

A QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ADVAITA - VEDĀNTA


The VOICE of ŚĀṆKARA

śaṅkara-bhāratī

Chairman, Advisory Board
V. R. Kalyanasundara Sastri

Editor
N. C. Krishnan

Volume FIFTEEN
Number ONE



May

1990

esā śaṅkara-bhāratī vijagate
nirvāṇa-sandāyini

victorious is the voice of śaṅkara,
leading, as it does, to liberation

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HOMAGE TO ŚAṄKARA

[140]

यत्पादपङ्कजनतेरपि जातु मूक-
लोकोऽपि दिव्यकवितामयते हि तूर्णम् ।
स त्वं तव स्तुतिकृते कवितां वितीर्य
श्रीशङ्करार्य मम देहि पदावलम्बम् ॥

*yatpādapaṅkajanaterapi jātu mūka-
loko'pi divyakavitām-ayate hi tūrṇam
sa tvam tava stutikṛte kavitām vitīrya
śrīśaṅkarārya mama dehi padāvalambam.*

Oh Śrī Śaṅkara! just by paying obeisance at the pair of your lotus feet once, even a mute obtains quickly the power of divine poesy. Therefore, may you bless me by yielding the poetic merit, as I sing in praise of you. Oh Śrī Śaṅkara! prithee, offer me shelter under the pair of your divine feet.

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आकर्ण्य दीनगृहीणीवचनं कृपार्द्रः
 स्वर्णात्मकामलकसन्ततिमासमन्तात् ।
 गेहस्य योऽतितरसा हि ववर्ष स त्वं
 श्रीशङ्करार्य मम देहि पदावलम्बम् ॥

*ākarnya dinagr̥hīṇīvacanaṁ kṛpārdraḥ
 svarṇātmakāmalaka-santatim-āsamantāt
 gehasya yo'titarasā hi vavarṣa sa tvam
 śrīśaṅkarārya mama dehi padāvalambam.*

Oh Śrī Śaṅkara! hearing the pitiable words of a housewife, you — fully compassionate as you are — have immediately showered in her house an array of golden gooseberries intermittently. So please favour me by giving me shelter under the pair of your divine lotus feet.

Jagadguru Śrī Saccidānanda Śivābhinava Nṛsimhabhārati
 in *Śrīśaṅkarācāryapadāvalambastava*

GĀNDHARVA VEDA — ART AND CULTURE IN LIFE*

Jagadguru Śrī Candrasekharendra Sarasvatī

The terms 'art and culture' have a single word in Sanskrit, namely, "kalā". This is the root word from which has come the Tamil word "kalvi", which means learning, and the English word "culture", as also the French word, both derived from the Latin "colore". By culture is meant the quality of mind which one brings to bear on the facts of life and, therefore, it is universal and obviously the word too is more or less similar. Both art and culture are ever-growing, for the Sanskrit root word "kalā" refers to the waxing phases of the moon. Another meaning of the word is any practical art, mechanical or fine; and there are 64 arts like music, dancing, painting, etc.

The innate impulse in man to soar upwards has given birth to several forms of art. The growth of knowledge of human nature is manifested in diverse ways: some display their skill in the arts of song, dance,

* Courtesy: *Devyattiy Kural* (தெய்வத்தின் குரல்) Vol. I, pp. 431-443; Vol. III, pp. 783-810. Translation: ARGUS.

painting, sculpture or poetry, while others direct their energies in sacrifice, service and charity to help the weak and the distressed. It is the latter kind endowed with the spirit of charity and love and who thrill in response to every sigh and thought of all that lives and breathes, which is to be regarded as the highest form of art and culture.

The yardstick to measure a nation's power and strength is not its GNP, but its culture. All the people of a country may not be noble and wise, as there will always be robbers, cheats and liars. Just as in the case of an individual who may have all kinds of ailments, but if his heart is sound the doctor gives him a good certificate of health, even so is a nation judged as great if it has a tradition of high culture. He is called a man of culture who believes that there are other things in life of vastly greater import than wealth and comfort, necessary as they might be.

Culture is born of meditation on the best that has been said and thought by men of great insight and wisdom. It lies in the great literary heritage of the nation *i.e.* in our epics like the *Rāmāyaṇa* and the *Mahābhārata* which have stood the test of Time. Like literature there are other forms of art and culture too, like music, dance, drama, painting, sculpture and architecture. Their utility may not be apparent or it may even be considered as useless, as its significance in life is hidden from the vision of the materialistic minded. But a man of culture will develop an inner grace of nature, a tendency of the soul which makes him live in constant and confident communion with the unseen reality. Culture and art help in the transformation of the human being so that he begins to think with his

whole mind and body which endows him with more sense and sensibility.

Voice of God

This is called the Gāndharva-Veda, which is not for the businessman who looks for profit but for one, the man of sensitivity who thrills at every sight and sound in Nature. And that sound is music which is holy, not only to the savant but the layman alike, for in each octave is a world, the frozen echo of the silent voice of God. This *śāstra* is named after the Gandharvas who are the gods of joy and merriment, devoted mainly to the enjoyment of the senses. Their arts are supposed to be many including both indoor and outdoor games. One of the accounts about the Gāndharva-Veda gives the number of sixty-four “*kalās*” or branches of art and culture. Based on this probably is the Goddess Ambāl described as “Catuṣ-ṣaṣṭi-kalāmayī”.

An important commentary on the *Lalitā Sahasranāma* is by the great savant Bhāskararāya. Here he lists what these sixty-four arts are: the four *Vedas* which form the basis of Hindu religion, the six limbs of the *Vedas* such as Śikṣā, Vyākaraṇa, etc., the six systems of Philosophy like Nyāya, Mīmāṃsā, etc., the eighteen *Purāṇas*, the *smṛtis* and *śrutis* and the various *śāstras*. The list includes, in addition to the religious scriptures, such secular subjects as horse-riding and elephant-riding and magical sciences, as also psychical and alchemical mysteries. Further, he lists such arts as palmistry, study of gems, jewel-making art, manufacture of incense and cosmetics. Such strange subjects as rejuvenating processes, riddle-solving, and even journalism are included in the long list. Besides these amusing

pastimes, the Gāndharva-śāstra's emphasis is mainly on the mastery of music, dance and drama.

In course of time, many of these arts, being devoted to the pleasure of the senses were degraded and instead of being fine arts they were defiled. But they can be refined and even the sensory delights can be transformed into divinity, says the great Tamil saint Appar. He has given in one of his verses a list: the divine music of the Vīṇā, the milk-white brightness of the full moon, the cool southern breeze, the resurgence of spring with its bright flowers, and the buzzing of bees in wild joy.

மாசில் வீணையும் மாலை மதியமும்
வீசு தென்றலும் வீங்கிளவேனிலும்
மூசு வண்டறைப் பொய்கையும் போன்றதே
ஈசன் எந்தை இணையடி நீழலே.

These are likened to the surrendering of oneself at the feet of the Lord; and of these delights he gives primary place to the melodious strains of the Vīṇā.

Nādopāsana

Our ancients considered music as a divine offering to Īsvara and a path to salvation, as is stated by the Maharṣi Yājñavalkya, who gave us the Dharmasāstra, as the following verse testifies:

वीणावादनतत्त्वज्ञः सृतिजातीविशारदः ।
तालज्ञश्च अप्रयत्नेन मोक्षमार्गं स गच्छति ॥

There is no need for *dhyāna*, *yoga*, *tapah*, *pūjā* or any difficult austerity to reach salvation, if only one tunes the Vīṇā properly and devotes himself to Nādopāsana, says the sage.

Another point to be noted here is that not only musician forgets himself and identifies with the divine bliss, but the members of the audience as well share that joy with him, for they are drawn by his magical skill, into the divine orbit.

In the *Saundaryalaharī*, there is a *śloka* which stresses the fact that the Goddess Sarasvatī is ever playing on her Vīṇā, singing hymns to the Lord, and never indulges in any secular songs. Describing the neck of the Divine Mother, Śrī Śaṅkara Bhagavatpāda affirms in the *Saundaryalaharī* that the three lines there stand to indicate that the Goddess has mastery over all the three musical scales (*gamakas*), of which only one known as *śadjā* comes within the capacity of human beings at present.

गले रेखास्तिस्रो गति-गमक-गीतैक-निपुणे
 विवाह-व्यानद्ध-प्रगुणगुण-संख्या-प्रतिभुवः ।
 विराजन्ते नानाविध-मधुर-रागाकर-भुवो
 त्रयाणां ग्रामाणां स्थिति-नियम-सीमान इव ते ॥

Just as the Adam's apple is the special masculine trait, signifying the Lord Paramasiva swallowing of the deadly poison arising from the churning of the ocean and his consort stopping its passage through the gullet by checking it at the throat, all devout women have three lines in their neck like the Goddess, whose form they are. Describing this, Śrī Ādi Śaṅkara says in that *śloka*;

“O Mistress of the musical technicalities of *gati* (procedure), *gamakam* (undulations) and *gītam* (song)! As though in confirmation of the three-foldness of the strands of the auspicious string

made by twisting several threads and tied round Thy neck (surrounding the *maṅgala-sūtra*) by Thy Consort in the time of Thy marriage, shine forth the three lines of Thy neck, smiling, as it were, as the boundaries demarcating the three musical scales (or *gamakas* consisting of *śaḍja*, *madhyama* and *gāndhāra*) which form the source of the various melodies of musical modes.”

From this *śloka* it is evident how much of technical knowledge about music the Paramācārya was proficient in. That is the reason why music has the power to lead one on to Advaita. The poet Kālidāsa describes the Goddess Ambikā with the Vīṇā in her hands as “*sari-gama-padani-ratām*” in his *Navaratnamālikā*. By Her melodious music she displays a tender, soft heart and within is evident the calm peacefulness of Advaita (“*Śāntām-mṛdulasvāntām*”). It is therefore, obvious that however emotional, loving and inspiring a piece of music may be, its purposeful end must be peace. All the great musicians of the land have emphasised this fact of quiet peacefulness as the inspiring effect of music. As a poet puts it, music is love in search of a word. Śrī Muttusvāmi Dīkṣitar in his *kīrtana* delineates the Goddess Mīnākṣī as pouring out love, harmony and peace from her Vīṇā playing. Saint Tyāgarāja’s songs are over-flowing with this same sentiment of love and peace, as is evident in his *kīrtana* in *Sāma rāga*: “*śāntamu lēkā saukhyamu lēthu*”. It is this same kind of divine peace that the Tamil saint, Appar too has stressed in the phrase: “*māsil vīṇaiyum*” (மாசில் வீணையும)

Transforming Magic of Music

That music hath charms to soothe the savage nature of man is obvious in the several verses of the

Navaratnamālikā of Kālidāsa. Reference has already been made to the verse:

“*sarigamaṣadani-ratām tāṃ vīṇā saṅkrānta kānta-
hastām.*”

The soft, tender heart of Śiva’s consort full of peace and love for all mankind is described in another *śloka*:

“*śāntām mṛdulasvāntām
kusapaḍāntām namāmi śivakāntām.*”

From this is inferred the truth that the heart of the Goddess is rendered malleable, soft, yielding and tender as a flower by her own music. There is no doubt that when people pray to the Goddess who when steeped in music is called *Śyāmaḷā*, then she will endow them with all blessings of prosperity. Music wrenches such ardours from the hearts of men inspiring all with love, peace and kindness. Music helps the devotee to reach heavenly bliss easier than any amount of austerities like the study of the *Vedas*, meditation, *yoga* postures or worship of gods. “*Aprayatnena*” *i.e.* without much effort, says the sage Yājñavalkya; the fruits of all Yajña, Dāna and Tapas can be achieved by devotional music alone. Great saintly divine composers (of songs) like Śrī Tyāgarāja achieved communion with their *Iṣṭadevatās*; and even those who heard his *kīrtanas* too were likewise blessed.

The Goddess Devī (Ambāl) is *śakti* of Brahman and “*nādam*” or Music is Brahman or Īsvara. If Devī is deeply immersed in her music, it means that there is no dichotomy of Brahman and Śakti but their union, which is pure Advaita. This bliss, Devī confers to all her devotees out of her deep compassion so that their souls are dissolved in the one Absolute Paramātman.

(to be continued)

THE FOOT-PATH OF THE HINDU RELIGION*

Jagadguru Śrī Jayendra Sarasvatī

There are many religions in this world such as Buddhism, Jainism, Islam, Christianity, Zoroastrianism, etc. Most of them have been founded by some great *mahāpuruṣa* or some holy personage, or some great man at sometime or the other in history. For instance, the year 1973 denotes the period that has elapsed since the founding of Christianity. It means that Christianity was founded so many years back and it has come down to us down the corridors of time. In the same way, for the other religions also, the year of their beginning is known and the founder is also known by name, and thus we know the age of all those religions. The founders of those religions were able to attract a large number of men to their way of thinking and thus they acquired a large following.

* Courtesy: *Heritage of Bhārata Varṣa and Sanātana Dhārma*, pp. 44-51 (Discourses by Śrī Jayendra Sarasvatī Swami at Delhi in 1973. Publisher: Oriental Cultural Educational Society, 20, I Canal Road, Gandhi Nagar, Madras-20)

But in the case of Hinduism, nobody has been able to determine its age. It is therefore called *Sanātana*, very ancient. It has not been named after any founder, and, therefore, in the case of our religion, no name has been given to it. This may appear strange, but really there is nothing strange about it. Name is given to a thing only when there is more than one thing of the same kind, in order to distinguish it from the others. But in the case of Hindus, there was only one religion ever since the dawn of creation and therefore, there was no need to give it a name. Other religions did not exist before and they were founded only at a particular time in history (much later) and therefore, they were given names to identify them.

Since Hinduism has had no beginning, it has no age also. Of course, historians make some computations and say that it is 6000 years old or 10,000 years old or 20,000 years old.

Even then the fact remains that the Western scholars have accepted that our religion is an ancient one. Even taking this fact for granted that it is so many years old, nobody has been able to determine who actually founded this religion and at what time. Our religion has been there ever since the world started. There is no such thing as the Lord having been born at any time. In the same way, nobody can say that Hinduism was born at any particular time. Therefore, it is a very ancient religion. Just as nobody has created God, nobody has created this religion of Hinduism. Thus Hinduism stands on a par with God in this respect. This religion is *anādi* (without any beginning).

When people ask about our religion and we say that it is *anādi*, they just laugh at us. Similarly, if somebody asks us for how long we have been having a particular mode of worship, again we say that it is *anādi* (without beginning). We say that something is *anādi* when we are not able to give a definite period for it. But the word *anādi* in regard to the Hindu religion means that nobody had founded it, nobody had started it at any particular period in history. It has come to us down the ages. It is without any *jātaka*. That which is without a *jātaka* or horoscope is *anādi*. If something has a *jātaka*, it automatically means that it was born at a particular time, and the fact that it was born at a particular time means that it is going to die also after sometime. As Śrī Kṛṣṇa says in the *Gītā*:

जातस्य हि ध्रुवो मृत्युः ...

Hinduism has no *jātaka* and therefore it has no period, and hence it has no death also. It is only a child who is born which will die. If a child is not born at all, then how can it die? Hinduism is such an ancient religion without any beginning and therefore with no end as well.

Further, in the case of other religions, they have got their scriptures in a definite form. For instance, the *Bible* is the basic scripture for Christianity, and the *Korān* for Islam and so on. But in the case of the *Vedas*, which are the scriptures for our Hindu religion, again we cannot fix any period when they started. In the case of the founded religions, the authority for them stems from the words or utterances of their founders, and they have been compiled together in the form of a book which serves as the basic scripture of the particular

religion. But in the case of Hinduism, there is no such thing.

The *Vedas* which are our basic scriptures are without any beginning. They are considered as the breath of God Himself. The Creator of the world Himself has given us the *Vedas*. Hence they constitute sounds transmitted by God, and they have come down to us by word of mouth down the ages. Thus, our religion is not the result of any book-learning or study of books, but is based on experience. A person following other religions may read some other book after reading the *Bible* or the *Korān* as the case may be, when they are in difficulties. But in the case of Hinduism, there is no such need. The *Vedas* are not text-books but they are God's own words transmitted in the form of sound. They contain *mantras* which symbolise sounds with meanings. Therefore, there is no need for us to go to any other book. Our minds will become steady by reading the *Vedas* themselves. There may be scope for doubts in other religions, but in our religion, there is no such scope. If we see the percentage of people who get converted to other religions, we shall see that it is hardly $\frac{1}{2}$ (half) a percent or so, and that too for special reasons, namely economic advantage or professional prospects. The *Vedas* contain the means for the removal of all our doubts and for giving us happiness.

The difference between the Hindu religion and the other religions can best be illustrated by a small example. All of you are familiar with the main tar road as well as the footpath. The footpath is generally a shorter path or a shortcut, so to say. The main road

is usually named after some individual and has been constructed after a great deal of expenditure. Further, there is some opening ceremony for it, and then only the road is opened to traffic. After sometime, that road has to be repaired also! The main road is a *pucca* road, and generally it connects places by a circuitous path. To cover a distance of one furlong or so from one place to another, it will actually take a route of one mile sometimes. Further the main road is so wide that even lorries and vehicles can pass over it. As I was coming to the Uttarāsvāminī temple from Laxmībainagar, the temple appeared to be so near as at a distance of just a furlong or so, but actually when we came here by the main road, it appeared to be very much longer. If we could have come by the footpath, perhaps it would have meant only a distance of a few furlongs. Thus, the main road covers always a longer distance and it takes more time to travel by it and reach our destination. But if one follows the footpath one is able to reach one's destination more quickly.

The footpath was not started by anyone. It has no name. There is no such thing as repair of the footpath. There is no opening ceremony for it. Nobody comes to open it either. Somebody has started it at some time which we do not know and it has just come down to us. It bears no name, either of the person who opens it or of the person who had walked on it first.

As long as people go walking on it, it remains clearly visible. When the people stop walking on it, then grass and shrubs start covering it. There is no such thing as an accident on the footpath, as a result of

which it has to be closed down sometime for repairs when the traffic has to be diverted to some other route. In the case of the main road, if something happens to it or some accident takes place, then the road is closed for all traffic to enable repairs to be done. In the case of the footpath there is no such fear. People can travel by the footpath all the time, and be sure of reaching their destination very quickly.

For going to a particular place, you can choose the footpath and go quicker to the destination by covering a shorter distance. If you go by the main road, you may have to cover a very much longer distance, sometimes even two or three miles.

In the same way, Hinduism is also like a footpath. Nobody had started it. People started following the footpath long long ago, and it has come down to us even to this day. The moment people stop following it, it becomes obscured from vision. The special characteristic of the footpath is that in order that it may be clearly visible all the time, people must continue to walk on it. In the case of the main road, even if nobody walks on it, the road remains clean and visible all the time; as more traffic passes over it, the cost of repairs also becomes very high. But in the case of the footpath, as long as people continue to walk on it, it remains clear and in good condition; otherwise grass will start covering it. In fact, the more the people who walk on it, the better it is visible and the better the condition which it is in. There is no such thing as a footpath being closed or destroyed. Likewise, our ancient religion has no beginning and has no end, just like the footpath.

