

A QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ADVAITA VEDANTA

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śaṅkara-bhāratī

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
Editor

V. R. Kalyanasundara Sastri

N. C. Krishnan

Volume FOURTEEN

Number FOUR



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1990

esā śaṅkara-bhāratī vijagate
nirvāṇa-sandāyini

victorious is the voice of śaṅkara,
leading, as it does, to liberation

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HOMAGE TO ŚAṄKARA

[138]

लीनं तथा कुरु मनः परमार्थवस्तु-
न्यैक्यावबोधनवशान्मम निःसरेन्न ।
यद्वत्पुनः परमकारुणिकाग्रगण्य !
श्रीशङ्करार्य ! मम देहि पदावलम्बम् ॥

*līnaṁ tathā kuru manaḥ paramārthavastuny-
aikyāvabodhana-vaśān-mama niḥ-sareṇna
yadvat punaḥ paramakāruṇikāgraganya!
śrīśaṅkarārya! mama dehi padāvalambam.*

O Śrī Śaṅkara! may you make my mind ever in-
tent on the supreme Reality, after imparting me the
knowledge of non-difference (non-duality of Brahman),
so that my mind will not go astray again. Oh Śrī
Śaṅkara, the foremost among all the most compassio-
nate preceptors! kindly yield me the refuge under your
divine pair of feet.

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सन्यासिनां हि विषवद्विषयेषु बुद्धिं
 तन्वंस्तथा च गृहिणां शुभकर्मवाञ्छाम् ।
 सर्वान्क्रमेण च परं पदमापयंस्त्वं
 श्रीशङ्करार्य मम देहि पदावलम्बम् ॥

*sanyāsīnām hi viṣavad-viṣayeṣu buddhiṁ
 tanvaṁstathā ca gr̥hiṇāṁ śubhakarmavāñchām
 sarvān-krameṇa ca param-padam-āpayaṁstvāṁ
 śrīśaṅkarārya! mama dehi padāvalambam.*

O Śrī Śaṅkara! you are making the ascetics (*sanyāsins*) averse to worldly objects like poison; and you are making the householders (*gr̥hasthas*) interested in doing good deeds alone. And, in this way, you are leading them all to the supreme state (of Brahmanhood) in due course. O great preceptor Śrī Śaṅkara! kindly give me shelter under your divine pair of feet.

Jagadguru Śrī Saccidānanda Śivābhinava Nṛsimhabhārati
 in *Śrīśaṅkarācāryapadāvalambastava*

ĀYURVEDA — THE SCIENCE OF LIFE*

Jagadguru Śrī Candrasekharendra Sarasvatī

If the Vedic religion is regarded as a deity, the four *Vedas* — the *R̥g-*, the *Yajur-*, the *Sāma-* and the *Atharva-veda* — constitute the life-blood of its body with the Śikṣā, Vyākaraṇa, Chandas, Nirukta, Jyotiṣa and Kalpa forming its six limbs. In addition, there are four more organs to this deity, namely, Mīmāṃsā, Nyāya, Purāṇa and Dharma-sāstra. These comprise the “*caturdaśa-vidyā*” or fourteen branches of knowledge. Further, four more sub-*vedas* such as Āyurveda, Dhanurveda, Gāndharva-veda and Arthasāstra are added to this list, thus making the *aṣṭādaśa-vidyā-sthānas* (18 branches of learning). The latter four are more secular than religious, intended to make the individual lead a happy practical life and to help form a joyous, contented social polity. Though these are not mainly orthodox theological texts, they have the basic undercurrent of Dhārmic foundation solidly laid, and therefore, called sub-*vedas*.

*Courtesy: *Deyvattin Kural* (தெய்வத்தின் குரல்), Vol. III, pp. 719-761. English rendering: ARGUS.

The Āyurveda deals with medicine; the Dhanurveda refers to the art of warfare; the Gandharva-veda is mainly concerned with artistic, aesthetic culture such as poetry, drama, dance and music; and the Arthasāstra is the science of economics and politics.

Confining our attention to the Āyurveda in this article, one cannot but marvel at the process which has transformed the instructions from ancient physicians on the grooming and care of the body, dietary prescriptions for different seasons and times of the day, on proper exercise and conduct, as unquestioned and unquestionable articles of faith for countless generations of men and women who were born, grown up and died in the fold of Indian culture. The Āyurveda is more than a system of medicine, as it stresses correct behaviour, cultivation of regular virtuous habits, and the right harmonious relation with the natural environment on the one hand and with one's psychic nature on the other.

A Paradox

The question may be asked how the Āyurveda fits in with the Hindu philosophy, which stresses the emptiness and futility of worldly life and calls phenomenal existence as "*māyā*" or illusion. How can this part of the solid edifice erected by the Āyurvedic system of medicine — for the word 'Āyurveda' itself signifies the science of longevity, which by its very nature is of the earth, earthly and practical — fit together with the metaphysical blocks of the Vedic worldview, especially with the idea of the theory of *Mokṣa* or liberation from the *samsāra* (the ocean of worldly life)? The above question arises out of a misunderstanding of the true nature of Vedic religion. Keeping high the

ideals, exemplified by the lives of Śrī Rāmā and Lord Kṛṣṇa, life in the world is not to be ignored, affirm our scriptures. The earthly life is the Kurukṣetra where *Dharma*, the Kingdom of Heaven, is to be established. Life is divine and the core, the central heart of the *Gītā* doctrine, is action, not running away to the forests. Lord Kṛṣṇa asks Arjuna to take up his Gāṇḍīva, which he had let fall, and fight with courage and determination. Hence the meeting of medicine and metaphysics in the Āyurvedic system is in complete harmony with the Hindu philosophy.

It is in this sense that Dhanurveda, the art of warfare, is not divorced from religious principles, as the *Bhagavad Gītā* amply testifies. By the separation of religion from the secular affairs such as medicine, defence, and education, there is so much confusion, turmoil, disorder and misery prevailing in the present day world.

The Āyurvedic system of medicine derives its strength from its unchallenging theory and practice of not only curing but preventing illness for scores of centuries. For life is precious and is not to be frittered away. It is the natural instinct of every living being to protect himself from any harm; and don't we see a leprous cripple in the street to when life is a drudge crawling away to safety, when he sees a truck coming fast before him? And how much effort do we take to cure our beloved ones from any dreadful disease? And are we not prepared to sacrifice anything for their complete cure? We have studied in history that Babar gave his life to cure his son Humayun from a deadly sickness.

Even as one could not paint without a canvas, we cannot attain *mokṣa* or liberation without the posses-

sion of our body, and that too kept in a strong and healthy condition. This is beautifully expressed in the *Bhagavad Gītā* (V. 23):

शक्नोतीहैव यः सोढुं प्राक् शरीरविमोक्षणात् ।
कामक्रोधोद्धवं वेगं स युक्तः स सुखी नरः ॥

The emphasis here is on the words: “*iha eva*” meaning “even here”, while we are alive; and then comes this phrase: प्राक् शरीरविमोक्षणात् (“*prāk śarīra vimokṣaṇāt*”) meaning “even before this body is given up”. In this *śloka*, Kṛṣṇa abjures that only he who can bear here now in this body the velocity of wrath and desire is the true Yogi, the happy man. Aren’t we told earlier in the third chapter of the *Gītā* that *kāma* and *krodha*, desire and wrath, are the gates to hell; and they have to be crushed out now, even while we are living and not after.

This helps us in mental purification; and *Āyurveda* is a system which cures not only the physical ailments but mental illness as well. That is the reason why *Āyurveda* insists that medicine should always be centered on the person rather than on the disease. The physician must have a thorough understanding of the person, his character, habits, mental faculties and behaviour before trying to diagnose the physical illness from which he is suffering.

Maṇi, Mantra, Auśada

There are three means suggested in *Āyurveda* for the cure of physical and mental illness, namely, “*maṇi, mantra* and *auśadha*”, i.e. the use of gems, *mantras* and medicine. There are nine gems each related to one of the nine planets and the wearing of

either a ring or a chain studded with such gems is suggested according to the planetary position of the person who is being treated. Along with the gems, gold, silver, copper, mercury and other metals too are used.

The repetition of *mantras* to such deities as *Jvara-hareśvara*, *Kampahareśvara* and other gods is suggested for the cure of some patients' ailments. Other rituals proposed are performance of " *sūryanamaskāra*" recitation of the *Kandaranubhūti*, etc.

Then comes the giving of medicine, where the philosophical emphasis on the wholeness of the person is reflected in the comprehensiveness of the diagnostic examination, prescribed for the physician in the Āyurvedic texts. In addition to a thorough check up for any pathological condition, the tone of the system, age, proportions, digestive power and capacity for work, the medical examination includes the patient's emotional and social spheres. Stress is also laid on the patient's present mental state and his personal traits supplemented by the doctor getting familiar with his family, social, and cultural context. Thus the doctor's diagnosis is an integral one, as every patient is living in different orders of being simultaneously — physical, psychological, social, and metaphysical.

To make the medicine offered more effective, the physician infuses it with the *mantras* related to *Tryambaka*, *Dhanvantari*, *Asvins*, and the sun god. In this connection, the importance of the recitation of the " *Ādityahṛdayam*" the prayer taught to Śrī Rāma by Sage Agastya on the eve of the war with Rāvaṇa may be mentioned.

As a perfect healing for poison and high fever, the following *śloka* from Ādi Śaṅkara's *Saundarya Laharī* is suggested:

किरन्तीमङ्गेभ्यः किरणनिकुरुम्बामृतरसं
 हृदि त्वामाधत्ते हिमकरशिलामूर्तिमिव यः ।
 स सर्पाणां दर्पं शमयति शकुन्ताधिप इव
 ज्वरप्लुष्टान् दृष्ट्या सुखयति सुधाधारसिरया ॥

“He who meditates on Thee, who sends forth luminous waves of Bliss from Thy body as an image of moonstone does, will be capable of humbling the pride and ferocity of serpents by his mere look, like Lord Garuḍa himself; nay, like the nectar-showering *nāḍī* (nerve), his look can cure any ailment, including the affliction of fever.”

Pilgrim Centre

By the pious repetition of some other verses from this great hymn of Ādi Śaṅkara, other diseases too can be cured, it is stated. The effectiveness of such hymns is exemplified by the fact that Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭatiri, the eminent Kerala poet, was cured of his serious illness when he wrote the *Nārāyaṇīyam*. Some patients repeat the *Tiruppugal* of St. Aruṇagirināthar commencing with the lines “*Irumuḷu rōga muyalagan vadha*” for the cure of all kinds of ailments. It is known that St. Sambandhamūrti Svāmigaḷ cured the hunchback Pāṇḍya king by singing his work “*Tirunīṟruppatigam*”. Even today, it is noted that several patients are cured today by the using of holy ash after the recitation of this holy hymn. Several cures are effected for various kinds of ailments by some herbs

given in the temples of Paḷani, Guruvāyūr, Trichūr, Vaideeshwaran Koil, Tirupati, Vānamāmalai and other pilgrim centres.

Āyurveda believes in the unity of man and nature and, therefore, the person is considered as a microcosm; for every thing that is part of the Cosmos or Nature has its homologue within the person. The identity of the person's body with the physical part of Nature lies in the *pañcabhūtas* (the five elements), the work of which is the cornerstone of Āyurveda. This medical system is not contrary to the injunctions of the *Dharmaśāstras*. In its theory of three *guṇas* — *sattva*, *rajas*, and *tamas* — Āyurveda is also similar to the Sāṅkhya philosophical system.

Linked to the three *guṇas* is the Āyurvedic theory emphasising the equilibrium of the three humours (*tridoṣāḥ*), namely, "*kapha-vāta-pittam*," i.e., phlegm, air and bile. Of these three, air seems to be important. Food is said to be moved into the stomach and blood circulation by the power of *prāṇa* or air (life-breath). There are six kinds of air i.e. *prāṇa*, *apāna*, *vyāna*, *udāna*, *samāna* and *brāhmaṇa*. Bile and phlegm too are of various kinds, distinguished by their specific functions in the body system. Diseases are caused when any one of the three humours becomes excessively agitated and increases disproportionately in relation to others. The Āyurvedic physician is able to detect any imbalance by feeling the pulse of the patient; and he prescribes a substance in nature — a drug in the form of herbs or dietary change — which when administered to the patient corrects the disequilibrium, and the patient is completely cured.

It is interesting to note that the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* in its section under "Āyurveda" remarks that the art of surgery began first in India, came to Greece via Arabia, then passed on to Italy, and from there spread all over Europe. The science of surgery was called the "Susruta" *śāstra* in which were detailed all the instruments used in the hospitals for operations. Recent researches in the palm-leaf documents reveal that the medical sciences of the ancients had their roots in the *Ṛgveda* and several stories in the *Purāṇas* testify to some curious and subtle operations performed in olden times. The heroic exploits of Queen Viṣpalā in the warfare are described in the *Ṛgveda*, and when she lost her legs, the Aswin devas are stated to have substituted them by iron ones. In the *Rāmāyaṇa* of Vālmīki, we find that when Indra, the lord of the gods, lost his potency by Gautama Ṛṣi's curse for his misbehaviour with Ahalyā, he regained his powers by a goat's transplant. And in the *Mahābhārata* are given the accounts of rejuvenation experiments carried on the persons, Yayāti and Cyavana. That these accounts are not tales but real facts have been proved by researchers who testify that the ancients were proficient in surgery and carried out successful transplantation, artificial limb surgery, rejuvenation and plastic surgery.

But with the passage of time, the surgical operations were becoming less, due to two reasons: First, fewer doctors took to surgery as it involved more dangers, and the after-effects were greater. Secondly, the ancient surgeons led a life of austerity and *tapas* and were able to get secret herbs from the Himālayas to set right difficult operations, even as Hanumān was able to bring the Sañjīvi hill to Laṅkā from the Himā-

layan heights and revived the life of the stricken army. With the decline of such divine powers Indian surgery slowly disappeared. But remnants of the old type are still to be seen in Malayalam medicine in what is called the Pañcakarma, viz., the five types of surgery: *lepa*, *vamana*, *virocana*, *svedana*, *nehana*.

The classic treatise on the Āyurvedic medicine is the *Caraka-samhitā* which, among other subjects, deals also with ecology and environmental problems.

Many are the advantages of the Āyurvedic system over the Western types. The equation of the socially desirable with health is reflected in Āyurvedic prescriptions for the maintenance of positive mental health and the prevention of mental disorders. Being in the mainstream of the Indian moral traditions, the Āyurvedic concept of the healthy personality is pervaded by the ideals of moderation, control and responsibility. The "golden mean" is the motto of the Āyurvedic system.

ETHICAL PRECEPTS TAUGHT BY THE RĀMĀYAṆA*

Jagadguru Śrī Jayendra Sarasvatī

The *Rāmāyaṇa* and the *Mahābhārata* form, as it were, the pair of eyes of the people. These two great epics teach *dharma* (moral codes) and *nyāya* (perfect way of life) in essence. *Adharma* and *anyāya* (wickedness and unjust way of life) are held to be destructive altogether; and this is conveyed by the plot constructions of the two great Epics while focusing the stories of the two illustrious heroines Śrī Sītā and Śrī Draupadī — both being *divine* by nature and birth. Śrī Sītā, daughter of Mother Earth and Śrī Draupadī, emerged from the God of fire and foster-daughter of King Drupada, are *ayonijā* (bereft of any human origin). Both of them are *anaghā* (faultless) and *anavadyā* (blemishless). They are also *prātaḥ smaraṇīyā* (worth remembering at the day-break), because when we think of them, all our sins get destroyed.

Every character of the *Rāmāyaṇa* of Sage Vālmīki teaches us an important moral. Though Lord Rāma is

*Courtesy: *Amudamoḷi*, pp. 70-72, Sri Ram Trust Publication, 145, Linghi Chetty Street, Madras-1, 1978. Free rendering in English: Dr. V. K. S. N. Raghavan.

the ultimate Reality, He adores and honours His mother, father and teacher in accordance with His advent in human form. He fully endorses and obeys the words of His parents. He declares that He is ready to abide by the wishes of His parents without caring for the consequence.

Prince Lakṣmaṇa leads his whole life in the service of Śrī Rāma, his brother. Prince Bharata, without any desire for worldly pursuits, receives the holy sandals given by his brother, Śrī Rāma; and he administers the kingdom as a protege of Śrī Rāma's sandals. The Goddess Sītā follows Her Lord as His shadow, and leads Her life in the sole service of Her Lord. The simple boatman Śrī Guha has great affection and devotion to Lord Śrī Rāma; and he conducts himself so meekly towards the Lord that Lord Rāma joyfully declares, "Inclusive of Guha we are five brothers."* Lord Āñjaneya, being an obedient servant, devotee and a courageous warrior, always thinks of Lord Śrī Rāma; he contemplates on the Lord always; and, thus he stands as a unique example of a perfect servant. The divine bird Jaṭāyu sacrifices his life for the sake of protecting the Goddess Śrī Sītā. The great savant Vibhīṣaṇa stands as a unique example of an earnest aspirant of *mokṣa* who achieves all good things by taking refuge only under the Lord's feet.

Even though the demon king, Rāvaṇa was an ardent devotee of Lord Śiva and had all gods as his sla-

*"குகனொடும் ஐவரானேம் முன்பு; பின்குன்று துழ்வான்
மகனொடும் அறுவர் ஆனேம்; எம் முழை அன்பின் வந்த
அகனமர் காதல் ஐய! நின்னொடும் எழுவர் ஆனேம்;
புகல் அருங் கானம்தந்து, புதல்வரால் பொலிந்தான்

ves, he succumbed to the evil tendencies to which he was heir. Rāvaṇa, with an evil motive, fixed his mind on the great Goddess Śrī Sītā — whom all the celestial beings and human beings respectfully adore — and so he (Rāvaṇa) trapped himself to destruction.

Hence the *Śrīmad Rāmāyaṇa* of Sage Vālmīki paves the path for human progress and social welfare; and thus, it is the great guide of humanity as a whole. Even though many persons in the *Rāmāyaṇa* adored Śrī Rāma, the latter (*viz.* Śrī Rāma) declared that he considers himself only as a human being; and he directed all men to follow him as the best example in leading a righteous way of life throughout.

आत्मानं मानुषं मन्ये रामं दशरथात्मजम् ।

(*Śrīmad Rāmāyaṇa* of Sage Vālmīki, VI.)

So also, the *Rāmāyaṇa* guides the people to lead a virtuous life. The leading exponents who discourse on the *Rāmāyaṇa* and the *Mahābhārata* should refrain from misinterpreting these great epics in the debates and seminars. Then alone will the people at large be benefited to inculcate devotion to Lord Rāma and Śrī Kṛṣṇa, and save humanity.

THE FOUR INDISPENSABLE
QUALIFICATIONS

*(An extract from Sarva-vedānta-siddhānta-sāra-saṅgraha
of Śrī Śaṅkara Bhagavatpāda)*

Free rendering by
Dr. V. K. S. N. Raghavan

(Contd. from Vol. XIV, No. 3)

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1968

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योगमभ्यस्यतो भिक्षोर्योगाच्चलितचेतसः ।

प्राप्य पुण्यकृताँ लोकानित्यादि प्राह केशवः ॥

Lord Kṛṣṇa has said: "The *bhikṣu* (*sannyāsin*) who practices *yoga* — but whose mind deviates from *yoga* — reaches the world of the righteous ..." (*Bhagavadgītā*, vi, 37 & 41).

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न तु कृत्वैव सन्यासं तूष्णीमेव मृतस्य हि ।

पुण्यलोकगतिं ब्रूते भगवान्न्यासमात्रतः ॥

Bhagavān has not said that, only by one's *nyāsa* (renunciation) and not having done anything else, can one attain the world of the righteous after one's death.

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न च संन्यसनादेव सिद्धिं समधिगच्छति ।

इत्यनुष्ठेयसंत्यागात्सिद्धयभावमुवाच च ॥¹

And, Śrī Bhagavān Vyāsa has declared that just by mere renunciation alone, one cannot get the goal (of supreme bliss of *mokṣa*) *i.e.* thereby it is implied that the abandoning of one's duties results in the non-attainment of one's goal.

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तस्मात्तितिक्षया सोढ्वा तत्तद्दुःखमुपागतम् ॥

कुर्याच्छक्यनुरूपेण श्रवणादि शनैः शनैः ॥

Therefore, it is intended that one should have forbearance, one should bear with the impending miseries;

and one should also practice *śravaṇa* (Vedic study), etc. slowly and according to one's ability.

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प्रयोजनं तितिक्षायां साधितायाः प्रयत्नतः ।
प्राप्तदुःखासहिष्णुत्वे न किञ्चिदपि दृश्यते ॥

There is no use of that fortitude — which has been achieved with much effort —, when one is not able to endure any impending misery.

सन्यासः

Renunciation

[142]

साधनत्वेन दृष्टानां सर्वेषामपि कर्मणाम् ।
विधिना यः परित्यागः स संन्यासः सतां मतः ॥

According to the wise people, renunciation (*sannyāsa*) consists in the proper abandonment of all forms of action* held to be the means (of gaining worldly or spiritual bliss).

[143]

उपरमयति कर्माणीत्युपरतिशब्देन कथ्यते न्यासः ।
न्यासेन हि सर्वेषां श्रुत्या प्रोक्तो विकर्मणां त्यागः ॥

Nyāsa (renunciation) is described by the term *uparati*, i.e. relinquishing all actions. According to *śruti*, even the abandonment of actions contributes to *nyāsa*.

*All forms of action: *nitya* or daily rituals; *naimittika* or occational rites; and, *kāmya* or rituals performed with an aim to fulfil a particular desire.

[144]

कर्मणा साद्ध्यमानस्यानित्यं श्रूयते यतः ।
कर्मणानेन किं नित्यफलेप्सोः परमार्थिनः ॥

Because the *śruti* says that anything achieved by action is only non-eternal, what is the use of action, for one seeking the highest truth, the eternal good?

