neither prompt one toward some activity nor make one refrain from some prohibited deed. It is well-known that attainment of happiness and avoidance of misery constitute the human goal. These two are to be accomplished by performing some activity like the *jyotiṣṭoma* sacrifice or by refraining from some interdicted action like causing injury to beings. And, activity and abstinence arise from the knowledge that the *jyotiṣṭoma* sacrifice is the means to a desired end and so it is to be achieved, and causing injury to others is the means to unwelcome results and hence it is to be avoided. The Vedic texts — '*jyotiṣṭomena svargakāmo yajeta*' and '*na hiṃsyāt sarvā bhūtāni*' give rise to such

knowledge which leads to activity regarding the *jyotiṣ-ṭoma* sacrifice and abstinence from causing injury to others; and, they, in turn, lead to happiness and to absence of misery. Hence these two texts are valid. The Pūrvamīmāṃsā school points out that the knowledge of Brahman said to arise from the *Upaniṣads* is not helpful towards activity or abstinence which would lead to human goal. Hence the Upaniṣadic texts are not valid in respect of Brahman — the existent entity.

If, however, the Advaitin wishes to maintain the validity of the *Upaniṣads*, he has to hold the view that they are construed with the injunctive texts in the ritualistic section of the Veda by praising the sacrificer as of the nature of Brahman which is consciousness, bliss and non-dual. In that case, independent validity in respect of the Upaniṣadic texts cannot be maintained.

Śrī Śaṅkara sums up this contention of the Pūrvamīmāṃsā school thus:

*puruṣam kañcit viṣayaviśeṣe pravartayat kutaścit
viṣayaviśeṣācca nivartayat ca arthavat śāstras tat
sāmānyāt vedāntānāmapī tathaiva arthavattvaṃ syāt.*²⁴

In his commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra* — '*tat tu samanvayāt*' Śrī Śaṅkara critically examines the objections raised by the Pūrvamīmāṃsā school outlined in the foregoing paragraphs. He says that it is true that injunctive texts in the Veda convey activity. But it should not be supposed that each and every sentence would be valid only when it conveys the sense of activity. There are Vedic texts which convey the existent entities such as *dadhi*, *yūpa*, *soma* and the like. These cannot be considered to be not valid. The Pūrva-

mīmāṃsā school might say that these texts convey the existent entities as the means to specific sacrifices and hence they are valid. Śrī Śaṅkara says that when the texts convey *dadhi*, etc., as the means to sacrifice the entities too which possess the power to accomplish the sacrifice are conveyed.²¹

Further, the text — '*brāhmaṇo na hantavyaḥ*' gives rise to a knowledge by which man remains quiet or inactive. And, inaction is neither activity like *jyotiṣ-ṭoma* sacrifice nor is the means to some activity like the *soma* creeper, etc. If it is said by the Pūrvamīmāṃsā school that the texts which do not convey activity are not valid, then the text '*brāhmaṇo na hantavyaḥ*' should also be treated as not valid.²² The Pūrvamīmāṃsā school might contend that the text '*brāhmaṇo na hantavyaḥ*' conveys activity only and hence it is valid. It is thus: the meaning of the root *han* is killing a person of spiritual birth born out of one's propensities. The prohibitive particle *nañ* related to the root *han* conveys the sense of the absence of killing such a person. The potential suffix conveys the sense that absence of killing must be pursued. This means that one must have the mental resolve of the form 'I shall not kill a man of spiritual birth'. And this comes within the purview of injunction.²³ Hence the assertion that the text — '*brāhmaṇo na hantavyaḥ*' does not convey the sense of activity is wrong.

Śrī Śaṅkara states that in the expression *hantavyaḥ*, the potential suffix, in view of its being a suffix, is primary and the root — *han* is secondary. The potential suffix conveys the sense that a particular act is the means to a desired end. The expression as such would give rise to the knowledge that killing is the means to a

desired end. The prohibitive particle *nañ* gives rise to the knowledge that the killing of a man is *not* the means to the desired end. And by this knowledge, the one who wished to kill a man remains quiet. Thus the sentence — ‘*brāhmaṇo na hantavyaḥ*’ does not give rise to the knowledge that prompts one towards some activity. It simply gives rise to the knowledge that killing a man is not the means to a desired end. And this culminates in one remaining inactive or quiet.¹⁸ Thus, according to Śrī Śaṅkara, the meaning of the text, ‘*brāhmaṇo na hantavyaḥ*’ is not activity; yet, it is valid. In the same way, the Upaniṣadic texts which convey Brahman are to be taken as valid.

In regard to the second objection that scripture which conveys Brahman is not valid as it does not signify anything of value to man, Śrī Śaṅkara states that it constitutes to our glory that the knowledge of Brahman which arises from the *Upaniṣads*, by annihilating *avidyā* which is the root-cause of passion and hatred that prompt one to activity, leads one to the highest human end, namely, liberation.

*alaṅkāro hyasmākaṁ yadbrahmātmāvagatau satyāṁ
sarvakartavyatāhāniḥ kṛtakṛtyatā ca*¹⁹

In his *Adhyāsa-bhāṣya*, Śrī Śaṅkara states that those who perform sacrifices, etc., do have the knowledge that the body is different from the soul. But they do not have the knowledge of the true nature of the soul that it is free from agency, etc. — the knowledge that is provided by the *Upaniṣads*.

*“śāstrīye tu vyavahāre yadyapi buddhipūrvakārī
nāviditvā ātmānaṁ paralokasambandham adhikriyate,*

*tathāpi na vedāntavedyam aśanāyādyatītam apeta-
brahmakṣatrādibhedam asaṁsāri ātmatattvam
adhikāre apekṣyate anupayogāt adhikārivirodhācca”*

It is said that Jaimini has fully inquired into *dharma* in his Vedic exegesis. The knowledge of Brahman, as it comes within the purview of injunction such as ‘*ātmā vā are draṣṭavyaḥ,*’ etc., acquires the character of *dharma*.

‘*codanālakṣaṇo’rtho dharmah*’ *Jaimini-sūtra*, I. i. 2

Hence Brahman which is adjectival (*viśeṣaṇa*) to knowledge also comes within the scope of *dharma*. Therefore the inquiry into Brahman also must be taken as having received full treatment in the work of Jaimini, and a fresh inquiry into it in the *Uttaramīmāṁsā* is not justifiable. This contention, however, cannot stand. The objects of injunction like sacrifice (*yāga*) making gifts (*dāna*), offering in fire (*homa*), etc., are solely achieved by human activity, while the knowledge of Brahman arises from the thing itself and not through human activity. So it does not fall within the scope of injunction and hence it is not a *dharma*. It follows from this that Brahman does not fall within the range of *dharma*. So Jaimini did not address himself to the inquiry into Brahman and a fresh inquiry is called for.

Śrī Śaṅkara is of the view that the two *śāstras* — the *Pūrvamīmāṁsā* and the *Uttaramīmāṁsā* are entirely different and a study of the former is not an essential condition for the study of the latter. The pre-requisite for the study of *Uttaramīmāṁsā* is total detachment toward the objects of enjoyment here and in a hereafter which is not the case in respect of those who study

the *Pūrvamīmāṃsā*, with a view to get at a clear understanding of the modes of performance of *karma*.

NOTES

1. *Upadeśapañcaratna*, 3.
2. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* (*Bṛh. Up.*), 2.4.5.
3. *Śaṅkarabhāṣya* on *Brahmasūtra* (*ŚB on BS*), 1.1.2.
4. *Ibid.*
5. *Śaṅkarabhāṣya* on *Kaṭha Upaniṣad* II. i. 14.
6. *Brahmasūtra* (*BS*) 1.1.3.
7. *Ibid.*, 1. 1. 30.
8. *Ibid.*, 2. 3. 33.

I offer my respectful salutations at the lotus-feet of my *Guru* — The Sage of Kāñcī, for graciously instructing me on this.

9. *ŚB on BS*, 2. 3. 33.
10. *ŚB on BS*, 1. 1. 3. “*śāstrasya ... yoniḥ kāraṇam.*”
11. *Ibid.*, “*śāstram yoniḥ kāraṇam pramāṇam asya.*”
12. *Bṛh. Up.*, 4. 4. 22.
13. *Śābarabhāṣya* on the *Pūrvamīmāṃsā-sūtra*, 3. 4. 40: “*bhūtam bhavyāyo’padiśyate.*”
14. *BS*, 1. 1. 30.
15. *Bṛh. Up.*, 1. 4. 10
16. *BS*, 1. 1. 30.
17. *svātmasiddhyanukūlasya niyojyasya prasiddhaye, kurvat svargādikamapī pradhānam kāryameva naḥ. Prakaraṇapañcikā*” (Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, No. 17, 1904), p. 190.
18. “*niyogaśca sādhyatvāt pravṛtṭyādyapekṣaḥ, tasmāt pravṛtṭyādiparam śāstram ityarthah,*”

Nyāyanirṇaya on ŚB on BS, Nirṇaya Sagar Press, Bombay 1933, 1. 1. 1.

19. *Pūrvamīmāṃsā-sūtra*, 1. 1. 1.

20. *Ibid.*, 1. 2. 7.

22. *Śābarabhāṣya* on the *Pūrvamīmāṃsā-sūtra*, 1. 1. 1.

22. *Ibid.*, 1. 1. 2.

23. *Pūrvamīmāṃsā-sūtra*, 1. 1. 2.

24. ŚB on BS, 1. 1. 4.

25. *Ibid.* : “kriyārthatve’pi kriyānirvartanaśaktimadvastūpadiṣṭameva.”

26. *Ibid.* : “brāhmaṇo na hantavyaḥ ityevamādyāḥ nivṛttiḥ upadiśyate, na ca sā kriyā, nāpi kriyāsādhanam.”

27. *Nyāyanirṇaya*, p. 92:

“na hantavyaḥ ityatra hananam na kuryāditi na vākyārthaḥ kim tu ahananam kuryāditi. tato hananavirodhinī vidhīyate. tena niśedhavākyaṃapi niyoganiṣṭhameva.”

28. ŚB on BS, 1. 1. 4: “tasmāt prasaktakriyānivṛttyaudāsīnyameva brahmaṇo na hantavyaḥ ityādiṣu pratiṣedhārtham manyāmahe”.

29. *Ibid.*

ŚRUTI, TARKA, AND ŚAṄKARA

*N. Jayashanmukham**

1. *Scripture and Logic*

Generally the texts of the *Upaniṣads* are intelligible in themselves. But when we try to connect them and arrive at a view of the *Upaniṣads* as a whole, difficulties crop up. For the gap between texts prove to be very often insurmountable. But it does not mean that the authors of the *Upaniṣads* thought disconnectedly without grasping the implications of what they wanted to teach. For the profound thoughts expressed in sentences or passages which are complete in themselves, prevent us from coming to such a hasty conclusion. All we have to do, in order to make the *Upaniṣads* intelligible to us, is to supply the missing thoughts and the connecting steps by suitable methods of analysis. Once this is done all the apparently disconnected or contradictory texts become harmonious and unified. To show that the *Upaniṣads* are harmonious and have a single subject to teach is the chief aim

* Professor, The Mother's Service Society, Pondicherry.

of the *Brahmasūtras* in which the very first division is called Samanvaya Adhyāya.

To bring out the implicit harmony of the texts in the *Upaniṣads*, we have to analyse them and determine their import in the light of rational principles evolved for this purpose. While doing so, we must recognise that the *Upaniṣads* belong to a special category, for they were composed not by ordinary men but by Ṛṣis men of spiritual vision and hearing. In other words, the authority of the *Upaniṣads* is derived from a faculty far superior to that of reason. Therefore any rational principle we employ in analysing and interpreting the scripture must be based on the clues that are to be found in the texts themselves, otherwise we will be imposing on it an inappropriate method whose validity is determined not by its texts but by other factors external to its aim and intention. The important clues supplied by the texts and developed into rational principles of interpretation are called indicatory marks, *tātparyalinga*.

Śaṅkara, while commenting on the *Upaniṣads*, makes a pointed reference to the importance of using rational methods not contrary to the scripture. He says: "Here is commenced, an ascertainment of the meaning of the texts of the *Upaniṣads* with the help of reasoning not opposed to the *Upaniṣads* themselves." (SBS., 1.1.1) In his opinion the true import of the *Upaniṣads* can be known not only by acquiring proficiency in them but by learning to apply to them the right principles of logic. He observes in his commentary on the

* Śaṅkara's commentary on the *Brahmasūtra*. Tr. Swami Gambhirananda.

Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad that persons of shallow understanding cannot grasp the meaning of the scriptures, for it can be grasped only by those who have "a firm hold on the scriptures *and* logic." (4.5.15)*

2. *The Two Texts*

Wherever texts concerning the nature of Brahman give two contradictory views, we do not know how to resolve the conflict or determine the true intention of the *Upaniṣad*. To resolve the conflict and arrive at the intended view of the scripture, we have to rely on the texts themselves and search for the right clues in words that occur in the original texts or in texts that follow the original or in similar texts in other *Upaniṣads*.

To illustrate the principle, we shall choose two passages from the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* and show how they are interpreted by Śaṅkara. (1) There is a passage where the Puruṣa is described as the creator. He moves out of the undifferentiated state and becomes differentiated into the world of names and forms. He enters into each form and becomes identified with the various functions associated with that form. When He does the function of living, He is called the vital force; when He speaks, the organ of speech; when He sees, the eye; when He hears, the ear; when He thinks, the mind (1.4.7). (2) There is another passage where the *Upaniṣad* gives a completely different account of Brahman. It is neither gross nor fine, neither red colour nor oiliness, neither shadow nor darkness, neither air nor space, unattached, without taste or smell, without eyes or ears, without the vocal organ or

* Śaṅkara's commentary on the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*. Tr. Swami Madhavananda.

mind, without radiance, without the vital force or mouth, without measure, without interior or exterior. It does not eat anything, nor is It eaten by anybody (3.8.8). In the first passage, Brahman is presented as the supreme reality which creates the world of names and forms by a process of transformation, whereas in the second, the same Brahman is presented as an entity devoid of attributes and, therefore, contrary to the world of names and forms created by a process of transformation. Unless in some way the contradiction is removed it is really very difficult to understand the true meaning of the *Upaniṣads*.

Śaṅkara invites our attention to many texts in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* and other *Upaniṣads* where Brahman is described in negative terms and where the Brahman so described is capable of generating certain and fruitful knowledge. To cite a few examples: the sage who has known the great and birthless Self, undecaying, unattached, conquers the dualities. Things done or not done do not trouble him (4-4-22); knowing this Self one is not, touched by evil action ... Evil does not overtake him but he transcends all evil (4-4-23); for, that great birthless Self is undecaying, immortal, undying Brahman. Brahman is indeed fearless. He who knows It as such certainly becomes the fearless Brahman (4.4.25); for truly when one finds fearlessness as support in Him who is invisible, bodiless, undefined, without support, then has he reached fearlessness (*Taitt. Up.* 2.7.1); by discerning that which is without sound, without touch and without form, undecaying, etc., one is freed from the face of death (*Kaṭha Up.* 1.3.15). The result (*i.e.*, freedom from the limiting conditions of empirical world) mentioned in these texts is an important clue. If we take the clue, we can understand that the text

setting forth the idea of the formless Brahman possesses a greater authority than the text which does not deal with that idea, for the simple reason that no fruitful result is mentioned in the latter text. Hence Śaṅkara says: "The texts which have the formless Brahman as their main purport are more authoritative than the others which do not have that as their main purport." (SBS., 3.2.14) Once the relative strength or authority of the conflicting texts is determined with the help of the clue provided by *śruti* itself, it is easy to ascertain the true import of the *Upaniṣad*.

When the scripture says that the knowledge of the attributeless Brahman leads to freedom from bondage, its aim is not only to distinguish the negative texts from the other texts which speak in affirmative terms, but expound the real nature of Brahman. In other words, it is in the negative texts that the real nature of Brahman is declared. Therefore, between the two texts of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* the negative text, 3.8.1, must be regarded as containing the true import of the *Upaniṣad*. Śaṅkara says: "It is the Brahman that is absolutely attributeless and unchangeable that has to be accepted and not the opposite." (SBS., 3.2.11) As this conclusion proceeds from the very words of the scripture, Śaṅkara's interpretation cannot be set aside as unwarranted or unauthoritative.

3. *The Authority of the Scripture*

Though Śaṅkara has succeeded in determining the true meaning of the conflicting texts, he has one more task to perform upon the completion of which the completeness of his interpretation depends. If one of the conflicting texts contains the true import, then

the other cannot be regarded as a valid text. Does it not then amount to invalidating a text of the *Upaniṣad*? Does it not imply that the *Upaniṣad* cannot claim validity for all its ideas and teachings? Śaṅkara is aware of this problem when he affirms that in the *Upaniṣad* all texts, without exception, are valid. He says: "It is not proper to interpret some Vedic sentences as having meaning and the others as meaningless, since they are all valid." (SBS., 3.2.15) Hence he is obliged to explain the significance of the other text (1.4.7) and establish that its validity is not undermined.