Further, the footpath has a definite destination. But the main road does not have any destination. It will go on and on. When we come to a traffic junction, we shall not know which way we have to go; unless there is a sign-post to tell us to which place each road goes, or unless there are name-plates for the different roads branching off from the traffic junction, as this road leads to Dindigul, this road leads to Madurai and soon, we shall be in a state of bewilderment as to what road we should take. In the absence of a signpost or chart indicating the destination of the roads, it will be difficult to know where we should go, and we shall have to go on standing at the junction not knowing in which direction to go.

But if we go by the footpath, it will automatically take us to the destination. Hinduism is like the footpath which does not need any signboard. If we follow it, we shall reach the goal quickly. Once we follow the footpath, there is no need to think any further about where we are going.

Thus, our ancient Hindu religion which was not started by any particular individual enables us to reach our goal very quickly. Since many people have gone by this and reached their destination, there is no need for us to have any doubts in this regard. The other religions are just like the tar roads. One can easily draw one's inference from this without my having to dwell on it at any length.

Our religion can also be compared to the ordinary policeman. Our religion is not a polarised religion. The policeman when he is on duty wears a certain dress and he has to do certain things at that time. But when he comes back to his house, he does not wear

that dress, because he has to do certain other things. Therefore, it is one type of action that he does when he is in uniform; and he does another type of action when he is not in uniform and when he is not on duty.

In the same manner, there are two types of *dharma* which are to be followed by us. It is not just one type of *dharma* which has to be practised by us all the time. When we go to our offices and do work there, we have to follow one particular type of *dharma*, but in our houses, we have to follow other duties which have been ordained on us. Thus, there is a type of duality as it were. In the morning, we perform certain household duties; and when we go to our offices, we do other types of duties. We have to do both of them, and only then God's grace will be bestowed on us. If we follow only one type of *dharma* throughout, in the house as well as in the office, it will only lead to indiscipline, conflict, instability and thereby mental agony.

To sum up: Hinduism is like an ancient footpath with no beginning and which was not founded by anyone. As long as we walk on it, it remains clearly visible. But when people stop going on it, the footpath becomes covered with shrubs and grass. When the main road is blocked due to some accident or there is some diversion provided, we again think of the footpath and start walking on it so that we may safely reach our destination more quickly, and the footpath becomes visible once again. The footpath may remain covered with grass for some time, but it never gets destroyed. Sometime, because it has not been in much use, it may suffer some decay. But God incarnates in the form of an *avatāra* to resuscitate that path. Śrī Kṛṣṇa says in the *Gītā*: (4 : 7):

यदा यदा हि धर्मस्य ग्लानिर्भवति भारत ।
अभ्युत्थानमधर्मस्य तदात्मानं सृजाम्यहम् ॥

He uses the word 'glāni' here and not the word *nāśa* or destruction. He refers only to decay and not destruction. Our Hinduism has had no birth and therefore it has no destruction also. Therefore, it only suffers some decay in between. At the time it undergoes decay or degeneration, God incarnates in the form of an *avatāra* to bring it back into its full use once again, or great *mahāpuruṣas* appear to set things right, or some *jñānins* are born to save our religion from decay.

Thus, God has made his advents in our country in the form of Rāma, Kṛṣṇa, and so on. In other countries, God comes only in the form of Messenger, but in our country God himself has appeared in the form of Rāma, Kṛṣṇa, and others.

In the Kaliyuga, we are still in the first quarter of it only; and it will take many more years before God will incarnate in the form of Kalki *avatāra*. So, we have had great Mahātmās or great saints who have appeared from time to time. In the *Bhaktavijaya* we find a description of the lives of these great saints.

There are also thousands of *jñānins* who have been born from time to time to resuscitate our religion, like Saint Jñānesvara and so on. It is only when there is utter decay that God himself appears, otherwise he sends only his representatives who are indeed his *aṁśas*. Even when there is decay, automatically God incarnates to set things right, and therefore, there is no question of our religion being destroyed at any time forever.

Due to environmental conditions, it may appear that our religion is decaying and, suffering is becoming much more pronounced. In fact, the whole country is in peril now. All that we have to do is to follow the ancient footpath of the Hindu religion which was not laid down by anyone but which has come down to us since ancient times, and it will definitely take us to the ultimate goal. It is unfortunate that what is *anādi* is *anātha* today, so to say. But there is no need to despair. Mahāpuruṣas are born from time to time to save our religion. So many Maharṣis have been born earlier, and many are to be born in the future also. As long as everyone does his duty and follows this footpath, there is no need to worry, as he is sure to reach his destination safely. All that is required is that everyone should do his *anuṣṭhāna*, *ācaraṇa*, *kārya* and duties with faith or *śraddhā*.

Whenever there is any sign of decay, there should be a spirit of revivalism or renaissance. It is our duty to see that the footpath is not covered with grass. The only way to ensure this is to continue to walk on the footpath. Instead of merely indulging in precepts, we should start putting those precepts into practice. If the people listen to good advice but forget about it later, it is of no use. After listening to good advice, everyone should start practising it. After listening to Śrī Kṛṣṇa's advice, Arjuna did not keep quiet but started putting the *upadeśa* into practice. Hinduism stresses not only precepts but putting things into practice. All the religious discourses would serve their purpose only if the teachings are put into practice. As long as we do our duties and put our precepts into practical action, everything will be alright. The duties ordained on us and the *dharmas* enjoined on us should be practised by

us. A father should do his *dharma* as a father, a mother should do her *dharma* as a mother, a daughter should do her *dharma* as a daughter, a teacher should do his *dharma* as a teacher, a disciple should do his *dharma* as a disciple, and so on. Every person should do the duties cast on him or her, properly and with faith. Only then will our religion start shining once again.

Therefore, people should understand the basic features of our Hindu religion, arrest the present state of decay and bring about a renaissance of our religion. It is the collective responsibility of all of us to ensure that the decay of our Hindu religion is arrested and there is renaissance once again.

If everyone starts doing his duty properly, then the necessary environment or atmosphere will be created for this. After all, the world is not so bad as it is made out to be; and, therefore, by doing our duties, we shall be able to bring about a glorious renaissance of our Hindu religion.

THE YAMUNĀṢṬAKAM — I*

Śrī Śaṅkara Bhagavatpāda

यमुनाष्टकम् - १

[1]

मुरारिकायकालिमाललामवारिधारिणी
तृणीकृतत्रिविष्टपा त्रिलोकशोकहारिणी ।
मनोऽनुकूलकूलकुञ्जपुञ्जधूतदुर्मदा
धुनोतु नो मनोमलं कलिन्दनन्दिनी सदा ॥

The river Yamunā is the one (i) who bears the lovely water having the blue colour of the body of Lord Murāri, (ii) who makes the heaven futile, on account of dispelling grief in the three worlds, and (iii) on whose enchanting banks are situated many clusters of bowers. May that daughter of Kālinda remove always the impurities of our mind.

The word Murāri denotes Lord Viṣṇu as the killer of the demon Mura. Kālinda is a mountain, and the river Yamunā

* Translated with notes by Dr. N. Gangadharan

rising from it is referred to as the daughter of Kalinda, and also as Kālindī.

[2]

मलापहारिवारिपूरभूरिमण्डितामृता
 भृशं प्रपातकप्रवञ्चनातिपण्डितानिशम् ।
 सुनन्दनन्दनाङ्गसङ्गरागरञ्जिता हिता
 धुनोतु नो मनोमलं कलिन्दनन्दिनी सदा ॥

Yamunā is resplendent with the columns of water that take away the impurities. She is eternal and is ever skilled in the removal of great sins; she shines with the blue hue on account of her contact with the handsome son of Nanda, and she is benevolent. May that daughter of Kalinda take away the impurities of our mind always.

The reading *prapātakapraṇācanātīpaṇḍitāniśam* has been chosen in lieu of *pravātakaprapaṇācanātīpaṇḍitāniśā* for better sense. So also *nandana* reads better than *nandina*. Son of Nanda denotes Lord Kṛṣṇa being brought up as a child by Nanda, the cowherd-chief.

[3]

लसत्तारङ्गसङ्गधूतभूतजातपातका
 नवीनमाधुरीधुरीणभक्तिजातचातका ।
 तटान्तवासदासहंससंवृता हि कामदा
 धुनोतु नो मनोमलं कलिन्दनन्दिनी सदा ॥

Yamunā destroys the sins of all beings as they (the beings) get the contact of her glittering waves. On her banks dwell the highly devoted *cātaka* birds with their fresh sweetness. She shines with the abundant groups of *hamsas* (swans) dwelling on her banks, and she fulfils the wishes of all. May that daughter of Kalinda remove the impurities of our mind always.

The *cātakas* and *hamsas* are aquatic birds. The former are well-known to be longing for the rains. The latter amuse in sporting in the water. These two terms may also be symbolical of the devotees of Lord Kṛṣṇa residing on the banks of the river.

[4]

विहारसखेदभेदधीरतीरमारुता

गता गिरामगोचरे यवीयनीरचारुता ।

प्रवाहसाहचर्यपूतमेदिनीनदीनदा

धुनोतु नो मनोमलं कलिन्दनन्दिनी सदा ॥

On her banks blows the gentle breeze mitigating the fatigue caused by lovesports. The beauty of her waters cannot be described by means of words. By means of her floods, she purifies the earth and the rivers flowing east and west. May that daughter of Kalinda destroy the impurities of our mind always.

The word *nadī* denotes the rivers flowing from the west to east, and *nada*, the rivers flowing from the east to west.

The river banks abound with bowers. Lord Kṛṣṇa and Rādhā and other cowherdesses sport in the bowers. The

gentle breeze blowing there is referred to as removing their fatigue.

[5]

तरङ्गसङ्गसैकताञ्चितान्तरा सदासिता
 शरद्विशक्रांशुमञ्जुमञ्जरोसभाजिता ।
 भवार्चनप्रचारुणाम्बुनाधुना विशारदा
 धुनोतु नो मनोमलं कलिन्दनन्दिनी सदा ॥

The mid-stream of Yamunā shines with the sandy stretches and waves. As her waters are of dark hue, she shines with the enchanting bunch of blossoms in the form of the rays of the autumnal moon. She is proficient in making the mundane life of the people blissful through her pleasing waters. May that daughter of Kalinda remove our mental impurities forever.

The reading *tarāṅgasaṅgasaikatāñcitāntarā* has been chosen for better sense.

The word *niśākara* denotes the moon.

[6]

जलान्तकेलिकरिचारुधिकाङ्गरागिणी
 स्वमर्तुरन्यदुर्लभाङ्गसङ्गतांशभागिनी ।
 स्वदत्तासुप्तसप्तसिन्धुभेदनातिकोविदा
 धुनोतु नो मनोमलं कलिन्दनन्दिनी सदा ॥

The unguents from the beautiful body of Rādhā sporting in the waters of Yamunā mixed with her. She,

enjoys the contact with the body of her Lord Kṛṣṇa, and such a divine contact is absolutely rare for anyone else. She is skilful in agitating the seven calm oceans, through her floods. May that daughter of Kalinda remove our mental impurities always.

It may be an exaggeration that the floods of the river Yamunā are capable of agitating the seven oceans which are otherwise calm.

[7]

जलच्युताच्युताङ्गरागलम्पटालिशालिनी
 विलोलाधिकाकचान्तचम्पकालिमालिनी ।
 सदावगाहनावतीर्णभर्तृभृत्यनारदा
 धुनोतु नो मनोमलं कलिन्दनन्दिनी सदा ॥

Yamunā's beauty become enhanced as the consorts of Lord Kṛṣṇa — with the unguents used by Lord Acyuta (Kṛṣṇa) on their limbs — bathe in the waters of Yamunā. She shines with the garland of bees which hover over the *campaka* flowers adorning the tresses of the tremulous-eyed Rādhikā. Sage Nārada and many other devotees of Lord Kṛṣṇa always descend in the waters of Yamunā for bathing. May that daughter of Kalinda remove the impurities of our mind always.

Because of the fragrance of *campaka* flowers adorning the tresses of Rādhikā, honey-bees are swarming around her tresses. The bees are fancied to form a garland.

[8]

सदैव नन्दनन्दकेलिशालिकुञ्जमञ्जुला
 तटोत्थफुल्लमल्लिकाकदम्बरेणसूज्ज्वला ।
 जलावगाहिनां नृणां भवाब्धिसिन्धुपारदा
 धुनोतु नो मनोमलं कलिन्दनन्दिनी सदा ॥

The beauty of the lovely bowers on the banks of Yamunā becomes manifold by the sports of the son of Nanda. Yamunā is radiant with the pollen dusts of the blossoming jasmine and *kadamba* trees on her banks. She enables the people — who bathe in her waters — to cross the mundane existence (and liberates them from the clutches of *saṁsāra*). May that daughter of Kalinda remove the impurities of our mind always.

Thus ends the *Yamunāṣṭakam* - I.

ADVAITA VEDĀNTA*

Arthur Isenberg

I shall not hide from you the fact that I was both pleased and embarrassed when our learned Chairman, Professor Raghavan, invited me to talk to you tonight about Vedānta and Śrī Śaṅkarācārya. *Pleased*, because without becoming a Vedāntist I have come to admire the system known as Advaita Vedānta and the lonely spiritual giant who has given it a cohesion and clarity unknown to most, if not all, other philosophical systems. *Embarrassed* because my credentials as a lecturer on Vedānta are so imperfect as to be almost entirely wanting. I am not a Sanskrit scholar — merely, a lover and beginning student of the ancient language. As for philosophy, once again I am not a scholar but merely one who agrees that “the unexamined life is not worth living,” one who has read, perhaps widely, but certainly unsystematically.

If, then, there be anything of value in what I am about to say to you, it might well be this, that it may

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be interesting to you to learn how certain concepts of Advaita Vedānta appear to a sympathetic and interested layman from the western world. And I know that I can count on your generous indulgence if my words betray my ignorance; for, as students of Śrī Śaṅkara, you are of course familiar with the great importance he attaches to *avidyā*.

I have often been struck by a strange fact, our ignorance about the lives of so many of mankind's wisest members. We do not know with certitude when Li Pe-jang better known as Lao-Tsu was born or when he died. We do not know when Gautama, the Buddha lived. We are not sure of the years of birth and death of Socrates, Jesus Christ, Mahāvīra - the Tīrthaṅkara. These men have somehow managed to remove their egos from the scene and to live on in their thoughts. Perhaps we have here one of the laws of spiritual eminence: that the great spiritual teacher must — and I should emphasize 'must' — be *self-effacing*.

Be that as it may, Śaṅkarācārya shares with those already mentioned the mystery that veils their personal lives. Tradition places his birth somewhere in the second century B.C. Modern scholarship moves the event nearer to our own times, to the seventh or eighth century, with perhaps a preference for the year 788 A. D. All agree that he died young, in his early thirties. We are told that he was born at Kālaḍi, in Cochin, in a family of Nambūdiri Brahmins, that he wandered all over India, from Cape Comorin to the Himalayas, engaging the learned men of his time in philosophical discussion; that he founded a number of *mathas*; and that he died near one of them — Badrināth — in the Himalayas. Most of the rest of what we are

told of his life is legend and anecdote and need not detain us now, for after all, mankind has always felt compelled to surround with legends and anecdotes — they are usually remarkably similar whether told in China, India or Greece — the lives of its greatest sons. We are told that they could and did revive the dead, heal the sick, tame the wild, and so on and so forth. The kernal of philosophical truth in all this, it seems to me, is that the lives of our great spiritual teachers are symbols and symbols are inexhaustible for those who ponder thereon.

But what of the lofty system of thought reared by the man whose birthday we are commemorating? If I have rightly understood it, it might be summed up — inevitably over-simplified — somewhat as follows:

Only one Entity is ultimately real: the *Nirguna Brahman* of which nothing positive can be predicated, since, to do so, would be to limit It. Of It, we can only say "*neti, neti.*" It cannot be described; but it can be experienced.

From this ineffable Entity everything else is *derived*. The entire Cosmos, the phenomenal universe including our egos (the "*aham*") but not the self (the *Ātman*) is derived "like the spiderweb from the spider." This is the result of *māyā*.

Māyā is — What? We see the word often translated as "Illusion." Properly qualified or understood, "illusion" may serve. The danger is that many people do not distinguish between "illusion" and "hallucination", and whatever *māyā* may or may not be, it is not hallucination. The universe has more reality-content in Vedānta than the snakes seen by an acute

alcoholic out of nothing. Śaṅkara himself has given us many analogies: the snake which turns out to be coils of rope, the silver which turns out to be mother-of-pearl, the thief who turns out to be a post, etc. Please note that, in all these analogies, *māyā* is portrayed as a creative mis-interpretation of something real rather than a total creation out of nothingness. Good logician that he is, Śaṅkara does not violate the doctrine, "*ex nihilo nihil fit.*"

But what then, is *māyā*? I propose to translate the word by the phrase "artistic creativity." *Māyā* is the power which enables a Kālidāsa to seize a number of words and ideas (— mere words!) and arrange them into an enchanting *Śakuntalā*. *Māyā* enables a Rembrandt to fling pigments of dyestuff on to an empty canvas and to create a *Nightwatch*. And, looking at a good painting, we are so carried away that we do not — fortunately — realize that the beautiful landscape, the charming woman, the playful child are none of them *really* there, that all is colour pigments cunningly grouped and arranged to make us forget the raw materials out of which the work of art itself is wrought.

Let us stay with the analogy of the painting a little longer. Suppose that we had before us a painting of an old man, say one with a white beard. If I invited you to gaze at it, you could easily do so. If I asked you to pick up the painting of the old man, you could do that, too. If I asked you, "What do you see?" you would tell me: "An old man." And if I pressed you and asked: "Is it really a picture of an old man?" my persistence might puzzle you, but you would reply: "Yes. Of course it is." But now I ask another question: "This painting of an old man: will you not agree

that it is really just a clever arrangement of pigments?" I take it, you would agree. I might pursue our discussion and ask you: "Will you not agree that the pigments are *really* just mixtures of chemical compounds and can be separated?" Having secured your concurrence, I should continue the enquiry by asking you whether "in reality," the chemical compounds were not "really" just configurations of atoms; and whether the atoms were, in reality, not merely groupings of electrons and protons.

Let me, at this stage, propose a definition. Let us agree to call that of two things more relatively real which has greater independent duration. Perhaps an example will make the meaning clearer. Suppose that a potter is asked to fashion a pot out of clay. Clearly, there can be no pot unless there *first* be clay. The clay existed before the pot and the pot can be squashed out of existence again without any loss of clay. In other words, the clay is a necessary antecedent for the pot. The clay can go on being clay without ever once being shaped into a pot. The pot owes its very existence to the clay, but not *vice versa*. Using the proposed definition, I would say that the clay in our example is more relatively real than the pot. Let us apply this definition to our painting of the old man. We discover a hierarchy of relative realities, the least relatively real aspect being that of the painting as such, followed in ascending order of relative reality, by the pigments, the compounds, the atoms, the electrons and protons.