[145]

उत्पाद्यमाप्यं संस्कार्यं विकार्यं परिगण्यते ।
चतुर्विधं कर्मसाध्यं फलं नान्यदितः परम् ॥

The fruit achieved by action is fourfold: *utpādya*, a fruit produced anew or afresh; *samskārya*, perfection of something already existing; *āpya*, or attainment of a goal; and, *vikārya* or the changing the shape of things. Nothing else is possible with regard to such fruit (achieved through action).

[146]

नैतदन्यतरं ब्रह्म कदा भवितुमर्हति ।
स्वतःसिद्धं सर्वदाप्तं शुद्धं निर्मलमक्रियम् ॥

But Brahman cannot be said to belong to any of the fourfold result of action. Brahman is *svataḥ siddha* (self-existent), *sarvadā āpta* (that which is ever in the form of 'attained'), *śuddha* (fully pure), *nirmala* (free from any taint or any evil), and *akriya* (never subject to modification).

[147]

न चास्य कश्चिज्जनितेत्यागमेन निषिध्यते ।
कारणं ब्रह्म तत्तस्माद्ब्रह्म नोत्पाद्यमिष्यते ॥

The *āgama* (verbal testimony or *śruti*) denies any origin for Brahman. Therefore Brahman is the only supreme cause (for which there is no other cause). Thus it is concluded that Brahman is not *utpādyā* (not produced from anything else).

[148]

आप्त्राप्ययोस्तु भेदश्चेदाप्त्रा चाप्यमवाप्यते ।
आप्तृस्वरूपमेवैतद्ब्रह्म नाप्यं कदाचन ॥

The difference between the goal and the one who reaches it consists in that one — being different from the goal — reaches the goal. Brahman, being the essential nature of the seeker, can never be said to be the goal (reached).

[149]

मलिनस्यैव संस्कारो दर्पणादेरिहेष्यते ।
व्योमवन्नित्यशुद्धस्य ब्रह्मणो नैव संस्क्रिया ॥

Refinement (*samskāra* or perfection) is here intended only for certain objects like mirror, etc., which get spoiled owing to dirt, dust, etc. Brahman which is eternally pure like the region of the sky (ethereal space) needs no *samskāra* or perfection.

[150]

केन दुष्टेन युज्येत वस्तु निर्मलमक्रियम् ।
यद्योगादागतं दोषं संस्कारो विनिवर्तयेत् ॥

Which blemish or evil can affect the eternally pure and actionless objects (Brahman)? If only some defect arises because of some blemish or evil, then that defect may be cured by *samskāra* or perfection.

[151]

निर्गुणस्य गुणाधानमपि नैवोपपद्यते ।
केवलो निर्गुणश्चेति नैर्गुण्यं श्रूयते यतः ॥

Conferment of attributes to Brahman which is free from attributes is totally untenable. For *śruti* speaks of Brahman as free from attributes in the text, "*kevalo nirguṇaśca*" (unique and free from attributes). (*Śvetāśvataropaniṣad*, vi, 11)

[152]

सावयवस्य क्षीरादेर्वस्तुनः परिणामिनः ।
येन केन विकारित्वं स्यान्नो निष्कर्मवस्तुनः ॥

Transformation (*pariṇāma* or *vikāra*) can be spoken of objects with parts like milk etc., which are liable to change. But with regard to Brahman which does not participate in any kind of activity, no modification or transformation is possible.

[153-54]

निष्कलं निष्क्रियं शान्तं निरवद्यं निरञ्जनम् ।
 इत्येव वस्तुनस्तत्त्वं श्रुतियुक्तिव्यवस्थितम् ॥
 तस्मान्न कर्मसाध्यत्वं ब्रह्मणोऽस्ति कुतश्चन ।
 कर्मसाध्यं त्वनित्यं हि ब्रह्म नित्यं सनातनम् ॥

Brahman is spoken of to be devoid of parts, actionless, tranquil, devoid of taint, and ever pure. Thus, it is established by *śruti* (*Vedas*) and *yukti* (reason). Therefore, by no means, can Brahman be said to be *karmasādhyā* (achieved as a result of any action). Whatever is *karma-sādhyā*, is but non-eternal; whereas, Brahman is eternal and self-existent.

[155-56]

देहादिः क्षीयते लोको यथैवं कर्मणा चितः ।
 तथैवामुष्मिको लोकः संचितः पुण्यकर्मणा ॥
 कृतकत्वमनित्यत्वे हेतुर्जागर्ति सर्वदा ।
 तस्मादनित्ये स्वर्गादौ पण्डितः को नु मुह्यति ॥

Just as the bodies, etc. and [the material worldly enjoyment — which are achieved through actions — become perished, even so the world hereafter, achieved through meritorious deeds, gets destroyed. Therefore always it is the case with anything that is achieved through action to be non-eternal. Hence, when *svarga* (heaven), etc. are only non-eternal, how would a wise person crave for such a non-eternal fruit?

(to be continued)

ADVAITA AS IMMANENT METAPHYSICS

*B. R. Shantha Kumari**

I The Need for the Distinction

The need for Walsh's distinction between immanent and transcendent metaphysics arises out of his defence of metaphysics. A metaphysics which ignores the world of sense, and posits an unchanging perfect reality behind it may be called "transcendent." By contrast, a metaphysics which shows no disposition to turn its back on the world of everyday experience may be called "immanent." It affirms that the highest Reality is immanent in all the experiences and phenomena of empirical life.

The word "metaphysics" has down the ages drawn various response ranging from ardent admiration to vehement denial and violent denunciation. In the modern period, criticisms to the claims of metaphysics came first from Hume and Kant. Although the critics are unanimous in their aim — rejecting metaphysics, yet they differ among themselves with regard to the

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intentions behind their anti-metaphysical adventures. For example, Voltaire confused metaphysics with theology. To Burke and Herder, metaphysics was nothing more than the height of abstract speculation. Hume wanted to burn books of metaphysics because to him they contained nothing but sophistry and illusion.

The common aim of the critics, to eliminate metaphysics and provide a strong foundation for the sciences, brought them together. "Their antipathy to metaphysics was like the antipathy of genuine practitioners to the lore of witch doctors; they abhorred it as senseless obscurantism."¹ The critics understood metaphysics as a theory of supersensible reality lying beyond the scope of the senses. They viewed metaphysics unsympathetically and with a prejudiced mind, and, therefore, had an imperfect view of its attractions and subtleties. It was believed that a metaphysician lived in a world of fantasy. They were accused of turning away from the harsh realities of the physical world and pretending that there is a different kind of reality behind the physical world, accessible only to reason and not the senses. Metaphysics, then, deals with what is really real in contrast to the empirically real. The critics, therefore, raised the question as to how one can verify the truth of metaphysics.

With the verification theory they sought to eliminate metaphysics once and for all. The critics contended that, since metaphysical propositions are neither analytic nor synthetic, they are "literally senseless" and, therefore, "nonsensical." Metaphysics was the outcome of bad logic and no rational person could take its "intellectual pretensions"² seriously. The critics equated metaphysicians with criminals, and

accused them of wanting to mislead the gullible with "news from nowhere."³ They contended that metaphysics was only an emotional response to reality, which can be better expressed in music, lyric, art of poetry, etc. These do not permit empirical verification and are unfit to be called scientific or philosophical.

According to the Analysts, philosophical problems arose from a misuse of language. Moore and his followers attacked metaphysics from the standpoint of common sense and said that philosophy was in the wrong if it contradicted common sense. The critics concluded that philosophers were logically unsophisticated. Metaphysicians were to be ashamed of themselves because metaphysics appealed only to the tender-minded and the emotionally weak individuals.

The critics, therefore, advised metaphysicians to abandon their non-productive speculation and instead engage themselves in more useful and worthwhile activities such as clarifying terms and scientific concepts, etc., and thereby further the prospects of science. The anti-metaphysicians declared that philosophy should subserve science and be its handmaid and not parade as the Queen of Sciences.

II *Walsh's Defence of Metaphysics*

Defending metaphysics, Walsh says that these criticisms are arbitrary and baseless on a closer examination. The critics are wrong, because they hastily presuppose that all metaphysics is of the transcendent kind, as is Plato's philosophy. Just because the criticisms are valid in the case of Plato's metaphysics, it does not mean that they apply equally to other philosophies as well. Walsh affirms that the attacks lose their

sting against immanent metaphysics, *e.g.* the philosophy of Aristotle, Leibniz, Hegel, etc. These cannot be accused of as wanting to impart "news from nowhere." Immanent metaphysics is a metaphysics in which neither naive belief nor theoretical presuppositions, factual or metaphysical interfere with the analysis of experience. The conditions for the possibility of experience are explored without reference to a metaphysical theory of Reality. Walsh believes that one can practise metaphysics and yet have one's feet firmly planted on the ground, because the common concern of metaphysics is how to take what happens here and now, and how to take the scheme of things entirely in their wordly perspective.

That distinguished philosophers like Plato, Aristotle, Leibniz, and others pursued metaphysical activity despite their discoveries in logic, refutes the view that metaphysicians are logically unsophisticated.

The critics are not naive or metaphysically neutral as they superficially appear to be. Their opposition to metaphysics is grounded in their aim to promote the cause of empiricism. And empiricism is not metaphysically neutral. Its advocates are committed to the world of ordinary facts and scientific data, and are indifferent to the life of the spirit. The Analysts are "covertly metaphysical" and "have definite metaphysical axes to grind." According to Walsh, the contrast between analysis and metaphysics is therefore, overdrawn, because there is no clear dividing line between the two activities, for metaphysicians necessarily engage in analysis while analytic philosophers tend to make covert metaphysical assumptions.

The anti-metaphysical arguments of the positivists are, therefore, made *in vacuo*, *i.e.*, without reference to any particular metaphysician. Like Don Quixote they were gratuitously fighting only a conjured opponent. The critics picked sentences at random in isolation from the context of the metaphysical treatises and showed them as meaningless. Therefore, the linguistic analysts are themselves guilty of overlooking that which they seek to pursue — clarifying concepts. This demands interpreting passages and propositions in their context to arrive at the right meaning intended by the author.

To view a metaphysician sympathetically and to endorse his standpoint are two different things. According to Walsh, a philosopher combines in him the qualities of a poet and a literary critic. Like the poet he has a vision, a vision of Reality. But he is more intellectual than the poet, in that like a literary critic, a philosopher throws new light on familiar facts and highlights their relation in a novel way. Since there is no knock-down proof in philosophy (as there is in the sciences), the method of evaluating a system of metaphysics is similar to that of evaluating works of art and literature, where we consider different interpretations, but the final judgment is subjective. Art and literature contains much that is fictitious. It is, therefore, inappropriate to judge them as right or wrong. They can be evaluated only as satisfactory or unsatisfactory or as adequate and inadequate.

Bearing these criteria in mind for evaluating a system of metaphysics, we may now apply these to Advaita and see how the term "immanent metaphysics" is justified in the case of Advaita.

III *Advaita as Immanent Metaphysics*

(1) *Metaphysical Assertions in Advaita*

Śaṅkara summarises the essence of the whole of his philosophy in half a verse:

“*brahma satyam jaganmithyā jīvo brahmaiva nāparaḥ*”

The verse asserts the following:

- (1) Brahman (*nirguṇa*) is the (sole) reality.
- (2) The world (*jagat*) is an illusion.
- (3) The soul (*jīva*) is non-different from Brahman.

In these explicit assertions, two other ideas are implicit.

- (4) *Māyā* is the cause of the world-illusion and also of the illusion that the *jīva* is different from Brahman.
- (5) So long as the *jīva* considers itself to be finite and different from Brahman, Brahman also, appears to it as with attributes (*saguṇa*), *i.e.* as *Īśvara*.

This verse has been widely misconstrued to arrive at the view that Advaita is a philosophy of Illusionism. The common misconception is that Advaita is other-worldly and world-negating. But this misunderstanding will cease to exist once the individual is clear about the standpoint from which Śaṅkara makes his proclamation.

In Advaita, there is a clear dichotomy between the empirical (*apāramārthika, vyāvahārika*) and the transcendental (*pāramārthika*). That the world is illusory or unreal (*mithyā*) is only for one who has transcended

duality and attained self-realisation (*ātma-jñāna*), and not for those wallowing in the physical world of senses. Therefore, the unrealised or ignorant man's (*ajñānin's*) assertion that the world is real, because it is perceived by the senses, reveals his own incomplete understanding of the subject rather than his assumed ingenuity. Advaita will be better appreciated if one remembers that Advaita does not deny that the world is presented and existent at the empirical level for one overcome by ignorance (*avidyā*). But the misconception that the world is absolutely real is false. Hence the reason why Vidyāraṇya tells that the world is real for the common man, a puzzle to the logician and non-existent for a seer.*

When we say *mithyā* or unreal, what we mean is that the physical world and all its phenomena — the sentient and the non-sentient, are not eternal or unsublatable like Brahman. According to Advaita, the Real (*sat*) is that which is unsublatable (*abādhita*) at all the three times, *trikāla* — past, present and future.


“*bādhyaṁānatvāt na sat*”

Similarly the non-real or illusory (*asat*) is that which cannot be perceived at all at any time, *e.g.* sky-lotus.

“*pratīyamānatvāt na asat*”

The physical phenomena are perceived by the senses. They are, therefore, not unreal (*asat*). But they are not unsublatable (*abādhita*), because they suffer temporary and permanent sublation in sleep and self-realisation respectively. Hence, the physical phenomena are different from both *sat* and *asat*, *i.e.* *sadasad-vilakṣaṇa*. It is, therefore, indescribable (*anirvacanīya*) as either *sat* or *asat*.

The categories of *sat* and *asat* are only mutually exclusive, but not collectively exhaustive. The Advaitin therefore, puts forward the dichotomous theory of Reality (*sattā-dvaividhya-vāda*) classifying all objects of knowledge into the ultimately Real (*pāramārthika*) and the illusory or the non-real (*apāramārthika*).




According to Advaita Brahman alone, of the nature of pure consciousness, is ultimately Real (*sat* or *pāramārthika*). The *apāramārthika* encompasses entities endowed with empirical reality (*vyāvahārika-sattā*), e.g. table, tree, etc. and those that possess phenomenal reality (*prātibhāsika-sattā*), e.g. “rope-snake”, “shell-silver”, “dream-lion”, etc.

Since the *apāramārthika* is subject to sublation (*bādha*), it is non-real (*asat*). Although illusory, it is assigned reality for the sake of courtesy (*upacāra*), because the non-real physical phenomena are presented to the senses. But the *vyāvahārika* is relatively more real than the *prātibhāsika* which has only momentary existence (*nimiṣa-kāla-sattā*), e.g. rope-“snake” — the “snake” exists only at that time, at that place and only for that individual. Its existence is, therefore, co-terminus with its perception. Unlike the *prātibhāsika*, empirical objects are more real, they are relatively more enduring in space and time (*dvaya-kāla-sattā*) and continue to be real until their permanent sublation at the time of self-realisation.

The terms "real" and "unreal" must not be confused or identified with the "useful" or the "non-useful" respectively, because there is no inconsistency or contradiction in something being unreal and useful or that which is "real" but not useful; *e.g.* a rubber replica of a snake can, although unreal, stimulate in the individual the same knowledge of a real snake and give rise to the consequent fear. "That which does not exist may be real, while that which does may not be so, for the real it is, impossible to exist."

According to Advaita, Brahman is the substratum (*adhiṣṭhāna*) on which all phenomena, sentient (*cit*) and non-sentient (*acit*), are superimposed. The *ajīva* includes the world (*jagat*) constituted of the five elements (*pañca-mahābhūtas*) and the elementals. The sentient phenomena can be distinguished into souls (*jīvas*) and God (*Īśvara*).



The *jīva* is Brahman or pure consciousness (*caitanya*, *cit*) with ignorance (*avidyā*) as its limiting adjunct (*upādhi*); *jīva* is *avidyā-viśiṣṭa-caitanya*. *Cit* which is the essence of the *jīva*, is limited by the body-mind-sense complex constituted of the five elements which are the evolutes of *māyā*. M. Hiriyanna aptly describes the *jīva* as "Brahman in empirical dress." *Īśvara* is Brah-

man or pure consciousness conditioned by *māyā*, i.e. *māyā-viśiṣṭa-caitanya*.

Advaita affirms that the *jīvas* and *Īśvara* are identical in essence with Brahman. Their identity with Brahman can be realised when their limiting adjuncts (*upādhis*) — *avidyā* and *māyā* — are dropped. What remains is pure consciousness, which can be called neither *jīva* nor *Īśvara*, but Brahman.

In Advaita, there is no inconsistency in holding a non-dualistic view of Reality and admitting the existence of a plurality of souls, all identical in essence with the supreme Reality; i.e. *ekātma-vāda* and *nānā-jīva-vāda*; because all diversity is due to the limiting adjuncts (*upādhis*) such as name (*nāma*) and form (*rūpa*) which are illusory (*mithyā*).

(2) *Metaphysical Arguments in Advaita*

The aim of metaphysical arguments, according to Walsh, is not to validate or invalidate a viewpoint but only to illustrate the adequacy or inadequacy of the concepts to the facts interpreted. The arguments justify the metaphysical views and show that they are not arbitrary and subjective.

To justify the metaphysical assertions and views stated so far, the synthetic philosophy of Advaita puts forward arguments — both objective and subjective to show the immanence of Brahman in all phenomena.

[A] *The Objective Approach*

According to Advaita, Brahman is existence (*sat*), knowledge (*cit*), bliss (*ānanda*), and infinite (*anantam*). The objective approach raises all phenomena to the

status of Brahman. It distinguishes Brahman from the five elements and the elemental modifications. Brahman is shown as immanent in every aspect of creation and that it is the ultimate Reality in all phenomena as their substratum.

Through the rope-“snake” analogy (*rajju-sarpa-nyāya*), Advaita explains the world of diversity perceived at the empirical level as an appearance (*vivarta*) of Brahman. According to Advaita, there can be no error (*bhrama*) without a substratum (*adhiṣṭhāna*), i.e. no *niradhiṣṭhāna bhrama*. What the rope is to the “snake”, Brahman is to the world. Brahman is the transfigurative material cause (*vivarta-upādāna-kāraṇa*) and *māyā* is the transformative material cause (*pariṇāmi-upādāna-kāraṇa*). All objects of the world are products of five elements. The *pañca-mahābhūtas* arise from the *tanmātras* which in turn are evolutes of Brahman conditioned by *māyā*. All empirical objects, therefore, display a combination of the characteristics of their cause. The five characteristics are existence (*asti*), luminosity (*bhāti*), desirability or lovability (*priyam*), name (*nāma*), and form (*rūpa*). Of these *asti*, *bhāti* and *priyam* belong to Brahman, but due to ignorance (*avidyā*) these are wrongly attributed to *māyā*; and *nāma-rūpa* constituting the nature of *māyā* are falsely superimposed on and predicated of Brahman. When all the varying and adventitious name and form are negated what remains is existence alone (*sanmātra*) which is common to all objects. *Sanmātra*, given in empirical experience, is no other than Brahman, the supreme Reality. The mediate knowledge that *sat* is the substratum of all entities does not divest objects of their pragmatic value.

[B] *The Subjective Approach*

The subjective approach undertakes an inquiry into the three states of experience (*avasthā-traya-vicāra*), and the five sheaths (*pañca-kośas*) which constitute the psycho-physical vesture of the self. The investigations reveal that the self is the eternal self-luminous witness to the three states of experience (*avasthā-traya-sākṣin*) and that it is different from the five sheaths (*pañca-kośa-vyatirikta*) or the three bodies (*deha-traya-vilakṣaṇa*) encasing the self. These inquiries show that Brahman is not transcendent but immanent in the individual as his very being and reality.

(i) *Avasthā-traya-vicāra*

Advaita analyses ordinary human experience at all levels to determine the real nature of the self. The three states of waking (*jāgrat*), dream (*svapna*) and deep sleep (*susupti*) encompass all human experience, and the reality of the objects perceived therein differ from one another. *Avasthā-traya-vicāra* shows that *cit* alone is ultimately real, that it is unattached (*asaṅga*), self-luminous (*svaprakāśa*) and different from the body, senses and mind, uninvolved in and unaffected by their activities, and which due to ignorance of the self's real nature, are falsely attributed to the self. The self as the eternal immutable witness (*sākṣī*) persists in all the three states and illumines their content.

The diversity perceived in the waking, dream and deep sleep states is born of ignorance of the self's true nature. The nature of being non-real and that of being perceived are common to objects of both these states.

Avasthā-traya-vicāra shows that while objects differ and are inconstant, the self alone persists in all the

three states as a witness (*avasthā-traya-sākṣī*), to the presence and absence of objects. The real nature of the self is obscured due to ignorance. The eternal is confused with the ephemeral, the self with the not-self and the phenomenal with the noumenal.

(ii) *Pañca-kośa-vicāra*

Although the essential nature of Brahman is *sat*, *cit* and *ānanda*, it is ordinarily not known so, because it is enshrined in the case of the five sheaths (*pañca-kośas*). The self can be realised only when the sheaths which are the evolutes of ignorance, veiling the self are negated. Through the method of co-presence (*anvaya*) and co-absence (*vyatireka*), the self is distinguished from the five sheaths forming the psycho-physical vesture or the "empirical dress" of the self.

The five sheaths are: (i) The *annamayakośa* which is the grossest of all sheaths. It is the physical body made of food. (ii) The *prāṇamaya-kośa* or the sheath of the vital airs energises the body. (iii) The *manomaya-kośa* is the sheath of the mind. (iv) The *vijñānamaya-kośa* is the sheath of the intellect endowed with the power of cognition. (v) The *ānandamaya-kośa* is the sheath of enjoyment enveloped in ignorance. The last one is the subtlest of all the five sheaths. The five sheaths telescope into one another, and that which is within assumes the form of that which is without, like mercury poured into a crucible. But the *Ātman* is not the physical body made of food nor the psychical self with its volitional, emotional and cognitional activities, it is not even the bliss of sleep which is an evolute of ignorance.