We shall now go back to the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* text (1.4.7) and note how Śaṅkara explains its significance in his effort to preserve its validity. We may recall that this text deals with the transformation of the undifferentiated Brahman of Puruṣa. If we take the text in this sense, it certainly contradicts the other text the intention of which is to teach that Brahman is non-dual; it contradicts, because the ideas of transformation and manifestation imply that Brahman is relative and part of the order of duality. Now there are two important steps in removing the contradiction: (1) to determine which of the two texts occupies the place of greater importance; (2) once this is determined the less important must be reinterpreted in such a way that it becomes subservient to the more important. We have already found in the previous section that the negative text must be given the pride of place, because it declares the real nature of Brahman. Therefore the next step in the process is to give up the primary sense of the affirmative text in favour of a secondary sense which is not opposed to the senses of the negative text. In fact, this is what Śaṅkara does in the effort to protect the authority of the affirmative text (1.4.7). Let us see how

he interprets the text: "This text about transformation," writes Śaṅkara, "is not meant to establish transformation as a fact, for no fruit is seen to result from such a knowledge. But this is meant to establish the fact that all this (*i.e.* the world of forms and names) is in essence one with Brahman that is beyond all phenomenal processes; for some fruit is seen to result from such a realisation." (SBS., 2.1.27) To take the text (1.4.7) in the sense of establishing the unity of Brahman and the world is to insist on its secondary sense. In so far as this refers to Brahman as the one and independent reality of the world, it is not basically opposed to the sense of the negative text. The *Upaniṣad* does not consider that in the context of Brahman the ideas of oneness and non-duality are really opposed to each other. Hence the declaration, "one only without a second" (*ekam eva advitīyam*).

Śaṅkara's commentary on these two texts, 1.4.7 and 3.8.8, brings out the true sense without at the same time sacrificing the authority of the *Upaniṣad*. It is worthwhile to recall his words here: "An unwarrented interpretation of the *Vedas* cannot be regarded either as a true interpretation or as helping towards them, for the *Vedas* do not derive their authority from any other source." (*Bṛhadāraṇyaka Bhāṣya*, 2.3.6).

THE DOCTRINE OF MĀYĀ IN ADVAITA VEDĀNTA

S. Revathy*

(1) *Introduction*

The Philosophy of Advaita is based on the *prasthānatraya* — the triple canon of the Vedānta, that is, the *Upaniṣads*, the *Bhagavad-gītā* and the *Brahma-sūtra*. Its central teaching may be briefly stated thus: God (Īśvara), soul (*jīva*), and the world (*prapañca*) which are distinct realities according to the pluralistic and theistic schools of Indian thought are only the appearances of a transcendental entity called Brahman or Ātman through *māyā* or *avidyā*. Brahman-Ātman is the ultimate reality and it is truth, existence, consciousness, bliss and non-dual. Owing to *māyā*, it appears as God, soul and the world. *Māyā* and the world are indeterminable (*mithyā*) as either real (*sat*) or an absolute nothing (*asat*). Īśvara is a complex of Brahman and *māyā*, and *jīva* is a complex of Brahman and *māyā* and its products — the gross body and

* Lecturer, Department of Sanskrit, University of Madras, Madras-600 005.

the subtle body. The essential nature of Īsvara and *jīva* is Brahman. Īsvara is always aware of His identity with Brahman, and is, therefore, ever-released. *Jīva*, on the other hand, falsely identifies itself with the gross and the subtle body, loses sight of its identity with Brahman and undergoes transmigration. The realization of its identity with Brahman and remaining as Brahman is the ultimate goal, that is, liberation. This is possible only by transcending *māyā*. The latter has Brahman as its content (*viṣaya*) and hence it could be removed only by the direct experience of Brahman. And, in order to achieve this direct experience, the Upaniṣadic texts are studied and their import is enquired into.¹

From the above it follows that according to Advaita, there are only two categories — *dr̥k* and *dr̥śya*. The former is three-fold as Brahman, Īsvara, and *jīva*. The latter is two-fold as *māyā* and the phenomenal world. Of these, Brahman is the ultimate reality. It is eternal, pure, consciousness, ever-released, truth, subtle, existence, all-pervasive, non-dual, and bliss. And through the principle known as *māyā* it appears as God, soul, and the world. *Māyā* is thus pivotal to Advaita Vedānta.

(2) *The Concept of Māyā in the Ṛgveda*

In a remarkably profound hymn,² the *Ṛgveda*, recognising the principle of *māyā* identical with *avidyā* states: The root-cause of the world, during the time of dissolution, was not an absolute nothing; for, an absolute nothing like hare's horn, etc., cannot be the cause of anything. It was not a real entity too. It could not be both real and an absolute nothing; for, that is a discrepant notion. Further, during the time

of dissolution, the nether worlds (*rajas*) did not exist. The heaven (*vyoma*) and other worlds in celestial regions (*paraḥ*) also did not exist.

It is said in the *Purāṇas* that the fundamental elements (*pañcabhūtas*) conceal the worlds. It is not so. The fundamental elements have no substratum to reside (*kuha*) and have nothing to conceal (*kimāvarivaḥ*). It might be said that the true nature of ultimate reality is being concealed from the souls. This also could not be; for the true nature of the ultimate reality is concealed from the souls mainly to provide the souls with objects of enjoyment to work out their past *karma*. Since dissolution takes place only when the *karmas* of the souls are exhausted; there is no need for the concealment of the true nature of reality.

It might be said that the text of the *Taittirīyasaṁhitā*³ speaks of the existence of water during the time of dissolution. This view is rejected by saying that inaccessible and impenetrable water did not exist then (*ambhaḥ kimāsīt gahanam gabhīram*). The view set forth in the above hymn is elaborated by Śrī Śaṅkara in his *Śataślokī*.⁴

In another hymn,⁵ the *Ṛgveda* speaks of *māyā* as associated with Brahman — the only reality. During the time of dissolution, there was neither day nor night as there existed neither the sun nor the moon — the marks of day and night (*praketaḥ*). It comes to this that the factor, time did not exist then. There existed (*ānīt*), That One (*tadekam*) associated with *māyā* (*svadhā*). Apart from this, there existed nothing.

The above hymn clearly sets forth the Upaniṣadic view that prior to creation there existed Brahman

associated with *māyā*. Śrī Śaṅkara in his *Śataślokī* sets forth⁶ the view contained in the above hymn.

It has been said that prior to creation, the world which we perceive now did not exist. The question arises then as to the creation of the world. The *Ṛgveda* states:⁷ Prior to creation, this entire world was concealed by *tamas* (*avidyā*). That is to say, the entire world remained in a latent form in its cause — *avidyā*. Creation means only the manifestation of what is latent into a gross form.

Avidyā is the concealing principle and the world is the concealed entity. The two have become one (*apraketam*). Just as water mixed with milk cannot be known separately, in the same way, the world having become one with *avidyā* by being merged in it cannot be known separately from *avidyā*. Manu also affirms this view.⁸

The world has been fully concealed (*ā bhū apihitam*) *avidyā* which is *tuccha*,⁹ that is, indeterminable either as real or as an absolute nothing. The world thus remaining in a latent form in *avidyā* manifested with name and form owing to the *tapas* or the contemplation (*ālocanam*) on the part of the reality associated with *avidyā*. That the word *tapas* stands for *ālocanam* or the act of contemplation is known from the *Muṇḍaka* text¹⁰ — “He knows everything in its general aspect; and has *tapas* in the form of knowledge; that is, the act of contemplation in regard to the creation of the world.”

The reality associated with *avidyā* comes to be endowed with a desire to create the world (*kāmaḥ*

tadagre samavartata). The merits and demerits of the souls — which exist in their subtle bodies of which mind is the most predominant factor — serve as the root of the desire to create the world: that is, the reality associated with *avidyā*, makes the world which remains in a latent form appear in gross form in order to provide the field of enjoyment for the souls to work out their accumulated *karma*. And, this is done on the basis of the merits and demerits of the souls (*manaso retah prathamam yadāsīt*). The reality associated with *avidyā* is God. Taking into consideration the merits and demerits to create the world, He, then contemplates upon the process of creation and creates the world. The above has been set forth in the *Taittirīyāranyaka*.¹¹

What has been set forth in the *Veda* is confirmed in the *Veda* itself by making a reference to the experience of the realized souls. The latter distinctly knew (*pratiṣyā manīṣā*) the merits and demerits of the souls accumulated in their previous births which serve as the basis for the creation of the world, by God. The merits and demerits are present in minds which are present in *avidyā* (*asatī*). The view expressed in the above two hymns has been set forth¹² by Śrī Śaṅkara in his *Śata-sloki*.

Avidyā which is mentioned as the power associated with the reality during the time of dissolution is the factor that conceals the true nature of reality and projects it as God, soul and the world.

Of these, God always realizes His identity and so He is ever-released. It is only the soul that has lost sight of its identity with Brahman and undergoes trans-

migration. This view is set forth in the *Ṛgveda*:¹³ "Oh men! You do not know the reality from which this world has come into existence. It is because the reality is far removed from you." It is true that the reality (Brahman) and the soul (*jīva*) are identical. Yet, the true nature of Brahman is concealed from the soul by an entity *avidyā* which is similar to mist. Thus, having lost sight of its identity with the reality, the soul performs actions prescribed in the *Vedas* and undergoes transmigration. This *avidyā* is identical with *māyā* and a hymn of the *Ṛgveda* extols its excellence.¹⁴

Māyā or *avidyā* has four features: (i) It is always fresh; (ii) it is adept in bringing about a relation between incompatible things, namely, Brahman and the world; (iii) it presents a world which is pleasing in the beginning and is repulsive subsequently; and, (iv) it conceals the knowledge of reality imparted in the *Upaniṣads*.

It is in this *māyā* [or *avidyā*, God and soul exist like birds. And, because of this *māyā*, the sense organs function towards their respective objects. In the above hymn, it has been set forth that the distinction between God and soul is caused by *avidyā* and it is through *avidyā* the sense organs relate the soul to their respective objects. Śrī Śaṅkara in his *Śataślokī* sets forth¹⁵ the above view.

The doctrine that the soul undergoes transmigration, the witness-self manifests the soul and its activities, is mentioned in the following hymn:¹⁶

"Between the God and the soul, God is supra-relational. The soul is in the ocean of *samsāra*. Having lost sight of its identity with Brahman, it undergoes

transmigration. And, with the mind which has become pure, the soul realizes that it is non-distinct from Brahman. Then *māyā* leaves the soul and the soul leaves out *māyā*. It is the only reality that is viewed by the wise to be many.”

Thus in this hymn, the distinction between the soul and the witness-self, and the Advaita view that self-realization brings about the removal of *māyā* or *avidyā* have been set forth. Śrī Śaṅkara in his *Śataślokī* explains the view¹⁷ set forth in the above hymn. These are some of the hymns of the *R̥gveda* wherein the doctrine of *māyā* is clearly and distinctly expressed.

(3) *The Concept of Māyā in the Upaniṣads*

One set of *Upaniṣads* speaks of Brahman as consciousness, bliss, and finite¹⁸ and also as one without a second.¹⁹ Other set of *Upaniṣads* speaks of Brahman as the cause of the world. For example, the *Taittirīya* text,²⁰ “From where all these beings come into existence, from which the created beings derive existence and manifestation, and into which every being lapses back at the time of dissolution — seek to know that. That is Brahman,” proclaims that Brahman is the cause of the world. In order to explain as to how the non-dual entity — Brahman could be the cause of the world, the *Upaniṣads* introduce the principle of *māyā*.

The *Śvetāśvataroṇiṣad* speaks of *māyā* as the primal cause of the world and as creative power. The text,²¹ “Know *māyā* to be the primal cause of the world and *Maheśvara* as the substratum of *māyā*” refers to *māyā* as the primal cause of the world. And, the text²² “The sages absorbed in meditation discovered the

creative power which is present in Brahman and which consists of the three strands of *sattva*, *rajas*, and *tamas*" speaks of *māyā* as the creative power.

Brahman associated with *māyā* appears as the world. Advaita holds that *māyā* is present in Brahman and it makes the latter appear as the world. In other words, *māyā* transforms itself into the form of the world.

The *Kaivalyopaniṣad*²¹ and the *Maitryupaniṣad*²² use the word *māyā* in the sense of appearance or illusion while referring to the world.

(4) *The Concept of Māyā in the Bhagavadgītā*

The *Bhagavad-gītā* uses the words *māyā* and *ajñāna* (*avidyā*) as synonyms. The passage,²³ "The absolute reality which is existence, consciousness, and bliss is veiled by *ajñāna*; and hence the individual souls experience phenomenal existence," speaks of *ajñāna* as concealing the true nature of Brahman. Another passage,²⁴ "Being veiled by *māyā* which is under the control of Īsvara, the true nature of Brahman is not manifest to all," states that *māyā* veils the true nature of Brahman. Yet another passage,²⁵ "*Ajñāna* is removed by the direct realization of Brahman-Ātman" states that direct realization of Brahman removes *ajñāna*. The passage,²⁶ "Those who realize my true nature (Brahman) transcend this *māyā*," says that the direct realization of Brahman removes *māyā*.

Thus the *Bhagavadgītā* admits the principle of *māyā*; and, by ascribing the common characteristics of veiling the true nature of Brahman and being removable by the

direct realization of Brahman in respect of *māyā* and *ajñāna*, the *Bhagavadgītā* emphasises that the two are identical and not distinct principles.

(5) *The Concept of Māyā in the Gauḍapādakārikā*

Gauḍapāda's *kārikā* on the *Māṇḍūkyaopaniṣad* is the first systematic exposition of Advaita Vedānta. The *kārikā* contains several passages wherein the word *māyā* occurs. And the word is used in the sense of appearance or illusion. The *kārikā*²⁹ "Under the influence of cosmic illusion which is beginningless, the individual soul feels as if asleep" speaks of the cosmic illusion (*māyā*) as beginningless. Another *kārikā*³⁰ (III, 10) states the so-called objective existences in this world are declared false and mere creations of Ātman's *māyā*. The *kārikā*³¹ (III, 19) states that plurality is due to *māyā*. This same idea is repeated in the *kārikā*³² (III, 24). Further, in the *kārikās*³³ (III, 27-28), it is discussed how the world comes into existence not from not-being but from being — not 'in reality' but as it were. The *kārikā*³⁴ (III, 58) states that *māyā* has no real existence at all.

Thus, in the *Gauḍapādakārikā*, *māyā* is described as beginningless, and a non-real entity. And it is present in Ātman or the self and is the cause of the world.

(6) *The Concept of Māyā in the Brahmasūtra*

In the *Brahmasūtra*, the word *māyā* occurs only in one aphorism, viz. "*māyāmātram tu kārtsnyena anabhivyaktasvarūpatvāt*" (III, ii, 3). This aphorism discusses the nature of dream and speaks of the dream world as mere illusion.

(7) *The Concept of Māyā in the Śaṅkara and the Post-Śaṅkara Period*

7. 1. *Identity of Māyā and Avidyā*

Māyā is admitted to be the primal cause of the world. It corresponds to the *prakṛti* of the Sāṅkhya system. But the concept of *prakṛti* in the Sāṅkhya is not identical with that of *māyā* in Advaita Vedānta. Śrī Śaṅkara in his commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra* (I, iv, 3) states:²⁵ "The *prakṛti* of the Sāṅkhya system is independent of *puruṣa*, the self, while the primal cause of the world (*māyā*) according to our school is fully dependent upon the reality!" Śrī Śaṅkara proceeds to say²⁶ that the principle of *māyā* should be admitted to account for the activity in the form of creation of the world on the part of supreme Brahman which is free from any action.

Māyā is identical with *ajñāna* or *avidyā*. This is the prevalent view in Advaita. There are some Advaitins who hold the view that *māyā* and *avidyā* are two distinct principles and this view, according to them, is based on the authority of Śrī Śaṅkara. The latter in his commentary on the *adr̥śyatvādhikaraṇa* states:²⁷ "*Avyākṛta* (*Avyakta*) is the limiting adjunct of Īsvara; and, it is located in Īsvara." In his commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra* (I, iv, 3), Śrī Śaṅkara states²⁸ that *avyakta* is *māyā*. From this it follows that *māyā* is the limiting adjunct of Īsvara.

In his commentary on the *ānumānikādhikaraṇa*²⁹ Śrī Śaṅkara states: "The released souls do not experience cyclic existence any more. It is because, by knowledge, the root-cause of cyclic existence, namely, *avidyā* is destroyed." From this it is clear that *avidyā*

is the limiting adjunct of *jīva*. Thus it is argued that according to Śrī Śaṅkara *māyā* and *avidyā* are two distinct principles.

The above distinction, it should be noted, is held mainly to account for the nature of Īśvara and *jīva* as reflected images of Brahman. According to this view, the consciousness that is reflected is Brahman which is one, and the reflected images are two — Īśvara and *jīva*. In order to account for the two reflected images of one entity, we require two different reflecting media. And *māyā* and *avidyā* serve as the reflecting media. The consciousness that is reflected in *māyā* is Īśvara and the consciousness that is reflected in *avidyā* is *jīva*. *Māyā* is located in Īśvara and it does not delude its locus, while *avidyā* is located in *jīva* and it does delude its locus.

It follows from the above that the view that *māyā* and *avidyā* are two distinct factors is held chiefly to account for the two reflected images of one entity — Brahman as Īśvara and *jīva*. But there are some preceptors like Padmapāda and Prakāśātman who do not subscribe to the view that both Īśvara and *jīva* are reflected images. They hold the view¹⁰ that *jīva* alone is the reflected image of Brahman — the pure consciousness in *avidyā*, mind, etc., and Īśvara is the pure consciousness which remains as the prototype. Sarvajñātman in his *Samkṣepaśārīraka*¹¹ favours the above view. Thus *jīva* alone is the reflected image and not Īśvara. Hence the assertion that to account for the two reflected images of one entity — Brahman as Īśvara and *jīva*, two different reflecting media must be admitted is unsound.