I beg leave to invite your attention to two features of this analysis. First: there is nothing mystic, let alone mysterious, in our definition and concept of relative reality. Second: we are led to the perhaps astonishing

conclusion that the more relatively real something becomes the more abstract and intangible it grows. The painting of the old man you can handle. Pigments you can still see and hold in your hands. Molecules may still be rendered visible through an electron microscope. But electrons and protons can be rendered perceptible only through their effects. And this is the place to note that we are, after all, dealing only with an analogy: for the electrons and protons are not the end of the line, even in physics. They are regarded as concealed energy. This leads me to suspect that, since matter is now regarded as merely another aspect of energy, that energy itself may be merely another aspect of yet another something; concealed mindstuff, for instance.

But we are not yet through with our painting of the old man. If we look at the painting through a microscope, the painting will — literally — disappear. In fact, we may say without fear of contradiction, that on the level of electrons and protons the painting simply does not exist at all. On the other hand, we may see and say that to a person absorbed in the painting as painting, there are no electrons and protons simply because on that level they are irrelevant.

This explains why so few of us, absorbed as we are in the business of living, pause to think of *māyā*, of the fact (if our definition was right) that the phenomenal universe represents merely a relative or a derived reality. It is hard to tear oneself away from the contemplation of what is pleasing or at any rate fascinating and, in a sense, to destroy it in order to uncover a deeper, let alone the ultimate, reality. It is to Śaṅkarācārya's everlasting glory that he did just that. Let us

note just one more lesson which the painting analogy can teach us, and we shall be done with it. To say that the Painting Level is *un-real* because it is relatively less real than, say, pigment level, is to talk nonsense. Of course it is real! But it *becomes* unreal as we proceed to levels of progressively greater reality.

Similarly, the universe in which we live is real enough. But, if Advaita Vedānta is right, it becomes progressively less real as we grope toward levels of greater reality; and when we are once more back in ultimate reality — in *Nirguṇa Brahman* — the phenomenal universe will then — and *only* then — become totally unreal. Here, too, we may say with an Italian scientist: “It is the scale of observation which *determines* the phenomena.”

We have spoken at some length of *māyā* the creative, transforming power which orders the progress from one level of reality to another. We must now speak of another key concept of *advaitavāda avidyā*.

Avidyā, as is well-known, is ignorance. But what kind of ignorance? I think that in the strictest sense, *avidyā* is not just any form of ignorance, but a necessary concomitant of *māyā*, *creative* ignorance. Śaṅkara declares that the *Nirguṇa Brahman* is the only ultimate real entity and that it is both immanent and transcendent. It is inactive, yet responsible somehow for all activity. This raises a question to which there can be no certain answer, only speculative reasoning. The question: why this Brahman activity at all? What is the motive? Let us hear how Śaṅkarācārya answers this — perhaps the ultimate — riddle. He says:

We see in every-day life that certain doings of princes or other men of high position who have no

unfulfilled desires left have no reference to any extraneous purpose but proceed from mere sportfulness, as for instance, their recreations in places of amusement. We further see that the process of inhalation and exhalation is going on without reference to any extraneous purpose, merely following the law of its own nature. Analogously the activity of the Lord also may be supposed to be mere sport, proceeding from His own nature, without reference to any purpose. For, on the ground neither of reason nor of Scripture, can we construe any other purpose of the Lord. Nor can His nature be questioned. Although the creation of this world appears to us a weighty and difficult undertaking, it is mere play to the Lord, whose power is unlimited.

This, as many of you will have recognised, is taken from Śaṅkara's *Bhāṣya* on the *Vedānta-sūtras* (second *adhyāya*, first *pāda*, *sūtra* 33), the one which says:

But (Brahman's creative activity) is mere sport, such as we see in ordinary life.

What has all this to do, you may ask, with *avidyā*? I think the answer could well be this: If Brahman is the only entity that *really* is, its sporting must of necessity proceed within itself. But what sport can there be in an activity which is exclusively self-created and self-conscious? Since neither the *Vedānta-sūtras* nor Śaṅkara disdain drawing on "ordinary life" for an analogy in this difficult task of assessing the ultimate motive, let us make bold to follow their example.

Suppose you go to the theatre to watch a play. Surely you can derive no entertainment, no "sport", if

you remain at all times fully conscious that you are watching mere makebelief. To enjoy the play you have no choice but somehow to manage to forget for a while that what you are watching is not *really* real; that the end of the play already exists; that the heroine is not really a suffering queen — is not queen at all — but just an actress. If at all times you kept thinking “Oh well, it is all makebelief!” you could not enjoy the play.

Or take your dreams. In them, you participate in strange doings, now enjoyable, now frightening, always interesting. You are not, as a rule, aware of the obvious fact that you yourself are the dreamer, the playwright, the actor, the designer of the stage set. If you were aware of these facts, you could no longer “sport” in your dream. In other words, and this is the point, there can be no “sporting” without *avidyā*. To remember, to gain “*Vidyā*”, is to end the dream, to end the enjoyment of the play. Hence: *avidyā*.

Let us quote Śaṅkara once more. I think he is, as usual, unambiguously clear on this point. He says:

As clay is the efficient cause of the pot, so is ignorance declared by the Vedānta to be the efficient cause of the universe. When that ignorance itself is destroyed, where then is the universe?... When the ultimate reality is realized, the universe vanishes. (Śaṅkara's *Aparokṣānubhūti*)

I cannot resist the temptation to digress for a moment. I happen to think that one of the finest artistic and philosophic conceptions ever created by the mind of man is that of the Dancing Śiva, Śiva

Naṭarāja. To me, it sums up the essence of Śaṅkara's conception of the world. We find in it a representation of the universe as an emanation of Śiva, the sporting deity. Many of the symbolic features of the work of art are well-known and well explained: how the material universe (represented by the *Tiruvāṣi, prakṛti*) springs into existence as vibrations emerge from Śiva's drum, how the universe will end, temporarily, through the fire, held in Śiva's hand, the gesture of "have no fear!", the pointing to the auspicious foot — all that I learned long ago. But it was only until after some six years of thinking about the Naṭarāja concept from time to time, yet another meaning implied in the symbol suddenly struck me:

Most of the Naṭarāja statues, as you know, show Śiva dancing or trampling on a dwarfish figure. This figure is, of course, none other than our old friend, Ignorance, *avidyā*, although it has many other names, including "evil" or "sin". But I like to think of it as *avidyā*. Śiva stamping out ignorance! I liked that thought. When it occurred to me that if Śiva is stamping out ignorance, it is equally true that ignorance provides the only footing for Śiva. Look at the statue of Naṭarāja; remove the figure of ignorance, and what will Śiva have to stand on? Literally nothing. And thus we see again how right Śaṅkarācārya is when he declares: "When the ultimate reality is realised, the universe vanishes."

It is Śiva's destiny to help man overcome ignorance. His own end is, implicit in the success of that mission. For, as Śaṅkarācārya says, end ignorance and you end the universe, including Śiva. What is left is only *Nirguṇa Brahman*, ultimate reality.

I do not find in this awesome edifice of thought much consolation, unless it be the affirmation, by a ruthlessly honest and profound thinker, that there is, there exists an ultimate reality at all. But if the thought-edifice is stark, it has the tremendous virtue — at any rate I so regard it — of being completely self-consistent. I know of no other system so free from internal contradictions. To have been the architect of so flawless a building is an achievement that must leave us lesser men breathless and awed.

There may be more consolation in the philosophic and religious systems of others, particularly of those who assure us that the purpose of the universe is the eventual triumph of good over evil. I frankly admit that I find it personally impossible to reconcile my experience of the universe with the notion of the supremacy of morals at the core of creation. I reckon it an advantage, not a flaw, in Śaṅkarācārya's system that it leaves morals wholly and entirely within the realm of man's responsibility. You will derive no authority from Śaṅkara for any attempt to saddle the ultimate deity with responsibility for man's good and evil deeds. Morals are of the utmost importance to us as mortal men and women. We — and we alone — must bear the responsibility in this sphere. No ultimately Real can ever be used as a scape-goat by us for the evil we bring into the world. This may be a harsh sentence. But it lends significance to our lives: we are not someone's marionets.

Progress along those lines may be painfully slow. But can we afford to disagree with the words of a German poet, Ruckert, who said:

Whither we cannot fly, we must go limping. The Scripture saith that limping is no sin.

One final remark; I believe that it is not an accident that among the world's outstanding theoretical physicists of the Western world so many — I am speaking relatively — should have been attracted to Vedānta. The reason is, I think, quite easy to see. Advaita Vedānta provides a complete philosophical and conceptual framework within which the findings of advanced modern physical science can be placed without stress or tear. Monism seemed unattractive as long as scientists had to believe in the separate natures of matter and energy. But now that matter and energy have been proved to be equivalent aspects of one underlying something, the appeal of monism has become far greater, if not indeed irresistible.

It is an interesting fact that Eastern and Western thought should in our century, for the first time, find themselves arriving at similar conclusions after journeying through the centuries in diametrically opposite directions. For time was when the East said, in effect: "Our external environment is purely phenomenal. No approach to ultimate Reality can be made by its observation and manipulation. The road lies through introspection." While the West, at least ever since Galileo, said, in effect: "We can make progress toward an understanding of reality only through controlled, repeatable manipulation of our environment, that is through experiments. All other roads are not to be trusted, are purely subjective and without probative value." And for a while — throughout the nineteenth century — it looked as if the Western approach would lead to a universe based on nothing more complicated

than levers and gears, a gigantic but perfectly orderly mechanism. The dream came to an abrupt end with the discovery of the phenomenon of radioactivity and its following of a non-mechanical set of laws. The end of materialism in science was not long delayed. One by one, mechanical and material models had to be given up. But to me the most surprising thing about this state of affairs was the realisation that the thought structure reared by men like Śaṅkarācārya was fully capable of accommodating the perplexing new insights of the men of science of the West.

The scientists — or at any rate some of them — are aware of these changes. Says Sir Arthur Eddington:

We are no longer tempted to condemn the spiritual aspects of our nature as illusory... We have travelled far from standpoint which identifies the real with the concrete... Our system of philosophy is itself on trial. (*Science and the Unseen World*)

India today is benefiting in many ways from Western science — a science no doubt greatly enriched by the many contributions of Indian scientists, men like Raman, Bose and Chandrasekharan. This is as it should be. But the Western world too is beginning once more to benefit from the deep voyages of exploration into the nature and role of man undertaken by Indian explorers no less intrepid and infinitely more lonely than the men who braved Mount Everest. A growing number of people in my own country, the United States, are delving into the treasures of your philosophy. A recent translation of the *Gītā* found more than two and a half lakhs of readers in the United States within less than one year. I envy my fellow-

countrymen, the intellectual excitement which will be theirs when they first discover the writings of men such as the one whom we have gathered to honour today.

Or let us, more truthfully, say that in honouring the memory and work of Śrī Śaṅkarācārya, we are just honouring ourselves. Thank you.

SUREŚVARA ON THE LOCUS AND CONTENT OF AVIDYĀ

R. Balasubramanian

The empirical world which involves distinctions such as cognizer, cognitum, cognition, and source of cognition and which is replete with action, instrument of action, and the ensuing result is *mithyā*. By contrast to the empirical world which is not-Self, the Self is immutable consciousness, one and non-dual. The entire world of plurality is a superimposition on the immutable Self. It is well-known that, though the object in front is only a rope, it is nevertheless perceived as a snake due to ignorance. In the same way the non-dual Self which is the reality is perceived as the pluralistic universe due to ignorance. The perception of one thing as another due to ignorance is called *adhyāsa*: it is, to use the celebrated words of Śaṅkara, *atasmin tadbuddhiḥ*.

It is necessary in this connection to distinguish the case of *adhyāsa* caused by ignorance from that of *upāsanā* enjoined by scripture. Not every case of perceiving one thing as another can be called *adhyāsa*. In meditation (*upāsanā*) one object is cognized as another as enjoined

by scripture. Suresvara, for example, refers to the method of meditating on the *udgītha* as taught in the *Upaniṣad*. The text says: "This (earth) is verily the the *Ṛk*, and fire is the *Sāman*." Here the *Ṛk* should be viewed as the earth, and the *Sāman*, as fire, for the purpose of meditation on the authority of scripture. Unlike the rope-snake example where a person, not knowing the object in front as a rope, cognizes it as a snake, here the meditator knowing the *Ṛk* as what it is nevertheless cognizes it as the earth not because of ignorance, but because of scriptural injunction. So *adhyāsa* caused by ignorance is different from *adhyāsa* which one deliberately practises due to scriptural injunction.

The nature of *ajñāna* is such that it is always dependent on something else both for its existence and revelation. It requires the Self for its locus as well as for its revelation. Knowledge, as ordinarily understood, is relational; it belongs to someone and is about something. Like knowledge, ignorance too involves subject-object relation. Ignorance must always be ignorance of someone and must be about something. In other words, it requires a locus (*āśraya*) and a content (*viśaya*). Suresvara discusses this question at some length in the *sambandhokti* at the commencement of the third chapter of his *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi*. Of the two entities we speak of at the *vyāvahārika* level, viz., the Self and the not-Self, the Self alone, declares Suresvara, is both the locus and the content of *ajñāna*. He adduces four reasons to show why the not-Self cannot be its locus. First of all, the not-Self is of the nature of ignorance; and it makes no sense to say that ignorance is located in the not-Self which is also ignorance. Secondly, *ajñāna* by

its very nature is capable of concealing the truth and projecting the false. But it will not have any scope for its work of concealment and distortion even if it should rest in the not-Self, because the latter does not admit of concealment. There is the principle that knowledge and ignorance must have the same locus (*ekādhikaraṇa*) if they should be mutually exclusive. Since the not-Self which is material is incapable of acquiring knowledge, it cannot be invested with ignorance. It follows that *ajñāna* which is the negation of knowledge (*jñāna-pratiśedhātmakam*) cannot be located in the not-Self as it will not have any work to do therein. Thirdly, since the entire not-Self is a product of *ajñāna*, it cannot be the locus of its own cause which is antecedent to it. Reference may be made in this connection to an oft-quoted statement of Sarvajñātman, which echoes Suresvara's view: "*pūrvāsiddhatamaso hi paścimo nāśrayo bhavati nāpi gocaraḥ.*" Fourthly, it is well-known that anything which serves as a locus has a nature of its own independently of what is located in it. Since the not-Self has no nature of its own independently of *ajñāna*, it cannot be the locus therefor. For these reasons the not-Self, Suresvara concludes, cannot be the locus of *ajñāna*.

The reasons given above, according to Suresvara, will also prove that the not-self is not the content (*viśaya*) of *ajñāna*. First of all, since the not-Self is of the nature of ignorance, to say that the not-Self is the content of ignorance amounts to saying that ignorance is the content of ignorance, which is absurd. Secondly, the not-Self which is material is not fit enough to be concealed by ignorance; consequently, it cannot be the object of ignorance. Thirdly, the not-Self is a product

of ignorance. That which is an effect of ignorance cannot be its content. For example, the illusory silver which is a product of *ajñāna* is not the content thereof. In this case, knowledge of shell (*śuktiviśayakajñāna*) removes ignorance of shell (*śuktiviśayaka ajñāna*). It means that, while shell is the content of ignorance, silver is its effect. If so, silver which is the effect of ignorance cannot be its content. In the same way, the not-Self which is the effect of ignorance cannot be its content. We may drive home this point in another way. The not-Self comes into existence from *ajñāna* which has already the Self as its locus and content: that is to say, *ajñāna* which is located in the Self conceals the nature of the Self and then projects the not-Self. So the not-Self, being a product of *ajñāna* which has already the Self as its content, cannot be the content of *ajñāna*. Fourthly, in the case of shell-silver illusion, shell is the content of ignorance; when the right knowledge arises, silver which is a product of ignorance gets negated. It means that in this case there is an object, *viz.* shell, which is fit enough to be the content of ignorance and which is different from that (silver) which is negated by the right knowledge of the shell. This principle does not hold if we say that the not-Self is the content of ignorance. If the not-Self is the content of ignorance, what is that which, being different from the not-Self, will be negated by the right knowledge? This question cannot be answered because of the wrong supposition that the not-Self is the content of ignorance.

In justification of his view that the Self is both the locus and the content of *ajñāna*, Suresvara invites our attention to our own experience. At some stage or

other, everyone says: "I am ignorant" (*ajñō'smī*); but an insentient object like a pot does not declare that it is ignorant. This clearly shows that the Self alone can be the locus of ignorance. Suresvara also refers to the confession of Nārada to Sanatkumāra: "Revered Sir, as I am, I know only the *mantras*; I know not the Self," a confession which comes from one who knows that the knower of the Self alone crosses over sorrow (*tarati śokam-ātmavit*). It is necessary to bear in mind two points in this connection. First of all, there is no doubt in the mind of Nārada whether he is ignorant or not. On the contrary he knows that he is ignorant. Secondly, knowing that he is ignorant of the Self, he approaches Sanatkumāra with the request to teach him the knowledge of the Self for overcoming his ignorance. It means that the Self is the locus as well as the content of ignorance.

Suresvara also shows that the view that the Self is the locus of *ajñāna* can meet the objections raised by him against the opposite view. First of all, the Self being of the nature of consciousness can be the locus of ignorance. Secondly, since the Self is self-luminous consciousness, *ajñāna* can, by indwelling in the Self, do the work of concealment and distortion of the truth; and it can also be removed through *pramāṇa-jñāna* for the attainment of which there is scope in it. Consider, for example, the following statements: "Now I do not know," and "Now I know." While the former statement suggests the presence of ignorance which is by nature the negation of knowledge (*jñānapratishedhāt-makam ajñānam*), the latter implies the rise of knowledge which removes ignorance (*ajñāna-vināśaka-jñānot-patti*). Thirdly, the Self which is *anādi* is not a product

of ignorance; and so it can be the locus for the latter. Finally, the Self which is consciousness is capable of revealing *ajñāna* which is material; consequently the Self, having a nature of its own independently of ignorance, can be the locus for it.

If the Self is the locus of ignorance, it cannot also, the opponent argues, be the content of ignorance. What holds good in the case of knowledge also holds good in the case of ignorance. Knowledge is in someone, and it is about something else. It means that the locus of knowledge is different from the content of knowledge. In the same way, if ignorance is in someone and if it is about something else, then its locus must be different from its content. In other words, one and the same entity cannot be both the locus and the content of ignorance. Since the Self is one and non-dual, homogeneous and partless, it is not possible to suggest, the critic argues, that ignorance is located in one part of the Self which is known and that its content will be the other part of the Self which is not known. So, if the Self is the locus of ignorance, it cannot, the critic concludes, be the content of ignorance as well.