The self is, thus, shown as different from and beyond the five sheaths which are the source of suffer-

ing (*duḥkha*), inert (*jaḍa*), unreal (*anṛta*) and pluralistic (*dvaita*). These obscure the self which is bliss (*ānanda*), *cit. sat* and secondless (*advitīya*).

Although the self is different from, and cannot be identified with, any of the five sheaths, yet, at the empirical level they are illicitly superimposed on the self due to ignorance, thus leading to the problem of false identification (*adhyāsa*). The five sheaths can be grouped into three bodies — the gross physical, the subtle psychical, and the causal bodies.

The gross physical body (*sthūla-deha*) is constituted of the *annamaya-kośa*. The subtle psychical body (*sūkṣma-deha*) consists of the *prāṇamaya-*, *manomaya-*, and *viññānamaya-kośas*. The *ānandamaya-kośa* constitutes the causal body (*kāraṇa-śarīra*).

The gross body is sublated in dream and sleep. The mind which is active in the dream state suffers sublation in deep sleep (*susupti*). The causal body (*avidyā*) which is the object of sleep is sublated forever in the state of absorption (*samādhi*). While the self is co-present with all the three bodies in all the three states, the three bodies are not co-present with the self. The self cannot be contradicted by any experience because it is the very nature of him who contradicts it. The self is the basis of all experience. It is not an object of knowledge because it is the cognising subject of all cognitions and experiences, and there is nothing other than it to know it. It is the self-luminous experience itself. Being self-effulgent like a burning lamp it illumines not only other objects but also itself, but it cannot be likewise revealed by anything else (*avedyatve sati sarva-itara-avabhāsakatvaṃ svaprakāśatvaṃ*). Speech

and mind fail to comprehend Brahman. The self which is the ever-auspicious witness, is different from the enjoyed object, the enjoyer and the enjoyment of the three states of experience. The self which realises itself as distinct from the three bodies or the five sheaths goes beyond sorrow and overcomes transmigration.

Walsh cites scope and adequacy as criteria to some extent for evaluating a system of metaphysics. We have to first check — (a) whether the metaphysical system covers all facts of experience; and (b) whether the facts are adequately discussed or not.

(3) *Scope and Adequacy*

Advaita comprehends all “facts” of experience and the highest experience itself as a fact under a very simple dichotomous classification.

(a) The self (*Ātman*) or not-this (*anidam*) which is of the nature of pure consciousness in the subject.

(b) The not-self (*anātman*) or not-this (*anidam*) comprising all entities gross and subtle, perceived in the psycho-physical realms and which constitute the objects experienced in the three states of experience by any ordinary normal human being in daily life. The *anātman* includes the entire world of objects reached through the six means of knowing, *i.e.* the five elements and their evolutes consisting of the sense-mind-body complex of the souls and varied objects of the empirical world.

According to T. M. P. Mahadevan, most philosophical systems, both realistic and idealistic take into account only the waking experience. Dream experi-

ence is rejected as incapable of yielding any metaphysical knowledge. The deep sleep state is not even acknowledged due to cessation of consciousness — it is dismissed as having no connection with metaphysics.*

But the method of Advaita takes life as a whole for consideration and all its expressions are studied. The scope of the inquiry into the three states of experience is comprehensive. The waking state experience covers valid as well as invalid erroneous cognitions. The analysis of the dream state accounts for objects perceived in dream and serves as an analogy to illustrate that the gross external world (created by God) perceived in the waking state is ultimately non-real like the fictitious subtle internal psychical realm conjured by the soul. In the state of bondage, the deep sleep experience affords a passing insight into the existential (*sat*), luminous (*cit*), blissful (*ānanda*) and unattached (*asaṅga*) nature of the self which is to be permanently experienced in the state of liberation (*mokṣa*).

Śaṅkara starts from the world of experienced facts, analyses it critically through reason and logic to arrive at the undeniable logical presupposition of all experiences — the self. His main concern is to establish the reality of Brahman by exposing the unreal nature of the *anātman* superimposed on the *Ātman*.

(4) *Comparison with a Poet and a Critic*

In the case of Śaṅkara, the mystic-philosopher-poet, the vision is one of the identity of the soul with Brahman (*jīva-brahma-aikya*), which is to be realised through the sublation of the non-real psycho-physical realms of the *vyāvahārika* by the immediate experience of the *pāramārthika*.

Like a literary critic, a metaphysician throws new light on familiar facts and reveals their inter-relation. He thereby helps us discover a new significance in them. Similarly, Advaita too is characterised by novelty (*apūrvatā, anadhigata*). The novelty lies in making the soul realise that it is not a limited reality characterised by finitude, but is in essence the supreme Brahman.

Through the *mahāvākyas*, Advaita reveals the true nature of the self which has remained ensnared by the world due to ignorance down infinite births and enables the soul to enjoy its own blissful nature in *mokṣa*. Nothing new is attained in liberation; it is only a negation of the adventitious and the illusory to grasp what is abiding and eternal. The threefold distinction of the experiencer, the experienced and the experience merge into a harmonious whole. "All plurality vanishes for the realised soul" (*jñāte dvaitam na vidyate*) says Gauḍapāda in his *Māṇḍūkya-kārikā*. There is no more return (*punarāvṛtti*) for him, who is emancipated from the fetters of endless transmigration (*samsāra*).

According to N. V. Banerjee, the concepts of *māyā, Īśvara* and *vivarta* together serve a dual purpose — (1) they present traditional religion in a new perspective, and (2) restore to the world its due reality.'

Advaita shows that the ultimate Reality is not transcendent nor does it exist in some hypostatised heaven, but it is immanent in the *jīva* constituting its very reality. The world of variety wrongly believed to be real out of ignorance of the self's true nature, is exposed as ultimately non-real. By highlighting the worthlessness of revelling in the empirical world, Śaṅkara awakens the confounded soul to a higher realm

of Truth in oneself. Advaita implants in the soul a desire for attaining the supreme self which is most immediate (*pratyak*) and certain (*niścaya*) than anything else in the world. It is a complete and comprehensive philosophical system with its centre fixed at the view of the ultimate Reality as one without a second (*ekam eva advitīyam*).

In evaluating the worth of a literary critic we look out for depth, penetration, insight, etc. The critic's arguments are revelatory rather than logically true. The metaphysician first clarifies his principles of interpretation and then applies them to interpret facts to yield genuine knowledge. The arguments "only incline" "but do not necessitate."¹⁰ Therefore, metaphysics cannot be judged as true or false, but only as "illuminating or the reverse" or "authentic or spurious."¹¹

When objective proof or agreed answers are not possible, we have to "make up our own minds as best as we can, on such evidence and with such knowledge as we can come by."¹² Due to lack of knock-down proof, judgments are semi-subjective. We consider different views, but the final judgment is personal. Although the Truth of Advaita is not verifiable objectively, yet, it can be experienced immediately and subjectively. All that needs to be done is to make the senses and the mind inward-turned to intuit the self within.

Vedānta is a compilation of the discoveries made by the ancient seers in the realm of the spirit. The Vedic declarations initiate a seeker of truth into the mysteries of the mystic intuitive experience. Just as a

research worker in the sphere of physical science takes into consideration the contributions made by previous investigators, so too in the realm of the supersensible the seeker takes into account the revelations and intuitive experience of the self-realised sages. The seeker trusts the *Vedas*, just as students of science believe the scientific theories. In Advaita, the final test is experience, just as facts certify a theory of science. Śaṅkara affirms that the goal of all philosophical inquiry is experience (*anubhava*). The mediate knowledge of the *Vedas* (*parokṣa jñāna*) is transformed into immediate knowledge (*aparokṣa jñāna*) in self-realisation. As Mahadevan says, the faith in the *Vedas* has only a methodological value, its aim is to enable the seeker experience Brahman. Revelation consummates in self-realisation. The *jñānin* who delights in *brahmānanda* need not depend on any external authority in the form of *śruti* or subscribe to a formal dogma. His wisdom is self-revealed and self-certifying. To him the *Vedas* are no *Veda* (*vedāḥ avedāḥ*).¹³

(5) *Analysis in Advaita*

Indian philosophy has developed through the commentarial tradition. This involves clarifying concepts and refuting rival views of other philosophers. The six schools of Indian philosophy are not mere faiths necessitating naive belief, but are philosophical systems as well. These schools were contemporaries. Although their source — the *Vedas*, was common to all of them, yet, each differed from the other in the meaning drawn from philosophical treatises. The concepts of the self, of the world, of God, of bondage, of liberation, etc. are the same, but the conception of the nature of these and their inter-relation is interpreted differently by

each school. Through analysis, the philosopher clarifies his own concepts, defends his system and fortifies it against rival attacks. He also refutes rival theories by exposing their limitations and inconsistencies. All this is achieved through dialectics. Much of this verbal warfare may appear to be mere quibbles to an individual who is sceptical about philosophical pursuits. But it nevertheless reveals, says Mahadevan, the intellectual virility and subtle argumentative skill of the Hindu philosophers. In the *Citsukhī*, the *Advaita-siddhi* and the *Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khāḍya*, "logical skill and dialectical subtlety attain heights scarcely reached by the most profound treatises of this kind in the West."¹⁴

The interpretation of the *mahāvākya*, "*tat tvam asi*", for the purpose of arriving at *jīva-brahma-aikya* involves the four conditions for significant combination, the six principles of interpretation (*ṣaṭ-tātparya-liṅga*), primary and secondary meanings of words, classification of sentences into relational and identity judgments, and the different stages in the interpretation of the *mahāvākyas*.

Reason and revelation are not opposed to one another. Just because revelation evades reasoning, it is improper to term it as irrational. Intuition includes the intellect and transcends it. "It is not alogical but supra-logical."¹⁵ Advaita synthesises the head and the heart. It is not barren intellectualism nor mere mysticism. According to S. Radhakrishnan, "Advaita is a system of great speculative, daring and logical subtlety. Its austere intellectualism, its remorseless logic, which marches on indifferent to the hopes and beliefs of man, its relative freedom from theological obsessions, make it a great example of purely philosophical scheme."¹⁶

NOTES

1. W. H. Walsh, *Metaphysics*, p. 15.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 44.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 46.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 192.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 193.
6. *Pañcadaśi* of Vidyāraṇya, VI, 130.
7. S. Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. II, p. 527.
8. T. M. P. Mahadevan, *Gauḍapāda*, pp. 95-96.
9. N. V. Banerjee, *The Spirit of Indian Philosophy*.
10. W. H. Walsh, *Metaphysics*, p. 183.
11. *Idid.*
12. *Ibid.*, p. 179.
13. *Bṛhadāranyaka Upaniṣad*, IV, 3, 22.
14. S. Chatterjee and D. M. Datta, *An Introduction to Indian Philosophy*, p. 375.
15. T. M. P. Mahadevan, *Gauḍapāda*, p. 3.
16. S. Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. II, p. 445.

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THE TAITTIRĪYOPANIṢADBHĀṢYA
OF ŚRĪ ŚAṆKARA

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It is impossible, according to Śaṅkara to state directly what Brahman is. Since Brahman is one and non-dual, free from difference of every kind, it can only be conveyed by the well-known method of superimposition (*adhyāropa*) and subsequent denial (*apavāda*). Śaṅkara says that this is the traditional method of teaching Brahman, which is trans-phenomenal (*niṣ-prapañca*).²¹ Brahman is first spoken of as the cause of creation, maintenance, and dissolution of the world, as endowed with attributes, etc. Since the ultimate reality is one and non-dual, without parts, immutable, and tranquil, the categories of understanding such as cause-effect relation, substance-attribute relation, whole-part relation, etc., cannot be applied to it. It can only be stated indirectly by eliminating the superimposed attributes through a process of "not this", "not this."²² Śaṅkara writes: "When we wish to describe its true nature, free from all differences due to limiting adjuncts, then it is an utter impossibility. Then there is only one way left, *viz.* to describe it as 'not this', 'not this', by eliminating all possible specifications of it that one may know of."²³ Even the definition of Brahman as "real, knowledge, and infinite" should not be understood as expressing the nature of Brahman directly. It seeks to convey indirectly that Brahman is other than the unreal, the insentient, and the finite.²⁴ Because of the inherent limitation of words to denote Brahman, *śruti* says that words along with the mind return without comprehending Brahman.²⁵

Considering the built-in limitation of words to express what is inexpressible, we could now specify the sense in which Scripture must be understood as the means of knowing Brahman. When it is said that

Brahman can be known only through the *Upaniṣad*, it does not mean that the *Upaniṣad* will intimate Brahman as such-and-such. This is an utter impossibility even for *śruti*. For one thing, Brahman is not an object of knowledge like a table or a tree to be made known by a means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*). There is yet another difficulty. Brahman-Ātman which is of the nature of consciousness is presupposed by all means of knowledge in the discharge of their work. A *pramāṇa* can do its work only because of the help it receives from the Self, the intelligent principle. What is presupposed by a means of knowledge can never be established by it. Further, as stated earlier, Brahman cannot be expressed by any word, not even by the word "Being" (*sat*).¹⁰ A word can denote a thing if that object is associated with a genus or an act or a quality or a relation. Brahman does not belong to any genus, and so it cannot be denoted by such words as *sat*. Since it is immutable, it cannot be expressed by a word implying an act. Being devoid of attributes, it cannot be indicated by a word implying a quality. Since it is one and non-dual, it is not related to anything; and so it cannot be denoted by a word expressing a relation. In short, Brahman cannot be expressed by *śabda*. Why is it, then, that Scripture is accepted as the means of knowing Brahman? The aim of Scripture, says Śaṅkara, is to help us discard all distinctions illusorily superimposed on Brahman due to *avidyā*. Scripture does not purport to present Brahman as this or that object; its purport is rather to show that Brahman as the eternal subject is never an object, and thereby to remove the distinctions such as the object known, the knower, etc., fictitiously created by *avidyā*.¹¹ Since Brahman-Ātman is mistaken for the not-Self,

Scripture reveals it by eliminating the five sheaths, which are not-Self, set up by *avidyā*.³³

The non-dualism of Śaṅkara is based on the authority of the Upaniṣads. Śaṅkara does not hesitate to reject any view that is opposed to the central teaching of the Upaniṣads. That Brahman is identical with the Self, that the Self being trans-phenomenal is free from the attributes of transmigratory existence such as sorrow and fear, and that these attributes are ascribed to the Self due to *avidyā*, constitute the central teaching of the Upaniṣads. It may be objected that the teaching of the Upaniṣads as expounded by Śaṅkara goes against the Vaiśeṣika of Kaṇāda, the Sāṅkhya of Kapila, and other schools. Śaṅkara holds that the teachings of these schools have to be rejected as erroneous for two important reasons. Not only are they not based on the *Upaniṣad*, but they are also opposed to its teaching.³⁴ Taking his stand on *śruti*, Śaṅkara makes use of reasoning (*upapatti*) in order to show that the teaching of Scripture also meets the demands of reason. That is why he says that the trans-phenomenal nature of the Self is established by Scripture as well as by reasoning.³⁵ Reasoning (*tarka*) which is not opposed to *śruti* must be pressed into service as a supplement thereto, according to Śaṅkara, for ascertaining its purport.³⁶ Since Brahman-inquiry must finally result in Brahman-intuition, intuition or experience (*anubhava*) is the consummation of the study of, and the inquiry into, the *Vedānta*. Only when Brahman-knowledge culminates in experience, it removes ignorance and thereby is the means to release.³⁷ Śaṅkara's commentary on the tenth section of the *Śikṣāvallī*, which refers to Brahman-intuition attained by

the sage Trisāṅku, is relevant in this context. The entire *mantra* of this section, according to Śaṅkara, is the statement of Trisāṅku after his realization of the unity of the Self for expressing the fact that he had reached, just like Vāmadeva, the goal of all desires.

If the non-dual Brahman-Ātman appears as the world of name and form, it is due to the principle called *avidyā*, which is referred to by different names such as *avyakta*, *māyā*, *prakṛti*, etc.³⁷ *Avidyā* is beginningless (*anādi*), indeterminable (*anirvacanīya*), and of the nature of an existent (*bhāvarūpa*). It has two powers — the power of concealment (*āvaraṇa*) and the power of projection (*vikṣepa*). It not only suppresses the true, but also suggests the false.

Śaṅkara brings out the twofold work of *avidyā* in several places in his commentary on the *Taittirīyopaniṣad*. It is the very nature of *avidyā* to conceal Brahman-Ātman which is of the nature of knowledge, and so he speaks of knowledge being screened by ignorance (*avidyayā-tiraskriyamāṇe vijñāṇe*).³⁸ Concealing the nature of the Self, *avidyā*, says Śaṅkara, sets up the fivefold sheath (*avidyākṛta-pañcakośa*).³⁹ If the ultimate reality is one and non-dual, duality is what is conjured up by ignorance (*avidyā-parikalpitasya dvaitasya*).⁴⁰ In another place Śaṅkara says that the elements beginning with ether are the creation of ignorance (*ākāśādibhūtārabdhair-avidyākṛtam*).⁴¹ The subject-object distinction is also caused by (*avidyākṛteviśaya-viśayi vibhāge*).⁴² Dream and waking states, Śaṅkara says, are also creations of ignorance (*avidyākṛtatvāt jāgratsvapnayoḥ*).⁴³ It will be obvious from the way in which Śaṅkara describes the work of *avidyā* that he takes it, not as a negative entity (*abhāvarūpa*) in the sense of absence or

non-existence of knowledge (*jñānābhāva*), but as an existent, something positive (*bhāvarūpa*). Though it is an existent, it is not real, according to Śaṅkara. Brahman alone is; Brahman alone is real. Since there is nothing different from Brahman, *avidyā* is not real to be reckoned as a second entity in addition to, and thereby to delimit, Brahman. The truth is that, though from the relative, empirical standpoint we are compelled to speak of *avidyā-māyā*, from the standpoint of Brahman, there is no such thing as *avidyā-māyā*. That is why Śaṅkara says that “*māyā* is that which does not exist,” and that “it is the name of the non-existent.”“

Śaṅkara reconciles the truth of non-duality as taught by the *Upaniṣads* with the appearance of duality involved in all our business of life by assigning them to two different spheres—the absolute (*pāramārthika*) and the relative (*vyāvahārika*). Though the truth is that the non-dual Brahman alone is, we have to admit the knower-known, the teacher-taught and other distinctions, the Scriptural texts which speak about them different sources of knowledge such as perception, the fact of bondage, and the Scriptural injunctions and prohibitions, so long as the non-dual Brahman is not realized; and the entire duality vanishes into thin air the moment one attains the saving knowledge of the non-dual reality. On the basis of the distinction between the two standpoints mentioned above, it is very often said that Śaṅkara advocates the “double-decker theory of reality”“ — reality as absolute and reality as empirical. The expression “double-decker” is misleading as it suggests that both the deckers or the standpoints are true to the same person simultaneously. Śaṅkara’s position is quite different from this. He does

not maintain that there is no conflict between non-duality and duality by admitting simultaneously the equal validity of both from the standpoint of one and the same person. A person who is involved in duality is assuredly under the spell of ignorance, and such a person has no Brahman-intuition. To one who has attained Brahman-intuition, there is no duality. That is why Śaṅkara says: "The highest Self in so far as it is limited by its adjuncts, *viz.* the body, the senses, and the mind, is, by the ignorant, spoken of as if it were embodied. With regard to this (unreal limitation of the one Self) the distinction of objects of activity and of agents may be practically assumed, as long as we have not realized that the Self is one only from the text, 'That art thou.' As soon, however, as we realize the truth that there is only one universal Self, there is an end to the whole practical view of the world with its distinction of bondage, final release, and the like."⁴ Commenting upon the statement of Gauḍapāda, *viz.* "This explanation is for the purpose of teaching. Duality ceases to exist when the highest truth is known," Śaṅkara observes: "The ideas of teacher, taught, and Scripture are for the purpose of teaching, and these are true till one realizes the highest truth. But duality does not exist when one, as a result of the teaching, attains knowledge, *i.e.* realizes the highest reality."⁵ Śaṅkara employs here the logic of disjunction. It is a case of *either or* and not of *both and*. Either one is involved at the relative level of duality based on ignorance, or one realizes the non-dual reality as the absolute truth.

Śaṅkara adopts the same point of view in his commentary on the *Taittirīyopaniṣad*. Reference may

be made to two passages here. Speaking of the spiritual aspirant who gets fearless stability in Brahman, he writes: "Since he does not see diversity that is the creation of ignorance and is the cause of fear, he becomes established in fearlessness. When he becomes established in his true nature, then he does not see anything else, does not know anything else."¹⁰ This passage refers to the state of knowledge, which is the standpoint of the Absolute. Referring to the state of ignorance where there is duality, he says: "In the state of ignorance, the ignorant man sees in this Self something, presented by ignorance, like the vision of a second moon seen by a man suffering from the eye disease called *timira*,"¹¹ and perceiving difference due to ignorance, he is overcome by fear.

To Śaṅkara, the strength of Advaita is the strength of its non-dualism based on the authority of the *Vedas*. Śaṅkara makes this point clear in the course of a discussion initiated by him on the problem: "Who is he that knows thus, and how does he attain (Brahman)? Is the attainer different from, or the same as, the supreme Self?" The opponent puts it to Śaṅkara that the discussion of this problem is useless, and that the latter cannot establish his point by ascertaining the meaning of Scripture.¹² The discussion at this stage proceeds as follows.

Śaṅkara: What! Is there a Vedic commandment that the point shall not be established?

Opponent: No.

Śaṅkara: Why then (do you say that I cannot establish the point)?

Opponent: Because there are many opponents. You are a monist, since you follow the Vedic teaching. But many, indeed, are the pluralists who are outside the Vedic pale and who are opposed to your point.

Śaṅkara: This itself is a benediction to me that you brand me a monist surrounded by many who are pluralists. Therefore I shall conquer all; and I shall now commence the discussion.