There are other preceptors like Suresvara, Vidyāraṇya, and Anubhūtiśvarūpa who hold both *jīva* and *Īsvara* to be reflected images. Even according to their view *māyā* and *avidyā* are not two distinct principles. Suresvara holds the view⁴² that the reflected image of pure consciousness in *māyā* is *Īsvara* and that of pure consciousness in mind is *jīva*. Sarvajñātman also adopts this view.⁴³ Vidyāraṇya and Anubhūtiśvarūpa hold that the reflected image of pure consciousness in *māyā* is *Īsvara*, and in *avidyā* is *jīva*. But *māyā* and *avidyā* are not two distinct factors according to them. They are two aspects of one *prakṛti*. According to Vidyāraṇya,⁴⁴ *māyā* is that aspect of *prakṛti* in which the *sattvaguna* is predominant, and *avidyā* is that aspect of *prakṛti* wherein the *sattva-guna* is less predominant. Anubhūtiśvarūpa in his *Prakāṣārtha-vivaraṇa* states⁴⁵ that *māyā* is the primal cause of the world. The reflected image of pure consciousness, that is, Brahman in it is *Īsvara*. *Māyā* consists of innumerable parts which are indeterminable. Each part consists of *āvaraṇaśakti* and *vikṣepaśakti* and is known as *avidyā*. The reflection of pure consciousness, that is, Brahman in *avidyā* is known as *jīva*. Thus Anubhūtiśvarūpa speaks of *māyā* and *avidyā* as two aspects of *prakṛti* which is one. It follows from the above that *māyā* and *avidyā* are not two distinct factors. They are two aspects of *prakṛti* which is one, and they are identical.

Those who advocate the distinction between *māyā* and *avidyā* hold that their view is based on the authority of Śrī Śaṅkara, who, according to them, speaks of the distinction between *māyā* and *avidyā* in his commentary on the *adṛśyatvādhikaraṇa* and *ānumānikādhikaraṇa*. A careful study of Śrī Śaṅkara's commentary on the above shows that Śrī Śaṅkara favours the

identity of *māyā* and *avidyā* and not of the distinction between the two. In his commentary on the *adr̥śyat-vādhikaraṇa* itself, Śrī Śaṅkara, while interpreting the text — *akṣarāt parataḥ paraḥ*¹⁰ states that *māyā* is the limiting adjunct of Īsvara.¹¹ And in his commentary on the *ānumānikādhikaraṇa*, he refers¹² to *avidyā* which is designated as *avyakta* and further states¹³ that this *avyakta* is sometimes referred to in the *Upaniṣad* as *akṣara* and at other times as *māyā*. From this it follows that according to Śrī Śaṅkara the words *avyakta*, *avidyā*, *akṣara* and *māyā* are synonyms.

Now we have to face the question as to why Śrī Śaṅkara has specifically stated that *māyā* is the limiting adjunct of Īsvara and *avidyā* is the limiting adjunct of *jīva*. An answer to this question is provided in the *Vivaraṇa* wherein it is stated¹⁴ that the *vikṣepa*-phase of *prakṛti* is known as *māyā*, and the *āvaraṇa*-phase of *prakṛti* is known as *avidyā*. Since the *vikṣepa*-phase of *prakṛti*, that is, *māyā* is active in respect of Īsvara, and since the *āvaraṇa*-phase of *prakṛti* is active in respect of *jīva*, it is usually said that *māyā* and *avidyā* are respectively the limiting adjuncts of Īsvara and *jīva*. In other words, Īsvara and *jīva* are respectively associated with two aspects of one *prakṛti* and not with two different factors.

It may be added here that since *prakṛti* is under the control of Īsvara, and since *prakṛti* as related to Īsvara is termed *māyā*, it is said that *māyā* does not delude its abode, that is Īsvara. In the same way, since *prakṛti* influences *jīva* and since *prakṛti* as related to *jīva* is termed *avidyā*, it is said that *avidyā* deludes its abode, namely, *jīva*. It must be noted here, that *māyā* and *avidyā* should not be distinguished as two on the

ground that the former is that which does not delude its abode, and the latter is that which deludes its abode. As has been said above, they are two aspects of one *prakṛti*. It would be clear from the foregoing analysis, that according to Śrī Śaṅkara *māyā* and *avidyā* are identical. Following Śaṅkara, Padmapāda in his *Pañcapādikā* speaks of¹¹ the identity of *māyā* and *avidyā*. Sarvajñātman, following the *Bhagavad-gītā*, speaks of¹² the identity of *māyā* and *avidyā*. Prakāśātman in his *Vivaraṇa* maintains¹³ the identity of *māyā* and *avidyā* on the basis of the *smṛti* text "Salutations to the one who does not come within the range of any proof and who is of the nature of consciousness, and by whose immanence in the heart, the yogin transcends *māyā* — *avidyā*." It may be added here that Maṇḍana also who is said¹⁴ to represent a standpoint in Advaita that is different from that of Śrī Śaṅkara treats¹⁵ *māyā* and *avidyā* as identical in his *Brahma-siddhi*. To sum up: the prevalent view in Advaita is that *māyā* and *avidyā* are identical.

7. 2. *Is Avidyā One or Many?*

Avidyā is one according to the *Vivaraṇa* school. This raises an important question whether this *avidyā* itself can be considered as the material cause of the illusory appearance of shell as silver, rope as snake, etc. The prevalent view in Advaita is that *avidyā* cannot be the material cause of the illusory appearances referred to above. If it were admitted to be so, then as illusory silver would be removed only by the removal of its cause — *avidyā* (according to the present view) and as *avidyā* would be removed only by the direct knowledge of Brahman, illusory silver will be manifested till there arises the direct knowledge of Brahman. But it is not

so. In ordinary experience, we find that illusory appearances of shell-silver, etc., are removed by the direct knowledge of shell, etc. Hence something other than *avidyā* must be admitted as the material cause of the illusory appearances referred to above. And that cause is modal ignorance or *avasthājñāna* or *tūlājñāna* or *tūlāvidyā*. It is a derivative of *avidyā*. It is located in the consciousness delimited by an object (say) shell. And its content also is the consciousness delimited by that object. Modal ignorances are many. Primal nescience is only one.⁵⁶

The *Bhāmatī* school, on the other hand, admits *avidyā* to be many.⁵⁷ The latter, however, does not constitute the transformative material cause of the world. The world is admitted to be the transfiguration or the illusory change of Brahman which is the content of *avidyā* that is located in the individual soul. Now it may be asked whether illusory silver also can be considered as an illusory change of Brahman which is the content of *avidyā*. It cannot be considered to be so; for, in that case the illusory silver would cease to exist only when Brahman — its transfigurative material cause — becomes free from its relation to *avidyā*. And Brahman would remain so, only when *avidyā* is removed by the direct knowledge of Brahman. It comes to this: illusory silver would continue to appear till there arises the direct knowledge of Brahman. This is contrary to the experience of the removal of silver, etc., by the direct knowledge of shell, etc. Hence the *Bhāmatī* school also has to admit modal ignorance as the cause of illusory silver, etc. According to this school, modal ignorance is located in the *jīva* and it has Brahman conditioned by shell, etc., as its content. And, modal ignorances are many.⁵⁸

The author of the *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* states that primal nescience itself would account for the manifestation of illusory silver, etc. He argues that removal is twofold as *bādhā* and *nivṛtti*. Of these *bādhā* is removal of an effect along with its cause. *Nivṛtti* is removal of the effect when the cause exists. The former is effected by the direct knowledge of the substratum, while the latter is effected by a mental state contrary to that of the effect. If *avidyā*, the primal nescience were admitted to be the cause of the illusory silver, then by the rise of the mental state in the form 'This is shell' the illusory silver is reduced to its latent form. This is the case of *nivṛtti*. It would continue to exist in *avidyā*, its cause, till there arises the knowledge of Brahman. Hence there is no question of the manifestation of the gross form of illusory silver till there arises the knowledge of Brahman. When there arises the knowledge of Brahman, *avidyā* and the latent form of illusory silver would be removed. This is *bādhā*.⁵⁹

To sum up: (i) *avidyā* or primal nescience is admitted to be one by the *Vivaraṇa* school, and many by the *Bhāmatī* school; (ii) in order to account for the illusory appearances of shell as silver, etc., the *Vivaraṇa* and the *Bhāmatī* school admit modal ignorance. The author of the *Vedāntaparibhāṣā*, however, argues that primal nescience itself can be considered as the cause of illusory silver, etc.

7.3. *The Manifestation and the Positive Nature of Avidyā*

Avidyā cannot be manifested by any proof or *pramāṇa*. It is because a *pramāṇa* is defined to be that which gives rise to the valid knowledge of an object unknown hitherto.⁶⁰ And unknown-ness in respect of

an object consists in its being characterized by primal nescience or modal ignorance. An object (say) pot is superimposed on the consciousness delimited by it, that is the pot. Thus there is the contact between the consciousness and the pot. Yet the pot is not manifested prior to the functioning of a *pramāṇa* (say) *pratyakṣa*, that is, sense of sight. It is because the consciousness delimited by the pot is concealed by what is known as modal ignorance. When the sense of sight functions, the mind, through the sense of sight, reaches the place of the pot and assumes its form. This modification of mind in the form of pot is known as *vṛtti* or mental state. The consciousness delimited by the pot is reflected in the mental state, and removes, the modal ignorance. The consciousness delimited by the pot is now free from modal ignorance; and it becomes identical with the consciousness reflected or delimited by the mind, that is *jīva*, through the mental state. Now there is direct association of the pot with the consciousness which is delimited by the object and which is manifested. The manifested consciousness is identical with *jīva*. Therefore, there is the manifestation of pot in the case of *jīva* in the form 'This is pot'.⁶¹

In the same way, Brahman is concealed by primal nescience and hence it is unknown. The major texts of the *Upaniṣads* give rise to the mental state in the form of Brahman, remove primal nescience, and are thereby characterized as *pramāṇas* in respect of Brahman.⁶²

From the above it follows that in order that an object may be taken as manifested by a *pramāṇa*, what is necessary first and foremost is that the consciousness delimited by that object must be concealed by modal ignorance. When viewed in this light if *avidyā* or primal

nescience is admitted to be manifested by a *pramāṇa*, then it amounts to admitting that the consciousness delimited by *avidyā* is concealed by a modal ignorance. The question arises as to what is the factor that manifests the modal ignorance which is said to conceal the consciousness delimited by *avidyā*. If it is admitted that a *pramāṇa* manifests it, then it amounts to saying that the consciousness is delimited by the modal ignorance. And so on *ad infinitum*. It comes to this that a *pramāṇa* cannot manifest *avidyā*.

Although *avidyā* is not manifested by *pramāṇas*, yet it is manifested by the witness-self (*sākṣi*) like happiness, misery, and other mental modes. Witness-self, according to the author of the *Vedāntaparibhāṣā*, is the consciousness that transcends the mind, while *jīva* is the consciousness that is immanent in the mind.⁶³ It is of the nature of consciousness. It is neither valid (*pramā*) nor erroneous (*bhrama*). In this sense, it is comparable to the knowledge of God which, according to the Vaiśeṣika, is eternal and therefore is not a case of *pramā* as it does not arise from any excellence (*guṇa*); nor is it a case of *bhrama* as it does not arise from any defect (*doṣa*). It is something different from being *pramā* and *bhrama*.⁶⁴ It is also comparable to the *nirvikalpa-pratyakṣa* of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika which is neither *pramā* nor *bhrama* but is different from the two.⁶⁵ It directly manifests the objects like happiness, misery, etc., which are not characterized by ignorance; and, it manifests objects like pot, etc., which are characterized by ignorance through a *pramāṇa*. Here *avidyā* or primal nescience is free from another ignorance, and hence it is directly manifested by the *sākṣi*. Exactly similar consideration applies to modal ignorance too. To sum up: *Avidyā* or primal nescience and

modal ignorance are not manifested by any *pramāṇa*; they are manifested by the *sākṣin* which, however, is not a *pramāṇa*.

Although *avidyā* as such does not come within the range of any *pramāṇa*, some aspects of it are comprehended by *pramāṇas*. For example there arises the doubt whether *avidyā* is positive in nature or mere absence of knowledge. And doubt would arise in respect of that alone which is the content of modal ignorance. When the positive nature of *avidyā*, thus becomes the content of a modal ignorance, it follows that proofs like perception, inference, verbal testimony and presumption could function to remove the modal ignorance through mental state and manifest the positive nature of *avidyā*. It comes to this: *pramāṇas* manifest the positive nature of *avidyā*. And, the *pramāṇas* are perception, inference, verbal testimony and presumption.

(1) The perceptual experience 'I am ignorant', points to the positive nature of *avidyā*. It might be said that the above experience refers to mere negation of knowledge. This is not correct, because negation presupposes the knowledge of the thing that is negated. If it is said that the experience 'I am ignorant' refers to the negation of knowledge, then we must have the knowledge of 'the knowledge that is negated'. If we have that knowledge, then we cannot have its negation. If we do not have that knowledge, then also we cannot have its negation, because negation presupposes the thing negated. Hence the perceptual experience 'I am ignorant' involves a reference not to absence of all knowledge but to a positive entity which is *avidyā*.¹⁰

(2) The positive nature of *avidyā* is also proved through inference which is as follows: "Valid knowledge, like light, removes the factor that conceals its object, because it manifests that object which remained unknown earlier." Here valid knowledge is the subject of inference (*pakṣa*). 'Removal of the factor that conceals the object of knowledge' is the thing that is sought to be established (*sādhya*). The state of being a manifesting factor is the ground (*hetu*) on the basis of which the *sādhya* is established. And 'light' is the illustrative example.

This inferential argument may be explained as follows. Light manifests an object (say) pot. This means it gives rise to usages such as 'The pot exists', 'The pot is manifest' etc. The *hetu*, namely, the state of being a manifesting factor is thus present in the light. The latter removes the factor, that is, darkness, which conceals the pot. This means that darkness gives rise to usages such as 'The pot does not exist', 'The pot is not manifest,' etc. The *sādhya*, namely, the removal of the factor that conceals the object of knowledge also is present in the light. So we say that that which manifests an object must remove the factor that conceals that object. When viewed in this light, the valid knowledge of pot manifests the pot and hence it must remove the factor that conceals the pot. This factor is modal ignorance. In the same way, the direct knowledge of Brahman manifests Brahman. That is, it gives rise to the usages such as 'Brahman exists,' 'Brahman manifests' etc. Hence it must remove the factor that conceals Brahman. And that factor is *avidyā* or primal nescience. The factor that conceals Brahman cannot be the absence of knowledge. It is be-

cause absence cannot conceal anything. Hence the concealing factor, namely, *avidyā*, must be a positive entity.”

(3) The Upaniṣadic passages, “The true nature^c of Brahman is concealed from the individual souls by *amṛta* (*avidyā*),” and “The true nature of Brahman is veiled from the individual souls by an entity similar to mist”, state that the true nature of Brahman is veiled by *avidyā*, which for the reason stated above must be a positive entity. Further, the *Śvetāśvatara* text “Know *māyā* to be the material cause of the world” states that *māyā* is the material cause of the world. Since *abhāva* can never be the material cause of any entity, and since *māyā* is said to be the material cause, it is not absence of knowledge but a positive entity. Thus verbal testimony proves that *māyā* or *avidyā* is a positive entity.”

(4) The positive nature of *avidyā* is postulated by the fact that the infinite bliss of Brahman does not manifest in its true nature. If there be no *avidyā* to obstruct, it would surely have manifested itself in its fullness. The concealing factor, *avidyā* must be positive in nature on the ground that it conceals the true nature of Brahman.”

Thus perception, inference, verbal testimony and presumption go to prove that primal nescience is positive in nature.

7.4. *The Locus and Content of Māyā or Avidyā*

Like *jñāna*, *māyā* or *avidyā* implies a locus in which it abides (*āśraya*) and a content to which it refers (*viśaya*). All Advaitins agree that the content of *avidyā* is only pure consciousness — Brahman. This means that *avidyā* could conceal Brahman only. When it is

said that *avidyā* conceals Brahman, what is meant is that *avidyā* gives rise to empirical usages such as 'Brahman does not exist' 'It is not manifest' etc. Everything apart from Brahman is inert by nature and hence it cannot be concealed by *avidyā*.

The Advaitins prove that *avidyā* cannot conceal an inert object on two grounds: (i) there is no proof that would establish that an inert object is veiled by *avidyā*; and (ii) no purpose will be served by the concealment of an inert object. These two grounds may be explained as follows: (1) It might be said that the cognition of the form, 'The object is concealed by *avidyā*' is the proof for the concealment of the object. The Advaitins argue that this cognition itself is not valid. It is because in order to know that the object is concealed by *avidyā* what is necessary first and foremost is that the object must be known. If the object itself is unknown then it is impossible to have the knowledge that the object is concealed by *avidyā*. In order to obviate this difficulty, if it is admitted that the object is known, then since it is known it cannot be said that it is veiled. Hence the cognition 'The object is concealed by *avidyā*' is not a valid one. It cannot, therefore, be established that the object is veiled by *avidyā*. (2) The fruit of concealment is only the obscuration of contingent luminosity (*prasaṅgaprakāśa*) which gives rise to empirical usages such as "The object does not exist," "It is not manifest," etc. The Advaitins argue that the contingent luminosity is possible only in the case of pure consciousness, Brahman. *Avidyā* conceals it and thereby gives rise to empirical usages such as 'Brahman does not exist,' 'It is not manifest,' etc.⁷⁰

The Advaitins further argue that if it is said that an inert object is concealed by *avidyā*, then it amounts to

saying that in the inert object there is contingent luminosity and that the latter is concealed. But in the inert object the luminosity is not contingent of itself, or on the strength of a *pramāṇa*, or on the strength of pure consciousness which serves as the underlying reality of the inert object.

The luminosity is not contingent of itself in an inert object, because the latter is inert. And, the luminosity is not contingent in the inert object on the strength of a *pramāṇa* also. It is because a *pramāṇa* removes the obscuration present in the consciousness delimited by the inert object and thereby manifests it. In other words, a *pramāṇa* causes luminosity in the object by removing the concealment caused by *avidyā* in the consciousness delimited by that object. And it is not reasonable to hold that the luminosity is concealed by *avidyā*.