By way of answering this objection Suresvara says that the Self is the content of ignorance. It is a matter of common experience for us to say: "I know myself," and also "I do not know myself." In the former case, one who has knowledge as well as the content of knowledge is one and the same person. In the latter case also, one and the same person is both the locus and the content of ignorance, *viz.* myself. The same line of explanation may be adopted to show that the Self is both the locus and the content of ignorance. So long as there is *vyavahāra*, the Self is *saviśeṣa*; and so we speak of its

general and specific features and also of its being known and unknown. While existence (*sadrūpam*) which is its general feature is known, non-duality and bliss (*advītyānandarūpam*) which are its specific features are not known. That aspect of the Self which is known is not concealed by *ajñāna*; and that aspect which is not known is concealed by it. So the statement "I do not know myself," conveys the idea that, even though I know myself in a general way as one existing, I do not know the special features in me such as non-duality and bliss. So Suresvara's views that *ajñāna* is not only located in, but also has, the Self as its content is tenable.

Suresvara considers the possible objections against the view that the Self is the locus of ignorance. Every one of these objections requires some brief explanation. (1) Knowledge and ignorance are mutually exclusive; if so how can ignorance be located in the Self which is of the nature of knowledge? (2) Since the Self is without a second, how can *ajñāna* which is different from it be located in it? (3) Since the relation of the locus and the contained involves difference, it is incompatible with the non-dual nature of the Self. (4) Since the Self is the source of *pramāṇa-jñāna* which removes ignorance, it cannot be the locus of ignorance any more than the sun could be the locus of darkness. (5) The Self by its very nature is unattached, because there is no second to it: it is ever free such that there cannot be any blemish whatsoever in it, and so *ajñāna* cannot be associated with it. In support of this there are *śruti* texts.' Suresvara's answer is that there is no incompatibility between the Self and *ajñāna* and that the partless and non-dual Self appears to be differen-

tiated and relational due to ignorance alone (*ajñāna-mātranimitatvāt*).

In order to answer the first objection it is necessary to clarify the sense in which the Self is said to be of the nature of knowledge. The Advaitin makes a distinction between *pramāṇa-jñāna* and *svarūpa-jñāna*. The latter is also called *sākṣi-caitanya*. Of the three epistemological factors, viz. the knower, the known, and the resulting knowledge, which are set up by *ajñāna*, what is called *pramāṇa-jñāna* is one of them. Inasmuch as it is part of the triple distinction projected by *ajñāna*, it cannot constitute the nature of the Self. The Advaitin does not say that this *pramāṇa-jñāna* is the locus of *ajñāna*. On the contrary, *sākṣi-caitanya*, otherwise called *svarūpa-jñāna*, is the locus of *ajñāna*. The second objection also can be answered only by presupposing *ajñāna*. Since *sākṣi-caitanya* and *ajñāna* are revealer and the revealed, they are not opposed to each other. The former can, therefore, be the locus for the latter. The real position is that from the standpoint of the Self, there is no *ajñāna* at all. Since *ajñāna* has to depend upon the Self both for its existence and cognition, in the same way as the illusory snake has to depend upon the rope both for its existence and cognition, it is but a superimposition on the Self and cannot, therefore, be reckoned as a real entity different from the Self. When we explain the relation between the Self which is the Witness-consciousness and *ajñāna* in terms of the revealer and the revealed, or in terms of the locus and the contained, we presuppose *ajñāna*. That is why Suresvara says that these relations are, indeed, dependent on *ajñāna*, while the truth is that the Self *per se* is neither the revealer nor the locus of

ajñāna. Since the relation of the locus and the contained is from the standpoint of *ajñāna* alone and not from the standpoint of the Self, the third objection too is of no avail; the non-dual nature of the Self remains untouched, whatever relation is superimposed thereon through *ajñāna*. The fourth objection also can be answered in terms of *ajñāna*. The *pramāṇa-jñāna* which removes *ajñāna* can arise only if there is the internal organ which is a product of *ajñāna*. Finally, the Self in itself is said to be unattached and ever free. If we view the non-relational Self as relational through *ajñāna*, it does not in any way affect the Self: the Self remains the same, notwithstanding the superimposition of relations and qualities thereon through *ajñāna*.

NOTES

1. *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, 1.6.1.
2. *San̄kṣeṣa-sārīraka*, I. 319.
3. *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, 7.1.3.
4. See *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, 4.3.15 and *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad*, 6.19.

CRITIQUE OF DIFFERENCE

*S. Revathy**

God, soul and the world that constitute the subject-matter of the schools of Vedānta are held to be real entities by the school of Dvaita Vedānta. The latter further holds that there is difference between God and the souls, between God and the objects of the world, between the souls and the objects of the world, among the souls, and among the objects of the world. Even in the state of liberation there is difference between one released soul and another, each one retaining its individuality. Difference, thus, is the key-concept according to the Dvaita Vedānta.

It may be said that difference which is noticed in common experience is seemingly real but ultimately non-real on the following grounds: difference may be admitted as being established on the basis of the cognition that pot and cloth are mutually different (*ghaṭa-
paṭau parasparam bhinnau*), or pot is different from cloth (*ghaṭaḥ paṭādbhinnah*), or pot is not cloth (*ghaṭaḥ paṭo*

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na), or there is difference between pot and cloth (*ghaṭa-paṭayorbhedah*). None of these cognitions could establish difference. We shall set forth the arguments in favour of this view.

The cognition that pot and cloth are mutually different (*ghaṭapaṭau parasparam bhinnau*) cannot establish difference. It is because this cognition is a complex one of the form that pot and cloth are associated with difference (*ghaṭapaṭau bhedaviśiṣṭau*). And, a complex-cognition, for its rise, depends upon the cognition of its adjectival feature. For example, the complex-cognition 'the person with a stick' (*daṇḍī-puruṣah*) cannot arise unless one has the cognition of the adjectival feature — stick or *daṇḍa*. In the same way, here the adjectival feature in the complex-cognition — *bhedaviśiṣṭau ghaṭapaṭau*, *bheda* or difference is the adjectival feature. And its cognition is necessary for the rise of the cognition that pot and cloth are mutually different which is admitted to establish difference. The defect of inter-dependence is quite clear.

Further, the ascertainment of the difference between the adjectival and the substantive feature is the cause of the complex-cognition. Here, in the cognition 'Pot and cloth are mutually different', pot and cloth constitute the substantive feature, and *bheda* constitutes the adjectival feature. And the cognition of difference between the two — pot and cloth on the one hand and difference on the other is essential for the rise of the complex-cognition that pot and cloth are mutually different. Again the defect of inter-dependence cannot be overcome. On this ground we have to conclude that the cognition 'Pot and cloth are mutually different' cannot establish difference.

The second cognition too that pot is different from cloth cannot establish difference. Here, in this cognition cloth is manifested as the *pratiyogin* or the counter-positive of difference. Such a cognition of cloth as the *pratiyogin* of difference is possible only when there is the cognition of difference. And it is only when cloth is cognized, there could be the manifestation of difference as having cloth as its counter-positive. Thus the defect of inter-dependence is quite evident and so this cognition too is not efficacious in establishing difference.

The third cognition also that pot is not cloth cannot prove difference. This cognition is admitted to be referring to the negation of the identity of cloth in pot. And the absence of identity is difference. But the identity of cloth is of the nature of cloth itself and its negation in pot can very well be viewed as *atyantābhāva* or absolute non-existence and there is thus no valid proof to maintain that such a negation is difference.

Further in the cognition that pot is not cloth, pot is manifested as the substratum (*anuyogin*) and the cloth as the counter-positive (*pratiyogin*). The cognition of difference will not arise without the cognition of *anuyogin* and *pratiyogin*. And, the cognition of one as *anuyogin* and another as *pratiyogin* is based upon the cognition of difference between the two. And this involves the defect of inter-dependence.

The fourth cognition of the form that there is difference between pot and cloth (*ghaṭapatayoḥ bhedaḥ*) when expressed involves the usage of the dual suffix — *ghaṭapatayoḥ*. And the latter is possible only when there is the cognition of difference between pot and cloth.

But the difference between pot and cloth is sought to be established on the basis of the cognition that pot and cloth are different. The defect of inter-dependence is inherent in this view also.¹

It is the above difficulties that have led the Dvaitin to assert that difference constitutes the essential nature of an object. That is, the difference of cloth in pot is of the nature of pot only. He argues that this is analogous to the Advaitin's view that identity (*aikya*) between the true nature of *jīva* which is pure consciousness and the true nature of God which too is pure consciousness is of the nature of pure consciousness only and is not something over and above the pure consciousness.²

The Dvaitin further argues that the view that difference constitutes the essential nature of an object must be admitted on the following ground: after the rise of the cognition of pot due to the contact of sense of sight with pot, there does not arise the doubt whether this is a pot or not; nor does there arise the contrary notion that this is not a pot. And this would be possible only if the pot while cognized is cognized as different from all other objects of the world. And difference from all other objects of the world in pot must be held to be the essential nature of the pot itself. This does not involve any defect such as inter-dependence and the like.³

The above view is open to one objection which is as follows: if difference is admitted to be the essential nature of an object, then the experience and the corresponding expression — *ghaṭasya bhedaḥ* involving difference between *ghaṭa* and *bheda* would not hold good.

The Dvaitin answers the above objection by saying that the above experience and the corresponding expression are similar to the experience and the corresponding expression — *padārthasya svarūpam*. Here, the essential nature (*svarūpa*) of an object is the same as the object. It is not different from it. It is only in the expression — *padārthasya svarūpam*, the difference between the object and its nature is manifested but not in the experience that is the basis of the expression. If it is held that in the experience also, difference between the object and its nature is manifested, then that experience will be erroneous as it comprehends the difference between the object and its nature which does not exist. This experience cannot be considered to be erroneous as there is no subsequent sublating cognition. In the same way, the experience, comprehends the identity between the object and difference. But if it should be communicated, then the genitive suffix has to be used. It should not be thought that there is difference between the object and difference.' To sum up: difference constitutes the essential nature of an object. It is real as it is not affected by the defect of inter-dependence as the *pūrvapakṣin* thinks.

The Advaitin would fully agree with the Dvaitin that after the rise of the cognition of pot due to the contact of sense of sight with the pot, there does not arise doubt or contrary notion in regard to the nature of pot. He would also agree with the Dvaitin that the above position warrants us to assume that the object when it is comprehended is comprehended as different from all other objects of the world. At this stage, the Dvaitin concludes that difference must be held as the essential nature of the object concerned. The Advaitin,

however, develops the argument further and states that in order that there may be the perceptual cognition of difference from all other objects of the world, what is necessary is the perceptual cognition of all the objects, which, however, is an impossibility. There are factors like *dharma*, *adharma*, etc. which are supra-sensuous. The objects of the past and of the future cannot be perceptually cognized. In the absence of the cognition of difference from all other objects, the cognition of pot as different from all other objects cannot hold good. If it is held that pot is not cognized as different from all other objects, then there is every likelihood of the rise of doubt or contrary notion in regard to the nature of pot, which however, is not noticed. Thus to maintain the absence of doubt or contrary notion in regard to the nature of an object after the rise of the perceptual cognition of that object, it must be held that that object is comprehended as different from all other objects of the world. But the comprehension of difference from all other objects, as has been shown above, is an impossibility. It is this dilemma that has forced the Advaitins like Maṇḍanamisra — the author of the *Brahmasiddhi*⁵ and a contemporary of Śrī Śaṅkara, and Jñānaghanapāda of 1000 A.D. — the author of the *Tattvasuddhi*⁶ to set forth the view that perception comprehends the substratal reality only and the objects like pot, etc., are only illusory presentations.

Difference as a category is admitted by the Advaitin. What he denies is its reality. It is *prasiddha*, that is, given in ordinary experience, but it is not *pramāṇasiddha*. As Vimuktātman states:

*satyam bheda prasiddhirasti, ata eva vyavaharāmaḥ.
kintu nāsyāḥ mūlam paśyāma iti.*⁷

Śrī Madhusūdana Sarasvatī in his commentary on the *Samkṣepaśārīraka* (I. 2) refers to the five-fold difference and states that it is only projected by nescience in the non-dual reality — Brahman. The latter is Advaita, that is, it is the substratum of the absence of all differences. And it is the essential nature of the so-called *jīva*.

NOTES

1. Nārāyaṇāśramī, *Advaitasiddhāntasārasaṅgraha* (Bombay: Nirnayasaḡar Press, 1935), pp. 46-47.

2. Śrī Madhvācārya, *Viṣṇutattvavivirṇaya* (Madras: Śrīmanmadhvarāddhāntasaṁvardhini Sabhā, 1969), p. 461.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 476.

4. *Ibid.*

5. Maṇḍanamiśra, *Brahmasiddhi* Madras Govt. Oriental Series, No. 4., 1937), II. 11.

For details see R. Balasubramaniam, *Advaita Vedānta* (Madras University Philosophical Series, 23, 1976), pp. 146-193.

6. Jñānaghanapāda, *Tattvaśuddhi* (Madras University Philosophical Series, 1941), p. 5.

7. Vimuktātman, *Iṣṭasiddhi* (Baroda: Gaekwad Oriental Series, No. LXV, 1933), p. 2.

THE INTERPRETATION OF THE GREAT SAYINGS (MĀHA-VĀKYAS) OF THE UPANIṢADS

N. Veezhinathan

The schools of Śrī Rāmānuja and Śrī Madhva consider the three factors of God, soul, and the world to be distinct realities. But Advaita Vedānta considers that these three are but the appearances of a transcendental entity which is non-dual consciousness.

The Upaniṣadic texts such as *tat tvam asi*,¹ etc., give rise to the knowledge of the transcendental entity. The latter is sometimes referred to as the all-pervading principle and is designated as Brahman;² and, at other times it is referred to as the inner consciousness of the individual soul and is designated as Ātman.³ The term *tat* gives us the knowledge of Brahman, while the term *tvam* gives us the knowledge of Ātman. This distinction is never meant to be taken as final. What the texts like *tat tvam asi* aim at teaching is the identity of Brahman and Ātman, or more strictly the non-difference of the one from the other. And, the texts like *tat tvam asi* are characterized as great sayings or major texts or *mahāvākyas*. Rāmatīrtha in his commentary

on the *Haristuti* of Śrī Śaṅkara* and Gaṅgādharendra Sarasvatī in his *Svārājya-siddhi*† give the interpretation of the five great sayings of the *Upaniṣads* which are as follows:

1. *prajñānam brahma* (*Rg-veda—Ait.*, III-3).
2. *aham brahmāsmi* (*Śukla-Yajur-veda—Brh.*, I, iv, 10).
3. *sa yaścāyaṁ puruṣe, yaścāsāvāditye, sa ekaḥ* (*Kṛṣṇa-Yajur-veda—Taitt.*, II, vii, 5).
4. *tat tvam asi* (*Sāma-veda—Chānd.*, VI, vii, 7).
5. *ayaṁ ātmā brahma* (*Atharva-veda, Māṇḍ.*, II).

We shall now consider how the great sayings convey the identity of Brahman and Ātman. A sentence could give rise to the knowledge of its sense only through the knowledge of the senses of the words constituting it. Words convey their senses through three kinds of signification, namely, primary one (*mukhyā vṛtti*), secondary one (*lakṣaṇā vṛtti*) and the one based upon the relation of qualities (*gauṇī vṛtti*). These three may be defined as follows:

A. Primary signification is the power that is present in a word through which the latter conveys a sense by means of either a universal (*jāti*), or a quality (*guṇa*), or activity (*kriyā*), or relation (*sambandha*).

B. The secondary signification is the power that is present in a word through which the latter conveys a sense which is different from but invariably associated with its primary meaning. And it is of three kinds:

- (i) *Jahallakṣaṇā* or exclusive secondary signification.

- (ii) *ajahallakṣaṇā* or non-exclusive secondary signification.
- (iii) *jahad-ajahallakṣaṇā* or exclusive-cum-non exclusive secondary signification.

The above three may be defined and illustrated as follows:

(i) *Jahallakṣaṇā* is that power through which a word completely leaves out its primary sense and signifies some other sense that is invariably connected with its primary meaning. This kind is adopted in the case of sentences such as 'The hamlet is on the Ganges', wherein the word 'Ganges' conveys the sense of bank which is invariably connected with its primary sense — the current.

(ii) *Ajahallakṣaṇā* is that power through which a word retains its primary sense and further conveys some other sense connected with its primary sense; and it is adopted in the case of sentences such as 'The red (horse) runs,' wherein the word 'red' retains its primary sense of redness and conveys the sense of horse to which redness belongs.

(iii) *Jahad-ajahallakṣaṇā* is that power through which a word leaves out a part of its primary sense and conveys another part. This kind is operative in the case of sentences such as "This is that Devadatta." The word 'that' conveys primarily Devadatta as related to past time and a different place. The word 'this' conveys primarily Devadatta as related to present time and a particular place. The sentence as a whole should convey the identity between the meanings of the two words constituting it. Here the meanings of the two

words are opposed to each other and hence identity between the two is impossible. The two words, therefore, leave out a part of their primary senses, namely, the spatial and temporal relation and convey another part, namely, the person-in-himself.

C. Signification based upon the relation of qualities is the power that is present in a word through which the latter conveys some other sense which has the same qualities that are present in its primary sense. This kind of signification is adopted in the case of sentences such as "Devadatta is a lion." Here since the literal meaning, namely, 'Devadatta being a lion' is discrepant, the word 'lion' signifies the person — 'Devadatta', who has the qualities of valour, cruelty, etc., — the qualities which are present in the primary sense of the word 'lion'. These qualities are secondarily signified by the word 'lion'.

Kumarila Bhaṭṭa explains⁶ the distinction between the secondary signification and the signification based upon the relation of qualities thus: a word has secondary signification if it signifies another sense connected with its primary sense. And, a word has signification based upon the relation of qualities if it conveys another sense having the same qualities present in its primary sense.

Now the question arises: what kind of signification is adopted by the words *tat* and *tvam* in conveying Brahman and Ātman respectively? Words cannot convey Brahman-Ātman through primary signification because of the absence of media, namely, relation, quality, action, and universal in Brahman-Ātman — the media through which words could convey their senses through primary signification. Never indeed in

Brahman-Ātman wherein all attributes are negated by the Upaniṣadic text "Not this, not this," is there the possibility of relation and other media referred to above, in which case the primary signification would hold good. Thus the absence of the media through which words could convey Brahman through primary signification suggests that Brahman cannot be conveyed through primary signification.

It follows from the above that the words could convey Brahman-Ātman either through secondary signification or the one based on the relation of qualities. And a word, in order to signify a sense secondarily requires its primary meaning. Hence we must first discuss the primary senses of the words constituting the great sayings of the *Upaniṣads*.

The primary as well as secondary senses could be known only from the *Upaniṣads*. The latter are known as subsidiary Upaniṣadic texts (*avāntara-vākya*) because they signify only the meanings of the words like *tat* and *tvam* constituting the great sayings such as *tat tvam asi* and the like.' The Upaniṣadic text "That from which these beings arise, that from which the created beings derive existence and manifestation, and into which they lapse back at the time of dissolution, seek to know That — That is Brahman" conveys the primary sense of the word *tat*. This passage states that the source of the universe is Brahman. The latter becomes the source of the universe only through *avidyā*: and, as possessing the characteristic of being the source of the universe, it is viewed as Īsvara — the blend of Brahman, the sentient element and *avidyā*, the insentient element. The primary meaning of the word *tat*, therefore, is Īsvara who is omniscient and is known mediately.