Three points emerge from this discussion: (1) Non-dualism is the central teaching of the *Vedas*. (2) Those who advocate pluralism in any form go outside the authority of the *Vedas*. (3) A philosophical position cannot be considered to be sound just because the number of its votaries is legion. While Advaita is based on the secure and solid foundations of the *Vedas*, pluralism, in whatever way it is formulated, is untenable, since it is not based on, and supported by, the *Vedas*.

Śaṅkara at times introduces in his commentary, either at the beginning, or at the end, or in the middle of a section, as the occasion demands, lengthy discussions on problems raised by the scriptural text for the sake of the clarification of the issues. There are such lengthy discussions in five places in his commentary on the *Taittirīyopaniṣad*, and in three of them he begins the discussion in his own characteristic style with a stress on inquiry (*cintana*).⁵¹

In the first of these, which occurs as an introduction to the first section of the *Śikṣāvallī*, Śaṅkara says that release (*mokṣa*) cannot be attained by means of ritual action (*karma*). His argument is that whatever is produced is impermanent and that, since release

which is of the nature of the Self is eternal, ritual action is not a means thereto.⁵² Release is positive, and so it is no argument to say that, though produced by *karma*, it can be eternal like *pradhvaṁsābhāva* which is said to have a beginning, but no end.⁵³ Śaṅkara says: "Release consists in remaining in one's own Self on the cessation of the material cause, *viz.* ignorance (and desire) on account of which one resorts to *karma*. The Self, as such, is Brahman, and the knowledge of Brahman leads to the removal of ignorance."⁵⁴

The main aim of the discussion which occurs at the end of the eleventh section of the *Śikṣāvallī* is to ascertain whether release can be attained by *karma* alone, or by *karma* aided by knowledge, or by *karma* and knowledge in combination, or by knowledge aided by *karma*, or by knowledge alone. By showing the untenability of the first four alternatives, Śaṅkara maintains that release can be attained by knowledge alone. What is produced by *karma* is perishable; and since release, as stated earlier, is eternal, *karma* cannot be a means thereto. The futility of *karma* cannot be overcome by bringing in knowledge as an aid to it. Śaṅkara declares that what is eternal cannot be produced even if there are one hundred scriptural texts to the contrary.⁵⁵ Nor can it be said that release can be attained by the combination of knowledge and ritual action. Śaṅkara rules out this possibility first on the ground that the result of *karma* is different from that of knowledge. *Karma* is required for the origination, purification, transformation, or attainment of something. But release is not any of these to be accomplished by *karma*. Further, the combination of knowledge and *karma* is not possible because of their mutual

opposition. "Knowledge which relates to the reality wherein agency and other factors are absent is opposed to *karma* which can only be brought about by accessories which are opposed to knowledge."⁵⁶ The fourth alternative also has to be ruled out in view of the mutual opposition between *karma* and knowledge. Śaṅkara, therefore, concludes that release can be attained by knowledge alone.

The discussion which occurs in the sixth section of the *Brahmavallī* is concerned about the meaning of the entry text (*praveśa-śruti*). "Having created that, into that very world It (Brahman) entered." After considering the various possibilities by which one may try to understand the meaning of this text, the opponent concludes that this text has to be ignored as it does not convey any meaning. Śaṅkara argues that this text purports to convey the knowledge of Brahman, which is the central theme of the chapter, through an account of the creation of ether, etc. The entry of the Self into the cavity of the intellect has been stated with a view to show that the association of the Self with the internal organ causes the knowledge of Brahman, because the internal organ which is proximate to the Self has the power of illumination.⁵⁷

Advaita which maintains that Brahman, the ultimate reality, is non-dual and that one attains release by Brahman-knowledge has to clarify certain issues such as "Who is the knower of Brahman? How does he attain Brahman? Is the attainer different from, or the same as, the supreme Brahman?" There are critics who urge that, since the attainer is different from the attained, the thesis of non-dualism is untenable. They also urge that, in order to make the term "attainment"

meaningful in the literal sense, the Advaitin must accept duality between the attainer and the attained. The discussion which occurs in the eighth section of the *Brahmavallī* focusses its attention on these issues. The substance of Śaṅkara's argument may be stated as follows. It is the *jīva* that is the knower of Brahman. On the authority of the aphoristic statement, "The knower of Brahman attains the highest," it has to be said that one attains the highest Brahman through knowledge. Since the *jīva* in its essential nature is identical with Brahman, the attainer and the attained are not different, and so there is no danger to the thesis of non-dualism. It is well-known that knowledge removes ignorance. Since knowledge alone is prescribed as the means of attaining Brahman,³ it follows that the non-attainment of Brahman is because of ignorance and that its attainment is through knowledge. In short, the *jīva* due to ignorance identifies itself with the body, the vital force, the mind, etc., which are not-Self, and through knowledge it distinguishes the Self from the not-Self, and remains as Brahman.⁴ If the *jīva* were really different from Brahman, it cannot become or remain as Brahman through knowledge. Under the circumstances, the attainment of Brahman by the *jīva* should not be understood in the literal sense of the acquisition of something new not already attained. The word "attainment" here means, according to Śaṅkara, knowledge or realization alone.⁵

The last of the discussions occurs in the concluding section of the *Bhṛguvallī*. Śaṅkara emphasises here that, though the Self is free from worldly existence involving the relation of enjoyment and enjoyership, it is nevertheless ascribed to the Self through igno-

rance¹¹ and that, since the *jīva* in its essential nature is identical with Brahman, sorrow, fear, and other characteristics of transmigratory existence do not really belong to it.¹²

Like his other commentaries, Śaṅkara's *Taittirīyopaniṣad bhāṣya* is both lucid and profound (*prasanna-gambhīra*). Śaṅkara sets forth the central teaching of Advaita within the framework of Scripture, supporting Scripture by reasoning. While reasoning is guided by Scripture, Scripture in its turn is ably supported by reasoning. Śaṅkara makes full use of flawless reasoning in support of his exegesis of Scripture and thereby shows that the teaching of Scripture meets the demands of reason. He is neither dogmatic in his exposition of Scripture nor does he indulge in dry reasoning. He shows that the teaching of creation, the principle of cause-effect relation, the inquiry into the five sheaths, the analysis of waking, dream, and deep sleep experience, the study of the calculus of pleasure and the analysis of the subject-object epistemology reinforce the truth of non-duality, which constitutes the central teaching of Scripture. Citing passages from *smṛti* and *itihāsa*,¹³ which are considered to be secondary Scripture, Śaṅkara shows that his teaching is not only based on *śruti*, but is also in harmony with other Scriptural authorities such as *smṛti* and *itihāsa*. To Śaṅkara, the truth known from Scripture and corroborated by reasoning must finally consummate in plenary experience (*anubhava*). The joy that results from such experience as evidenced in the case of Vāmadeva and Triśaṅku knows no bounds; the effulgence which a realized person radiates is ever-shining like that of the sun;¹⁴ and to attain the plenary experience through the grace of the

teacher and the teaching of Scripture is, indeed, the greatest wonder. Śaṅkara sets forth the teaching of Advaita with devotion to Scripture, respect for reasoning, and the finality of plenary experience. He is unsurpassed in facility of style and magnificence of diction, profundity of thought and richness of imagery; and his writings, which are quite numerous, exhibit a remarkable consistency throughout. There is nothing in Śaṅkara of the ephemeral and the parochial; the midrib of his philosophy is eternal and universal.

NOTES

25. See Śaṅkara's commentary on the *Bhagavadgītā*, XIII, 13: "tathā hi sampradāyavidām vacanam adhyāropā-pavādābhyām niṣprapañcam prapañcyate."

26. See *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣadbhāṣya* (BUB), IV, iv, 5.

27. See BUB, II, iii 6.

28. TUB, II, 1.

29. *Ibid.*, II, 9.

30. *Gītā* XIII, 12.

31. Śaṅkara's *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* (SBSB), I, i, 4:

"avidyākālpita-bheda-nivṛttiparatvāt śāstrasya, na hi śāstramīdamtayā viṣayabhūtam brahma pratipipādayiṣati. kim tarhi? pratyagātmatvena aviṣayatayā pratipādayad-avidyā-kālpitam vedya-veditṛ-vedanādibhedamapanayati."

32. TUB, II, 2:

"annamayādibhya ānandamayāntebhya ātmabhyaḥ abhyantaratamam brahma-vidyayā pratyagātmatvena didarśayiṣu śāstram avidyākṛtapañcakośa-apanayanena..."

33. *Ibid.*, III, 10:

"kāpila-kāṇādādi-tarkaśāstrāvirodha iti cet, na; tēṣām mulābhāve vedāvirodhe ca bhrāntatvopapatteḥ."

34. *Ibid.*, III, 10:
 “śrutypapattibhyaṃ ca siddham ātmano'saṃsā-
 ritvam.”
35. *SBSB*, I, i, 2:
 “śrutyaiva ca sahāyatvena tarkasya abhyupeatvāt.”
36. *Ibid.*, II, i, 4:
 “anubhavāvasānam ca brahmavijñānam avidyāyā
 nivartakam, mokṣasādhanam ca, dṛṣṭaphalatayā iṣyate.”
37. *SBSB*, I, iv, 3.
 See also Śaṅkara's *Bhagavadgītābhāṣya*, V, 14.
38. *TUB*, II, 8. See *Gītā*, V, 15:
 “ajñānenāvṛtam jñānam tena muhyanti jantavaḥ.”
39. *TUB*, II, 2.
40. *Ibid.*, II, 5.
41. *Ibid.*, II, 3.
42. *Ibid.*, II, 8.
43. *Ibid.*, II, 8.
44. See Śaṅkara's commentary on the *Māṇḍūkya-kārikā*.
 IV, 58: “sā ca māyā na vidyate, māyetyavidyamānasyā-
 khyā.”
45. See Ninian Smart, *The Yogi and the Devotee* (London:
 George Allen & Unwin, 1968), p. 37 for the use of the
 expression “double-decker theory”.
46. *SBSB*, I, ii, 6.
47. Śaṅkara's commentary on the *Māṇḍūkya-kārikā*,
 I, 18.
48. *TUB*, II, 7:
 “atha tadā saḥ tasmin-nānātvasya bhayahetor-
 avidyākṛtasyādarśanāt abhayaṃ gato bhavati. svarūpapra-
 tiṣṭho hyasau yadā bhavati, tadā nānyat paśyati, nānyacchr-
 noti, nānyadvijānāti.”

49. *Ibid.*, II, 7:

“yadā punaravidyāvasthāyām hi yasmāt eṣaḥ
avidyāvān avidyayā pratyupasthāpitaṁ vastu taimirika-
dvtīyacandravat paśyati, ātmani ca etasmin brahmaṇi...
bhedadarśanemeva hi bhayakāraṇam.”

50. *Ibid.*, II, 8.

51. *Ibid.*, I, 11:

“atraitaccintyate vidyākarmaṇor-vivekārtham.”

Ibid., II, 6:

“tatra itaccintyam — katham anuprāviśaditi.”

Ibid., II, 8:

“tatra itaccintyam — ko’yamevaṁ vit katham vā
saṅkrāmatīti...”

52. *Ibid.*, I, 1.

“na hi nityaṁ kiñcidārabhyate loke, yadārabdham
tadanityamīti; ato na karmārabhyo mokṣaḥ.”

53. *Ibid.*:

“pradhvaṁsābhāvavannityo’pi mokṣa ārabhyata
eveti cet, na, mokṣasya bhāvarūpatvāt.”

54. *Ibid.*, I, 1.

55. *Ibid.*, I, 11:

“na hi vacanaśatenāpi nityamārabhyate, ārabdham
vā avināśi bhavet.”

56. *Ibid.*:

“pravilina-kartrādi-kāraka-viśeṣa-tattvaviṣayā hi
vidyātadviparīta-kāraḥ sādhyena karmaṇā virudhyate.”

57. *Ibid.*, II, 6:

“evamantaḥkaraṇa-guhātma-sambandho brahmaṇa
upalabdhihetuḥ, sannikarṣāt, avabhāsātmakatvācca antaḥ-
karaṇasya.”

58. *Ibid.*, II, 8:

“vidyāmātropadeśāt; vidyāyāśca dṛṣṭam kārya avidyānivṛttih; tacceha vidyāmātram ātmaprāptau sādhanamupadiśyate.”

59. *Ibid.*,

“yā hi brahmavidyayā svātmaprāptirupadiśyate sā avidyākṛtasya annādiviśeṣātmanah ātmatvenādhyāropitasya anātmanah apohārthā.”

60. *Ibid.*:

“tasmāt na prāptih saṅkramaṇam...jñānamātram ca saṅkramaṇam-upapadyate.”

61. *Ibid.*, III, 10:

“kāryaviśaya eva bhogyabhokṛtvakṛtaḥ saṁsāraḥ, na tvātmanīti.”

62. *Ibid.*:

“trāsāderduḥkhasya ca upalabhyamānatvāt nopalabdhr̥dharmatvam.”

63. Śaṅkara quotes from the *Manusmṛti* in three places in his *TUB* — once in his commentary on I, 1 and twice in his commentary on I, 11. He quotes from the *Mahābhārata* twice — once in his commentary on I, 4 and again on III, 1. He also quotes from the *Āpastambadharmasūtra* in his commentary on I, 11.

64. Commenting on the text “*suvarṇajyotiḥ*”, Śaṅkara says:

“āditya iva sakṛt-vibhātam asmadiyam jyotīrjyotiḥ, prakāśa ityarthah.” (*TUB*, III, 10)

THE NIRVĀṆAṢAṬKAM*

Śrī Śaṅkara Bhagavatpāda

Introduction

The *Nirvāṇaṣaṭkam* also known as the *Nirvāṇa-pañcakam* or *Ātmabhujāṅgam* or *Ātmaṣaṭkam* is one of the minor philosophical poems (*prakaraṇas*) of Śrī Śaṅkara Bhagavatpāda. It consists of six verses composed in the metre *bhujāṅgaṣṭayāta* (literally meaning the movement of a serpent). Its central theme is the realization of the identity of one's own self with the supreme Being. It begins with the negation of the identity of one's self with any of the different principles of the world, and concludes with a refrain emphasising the identity of the self with the Supreme Being — the state of consciousness-bliss — in each one of the verses of the hymn. This hymn is believed to have been composed by the great Ācārya after (i) having had the vision of Sage Bādarāyaṇa and Sage Śuka at Kailāsa, and (ii) having composed the two great hymns on Lord Śiva glorifying His beautiful form from foot to head and head to foot. The two hymns, the *Śivakeśādīpādāntavarṇana* and the *Śivapādādīkeśāntavarṇana* appeared in *The Voice of Śaṅkara* earlier.

*Translated with notes by Dr. N. Gangadharan.

निर्वाणषट्कम्

[1]

मनोबुद्ध्यहङ्कारचित्तानि नाहं
 न कर्णं न जिह्वा न च घ्राणनेत्रे ।
 न च व्योम भूमिर्न तेजो न वायु-
 श्चिदानन्दरूपः शिवोऽहं शिवोऽहम् ॥

I am neither the mind nor intellect nor ego nor thinking power of the mind. Neither I am the ear nor the tongue; nor even the nose nor the eye (am I). I am neither the sky nor the earth. I am neither the lustre nor the wind. I am verily the auspiciousness of the form of consciousness-bliss.

This verse negates the identity of one's self with the mind and its functions, four of the sense-organs and four of the gross elements. The word *Śiva* in the refrain means auspiciousness.

[2]

न च प्राणसंज्ञो न वै पञ्चवायुः
 न वा सप्तधातुर्न वा पञ्चकोशः ।
 न वाक्पाणिपादौ न चोपस्थपायू
 चिदानन्दरूपः शिवोऽहं शिवोऽहम् ॥

(I am) neither that which is named the life-breath nor indeed the five vital airs. (I am) neither

indeed the seven primary fluids nor the five sheaths. I am neither the speech, nor the hand, nor the foot. I am neither the organ of generation nor the anus. I am verily the auspiciousness of the form of consciousness-bliss.

The vital airs are five: *prāṇa*, *apāna*, *vyāna*, *udāna* and *samāna*. The *prāṇa* is the vital air that moves forward and it has its place in the region of the mouth, nose, heart, etc. *Apāna* is that which moves downwards and it has its place in the region of the anus, etc. *Vyāna* is that which moves in all directions and pervades the whole body. *Udāna* is that which moves upwards and helps the self's departure from the body. It has its place in the region of the throat. *Samāna* is that which metabolises the food, etc. and which has its place in the region of the navel.

The *dhātus* or primary fluids are: *rasa* (a constitutional fluid in the body), *asyk* (blood), *māmsa* (flesh), *medas* (fat or marrow), *asthi* (bones) and *majjā* (marrow of the bones).

The five sheaths successively make the body enshrining the soul. They are the earthly body (*annamayakośa*), the vesture of the vital airs (*prāṇamayakośa*), the sensorial vesture (*manomayakośa*), the cognitional vesture (*viññānamayakośa*) and that of beatitude (*ānandamayakośa*). Of these the first one constitutes the *sthūlaśarīra*, and the next three the *liṅgaśarīra*. The self is not identical with anyone of these.

[3]

न मे द्वेषरागौ न मे लोभमोहौ

मदो नैव मे नैव मात्सर्यभावः ।

न धर्मो न चार्थो न कामो न मोक्ष-

श्चिदानन्दरूपः शिवोऽहं शिवोऽहम् ॥

Neither do I have dislikes nor likes. I do not have greed and infatuation. Never do I possess haughtiness. I do never have the feeling of jealousy. I am neither the righteousness, nor the material property, nor the pleasures, nor liberation. I am verily the auspiciousness of the form of consciousness-bliss.

After having negated the identity of the soul with the mind and its functions and the different limbs of the body, etc. in the first two verses, the author points out that the soul is different from the various undesirable traits of human nature and the fourfold goals of human existence.

[4]

न पुण्यं न पापं न सौख्यं न दुःखं
 न मन्त्रं न तीर्थं न वेदा न यज्ञाः ।
 अहं भोजनं नैव भोज्यं न भोक्ता
 चिदानन्दरूपः शिवोऽहं शिवोऽहम् ॥

Neither merit, nor sin, nor happiness, nor grief am I. I am neither the mystic formula, nor the sacred water, nor the scriptures, nor the rituals. I am neither that is enjoyed, nor the enjoyment, nor the enjoyer. I am verily the auspiciousness of the form of consciousness-bliss.

This verse negates the identity of the soul with some of the worldly experiences. The soul is not identical with the scriptures, the mystic formulae they contain and the rites they enjoin. There are the different of objects of enjoyment, the experience of enjoying these objects and the enjoyer. The soul is also not identical with any of these items.

[5]

न मृत्युर्न शङ्का न मे जातिभेदः
 पिता नैव मे नैव माता च जन्म ।
 न बन्धुर्न मित्रं गुरुर्नैव शिष्य-
 श्रिदानन्दरूपः शिवोऽहं शिवोऽहम् ॥

(I am) neither death, nor doubt. I do not possess the distinction of any species. Neither do I have a father, nor a mother, nor birth. Neither (do I have) a relative, nor a friend, nor a preceptor, nor a disciple. I am verily the auspiciousness of the form of consciousness-bliss.

This verse negates the identity of the soul with mutually related concept such as birth and death, father and mother, preceptor and disciple, etc. The word *jāti*, in its primary sense, denotes the species, the different classes of human beings. Later the word has been generally used to denote the caste in its extended application.

[6]

अहं निर्विकल्पो निराकाररूपो
 विभुत्वाच्च सर्वत्र सर्वेन्द्रियाणाम् ।
 न चासङ्गतं नैव मुक्तिर्न बन्ध-
 श्रिदानन्दरूपः शिवोऽहं शिवोऽहम् ॥

I am indeterminate and not having any form because (I am) the Lord of all the organs everywhere. I am neither that is ununited nor liberation, nor bondage. I am verily the auspiciousness of the form of consciousness-bliss.

This verse explains the supreme nature of the soul as the lord of all the organs. The word '*aham*' equal to 'I' is hence not identical with the body or bodily functions or the different experiences associated with the body. Hence the soul has no bondage, nor release from bondage, etc. once when one realizes the true nature of the soul.

THE DOCTRINE OF MĀYĀ IN
ADVAITA VEDĀNTA

by Dr. S. Revathy

(Contd. from Vol. XIV, No. 3)

THE DOCTRINE OF THE
ADULTA FEMINA

BY DR. S. H. HARRIS

NEW YORK: THE DOCTRINE OF THE ADULTA FEMINA

The distinction between the view of Suresvara and others, on the one hand, and that of Vācaspatimīśra on the other is as follows: (i) According to Suresvara and others it is pure consciousness as such that is the locus of *avidyā*; (ii) According to Vācaspatimīśra, the pure consciousness is not the locus. But it is the consciousness which is distinguished from the pure one by the characteristics of *avidyā*, mind, etc., that serves as the locus of *avidyā*. These characteristics which go to make up the concept of *jīva* merely serve as the distinctive features (*upalakṣaṇa*) of consciousness and not as qualifying (*viśeṣaṇa*) of consciousness when we view the latter as the locus of *avidyā*.⁹

7.5. *The Indeterminable Nature of Avidyā*

Avidyā is admitted to account for the rise of the world from Brahman — the non-dual consciousness. The world is not real; for it is said in the *Upaniṣads* that it is annihilated by the direct knowledge of Brahman. Reality is unsublatability in the three divisions of time — past, present, and future. It is not an absolute nothing; for, an absolute nothing like a square circle is never given in perception. The world, however, is given in perception and on this ground it is not an absolute nothing. The world is not real and absolute nothing at once; for, it is a self-discrepant notion. Hence the world is admitted to be indeterminable either as real or as an absolute nothing or both. However, it does appear and there must be a cause for its appearance. And that cause must necessarily be of the same order as the effect — the world. That cause is admitted in the *Upaniṣads* to be *avidyā* which also is indeterminable either as real or as an absolute nothing. The Ṛgvedic passage, “The cause of the world is neither

an absolute nothing, nor a real entity,"¹¹ affirms that the cause of the world is something that is neither real nor an absolute nothing. This is exactly what is meant when it is said that the cause of the world is indeterminable either as real or as an absolute nothing.