In the same way, the luminosity is not contingent in the inert object on the strength of the consciousness delimited by it. The Advaitins argue that the consciousness delimited by the object has contingent luminosity. It is veiled by *avidyā*; and, consequently the object superimposed upon it also appears to be concealed. This means that there arises empirical usages in respect of that object in the form 'The object does not exist' 'It is not manifest' etc.¹¹ Thus inert objects are not concealed by *avidyā*, and hence they are not the content of *avidyā*. The pure consciousness, Brahman alone is veiled; and, it is the content of *avidyā*.

As regards the locus of *avidyā*, there are two different views in Advaita, one advocated by Suresvara, Sarvajñātman and Prakāsātman, and the other advo-

cated by Vācaspatimisra. Suresvara, Sarvajñātman, and Prakāśātman hold¹⁹ the view that pure consciousness as inner self is the locus of *avidyā*. Their argument in favour of this view may be stated as follows: in the state of deep sleep, *avidyā* is experienced and this is known from the recollection which one has, after coming back to the waking state, in the form "I did not know anything when I was asleep." Sense-organs do not function in that state, and mind provisionally merges in *avidyā* then. And, what we have in that state is *avidyā* and pure consciousness. There must be a locus to which *avidyā* could belong. And, it is the pure consciousness that serves as the locus of *avidyā*.

Those who favour the view that pure consciousness is the locus of *avidyā* reject the other view that *jīva* is the locus of *avidyā* on the following ground: *Jīva* is only the blend of pure consciousness and mind. In the state of deep sleep, mind provisionally merges in *avidyā* and so we do not have the notion of *jīva* then. There is, however, the direct experience of *avidyā*, even in the absence of the notion of *jīva*. If *jīva* were the locus of *avidyā*, then the latter could not be experienced in the state of deep sleep, because its locus, namely, *jīva* is not manifested as such. *Avidyā*, however, is experienced and it must have a locus. And the pure consciousness alone serves as its locus.²⁰

It is argued further that the experience 'I am ignorant' which shows that the sense of the word 'I' namely, *jīva* is the locus of *avidyā* should be explained in the following manner: *avidyā* present in the pure consciousness in the state of deep sleep is not determinately manifested in the form 'I am ignorant'. It is because mind which is the revealing medium of *avidyā*

is provisionally merged in the latter. When one comes back to the waking state, mind is superimposed on the pure consciousness. It reveals *avidyā*; and, while doing so, it reveals it as present in itself and consequently in the consciousness delimited by it, namely, the *jīva*. Hence there is the experience of *avidyā* in the form 'I am ignorant'.

Sarvajñātman in his *Saṁkṣepaśārīraka*⁷⁴ and Vidyāraṇya in his *Vivaraṇaprameyasāṅgraha*⁷⁵ state that although *avidyā* is present in the consciousness itself, yet because of the mutual identification of consciousness and mind, it appears as present in the consciousness delimited by the mind, namely, the *jīva*. It is with this in view that Śrī Śaṅkara and Suresvara speak of *avidyā* as present in *jīva*.

Vācaspatimīśra is of the view that the locus of *avidyā* must be one from whom the true nature of Brahman is concealed. The true nature of Brahman is concealed from *jīva* who feels that Brahman is not manifest to him. Hence *jīva* alone is the locus of *avidyā*.⁷⁶

According to Vācaspatimīśra, *jīva* is the reality conditioned by *avidyā*.⁷⁷ And when associated with mind, it is determinately perceived in the form 'I', and it becomes an agent, etc. In the state of deep sleep, *jīva* — the reality conditioned by *avidyā* — exists. And it could serve as the locus of *avidyā* even then. But since it is free from *jīva*, the superimposition of mind in that state, it is not determinately perceived in the form 'I'.

Now it might be said that the view that *jīva* is the locus of *avidyā* suffers from the fallacy of interdependence (*anyonyāśraya*). It is because *avidyā* has to exist

in *jīva*, and one could have the *jīva*-aspect of reality only when the reality is conditioned by *avidyā*.

Advaitins argue that two objects can be said to be interdependent, if each depends on the other for its existence, origination and cognition. Of these three, the first one is not a defect. For example, an entity can be considered as a substance (*dravya*) only when it is a substratum of a quality (*guṇāśraya*). And it can be viewed as the substratum of a quality only when it is held to be a substance. Thus *dravyatva* and the state of being a substratum of a quality depend upon each other for their existence. And, yet this interdependence is not considered to be a defect.¹¹

Interdependence in respect of origination, however, is a defect. But this relates only to entities that are subject to origination, and not to eternal entities. In the present case, both *jīva* and *avidyā* are eternal entities. And hence there arises no question of their depending upon each other for their origination.

In the same way, *jīva* and *avidyā* do not depend upon each other for their being known. It is because *avidyā* is manifested by *sākṣin*, while *jīva* in its essential nature is manifested by itself and as associated with mind, etc., is manifested by *sākṣin*. So *jīva* and *avidyā* are not interdependent in respect of their cognition.¹²

It follows from the above that *jīva* is the locus of *avidyā*. It should be noted here that according to Vācaspatimisra, it is only the reality part of the *jīva* that is the locus of *avidyā*. He does not admit that *jīva* as associated with the characteristics of *avidyā*, mind, etc., is the locus of *avidyā*.

(to be continued)

NOTES

Abbreviations

<i>AS</i>	— <i>Advaitasiddhi</i>
<i>B</i>	— <i>Bhāmatī</i>
<i>Bh. G.</i>	— <i>Bhagavad Gītā</i>
<i>Byh. Up. Bh. V</i>	— <i>Byhadāranyakopaniṣadbhāṣya-vārttika</i>
<i>BSB</i>	— <i>Brahmasūtrabhāṣya</i>
<i>Chānd. Up.</i>	— <i>Chāndogyopaniṣad</i>
<i>GD</i>	— <i>Gūḍhārthadīpikā</i>
<i>IS</i>	— <i>Iṣṭasiddhi</i>
<i>Kaiv. Up.</i>	— <i>Kaivalyopaniṣad</i>
<i>KA</i>	— <i>Kṛṣṇālaṅkāra</i>
<i>Mait. Up.</i>	— <i>Maitryupaniṣad</i>
<i>Munḍ. Up.</i>	— <i>Munḍakopaniṣad</i>
<i>NS</i>	— <i>Naiṣkarmyasiddhi</i>
<i>NM</i>	— <i>Nyāyamakaranda</i>
<i>PD</i>	— <i>Pañcadaśī</i>
<i>PP</i>	— <i>Pañcapādikā</i>
<i>PPR</i>	— <i>Pañcaprakriyā</i>
<i>PV</i>	— <i>Prakatārtha Vivaraṇa</i>
<i>SŚ</i>	— <i>Samkṣepaśārīraka</i>
<i>SLS</i>	— <i>Siddhānta-leśa-saṅgraha</i>
<i>Śvet. Up.</i>	— <i>Śvetāśoataropaniṣad</i>
<i>TP</i>	— <i>Tattvopradīpikā</i>
<i>Taitt. Up.</i>	— <i>Taittirīyopaniṣad</i>
<i>VK</i>	— <i>Vedāntakalpalatikā</i>
<i>VP</i>	— <i>Vedāntaparibhāṣā</i>
<i>VTV</i>	— <i>Vedāntatattva-viveka</i>
<i>V</i>	— <i>Vivaraṇa</i>
<i>VPS</i>	— <i>Vivaraṇaprameyasāṅgraha</i>

1. अस्यानर्थहेतोः प्रहाणाय आत्मैकत्वविद्याप्रतिपत्तये सर्वे वेदान्ता आरभ्यन्ते । *BSB* 1.1.1.

2. नासदासीत् नो सदासीत् तदानीं
नासीद्रजो नो व्योमा परो यत् ।
किमावरीवः कुहकस्य शर्मन्
अम्भः किमासीद्गहनं गभीरम् ॥ 10-129-1

3. आपो वा इदमग्रे सलिलमासीत् । 7-1-5

4. तुच्छत्वाद्नासदासीत् गगनकुसुमवद्भेदकं नो सदासीत्
किन्त्वाभ्यामन्यदासीत् व्यवहृतिगतिसन्नासलोकस्तदानीम् ।
किन्त्ववरीवः शुकतौ रजतवदपरो नो विराड्व्योमपूर्वः
शर्मण्यात्मन्यथैतत् कुहकसलिलवर्तिकं भवेदावरीवः ॥

Verse 23

5. न मृत्युरासीदमृतं न तर्हि
न राज्या अह्म आसीत् प्रकेतः ।
आनीदवातं स्वधया तदेकं
तस्मात् ह अन्यं न परं किञ्चनास ॥ 10-129-2

6. बन्धो जन्मात्ययात्मा यदि न पुनरभूत्तर्हि मोक्षोऽपि नासीत्
यद्बद्धात्रिदिनं वा न भवति तरणौ किन्तु दृग्दोष एषः ।
अप्राणं शुद्धमेकं समभवदथ तन्मायया कर्तृसंज्ञं
तस्मादन्यच्च नासीत्परिवृतमजया जीवभूतं तदेव ॥ Verse 24

7. तम आसीत्तमसा गूढमग्रे अप्रकेतं सलिलं सर्वमा इदम् ।
तुच्छेनाभ्वपिहितं यदासीत्तपसस्तन्महिमा जायतैकम् ॥

10-129-3

कामस्तदग्रे समवर्तताधि मनसो रेतः प्रथमं यदासीत् ।

सतो बन्धुमसति निरविन्दन्हृदि प्रतीप्या कवयो मनीषा ॥

10-129-4

8. आसीदिदं तमोभूतं अप्रज्ञातमलक्षणम् ।

अप्रतर्क्यमनिर्देश्यं प्रसुप्तमिव सर्वतः ॥ *Manusmṛti*, I.5

9. तुच्छेन सदसद्विलक्षणेन भावरूपाज्ञानेन । *C. on Śataśloki*,

Verse 25

10. यः सर्वज्ञः सर्वविद्यस्य ज्ञानमयं तपः । *Mund. Up.*, I,i,9.

11. सोऽकामयत बहु स्यां प्रजायेयेति ।

स तपोऽतप्यत । स तपस्तप्त्वा ॥ *Taitt. Up.*, 8-6

12. प्रागासीद्भावरूपं तम इति तमसा गूढमस्मादतर्क्यं

क्षीरान्तर्यद्वदम्भो जनिरिह जगतो नामरूपात्मकस्य ।

कामाद्भ्रातुः सिसृक्षोः अनुगतजगतः कर्मभिः सम्प्रवृत्तात्
रेतोरूपैर्मनोभिः प्रथममनुगतैः सन्ततैः कार्यमाणैः ॥

Verse 25

13. न तं विदाथ य इमा जजान

अन्यदृष्माकमन्तरं बभूव ।

नीहारेण प्रवृता जल्प्या

चासुतृप उक्थशासश्चरन्ति ॥ 10-82-7

14. चतुष्कपर्दा युवतिस्सुपेशा

घृतप्रतीका वयुनानि वस्ते ।

तस्यां सुपर्णा वृषणा निषेदतु -

यत्र देवा दधिरे भागधेयम् ॥ 10-114-3

15. चत्वारोऽस्याः कपर्दाः युवतिरथ भवेन्नूतना नित्यमेषा

माया वा पेशला स्यात् अघटितघटनापाटवं याति यस्मात् ।

स्यादारम्भे घृतास्या श्रुतिभववयुनान्येवमाच्छादयन्ती

तस्यामेतौ सुपर्णाविव परपुरुषौ तिष्ठतोऽर्थप्रतीत्या ॥

Verse 26

16. एकस्सुपर्णः ससमुद्रमाविवेश स इदं विश्वं भुवनं विचष्टे ।

तं पाकेन मनसा ततस्तं माता रेन्धि स उ रेन्धि मातरम् ॥

सुपर्णं विप्राः कवयो वयोभिः एकं सन्तं बहुधा कल्पयन्ति ॥

10-114-4

17. एकस्तत्रास्त्यसङ्गः तदनु तदपरोऽज्ञानसिन्धुं प्रविष्टः

विस्मृत्यात्मस्वरूपं स विविधजगदाकारमाभासमैक्षत् ।

बुद्ध्याऽन्तर्याविदैक्षद्विसृजति तमजा सोऽपि तामेवमेकः

तावद्विप्राः तमेकं कथमपि बहुधा कल्पयन्ति स्ववाग्भिः ॥

Verse 27

18. सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्म । *Taitt. Up.*, 2.1.1.
19. एकमेवाद्वितीयम् । *Chānd. Up.*, 6.2.1.
20. यतो वा इमानि भूतानि जायन्ते, येन जातानि जीवन्ति,
यत्प्रयन्त्यभिसंविशन्ति, तद्विजिज्ञासस्व तद्ब्रह्मेति ।
Taitt. Up., 3.1.
21. मायां तु प्रकृतिं विद्यान्मायिनं तु महेश्वरम् ।— *Svet. Up.*,
3.4.10.
22. ते ध्यानयोगानुगता अपश्यन् देवात्मशक्तिं स्वगुणैर्निगूढाम् ।
Ibid., 1.3.
23. स एव मायापरिमोहितात्मा । *Kaiv. Up.*, 12.
24. इन्द्रजालमिव मायामयम् । *Mait. Up.*, 4.
25. अज्ञानेनावृत्तं ज्ञानं तेन मुह्यन्ति जन्तवः । *Bh.G.* 5.15.

अज्ञानेन - आवरणविक्षेपशक्तिमता मायाख्येनानतेन तमसा आवृतम् - आच्छादितं ज्ञानं, जीवेश्वरजगद्भेदभ्रमाधिष्ठानभूतं नित्यं स्वप्रकाशं सच्चिदानन्दरूपमद्वितीयं परमार्थसत्यं तेन स्वरूपावरो-
णेन मुह्यन्ति ... संसाररूपं विक्षेपं गच्छन्ति जन्तवः जननशीलाः संसारिणः । *GD, C. on Bh.G.* 5.15

26. नाहं प्रकाशः सर्वस्य योगमाया समावृतः । *Bh.G.* 7.25.
27. ज्ञानेन तु तदज्ञानं येषां नाशितमात्मनः । *Ibid.*, 5.16.
28. मामेव ये प्रपद्यन्ते मायामेतां तरन्ति ते । *Ibid.*, 7.14.

Vide: (i) अज्ञानमावरणमावरणं च माया
सर्वेश्वरेण हरिणा दृढमभ्यधायि ।
चैतन्यवस्तुन इति प्रतिपद्यमाना-
स्तत्त्वं तदेकमिति निश्चयतः प्रतीमः ॥

SS, 3.108

- (ii) ज्ञानं निवर्तकमपि द्वितीयस्य तस्य
गीतागतः करुणया भगवानुवाच ।
तेनापि तत्त्वमिदमेकमिति प्रतीति-
रानीयते कथितलक्षणतुल्यभावात् ॥

Ibid., 3.109

29. अनादिमायया सुप्तः यदा जीवः प्रबुद्ध्यते । *Ibid.*, I.16
30. संघातः स्वप्नवत् सर्वे आत्ममायाविसर्जिताः । *Ibid.*,
III, 10
31. मायया विद्यते हि एतान् नान्यथाजं कथञ्चन । *Ibid.*,
III, 19
32. नेह नानेति चाग्नायात् इन्द्रो मायाभिरित्यपि ।
अजायमानो बहुधा मायया जायते तु सः ॥ *Ibid.*, III, 24
33. (i) सतो हि मायया जन्म युज्यते न तु तत्त्वतः ।
Ibid., III, 27
- (ii) असतो मायया जन्म तत्त्वतो नैव युज्यते ।
Ibid., III, 28
34. जन्म मायोपमं तेषां सा च माया न विद्यते । *Ibid.*, III, 58
35. यदि वयं स्वतन्त्रां काञ्चित् प्रागवस्थां जगतोऽभ्युपगच्छेम
प्रसङ्ग्येम तदा प्रधानकारणवादम् । परमेश्वराधीना
त्वियमस्माभिः प्रागवस्था जगतोऽभ्युपगम्यते, न स्वतन्त्रा ।
BSB, 1-4-3
36. सा चावश्यमभ्युपगन्तव्या । अर्थवती हि सा । न हि
तया विना परमेश्वरस्य स्रष्टृत्वं सिद्धयति । शक्तिरहितस्य
तस्य प्रवृत्त्यनुपपत्तेः । *Ibid.*, I.4.3
37. अक्षरमव्याकृतं ईश्वराश्रयं तस्यैवोपाधिभूतम् ।
Ibid., 1-2-22
38. अव्यक्ता हि सा माया । *Ibid.*, 1-4-3
39. मुक्तानां च पुनः अनुत्पत्तिः । कुतः ? विद्यया तस्याः
बीजशक्तेः दाहात् । अविद्यात्मिका हि बीजशक्तिः । *Ibid.*
40. तत्त्वमिति विम्बस्थानीयब्रह्मस्वरूपता प्रतिविम्ब-
स्थानीयस्य जीवस्योपदिश्यते । *PP*, p. 108
41. स्पष्टं तमः स्फुरणमत्र न तत्र तद्वत्
सर्वेश्वरे तदिति तत्र निषिध्यते तत् ।
विम्बे तमोनिपतिते प्रतिविम्बके वा
देहद्वयावरणवर्जितचित्स्वरूपे ॥ *SS*, 2. 176.