The Upaniṣadic texts such as “Brahman is truth, consciousness, and absolute,”¹⁰ ‘Brahman is consciousness and bliss’,¹¹ and the like convey the secondary sense of the word *tat*, namely, Brahman which is truth, consciousness, bliss, and non-dual.

In the same way, the Upaniṣadic texts give us the knowledge of the primary and secondary senses of the word *tvam*. The Upaniṣadic texts ‘As a large fish swims alternately to both banks of a river — the east and the west — so does the infinite being move to both these states: dreaming and waking,’¹² and ‘As a hawk or falcon roaming in the sky becomes tired, folds its wings, and hastens for its nest, so does this infinite entity (*puruṣa*) hasten for this state, where falling asleep, he cherishes no more desires and dreams no more dreams,’¹³ state that the *puruṣa* or the self experiences the three states of waking, dream, and deep sleep. The self as the experient of the three states is *jīva* who is ignorant, finite, and immediate. And it is the primary sense of the word *tvam*.

The Upaniṣadic texts such as ‘The self is (transparent) like water; it is self-luminous consciousness, one, and free from duality,’¹⁴ convey the self to be self-luminous consciousness and non-dual; and, it is termed *Ātman*. The secondary sense of the word *tvam* is, therefore, *Ātman* which is self-luminous consciousness.

Now the question arises as to the specific kind of secondary signification that could be adopted. This centres around the discussion regarding the nature of *jīva* and *Īśvara* — the primary meanings of *tat* and *tvam*.

Sarvajñātman, Anubhūtiśvarūpa, and Vidyāraṇya in the first section of his *Pañcadaśī* hold the view that

both *jīva* and *Īsvara* are reflected images. According to Sarvajñātman, Brahman when reflected in *māyā* is *Īsvara* and when reflected in mind is *jīva*.¹³ According to Anubhūtiśvarūpa and Vidyāraṇya, Brahman reflected in *māyā* is *Īsvara* and when reflected in *avidyā* is *jīva*. *Māyā* and *avidyā* are two aspects of *prakṛti*.¹⁴

Prakāśātman in his *Vivaraṇa* maintains the view that the reflected image of Brahman in *māyā-avidyā*, mind, etc., is *jīva* and Brahman which thereby remains as the prototype or original is *Īsvara*.¹⁵ Sarvajñātman adopts this view too.¹⁶

According to the above preceptors, the reflected image consists of two parts, namely, the sentient element of Brahman and the insentient element of *māyā-avidyā*, mind, and their characteristics. The prototype too consists of the sentient element of Brahman and the insentient element of the characteristic of being a prototype. The sentient element is real and the insentient element is indeterminable.¹⁷

Vācaspatimīśra in his *Bhāmātī* maintains the view that Brahman delimited by mind is *jīva* and Brahman which is not so delimited but which is the content of *māyā-avidyā* is *Īsvara*.¹⁸ The limiting adjuncts — mind and its characteristics in the case of *jīva* and *māyā* and its characteristics in the case of *Īsvara* are indeterminable, while the sentient part of Brahman in *jīva* and *Īsvara* is real.

According to the views set forth above, the primary meaning of *tat* is *Īsvara* who is a blend of Brahman and *māyā-avidyā* and its characteristics; and, the primary meaning of *tvam* is *jīva* which is a blend of Brahman

and *māyā-avidyā*, mind and their characteristics. The words *tat* and *tvam*, through exclusive-non-exclusive secondary signification, discard a part of their primary senses, namely, the insentient part of *māyā-avidyā*, mind, and their characteristics respectively, and give rise to the *recollection* of the other part, namely, the sentient element of Brahman which is pure consciousness and which is known from the subsidiary Upaniṣadic texts.²¹

Suresvara and others in his line of thinking advocate the view that Brahman reflected in *māyā-avidyā* is Īsvara and Brahman reflected in mind is *jīva*. The reflected images, unlike in the earlier view, are totally indeterminable either as real or as an absolute nothing. *Jīva* and Īsvara, being images, are indeterminable. Yet they are falsely identified with the original consciousness, namely, Brahman-Ātman and hence they are respectively viewed as the agent of actions, and the source of the universe.²² It may be added here that Vidyāraṇya in a later section of the *Pañcadaśī* considers that *jīva* and Īsvara are reflected images of Brahman-Ātman in mind and *māyā* respectively and they are indeterminable.²³

The primary senses of the terms *tat* and *tvam* are thus Īsvara and *jīva* which are indeterminable. The terms *tat* and *tvam*, through exclusive secondary signification (*jahallakṣaṇā*) totally abandon their primary meanings — Īsvara and *jīva* and give rise to the *recollection* of Brahman-Ātman — the original consciousness with which their primary meanings are falsely identified.²⁴

Signification based on the relation of qualities can also be adopted. The word *tvam* primarily conveys *jīva* who is inward. It secondarily signifies Ātman

which is taken to be possessing the quality of inwardness; and this signification is based upon the common feature of inwardness present both in *jīva* and *Ātman*. In the same way, the word *tat* primarily conveys *Īsvara* who is all-pervasive. It secondarily signifies Brahman which is taken to be possessing the quality of all-pervasiveness; and, this signification is based upon the common feature of all-pervasiveness present both in *Īsvara* and Brahman.

It must be added here that Brahman-*Ātman* is free from any quality. Inwardness constitutes the essential nature of *jīva* and all-pervasiveness, of Brahman. Yet inwardness and all-pervasiveness are, by courtesy, spoken of as the attributes of *Ātman* and Brahman and it is on the basis of these attributes, the two words *tat* and *tvam* convey through the signification based upon the relation of qualities (*gauṇī vṛtti*) Brahman and *Ātman* respectively.²³

It follows from the above discussion that the words *tat* and *tvam* through exclusive-cum-non-exclusive secondary signification or through exclusive secondary signification or through signification based on the relation of qualities give rise to the *recollection* of Brahman and *Ātman* which are already known from the subsidiary Upaniṣadic texts.²⁴ The great-sayings such as *tat tvam asi*, and the like as a whole give rise to the valid cognition of the identity of the two senses, or more strictly the non-difference of the one from the other which is hitherto unknown from any other source.

NOTES

Abbreviations: *Ait.*, — *Aitareyopaniṣad*; *ASV*, — *Ānandagīrīya-Śaṅkara-vijaya* (Madras University Philosophical Series, No. 16, 1971); *Bṛh.*, — *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad*; *Chānd.*, —

Chāndogyopaniṣad; Māṇḍ., — Māṇḍūkyopaniṣad; PD, — Pañcadaśī; PV, — Prakāṭārtha-Vivaraṇa (Madras University Sanskrit Series. No. 9, 1935); *SB, Siddhānta-bindu* (Kāśī Sanskrit Series, No. 65, Benares, 1928); *ŚŚ, — Saṅkṣepaśārīraka; Taitt., — Taittirīyopaniṣad.*

1. *Chānd*, VI, vii, 7.
2. *Ibid.*, VI, ii, 1.
3. *Brh.*, IV, iii, 7.
4. *Haristutti*, 13.
5. *Svārājya-siddhi* (Āryamatasamskṛta-granthāvali, No. 25, Madras, 1927), pp. 235-258.

For details regarding the number of *mahāvākya*-s, see *ASV*, p. 145 (fn.).

6. *Tantra-vārtika* (Ānandāśrama Sanskrit Series, Poona), p. 34.
7. *Brh.*, IV, iv, 22.
8. *SB.*, pp. 26-32.
9. *Taitt.*, III, i, 1.
10. *Ibid.*, II, i, 1.
11. *Brh.*, III, ix, 28.
12. *Ibid.*, IV, iii, 18.
13. *Ibid.*, IV, iii, 19.
14. *Ibid.*, IV, iii, 32.
15. *ŚŚ*, I, 196-197.
16. *PV*, pp. 3-4; *PD*, I, 16-17.
17. *Vide: SB*, p. 225.
18. *ŚŚ*, II, 176-7.
19. *Vide: SB*, p. 226.
20. *Ibid.*, p. 227.
21. *ŚŚ*, I, 160.
22. *SB*, p. 220.
23. *PD*, VI, 1-4, 18-23, 33-35, 38-40, 153-155, 161-162.
24. *ŚŚ*, I, 169; *SB*, p. 221.
25. *ŚŚ*, I, 170.
26. *Ibid.*, I, 160 and 191.

THE JĪVANMUKTA

*N. Jayashanmukham**

Bondage and Freedom

According to an early school of thought, man is practically a soul of desires, *kāmātmā*. He lives for desires and works for their fulfilment. But in the end he realises that desires bring him neither peace nor permanence. In answer to the question why peace and permanence elude him, the Vedānta says that they can be obtained only by rejecting the desires. Then, is he not a soul of desires? The Vedānta teaches that he is essentially the supreme Self *paramātmā* which is immobile, eternal, infinite, and blissful. Once he ceases to be a soul of desires and becomes the true Self, he realises that, by attaining the true Self, he is in possession of peace and permanence, for they are the essence of the Self.

Truly speaking, man believes that he is nothing but his body, *dehātmā*. He thinks that he is a product of the material world and cannot survive without the

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material support of the world. It is this original identification that accounts for his identification with desires, ego, and intellect all of which operate in the subtle part of the body. But how does he come to identify himself with the body? It is due to the ignorance of the true Self of which the body is an instrument of action, *dharma-sādhana*. With the elimination of this ignorance, he becomes free and is no longer bound by his body; with the cessation of this bondage, his other bondages also cease, bondages created by his identification with desires, ego, and intellect. He in whom these bondages have been dissolved, he who is thus absolutely free, while in the body, and acts here even as others act in the world, is referred to in the Vedānta as one who is liberated in this very life, *jīvanmukta*.

The Jīvanmukta: His Body and Works in the World

The *Vivekacūḍāmaṇi*, a work attributed to Śaṅkara, is considered to be an important treatise on the subject of spiritual emancipation. Presenting a systematic account of the ultimate aim of human life according to the school of Advaita Vedānta, it gives us an authentic account of the *jīvanmukta* from several points of view. In view of our limited aim we shall describe, as briefly as possible, one aspect about the *jīvanmukta* as expounded in the text — his attitude towards his body and works in the world.

A *jīvanmukta* is one who is established in the true Self, *nitya-svarūpam*, which is not different from the supreme Being, *paramārtha-bhūtam*. He sees that the living body does not really belong to his Self, for it is a form superimposed by the mind, *buddhi-kalpita* (296).

In order not to identify oneself with the body, one has to remove the limitations of one's mind: ego, desire

for external objects, and desire-born works. As long as the mind is subject to these limitations, it does not see the true Self, but sees it as the not-self, does not seek the bliss of the Self but goes out in search of enjoyment in external objects, does not remain Self-possessed, but is carried away by impulses to possess the sense-objects. With the elimination of these limitations, the mind becomes pure and is able to see the Self as it is. When knowledge of the Self arises, the mind itself ceases to exist because there is no more deviation from the Self, *svasthitimuṣi* (305).

But the process of removing the limitations of the mind is indeed very difficult and involves a long and steady practice. There are two methods by which the mind is taught to overcome its limitations: the first method is to give up contact with the sense-objects, *parihṛtya bāhyam* (334); and the second one is to see the Self in moving and unmoving objects as their substratum, *ātmanādhāratayā vilokya* (338). Mastery in this practice comes when the mind disregards the material (414).

We shall now come to the other aspect of the *jīvanmukta's* works in the world. Since works mark the culminating point in the process of mistaking the Self for the body, all works are renounced as a first step in reversing this process, *sannyasya sarvakarmāṇi* (10). Works arise from past impressions left by the action of the mind and other instruments in the subtle body. When manifest, works serve to keep these impressions alive and affective. Thus, works and past impressions grow and multiply by mutual support and influence, *vāsanāvṛddhitāḥ kāryaṁ kāryavṛddhyā ca vāsanā* (313). When works are renounced, the effects of past impres-

sions are destroyed; when the effects are thus destroyed, their cause *viz.* the impressions are also destroyed, *kāryanāśād-bījanāśaḥ* (312). Once the impressions are totally eliminated, there is no need at all to give up works, because works simply cease to exist, *nāsti kriyā* (282). Not only works, but the action of the subtle instruments like *buddhi* also does not exist, because in the absence of past impressions these instruments fall into disuse and finally disappear. Strictly speaking, when past impressions are totally destroyed one is liberated in this very life *vāsanāprakṣayo mokṣaḥ* (317). Thus, dissolution of works leads to the dissolution of bondage to the body. Therefore, for the enlightened soul works are an obstacle and serve no purpose.

Paradoxically, the liberated soul, though free from all works, does not hesitate to help others in distress and confer upon them freedom from bondage, *bandhavimokṣanam* (32). Very willingly he undertakes the work of helping others to cross the ocean of birth and death as he has himself crossed it, *tīrṇāḥ svayam* (37). He is full of compassion and concern for those who seek his protection. His help is spontaneous and without any motive. He is compared to the spring and the moon, for they serve without any ulterior motive. Like the spring, he brings happiness to every one; like the moon, he removes sufferings from all living beings. Though he is thus engaged in work, there is no deviation from the Self which is without work, *api kurvanna-kurvāṇaḥ* (544).

What is of interest to us here is that the enlightened soul does not see any difficulty in looking upon the suffering humanity with compassion, *nirīksya kārunyarasūdradrṣṭyā* (41), and ferrying it across the ocean of

birth and death, *tārayantaḥ* (37), as if the body's instrumentation is possible for this purpose, regardless of the fact that the original nature of subtle instruments, *antaḥkāraṇa*, which willed and moved the body to envisaged goals in the world, has ceased to exist following the dissolution of past impressions, *mano naśyati yoginaḥ* (277). If the body's instrumentation is possible in this circumstance, then we have to find a suitable explanation for this unique phenomenon.

The Jīvanmukta's Body and its Instrumentation

In order to liberate the Self from its bondage to the body, the body is immobilised, except for motions necessary for its maintenance, and brought to the level of an inert entity, *jaḍātmaḥ* (509). With the destruction of the original nature which constantly directs the body through its subtle instruments towards envisaged goals, the knot in the body is loosened and the Self attains liberation. Once liberated, the *jīvanmukta* cannot remain unconcerned at the sight of the sufferings of his fellowmen. He, therefore, undertakes the work of helping others in distress.* When he dedicates himself to this work, the instrumentation of the body becomes indispensable. His body becomes once again an instrument of action, but now under a completely different circumstance. The original nature of subtle instruments which willed the body to do envisaged works in the world does not exist now, but yet the body is moved from within. What is it that moves the body from within? One possibility is that it must be a new nature which has come into existence in place of the nature of subtle instruments.

* The *śruti* describes him as the doer of good deeds, *brahmavid puṇyakṛt* — *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, 4.5.9.

Before we proceed further, we have to pause a little and answer an important objection. Since the instrumentation of the body can be attributed to the action of the purified form of the original nature, it is not necessary to suppose that a new nature comes into existence. We admit that owing to a rigorous inner discipline, *prayatnena* (181), there is an abundant increase of *sattva* followed by a proportionate decrease in *rajas* and *tamas* in the original nature. We cannot, however, say that this purified nature is capable of moving the *jīvanmukta's* body for two reasons. (1) In its purified form, the original nature is a power of illumination and understanding, rather than a power which moves and produces impulse to action. Hence, the body's instrumentation cannot be attributed to the action of this purified nature. (2) Even if it is possible, the purified nature cannot get rid of the influence of ego to which, like the other two *guṇas*, it is inextricably tied. This is the reason why *sattva* too is regarded as an impurity like *tamas* and *rajas*, *sattvarajastamomalam* (361). Therefore when the body is moved by this purified nature to do the work of saving others from ego, how can such a work be accomplished at all? So our supposition that the *jīvanmukta's* body is moved by a new nature is inevitable.

Textual Evidence for the New Nature

We shall now turn to the text in question and see if there is any evidence in support of our argument. There are two verses in the text which come to our help. In verse (37) it is said that the help rendered by great souls is unique. The intention of the text is to bring out the fact that the work of the great souls is *absolutely* devoid of ego. In verse (38) the same point

is brought out from another point of view. The text says that they move towards removing others' distress on their own accord, *svata eva*. There must be some special reason for this verse to go back to the same point and emphasise it affirmatively now. One may think that the service rendered by great souls to humanity issues out of a nature which is abundantly *sāttvika*. As we have already seen, a nature full of *sāttvika* quality may be pure, but yet is impure because it is not free from ego. The text, therefore, wants us to understand that their compassion and service are not *sāttvika* in origin, but belong to an entirely different nature which is absolutely free from ego. Is there any evidence in the text which refers to this unique nature which is different from that of *sāttvika* quality achieved by one's effort, *prayatnena*? Fortunately, the text (38) makes a pointed reference to this unique nature of great souls — *ayam svabhāvaḥ mahātmanām* (this is the Mahātma's own nature). It is not a nature of *sattva* attainable by one's effort, but a unique nature which is *one's own svabhāva* and independent of effort. There is a further evidence for this unique nature in the text (278). The text refers to the existence of a pure nature other than the nature of *sattva* when it says *sattvān sūddhena naśyati* (*sattva* is destroyed by the pure). This pure nature is nothing but the *svabhāva* of the liberated soul. It is significantly termed the pure because it is entirely free from the influence of ego.

That this *svabhāva* is not *sāttvika* is indicated in another ancient text also. The *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi* (4.69) speaks of the qualities of this nature as those not due to any effort, *ayatnataḥ*. Further, it adds that they are not of the nature of means, *na tu sādhanarūpiṇaḥ*.

Stated in clear terms, this nature is one's own, unlike the *sāttvika* nature which is to be acquired by effort. Also, this nature, like the *sāttvika* one, is not a means to the knowledge of the Self. Be it noted that these two expressions, *ayatnato* and *na tu sādhanarūpiṇaḥ*, are only used to remove the confusion between the *sāttvika* nature and the *svabhāva* of the great souls.

It is now established that that the body of the *jīvanmukta* is moved by nature which is his own as distinguished from the *sāttvika* nature which is the result of his spiritual discipline.

ŚRĪ ŚAṆKARA'S TEACHINGS IN HIS OWN WORDS*

C. L. Ramakrishnan**

Śrī Śaṅkara is one of the great expounders of the Advaita system, if at all it could be called a system. For, Advaita means that wherein there is absence of duality. It does stand for Brahman — the non-dual principle. This concept has been expounded by great preceptors and Śrī Śaṅkara refers to this in his commentary on the *Taittirīyopaniṣad* thus:

यैः इमे गुरुभिः पूर्वं पदवाक्यप्रमाणतः ।

व्याख्याताः सर्ववेदान्ताः तान् नित्यं प्रणतोऽस्म्यहम् ॥

Very freely translated it means: I offer salutations to the great preceptors who, on the basis of the maxims arrived at in the *Pūrvamīmāṃsā-sūtras*, on the basis of grammar and also of logic, have explained the true import of the *Upaniṣads*.