The indeterminable character of *avidyā* is explained in another manner too. *Avidyā* cannot be really different from Brahman. It is because everything other than Brahman is non-real and so the difference too cannot be real. It cannot be said that *avidyā* is identical with Brahman. It is because Brahman is sentient while *avidyā* is insentient and any identity between the two is unthinkable. It cannot be different from and identical with Brahman at once; for, it is a discrepant notion. In the same way, *avidyā* cannot be real; for if it were real there will be two real entities, namely, Brahman and *avidyā*; and the non-dual nature of Brahman would be contradicted thereby. It cannot be an absolute nothing; for, it is manifested by the witness-self. Moreover, if it were an absolute nothing, it cannot serve as the transformative material cause of the world. It cannot be real and an absolute nothing at once; for it is a discrepant notion. Further, *avidyā* cannot be considered to be composed of parts; for, in that case it would have a beginning and we must admit a cause for it. The latter too would have a beginning and we must admit a cause for this too, and thus we are led to the fallacy of *infinite regress*. It cannot be admitted that it does not possess parts; for, in that case it cannot serve as the material cause of the world. In ordinary experience we have found that only objects which are composed of parts serve as material cause of effects. It cannot be composed of parts and

partless at the same time; for it is a discrepant notion. Thus *avidyā* cannot be characterized either as real, or an absolute nothing, either as different from Brahman or identical with it either as composed of parts or partless. Hence it is indeterminable."²

7.6. *The Powers of Avidyā*

Being indeterminable, *avidyā* cannot function by itself unless it is related to a sentient element. Brahman is the only sentient principle according to Advaita. *Avidyā* and Brahman cannot be identified because of their opposite nature. Hence it must be admitted that *avidyā* is falsely related to Brahman. The cause of the false relation of *avidyā* to Brahman is *avidyā* itself. If it is admitted that some other cause brings about the relation of *avidyā* to Brahman, then the question would arise as to whether that cause is related to Brahman or not. If it is not related, then it cannot bring about the relation of Brahman to *avidyā*. If it is related to Brahman, then what is the cause of its relation to Brahman? If we admit another cause, then we land ourselves in the fallacy of *infinite regress*. Hence it must be held that it is *avidyā* that is responsible for its relation to Brahman."

Avidyā thus falsely related to Brahman acquires a twofold power of concealment (*āvaraṇa-śakti*) and projection (*vikṣepa-śakti*). It is stated in the *Saṁkṣepa-śārīraka* thus:"

"*Avidyā*, owing to the strength of having pure consciousness as its locus and content, acquires a veiling and a transfiguring faculty. It veils the ever-luminous consciousness, and then projects it illusorily in the form of embodied souls, God, and the world."

Of these two powers, *āvaraṇa-śakti* is that power which gives rise to the usages such as 'Brahman does not exist' and 'Brahman is not manifest.' *Vikṣepa-śakti* is that power which gives rise to erroneous notions such as 'I am an agent, enjoyer' etc., and also to the appearance of the world.⁵³

The *vikṣepa-śakti* has three aspects. Of these, one gives rise to the notion that the universe is absolutely real. The second one gives rise to the notion that the universe though not absolutely real, is empirically real. That is, the objects of the universe can be adapted to practical needs of life. The third one gives rise to the apparent presentation of the Universe. The first one is removed by the study of Vedānta; the second one, by the direct knowledge of Brahman. To the aspirant who has attained the knowledge of Brahman, the third power makes the world of objects appear as illusory because of his fructified deeds. When the fructified deeds are exhausted by the experience of their fruits, the third aspect also is removed and there will be no manifestation of the world. The aspirant will be dissociated from the psycho-physical organism and would remain as Brahman. The above three aspects of the *vikṣepa-śakti* are mentioned in the *Varāhoṣanīṣad*.⁵⁴

7.7. *The Annihilating Factor of Avidyā*

Avidyā or ignorance will be removed by *vidyā* or knowledge. And, in order that ignorance and knowledge may be opposed to each other, what is necessary is that their content must be the same. Here *avidyā* has self or Brahman as its content, and so for its removal what is required is the knowledge of Brahman.

The view that *avidyā* is removed by the direct knowledge of Brahman is based upon *śruti* and *śrutārthāpatti*. These two are valid proofs and hence there is no reason that would disprove the above view.

(i) *Śruti*: The Upaniṣadic passage affirms that the knowledge of Brahman removes *avidyā*. We may cite two passages in this connection: The passage "Only by realizing Brahman, one overcomes *mṛtyu* (*avidyā*)", and the passage 'One who has the direct experience of Ātman (Brahman) overcomes *śoka* (*avidyā*), states that the direct knowledge of Brahman annihilates *avidyā*.

(ii) *Śrutārthāpatti*: This is postulating something to account for what apparently clashes with the import of a sentence. The Upaniṣadic text 'One who realizes Brahman remains as Brahman' states that the direct knowledge of Brahman leads to the manifestation of Brahman in its true nature which is liberation. The manifestation of Brahman in its true nature would be impossible unless there is the removal of *avidyā* which veils it. The Upaniṣadic text, 'The true nature of the individual souls, that is, Brahman is veiled by *avidyā*' conveys that *avidyā* veils the true nature of Brahman. Hence the above Upaniṣadic text 'One who realizes Brahman remains as Brahman' which states that the direct knowledge of Brahman leads to the manifestation of Brahman implies the removal of *avidyā* by the direct knowledge of Brahman."

According to the *Vivaraṇa* tradition,⁶⁸ the question whether verbal statements refer to the absolute or related, the mediate or the immediate depends entirely on the *prameya*. Because Brahman, the unrelated

absolute, is at the bottom, one with our immediate self propositions like *tat tvam asi* can well be the means of imparting an immediate knowledge of it just as it is.

According to the *Bhāmatī* tradition,²⁰ statements like *tat tvam asi* cannot convey precisely the kind of knowledge required for the removal of *avidyā*. Being in the form of words, they must necessarily partake of the character of all verbal testimony and signify what is related and mediate. But Brahman in truth is neither, so that the knowledge imparted by the *Upaniṣads* has to be transmuted into one of the required kind before *avidyā-nivṛtti* is possible. Thus Upaniṣadic knowledge which is mediate has to be followed up by a course of *bhāvanā* or meditative discipline which is only a function of mind. Thus according to the *Bhāmatī* tradition, the direct knowledge of Brahman arises from mind. It should be noted here that since the mediate knowledge of Brahman could be had only from the *Upaniṣads* and not from any other source, the Upaniṣadic text that Brahman is to be known only from the *Upaniṣads* becomes significant even in the *Bhāmatī* tradition.²¹

It comes to this: knowledge of Brahman which is only a mental state inspired by the reflection of Brahman in it removes *avidyā*.

Closely allied with this is the question regarding the removal of the knowledge of Brahman. The latter being a modification of mind which is the effect of *avidyā* is illusory. Hence it must also be removed. If any factor is admitted as bringing about its removal, then for the removal of that factor we must admit another; and so on *ad infinitum*. Nor can it remain without being removed; for that would contradict the non-dual nature of Brahman.²¹

Advaitins answer the above objection by saying that the knowledge of Brahman gets itself removed after removing *avidyā*. Just as the clearing nut mixed with water causes the precipitation of mud already conjoined with water and causes its own precipitation as well, in the same way, knowledge of Brahman removes *avidyā* and gets itself removed.²² In the language of Śrī Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, the knowledge of Brahman in its aspect as a valid knowledge (*pramā*) removes *avidyā*, and in its aspect as a known entity (*dr̥śya*) it gets itself removed.²³

7.8. *The Nature of the Removal of Avidyā*

Advaitins explain the nature of the removal of *avidyā* in four different ways which are as follows:

- (i) it is identical with Brahman;
- (ii) it is different from Brahman; but it is not *anirvacaniya*;
- (iii) it is different from Brahman and it is momentary; and,
- (iv) it is identical with the direct knowledge of Brahman which brings about the removal of *avidyā*.

We shall now examine these views more closely as follows.

(i) *Avidyā-nivṛtti is identical with Brahman*

Maṇḍanamisra in his *Brahma-siddhi*²⁴, and Nṛsimhāśrama in his *Vedāntatattvaviveka*²⁵ advocate this view. The removal of a superimposed entity is but its being reduced to its substratum.²⁶ *Avidyā* is superimposed upon Brahman; and hence its removal must necessa-

rily be of the nature of its substratum, that is, Brahman.

One objection may be raised against this view; and it is: Brahman is ever-existent. And, *avidyā-nivṛtti* which is said to be identical with Brahman also must be ever-existent. And so no attempt need be made to achieve *avidyā-nivṛtti* by the direct knowledge of Brahman.⁹⁷

The above objection is answered by pointing out that the definition of *sādhya* or the thing to be achieved can extend to objects that are beginningless. To be explicit: an object which exists in the presence of some other factor, and which does not exist when the other factor is not present, is said to be the *sādhya* or the thing achieved by the other factor. When viewed in this light, *avidyā-nivṛtti* although existent by being identical with Brahman can be considered to be the *sādhya* of the direct knowledge of Brahman. When the direct knowledge of Brahman arises, there is the experience of *avidyā-nivṛtti*. And in the absence of the direct knowledge of Brahman there is the absence of *avidyā-nivṛtti*, that is, there is *avidyā*. *Avidyā-nivṛtti* thus becomes the *sādhya* of the direct experience of Brahman.

(ii) *Avidyā-nivṛtti is different from Brahman but it is not anirvacanīya*

This view is advocated by Ānandabodha in his *Nyāyamakaranda*⁹⁸ and Vimuktātman in his *Iṣṭa-siddhi*.¹⁰⁰ According to this view, *avidyā-nivṛtti* is not the self; if it were so, it would be a real entity other than Brahman and this would go against the spirit of Advaita that Brahman alone is real. It cannot be un-

real; for if it were so, then it would be an absolute nothing and it cannot be attained at all. It cannot be real and unreal at once; for, that is a self-discrepant notion. It cannot be indeterminable (*anirvacanīya*); for indeterminability is based upon *avidyā*. *Nivṛtti* does not have an end and so *avidyānivṛtti* would exist in the state of liberation too. If, in order to account for the indeterminable nature of *avidyānivṛtti*, *avidyā* is admitted in the state of liberation, then liberation does not differ in any way from transmigratory existence. On this ground it is held that *avidyā-nivṛtti* is not *anirvacanīya*. It is not real; not unreal; not real and unreal at once; not indeterminable. Hence it is of a fifth kind.

(iii) *Avidyā-nivṛtti* is different from Brahman and is *anirvacanīya*

This view is advocated by Advaitavidyācārya and is referred to in the *Siddhānta-leśa-saṅgraha*¹⁰¹ of Appayya Dīkṣita. According to this view, *nivṛtti* is not permanent but is only momentary. Hence, *avidyā-nivṛtti* will not persist in the state of liberation. Hence the argument that to account for the indeterminable nature of *avidyānivṛtti* in the state of liberation, the existence of *avidyā* is to be admitted is unsound. How *nivṛtti* is not a permanent factor but is only a momentary one is explained by Advaitavidyācārya thus: The origination or *utpatti* of an object (say) pot, is only a positive change in the pot and it is present only in the first moment of its existence. This is clear from the worldly usages '*ghaṭaḥ utpatsyate*', '*ghaṭaḥ utpannaḥ*', and '*ghaṭaḥ utpadyate*' involving the future tense suffix, the past tense suffix, and the present tense suffix in regard to *utpatti* of the pot

before, after, and the first moment of its rise respectively. In the same way, the worldly usages, *ghaṭaḥ nivartisyate*, *ghaṭaḥ nivṛttaḥ*, and *ghaṭaḥ nivartate* involving the future tense suffix, the past tense suffix, and the present tense suffix, in regard to *nivṛtti* or *dhvaṁsa* of the pot before, after and the present moment of its destruction respectively. Thus from the usages *ghaṭaḥ utpadyate* and *ghaṭaḥ nivartate* which have the present tense suffix, it is known that origination and annihilation, *utpatti* or *dhvaṁsa* exist for a moment only; for, during the times after the origination and annihilation of an object or before the origination and annihilation of an object, the latter are referred to as having taken place, or going to occur in future. *Utpatti* and *nivṛtti*, therefore, exist for one moment only; they are, therefore, momentary.

Nivṛtti is momentary; and, so *avidyānivṛtti* also is momentary. It does not continue to exist in the state of liberation. It is neither real, nor unreal, nor real and unreal at once. Hence it is *anirvacanīya* or indeterminable either as real or unreal. Since it does not exist for more than a moment, there is no need to admit the presence of *avidyā* to account for its indeterminable nature.

(iv) *Avidyānivṛtti* is identical with the direct knowledge of Brahman

This view according to Gitsukha¹⁰² is advocated by both Maṇḍana¹⁰³ and Vimuktātman.¹⁰⁴ The direct knowledge of Brahman is the annihilating factor of *avidyā*. And, *avidyānivṛtti* is identical with the direct knowledge of Brahman. Apart from the rise of the annihilating factor, it is not intelligible to hold anything like the annihilation of a thing.¹⁰⁵

(8) *Conclusion*

We shall now give a resume of the conclusions arrived at in the earlier sections.

1. *Māyā* is the transformative material cause of the world.

2. It is identical with *avidyā*.

3. It is manifested by the *sākṣī*; and, its positive nature is proved by perception, inference, verbal testimony, and presumption.

4. It has Brahman — the pure consciousness as its content, and its locus is pure consciousness according to the *Vivaraṇa* tradition, and *jīva* according to the *Bhāmatī* tradition.

5. It is indeterminable.

6. It is characterized by the two powers of *āvaraṇa* and *vikṣepa*.

7. It is removed by the direct knowledge of self.

8. Its removal is nothing but Brahman according to Maṇḍana; it is of a fifth kind, according to Ānanda-bodha and Vimuktātman; it is momentary and *anirvacanīya* according to Advaitavidyācārya; and it is identical with the knowledge of Brahman itself according to some other preceptors.

NOTES

76. न अविद्या ब्रह्माश्रया, किं तु जीवे, सा तु अनिर्वचनीया इत्युक्तम् । तेन नित्यशुद्धं ब्रह्म । *B*, pp. 80-81.
77. अनाद्यविद्यावच्छेदलब्धजीवभावः पर एव आत्मा स्वतो भेदेनावभासते, तादृशानां च जीवानामविद्या ।
Ibid., p. 235.
78. न च जीवत्वस्यापि चैतन्ये वृत्तौ मायैवावच्छेदिका वाच्या इति परस्परश्रयप्रसङ्गः इति वाच्यम् । द्रव्यत्व-गुणाश्रयत्वयोरिव परस्परस्थितिप्रयोजकतया परस्परापेक्षत्व-लक्षणपरस्पराश्रयत्वस्यादोषत्वात् । *KA*, p. 66.
79. परस्पराश्रयो हि उत्पत्तौ क्षप्तौ वा दोषो भवेत्, स च प्रकृते नास्ति, अविद्याजीवत्वयोरनादित्वात् नित्यसाक्षि-भास्यत्वाच्च । *Ibid.*
80. जीवाश्रितेति पदेन जीवत्वविशिष्टचैतन्याश्रितत्वं विवक्षितं न भवति । किन्तु अक्षरब्रह्मणोऽनुरोधेन चैतन्याश्रितत्वमेव । अवच्छेदकमिति जीवाश्रितमायेत्युच्यते । *Ibid.*
81. See footnote 2.
82. सर्वप्रकारेण निर्वक्तुमशक्यतया माया अनिर्वाच्येत्यर्थः — *KA*, p. 69.
83. मोहं च कार्यं च विभर्ति मोहः तथैव मोहान्तरमन्तरेण, *SS*, I. 55.
84. आच्छाद्य विक्षिपति संस्फुरदात्मरूपं
जीवेश्वरत्वजगदाकृतिभिर्मृषैव ।
अज्ञानमावरणविभ्रमशक्तियोगा -
दात्मत्वमात्रविषयाश्रयताबलेन ॥ *Ibid.*, I. 20.
85. आवरणशक्तिः — नास्त्यद्वयं ब्रह्म न प्रकाशते इति व्यवहारयोग्यता आवरणम् तत्प्रयोजकशक्तिः ।
विक्षेपशक्तिः — 'अहं कर्ता भोक्ता' इत्यादिभ्रमजनन-शक्तिः इत्यर्थः — *Sārasaṅgraha*, p. 26.

86. शास्त्रेण नश्येत् परमार्थदृष्टिः
कार्यक्षमा नश्यति चापरोक्ष्यात् ।
प्रारब्धनाशात् प्रतिभासनाशः
एवं त्रिधा नश्यति चात्ममाया ॥
Varāhoṣaṇīṣad, 2-67.
87. न हि अनुमानात् ब्रह्मज्ञानस्य अज्ञाननिवर्तकत्वं वयं
साधयामः, येन व्याप्तिग्रहार्थं उदाहरणापेक्षा भवेत् ।
किन्तु श्रुत्या श्रुतार्थापत्या चेति ब्रूमः । *VK*, p. 64.
88. शब्द एव अपरोक्षज्ञानमुत्पादयति । *V*, p. 452.
89. आदर नैरन्तर्यदीर्घकालासेविता
साक्षात्कारवतीमाघत्ते ' *B*, p. 898.
90. मनः करणत्ववादिनामपि शब्दस्य निर्विशेषे परोक्षज्ञान-
करणस्याभ्युपगतत्वेन, *SLS*, pp. 339-340.
91. ' सविलासाज्ञाननाशकमिदं ब्रह्मज्ञानं कथं नश्येत्,
नाशकान्तरस्याभावात् ' *Ibid.*, p. 360.
92. ' कतकरजो रजोऽन्तराविले पाथसि प्रक्षिप्तं
रजोऽन्तराणि भिन्दत् स्वयमपि भिद्यमानमनाविलं पाथः
करोति,' *B*, p. 58.
93. ' प्रमाविशेषत्वेन निवर्तकता, दृश्यत्वेन निवर्त्यता ',
VK, p. 62.
94. आत्मैवेति ब्रह्मसिद्धिकाराः, *SLS*, p. 366.
95. ' निवृत्तिरप्यात्मैव ', *VTV*, p. 736.
96. अधिष्ठानावशेषो हि नाशः कल्पितवस्तुनः, *VP*, p. 214.
97. न च तस्य नित्यसिद्धत्वात् ज्ञानवैयर्थ्यम्, *SLS*, p. 366.
98. ' यस्मिन् सति अग्रिमक्षणे यस्य सत्वम्, यद्व्यतिरेके
चाभावः तत् तत्साध्यम् इति लक्षणानुरोधेन आत्म-
रूपाया अपि अविद्यानिवृत्तेः ज्ञानसाध्यत्वाच्च ',
SLS, p. 367.

99. न सन्नासन्न सदसन्नानिर्वाच्योऽपि तत्क्षयः यक्षानुरूपो
बलिरित्याचार्या व्यचीचरन् — *Ny. M.*, p. 355.
100. सदसत्सदसदनिर्वचनीयप्रकारेभ्यो हि अन्यप्रकारैव
अज्ञानस्य निवृत्तिर्युक्ता — *IS*, p. 85.
101. अधिद्यानिवृत्तिरपि ब्रह्मसाक्षात्कारोदयानन्तरक्षणवर्ती कश्चिद्
भावविकार इति तस्या मुक्तावनुवृत्त्यभावाच्च तदनिर्वा-
च्यत्वे कश्चिद्दोषः इत्यद्वैतविद्याचार्याः, *SLS*, p. 372.
102. *TP*, p. 381.
103. 'विद्यैव वा अद्वया शान्ता तदस्तमय उच्यते', *Ibid.*
104. 'ज्ञातोऽर्थः तज्ज्ञप्तिर्वाऽज्ञानहानिः' *Ibid.*
105. 'न हि विरोध्युदयमन्तरेण विरोधिनिवृत्तिर्नामान्या दृश्यते
युज्यते वा ' *Ibid.*

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INTERPRETATION OF VEDĀNTIC TEXTS*

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The *Mīmāṃsaka*-s of the Bhāṭṭa school admit six *pramāṇa*-s, namely, *pratyakṣa*, *anumāna*, *upamāna*, *śabda*, *arthāpatti* and *anupalabdhi*. The Advaitin too admits all these *pramāṇa* and it is evident from Śrī Śaṅkara's reference to them in his commentary on the *Viṣṇusahasranāmastotra*.¹ A *pramāṇa* is defined as that which gives rise to the knowledge of an entity which is hitherto unknown or veiled by *avidyā* and which is not sublated subsequently. According to Advaita, Brahman is veiled by *avidyā* as it alone is self-luminous. All other objects being inert by themselves need no external cause for being concealed. Further, according to Advaita, Brahman is the only reality and everything else is indeterminate or provisionally real till there arises the direct knowledge of Brahman. When viewed in this light it is only the *Upaniṣad*-s that could be considered as *pramāṇa* in the strict sense of the term. No doubt all the *pramāṇa*-s according to Advaita are the trans-

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gurations (*vivarta*) of Brahman through *avidyā*. But noticing that the Upaniṣadic texts give rise to the knowledge of Brahman, and the other *pramāṇa*-s, to the objects of the world, the Advaitin concludes that the sentient element of Brahman is predominant in the *Upaniṣad*-s and the insentient element of *avidyā* is predominant in the other *pramāṇa*-s.²

Pratyakṣa, *anumāna*, *upamāna*, *arthāpatti* and *anupalabdhi* have the semblance of *pramāṇa*-s; they are *pramāṇābhāsa*-s. Their respective objects, being inert by nature, are not concealed by *avidyā*. They are not unsublatable too. Yet they are located in the consciousness conditioned by them; and the consciousness element is concealed by the derivative of *avidyā* known as *tūlājñāna*.³ The objects are unsublatable till the rise of the knowledge of Brahman. The *pramāṇa*-s, *pratyakṣa*, etc., remove the *tūlājñāna* present in the consciousness conditioned by their respective objects which are unsublatable till the rise of the knowledge of Brahman. It is on this basis they are spoken of as *pramāṇa*-s, although the *Upaniṣad*-s alone can be viewed as the *pramāṇa* in the strict sense of the term.