42. आत्माभासोऽपि योऽज्ञाने तत्कार्यं चावभासते ।
Brh. Up. Bh. V, 4.3.1320.
43. See note 41.
44. सत्त्वशुद्धयविशुद्धिभ्यां मायाविद्ये च ते मते ।
 मायाविम्बो वशीकृत्य तां स्यात् सर्वज्ञ ईश्वरः ॥ *PD, I, 16.*
45. एका तावदनाद्यनिर्वाच्या भूतप्रकृतिश्चिन्मात्रसम्बन्धिनी
 माया, तस्यां चित्प्रतिबिम्ब ईश्वरः, तस्या एव
 परिच्छिन्नानिर्वाच्यानन्तप्रदेशेष्वज्ञानाभिधानेष्ववरण-
 विश्लेषशक्तिमत्सु चित्प्रतिबिम्बो जीवः । *PV, pp. 3-4.*
46. *Mund. Up., 2-1-2.*
47. See note 37.
48. See note 38.
49. अविद्यात्मिका हि बीजशक्तिः अव्यक्तशब्दनिर्देश्या
 तदेतदव्यक्तं क्वचिदाकाशशब्दनिर्दिष्टम् ... क्वचिदक्षर-
 शब्दोदितम् ... क्वचिन्मायेति सूचितम् । *BSB, 1-4-3.*
50. एकस्मिन्नपि वस्तुनि विश्लेषप्राधान्येन माया,
 आच्छादनप्राधान्येनाविद्या । *V, p. 173.*
51. योऽयं श्रुतिस्मृतीतिहासपुराणेषु नामरूपम् अव्याकृतम्
 अविद्या मायाप्रकृतिः अग्रहणम् अव्यक्तं तमः कारणं लयः
 शक्तिः महासुप्तिः निद्रा अक्षरम् आकाशं इति च तत्र
 तत्र बहुधा गीयते । *PP, p. 98.*
52. See note 28.
53. तरत्यविद्यां विततां हृदि यस्मिन्निवेशिते ।
 योगी मायाममेयाय तस्मै विद्यात्मने नमः ॥
Viṣṇupurāṇa, 5-17-14
54. ... मण्डनवचः तद्भयन्यथाप्रस्थितम् । *SS, 2. 174.*
55. एवमेवायमविद्या माया मिथ्यावभासः ।
56. मूलाज्ञानस्यैवावस्थाभेदाः रजताद्युपादानानि
 शुक्तिकादिज्ञानैः सह अद्यासेन निवर्तन्ते । *V, p. 99.*

57. न वयं प्रधानवत् अविद्यां सर्वजीवेषु एकामाचक्ष्महे, किन्तु इयं प्रतिजीवं भिद्यते । *B*, p. 377.
58. वाचस्पतिमते सर्वस्य प्रपञ्चस्य जीवाश्रिताज्ञानविषयीकृत-ब्रह्मविवर्तत्वोपपत्तेः तद्वत् शुक्तिरजतादेः पुरुषाश्रिताज्ञान-विषयीकृतब्रह्मविवर्तत्वोपपत्तेः । *SLS*, p. 146.
59. कार्यविनाशो हि द्विविधः । कश्चिदुपादानेन सह, कश्चित्तु विद्यमान एवोपादाने । आद्यो बाधः, द्वितीयस्तु निवृत्तिः । आद्यस्य कारणमधिष्ठानतत्त्वसाक्षात्कारः । तेन विना उपादानभूताया अविद्याया अनिवृत्तिः । द्वितीये विरोधिवृत्त्यु-त्पत्तिः, दोषनिवृत्तिश्च । *VP*, p. 104.
60. प्रमाकरणम् प्रमाणम् । प्रमात्वमनधिगताबाधितार्थविषयक-ज्ञानत्वम् । *VP*, pp. 9-13
61. घटादेर्विषयस्य प्रत्यक्षत्वं तु प्रमात्रभिन्नत्वम् । *VP*, p.47.
62. अविद्याकल्पितभेदनिवृत्तिपरत्वात् शास्त्रस्य । *BSB*, 1.1.4.
63. जीवो नाम अन्तःकरणावाच्छिन्नचैतन्यम्, तत्साक्षी तु अन्तःकरणोपहितचैतन्यम् । *VP*, pp. 69-70.
64. पराभिमतेश्वरज्ञानवत् साक्षिणः प्रमाऽप्रमावहि-भूतत्वेन ... *KA*, p. 143.
65. न प्रमा नापि भ्रमः स्यान्निरिकल्पकम् । *Kārikāvalī*, 135.
66. प्रत्यक्षं तावत् 'अहमक्षः' 'मयि ज्ञानं नास्ति' इत्यपरोक्षावभासदर्शनात् । *V*, p. 74.
67. विवादपदं प्रमाणज्ञानं स्वप्रागभावव्यतिरिक्त-स्वविषया-वरणस्वनिवर्त्य-स्वदेशगतवस्त्वन्तरपूर्वकम्, अप्रकाशितार्थ-प्रकाशकत्वात् अन्धकारे प्रथमोत्पन्नप्रदीपप्रभावत् ।
V, p. 85.
68. श्रुतिस्तावत् अन्तेन हि प्रत्यूढाः इत्येवमाद्या । *PP*, p. 73.
69. अर्थापत्तिरपि भावरूपाज्ञानसद्भावे प्रमाणमित्याह, अन्यथा मिथ्यार्थावभासानुपपत्तेः इति । *V*, p. 89.
70. ननु किमिदमज्ञानं आत्मानमिव अनात्मानमप्यावृणोति, किं वा नावृणोति । नाद्यः, प्रमाणप्रयोजनयोः अभावात् । तथा

हि — ' इदं नीलम् अज्ञानेनावृतम् ' इति प्रमाणेन ग्रही-
तव्यम् । तच्च नीलप्रतीत्यप्रतीत्योर्न संभाव्यते । *VPS*, p. 21.

71. प्रयोजनं च दुःसंपादम् । सर्वत्र हि आवरणस्य प्रसक्त-
प्रकाशप्रतिबन्धः प्रयोजनम् । तदत्र किमनात्मनि स्वतः
प्रकाशः प्रसक्तः, किं वा प्रमाणबलात्, उत चैतन्य-
बलात् ? नाद्यः, जडत्वात् । न द्वितीयः, माननिवर्त्यस्य
आवरणस्य तत्प्रतिबन्धकत्वायोगात् । न तृतीयः, चैतन्या-
वरणादेव तत्सिद्धावनात्मनि पृथगावरणकल्पना-
वैयर्थ्यात् । *VPS*, p. 22.
72. (i) आत्मन एवाज्ञत्वम् । किं विषयं पुनस्त-
दात्मनोऽज्ञानम् । आत्मविषयमिति ब्रूमः । *NS*, p. 106.
- (ii) आश्रयत्वविषयत्वभागिनी
निर्विभागचित्तिरेव केवला । *SS*, I. 319.
- (iii) न तावदज्ञानं आश्रयविषयभेदापेक्षम् ।
किन्तु एकस्मिन्नेव वस्तुनि आश्रयत्वमावरणञ्चेति कृत्यद्वयं
संपादयति । *V*, p. 210.
73. ... न त्वपरोक्षतया परोक्षतया वा सुषुप्तिकाले जीवत्वस्य
स्फुरणमस्ति । न च परोक्षे जीवत्वे जीवस्यापरोक्षत्वं
सम्भवति । तत्र जीवाश्रयत्वं चेत्, अज्ञानमपि परोक्षमेव
स्यात् ; न चैतद्दृष्टम् । तस्मात् प्रत्यग्रहण एव अज्ञानि-
त्वमभ्युपगन्तव्यम् । सुषुप्तिकाले प्रत्यक्चैतन्याश्रयत्वेनैव
अज्ञानस्य स्फुरणात् । *PPR*, pp. 56-55.
74. जीवन्मुक्तिगतो यदाह भगवान् सत्संप्रदायप्रभुः
जीवाज्ञानवचस्तदीद्गुचितं पूर्वापरालोचनात् ।
SS, II. 174.
75. 'अयो दहति' इत्यत्र दग्धत्वायसोरेकाग्निसंबन्धात् परस्पर
संबन्धावभासः, तद्वदज्ञानान्तःकरणयोः एकात्मसंबन्धादेव
सामानाधिकरण्यावभासः, न त्वन्तःकरणस्याज्ञानाश्रयत्वात् ।
VPS, p. 58.

(to be continued)

ŚIVAPĀDĀDIKEŚĀNTAVARṆANASTOTRA
of Śrī Śaṅkara Bhagavatpāda

Translated by
Dr N. Gangadharan

(Contd. from Vol. XIV. No. 1-2)

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

PHYSICS DEPARTMENT

PHYSICS 350

LECTURE 10

1997-1998

[31]

यस्मिन्नर्धेन्दुमुग्धद्युतिनिचयतिरस्कारनिस्तन्द्रकान्तौ

काश्मीरक्षोदसङ्कल्पितमिव रुचिरं चित्रकं भाति नेत्रम् ।

तस्मिन्नुल्लोलचिह्नीनटवरतरुणीलास्यरङ्गायमाणे

कालारेः फालदेशे विहरतु हृदयं वीतचिन्तान्तरं नः ॥

May our mind shedding all other anxious reflections sport on Śiva's forehead, (i) on which shines the eye like a beautiful mark made with the saffron powder possessing the radiance excelling the gracious lustre of the crescent, and (ii) that resembles a rostrum for the foremost danseuse, namely, the moving lovely lines.

The term '*kālāri*' denotes Lord Śiva, the foe of Kāla, the god of death. The science of physiognomy glorifies the excellent lines on the forehead of the great men. The forehead of Lord Śiva is fancied as the rostrum on which the danseuse, the wavy lines dance. The third red eye on the forehead of Lord Śiva is compared to the mark made with the saffron powder. Once the mind of a devotee dwells on the gracious form of the Lord all other anxieties vanish from it.

[32]

स्वामिन् गङ्गामिवाङ्गीकुरु तव शिरसा मामपीत्यर्थयन्तीं

धन्यां कन्यां खरांशोः शिरसि वहति किं न्वेष कारुण्यशाली ।

इत्थं शङ्कां जनानां जनयदतिघनं कैशिकं कालमेघ-

च्छायं भूयादुदारं त्रिपुरविजयिनः श्रेयसे भूयसे नः ॥

May Lord Śiva's very dark lock of hair (i) that has the lustre of the rain-bearing cloud, (ii) that is gracious in fulfilling the desires of the devotees, (iii) which makes the people wonder whether the compassionate Lord Śiva bears the fortunate Yamunā, the daughter of the Sun, beseeching, "Oh! Lord Śiva! accept me also on your head like the Ganges," be for our abundant welfare.

The Ganges that had its origin from the feet of Lord Viṣṇu is honoured by Lord Śiva by placing it on His head. The Yamunā, the daughter of the Sun, is often referred to as black on account of the colour of the water. The word *khara* means hot and *kharaṁśu* denotes Sun, as having the hot rays. The dark lock of hair of Lord Śiva is fancied to be the Yamunā, compassionately given a place on His head.

[33]

शृङ्गाराकल्पयोग्यैः शिखरिवरसुतासत्सखीहस्तलूनैः
 सूनैराबद्धमालावलिपरिविलसत् सौरभाकृष्टभृङ्गम् ।
 तुङ्गं माणिक्यकान्त्या परिहसितसुरावासशैलेन्द्रशृङ्गं
 सङ्घं नः सङ्कटानां विघटयतु सदा काङ्कटीकं किरीटम् ॥

May that metallic crown — (i) that is fit for the decoration conducive to the sentiment of love; (ii) that has the swarm [of bees drawn by the fragrance of the garlands strung with the flowers plucked with their hands by the dear female companions of Pārvatī, the daughter of the lord of the mountains; (iii) that is lofty; and (iv) which mocks at the peak of the Meru mountain, the abode of the celestials, by the radiance of the gems studded therein — remove the multitudes of our afflictions always.

The term 'śikharivara' denotes Himavān, the lord of the mountains. The word 'śikharivarasutā' denotes Pārvatī, the daughter of Himavān. Again the word 'śailendra' denotes the Meru mountain.

[34]

वक्राकारः कलङ्की जडतनुरहमप्यङ्घ्रिसेवानुभावाद् -
 उत्तंसत्वं प्रयातः सुलभतरघृणास्यन्दिनश्चन्द्रमौलेः ।
 तत्सेवन्तां जनौघाः शिवमिति निजयावस्थयैव ब्रुवाणं
 वन्दे देवस्य शम्भोर्मुकुटसुघटितं मुग्धपीयूषभानुम् ॥

I worship that crescent moon, — having graceful and nectarine rays — that is well-placed on the crown of Lord Śambhu (Śiva) proclaiming by its own position thus: "O Flocks of Men! worship Lord Śiva. Although I am crooked-shaped, possessing a blemish (did sinful deeds) and ignorant (having a watery body), have also attained the position of an ornament on the head (of Śiva) by serving the feet of the crescent-headed Lord showering compassion."

The three words *vakrākārah*, *kalāṅkī* and *jaḍatanuḥ* are capable of being interpreted in two ways. The second meaning is given in the bracket in the above translation. The Sanskrit tradition accepts no distinction between the sounds 'da' and 'la'.

[35]

कान्त्या सम्फुल्लमल्लीकुसुमधवलया व्याप्य विश्वं विराजन्
 वृत्ताकारो वितन्वन् मुहुरपि च परां निर्वृतिं पादभाजाम् ।

सानन्दं नन्दिदोष्णा मणिकटकवता बाह्यमानः पुरारेः
श्वेतच्छत्राख्यशीतद्युतिरपहस्तादापदस्तापदा नः ॥

May the moon, the umbrella made of the white silk of Lord Śiva — (i) that spreads the entire world with its radiance, white like the blossomed jasmine; (ii) circular in shape; (iii) which blesses those that resort to the feet of Lord Śiva with supreme beatitude; and (iv) that is held merrily by Nandikeśvara wearing the gem-studded bangles — remove all our afflictions that trouble us.

Moon is denoted by the word *śītadyutiḥ* — having the cool rays. Nandikeśvara is one of the favourite attendants of Lord Śiva. The white-silken umbrella stands for peace and protection.

[36]

दिव्याकल्पोज्ज्वलानां शिवगिरिसुतयोः पार्श्वयोरश्रितानां
रुद्राणीसत्सखीनां मदतरलकटाक्षाञ्चलैरञ्चितानाम् ।
उद्वेष्टद्वाहुवल्लीविलसनसमये चामरान्दोलनीनाम्
उद्धूतः कङ्कणालीवलयकलकलो वारयेदापदो नः ॥

May the jingling sound produced by the bangles on the hands of the best companions of Pārvatī as they (the hands) were raised up and lowered for wafting the *cāmara* — (i) they (the companions) shining with ornaments appropriate for the celestial world; (ii) they being stationed on either side of Śiva and Pārvatī; and (iii) they having their side-glances enlarged on account of rejoice — remove our misfortunes.

The words *Girisutā* and *Rudrāṇi* have been used to denote Goddess Pārvatī.

[37]

स्वर्गौकस्सुन्दरीणां सुललितवपुषां स्वामिसेवापराणां
 बल्गद्भूषाणि वक्त्राम्बुजपरिविलगन् मुग्धगीतामृतानि ।
 नित्यं नृत्तान्युपासे भुजविधृतिपदन्यासभावावलोक-
 प्रत्युद्यत्प्रीतिमाद्यत्प्रमथनटनटीदत्तासम्भावनानि ॥

I always adore the dances of the nymphs of the celestial world possessing beautiful physical frames and who are eager to serve the Lord (of all the beings), — with their shaking ornaments, with the ambrosia in the form of the sweet songs flowing from their lotus faces — and honoured by the male dancers and danseuses belonging to the group of *gaṇas* (attendants) rejoicing on perceiving the graceful movements of the hands, placements of the feet and the expressions (of the nymphs).

This verse expresses the effect produced by the dances of the nymphs serving Lord Śiva, on the attendants of Śiva and forms an adoration to those dances.

[38]

स्थानप्राप्त्या स्वराणां किमपि विशदतां व्यञ्जयन्मञ्जुवीणा-
 स्वानावच्छिन्नतालक्रममृतमिवास्वाद्यमानं शिवाभ्याम् ।
 नानारागातिहृद्यं नवरसमधुरस्तोत्रजातानुविद्धं
 गानं वीणामहर्षैः कलमतिललितं कर्णपूरायतां नः ॥

May our ears be filled with the simple and indescribable sweet songs of the lute-bearing sage expressing gracefully the clarity of the musical notes in their appropriate places, — possessing the rythmic beats blending with the sweet music of the lute, — being enjoyed like nectar by Śiva and Pārvatī, — captivating the mind with the different *rāgas*, — blending with the sweet laudatory hymns expressing the nine sentiments.

The expression '*vīṇāmaharṣi*' denotes the Sage Nārada holding always the lute and singing the glory of the Lord. There are seven musical notes in Indian music, six notes (being more than two-fold) giving rise to 15 notes. Various *rāgas* are produced by the combinations of these notes, while the *sampūrṇa-rāgas* will have the seven notes, the other will have only some of these notes.

[39]

चेतो जातप्रमोदं सपदि विदधती प्राणिनां वाणिनीनां
 पाणिद्वन्द्वग्रजाग्रत्सुललितरणितस्वर्णतालानुकूला ।
 स्वीयारात्रेण पाथोधररवपटुना नादयन्ती मयूरी
 मायूरी मन्दभावं मणिमुरजभवा मार्जना मार्जयेन्नः ॥

May the sound emanating from the gem-studded *mṛdaṅga* (i) which makes the minds of the beings rejoice, (ii) which is conducive to the beautiful golden cymbals sporting in the tips of the hands of the danseuses, (iii) that could be identified with the dance of the peacock influencing the peahen to cry on account of its lofty sound as that of the cloud, — remove our laziness.