Suresvara, in his *Vārttika* on Śaṅkara's commentary on the *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad*, states that Śrī

* Lecture delivered at Śaṅkara Vihār, Ayanavaram during the Śaṅkara Jayantī Celebrations in April, 1990.

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Śaṅkara has learnt the traditional interpretation of Advaita from his preceptor.

यां काण्वोपनिषच्छलेन सकलाम्नायार्थसंशोधिनीं
व्याचक्रुः गुर्वः अनुवृत्तागुर्वः वृत्तिं सतां शान्तये ।

In the history of Indian Philosophy, there is a vital difference between Advaita on the one hand and other systems of Vedānta, on the other. The latter consider God, soul and the world as disparate and real entities. Advaita, on the other hand, considers that the world is only an illusory appearance of a principle which is pure consciousness and non-dual. The principle that accounts for the appearance of pure consciousness as the world is *māyā* or *avidyā*. Śrī Śaṅkara in his commentary on the *Brahmasūtra* (1.4.3) —

तदधीनत्वादर्थवत्

states that we admit that the world exists in a subtle form in a principle that is absolutely dependent upon pure consciousness. This principle must necessarily be admitted. It is because this principle is highly potent and without this principle, the pure consciousness cannot be viewed as the substratum of the appearance of the world. Pure consciousness cannot function of its own accord, as it is free from action.

परमेश्वराधीना त्वियमस्माभिः प्रागवस्था जगतः अभ्युपगम्यते
न स्वतन्त्रा । सा च अवश्याभ्युपगन्तव्या । अर्थवती हि सा ।
न हि तया विना परमेश्वरस्य स्रष्टृत्वं सिद्ध्यति । शक्तिरहितस्य
तस्य प्रवृत्त्यनुपपत्तेः ॥

This can be favourably compared with the *Saundaryalaharī*, 1:

शिवः शक्त्या युक्तो यदि भवति शक्तः प्रभवितुं
 न चेदेवं देवो न खलु कुशलः स्पन्दितुमपि ।
 अतस्त्वामाराध्यां हरिहरविरिञ्चादिभिरपि
 प्रणन्तुं स्तोतुं वा कथमकृतपुण्यः प्रभवति ॥

So, it is known that the world comes into existence from a principle which the *Svetāśvataropaniṣad* refers to as *māyā* that is dependent upon the pure consciousness. Śaṅkara further proceeds to say that it is impossible to define *māyā* either as real or as an absolute nothing. It cannot be both. So it is said to be indeterminate. Śaṅkara epigrammatically states:

तत्त्वान्यत्वनिरूपणस्य अशक्यत्वात् ।

It is *māyā* that is referred to as *avidyā* also. The pure consciousness reflected in mind — the effect of *avidyā* is the individual soul, and the pure consciousness that serves as the original is God or *Īsvara*. Thus, we see that in the pure consciousness, owing to the principle of *māyā* or *avidyā*, three factors, namely, world as such, the state of being God (*Īsvaratva*) and the state of being a soul (*jīvatva*) are falsely presented. It must be noted here that the true nature of *Īsvara* and *jīva* is pure consciousness only. But it is only the state of being God and the state of being soul that are illusorily presented.

Of these two, *Īsvara* and *jīva*, *Īsvara* is all pervasive, while the locus of *jīva* is within the body. God is omniscient and omnipotent while the soul, under the influence of *avidyā*, undergoes transmigratory existence.

अविद्यात्मिका हि बीजशक्तिः अव्यक्तशब्दनिर्देश्या , परमेश्वरा-
श्रया , मायामयी , महासुषुप्तिः यस्यां शेरते स्वरूपप्रतिबोध-
रहिताः संसारिणो जीवाः (BSB., 1.4.3.).

Śaṅkara further states that the *jīva* — having lost sight of its identity with its essential nature, owing to the influence of *avidyā* — experiences continually the transmigratory process.

अविद्यावत्त्वेनैव जीवस्य सर्वः संव्यवहारः सन्ततो वर्तते ।

It might be asked as to whether the Advaita Vedānta on its theoretical side could provide room for God. In this connection, it is necessary to deal with the import of the *Brahmasūtra* (3.2.1) —

न स्थानतोऽपि परस्य उभयलिङ्गं सर्वत्र हि

In the light of Śaṅkara's commentary on this *sūtra*, there are two sets of Upaniṣadic texts — one stating the ultimate reality as possessing all auspicious attributes, and another stating the ultimate reality rid of all attributes. The *Chāndogya* (3.14.2) text —

सर्वकर्मा सर्वकामः सर्वगन्धः सर्वरसः . . .

speaks of Brahman as endowed with attributes. The *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* (3.8.8) text —

अस्थूलमनण्वह्रस्वमदीर्घम् . . .

refers to Brahman as free from all attributes. The author of the *Brahmasūtras* in the aphorism cited above considers the import of these two passages and states that Brahman cannot be viewed as possessing these two aspects *really*. It is because it is an impossi-

bility. Either of the one must be true. And Śaṅkara on the strength of the *Kaṭhopanīṣad* (4-10) passage —

मृत्योः स मृत्युमाप्नोति य इह नानेव पश्यति

which states that cognition of duality necessitates the continual experience of transmigratory process, concludes that the aspect of Brahman associated with attributes must be viewed as being presented falsely by *avidyā*.

अतश्च अन्यतरलिङ्गपरिग्रहेऽपि समस्तविशेषरहितं
निर्विकल्पकमेव ब्रह्म प्रतिपत्तव्यं, न तद्विपरीतम् ।

In his commentary on the *Ānandamayādhikaraṇa* of the *Brahmasūtra* (1.1.11), Śaṅkara states —

द्विरूपं हि ब्रह्मावगम्यते, नामरूपविकारभेदोपाधिविशिष्टम्,
तद्विपरीतञ्च सर्वोपाधिविवर्जितम् ।

Now it may be asked as to what exactly is the purpose of instructing two aspects of Brahman. It is answered that the *jīva* has to realize its true nature which is attributeless consciousness and identical with the true nature of God. In order that this realisation may be possible, the grace of God is essential. And the aspect of Brahman associated with all attributes is intended for purpose of meditation. In other words, the acosmic (attributeless) aspect is for the purpose of realization Śaṅkara states in his commentary on the *adhikaraṇa* referred to above:

एवमेकमपि ब्रह्मापेक्षितोपाधिसंबन्धं निरस्तोपाधिसंबन्धं च उपास्य-
त्वेन ज्ञेयत्वेन च वेदान्तेषूपदिश्यते ।

Thus, it follows that God is only an aspect of pure consciousness associated with the characteristics of

māyā such as omniscience, etc., and the *jīva* too is an aspect of pure consciousness associated with mind and its characteristics such as agency, enjoyership, knower-ship, etc. This distinction, it will be evident, is operative only in the realm of *avidyā*.

Śaṅkara refers to this in his commentary on the *Brahmasūtra* (2.1.22) — ‘अधिकं तु भेदनिर्देशात्’ as follows: “In the case of God there is no force to restrict either his knowledge or power; for, He is omniscient and omnipotent. The *jīva* is not like Him. How is it so? It is because the *Upaniṣads* such as ‘Ātman is fit to be realised’ etc.,

आत्मा वा अरे द्रष्टव्यः श्रोतव्यो मन्तव्यो निदिध्यासितव्यः।
(BU, 2.4.5)

refers to Brahman as the factor to be realised by soul which involves reference to the distinction between *jīva* and Brahman.” —

आत्मा वा अरे द्रष्टव्यः श्रोतव्यः मन्तव्यः निदिध्यासितव्यः
इत्येवंजातीयकः कर्तृकर्मादिभेदनिर्देशो जीवादधिकं ब्रह्म दर्शयति।
(commentary on BS, 2.1.22)

He further says that when the identity of the true nature of the soul as Brahman — which is the true nature of God — is realised from the text like *tat tvam asi* etc., then the characteristics of agency, etc., are removed from the so-called *jīva*, and the characteristic of being the creator of the world based on omniscience and omnipotence on the part of God also would cease to exist. It is because the cognition of duality projected by *avidyā* would have been annihilated by the knowledge of Brahman that has arisen from the *mahāvākyas* like *tat tvam asi* etc.

At this stage, Śaṅkara feels the necessity of making a distinction between the transcendental and empirical standpoints. From the latter standpoint, the distinction between *jīva* and *Īsvara* is clear. From the former, there could be no such distinction. Within the fold of empirical standpoint, Śaṅkara makes a distinction between the waking state and the dream state. Both are of the same kind differing only in degree. The waking state is a prolonged dream while the dream state is a short-lived one. Just as one who experiences the dream-object considers it to be true till he comes back to the waking state, in the same way, the soul considers everything characterised by duality to be true, till it wakes back to reality. Śaṅkara in his commentary on the *Brahmasūtra* (2.1.14) “ तदनन्यत्वमारम्भणशब्दादिभ्यः ” makes a clear distinction between the waking state and dream state within the fold of the world having empirical reality. And the distinction lies here that the dream world is sublated while the waking state is not so. In his commentary on the *Brahmasūtra* (2.2.29) “ वैद्यम्याञ्च न स्वप्नादिवत् ” he makes a clear distinction between these two states. From this it would not be construed that the waking state is unsublatable. It is unsublatable till there arises the knowledge of Brahman. It is with this in view that Gauḍapāda in his *Māṇḍūkya-kārikā* (15) says:

अनादिमायया सुप्तः यदा जीवः प्रबुध्यते ।

अजमनिद्रमस्वप्नम् अद्वैतं बुध्यते तदा ॥

This means that the individual soul is perpetually in a state of dream caused by the beginningless *māyā*. When he wakes back to reality he remains as Advaita, that is,

Brahman free from concealment (*anidra*), and from illusory projection (*asvapna*).

The contribution of Śrī Śaṅkara lies in this that he emphasized on the basis of scriptural texts that the state of being God associated with omniscience and omnipotence is due to *avidyā*. It does not exist really. In the case of the *jīva* too, the transmigratory process is caused by the false identification with body-mind complex. When the limiting adjuncts, namely, *avidyā* and mind are removed by the knowledge of Brahman, the verbal usage — such as God who rules and the soul who is ruled — vanishes.

The chief task of the *jīva* is to realise its true nature by loving devotion to God. Advaita is not theistic; it is not atheistic too. But it is supra-theistic. This means at the empirical level, the *jīva* worships God, earns His grace, attains knowledge from the *mahāvākyas* and becomes one with His true nature.

Let us conclude by citing the fervant appeal made by Śaṅkara to the entire humanity in his commentary on the *Kāthopanīṣad*:

“Leave out the false notion of the atheists; avoid the perverse logic of the logicians; by being free from pride, resort to the true nature of the self imparted by the *Vedas*, which are a thousand-times more beneficial to us, than even our own parents.”

And this is the clarion call of the master who has so movingly composed the *Mātr̥pañcaka*, extolling the greatness of one’s mother.

To sum up: in the language of the *Sanatsujātiya* death is not physical, but it is only losing sight of one's identity with one's original source.

प्रमादं वै मृत्युमहं ब्रवीमि ।

And immortality consists in being eternally aware of one's true nature, *i.e.* Brahman.

सदा अप्रमादं अमृतत्वं ब्रवीमि ॥

The splendour — imprisoned as it were — merely needs to be freed of its veil. And towards suggesting the means to achieve this, the preceptors of Advaita were and are chiefly concerned with.

DEVOTION TO GOD AND GURU

यस्य देवे परा भक्तिः यथा देवे तथा गुरौ ।
 तस्यैते कथिता ह्यर्थाः प्रकाशन्ते महात्मनः ॥

The great man who has supreme devotion to God, and also supreme devotion to his *guru* understands clearly all the subtle teachings of the *śāstras*.

(*Śvetāśvataropaniṣad*, VI, 23)

THE FOUR INDISPENSABLE
QUALIFICATIONS

*(An extract from Sarva-vedānta-siddhānta-sāra-saṅgraha
of Śrī Śaṅkara Bhagavatpāda)*

Free rendering by

Dr. V. K. S. N. Raghavan

(Contd. from Vol. XIV, No. 4)

न स्नानैरपि कीर्तनैरपि जपैर्नो कृच्छ्रचान्द्रयणै-
 नो वाप्यध्वरयज्ञदाननिगमैर्नो मन्त्रतन्त्रैरपि ॥

One cannot attain liberation (*mokṣa*) — which consists in the knowledge of absolute identity of the self with Brahman — without the proper comprehension of the unity of both. *Mokṣa* can be attained neither by bathing in the sacred rivers, nor by reciting holy hymns (*kīrtanas*), nor by chanting sacred syllables (*japas*), nor by the performances of penances like *kr̥cchra* and *cāndrāyaṇa*, nor by doing sacrifices nor by charity, nor by the study of scriptures, nor by *mantras*, nor by *tantras* (ritualistic actions).

[161]

ज्ञानादेव तु कैवल्यमिति श्रुत्या निगद्यते ।
 ज्ञानस्य मुक्तिहेतुत्वमन्यव्यावृत्तिपूर्वकम् ॥

Therefore, it is said in the *śruti* "Through Brahman-knowledge alone, does one attain liberation." (*Taittīyopaniṣad*, 2.1.1) That is: Knowledge is the sole means to *mokṣa*; and there is no other means at all.

[162]

विवेकिनो विरक्तस्य ब्रह्मनित्यत्ववेदिनः ।
 तद्भावेच्छोरनित्यार्थे तत्सामग्र्ये कुतो रतिः ॥

How would a man of discrimination (*vivekin*)
 (i) who is indifferent to all else (other than Brahman),

(ii) who has realised Brahman alone as eternal, and
 (iii) who likes to attain the unity of Brahman, have any
 desire towards non-eternal things? Or, would he follow
 any means to acquire those non-eternal objects?

[163 - 164 ab]

तस्मादनित्ये स्वर्गादौ साधनत्वेन चोदितम् ।
 नित्यं नैमित्तिकं चापि सर्वं कर्म ससाधनम् ॥
 मुमुक्षुणा परित्याज्यं ब्रह्मभावमभीप्सुना ।

Therefore a *mumukṣu* (one who desires *mokṣa*), *i.e.* who desires to attain the status of Brahman, should thoroughly refrain from all the rituals — daily (*nitya*), or occasional (*naimittika*) — both of which are performed in order to attain heaven, etc. — *i.e.* the fruits of which are merely *anitya* (ephemeral).

[164 cd - 167]

मुमुक्षोरपि कर्मास्तु श्रवणं चापि साधनम् ॥
 हस्तवद्द्वयमेतस्य स्वकार्यं साधयिष्यति ।
 यथा विजृम्भते दीपो ऋजूकरणकर्मणा ॥
 तथा श्रवणजो बोधः पुंसो विहितकर्मणा ।
 अतः सापेक्षितं ज्ञानमथवापि समुच्चयम् ॥

मोक्षस्य साधनमिति वदन्ति ब्रह्मवादिनः ।
मुमुक्षोर्युज्यते त्यागः कथं विहितकर्मणः ॥

Even a seeker of *mokṣa* has to observe the prescribed *karmas*, and Vedic study forms part of the means to attain it (*mokṣa*) — some say thus. They further hold that this *samuccaya* (combination) of action and knowledge (*karma* and *jñāna*) leads to the fulfilment of one's task just as two hands function in unison to complete an action. It is held that action (*karma*) contributes to an increased brightness of knowledge just as a lamp shines brighter when it is trimmed.

Thus some *brahmvādins* (knowers of Brahman) contend that knowledge needs the performance of action as a prerequisite. Some others also argue that the combination (*jñāna-karma-samuccaya*) of the two is an essential means to attain *mokṣa*.

Therefore arises the question: "How could an aspirant of *mokṣa* abandon the prescribed ritualistic action (*karma*)?"

[168]

इति शङ्का न कर्तव्या मूढवत्पण्डितोत्तमैः ।
कर्मणः फलमन्यत्तु श्रवणस्य फलं पृथक् ॥

The wise persons should not entertain any such doubt (as referred to in the previous verse) like an unwise person. The fruit of action (rituals) is completely different from the fruit attained by the study of Vedānta.