Pratyakṣa, etc., although they are *pramāṇābhāsa*-s, yet are useful on the theoretical side of Advaita in one way or the other. Discussion about *pratyakṣa* is useful in this that the Advaitin concludes that the *Upaniṣad*-s could give rise to the immediate experience of Brahman. *Anumāna* and *arthāpatti* are useful to prove the non-reality of the world. *Upamāna* gives rise to the knowledge of similarity between objects. In the same way, it would give rise to the knowledge that a particular object is dissimilar to another object. The Advaitin, on the basis of this *pramāṇa*, concludes that

Brahman is unlike everything and like nothing, and the world, therefore, is not real like Brahman. *Anupalabdhi* is useful in this that the aspirant is able to ascertain the absence of silver in the shell after the rise of the knowledge of the true nature of the shell and to conclude that shell is free from silver in the three divisions of time — past, present and future. He is then able to extend this line of explanation to Brahman and to conclude that Brahman is free from the world and it is acosmic. Thus although *pratyakṣa*, etc., are *pramāṇābhāsa*-s, yet they have specific functions to perform.'

We have now to deal with the role of the ritualistic section of the Veda. Śrī Śaṅkara is of the view that the ritual-actions prescribed in this part of the Veda, when performed without any desire for their fruits cleanses one's heart and make one fit to pursue a thorough enquiry into the import of the *Upaniṣad*-s.³ This view is based upon the text of the *Bṛhadāraṇyakoṇiṣad*.⁴ Those who seek liberation desire to have the knowledge of Brahman by the study of one's *veda*, by the performance of sacrifice and the offering of gifts, and by austerity in the form of fasting (that consists in limiting one's food as a religious performance).

In the above text, the expressions 'study of one's *veda*,' 'performance of sacrifice and the offering of gifts' and 'austerity in the form of fasting' respectively signify the duties relating to the stage of the celibate, the house-holder and the hermit. And, the relation between the duties pertaining to one's stage of life and the desire to have to the knowledge of Brahman is set forth in this Upaniṣadic text.

Śabara in his commentary on the *Pūrvamīmāṃsā-sūtra*⁵ states that existent entities like sacrificial substan-

ces are subordinate to sacrifices, etc., which are to be achieved. In the Upaniṣadic section, however, sacrifices, etc., which are to be achieved are subordinate to the existent entity — Brahman. This means that they indirectly lead to the realization of Brahman.⁹

Having thus set forth the role of the ritualistic section of the Veda in regard to the realization of Brahman we shall now deal with the Upaniṣadic section which is its direct means. The Upaniṣadic texts when analysed fall into five groups which appear contradictory to one another. We shall set forth these texts:

1. There are certain texts which speak of Brahman as endowed with qualities. The *Chāndogya* text —

*ya ātmā apahatapāpmā vijaro vimṛtyuḥ viśokaḥ
vijīghatsaḥ apipāsaḥ satyakāmaḥ satyasaṅkalpaḥ*

states that Brahman is free from sins, from old age, from death, from sorrow, from hunger and thirst and is one who possesses desire and resolve that never go unfulfilled. Thus this and other similar texts¹⁰ convey Brahman to be *saviśeṣa*.

2. Another group of Upaniṣadic texts speaks of Brahman as free from all phenomenal elements. The *Kāthopaniṣad* in its passage ¹¹—

aśabdam asparśam arūpam avyayam,,

and the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* text ¹²—

asthūlam ananu ahrasvam adīrgham,,

convey Brahman as free from all qualities. Again the text of the *Kāthopaniṣad* ¹³—

neha nānāsti kiñcana

declares that there is no duality in Brahman. These texts do suggest that Brahman is *nirviśeṣa*.

3. Yet another group of the texts of the *Upaniṣad-s* states that the souls and the world are not different from Brahman. The *Chāndogya* text —¹⁴

tat tvam asi

is specific in stating the non-difference of the souls from Brahman. Another text¹⁵ of the same *Upaniṣad* —

sarvaṁ khalu idam brahma

and the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* text¹⁶—

idaṁ sarvaṁ yadāyam ātmā

and the text of the *Muṇḍakopaniṣad*¹⁷—

brahmaiva idaṁ viśvam

refer to the oneness of the world with Brahman.

4. The text of the *Śvetāśvataropaniṣad*¹⁸—

*prthagātmānam preritūraṁ ca matvā
juṣṭastastena amṛtatvameti*

emphasizes the difference between the soul and Brahman by stating that the soul could attain liberation by realizing that it is different from Brahman.

5. The *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* text¹⁹—

sarvasya vaśi sarvasya iśānaḥ

states that Brahman rules over everything and thereby implies the difference between the world that is controlled and Brahman that controls.

Thus in regard to the essential nature of Brahman there are apparent contradictions in the *Upaniṣad-s* and Śrī Śaṅkara is chiefly concerned with interpreting the

above texts in such a manner that there will be no inconsistency among them.

In regard to the two sets of Upaniṣadic texts — one referring to Brahman as *saviśeṣa* and the other as *nirviśeṣa*, Śrī Śaṅkara following the author of the *Brahma-sūtra* states that Brahman by itself is free from all qualities; but by its association with *māyā* or *avidyā* it acquires those qualities and they are, therefore, not real.¹⁰

Śrī Śaṅkara's critique of the concept of *samavāya* would substantiate the above conclusion. A quality could exist in its substratum through the relation of *samavāya*. The latter, in order that it may serve as a relation, must be related to the relata, namely, quality and its substratum. Thus we have another relation between *samavāya* and the quality, and yet another relation between *samavāya* and the substratum of the quality. These two additional relations too would require some other relation to get themselves related to their respective relata. And so on *ad infinitum*. It is on this ground that the relation of *samavāya* is held to be a *pseudo-concept*.¹¹ The qualities that are mentioned in respect of Brahman cannot therefore be really related to Brahman. They are only falsely presented upon it and the cause of such a false presentation is *avidyā*.

The distinctive qualities although non-real are mentioned in Brahman — the *nirviśeṣa* entity for the sake of meditative worship upon it. Śrī Śaṅkara emphasizes the Advaita position that Brahman as *nirviśeṣa* can only be realized as identical with the true nature of the soul and Brahman as endowed with attributes can only be meditated upon.

*ekamapi brahma apekṣitopādhisambandham nirastopādhi-sambandhañca upāsyatvena jñeyatvena vedānteṣūpadiśyate*²³

It follows from the above that there is no contradiction between the two sets of the Upaniṣadic texts — one proclaiming Brahman to be *nirviśeṣa* and the other as *saviśeṣa*.²³

As regards the text such as *sarvam khalu idaṁ brahma* and the like which seem to convey the oneness of the world with Brahman, Śrī Śaṅkara is of the view that they point out that the world has no independent existence apart from Brahman. In other words, the world is superimposed upon Brahman like silver upon a piece of shell and as such it derives its existence and manifestation from it.

Śrī Śaṅkara arrives at the above conclusion on the basis of the teaching of the *Chândogya* text²⁴ —

vācārambhaṇam vikāro nāmadheyam mṛttiketyeva satyam

This text states that pot — the effect is merely referred to by name. It is not real. It is thus: we have the empirical usage in the form *mṛd ghaṭaḥ*. The words *mṛd* and *ghaṭaḥ* are in appositional relation to each other. This would not hold good if the senses of the two words are different from each other. The words 'cow' and 'horse' whose senses are different from each other are not noticed to be standing in appositional relation to each other. Further the appositional relation between *mṛd* and *ghaṭaḥ* cannot hold good if the senses of the two words are identical. For, in that case the practical efficiency of the two would be one and the same. This, however, is opposed to perceptual experience. Pot is used for the purpose of bringing

water while the lump of clay is used for bringing a pot into existence. Thus pot and clay are not identical too. The result of this argument is that pot is neither identical with nor different from clay. The only alternative left is to treat it as non-real or indeterminable. This is the significance of the expression, *vācārambhaṇam vikāraḥ*.

The above view that the effect — pot is non-real would preclude the possibility of having the verbal usage that pot has come into existence from clay. It is answered that in view of the logical difficulties outlined in the foregoing paragraph it must be held that the above verbal usage is devoid of any content. This is the significance of the expression *nāmadheyam* in the text.

Now the question arises as to what then is real. The *Upaniṣad* states that the cause, namely, the clay alone is real. It is because the clay-element exists prior to the creation of pot, at the time of the existence of pot and after the destruction of pot. It comes to this that the causal factor alone is real and the effect is non-real.

When the *Upaniṣad* states that the clay-element is real what is meant to be conveyed is that the causal element alone is real. It is because when compared to Brahman, the clay-element too is an effect and so it is an appearance of Brahman. The *Upaniṣad* speaks of the reality of the clay-element in order to emphasize the fact that the cause is more real than the effect. According to the *Taittirīya* text,²⁵

yato vā imāni bhūtāni jāyante, ...

it is Brahman that is the cause of the world. The world being an effect is not real.

The teaching of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* texts —

*dve vāva brahmaṇo rūpe mūrtam caivāmūrtam ca,*²⁶

and,

*athāta ādeśo neti neti*²⁷

confirm the view that the world is non-real. The former text states that there are two factors which define Brahman; and, they are those which possess material shape, namely, earth, water and fire, and those which do not have any material shape, namely, air and space. This text thus affirms the existence of the world in Brahman.

The second text referred to above negates the existence of the world in Brahman. These two texts when read together convey the absence of the world in the substratum in which it is said to exist. The *Chāndogya* text²⁸ —

sadeva saumya idamagra āsīt

refers to sat or Brahman as associated with the world in its subtle form. And the text²⁹ that forms a complement to this, namely,

ekameva advitīyam

states that Brahman is free from any object that is either similar or dissimilar to it. It is free from internal differences too. Thus, according to these texts of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* and the *Chāndogya* the world is negated in Brahman where it is said to exist. And the negation of an object in the substratum wherein it appears implies the indeterminable nature of the object. It

may be added here that these Upaniṣadic texts have served as the basis for framing the definition of *mithyātva* by Prakāśātman in his *Vivarana* as

*pratipannopādhanau traikālikaniṣedhapratiyogitvam*³⁰

It is in the light of what has been said above that the texts like *sarvam khalu idaṁ brahma* and the like are to be interpreted. The words *idaṁ sarvam* and *brahma* stand in appositional relation to each other. They cannot convey the sense of identity of their senses because, the world which is the sense of the expression *idaṁ sarvam* and Brahman which is the sense of the word *brahma* cannot be identical as the former is inert and the latter is sentient. Hence the appositional relation between the words must be taken in the view of sublation. The above texts convey Brahman as that wherein there is the absence of world. Brahman is acosmic; it is non-dual.

The text *tat tvam asi* conveys the identity of the true nature of the soul and that of God. The primary meaning of the word *tat* is God who is the creator of the world and who possesses all auspicious qualities. This we know from the *Taittirīya* text,³¹

yato vā imāni bhūtāni jāyante,

and, the *Chāndogya* text — ³²

satyakāmaḥ satyasaṅkalpaḥ

The primary meaning of the word *tvam* is the soul which is associated with the states of waking, dream and deep sleep and which is an agent and an experient. This we know from the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* texts³³ —

tad yathā mahāmatsya ubhe kūle anusañcarati,

and,

tad yathā asmin ākāṣe śyeno vā suḥarṇo vā

Any identity between the two senses is impossible in view of the contradictory attributes present in them. Hence Śrī Śaṅkara holds the view that these two words through *jahadajahallakṣaṇā* leave out a part of their primary senses namely, *iśvaratva* in the case of God and *jīvatva* in the case of the soul and convey another part, namely, the element of pure consciousness. The logical significance of the text *tat tvam asi* is the non-difference between the essential nature of the soul which is consciousness and the essential nature of God which too is consciousness.

The text "*tat tvam asi*" does not speak of the identity between God and soul as such. Śrī Śaṅkara in his commentary on the *Brahmasūtra*²⁴ —

adhikaṁ tu bhedanirdeśāt

specifically states that we do admit difference between God and soul as such and the texts like "*tat tvam asi*" convey the identity of the true nature of soul and that of God. Hence there is no contradiction between the texts which speak of the difference between the soul and God and which refer to the identity of the true nature of the soul and that of God. In the same way, the text²⁵ —

sarvasya vaśi sarvasya iśānaḥ

speaks of the difference between God and the world, while the texts like "*sarvaṁ khalu idam-brahma*" speaks of Brahman as free from the world. Thus there is no contradiction among the Upaniṣadic texts.

The text "*prthagātmānam preritāram ca matvā*" cited earlier is interpreted by Śrī Madhusūdana Sarasvatī

in his *Advaitasiddhi* thus:²⁴ prior to the rise of the knowledge of Brahman the Advaitin admits the distinction between God and the soul. It is also accepted that God is the ruler and the soul is ruled over by him. By loving devotion towards God, the soul earns His grace, attains the knowledge of identity between Brahman and the true nature of the soul and is liberated. That the knowledge of identity between Brahman and the true nature of the soul alone is the means to liberation and not the knowledge of difference between the two is arrived at on the basis of the text of the *Kaṭhopanīṣad*²⁵ —

mṛtyoḥ sa mṛtyumāpnoti ya iha nāneva paśyati

which states that one who sees duality in Brahman would experience phenomenal existence incessantly.

So far we have explained the interpretation of the apparently contradictory statements of the *Upaniṣad-s* according of Śrī Śaṅkara. The *Upaniṣad-s* emphasize the non-dual nature of Brahman by stating that the soul is not different from it and the world is indeterminate. As regards the conclusion that the *Upaniṣad-s* constitute the *pramāṇa* in respect of Brahman, the Advaitin cites the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* text²⁶ —

taṁ tu aupaniṣadam puruṣam pṛcchāmi.

But the other text of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*²⁷ —

yo'yaṁ vijñānamayaḥ prāṇeṣu hṛdyantarjyotiḥ puruṣaḥ

states that Brahman is self-luminous. This means that Brahman does not depend upon any *pramāṇa* for its manifestation. It is clear that 'the scripture is the *pramāṇa* in respect of Brahman' is in conflict with the view that Brahman is self-luminous. This position is

referred to as a *prima facie* view in the *Saṁkṣepa-sārīraka*.¹⁰

The above difficulty is resolved by the Advaitin thus: in the case of pot, for example, sense of sight gives rise to the mental state (*vr̥tti*) in the form of pot. Thus pot is *vr̥tti-vyāp̥ya*. This *vr̥tti* is inspired by the reflection of consciousness conditioned by pot. The reflected consciousness is known as *phala*. The *vr̥tti* — element removes the ignorance present in the consciousness conditioned by pot. The consciousness element which is present in the *vr̥tti* and which is known as *phala* manifests the pot. Thus pot is *phala-vyāp̥ya* too.

In the case of Brahman, the *Upaniṣad-s* give rise to the mental state in the form of Brahman. The latter is *vr̥tti-vyāp̥ya*. *Avidyā* present in Brahman is removed by it. Brahman manifests of its own accord and so there is no need for the reflection of consciousness in the mental state known as *phala* to manifest it. Brahman, therefore, is not *phala-vyāp̥ya*. Pot is referred to as an *object of knowledge* as it is manifested by *phala*. Brahman is not manifested by *phala* and so it is not an object of knowledge. The *Upaniṣad-s* are considered to be the *pramāṇa* in respect of Brahman in the sense that they remove *avidyā* present in Brahman by giving rise to *vr̥tti* in the form of the latter. Brahman is self-luminous in the sense that it manifests of its own accord when *avidyā* is removed. Thus there is no contradiction between the Upaniṣadic texts which state that Brahman is self-luminous and the *Upaniṣad-s* constitute the *pramāṇa* in respect of it. Śrī Śaṅkara in his commentary on the *Brahmasūtra*¹¹ states:

“The scripture is valid in respect of Brahman by removing duality projected by *avidyā*. Never indeed, does the scripture convey Brahman as ‘This is Brahman’.”

The text of the *Kenopaniṣad*² —

yasya amatam tasya matam, matam yasya na veda saḥ

must be understood in the above light. Brahman is realized by him (*tasya matam*) who knows that it is not manifested by *phala* (*yasya amatam*). He who thinks that it is manifested by *phala* (*yasya matam*) has not realized it (*na veda saḥ*).

To sum up: The *Upaniṣad*-s according to Śrī Śaṅkara convey Brahman to be non-dual, self-luminous consciousness. The soul is non-different from it and the world is non-real.

NOTES

Abbreviations: AS. — *Advaitasiddhi*; Bṛh. — *Bṛhadāranya-kopaniṣad*; BS. — *Brahmasūtra*; BSB. — *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*; Chānd. — *Chāndogyopaniṣad*; Kath. — *Kāthopaniṣad*; Ken. — *Kenopaniṣad*; Muṇḍ. — *Muṇḍakopaniṣad*; PMS. — *Pūrvamīmāṃsāsūtra*; ŚŚ. — *Samkṣepaśārīraka*; Śvet. — *Śvetāśvataropaniṣad*; Taitt. — *Taittirīyopaniṣad*.

1. Śrī Śaṅkara’s commentary on the verse — *aḥrameyo hr̥ṣīkeśaḥ*, etc., *Viṣṇusahasranāmastotra*, 23.

2. *pratyaksamvidavacchinnam ajñānam pramāṇākāreṇa vivartate, samvidprādhānyena vedavivartaḥ*, *Sārasaṅgraha* on ŚŚ., II, 102.

3. Veezhinathan, N., ‘The Locus and Content of Modal Ignorance,’ *Indian Philosophical Annual*, University of Madras, 1972.

4. Veezhinathan, N., 'The Problem of Method in Advaita,' *Indian Philosophical Annual*, University of Madras, 1968.

5. *BSB.*, 3.4.23.
6. *Bṛh.*, 4.4.22.
7. *PMS.*, 3.4.40.
8. *SŚ.*, I, 143, 312, 395.
9. *Chānd.*, 8.1.5.
10. *Chānd.*, 34.2., *Munḍ.*, 1.1.9.
11. *Kāth.*, 3.15.
12. *Bṛh.*, 3.8.8.
13. *Kāth.*, 4.11.
14. *Chānd.*, 6.8.7.
15. *Ibid.*, 3.14.2.
16. *Bṛh.*, 2.4.6.
17. *Munḍ.*, 2.2.11.
18. *Śvet.*, 1.6.
19. *Bṛh.*, 4.4.22.
20. *BSB.*, 3.2.11.
21. *Ibid.*, 2.2.13.
22. *Ibid.*, 1.1.12.
23. *Chānd.*, 3.14.2.
24. *Ibid.*, 6.1.4.
25. *Taitt.*, 3.1.1.
26. *Bṛh.*, 2.3.1.
27. *Ibid.*, 2.3.6.
28. *Chānd.*, 6.1.8.
29. *Ibid.*
30. *Vivaraṇa*, Part II, pp. 175-6.
31. *Taitt.*, 3.1.1.
32. *Chānd.*, 8.1.5.
33. *Bṛh.*, 4.3. 18, 19.

34. *BS.*, 2.1.22.
 35. *Brh.*, 4.4.22.
 36. *AS.*, p. 627.
 37. *Kath.*, 4.10.
 38. *Brh.*, 3.9.26.
 39. *Ibid.*, 4.3.7.
 40. *SS.*, 1.116.

41. *aviṣayatve brahmaṇah śāstrayonitvānupapattiriti cet, na. avidyā-kalpitabhedanivṛttiparatvāt śāstrasya. na hi śūstram idantayā viṣayabhūtam brahma pratipipādayiṣati. kim tarhi, pratyagātmatvena aviṣayatayā pratipādayat avidyākalpitaṁ vedya-veditr-vedanādi-bhedamaṇanayati, BSB.*, 1.1.4.

42. *Ken.*, 2.3.