The *Myraṅga* is a percussion instrument. The thunder-clouds make the peacock dance and it in turn influences the peahen to cry. To word *vāṇinī* means a danseuse.

[40]

देवेभ्यो दानवेभ्यः पितृमुनिपरिषत्सिद्धविद्याधरेभ्यः

साध्येभ्यश्चारणेभ्यो मनुजपशुपतज्जातिकीटादिकेभ्यः ।

श्रीकैलासप्ररूढास्तृणव्रिटपिमुखाश्चापि ये सन्ति तेभ्यः

सर्वेभ्यो निर्विचारं नतिमुपरचये शर्वपादाश्रयेभ्यः ॥

I bow without any other thought to all those — the celestials, the Dānavas (demons), manes, ascetics, Siddhas and Vidyādharas, Sādhyas, Cāraṇas, men, animals, birds and insects, the grass and trees, and the like grown in the Mount Kailāsa — who have resorted to the feet of Lord Śiva.

The progeny of Danu were known as Dānavas. Sādhyas, Vidyādharas and Cāraṇas are different classes of divine beings. These beings are capable of remaining invisible, flying in the air, walking on the water, etc. Mount Kailāsa is the abode of Lord Śiva.

[41]

ध्यायन्नित्यं प्रभाते प्रतिदिवसमिदं स्तोत्ररत्नं पठेद्यः

किं वा ब्रूमस्तदीयं सुचरितमथवा कीर्तयामः समासात् ।

सम्पज्जातं समग्रं सदसि बहुमतिं सर्वलोकप्रियत्वं

सम्प्राप्यायुः शतान्ते पदमयति परब्रह्मणो मन्मथारेः ॥

What shall we say about the merits of a person who contemplates and reads this excellent hymn every-day at dawn? Or let us describe briefly: One would, attain the abode of Lord Śiva, the Supreme Brahman, after having (i) attained all the prosperities, (ii) gained the awards in the assembly of learned men, becoming dear to all the people, and (iii) lived for hundred years.

This verse is a *phalaśruti* explaining the benefits that would accrue by reading this hymn. This hymn concludes with this verse.

महाकवेः कालिदासस्य “ गीतात्रयम् ”

आत्मविद्यामूषणम् च. श. वै. गुरुस्वामी शास्त्री

कालिदासीयास्तिष्ठो गीताः — प्रथमा देवकृतविष्णुस्तुतिरूपा षोडशश्लोकात्मिका रघुवंशदशमसर्गान्तर्गता, द्वितीया देवकृतब्रह्मस्तुतिरूपा द्वादशश्लोकात्मिका कुमारसंभवद्वितीयसर्गान्तर्गता, तृतीया सप्तर्षिकृतशिवस्तुतिरूपा षट्श्लोकी कुमारसम्भवषष्ठसर्गान्तर्गता इत्येताः — “ निखिलोपनिषद् ” इत्याद्यैः “ इदं महाकविवचः ” इत्यन्तैः पद्यैः प्रपञ्च्यन्ते ॥

I. कालिदासीया प्रथमगीता

॥ देवकृतविष्णुस्तुतिरूपा षोडशश्लोकी ॥
(रघुवंशमहाकाव्य-दशमसर्गान्तर्गता)

[1]

निखिलोपनिषद्गीतासूक्तमद्वैतदर्शनम् ।
निःसन्देहं स्वाभिमतं विवक्षुश्च महाकविः ॥

[2]

कुमारसंभवे काव्ये रघुवंशे च तत्त्ववित् ।
विधिविष्णुमहेशानां सृष्टिस्थित्यन्तकारिणाम् ॥

[3]

सुरसप्तर्षिकल्पानि स्थाने स्तोत्राण्यकल्पयत् ।
सर्वात्मतामद्वयतां सर्वकारणतां तथा ॥

[4]

मुमुक्षुज्ञेयतां मुक्तप्राप्यतां परमार्थताम् ।
औपाधिकीं मूर्तिमत्तां गुणवत्तामनेकताम् ॥

[5]

त्रयाणामपि देवानां समानं वर्णयन्कविः ।
नित्यशुद्धबुद्धमुक्तमद्वैतं तत्त्वमिच्छति ॥

[6]

इति स्पष्टं करतले कृतमामलकं यथा ।
निर्मत्सराणां विदुषां महाकाव्यावलोकिनाम् ॥

[7]

विधिविष्ण्वीशविषयं स्तोत्रत्रितयमप्यहम् ।
मन्ये तत्कालिदासीयं गीतात्रितयमद्भुतम् ॥

[8]

प्रथमा षोडशश्लोकी गीता नारायणस्तुतिः ।
द्वितीया द्वादशश्लोकी गीता पद्मभुवः स्तुतिः ॥

[9]

गीता तृतीया षट्श्लोकी चाष्टमूर्तेर्भवेत्स्तुतिः ।
इत्युक्ताः कविना गीतास्त्रिसोऽप्यद्वैतबोधिकाः ॥

[10]

पौलस्त्योपप्लुतैर्देवैरब्धिकूलगतैः कृता ।
 नारायणस्तोत्ररूपा षोडशश्लोकरूपिणी ॥
 रघुवंशगता गीता प्रथमं प्रतिपाद्यते ॥

नारायणस्तोत्ररूपा-प्रथमगीता
 अवतारिका

[11]

“अथैनं तुष्टवुःस्तुत्यमवाङ्मनसगोचरम् ।”

(रघु, १० - १५)

इति स्तोत्रोपक्रमस्थपथार्धेन महाकविः ।

“यतो वाचो निवर्तन्ते अप्राप्य मनसा सह ॥”

(तै-उ, २ - ९)

[12]

“नैव वाचा न मनसा प्राप्तुं शक्यो न चक्षुषा ।”

(कठो, २ - ६ - १२)

इति श्रुत्योरिवाद्धैतं निर्गुणं ब्रह्म मङ्गलम् ।

आदावावेदयत्स्पष्टं देवस्तवनगोचरम् ॥

(१)

रघुवंशे १० - १६ :

नमो विश्वसृजे पूर्वं विश्वं तदनु विभ्रते ।

अथ विश्वस्य संहर्त्रे तुभ्यं त्रेधास्थितात्मने ॥

[13]

यतो भूतानि जायन्ते येन जीवन्ति यत्र च ।
प्रयन्त्यभिविशन्तीति यजुर्वेदान्तबोधितम् ॥

(तै. उ, ३-१)

[14]

“जन्माद्यस्य यतः” सूत्राद् व्यासाचार्यैः सुनिश्चितम् ।
जगज्जन्मस्थितिलयकारणत्वं हि लक्षणम् ॥
ब्रह्मणो निर्दिशन्नत्र ब्रह्मागमदिशादिशत् ॥

[15]

“मृच्छोहविस्फुलिङ्गाद्यैः सृष्टिर्या चोदितान्यथा ।
उपायः सोवताराय नास्ति भेदः कथञ्चन ॥”

[16]

इति सृष्टिश्रुतिर्ब्रह्मबुबोधयिषयोदिता ।
इत्यहो ब्रह्मविन्मार्गगामिष्वेषोऽग्रणीः कविः ॥

(२)

रघुवंशे १०-१७ :

रसान्तराण्येकरसं यथा दिव्यं पयोऽश्नुते ।
देशे देशे गुणेष्वेवमवस्थास्त्वमविक्रियः ॥

[17]

आत्मनोऽनेकमूर्त्तित्वं त्रिमूर्त्तित्वं यदुच्यते ।

औपाधिकं न सत्यं तद्गुणसङ्गनिबन्धनम् ॥
इति वेदान्तगीतोक्तं पद्येऽस्मिन्कविरब्रवीत् ॥

[18]

“ यथोदकं दुर्गे वृष्टं पर्वतेषु विधावति ।
एवं धर्मान्पृथक्पश्यँस्तानेवानुविधावति ॥ ”

[19]

“ यथोदकं शुद्धे शुद्धमासिक्तं तादृगेव भवति ।
एवं मुनेर्विजानत आत्मा भवति गौतम । ”

[20]

“ पुरुषः प्रकृतिस्थो हि भुङ्क्ते प्रकृतिजान्गुणान् ।
कारणं गुणसङ्गोऽस्य सदसद्योनिजन्मसु ॥ ”

[21]

एवं कठोपनिषदं गीतां भागवतीमपि ।
रसयन्निह नः सर्वान्सरसं स्मारयत्यहो ॥

[22]

आत्मनोऽनेकता बिम्बप्रतिबिम्बात्मनेष्यते ।
प्रतिबिम्बगता धर्मा बिम्बं यान्ति न हि क्वचित् ॥
इति श्रुत्यन्तभगवद्गीता-शारीरकेरितम् ॥

[23]

“ यथा ह्ययं ज्योतिरात्मा विवस्वान्
 अपो भिन्ना बहुधैकोऽनुगच्छन् ।
 उपाधिना क्रियते भेदरूपः
 देवः क्षेत्रेष्वेवमजोऽयमात्मा । ”

[24]

“ एक एव हि भूतात्मा भूते भूते व्यवस्थितः ।
 एकधा बहुधा चैव दृश्यते जलचन्द्रवत् ॥ ”

[25]

“ अग्निर्यथैको भुवनं प्रविष्टो रूपं रूपं प्रतिरूपो बभूव ।
 एकस्तथा सर्वभूतान्तरात्मा रूपं रूपं प्रतिरूपो बहिश्च ॥

[26]

वायुर्यथैको भुवनं प्रविष्टो रूपं रूपं प्रतिरूपो बभूव ।
 एकस्तथा सर्वभूतान्तरात्मा रूपं रूपं प्रतिरूपो बहिश्च ॥

[27]

सूर्यो यथा सर्वलोकस्य चक्षुः
 न लिप्यते चाक्षुषैर्बाह्यदोषैः ।
 एकस्तथा सर्वभूतान्तरात्मा
 न लिप्यते लोकदुःखेन बाह्यः ॥ ”

28

“ क्षेत्रज्ञं चापि मां विद्धि सर्वक्षेत्रेषु भारत । ...
 यथा प्रकाशयत्येकः कृत्स्नं लोकमिमं रविः ।
 क्षेत्रं क्षेत्री तथा कृत्स्नं प्रकाशयति भारत ॥ ”

[29]

“ अत एवोपमा सूर्यकादिवत् ” सूत्रमीदृशम् ।
 गीतोपनिषदां वाक्यजातं कविरिहास्मरत् ॥

[30]

“ विभक्तात्मा विभुस्तासां एकः कुक्षिष्वनेकधा ।
 उवास प्रतिमाचन्द्रः प्रसन्नानामपामिव ॥ ”

(रघु, १०-६५)

[31]

इति रामावतारोक्तौ निपुणं तदवर्णयत् ।
 त्रिषु कालेषु यन्नैव याति रूपविपर्ययम् ॥

[32]

तत्सत्यमिति निर्वक्तुमविक्रियपदं कविः ।
 रसान्तरेति पद्येऽस्मिन् निबबन्ध यथोचितम् ॥

(अनुवर्तते)

“A TRIAD OF GĪTĀ” OF KĀLIDĀSA

(*Kālidāsiyam Gītātrayaprakaraṇam*)*

Ātmavidyābhūṣaṇam V. S. V. Gurusvāmī Śāstrī

In the epic poems of Kālidāsa — the *Raghuvamśa* and the *Kumārasambhava* — there are three *stotra* sections in praise of Lord Viṣṇu, Lord Brahmā, and Lord Śiva. In the *Raghuvamśa* (Canto X), there are sixteen verses in praise of Lord Viṣṇu — sung by gods (*devas*). In the *Kumārasambhava* (Canto II), there are twelve verses in praise of Lord Brahmā — sung by gods. Again, in the *Kumārasambhava* (Canto VI), there are six significant verses in praise of Lord Śiva — sung by the seven great sages (*Saptarṣayaḥ*). A lucid commentary on the above-mentioned three *stotras* is given here as “*Kālidāsiyam Gītātrayaprakaraṇam*” (“A Triad of *Gītā*” of Kālidāsa).

I

The first *stotra* (*gītā*) sung by the gods in praise of Lord Viṣṇu forms part of the Tenth Canto of the *Raghuvamśa* (verses 16-31) of Kālidāsa.

*Free rendering in English by Dr. V. K. S. N. Raghavan

[1-10]

Desirous of explaining his indubitable Advaitic outlook, the great poet, Kālidāsa presents the philosophical principles, contained in the *Upaniṣads*, and the *Bhagavadgītā*, in the words of gods and the seven great sages. The philosopher-poet Kālidāsa has incorporated the Advaita principles in the *Raghuvamśa* (X, 16-31), the *Kumārasambhava* (II, 4-15) and the *Kumārasambhava* (VI, 21-23, 75-77) — first, in the words of gods in praise of Lord Viṣṇu; secondly in the words of gods in praise of Lord Brahmā; and thirdly, in the words of the seven great sages (*Saptarṣayah*) in praise of Lord Śiva, respectively.

Brahmā, Viṣṇu and Śiva are treated as the Lords of creation, sustenance and absorption. The great poet has referred to the three primeval Gods as the ultimate Reality being (i) the essential indwelling principle of all, (ii) the unsurpassed, (iii) the supreme cause of all, (iv) the sole Absolute to be realized by the *mumukṣus* (aspirants of *mokṣa*), (v) the ultimate goal to be attained by the liberated, (vi) the supremely real, (vii) possessing forms and qualities only in an *aupādihika* (secondary) aspect, and (viii) *aneka* (not the 'one' — for Reality is Infinite). The great poet describes all the three supreme Gods almost in parallel terms and sequences, and thus intends to convey his firm faith in Advaita philosophy, referring to Brahman as eternal, pure, knowledge, freedom and the only unique Principle. This will be clear to all wise scholars who make a thorough and impartial perusal of the great epics of Kālidāsa, as clear as a goose-berry presented on the palms of a person. Therefore, I consider the three *stotras* found in the works of Kālidāsa as "The wonder-

ful *gītātrīṭayam*” of the great poet. Lord Nārāyaṇa is praised in the first ‘*gītā*’ of 16 verses. Lord Brahmā is extolled in the second ‘*gītā*’ of 12 verses, and Lord Śiva (*Aṣṭamūrti*) is eulogised in the third ‘*gītā*’ of six verses. These three *gītās* of Poet Kālidāsa teach only the Advaita doctrines.

An analysis of the first *gītā* (*Raghuvamśa*, X, 16-31) — in praise of Viṣṇu, sung by gods who, afflicted by Rāvaṇa, went to report their affliction to Lord Viṣṇu, reclining on the milky ocean (*Kṣīrābdhi*) — is dealt with in the following verses (11-159).

The first gītā in praise of Lord Nārāyaṇa (Viṣṇu)

[11-12]

Introduction: In the *Raghuvamśa* (X, 15), Kālidāsa says: “Then the gods sang in praise of Lord Viṣṇu, worthy of praise and the One beyond the purview of words and mind.” Even the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* and the *Kaṭha Upaniṣad* portray Brahman as, “From whom the words along with mind retrace their path (being not able to comprehend Brahman fully),” “Brahman cannot be comprehended fully by either words, mind, or sense organ (eye),” respectively. So Kālidāsa makes it clear that though Lord Viṣṇu is praised by gods, Lord Viṣṇu stands for Brahman — “the One without a second,” bereft of any specifications, and the auspicious one.

I. *The Raghuvamśa* (X, 16):

[The gods praise Lord Viṣṇu as follows:] “We pay our obeisance to Thee, O Lord, who remainest in three-fold form — being the creator of the universe in the beginning, afterwards the upholder of it, and last of all being its destroyer.”

[13]

In the *Taittirīya Āraṇyaka* (III, 1) of the *Yajurveda*, it is taught that "From the Brahman, the beings emerge; by it the beings live; and to it go the beings and merge with it."

[14]

Sage Vyāsa (Bādarāyaṇa) has furnished the definition of Brahman in the *Brahmasūtra* (I. i. 2): "*janmādyasya yataḥ*" as the ultimate cause of the creation, sustenance and absorption of the world.

[15-16]

According to the *Māṇḍūkya-kārikā* (III, 15) of Gauḍapāda, the above definition of Brahman is to be explained thus: "The creation that has been multifariously set forth with the help of the examples of earth, gold, sparks, etc. is merely by way of generating the idea of oneness; but there is no multiplicity in any way." The *śṛṣṭi-śruti* (passage explaining creation) has for its purpose an earnest desire to teach what is Brahman. In this way, the great poet Kālidāsa stands unique among the most prominent Advaita preceptors showing the right path to realize Brahman.

II. *The Raghuvamśa* (X, 17):

As the water from heaven (rain-water) which has but originally one taste obtains a diversity of flavours (assumes different tastes) in different parts of the countries, so Thou who art immutable, assumest different conditions when connected with different qualities of *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*.

[17-21]

In the above verse (*Raghuvamśa*, X. 17), Kālidāsa reiterates the Vedāntic viewpoints as — “Even though Ātman has infinite forms or three forms, they are all just *aupādhika* (secondary) and not at all real; it is only binding with regard to the limiting adjuncts of qualities (*guṇas*) (and so Brahman is free from forms, etc.).”

“As water rained upon a height flows down in various ways among the hills, so he who views things as varied runs after them (distractedly).” “Oh Gautama! as pure water poured forth into pure becomes the very same, so the self of the seer who has knowledge becomes (one with the Supreme).” (*Kāthopanīṣad*, 2.1.14-15)

Vide also the *Bhagavadgītā* (13, 21): “For the Puruṣa residing in *prakṛti* experiences the *guṇas* born of *prakṛti*. The cause of its birth from good and evil sources is its attachment to the *guṇas* (senses).” Thus Kālidāsa reminds us of the views of the *Kāthopanīṣad* and the *Gītā*.