(to be continued)

MAHĀKAVEH KĀLIDĀSASYA
GĪTĀTRAYAM

[in Sanskrit]

by Ātmavidyābhūṣaṇam

V. S. V. Gurusvāmī Śāstri

with an English translation

by Dr. V. K. S. N. Raghavan

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[68]

शुद्धात्मनः स्वरूपञ्च ज्योतिः सत्यं सुखात्मकम् ।
अवर्णयत्तथैवासौ वेदैकशरणः कविः ॥

[69]

“ यमक्षरं क्षेत्रविदो विदुस्तं आत्मानमात्मन्यवलोकयन्तम् ।
...
योगात्स चान्तःपरमात्मसंज्ञं दृष्ट्वा स्वयंज्योतिरुपरराम ॥ ”
इत्यत्र च कविर्योगात्सम्यग्दर्शनमब्रवीत् ॥

[70]

अवतारिका —

श्रुतिर्भगवती ब्रह्म विरोधाभाससूक्तिभिः ।
पौनःपुन्येन हि यथा सादरं समवर्णयत् ॥

[71]

तथा नावर्णयद्ब्रह्म निषेधविधिसूक्तिभिः ।
तद्वन्महाकविरपि विरोधाभाससूक्तिभिः ॥
पद्यद्वयेन हृद्येन हरिं परमवर्णयत् ॥

रघुवंशे १० - २४, २५

(९) - (१०)

अजस्य गृह्णतो जन्म निरीहस्य हतद्विषः ।
स्वपतो जागरूकस्य याथार्थ्यं वेद कस्तव ॥

शब्दादीन्विषयान्भोक्तुं चरितुं दुश्चरं तपः ।
पर्याप्तोऽसि प्रजाः पातुमौदासीन्येन वर्तितुम् ॥

[72]

“ अजायमानो बहुधा विजायत ” इति श्रुतिम् ।
“ यदा सुषुप्त ” इत्यादि बार्हदारण्यकं वचः ॥

[72 A]

“ एष सुप्तेषु जागर्ति ” इत्यनवाच्च कठश्रुतिम् ॥

[72 B]

“ अजोऽपि सन्नव्ययात्मा भूतानामीश्वरोपि सन् ।
प्रकृतिं स्वामधिष्ठाय सम्भवाभ्यात्ममायया ॥ ”

[72C - 72 H]

‘ समोऽहं सर्वभूतेषु न मे द्वेष्योऽस्ति न प्रियः । ’

‘ उदासीनवदासीनं असक्तं तेषु कर्मसु । ’

‘ उपद्रष्टानुमन्ता च भर्ता भोक्ता महेश्वरः । ’

‘ तस्य कर्तारमपि मां विद्वद्यकर्तारमव्यम् । ’

‘ जीवनं सर्वभूतेषु तपश्चास्मि तपस्विषु । ’

‘ तेषामहं समुद्धर्ता मृत्युसंसारसागरात् । ’

[73]

इति गीताः सुरुचिराः सुचिरं हृदि भाविताः ।
रूपान्तरं समापाद्य हृद्यपद्यद्वयात्मना ॥

[74]

प्रदर्शयन् सुनिपुणं महनीयो महाकविः ।
सर्वान्निमज्जयत्यस्मान्नमन्दानन्दवारिधौ ॥

रघुवंशे १० - २६

(११)

बहुधाप्यगमैर्भिन्नाः पन्थानः सिद्धिहेतवः ।
त्वय्येव निपतन्त्योघा जाह्नवीया इवार्णवे ॥

[75]

व्युत्पत्तेरधिकारस्य भेदाद्भिन्नान्ब्रह्मन्पथः ।
बोधयन्ति बुभुत्सुभ्यो दर्शनान्यखिलान्यपि ॥

[76]

तथापि पर्यवस्यन्ति पर्यन्ते परमेश्वरे ।
इत्येवं गतिसामान्यं दर्शनानां महाकविः ॥

[77]

समादिदेश 'बहुधे'त्यस्मिन्पद्ये मनोहरम् ।
“समन्वयादिति” ब्रह्मसूत्रसूक्तं महाकविः ॥

[78]

स्थाने निवेशयन् काव्यं कमनीयमकल्पयत् ।
कवयः क्रान्तदर्शित्वाद्विशालमतयो ध्रुवम् ॥

[79]

पुष्पदन्ताभिधानश्च गन्धर्वकविराडिदम् ।
प्रोचे “ त्रयी सांख्य”मिति शिवमाहात्म्यवर्णने ॥

[80]

सर्वोपनिषदामाद्यो दुर्वासा देशिको मुनिः ।
“ गायत्री”त्यवदत्त्वेतत् शक्तिमाहात्म्यवर्णने ॥

रघुवंशे १० - २७

(१२)

त्वय्यावेशितचित्तानां त्वत्समर्पितकर्मणाम् ।
गतिस्त्वं वीतरागाणाम् अभूयःसन्निवृत्ताये ॥

-
1. “ त्रयी सांख्यं योगः पशुपतिमतं वैष्णवमिति
प्रभिन्ने प्रस्थाने परमिदमदः पथ्यमिति च ।
रुचीनां वैचित्याद्दजुकुटिलनानापथजुषां
नृणामेको गम्यस्त्वमसि पयसामर्णव इव ॥ ”
[पुष्पदन्तकृते शिवमहिम्नःस्तोत्रे, २३]
 2. “ गायत्री सशिरास्तुरीयसहिता सन्ध्यामयीत्यागमैः
आख्याता त्रिपुरे त्वमेव महतां शर्मप्रदा कर्मणाम् ।
तत्तद्दर्शनमुख्यशक्तिरपि च त्वं ब्रह्म कर्मेंश्वरी
कर्ताहंन्पुरुषो हरिश्च सविता बुद्धः शिवस्त्वं गुरुः ॥ ”
[दुर्वासःप्रणीते शक्तिमहिम्नःस्तोत्रे, २३]

[81]

फलानुरागरहितं कर्म सर्वेश्वरार्पितम् ।
परानुरक्तिं भगवत्युत्पादयति निर्मलाम् ॥

[82]

स्थिरं विरागमन्येषु विज्ञानञ्च विमुक्तिदम् ।
इति निःश्रेयसावाप्तिनिःश्रेणीं निगमोदिताम् ॥

[83]

स्मारितां वासुदेवेन गीतासु च पुनःपुनः ।
एकेन हृद्यपद्येन कविर्हृदयहारिणा ॥

[84]

उद्धोधयन्पुनर्गीताः श्रुतीस्तद्वादिनीर्हृदि ।
हलादमानः स्वयं सर्वानस्मान्संहलादयत्यसौ ॥

[85]

पद्येनानेन कविना स्मर्यमाणाः श्रुतोः स्मृतीः ।
अर्थतश्शब्दतस्तास्तास्तद्धोधाय लिखाम्यहम् ॥

[86]

यज्ञेन दानेन तथा तपसाऽनाशकेन च ।
वेदानुवचनेनैतं विप्रा विविदिषन्ति तम् ॥

[87]

मनः संयम्य मच्चित्तो युक्त आसीत् मत्परः ।

(गी. ६-१४)

[88 - 89]

मय्यासक्तमनाः पार्थ योगं युञ्जन्मदाश्रयः ।

असंशयं समग्रं मां यथा ज्ञास्यसि तच्छृणु ॥

(गी. ७-१)

तस्मात्सर्वेषु कालेषु मामनुस्मर युध्य च ।

मय्यर्पितमनोबुद्धिर्माभिवैष्यस्यसंशयम् ॥

(गी. ८-७)

[90]

यदक्षरं वेदविदो वदन्ति विशन्ति यद्यतयो वीतरागाः ।

(गी. ८-११)

[91 - 95]

यत्करोषि यदश्नासि यज्जुहोषि ददासि यत् ।

यत्तपस्यसि कौन्तेय तत्कुरुष्व मदर्पणम् ॥३॥

(गी. ९-२७)

शुभाशुभफलैरेवं मोक्ष्यसे कर्मबन्धनैः ।

संन्यासयोगयुक्तात्मा विमुक्तो मामुपैष्यसि ॥

(गी. ९-२८)

मन्मना भव मद्भक्तो मद्याजी मां नमस्कुरु ।
मामेवैष्यसि युक्त्वैवमात्मानं मत्परायणः ॥

(गी. १०-३४)

मत्कर्मकृन्मत्परमो मद्भक्तः सङ्गवर्जितः ।
निर्वैरः सर्वभूतेषु यः स मामेति पाण्डव ॥

(गी. ११-५५)

मय्यावेश्य मनो ये मां नित्ययुक्ता उपासते ।
श्रद्धया परयोपेतास्ते मे युक्ततमा मताः ॥

(गी. १२-२)

[96 - 97]

तेषामहं समुद्धर्ता मृत्युसंसारसागरात् ।
भवामि न चिरात्पार्थ मय्यावेशितचेतसाम् ॥

(गी. १२-७)

मय्येव मन आधत्स्व मयि बुद्धिं निवेशय ।
निवसिष्यसि मय्येव अत ऊर्ध्वं न संशयः ॥

(गी. १२-८)

[98 (i)]

मय्यर्पितमनोबुद्धिर्यो मद्भक्तः स मे प्रियः ।

(गी. १२-१४)

[98 (ii)]

मयि चानन्ययोगेन भक्तिरव्यभिचारिणी ।

(गी. २३-२०)

[99 - 100]

मां च योऽव्यभिचारेण भक्तियोगेन सेवते ।

स गुणान्समतीत्यैतान् ब्रह्मभूयाय कल्पते ॥

(गी. १४-२६)

सर्वकर्माण्यपि सदा कुर्वाणो मद्व्यपाश्रयः ।

मत्प्रसादादवाप्नोति शाश्वतं पदमव्ययम् ॥

(गी. १८-५६)

[101]

मच्चित्ताः सर्वदुर्गाणि मत्प्रसादात्तारिष्यसि ।

(गी. १८-५८)

[102]

मन्मना मव मद्भक्तो मद्याजी मां नमस्कुरु ।

मामेवैष्यसि सत्यं ते प्रतिजाने प्रियोऽसि मे ॥

(गी. १८-६५)

[103]

इत्यनेका रम्यगीताः कविमानससुस्थिराः ।

प्रकाशयति तत्सर्वं पद्यमेतन्महाकवेः ॥

(अनुवर्तते)

[68]

This great poet, Kālidāsa, who holds the *Vedas* alone as his prime source-book, delineates Brahman — as it is — to be the pure Ātman, the supreme lustre, the supreme truth and the supreme bliss.

[69]

“Him — whom the knowers of *kṣetra* cognize as the immutable (*akṣara*) — and who perceives the Self within Himself...” (*Kumārasambhava*, III, 50 cd); “He who through *yoga* (direct vision of Self) has perceived the inner supreme consciousness as the self-effulgent one, relaxed from *yoga*...” (*Ibid.*, III, 58 cd). (cf. John Brough (ed. & tr.) *Selections from Classical Sanskrit Literature*, pp. 95-99, London: Luzac & Co. 1951).

As mentioned above, the poet has interpreted the word *yoga* to mean *samyagdarśana* (perfect or absolute perception).

Introduction (for verses IX-X)

[70 - 71]

The Vedic texts have explained Brahman repeatedly with due respect and regard — the texts in the form of apparently contradictory statements. However other Vedic texts which are in the form of injunctions and prohibitions have not described Brahman exactly.

Similarly the poet also has described the supreme Lord Hari (Viṣṇu) in the following two excellent stanzas through the figure of speech — apparent contradiction.

[IX - X]

The Raghuvamśa, X, 24-25:

Who knows your real nature? For, though unborn, you have taken birth; though without action, yet you have destroyed the enemies; and, though enjoying the *yoga-nidrā* (contemplation-sleep), yet you are most vigilant (wide awake).

You alone are able to enjoy the objects of sense such as sound and others, and (at the same time) you alone are able to practise austere asceticism. You alone are able to protect one and all, and yet you alone are able to be indifferent.

[72]

Cf. the *Taittirīya Āraṇyaka* (III. xiii. 3) text: "The supreme Principle — which does not take birth at all — assumes manifold forms." Compare also the *Bṛhad-āraṇyaka Upaniṣad* (II. i. 19): "*yadā susupta*" (when he who is in deep sleep).

[72 A]

The *Kaṭhōpaniṣad* (II. ii. 8) also states: "He is quite awake when all else are in deep sleep."

[72 B]

"Though unborn and immortal, and also the Lord of all beings, I manifest myself through my own *yoga-māyā* (divine potency), keeping my nature (*prakṛti*) under control." (*Gītā*, iv, 6)

[72C - 72 H]

"I am equally present in all beings, there is no one hostile or dear to me.

I am unattached to (those) actions, and I remain indifferent.

He has been declared to be the witness, guide, sustainer, experiencer (of pleasure and pain), the supreme Lord, and the over-soul.

Though the author of this creation, know me, the immortal Lord, to be a non-doer.

I am life in all beings; I am the austerity of the ascetics.

These, I speedily rescue from the ocean of birth and death." (*Ibid.*, ix, 29; ix, 9; xiii, 22; iv, 13; vii, 9; xii, 7)

[73 - 74]

The essence of the above verses of the benign *Bhagavadgītā* have been cleverly incorporated by the great poet Kālidāsa in the above two stanzas (verses IX-X); and in this way, the poet has immersed us in the ineffable bliss of ocean-like ecstasy.

[XI]

The Raghuvamśa, X, 26:

The ways that accomplish the object of human pursuit (*i.e.* which lead to the path of supreme felicity) through many ways differently laid down in the various sāstraic works, all meet, Oh Lord! in you alone, just as the streams of the Gaṅgā — though running in different directions — fall at last into the ocean.

[75 - 79]

All the systems of thought (*darśanas*) teach different ways to the aspirants of the knowledge of truth according to their varied proficiency and merit. Nevertheless all paths lead to one supreme goal, *viz.* God — this unitary nature of the goal of all systems has been brought out by the great poet in this elegant verse which begins with “*bahudhā.*”

Having elucidated properly the meaning of the *sūtra* (*Brahmasūtra*, I, i. 4), “*tattu samanvayāt,*” in the above verse (XI), the poet has made his epic excellent. Indeed the poets are ever large-hearted because they are endowed with poetic genius (knowing everything perfectly).

The great king of poets, Puṣpadanta also has proclaimed such a view in his *Śivamahimnaḥ stotra*, in the verse, “*trayī sāṅkhyam yogaḥ...*”¹

[80]

The first and foremost sage of the *Upaniṣads*, *viz.* Sage Durvāsa has referred to this as *Gāyatrī*² while describing the greatness of the Goddess Śakti.

1. There are different paths (of realization) as enjoined by the three *Vedas*, Sāṅkhya, Yoga, Pāśupata doctrine and Vaiṣṇava Śāstras. Persons following different paths — straight or crooked — according as they consider that this path is best or that one is proper due to the difference in temperaments, reach Thee alone just as the rivers enter the ocean. (Swami Paramātmānanda (Tr.) *Puṣpadanta's Śivamahimnaḥ stotra*, 7).

2. In his description of Śakti in the *Śaktimahimnaḥ stotra* (23), Sage Durvāsa says: “O Goddess Tripurā! the

[XII]

The Raghuvamśa, X, 27:

To persons whose desires for worldly pursuits are entirely annulled, and who have devoted their hearts fully and consigned their actions solely to Thee alone, Thou art the refuge for attaining absolution (not to return again to this world).

[81 - 84]

The act which is performed without any intention of attaining the fruit, and which is dedicated to the supreme Lord, generates (i) pure and earnest devotion to the Lord, (ii) firm detachment towards other things, (iii) higher wisdom leading to liberation. This method has been brought out by the *Vedas* as the proper way to attain the great good (beatitude). This has also been proclaimed by Lord Kṛṣṇa (Vāsudeva) in the *Gītā* repeatedly.

Incorporating the above idea attractively within a fine *śloka*, the great poet Kālidāsa makes all of us happy as he teaches the tenets of the *Gītā* and the *Vedas* in a simple way.

Āgamas refer to You as (i) the deity embedded in *Gāyatrī* — expressed along with *praṇava* and inclusive of *turīya*, and (ii) as Sandhyā (Herself); You are the yielder of the fruits of all great actions; You are the prime deity or spirit of all systems of thought; You are Brahman, Karma, the supreme Goddess, Kartā (Agent), Arhan, Great Person, Hari (Viṣṇu), Sun, Buddha (Enlightened), Śiva and Guru.”

[85]

To elucidate the meaning and to point out the similarity of verbal diction of the poet's *śloka* with those of the *Gītā* and Upaniṣadic texts, let me highlight them below.

[86]

The brahmins (those well versed in the scriptural lore) seek to know It (Brahman) by the study of the *Vedas*, by sacrifices, by gifts, by penance, and by fasting (An adaptation of a passage of the *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad*, IV, iv, 22).

[87]

With the mind thoroughly brought under control and fixed on me, the vigilant *yogin* should sit absorbed in me. (*Gītā*, vi, 14).

[88]

Oh Arjuna! now listen, how with the mind attached to me (through exclusive love) and practising *yoga* with complete dependence on me, you will know me (the repository of all power and glory, the soul of all) in full and be freed from all doubts. (*Ibid.*, vii, 1)

[89]

Therefore Arjuna! think of me at all times and fight. With mind and reason thus surrendered to me, you will, without doubt, come to me. (*Ibid.*, viii, 7)

[90]

That supreme Goal (God) — the knower of the *Vedas* term as the Indestructible. The striving recluses *free from attachment* enter that goal... (*Ibid.*, viii, 11)

[91 - 95]

O Arjuna! whatever you do, whatever you eat, whatever you offer as oblation to the sacred fire, whatever you bestow as a gift, whatever you do by way of penance, dedicate them to me.

With your mind thus established in the *yoga* of renunciation (offering of all actions to me), you will be freed from the bonds of *karma* in the shape of good and evil consequences; and freed from them, you shall attain me.

Fix your mind on me; be devoted to me; adore me and make obeisance to me; thus uniting yourself to me and entirely depending on me, you shall come to me.

O Arjuna! he who works for my sake, depends on me, is devoted to me, has no attachment, and is free from malice towards all beings, reaches me.

I consider them to be the best *yogins* who, endowed with supreme faith, and ever united with me, through meditation, worship me with the mind centred on me. (*Gītā*, ix, 27-28, 34; xi, 55; xii, 2)

[96 - 97]

Oh Arjuna! I rescue these persons speedily from the ocean of birth and death, their mind being fixed on me. Therefore, fix your mind on me, and establish your reason in me alone; thereafter you will abide in me. There is no doubt about that. (*Gītā*, xii, 7-8)

चेन्मैवम् । तस्यैव सर्वपरत्वेन ततः परस्याभावात् । अधीतवेदान्तः प्रतिपन्नब्रह्मात्मसाक्षात्कारः कृतकृत्यस्सर्वविद्ब्रह्मीभूतः पुरुषो हि न शास्त्रान्तरमड्येति, नापि ज्ञानान्तरं प्रतिपद्यते नाहं ब्रह्मेति, येन ब्रह्माहमस्मीति शास्त्रजन्यं ज्ञानं पूर्वमुदितं परं ज्ञानान्तरं बाधेत । सर्वाण्यपि ज्ञानान्तराणि सविकल्पकान्युपमृद्य हि शास्त्रान्निर्विकल्पकमहं ब्रह्मेति ज्ञानं जातम् । तस्मान्न वेदान्तशास्त्रजन्यज्ञानस्यास्ति बाधकं परं ज्ञानान्तरम् ॥

ननु परमपि शास्त्रं निर्दोषत्वात्प्रमाणमिति निश्चये सत्येव तज्जन्यज्ञानस्य संसारनिवर्तकत्वम् — ननु तदभावे तत् - रज्जुसर्पभ्रान्तिमान्दि नायं सर्पः, किंतु रज्जुरेवेति वदति, परस्मिन् प्रामाणिकत्वनिश्चये सत्येव तद्वाक्यात्स्वभ्रान्ति जहाति, न तु तदभावे — शास्त्रं च सदोषमिति न तत्र प्रामाण्यनिश्चयः पुरुषस्येति । न तज्जन्यज्ञानात्पुरुषस्य संसारनिवृत्तिरिति । मैवम् — शास्त्रकर्तारि आस्तिकस्य प्रामाणिकत्वनिश्चयसत्त्वात् । परमेश्वरकर्तृके च शास्त्रे निर्दोषत्वात्प्रामाण्यनिश्चयसत्त्वाच्च । न चाविद्यकं शास्त्रं कथं निर्दोषमिति वाच्यं, तदतिरिक्तभ्रमप्रमादादिपुंदोषरहितत्वस्यैव निर्दोषत्वरूपत्वात् । तस्मादनादिकालादारभ्य द्वैतभ्रमं प्रतिपन्नः पुरुषः परमेश्वरानुग्रहादुत्पन्नब्रह्मजिज्ञासस्सन् पश्चाद्गुरुरूपदेशादिना वेदान्तशास्त्रार्थमधिगत्य मननादिना ब्रह्मात्मसाक्षात्कारात्तं भ्रमं परित्यजतीति विद्वन्मार्गात्, पूर्वं प्रत्यक्षं परं शास्त्रं बाधत एव । शास्त्रस्य अविद्यादोषजन्यत्वं तु न भ्रमबाधकत्वप्रतिक्षेपकं भ्रमस्यापि तथात्वात् । अपौरुषेयत्वादसम्भाव्यमानदोषत्वं तु भ्रमबाधकत्वस्थापकमेवेति ॥