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MAHĀKAVEH KĀLIDĀSASYA
GĪTĀTRAYAM

[in Sanskrit]

by Ātmavidyābhūṣaṇam
V. S. V. Gurusvāmī Śāstri

with an English translation

by Dr. V. K. S. N. Raghavan

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अवतारिका —

[33]

जिज्ञासुभ्यो मुमुक्षुभ्यः सच्चिदानन्दलक्षणम् ।
ब्रह्म वेदैकगम्यं तदवाङ्मनसगोचरम् ॥

[34]

कथं नामोपदेष्टव्यमित्यनुक्रोशशालिनः ।
सर्वं निगममूर्धानो मातृसाहस्रमंनिभाः ॥

[35]

“विज्ञानमानन्द” मिति वचोभिर्विधिलक्षणैः ।
“अस्थूलमहृस्व” मिति प्रतिषेधात्मकोक्तिभिः ॥

[36]

“पश्यत्यचक्षु” रित्यादि विरोधाभाससूक्तिभिः ।
त्रिप्रकाराः प्रवर्तन्ते ब्रह्म बोधयितुं परम् ॥

[37]

धर्मानारोपयन्त्यस्मिन्निगमाः किल केचन ।
निषेधलक्षणास्त्वन्ये धर्मानपवदन्ति तान् ॥

[38]

इत्यारोपापवादाभ्यां निगमाः शुद्धमूचिरे ।
श्रुतिरत्राप्यसन्तृप्ता विचित्रां सरणिं श्रिता ॥

[39]

विरुद्धवद्वासमानैर्वचोभिस्तदबोधयत् ।
ब्रह्म द्विविधमाम्नातमाम्नायैर्निखिलैरपि ॥

[40]

समस्तोपाधिसम्बद्धं निरस्तोपाधिकं तथा ।
द्विरूपमिदमाश्रित्य विरोधपरिहारयोः ॥

[41]

सुकरत्वात् श्रुतिर्ब्रह्म वर्णयत्यनया दिशा ।
ध्यायं ध्यायमिमं रम्यं श्रुतिबोधितमद्भुतम् ॥

[42]

पन्थानमनुरुन्धानो मोदमानो महाकविः ।
अमेयेत्यादिभिः पद्यैर्हृद्यैर्वर्णयति त्रिभिः ॥

(३) - (५)

रघुवंशे १० - १८, १९, २०:

अमेयो मितलोकस्त्वमनर्थी प्रार्थनावहः ।
अजितो जिष्णुरत्यन्तमव्यक्तो व्यक्तकारणम् ॥
हृदयस्थमनासन्नमकामं त्वां तपस्विनम् ।
दयालुमनघस्पृष्टं पुराणमजरं विदुः ॥
सर्वज्ञस्त्वमविज्ञातः सर्वयोनिस्त्वमात्मभूः ।
सर्वप्रभुरनीशस्त्वमेकस्त्वं सर्वरूपभाक् ॥

[43 A]

“अपाणिपादो जवनो गृहीता
पश्यत्यचक्षुः सशृणोत्यकर्णः ।”

[43 B]

“तदेजति नञ्जति तदूरे तद्वन्तिके ।
तदन्तरस्य सर्वस्य तदु सर्वस्यास्य बाह्यतः ॥”

[44]

“आसीनो दूरं व्रजति शयानो याति सर्वतः ।
कस्तं मदामदं देवं मदन्यां ज्ञातुमर्हति ॥”

[45]

“अणोरणीयान् महतो महीयान् ।”
“दूरात् सुदूरे तदिहान्तिके च ॥”

[46]

“अन्धो मणिमविन्दत्तमनङ्गुलिरावयत् ।
तमग्रीवः प्रत्यमुञ्चत् तमजिह्वः प्रशंसति ॥”

[47]

“बहिरन्तश्च भूतानामचरं चरमेव च ।
सूक्ष्मत्वात्तादविज्ञेयं दूरस्थञ्चान्तिके च तत ॥”

[48]

“असक्तं सर्वभृच्चैव निर्गुणं गुणभोक्तृ च ।
 सर्वेन्द्रियगुणाभासं सर्वेन्द्रियविवर्जितम् ॥”
 “अविभक्तं च भूतेषु विभक्तमिव च स्थितम् ॥”

[49]

इति गीताः श्रुतीर्भव्याः सर्वदा भावयन्कविः ।
 तद्वासनावासितात्मा शब्दान्प्रायुङ्क्त तादृशान् ॥

(६) - (७)

रघुवंशे १०- २१, २२:

सप्तसामोपगीतं त्वां सप्तार्णवजलेशयम् ।
 सप्तार्चिर्मुखमाचख्युः सप्तलोकैकसंश्रयम् ॥
 चतुर्वर्गफलं ज्ञानं कालावस्थाश्चतुर्युगाः ।
 चतुर्वर्णमयो लोकस्त्वत्तः सर्वं चतुर्मुखात् ॥

[50]

अर्जुनाय प्रपन्नाय गीतायां भगवान् हरिः ।
 “ज्ञेयं यत्तात्प्रवक्ष्यामि यज्ज्ञात्वा मोक्षयसेऽशुभात् ।
 अनादिमत्परं ब्रह्म न सत्तन्नासदुच्यते ॥”

[51]

इति सस्यग्वदिष्यामि ब्रह्मेत्यारभ्य तस्य च ।
 सदसच्छब्दवाध्यत्वं मुक्तकण्ठं निराकरोत् ॥

[52]

यदाधारस्त्वस्ति नास्ति व्यवहारः प्रसिद्धयति ।
तत्कथं व्यवहारस्य स्वाश्रितस्यैव गोचरः ॥

[53]

इति तर्कानुसन्धानविधुरैर्मन्दबुद्धिभिः ।
शुद्धं ब्रह्म सुदुर्बोधमिति कृष्णः कृपानिधिः ॥
समस्तोपाधिसम्बद्धं विराड् रूपमवर्णयत् ॥

[54]

“सर्वतः पाणिपादं तत्सर्वतोऽक्षिशिरोमुखम् ।
सर्वतःश्रुतिमह्लोके सर्वमावृत्य तिष्ठति ॥”

[55]

इतीमां भगवत्प्रोक्तां रुचिरां रीतिमाश्रयन् ।
महाकविर्विराड् रूपं श्लोकाभ्यां समवर्णयत् ॥

अवतारिका

[56]

प्राहुर्महर्षयस्तत्त्वज्ञानान्निःश्रेयसं परम् ।
तत्त्वज्ञानस्य चोपायो योगो मुख्यो भवेदिति ॥

[57]

“तमेवं विदित्वा अतिमृत्यमेति ।
नान्यः पन्था विद्यतेऽयनाय ॥”

[58]

“ तस्याभिध्यानाद्योजनात्तत्त्वभावाद्-
भूयश्चान्ते विश्वमायानिवृत्तिः ॥ ”
“ ज्ञात्वा देवं मृत्युपाशाद्धिसुक्तः ॥ ”

[59]

“ जिज्ञासितव्योऽन्वेष्टव्यो विजिज्ञासस्व तत्परम् ।
श्रोतव्यश्चाथ मन्तव्यो ध्यातव्यश्च मुमुक्षुभिः ॥ ”

[60]

“ एवं द्रष्टव्य ” इति च निगमा आत्मदर्शनम् ।
साङ्गोपाङ्गं वर्णयन्ति वेदव्यासश्च सूत्रकृत् ।

[61]

“ अथातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासे ” त्याद्यसूत्रे ह्यबोधयत् ।
भगवानपि गीतायां विशदं प्रत्यपादयत् ॥

[62]

“ यतन्तो योगिनश्चैनं पश्यन्त्यात्मन्यवस्थितम् ।
यतन्तोप्यकृतात्मानो नैनं पश्यन्त्यचेतसः ॥ ”

[63]

असंशयं महाबाहो मनो दुर्निग्रहं चलम् ।
अभ्यासेन तु कौन्तेय वैराग्येण च गृह्यते ॥ ”

[64]

“उत्सेक उदधेर्यद्वत्कुशाग्रेणैकविन्दुना ।
मनसो निग्रहस्तद्वद्भवेदपरिखेदतः ॥”

[65]

“मनसैवानुद्रष्टव्यं नेह नानास्ति किञ्चन ।”
“अभ्यासवैराग्याभ्यां तन्निरोध” इति यद्वहु ।
श्रुति-गीता-ब्रह्मसूत्र-योगसूत्रादिवर्णितम् ॥

[66]

अभ्यासेत्येकपद्येन मधुरेण महाकविः ।
सरसं वर्णयन् सर्वं अहो विजयतेतमाम् ॥

रघुवंशे १०- २३ :

(८)

अभ्यासनिगृहीतेन मनसा हृदयाश्रयम् ।
ज्योतिर्मयं विचिन्वन्ति योगिनस्त्वां विमुक्तये ॥

[67]

जगद्व्यापारमत्यन्तं परित्यज्य व्यवस्थितम् ।
शुद्धमित्यागमाः प्राहुस्तज्ज्ञानं मोक्षसाधनम् ॥

(अनुवर्तते)

[33 - 42]

Introduction [for the stanzas of the *Raghuvamśa*, X, 18-20]: Brahman is *sat* (real), *cit* (knowledge), and *ānanda* (bliss). It can be known only through the Vedic texts. It is beyond the purview of words and mind. All the texts of the *Upaniṣads* which are highly compassionate similar to thousands of mothers are very much concerned with regard to describing Brahman for the seekers of liberation, *viz.*, people desirous of the knowledge of the ultimate Reality. The Upaniṣadic texts try to explain supreme Brahman in a threefold way. A set of texts asserts the essence of Brahman as, "It is supreme knowledge; It is supreme bliss..." (*Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, 3.9.34). Another set of texts denies any attribute to Brahman as "Neither gross, nor short..." (*Ibid.*, 3.8.8.) and thus indicate what Brahman is. The third set of texts refer to Brahman in a pseudo-contradictory mode as "It sees, but it has no eyes," (*Śvetāśvatara*, 3, 19). Therefore some texts superimpose attributes on Brahman, while others deny Brahman of any attributes. Hence, according to the *Upaniṣads* Brahman is perfect and pure. In addition, the third set of texts, in a strange way of description, refers to Brahman, appearing as though to be a repository of mutually contradictory features. Yet another classification of Upaniṣadic texts is possible with regard to the explanation of Brahman. To explain: in one way, Brahman is held to be related to all kinds of limiting adjuncts; but, in essence, Brahman is said to be thoroughly free from any *upādhi*. Providing a twofold description of Brahman in the above manner, *śruti* tries to resolve the conflict of contradictory statements about Brahman. Having known this wonderful theory about Brahman

held by the *śruti*, the great poet Kālidāsa gladly follows the *śruti* to praise Lord Viṣṇu (in the words of gods), in the following three verses, beginning with — ‘*ameyo ..*’, ‘*hṛdayastham...*’ and ‘*sarvajñastvam...*’

[III - V]

The Raghuvamśa, X, 18-20:

O Lord! immeasurable as thou art, thou hast measured all the worlds; indifferent to all the desires, thou grantest the desires of all; unconquered thyself, thou art conquering; imperceptible thyself, thou art the cause of the perceptible world.

O Lord! the sages declare thee to be present in the heart (of all), and yet not near (to the comprehension); free from desires, yet thou art an ascetic; compassionate, yet not affected by grief; and old, yet not subject to decay.

Though omniscient, thou art thyself unknown; though the source of all, thou art self-existent (thyself uncreate); thou, the Lord of all, art thyself without any superior; thou art one, and yet assumest all forms.

[43 - 45]

The *Śvetāśvataropaniṣad* (3.19) says: Brahman is without hands and feet; but It moves swiftly and grasps (catches); and without eyes and ears, It sees and hears.

The *Īśāvāsyopaniṣad* (5) explains: It (Brahman) moves and moves not; It is far, and It is, indeed, very near; It is within everything here; and, It is, indeed, outside of everything here.

The *Kāthopanīṣad* (2.21) asserts: Being seated, It moves far off; having lied down, It goes everywhere; except myself, who else can know that divine Being who is free from joy and sorrow. In another stanza (2.20), the *Kāthopanīṣad* describes It as: It is more subtle than the atom (subtlest), and bigger than the biggest (entity/substance).

The *Munḍakopaniṣad* (3.1.7) states: It is farther than the farthest, and It is here the nearest as well.

[46]

(In a very sarcastic note, it is described:) "A blind person obtained that jewel (Brahman); a person without fingers kept it in his hand; a person without neck adorned himself with the jewel (on his chest); and a tongue-less person praises It." (i.e. It is beyond description, and hence one can just fancy about It.)

[47 - 48]

The *Bhagavadgītā* explains: 'It is outside and within all beings; It constitutes both animate and inanimate creation. By reason of Its subtlety, It is incomprehensible; It is both at hand and far away.' (13.15). 'Though unattached and free from attributes, It is the sustainer of all and the enjoyer of *guṇas* (three aspects of *prakṛti*). It is the perceiver of all sense-objects, even though It is devoid of all senses.' (13.14). 'Though indivisible (like ether), It stands as if divided among beings.' (13.16)

[49]

Having taken into account the above statements of the *śruti* and the verses of the *Bhagavadgītā*, the great

poet Kālidāsa has used similar expressions, being influenced by the sweet flavour of those texts.

[VI - VII]

The Raghuvamśa, X, 21-22:

They have declared thee, Oh Lord! to be the sole refuge (or one support) of the seven worlds, resting in the waters of the seven oceans; thou hast been sung in the seven *Sāmans* and hast (seven-flamed) fire for thy mouth (propitiation to thee is through Agni alone).

From thee, having four mouths, have sprung the knowledge resulting in (i) the group of four ends (purposes) of life, (ii) the arrangement (division) of time into the four cycles, and (iii) the people consisting of the four castes.

[50]

In the *Bhagavadgītā* (13.12), Lord Kṛṣṇa explained as follows to Arjuna who resorted to Him: 'Now I shall provide you with the explanation on that which ought to be known, and knowing which one gets immortality; that beginningless supreme Brahman is beyond descriptions, neither *sat* (being) nor *asat* (non-being).'

[51]

Having commenced to explain about Brahman, saying, 'I will explain it to you well,' Lord Kṛṣṇa refuted thoroughly the contention about Brahman that it can be denoted by the terms — *sat*, *asat* and *sad-asat*.

[52]

Based on which (Brahman) the *vyavahāra* (the usage) of *asti* (is) and *nāsti* (is not) becomes well known (or explained), how could it (Brahman) be within the purview (part of the explanation) of the *vyavahāra* which depends on Itself Brahman)?

[53 - 54]

Those who are dull-witted and are free from analytical enquiry of reason cannot know clearly what is pure Brahman. Therefore Lord Kṛṣṇa, full of compassion, described the *virāḍ-rūpa* of Īsvara which is related to all *upādhis* (limiting adjuncts) — in the *Gītā* (13.13) — as follows: 'It has hands and feet everywhere, eyes, head and face everywhere, ears everywhere. It stands pervading all.'

[55]

Following Lord Kṛṣṇa's explanation in the *Gītā*, the great poet Kālidāsa described the *virāḍ-rūpa* (cosmic form) in the two verses — "*saptasāma ...*" and "*caturvarga- ...*" [*Raghuvamśa*, X, 11-12].

Introduction (to the eighth verse)

[56 - 66]

The great sages put forth the view (i) that through the supreme knowledge of Reality, one attains the supreme and foremost, *viz.*, Good, (ii) and that the means of *tattvajñāna* will be primarily *Yoga* alone.

The *Śvetāśvataropaniṣad* (3, 8; 1, 10; and 2, 15) says: 'Having realized It thus, one attains immortality;

and, there is no other way to salvation, except *jñāna* (self-realization).’ ‘Through the meditation, contemplation, and actual realization of It, one annihilates the *māyā* (nescience) entirely.’ ‘As one knows Him, the resplendent, one is freed from the bond of *mṛtyu* (death).’

“By the aspirants of *mokṣa* (final release), that supreme Reality is to be enquired into, sought after, thoroughly probed into, studied, contemplated upon, and constantly meditated upon.”

Thus the *śruti* texts emphasize the ‘vision of Ātman’ in a detailed manner, just like the text, “It is to be seen...” etc. (*Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad*, 2.4.5). Śrī Vyāsa, compiler of the *Vedas* and the author of the *Brahmasūtra* has taught the same in the first aphorism of the *Brahmasūtra*, “Then, therefore, the enquiry into Brahman.” (*BS*, I, i, 1).

Even Lord Kṛṣṇa states, in detail, in the *Bhagavad-gītā* (6, 35 and 15, 11): ‘The mind is without doubt unsteady and difficult to curb, O Arjuna; but it can be controlled through practice (of meditation) and dispassion, O son of Kuntī.’

‘Even the striving Yogins are able to know the Self abiding in their heart. The ignorant, however, whose hearts have not been purified, perceive Him not, even though striving.’

The *Advaitopaniṣad* (4, 1) states: “Just as the drop of water that rests on the tip of a *kuśa* grass could make the ocean to get agitated, even so one could control the mind without any effort.” And

again the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* text (4, 4, 19) insists: "By mind alone should one perceive It again and again, (and there is no other way left) — there is no multiplicity at all here."

And even Patañjali, in his *Yogasūtra* (I, 12), explains: "If *samādhi* (trance or peace of mind) is to be attained, the mind must be restrained from moving along the evil path, and this can be achieved by constant practice (*abhyāsa*) leading to correct knowledge and by removing desires through the attitude of desirelessness."^{*}

^{*}(*Vide* K. P. Bahadur, *The Wisdom of Yoga*, p. 56, Sterling Publishers Private Limited, New Delhi, 1977)

Having taken into account the above declaration in the *Vedas*, *Gītā*, *Brahmasūtra* and *Yogasūtra*, the great poet Kālidāsa puts them sweetly in a capsule form through the following verse, "*abhyāsa ...*"

[VIII]

The Raghuvamśa, X. 23:

With minds checked by practice from the external object, the Yogins (or devotees) seek Thee for emancipation (release from life), who — Thou full of light abidest in their hearts.

[67]

The Vedic texts hold that the knowledge of Brahman alone constitutes the means of *mokṣa* (liberation). Brahman is pure and thoroughly free from any activity — like the creation of the world, etc.

(to be continued)

प्रत्यक्षस्य आगमबाध्यत्वोपपत्तिः

भाष्यभावज्ञः ब्रह्मश्री वरहृद् कल्याणसुन्दरशास्त्री

अथ भेदप्रत्यक्षस्य शास्त्रबाध्यत्वमस्ति वा न वा इत्यंश इह विचार्यते । अत्राह कश्चित् — 'यदुक्तं दोषमूलत्वेनान्यथासिद्धिसम्भावनाया सकलभेदावलंबिप्रत्यक्षस्य शास्त्रबाध्यत्वमिति कोऽयं दोष इति वक्तव्यम् , यन्मूलतया प्रत्यक्षस्यान्यथासिद्धिः । अनादिभेदवासनैव दोष इति चेत् , भेदवासनायास्तिमिरादिवत् यथावस्थितवस्तुविपरीतज्ञानहेतुत्वं किमन्यत्र ज्ञातपूर्वम् ? अनेनैव शास्त्रविरोधेन ज्ञास्यत इति चेत् — अन्योन्याश्रयणात् । शास्त्रस्य निरस्तनिखिलविशेषवस्तुबोधित्वनिश्चये सति, भेदवासनाया दोषत्वनिश्चयः, दोषत्वनिश्चये सति शास्त्रस्य तादृशवस्तुबोधित्वनिश्चय' इति । नैतत्सारम् । अपौरुषेयत्वेन असम्भावितभ्रमप्रमादादिपुंदोषतया वेदः प्रमाणमिति भवत्यास्तिकस्य निश्चयः । तत्र च

‘ एकमेवाद्वितीयं ब्रह्म ’ ‘ तत्सत्यं ’ ‘ अतोऽन्यदार्तम् ’

‘ मृत्योस्स मृत्युमाप्नोति । य इह नानेव पश्यति ’

‘ नेह नानास्ति किञ्चन ’

इत्यादिवाक्यैरद्वैतसत्यत्वस्य द्वैतासत्यत्वस्य च प्रतिपादितत्वाद्ब्रह्मसंपन्धन्मिथ्याभूतमिदं द्वैतं कस्माच्चिदोषादेव जातमिति निश्चीयते ।

स च दोषोऽनादिभेदवासनासहकृताविद्यैवेति , तत एवावगम्यत इति
नात्रान्योन्याश्रयः ॥

न च शास्त्रादप्यद्वैतसत्यत्वनिश्चये सत्येव द्वैतमिथ्यात्वनिश्चयः,
द्वैतमिथ्यात्वनिश्चये सत्येवाद्वैतसत्यत्वनिश्चय इत्यन्योन्याश्रय इति
वाच्यं, अद्वैतसत्यत्वनिश्चयाद्द्वैतमिथ्यात्वनिश्चयो भवति । द्वैतमिथ्यात्व-
निश्चयाद्द्वैतसत्यत्वनिश्चयो भवतीति यदुच्यते तद्व्यन्योन्याश्रयात्
कस्याप्यनुत्पत्तिरित्यस्तु । नैवमुच्यते, किंतु शास्त्रादेव तदुभयं
भवतीत्युच्यते, अतो न तदुत्पत्त्यनुत्पत्तिरिति । तथा अनादिभेद-
वासनासहकृताविद्यादोषस्य विपरीतज्ञानहेतुत्वं स्वप्ने दृष्टमेव । एक
एव हि सुप्तः पुरुषः स्वस्मिन्नेव रथगजादिद्वैतमविद्यादोषात् पश्यति,
जाग्रति चाविद्यादोषादेकस्यामेव रज्ज्वां सर्पदण्डभूच्छिद्रादिभेदान्
पश्यति । किं बहुना, तिमिरादिदोषस्य विपरीतज्ञानहेतुत्वं सम्प्रति-
पन्नम् । तत्र तिमिरादिदोष एव न तद्धेतुः, किंतु तत्सहकृताऽ-
विद्यैव । सर्वत्र लाघवादविद्याया एव दोषत्वेन स्वीकर्तव्यत्वात्,
अविद्यां विना यस्य कस्यापि भ्रमस्यानुदयात्, अनात्मन्यात्म-
भ्रमहेतुरविद्येति त्वयाप्युक्तत्वात् । एवं भ्रममात्रं प्रत्यविद्याया दोष-
त्वस्य रज्जुसर्पदोषो ज्ञातपूर्वत्वात् अभेदे ब्रह्मणि भेदभ्रमोऽविद्यादोष-
जन्य एवेति निश्चीयते ॥

न च ब्रह्म न निर्भेदमिति वाच्यं,

‘ एकमेवाद्वितीयं ब्रह्म ’

इति मुक्तकण्ठं श्रुत्यैवोक्तत्वात् । न च द्वैतभ्रमहेतुरविद्येति शास्त्रे
कदापि नोक्तमिति वाच्यं,

‘ इन्द्रो मायाभिः पुरुरूप ईयते ’

इत्यादिशास्त्रसद्भावात् । एवं रज्जुसर्पप्रत्यक्षवत् अविद्यादोषजन्य-
त्वात् द्वैतप्रत्यक्षस्य भ्रमत्वात् वाध्यत्वम् । न च रज्जुसर्पप्रत्यक्षस्या
बाधकं रज्जुज्ञानमेवेति न शास्त्रमिति वाच्यं, आप्तवाक्यरूपशब्दस्यैव