[22]

The view that ‘one Ātman becomes many’ can be accepted by the application of *bimba-pratibimbavāda* (theory of a prototype and its reflections). But the attributes ascribed to the reflections cannot be spoken of with regard to the prototype. Such a view is set forth in the *Upanīṣads*, *Gītā* and *Śārīraka-mīmāṃsā* (the *Brahmasūtras*).

[23]

“Just as the one sun obtains varied forms (as reflected) in water kept in different containers (serving as limiting adjuncts, even so this unborn self gets different forms in different *kṣetras* (bodies).”

[24]

“Indeed, this one self is seen to be of different forms abiding in the different *bhūtas* (material objects) even as the one moon found in (different) water (reservoirs).” (*Brahmabindūpaniṣad*, 11).

[25]

“As fire which is one, entering this world becomes varied in shape according to the object (it burns), so also the one self within all beings becomes varied according to whatever (it enters) and also exists outside (them all).” (*Kaṭhōpaniṣad*, 2.2.9).

[26]

“As air which is one, entering this world becomes varied in shape according to the object (it enters) so also the one Self within all beings becomes varied according to whatever (it enters) and also exists outside (them all).” (*Ibid.*, 2.2.10).

[27]

“Just as the sun is the eye of all the world, but is not smeared by the eye-defects which are outside, even so the one inner Self of all beings is not smeared by the griefs of the world, He being outside them.” (*Ibid.*, 2.2.11).

[28]

“Know me (myself) to be the *kṣetrajña (jīva)* also in all the *kṣetras*, O Arjuna!” (*Gītā*, 13. 2)

“Arjuna! just as the one sun illumines this whole world, even so the one self (*ātman*) illumines the whole *kṣetra* (field).” (*Ibid.*, 13.33).

[29]

“For this very reason (there are applied to Brahman) comparisons such as that of the images of the sun and the like.” (*Brahmasūtras*, 3.2.18)

[30-31ab]

(In the *Raghuvamśa*, X, 65) while describing the descent of Śrī Rāma, Kālidāsa has ably pointed out the essential doctrine of Advaita: “The all-pervading Being, himself one, lived in the wombs of the three queens, dividing his self into manifold forms, just as the reflected image of the moon, though one, displays itself in manifold forms in clear water.”

[32cd - 33]

In the verse beginning with ‘*rasāntara*’ (*Raghuvamśa*, X, 17), Kālidāsa has used the term ‘*avikriya*’ especially, in an appropriate manner, to point out the correct etymology of ‘*satya*’ (real) — “that which does not undergo any change in all the three periods of time.”

(to be continued)

आत्मा नैवाहमर्थः स्यात्

भाष्यभावज्ञः ब्रह्मश्री वरहृत् कल्याणसुन्दरशास्त्री

स्वस्यैवाहंशब्दवाच्यत्वात् आत्मनश्च स्वत्वादात्मशब्दाहंशब्दौ पर्यायभूतावेव । तथा च आत्मशब्द इवाहंशब्दोऽपि मुख्ययैव वृत्त्या जीवमीश्वरं वा बोधयति, इति चेत्, मैवम् । त्वन्ताऽहन्तयोरिव आत्मताऽहन्तयोरविरोधेन आत्माहंशब्दयोरपर्यायत्वात् । त्वमात्मना जानासीति हि प्रयुज्यते, स्वयंशब्दार्थे आत्मशब्दो वर्तते । स च त्वन्ताहन्तेदन्तानामविरोधो, आत्मनासौ तृतीय इत्यादिप्रयोगात् । यदुक्तमहंशब्दस्य मुख्यया वृत्त्या जीवेश्वरवाचित्वमिति तदिष्टमेव — चैतन्यवाचित्वं हि लाक्षणिकम् ॥

ननु आत्मन्यहंशब्दप्रयोगस्स्वाभाविक एव । अनात्मन्यहंशब्दप्रयोगस्तु दोषकृतः । स च दोषोऽविद्या, अविद्यया हि जीवोऽनात्मान देहादिमहमिति मन्यते, विद्यया तु आत्मानमेवाहमिति मन्यते । तस्मादहंशब्दार्थं आत्मैवेति, मैवम् । आत्मानहमिति किमात्मा मन्यते ? उतानात्मा ? नाद्यः, चिन्मात्रस्यात्मनो मन्तृत्वायोगात् । अन्यथा सुषुप्तिमृतिमूर्च्छास्वपि अहमित्यात्मा मनुयादेवात्मनम् । न चेष्टापत्तिः, सार्वजनीनानुभवविरोधात् । अन्त्ये, अनात्मैवाहंशब्दार्थं इति सिद्धम् । एवमात्मन्यहंशब्दं यः प्रयुङ्क्ते स किमात्मा ? उतानात्मा ? नाद्यः, देहेन्द्रियादिरहितस्य तस्य शब्दप्रयोगायोगात् । द्वितीये, अनात्मैवाहंशब्दार्थः । न च देहेन्द्रियादिसहित एवात्मा

शब्दं प्रयुङ्क्त इति वाच्यं, अविद्यां विना आत्मनो देहेन्द्रियादि-
साहित्यायोगात् । असङ्गस्य पुरुषस्यात्मनो न हि देहेन्द्रियादिसङ्गः ।
य एवं देहेन्द्रियादिसहितः स न प्रत्यगात्मा, किंतु जीव एव
कर्ता भोक्ता । तस्य चाहंकारविशिष्टस्याहमर्थत्वमस्मदभिप्रेतमेव ।
तस्मादात्मन्यात्मशब्दप्रयोगस्स्वशब्दप्रयोगो वा स्वाभाविकः । अहं-
शब्दप्रयोगस्तु दोषकृत एव । स च दोषोऽविद्याकृतोऽहंकारात्मनो-
स्तादात्म्याऽयास एव । विद्यया समूलस्य तस्य नाशे सति, आत्म-
न्यहंशब्दप्रयोगो न सम्भवत्येव । न च विद्वानप्यात्मन्यहंशब्दं प्रयुङ्क्ते,
अहं ब्रह्मेति प्रतीतेरिति वाच्यं, तत्र लक्षणयाऽहंशब्द आत्मवाची
न त्वभिधयेत्युक्तत्वात् ॥

ननु यद्येवमनात्मन्येवाहंशब्दो मुख्यस्तर्हि घटादिरप्यहंशब्दाथः
स्यादिति चेत्, मैवम् । अनात्मन्यहङ्कार एवाहंशब्दो मुख्य इत्युक्तत्वात् ।
किञ्च तव मते यद्यहंशब्दार्थ एवात्मा तर्हि कः पुनस्त्वंशब्दार्थः ।
न च सोप्यात्मैवेति वाच्यं, त्वया आत्मनोऽहमित्येव स्वरूपमित्यु-
क्तत्वात् । न हि आत्मनस्त्वमित्यपि स्वरूपमिति त्वयोक्तम् । न च
तदिदानीमुच्यत इति वाच्यं, त्वन्ताहन्तयोर्विरुद्धयोरेकत्रात्मनि वृत्त्य-
योगात् । न च द्वयोरात्मनोर्द्वयं वर्तत इति वाच्यं, आत्मद्वित्वा-
भावात् । सत्यप्यात्मभेदे, अत्रात्मनि त्वन्ता वर्तते, अत्र पुनरह-
न्तेति नियमासिद्धेः । न च स्वात्मन्यहन्ता परात्मनि त्वन्ता चेति
नियमसिद्धिरिति वाच्यं, स्वात्मशब्दयोरेकार्थत्वात्, परात्मशब्दयोः
परस्परविरुद्धार्थत्वाच्च । न च स्वस्मिन्नहन्ता, परस्मिन्त्वन्ता चेति
वाच्यं, कोऽसौ स्वशब्दार्थः परशब्दार्थश्च ? आत्मेति चेन्मैवम् ।
परशब्दार्थत्वायोगादात्मनः, न हि कोऽप्यात्मानं परं मन्यते । तस्मात्
स्वशब्दार्थ एवात्मा, नाहंशब्दार्थो नापि त्वंशब्दार्थः ॥

ननु अहंशब्दार्थस्साभासाहङ्कार इत्युक्तं, तत्तथाऽस्तु, कः पुन-
स्त्वंशब्दार्थः ? न च साभासाङ्कार एवेति वाच्यं, त्वङ्काराहङ्कारयोः
विरोधादिति चेन्मैवम् —

‘महाभूतान्यहङ्कारो बुद्धिरव्यक्तमेव च ।’

इति गीतावचनात्,

‘अव्यक्तान्महन्महतोऽहङ्कारः’

इति शास्त्राच्च । अहङ्कार एव तत्त्वं, न तु त्वङ्कारः, त्वङ्कारस्य तत्त्वत्वेन क्वाप्यनुक्तत्वात् । परन्तु एकस्य सामासाहङ्कारस्य जीवस्य स्वपुरोवर्तिन्यन्यस्मिन् सामासाहङ्कारे जीवे त्वमिति बुद्धिर्भवतीति सैव त्वङ्कार इत्युच्यत इति । तथा च त्वङ्कारविषयोऽपि सामासाहङ्कार एवेति नाहङ्कारतत्त्वस्य त्वङ्कारबुद्धिविरोधित्वं, किंतु अहं-बुद्धेरेव त्वंबुद्धिविरोधित्वमिति ॥

ननु सामासाहङ्कारस्य स्वस्मिन्नहंबुद्धिर्भवतीत्युक्तं, स्वशब्द-श्चात्मवाचीत्युक्तं, तथा चाहंशब्दार्थं आत्मैवेति फलितमिति चेन्मैवम् । सामासाहङ्कारस्य यत्राहंबुद्धिर्भवति स स्वशब्दार्थस्सामासाहङ्कार एव न त्वात्मेति । यद्यपि सर्वमात्मैव

‘ ऐतदात्म्यमिदं सर्वम् ’

इति श्रुतेः, सर्वस्यात्मनि कल्पितत्वेनात्मत्वाच्च । तथापि लोको नैतज्जानाति, किंतु जीवमेवात्मानं मन्यते । तथा च बोद्धृतात्पर्या-नुरोधेन सामासाहङ्कारस्याहंबुद्धिविषयस्सामासाहङ्कार एव, इति । यद्युच्येत — अनात्मन्यहंबुद्धिजनकोऽहङ्कारः प्रकृतिपरिणामः, आत्म-न्यहंबुद्धिस्तु स्वाभाविक्येवेति नाहङ्कारजन्येति, तदयुक्तम् । सर्वस्य अपि बुद्धेर्वृत्तिज्ञानरूपाया अन्तःकरणजन्यत्वेन तदजन्यस्वाभाविक-बुद्धेरेवाभावात् । आत्मन्यहंबुद्धेस्स्वाभाविकत्वे सति वेदान्तशास्त्र-वैयर्थ्यप्रसङ्गात् । आत्मसाक्षात्कारार्थं हि तत् । तस्मादनात्मन्यहंबुद्धि-जनक एवाहङ्कारः । यच्चोच्यतेऽभूततद्भावार्थं च्विप्रत्यये कृते निष्प-न्नोऽहङ्कारशब्दः, अनहमि अहमः करणं कारोहङ्कार इति, तदयुक्तम् । च्विप्रत्ययस्यादर्शनात्, तत्कल्पनस्य चाप्रमाणत्वात्, अहमः कारोऽहङ्कार इत्यस्यैवार्थस्य यथाश्रुतत्वाच्च ॥

यदुक्तं — अयमेवाहङ्कारो गर्वापरनामा शास्त्रे हेयतया कथित इति, तदयुक्तम् । अहङ्काराख्यतत्त्वस्य विषय एव गर्वो न त्वहङ्कारः,

‘मनो बुद्धिरहङ्कारश्चित्तं करणमान्तरम् ।
संशयो निश्चयो गर्वः स्मरणं विषया अमी ॥’

इति वचनात् । ‘गर्वोऽभिमानाहङ्कार’ इति निघण्टुवचनं तु अहं-
कारविषये गर्वे अहङ्कारशब्दप्रयोग औपचारिक इत्यभिप्रायगर्भम् ।
कश्चित्तु, एतद्दोषपरिहाराय भावसाधनो गर्ववाची अहङ्कारशब्दः,
तत्त्ववाची तु करणसाधन इत्युक्तवान्, अनहमहंक्रियतेऽनेनेत्यहंकार
इति करणे व्युत्पत्तिः, अनहमोऽहमः कारोऽहंकार इति भावे व्युत्पत्तिः ;
उभयत्राप्यभूततद्भावे च्वरित्येव तदाशयः । स चायुक्तः, अभूत-
तद्भावस्यात्राभावात् । किञ्च अनहमि अहंबुद्धिरेवाहंकारः, अहमि
अहम्बुद्धिस्तु नाहंकार इत्येतदपहासास्पदम् ; अत्वमि त्वम्बुद्धिरेव
त्वंकारः, त्वमि त्वम्बुद्धिस्तु न त्वंकार इति, अनिदमि इदम्बुद्धिरेव-
दंकारः, इदमि इदम्बुद्धिस्तु नेदंकारः, इत्यपि वक्तव्यत्वापत्तेः । न
चेष्टापत्तिः सर्वशास्त्रविरोधात् । अपि च बुद्धावहम्बुद्धिः किमहंकार
उत न ? आद्ये अनहम्यहम्बुद्धिरहङ्कार इत्यस्य भङ्गः । न च
बुद्धिरहमर्थो नेति वाच्यं,

‘ अथातोऽहंकारादेशः ’

इत्यत्राहंशब्दस्साक्षादहमर्थबुद्धिवाचीति त्वयैवोक्तत्वात् । द्वितीये
अनहम्यहम्बुद्धेस्तस्याः कथं नाहङ्कारता । न च बुद्धिरहमर्थ एवेति
वाच्यं, अहमर्थ आत्मेति स्वमतभङ्गप्रसङ्गात् । तस्मादहमर्थ आत्मेति
प्रतिज्ञाय साक्षादहमर्थः बुद्धिवाचीति वचनं विप्रतिषिद्धम् ॥

यदुक्तं शरीरादावनात्मन्यात्मबुद्धिरविद्या, आत्मन्यहम्बुद्धिस्तु बाध-
कापेतेति तदयुक्तम् । अनात्मन्यात्मबुद्धेरविद्यात्वमुचितमेव, अतस्मि-
स्तद्बुद्धेर्भ्रमत्वात् । आत्मन्यहम्बुद्धिस्तु न बाधकापेता । किमात्म-
न्यहम्बुद्धिरात्मनो भवति ? उतानात्मनः ? नाद्यः, सुषुप्त्यादावप्यह-
म्बुद्धिप्रसङ्गात् । द्वितीये, आत्मन्यनात्मनोऽहम्बुद्धिरविद्यैव । अहमा-
त्मेति मन्वानोऽनात्मा ह्यहमर्थः इति । न चाहम्पदलक्ष्य आत्मेति

बुद्धिर्वाधकापेतेति वाच्यं, तस्यास्त्वयाऽनभ्युपेतत्वात् । यदप्युक्तं यदि ज्ञप्तिमात्रमेवात्मा तर्हि अनात्मन्यात्माभिमानशरीरे ज्ञप्तिमात्रप्रतिभासस्स्यात्, न ज्ञातृप्रतिभास इति, तदपि मन्दम् । वस्तुतो ज्ञप्तिमात्रस्याप्यात्मनो व्यवहारतो ज्ञातृत्वमित्युक्तत्वात् । यो ज्ञप्तिमात्रमात्मेति जानाति तस्यानात्मन्यात्मबुद्धिर्न भवेदेव ॥

यदत्रोच्यते अनात्मन्यहम्प्रत्ययः कथमात्माभिमान इति, तदयुक्तम् । चिदाभासाहङ्कारयोरन्योन्याविवेकाच्चिदाभासाविविक्तमहङ्कारमेव लोक आत्मेति जानातीति कृत्वा अनात्मनि शरीरे अहम्प्रत्यय आत्माभिमान एवेति । न चानात्मन्यहङ्कारेऽप्यहम्प्रत्यय आत्माभिमान एवेति वाच्यं, अनात्मन्यहङ्कारे यद्यात्मनोऽहम्प्रत्ययो भवेत्तर्हि स आत्माभिमान एव भवेत्, न तु तस्य भवति, जन्यज्ञानानाश्रयत्वात्तस्य । यद्यात्मनो भवति कथं तस्यात्माभिमानता । तस्मात्साभासाहङ्कारस्य जीवस्य साभासाहङ्कारे जीवे स्वस्मिन्नहम्प्रत्ययो नात्माभिमानः, किंतु स्वस्मादन्यस्मिन् शरीरादावेवाहम्प्रत्यय आत्माभिमानः, जीवस्य स्वस्मिन्नहम्बुद्धेरिवात्मबुद्धेर्भवितुं युक्तत्वात् । न चैवं अहमर्थो जीवो ज्ञातैव सिद्ध इति वाच्यं, तस्यैव सेद्धव्यत्वात् । अहमर्थो हि साभासाहङ्कारो जीवो ज्ञाता संसारी, प्रत्यगात्मा तु नाहमर्थः, तस्य ज्ञप्तिमात्रत्वादियुक्तत्वात् इति ॥

नन्वहमर्थस्यानात्मत्वे स्थूलोऽहमिति भ्रान्तेरयोग इति, मैवम् । भ्रान्तदृष्ट्या अहमर्थ आत्मैवेति । यथा भ्रान्तदृष्ट्या इदमर्थस्सर्प एव तद्वत् । किंच यद्यहमर्थ एवात्मा तर्हि नियमेन स्थूलोऽहमित्येव किमिति प्रतीयात्, स्थूल आत्मेति किमिति न प्रतीयात् ? तस्मादहङ्कारावच्छिन्न एवात्माऽहंशब्दार्थो न केवल इति । यदुक्तम् —