अत्राह कश्चित् — इदं शास्त्रमसम्भाव्यमानदोषमिति, प्रत्यक्षादिकं तु सम्भाव्यमानदोषमिति च केनावगतम् ? त्वया न तावन्निर्विशेषाऽनुभूतिरिममर्थमवगमयति, तस्या निर्विशेषत्वाच्छास्त्रपक्षपातविरहाच्च । नाप्यैन्द्रियिकप्रत्यक्षं दोषमूलत्वेन विपरीतार्थत्वात् । नाप्यनुमानादीनि, तेषां प्रत्यक्षमूलत्वात् । अतः स्वपक्षसाधनप्रमाणानभ्युपगमात् स्वामिमतार्थसिद्धिरिति । नैतद्युक्तम् — शास्त्रमसम्भा-

व्यमानपुंदोषमिति मया शास्त्रादेवावगतम् — शास्त्रकर्ता हीश्वर-
स्सर्वज्ञस्सकलपुंदोषविधुरः । तथा प्रत्यक्षादेः सम्भाव्यमानदोषत्वं च
शास्त्रादनुभवाच्चावगतमिति । न च प्रत्यक्षस्य दोषमूलत्वे सति
प्रत्यक्षमूलत्वाच्छब्दोऽपि दोषमूल एवेति विपरीतार्थं एवेति वाच्यं,
अपौरुषेयत्वेन शास्त्रस्यादोषमूलत्वस्योक्तत्वात् । शास्त्रस्य पृथक्-
प्रमाणत्वेन स्वतः प्रमाणत्वेन च प्रत्यक्षमूलत्वाभावाच्च ॥

ननु शास्त्रं नाम वैदिकशब्दराशिः, स च घटवद्भेर्यादिशब्द-
वच्च चक्षुःश्रोत्रप्रत्यक्षविषय एवेति कृत्वा प्रत्यक्षमूलमेव शास्त्रं,
तथा च प्रत्यक्षस्यैव विपरीतार्थत्वे तन्मूलस्य शास्त्रस्य कथमवि-
परीतार्थत्वमिति । मैवम् — यद्यपि ब्रह्मैव चक्षुषा स्वाभाविकदोष-
वशाच्छास्त्रत्वेन गृहीतं रज्जुरिव सर्पत्वेनागन्तुकदोषवशात्,

‘ ब्रह्मार्पणं ब्रह्म हविः ’

इति गीतावचनात् । तथापि शास्त्रमविपरीतार्थकमेव शास्त्रैणैवास्य
अर्थस्योक्तत्वात् । न च चक्षुर्ग्राह्यस्य शास्त्रस्य कथं चक्षुःप्रामाण्यप्रति-
क्षेपकतेति वाच्यं, दीपावभास्यस्य घटस्य दीपप्रकाशप्रतिरोधित्वदर्श-
नात् । न च चक्षुषोऽप्रमाणत्वे तद्ग्राह्यस्य कथं प्रमाणत्वमिति वाच्यं,
अप्रमाजनकत्वेन चक्षुषोऽप्रमाणत्वेऽपि प्रमाजनकत्वेन शास्त्रस्य प्रमा-
णत्वात् । अग्निजनकस्य काष्ठस्याप्रकाशकत्वेऽपि काष्ठजन्यस्याग्नेः प्रका-
शत्वदर्शनात् । न च चक्षुर्ग्राह्यत्वेन मिथ्याभूतं शास्त्रं कथं प्रमा-
जनकं भवेदिति वाच्यं, प्रमाया अपि जन्यत्वेन मिथ्यात्वात् ।
यज्जन्यं तद्धि नश्यत्वेन मिथ्या । न च यथार्थज्ञानस्य कथं
मिथ्यात्वमिति वाच्यं, सापेक्षमेव ज्ञानस्य जन्यस्य याथार्थ्यं नतु
निरपेक्षमिति भ्रमापेक्षया हि प्रमा सत्या, ब्रह्मदृष्ट्या तु सर्व-
मसत्यमेवेति । न च शास्त्रं कथं स्वस्यैव मिथ्यात्वं ब्रूयादिति
वाच्यं, शास्त्रस्य जडस्य वचनायोगात् । न च शास्त्रकर्तापी-
श्वरः कथं स्वशास्त्रं मिथ्येति ब्रूयादिति वाच्यम् स्वशास्त्रस्य
ब्रह्मभिन्नत्वेन मिथ्यात्वादेव । न च मिथ्याशास्त्रकर्तृत्वमीश्वरस्य
सर्वशक्तेन युक्तमिति वाच्यम्, कार्यमात्रस्य मिथ्यात्वेन सत्य-

स्याकार्यत्वेन च मिथ्याशास्त्रस्यैश्वरेण कर्तव्यत्वात् । न चैवं शास्त्रकर्तापीश्वरो मिथ्यैवेति वाच्यं , इष्टापत्तेः । न चेश्वरः स्वमिथ्यात्वं कथं प्रतिपादयेदिति वाच्यं , ब्रह्मैवाहं वस्तुतो मायया तु ममेश्वरत्वमागतं तच्च मिथ्येतीश्वरः प्रतिपादयेदेवेति । न च ममेश्वरत्वं मिथ्येतीश्वर एव कथं प्रतिपादयेदिति वाच्यं , स्वप्नोत्थितः पुरुषो ब्राह्मण एव स्वप्ने मम क्षत्रियत्वमागतं तच्च मिथ्येति प्रतिपादयतीति दर्शनात् । न च ब्राह्मण एव मम ब्राह्मणत्वं मिथ्येति कथं ब्रूयादिति वाच्यम् , ब्राह्मण एव स्वस्य देहतादात्म्याध्यासविगमे सति नाहं ब्राह्मण इति निश्चीय मम ब्राह्मणत्वं मिथ्यैवाभूदिति वक्त्येवेति । न च तत्र ब्राह्मणाद्देहादन्यो जीव एव वक्तोति वाच्यम् , जीवस्य वाग्निन्द्रियाभावेन मुखाभावेन च वक्तृत्वायोगात् । तस्माद्ब्रह्मण एव सतो मम मायया ईश्वरत्वं जीवत्वं चागतमितीश्वरो गुरुर्वा शास्त्रेणोपदेशेन वा शिष्यं प्रतिबोधयेदेव । यावद्ब्रह्मवहारं गुरुशिष्येश्वरादिसर्वद्वैतसत्त्वात् । परमार्थतस्तु न

‘ न शास्ता न शास्त्रं न शिष्यो न शिक्षा
न च त्वं न चाहं न चायं प्रपञ्चः’

‘ नेह नानास्ति किञ्चन ’

इत्यादि शास्त्रात् । तथा च ऐन्द्रियकत्वेन मिथ्याभूतमपि शास्त्रं प्रमाजनकत्वाद्यावद्ब्रह्मवहारं परं प्रमाणमेव । तद्ग्राहकमिन्द्रियं तु विपरीतार्थग्राहित्वाद्प्रमाणमेव , यथा ग्राहकस्यान्तःकरणस्यानित्यत्वेऽपि ग्राह्यस्य ब्रह्मणो नित्यत्वं तद्वत् । न चैवं चक्षुरादेः प्रमाणत्वप्रसिद्धिमङ्गप्रसङ्गः , यावद्ब्रह्मवहारमवाधितार्थविषयज्ञानरूपप्रमाजनकत्वेन तेषां प्रमाणत्वसिद्धेः । शास्त्रं त्वत्यन्तावाधितार्थविषयज्ञानजनकत्वेनात्यन्तं प्रमाणम् । तस्माद्देदान्तशास्त्रमेकमेव प्रमाणम् , अन्यानि चक्षुरादीनि प्रमाणानि तु प्रमाणाभासा एव इति ॥

JUSTIFICATION FOR SCRIPTURE BEING THE PRAMĀṆA*

*Bhāṣyabhāvañña Brahmaśrī Varahūr
Kalyāṇasundara Śāstrī*

By the principle of the later sublating the earlier, it is held that scripture which is later sublates perception which reveals duality. It cannot be said that scripture which is rooted in a defect cannot sublata (perception), for it has been stated that scripture is devoid of the special defect (which vitiates other *pramāṇas*). Since the rootedness in ordinary defect is common to both the sublator and the sublata, scripture which is devoid of the special defect does sublata perception which is associated with the special defect, even though it comes later. By this the contention that perception which is earlier sublates scripture which is later on the basis of the principle enunciated in the *upakrama-adhikaraṇa* stands refuted. The earlier which is devoid of the defect alone sublates the later, but not that which is defective. It may be argued: "Let it be said that scripture sublata perception only on account of its being free from defect; why is it said that it sub-

*Translated by Dr R. Balasubramanian

lates on account of its being later?" The answer is that it is for the sake of strengthening the work of sublation of perception.

It may be argued: "Though it is accepted that scripture, like perception, etc., is rooted in defect, it sublates perception on account of its being later. However, its being later (than perception) is of no consequence in this regard." The earlier perception of the illusory snake in the rope is, indeed, sublated by the later perception of the stick. It should not be said that the illusion of snake is removed only by the knowledge of the rope, for we find that it is removed by the illusion of the stick also. So there is no scope here for the application of the principle enunciated in the *upakramā-adhikaraṇa*.

It may be argued: "If the subsequent illusion sublates the earlier illusion, then that subsequent illusion too is sublated by the true cognition. Or, that too is sublated by its subsequent illusion. Thus, scripture too, which is later, sublates perception, and something else which is subsequent to that (scripture) sublates it." This is not tenable. Since scripture itself is subsequent to everything else, there is nothing which is subsequent to it. Indeed, a person who has learnt the Vedānta and who has attained the direct realization of Brahman-Ātman, who has done everything that has to be done, who knows everything, and who has become Brahman, does not learn some other scripture; nor does he attain another knowledge on the ground that "I am not Brahman." If that were the case, then the subsequent knowledge will sublata the knowledge, "I am Brahman," which is produced by the scripture and which is earlier. Indeed, it is after sublating all other kinds of knowledge of distinctions that the dis-

inctionless knowledge, "I am Brahman," has arisen from scripture. Therefore, there is no other subsequent knowledge which sublates the knowledge produced by the *vedānta-śāstra*.

It may be argued: "It is only when it is ascertained that scripture, though subsequent, is *pramāṇa* since it is devoid of defect that the knowledge produced by it removes bondage. But it cannot, when that is not the case. Only after ascertaining the truth, a person having the rope-snake illusion is able to tell another, "This is not a snake, but only a rope," and removes the illusion through the sentence, but not in the absence of that (ascertainment). A person does not think of scripture as authoritative since it is associated with defect. And so, there is no removal of bondage of the person from the knowledge produced by it." This argument cannot be accepted. One who is an *āstika* has certainty in respect of the authority of the author of scripture. Since scripture authored by the supreme Lord is free from defect, there is certainty about its authority. So, a person who is in the grip of the illusion of duality which is beginningless develops a desire for Brahman-knowledge due to the grace of the supreme Lord; thereafter, having known the meaning of the *vedānta-śāstra* through the instruction of the preceptor, he removes that illusion after having attained the direct realization of Brahman-Ātman through the practice of the discipline of *manana*, etc. So, scripture which is later sublates the earlier perception, the fact that scripture is produced by the defect of *avidyā* is not a hindrance to the removal of illusion, for the illusion too is in the same situation. Since scripture is of non-human origin, it is free from the possibility of defect, and it is capable of removing the illusion.

Some may argue like this: "By what means do you arrive at the conclusion that scripture is devoid of the possibility of defect, whereas perception has the possibility of defect? It cannot be said that consciousness which is devoid of distinctions gives you this enlightenment, for such consciousness is unrelated to any object whatever; also it is incapable of partiality to scripture. Nor can sense-perception give you this enlightenment for, as it is based on a defect, it gives wrong information. Nor can inference, etc., give you this information, for all of them are based on perception. So, since there is no *pramāṇa* to prove your view, you must give it up." This is not tenable. That scripture is devoid of the possibility of defect associated with the human agency has been known to me through scripture itself. The omniscient Lord who is the author of scripture is indeed, free from all defects associated with the human agency. In the same way, that perception and other *pramāṇas* are liable to the possibility of defects is also known through scripture as well as experience. It is no argument to say that, if perception is rooted in defect, verbal testimony, too, which is based on perception is rooted in defect and so it will give wrong information. It has already been stated that scripture is free from defect in respect of its origin. Since scripture is a separate *pramāṇa* and since it has also intrinsic validity, it is not rooted in perception.

It may be argued as follows: "What is called scripture is an aggregate of Vedic words; inasmuch as it is the object of perception like a pot, and the sound produced by a drum, etc. are objects perceived by the visual sense and the auditory sense, etc., respectively, scripture is rooted in perception. This being the case if perception gives wrong information how could it be

said that scripture which is rooted in perception would not give wrong information?" This cannot be accepted. As the *Bhagavadgītā* (iv, 24) says that "Brahman is the offering, Brahman is the oblation," Brahman alone is apprehended as scripture by the visual sense due to the natural defect (*viz.*, *avidyā*) in the same way as rope is apprehended as snake due to the defect which arises subsequently; even then, scripture does not give wrong information, for scripture itself declares to this effect. It should not be asked how scripture which is apprehended by perception can oppose the validity of perception? It is seen that a pot which revealed by lamp obstructs the latter.

It may be argued: "If the visual sense is not authoritative, how can scripture which is apprehended by it be authoritative?" This argument does not hold good; for, though the visual sense is not authoritative inasmuch as it gives rise to *apramā* (*i.e.* reveals content which is sublated), scripture which gives rise to *pramā* (*i.e.* reveals a content which is not subject to sublation) is authoritative. Even though wood which produces fire has no illumination, the fire produced by wood has the power of illumination. If it be asked how scripture, which is *mithyā* due to its being apprehended by the visual sense, could produce *pramā*, the reply is that *pramā* too, on account of its being produced, is *mithyā*. Indeed, whatever is produced, being destructible, is *mithyā*. If it be asked how a valid cognition can be *mithyā*, the reply is that the validity of a cognition which is produced is only relative and not absolute; and so by comparison with erroneous cognition, a valid cognition (*pramā*) is real; however, from the perspective of Brahman everything is unreal alone. It should not be asked how scripture

could speak about its own illusory nature, for scripture which is insentient is incapable of speech. Nor should it be asked how even God, the author of scripture, could speak about the falsity of his own scripture; for his own scripture, being different from Brahman, is undoubtedly *mithyā*. If it be said that it is not proper to hold that God who is omnipotent is the author of scripture which is *mithyā*, the reply is that since whatever is produced is *mithyā* and that since the real cannot be produced, only *mithyā-śāstra* (*i.e.* scripture which is *mithyā*) can be produced by God. If it be said that God, who is the author of scripture, is also *mithyā*, it is quite acceptable. It is no argument to say how God could set forth his own falsity; for, he, indeed, sets forth, "I am in truth Brahman alone; but through *māyā*, I have attained the status of *Īsvara*; and that status is *mithyā*." If it be asked how *Īsvara* could set forth the falsity of his own *Īsvaratva*, the reply is that a person who is awakened from dream declares, so we find, that, though he is a *Brāhmaṇa* alone, the status of a *Kṣatriya* came to him in dream and that *kṣatriyatva* is false. It may be argued: "How could a person who is *Brāhmaṇa* alone declare that his *brāhmaṇatva* is *mithyā*?" A person who is *Brāhmaṇa*, when he is freed from the false identification with the body, indeed declares: "I know I am not a *Brāhmaṇa*; my *Brāhmaṇa*-hood was only *mithyā*." So, *Īsvara* or the preceptor enlightens the disciple through scripture or instruction respectively to the effect: "Though I am Brahman alone, the status of *Īsvara* or the status of *jīva* (as the case may be) has come to me through *māyā*." So long as there is *vyavahāra*, all kinds of distinctions such as preceptor, disciple, *Īsvara* do exist. But in reality, there are no such distinctions, as it has

been conveyed through such authoritative statement: "There is neither teacher nor scripture; there is neither disciple nor teaching; there is neither 'you' nor 'I', not this world," (*Daśaslokī*, 7) "There is no plurality whatsoever here," (*Bṛhadāraṇyakoṇiṣad*, IV, iv. 19) etc. Thus, even though scripture is *mithyā* on account of its being apprehended by the senses, it is certainly the supreme *pramāṇa* so long as there is *vyavahāra*, since it produces knowledge (*pramā*). But the senses which apprehend it are not valid, since they apprehend what is erroneous. It is like this: though the *antaḥkāraṇa* (internal organ) which apprehends Brahman is not eternal. It does not follow from this that the visual sense, etc., will cease to be *pramāṇas*; they are accepted to be *pramāṇas* since they produce knowledge of objects which remain unsublated as long as there is *vyavahāra*. But scripture is the final *pramāṇa*, since it produces knowledge of the real which remains unsublated finally. So, the *vedānta-śāstra* alone is the *pramāṇa*; but the other *pramāṇas* such as the visual sense are only pseudo-*pramāṇas*.

HOMAGE TO CANDRACŪDA (ŚIVA)

रे कन्दर्प करं कदर्थयसि किं कोदण्डटङ्कारितैः
 रे रे कोकिल कोमलैः कलरवैः किं त्वं वृथा जल्पसि ।
 मुग्धे स्निग्धविदग्धमुग्धमधुरैर्लोलैः कटाक्षैरलं
 चेतश्चुम्बितचन्द्रचूडचरणध्यानामृतं वर्तते ॥

Why do you, O God of Love! trouble your hand with the twangings of your bow? Why do you, O Cuckoo! chatter ineffectually with soft and sweet notes? O young woman! enough of your glances, affectionate, artful, charming, sweet and unsteady. Our heart has tasted the nectar-like contemplation of the Moon-crested God.

Bhartṛhari's Vairāgyaśataka (Misc.) v. 42

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- (1) to undertake the carrying on of scientific research for the extension of knowledge in the fields of Natural and Applied Sciences generally, and in particular in the fields of Physics and Metaphysics.
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- (4) to undertake research for the purposes of establishing norms necessary for realising the divinity in man through moral, spiritual and cultural infra-structure.

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संसाराध्वनि तापभानुकिरणप्रोद्भूतदाहव्यथा-

खिन्नानां जलकाङ्क्षया मरुभुवि भ्रान्त्या परिभ्राम्यताम् ।

अत्यासन्नसुधाम्बुधिं सुखकरं ब्रह्माद्वयं दर्शय-

त्येषा शङ्करभारती विजयते निर्वाणसन्दायिनी ॥

*saṁsārādhvani tāpabhānukiraṇaprodhūtadāhavyathā-
khinnānāṁ jalakāṅkṣayā marubhuvi bhrāntyā
paribhrāmyatām
atyāsannasudhāmbudhiṁ sukhakaraṁ brahmādvayaṁ
darśayaty-
eṣā śaṅkarabhārati vijayate nirvāṇasandāyini.*

To those who are afflicted, in the way of the world, by the burning pain given rise to by the scorching sun-shafts of misery, and who through delusion wander about in the desert (of worldliness) seeking water — showing the felicitous ocean of nectar, which is very near, the non-dual *Brahman*, this — the Voice of Śaṅkara — is victorious, leading, as it does, to liberation.