तत्रापि बाधकत्वाभ्युपगमात्। नायं सर्पः किंतु रज्जुरित्याप्तवाक्यं हि सर्पभ्रमं बाधते, तथा नेदं द्वैतं, किं त्वद्वैतमेवेत्यागमाद्द्वैतभ्रमो बाध्यते। न च रज्जुसर्पप्रत्यक्षस्येव द्वैतप्रत्यक्षस्य कथं भ्रमत्वसिद्धिरिति वाच्यं, रज्जुसर्पप्रत्यक्षस्य कथं भ्रमत्वसिद्धिः? आप्तवाक्यप्रदीपालोकादिना रज्जुज्ञानबाध्यत्वादिति चेत् तथैवेहाप्यस्तु, श्रवणमननादिना ब्रह्मज्ञानबाध्यत्वादिति। अतस्मिस्तद्बुद्धित्वादिति चेत् तत एवेहाप्यस्तु; रज्जौ सर्पस्याविद्यमानत्वादिति चेत् तथैव ब्रह्मणि द्वैतस्याविद्यमानत्वादित्यस्तु। किं बहुना — यथा तथा त्वं रज्जुसर्पप्रत्यक्षस्य भ्रमत्वं साधयसि, तथा तथा वयं द्वैतप्रत्यक्षस्य भ्रमत्वं साधयामः। साधिते च तस्मिन् शास्त्रमत्यन्ताप्तेश्वरवाक्यत्वेन प्रमाणत्वात्सर्पप्रत्यक्षमाप्तवाक्यमिव द्वैतप्रत्यक्षं बाधत एव ॥

न चैवं प्रत्यक्षमात्रस्य शास्त्रबाध्यत्वे सति सन्मात्रावगाहिप्रत्यक्षमपि शास्त्रबाध्यं भवेदिति वाच्यं, न वयं प्रत्यक्षमात्रं शास्त्रबाध्यमिति वदामः, शास्त्रस्यापि प्रत्यक्षज्ञानजनकत्वात्। किंतु भ्रमप्रत्यक्षं शास्त्रबाध्यमिति वदामः। न हि सर्पप्रत्यक्षं रज्जुसर्पप्रत्यक्षवदाप्तवाक्यबाधितं भवति, सन्मात्रावगाहिप्रत्यक्षं च सर्पप्रत्यक्षवत् प्रमेवेति न तस्य कुतोऽपि बाधः। अबाधितार्थविषयं ज्ञानं हि प्रमा। सन्मात्रं चाबाधितार्थविषयः, यथा यावद्व्यवहारं सर्पोऽबाधितार्थविषयः। तस्मात्सन्मात्रावगाहिप्रत्यक्षं शास्त्रजन्यमेवेति न शास्त्रबाध्यत्वं तस्य। एतेन प्रत्यक्षान्तराणां दोषमूलत्वमनुमीयसे चेत्, शब्दत्वाच्छास्त्रस्यापि दोषमूलत्वमनुमीयतामिति — यदुक्तं तत् परास्तम्। भ्रमप्रत्यक्षस्यैव दोषमूलत्वानुमानं, न तु प्रमाप्रत्यक्षस्येति कृत्वा प्रमाप्रत्यक्षजनकत्वाच्छास्त्रमदोषमूलं प्रमाणमेवेति। न च शास्त्रस्य प्रमाप्रत्यक्षजनकत्वेऽपि घटप्रत्यक्षमिव शास्त्रप्रत्यक्षमपि दोषमूलकत्वेन भ्रमभूतमेवेति वाच्यं इष्टापत्तेः, ब्रह्मभिन्नं हि सर्वं मिथ्या। न चैवं भ्रमभूतस्य शास्त्रस्य कथं प्रमाजनकत्वमिति वाच्यं, रजसोपिकातकस्य रजस्वलजलनिर्मलत्वहेतुत्वदर्शनात् ॥

वस्तुतस्तु शास्त्रं, तत्कर्ता ईश्वरः, तद्ध्येता जीवः, तज्जन्यं ज्ञानं, तत्साध्यं द्वैतं चेत्येतत्सर्वं मिथ्यैव, ब्रह्मभिन्नत्वात्। ततश्च

मिथ्याभूतमेव प्रमाज्ञानं जनयतीति न कश्चिद्दोषः । न चैवं भ्रमज्ञान-
वत्प्रमाज्ञानस्यापि मिथ्यात्वेन बाधितत्वे सति भ्रमप्रमयोरविशेष
इति वाच्यं, न हि ज्ञानस्याबाधितत्वं प्रमात्वप्रयोजकं वृत्तिरूपज्ञानस्य
त्रैकालिकत्वाभावेन बाधितत्वात्, किं तर्हि अबाधितार्थविषयत्वमेव, तच्च
भ्रमस्य नास्तीति । एवं प्रमाजनकत्वादेव शास्त्रं मिथ्याभूतमपि
प्रमाणमित्युच्यते । चक्षुरादीनि तु एतत्प्रमाजनकानि न भवन्तीत्य-
प्रमाणान्येव । यद्यप्येवं तथापि यावद्व्यवहारमबाधितार्थविषयज्ञान-
जनकत्वात्तान्यपि प्रमाणाणीत्युच्यन्ते ॥

वस्तुतस्तु प्रमाणाभावा एव तानि । एव शास्त्रस्य प्रमाणत्वादेवा-
दोषमूलत्वमित्युच्यते, न त्वमिथ्यात्वात्, शास्त्रं ह्यविद्याजन्य-
त्वान्मिथ्यैव । यद्वा भ्रमप्रमादादिपुंदोषरहितत्वाच्छास्त्रमदोषमूल-
मित्युच्यते । तस्माच्छास्त्रमेव प्रमाणं तज्जन्यं निर्विकल्पकं सर्वं ज्ञान-
जातं भ्रम एव । ततस्सर्वस्य द्वैतभ्रमस्य शास्त्रबाध्यत्वं निर्विवाद-
मिति ॥

यदुक्तं कैश्चित् — आयुर्वेदे दोषाणां स्वरूपं तन्निवृत्त्युपायादिकं
च निरूपितं, सर्वप्रत्यक्षाणां दोषमूलत्वानुमानं तद्विरुद्धमिति, — तद-
युक्तम् परमार्थतत्त्वावेदनपरे वेदान्तशास्त्रे कामकर्मादिसहकृताया
अविद्याया दोषत्वस्योक्तत्वादायुर्वेदे रोगादिस्वरूपप्रतिपादनपरत्वेनातत्परे
तदनुक्तेरकिञ्चित्करत्वाच्च । तस्माज्जीवानां सहजसुखत्वेन परमाप्त-
भूतेश्वरप्रणीतं प्रमाणराजवेदान्तशास्त्रम् अपौरुषेयत्वादसम्भावितसकल-
पुंदोषगन्धं सर्वतो बलाधिकं सत् कामकर्मादिसहकृताविद्यादोषजन्यं
द्वैतभ्रमं दुर्बलं बाधत एव — आप्तवाक्यमिव रज्जुसर्पभ्रमम् । एतेन
शास्त्रप्रत्यक्षयोस्तुल्यदोषत्वं तुल्यबलत्वं चेत्येतदुभयं प्रत्युक्तम् ॥

न च यथा प्रत्यक्षमविद्याजन्यं तथा शास्त्रमपीति वाच्यं,
प्रत्यक्षं शास्त्रादपि भवतीति न शास्त्रप्रत्यक्षयोस्तुल्यकक्ष्या, किंतु
प्रत्यक्षज्ञानजनकस्य शास्त्रस्य चक्षुरादेश्च तुल्यकक्ष्यता वाच्या ।
न च तथैव वदामः, यथा चक्षुरादिप्रमाणमविद्याजन्यं तथा
शास्त्रं प्रमाणमप्यविद्याजन्यमेवेति तुल्यदोषत्वमिति वाच्यं,

अविद्याजन्यत्वांशे समेऽपि अपौरुषेयत्वपौरुषेयत्वप्रयुक्तनिर्दोषत्वसदो-
षत्वाभ्यां भेदादिति । न च शास्त्रवच्चक्षुरादिकमपीश्वरसृष्टत्वाद्-
पौरुषेयमेवेति वाच्यं, ईश्वरसृष्टत्वेऽपि चक्षुरादेः पुरुषतन्त्रत्वेनापौरु-
षेयत्वाभावात् । न च शास्त्रमपि पुरुषेणाधीयत इति पुरुषतन्त्र-
मेवेति वाच्यं, पुरुषेण वेदस्य भारतादिवत्त्रिजेच्छया उच्चारयितुमयु-
क्तत्वात् । गुरुच्चारणान्च्चारणविषयो हि वेदः । अत एवानुश्रव
इत्युच्यते । एवमीश्वराद्विरण्यगर्भो यथा श्रुतवान्वेदं तथैव मरी-
च्यादिभ्यस्स प्रोवाच । ते च स्वशिष्येभ्यः । स चेश्वरः कल्पा-
न्तरस्यवेदसज्जातायमेवेति वेदस्यागौरुषेयत्वम् । अत एव नित्यत्वं
च,

‘ अनादिनिधना नित्या वागुत्सृष्टा स्वयम्भुवा ’

इति । तस्माच्छास्त्रस्य चक्षुरादेश्च अविद्यादिसाधारणदोषतौल्येऽपि
भ्रमप्रमादादिपदोपतौल्याभावात् तुल्यदोषत्वम् । एवमसाधारणदोषव-
त्त्वाच्चक्षुरादिप्रमाणानां प्रमाणाभासत्वेन दुर्बलत्वं, तद्रहितत्वाच्च शास्त्रस्य
प्राबल्यम् । शास्त्रं च वेद एव प्रमाणम्, न पाञ्चरात्रागमादिकं,
तस्य नारदादिपुरुषविशेषकृतत्वेनाप्रमाणत्वात् । स्वतः प्रमाणं हि
वेदः, अपौरुषेयत्वात् । स्मृत्यादयस्तु तदनुरोधिन एव प्रमाणानि,
इति विरोधाधिकरणे स्थापितं जमिनिनेव । पाञ्चरात्रगमादयस्तु
श्रौताद्वैतमतविरुद्धार्थप्रतिपादकत्वात् अप्रमाणान्येवेत्यलम् ॥

JUSTIFICATION FOR THE SUBLATION OF PERCEPTION BY SCRIPTURE*

*Bhāṣyabhāvajña Brahmaśrī Varahūr
Kalyāṇasundara Śāstrī*

Now, the view whether perception which apprehends difference is sublated by scripture or not is taken up for discussion. In this connection some hold the view: "It has been stated that perception which apprehends all kinds of difference is sublated by scripture, because it is rooted in a defect; consequently it can be accounted for differently. If so, the defect (in the case of perception) as a result of which it can be accounted for differently has to be stated. If it be said that the impression of the beginningless difference is the defect, then is it known elsewhere that, as in the case of *timira-dosa*, etc., the impression of difference produces a cognition of an object different from what it is? If it be said that it is known through its conflict with scripture, it cannot be accepted, as it involves the fallacy of mutual dependence. Only if it is established that scripture conveys the knowledge of the reality which is devoid of all specifications, the defect of the

* Translated by Dr. R. Balasubramanian

impression of difference can be established; and only if the defect is established, it can be shown that scripture conveys the knowledge of such a reality." This argument is not satisfactory. It is accepted by all *āstikas* that the *Veda* which is impersonal is free from defects such as untenability, error, omission, etc., associated with a person. In this context, through texts such as "Brahman is one only, without a second," "That is real," "Everything other than that is false," "He who sees plurality goes from death to death," "There is no plurality whatsoever here," it has been established that non-duality is real, and that duality is false; and so it is ascertained that, this duality which is false, like the rope-snake, arises because of a defect. And the defect is *avidyā* alone which is associated with the impression of difference which is beginningless. Also, since it is known only therefrom (*i.e.* from scripture), there is no defect of mutual dependence.

It is no argument to say that the ascertainment of the falsity of difference is possible only if the ascertainment of the truth of non-duality from scripture takes place, and that the ascertainment of the truth of non-duality is possible only if the ascertainment of the falsity of duality takes place; and so there will be the fallacy of mutual dependence. We hold that it is only from the establishment of the truth of non-duality, there takes place the ascertainment of the falsity of difference. If it be said that the ascertainment of the truth of non-duality takes place from the ascertainment of the falsity of difference, then let it be that, because of the fallacy of mutual dependence, nothing can be established. But we do not say this. On the contrary, we say that from scripture alone both of them are known. So there is nothing untenable in holding both

these views. Thus, it is, indeed, seen that there is erroneous cognition in dream because of the defect of *avidyā* helped by the impression of the beginningless difference. One and the same sleeping person sees in himself chariot, elephant and other objects of difference due to the defect of *avidyā*. And in the waking state a person sees one and the same rope as a snake, a stick, a cleft in the ground, etc. Why multiply examples? It is accepted that *timira-doṣa* etc., are the cause of erroneous cognition. In this case, *timira-doṣa*, etc., alone are the cause of error. On the contrary, *avidyā* alone which helps them is the cause. In all cases, *avidyā* alone, inasmuch as it is a defect, is held responsible on the basis of the principle of parsimony, for in the absence of *avidyā* no error whatsoever can take place; and it has been stated even by you that *avidyā* is the cause of the erroneous cognition of the Self in the not-Self. Thus, it is already known that *avidyā* is the cause of error in cases such as the rope-serpent; and so it is ascertained that the error of difference in the non-dual Brahman is also caused by the defect of *avidyā*.

It cannot be said that Brahman is not free from difference, for *śruti* itself declares loudly that Brahman is "One only without a second." It cannot be argued that nowhere in scripture has it been stated that *avidyā* is the cause of the error of difference, for there are scriptural texts such as "Indra (*i.e.* the luminous Brahman) assumes many forms through the powers of *māyā*." Thus, just as the perception of snake in a rope which is caused by the defect of *avidyā* is subject to sublation, even so the perception of difference, since it is erroneous, is subject to sublation. It is no argument to say that the perception of the rope-snake is sublated

by the cognition of the rope alone and not by scripture, for even in this case it has been accepted that the verbal testimony of a trustworthy person sublates it. The statement of a trustworthy person, "This is not a snake, but a rope," sublates the erroneous cognition of snake. In the same way, from the scriptural statement, "This is not dual, but non-dual alone," the erroneous cognition of difference is sublated. It cannot be asked how the perception of difference is erroneous like the perception of the rope-snake. How is it ascertained that the perception of the rope-snake is erroneous? If it be said that the cognition of the rope obtained through the statement of a trustworthy person, the light of the lamp, etc. sublates it, let it be so even here: the cognition of Brahman obtained through hearing, reflection, etc. sublates (the cognition of difference). If it be said that (in the case of rope-snake) it is a case of cognition of the given as something different, let it be so even here. If it be said that the snake is absent in the rope; here also, in the same way, difference is absent in Brahman. Why further explanation? Just as you establish the erroneous nature of the perception of the rope-snake, even so we establish the erroneous nature of the perception of difference. When it is thus established, since scripture, being the statement of Īsvara, the most trustworthy person, is the *pramāṇa*, it sublates the perception of difference in the same way as the statement of a trustworthy person sublates the perception of the snake.

It is no argument to say that, if perception as such is sublated by scripture, even the perception which apprehends *sat* alone must be sublated by scripture. We do not say that perception as such is sublated by scripture, for scripture too produces perceptual knowledge. On the contrary, we say that

erroneous perception is sublated by scripture. The perception of (the real) snake, like the perception of the rope-snake, is not sublated by the statement of a trustworthy person. Like the perception of (the real) snake, even the perception which apprehends *sat* is a valid cognition; and so there is no sublation at all to it. A valid cognition is, indeed, one whose content remains unsublated. *Sat* as such is something which remains unsublated, just as (the real) snake remains unsublated so long as there is *vyavahāra*. So, the perception which apprehends *sat* as such is produced by scripture; consequently it is not sublated by scripture. By this, the argument that, if the defective nature of other cases of perception is inferred, then even the defective nature of scripture, because it is in the form of verbal testimony, may be inferred, stands refuted. Since the inference about the defective origin is only with regard to erroneous perception and not with regard to valid cognition, scripture which produces valid perceptual cognition is not rooted in defect, and so it is a *pramāṇa*. If it be said that, even though scripture produces valid perceptual cognition, it is defective like the perception of a pot; and so it is erroneous; this is acceptable, for everything other than Brahman is *mithyā*. It cannot be asked how scripture which is erroneous could produce valid cognition, for it is seen that the clearing-nut, though only dust, is the cause of making the water free from dust.

The real position is that scripture, Īśvara who is its author, the *jīva* who studies it, the knowledge produced by it, difference which is produced by it — all these are *mithyā*, because they are other than Brahman. So, there is no defect in saying that scripture which is *mithyā* produces a valid cognition which is also *mithyā*.

It may be argued that, since valid cognition, like erroneous cognition, is *mithyā* then it must be subject to sublation; if so, there will not be any distinction between error and valid cognition. Non-sublatability of cognition is not the cause of its being a valid cognition for the *vṛttijñāna* which does not exist in all the three periods of time gets sublated. What, then, makes it a valid cognition? Its having a content which remains unsublated makes it a valid cognition. And this does not hold good in the case of erroneous cognition. Thus, scripture, though *mithyā*, is said to be *pramāṇa*, since it produces valid cognition. Visual sense, etc. do not produce valid cognition as explained above, and so they are not *pramāṇas*. Though this is the real position, they are spoken of as *pramāṇas* since they produce cognition whose content remain unsublated so long as there is *vyavahāra*.

In fact, these are only pseudo-*pramāṇas*. Thus, only on account of scripture being *pramāṇa*, and not on account of its being non-illusory, it is said to be free from defect. Scripture is, indeed, *mithyā* alone since it produces *avidyā*. Or, since scripture is free from the defects such as error, omission, associated with a person, it is said to be free from defect. So scripture alone is *pramāṇa*; the indeterminate cognition alone produced by it is valid cognition; the entire determinate cognition is nothing but erroneous. So it cannot be disputed that the erroneous cognition of difference is sublated by scripture.

Some argue like this: "In Ayurveda, the nature of defects as well as the means to cure them has been established. The conclusion that the entire perception is defective comes into conflict with it. This

argument is untenable. In the *Vedānta-śāstra* whose purport is in knowing the ultimate reality, the defect of *avidyā* aided by *kāma*, *karma*, etc. has been stated. But in *Āyurveda* whose purport is in setting forth the nature of disease, etc., it does not say anything about that (ultimate reality), and so it is of no avail thereto. So the *Vedānta-śāstra*, the supreme among the *pramāṇas*, composed by Īśvara, the most trustworthy person, for attaining the natural bliss by all *jīvas*, is stronger than others, as it is free from all defects such as untenability, associated with a person on account of its impersonal nature; but the erroneous cognition of duality produced by the defect of *avidyā* aided by *kāma*, *karma*, etc. is weak and so it is sublated, as the erroneous cognition of the rope-snake is sublated by the statement of a trustworthy person. By this is refuted both the views that scripture and perception are equally defective and that they are equally strong.

It cannot be said that, just as perception is produced by *avidyā*, scripture also is produced by *avidyā*. Since perception arises from scripture, there is no parity between scripture and perception. On the contrary, parity should be spoken of between scripture which produces perceptual cognition as well as visual sense, etc. It is no argument to say: "We say the same thing. Just as the visual sense, etc. which are *pramāṇas* are produced by *avidyā*, even so scripture, though *pramāṇa*, is produced by *avidyā*, and so they are vitiated by the same defect." Even though there is parity between them in so far as they are produced by *avidyā*, there is difference between them as the one is devoid of defect due to the impersonal nature, whereas the other is defective due to the personal nature. It is no

argument to say that, like scripture, even the visual sense, etc., are created by Īsvara, and so they should be spoken of as impersonal. Even though the visual sense, etc., are created by Īsvara, they are dependent on a person; consequently they are not impersonal. It is no argument to say that scripture too is dependent on a person inasmuch as it is learnt by a person, for the *Veda*, as the *Mahābhārata*, etc., cannot be uttered by a person according to his own desire. The *Veda*, is indeed, a subject to be learnt by repeating what is uttered by the teacher. That is why it is called *anuśrava* (sacred tradition). Thus, in the manner in which Hiraṇyagarbha heard it from Īsvara, in the same manner he taught it to Marīci and others. They too must have taught (in the same manner) to their disciples. Īsvara too must have taught *Veda* in the same way as it was in the previous *Kalpa*, and so the *Veda* is impersonal. That is why it is said to be eternal as stated in the text, "It is without beginning and end, eternal, created by speech and self-existent." So, even though scripture and visual sense, etc., are on a par in respect of the defect of *avidyā*, etc., there is no parity between them in respect of their defective nature, because defects such as error, omission, etc., which are associated with a person are absent (in scripture). Thus, *pramāṇas* such as the visual sense, in so far as they are vitiated by special defects are pseudo-*pramāṇas*; and so they are weak. Since scripture is free from this (special defect), it is strong. Scripture, that is *Veda* alone, is *pramāṇa*, and not *Āgamas* such as *Pāñcarātra*, for these, being the compositions of exceptionally great persons such as *Nārada*, are not *pramāṇas*. Indeed, the *Veda* is intrinsically valid, because it is impersonal. However, *smṛti*, etc., are *pramāṇas* in so far as they are

in conformity with it. This has been established by Jaimini in the chapter on "*Virodha*". But the *Pāñcarātra* and other *Āgamas* are not *pramāṇas* at all, because they set forth a view opposed to the standpoint of Advaita which is based on *śruti*.

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खिन्नानां जलकाङ्क्षया मरुभुवि भ्रान्त्या परिभ्राम्यताम् ।

अत्यासन्नमुधाम्बुधिं सुखकरं ब्रह्माद्वयं दर्शय-

त्येषा शङ्करभारती विजयते निर्वाणसन्दायिनी ॥

saṁsārādhvani tāpabhānukiraṇaprodhūtadāhavyathā-

khinnānām jalakāṅksayā marubhuvi bhrāntyā

paribhrāmyatām

atyāsannasudhāmbudhiṁ sukhakaram brahmādvayaṁ

darśayaty-

eṣā śaṅkarabhārati vijayate nirvāṇasandāyini.

To those who are afflicted, in the way of the world, by the burning pain given rise to by the scorching sun-shafts of misery, and who through delusion wander about in the desert (of worldliness) seeking water — showing the felicitous ocean of nectar, which is very near, the non-dual *Brahman*, this — the Voice of Śaṅkara — is victorious, leading, as it does, to liberation.