‘ देहेन्द्रियमनःप्राणधीभ्योऽन्योऽनन्यसाधनः ।

नित्यो व्यापी प्रतिक्षेत्रमात्माऽभिन्नस्त्वतस्सुखी ॥ ’

इति, तत्र पूर्वार्धमनवद्यम् । उत्तरार्धस्य त्वयमर्थः — आत्मा नित्यः कुतः ? प्रतिक्षेत्रं व्यापी । प्रतिशब्दः कात्स्न्यपरः । सर्वमपि क्षेत्रजातं व्याप्य स्थित इत्यर्थः । आत्मभिन्नं सर्वमपि क्षेत्रमेवेति सर्वव्यापीति यावत् । सर्वव्यापित्वं न देशकालवस्तुकृतपरिच्छेदराहित्यम् । तथा चापरिच्छिन्नत्वादात्मा नित्य इति सिद्धम्, परिच्छिन्नस्य घटादेरनित्यत्वदर्शनात् । एतेन — आत्मा न विभुः किंतु सूक्ष्म इति परोक्तं — प्रत्युक्तम् । अभिन्न इति छेदः । स्वतो वस्तुतोऽभिन्नः, व्यधहारतस्तु उपाधिवशाद्भिन्न इव प्रतिभातीत्यर्थः । सुखी सुखस्वरूपवान् सुखस्वरूप इत्येतत् । सुखधर्मवानिति त् नार्थः । अन्तःकरणधर्मत्वात्सुखस्य निर्धर्मकत्वमात्मनः । अस्यार्थस्य परिग्रहे उत्तरार्धमपि निरवद्यमेव । अन्यथा तु सावद्यमेव इति । न च जीवस्य व्यापित्वं न स्वरूपतः, किंतु धर्मज्ञानद्वारेति वाच्यं, धर्मज्ञानस्यैवाभावात् । तत्सत्त्वेपि तस्य सर्वव्याप्त्यभावात्, व्याप्ति-संकोचस्य चायुक्तत्वात् इति ॥

THE SELF IS NEVER AHAMARTHA*

Bhāṣyabhāva-jña V. R. Kalyāṇasundara Śāstri

It is argued: "The words 'ātman' (self) and 'I' (*aham*) are synonyms, since the word 'I' refers to one's own being and the word 'self' also refers to one's own being. Thus, even the word 'I' like the word 'self' conveys directly the sense of *jīva* or *Īśvara*." This argument cannot be accepted. Unlike the case of 'you-ness' and 'I-ness', there is no conflict between selfhood and you-ness; and so the words 'I' and 'self' are not synonyms. There is the usage, "You know yourself;" the word 'self' is used in the sense of one's own; and it is not in conflict with 'you-ness,' 'I-ness,' and 'this-ness.' There is the usage such as "He is the third person by himself." It was stated that the word 'I' directly refers to *jīva* and *Īśvara*; and this is acceptable, because signification of consciousness (by 'I') is through secondary sense.

There is again the argument: "The use of 'I' in respect of the self is quite normal; but its usage in respect of the not-self is defective. And the defect is

*Translated by Dr. R. Balasubramanian

avidyā. It is due to *avidyā* that the *jīva* considers body and other objects which are not-self as 'I'; but through *vidyā*, the *jīva* views the self alone as 'I'. So the meaning of 'I' is self alone." Even this argument does not hold good. Does the self know itself as 'I,' or does the not-self? It is not the former, because the self which is of the nature of consciousness cannot be the knower. Otherwise, the self should know itself as 'I' even in the states of deep sleep, death and trance. This is not acceptable as this goes against the experience of everyone. If the latter, it would prove that the 'I' is not-self. Thus, if one uses the word 'I' in respect of the self, is that one the self or the not-self? It cannot be the former, for the self which is bereft of body, senses, etc. cannot use the words. If the latter, what is referred to by the word 'I' is not-self alone. It cannot be said that the self which is endowed with body, senses, etc., uses the word, for in the absence of *avidyā* there is no association of body, senses, etc., to the self. The *puruṣa*, i.e. the self, which is non-relational has no relation with body, senses, etc. That which has relation with body, senses, etc., is not the inward self, but the *jīva* alone who is the agent and enjoyer. It is accepted by us that consciousness qualified by *ahaṅkāra* is what is referred to by *ahamārtha*. So, the usage of the word 'self' or 'one's own' in respect of the self is normal. On the contrary, the usage of the word 'I' (in respect of the self) is surely defective. This defect which is caused by *avidyā* is wrong identification of the 'I' and the self. When this defect along with its root cause is destroyed by knowledge, the usage of 'I' in respect of the self does not take place at all. It is no argument to say that the enlightened man also uses the word 'I' in respect of the self as when he says, "I am Brahman," for in this case

the word 'I', it has been stated, signifies the self not directly, but only through secondary sense.

If it be said that the word 'I' is used only in respect of the not-self, then even objects such as pot, it is argued, will be the sense of the word 'I'. But this argument is untenable, for it has been said that the word 'I' signifies directly only the *ahankāra* which is not-self. Further, if according to you the word 'I' signifies the self, what then is the meaning of the word 'you'? It cannot be said that the meaning of the word 'you' is also the self, for you have already said that the nature of the self is 'I'; and you have not said that 'you' too constitutes the nature of the self. You cannot in fact say so, because the 'you-sense' and 'I-sense' which are opposed cannot be used in respect of the self. It cannot be said that they are used in respect of two selves, for there is no duality of the self. Even if duality of the self be accepted, there is no restriction such that the 'you-sense' exists in this self and that the 'I-sense' exists in that self. It is no argument to say that 'I-sense' exists in one's own self whereas 'you-sense' exists in another self, for the words '*sva*' and '*ātman*' have the same meaning, and the words '*para*' and '*ātman*' convey senses which are opposed. It cannot be said that 'I-sense' is in respect of 'one's own' and 'you-sense' is in respect of another self; in that case, we will ask: What is the sense of the word '*sva*', and what is the sense of the word '*para*'? If the answer is the self, it is untenable, for the self cannot be the meaning of the word '*para*'. Indeed, no one looks upon the self as other (*para*). So, the self alone is the meaning of the word '*sva*'; it is not the meaning of the word 'I' or 'you'.

It may be argued: "It has been stated that the meaning of the word 'I' is *ahaṅkāra* with consciousness reflected therein. Let it be the case. What, then, is the meaning of the word 'you'? It cannot be said that it is also *ahaṅkāra* with consciousness reflected therein, because 'you' and '*ahaṅkāra*' are opposed." This argument cannot be accepted. There is the statement of the *Bhagavad-gītā* (13.5) which refers to "the great elements, egoity, intellect and the unmanifested;" and there is the scriptural statement mentioning "the unmanifested, *mahat*, and the egoity coming from *mahat*." *Ahaṅkāra* (egoity) alone is the principle (*tattvam*), and not the 'you'. The 'you' has not been stated as a principle anywhere. On the contrary, the *jīva*, i.e. *ahaṅkāra* with consciousness reflected therein cognizes another *ahaṅkāra* with consciousness reflected therein as 'you' which is in front, and this *jīva* in front is *ahaṅkāra*. Thus, the 'you' too is *ahaṅkāra* with consciousness reflected therein; and so the principle, viz., *ahaṅkāra*, is not opposed to the cognition of 'you', but the cognition of 'I' is opposed to the cognition of 'you'.

There is the argument: "It has been stated that *ahaṅkāra* with consciousness reflected therein has the cognition of 'I' in respect of itself and that the term 'one's own' signifies the self; if so, it amounts to saying that the word 'I' signifies the self." This argument is wrong. When the *ahaṅkāra* with consciousness reflected therein has the cognition of 'I', then the term 'one's own' signifies only *ahaṅkāra* with consciousness reflected therein, and not the self. However, as stated in the *śruti* text, "All this has the self for its nature," (*Chāndogyopaniṣad*, 6.8.7) everything is the self alone, because everything being superimposed on the self has the self

as its nature. Though this is the real position, the common man does not know this, but thinks that the *jīva* alone is the self. This being the case, with reference to the knower concerned, we have to say that the 'I'-cognition of the *ahaṅkāra* with the consciousness reflected therein signifies *ahaṅkāra*.

Some argue like this: "*Ahaṅkāra*, which produces the 'I'-cognition in respect of the not-self, is a product of *prakṛti* (primeval matter); but the 'I'-cognition in respect of the self is but normal, and so it is not produced by *ahaṅkāra*." This is untenable; since all cognitions which are of the nature of *vṛttis* are produced by the internal organ, there is no cognition which is not produced by it. If the 'I' -cognition in respect of the self is normal, it will lead to the futility of *Vēdānta* text. It is, indeed, for the sake of self-realization. Hence *ahaṅkāra* produces the 'I'-cognition in the not-self. It is argued: "The word '*ahaṅkāra*' refers to that which produces what is non-existent due to the usage of '*cvi-pratyaya*,' that is to say, *ahaṅkāra* is that which transforms into 'I' what is not 'I'." This argument is untenable, because there is no *cvi-pratyaya* in this case, and also there is no justification for postulating it here. The meaning of the word (*ahaṅkāra*) as it is that which produces the 'I'-sense.

It has been said: "It is this *ahaṅkāra*, another name for '*garva*' (pride), that has been spoken of in scripture as what has to be avoided." This is not tenable. Pride is the content alone of the principle called *ahaṅkāra*; but it itself is not *ahaṅkāra*, because of the statement, "*Manas, buddhi, ahaṅkāra* and *citta* are the internal organs; and their contents are doubt, determination, pride, and memory respectively." However

the statement in *nighaṇṭu* “*garva, abhimāna, ahaṅkāra,*” purports to convey that the usage of *ahaṅkāra* in respect of pride which is the content of *ahaṅkāra* is figurative. Some argue like this: “With a view to overcome the above difficulty, the word ‘*ahaṅkāra*’ means pride when it is used in the sense of *bhāvasādhana*, and it means the principle when it is used in the sense of *karaṇasādhana*: that is to say, there is *karaṇasādhana* usage when we say that *ahaṅkāra* is that by which what is not *aham* is made ‘*aham*’; and there is *bhāvasādhana* usage when we say that the *aham* of what is not *aham* is *ahaṅkāra*. In both the cases, what is absent is produced.” This manner of argument too is untenable, for what is not absent is not produced here. Further, it is ridiculous for it amounts to saying that what produces the ‘I’-notion in what is not ‘I’ is *ahaṅkāra* whereas the rise of ‘I’-notion in the ‘I’ is not *ahaṅkāra*. In that case, one might as well say that *ahaṅkāra* is getting the ‘you-notion’ in what is not ‘you’, whereas the rise of ‘you-notion’ in ‘you’ is not *ahaṅkāra*; and also one might argue that *ahaṅkāra* is getting the ‘this-notion’ in what is not ‘this’, whereas the rise of ‘this-notion’ in ‘this’ is not *ahaṅkāra*. One cannot accept this position as it goes against the entire scripture. Further, we want to know whether the ‘I’-notion in the intellect is *ahaṅkāra* or not. If the former, it jeopardizes the view that *ahaṅkāra* is getting the ‘I’-notion in what is not ‘I’. It cannot be said that the intellect is not *ahamārtha*, because the opponent has accepted that the word ‘I’ directly refers to the intellect, *i.e.* *ahamārtha* in the context of the explanation of the text, “Now, therefore, the instruction about *ahaṅkāra*.” (*Chāndogyopaniṣad*, 7.25.1) If the latter, when there is ‘I’-notion in what is not ‘I’, why is it not *ahaṅ-*

kāra? You cannot say now that the intellect is *ahamartha* alone, for it will go against your view that *ahamartha* is the self alone. So to say that *ahamartha* is the intellect after having asserted that *ahamartha* is the self is a contradiction in terms.

It has been stated: "The cognition of the self in the not-self such as the body is *avidyā*; but the 'I' cognition in the self does not suffer sublation." This view too cannot be accepted. It is but correct to say that the cognition of the self in the not-self is *avidyā*, for the reason that what is, is cognized differently. But the 'I'-cognition in the self does not remain unsublated. Is it the case that the 'I'-cognition in the self is the self or the not-self? It cannot be the former as it will lead to the admission of 'I'-cognition in sleep. If the latter, the 'I'-cognition of the not-self in the self is but *avidyā*. The *ahamartha* which thinks "I am the self" is, indeed, not-self. It may be said that the cognition that the self is what is implied by the word 'I' does not suffer sublation; this, however, is not acceptable to you. There is also the view: "If the self is knowledge alone, then there should be the appearance of knowledge alone in the body which is not-self, but which is identified with the self, but there should not be the appearance of cognizership." Even this is unacceptable. Even though the self is really knowledge alone, it is in practice associated with cognizership. One who knows that the self is knowledge alone will never have cognition of self in the not-self.

If it be asked: "How can the 'I'-cognition in the not-self be a (false) thought of the self?" this is untenable. Because of the mutual non-discrimination

between the semblance of consciousness and *ahaṅkāra*, the common man looks upon the *ahaṅkāra* which is not differentiated from the semblance of consciousness as the self, and so the cognition of 'I' in the body which is not-self is only a false thought of the self. It cannot be said that the 'I'-cognition in the *ahaṅkāra* which is not-self is a (false) thought of the self. If the 'I'-cognition of the self arises in the *ahaṅkāra* which is not-self, then it would be a false thought of the self. But it does not arise that way, because it is not the locus of the cognition that is produced. If it arises in the not-self, how could it be a false thought of the self? So the 'I'-cognition of the *jīva*, which is *ahaṅkāra* with consciousness reflected therein, in respect of itself, *i.e.* *sābhāsa-ahaṅkāra*, is not false thought of the self. But, the 'I'-cognition in respect of body and other objects alone different from oneself is false knowledge of the self, for it is proper for the *jīva* to have with reference to itself the cognition of the self in the same way as it has the 'I'-cognition. It is no argument to say that it is established that the *jīva*, *i.e.*, *ahamartha*, is the knower, for it is to be established. The *ahamartha* is, indeed, *ahaṅkāra* with consciousness reflected therein, *jīva*, knower, one in bondage; on the contrary, the inward self is not *ahamartha*, because it is, it has already been stated, of the nature of knowledge.

If *ahamartha* is not-self, it is argued, the illusion that "I am stout" should not take place. This argument does not hold good. Just as the object denoted by 'this' is snake due to erroneous perception, even so the object denoted by 'I' is the self due to erroneous cognition. Further, if the object denoted by 'I' is the self itself, then why should there always be the cogni-

tion "I am fat?" Why is there no cognition, as "The self is fat"? So, the object signified by the word 'I' is the self delimited by *ahaṅkāra*, and not the pure self. It has been stated: "The self is different from the body, senses, mind, vital breath; and it cannot be proved by anything else. The self is eternal; it pervades all *kṣetras*; it is one and is of the nature of bliss." The first half of the verse is free from blemish. The meaning of the second half is as follows. The self is eternal. Why? It pervades every body (*kṣetra*). The word '*prati*' refers to all (bodies). It means that the self pervades all bodies. Or, since everything other than the self is body alone, it is all-pervasive. All-pervasiveness means devoid of limitation by space, time, and objects. Thus, since the self is free from limitation, it is eternal; for, we find that pot and other objects which are limited are not eternal. By this, the view of the opponent who holds that the self is not all-pervasive, but atomic stands refuted. The word should be split as '*abhinna*'. Though the self by its very nature is one, in practice it appears to be different due to the adjunct. '*Sukhī*' means one who has happiness-nature, or one who is of the nature of happiness. It does not mean one who has the attribute of happiness. Otherwise, it will be defective. It cannot be said that the all-pervasiveness of the *jīva* is not its essential nature, but it is through attributive knowledge, because there is no attributive knowledge at all. Even if it is accepted, the self will not become all-pervasive through that; and it is not proper to speak of the contraction of its pervasiveness.

AN INVOCATION TO VIṢṆU

ध्येयं वदन्ति शिवमेव हि केचिदन्ये
 शक्तिं गणेशमपरे तु दिवाकरं वै ।
 रूपैस्तु तैरपि विभासि यतस्त्वमेव तस्मात्
 त्वमेव शरणं मम शङ्खपाणे ॥

According to some people, Lord Śiva alone is the God to be meditated. Some others hold that Goddess Śakti alone is the adorable Deity. Yet another group of men hold that Lord Gaṇeśa alone is the adorable God. According to some other people, the Sun (*Divākara*) is the only adorable God. Because all the above forms are but your own transformations, I take refuge under You alone, O Lord Viṣṇu, the wielder of Conch.

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 खिन्नानां जलकाङ्क्षया मरुभुवि भ्रान्त्या परिभ्राम्यताम् ।
 अत्यासन्नसुधाम्बुधिं सुखकरं ब्रह्माद्वयं दर्शय-
 त्पेषा शङ्करभारती विजयते निर्वाणसन्दायिनी ॥

saṁsārādhvani tāpabhānukiraṇaprodhūtatādāhavyathā-
khinnānāṁ jalakāṅkṣayā marubhuvi bhrāntyā
paribhrāmyatām
atyāsannasudhāmbudhiṁ sukhakaraṁ brahmādvayaṁ
darśayaty-
eṣā śaṅkarabhārati vijayate nirvāṇasandāyini.

To those who are afflicted, in the way of the world, by the burning pain given rise to by the scorching sun-shafts of misery, and who through delusion wander about in the desert (of worldliness) seeking water — showing the felicitous ocean of nectar, which is very near, the non-dual *Brahman*, this — the Voice of Śaṅkara — is victorious, leading, as it does, to liberation.