


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Volume FIFTEEN

Number 4



February

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esā śaṅkara-bhāratī vijagate
nirvāṇa-sandāyini

victorious is the voice of śaṅkara.
leading, as it does, to liberation

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ŚĀṆKARĀ

śaṅkara-bhāratī

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Editor
N. C. Krishnan

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Kālidāsa

HOMAGE TO ŚAṆKARA

[144]

सर्वान् स्वकीयमतत्त्वपरीक्षणेच्छुं -
स्तत्तन्मतार्थकथनेन विजित्य मोदम् ।
सर्वज्ञपीठमधिरुह्य य आप स त्वं
श्रीशङ्करार्य मम देहि पदावलम्बम् ॥

*sarvān svakīya-mata-tattva-parikṣaṇecchūms-
tattanmatārthakathanena vijitya modam
sarvajña-pīṭham-adhiruhya ya āpa sa tvaṁ
śrīśaṅkarārya mama dehi padāvalambam.*

Oh Śrī Śaṅkara! having defeated the disputants — who wanted to probe into the principles of your system —, by explaining (and exposing the untenability of) their respective systems, you have mounted on *Sarvajñapīṭha* [Victory stand of Omniscience], and you have achieved supreme bliss. Oh Śrī Śaṅkara! may you give me shelter under your benign lotus feet!

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शान्त्यादिसाधनवता पुरुषोत्तमेन
 सम्प्राप्य सद्गुरुमतः श्रवणादि कृत्वा ।
 यः प्राप्यते विमलबोधतनुर्हि स त्वं
 श्रीशङ्करार्य मम देहि पदावलम्बम् ॥

*śāntyādi-sādhanavatā puruṣottamena
 samprāpya sadgurumataḥ śravanādi kṛtvā
 yaḥ prāpyate vimalabodhatanurhi sa tvam
 śrīśaṅkarārya mama dehi padāvalambam.*

Oh Śrī Śaṅkara! through the grace of the Lord Puruṣottama endowed with sublime qualities like *śānti* (serenity), etc., you have resorted to the good preceptor, Govinda Bhagavatpāda and having studied under him, you have acquired perfect knowledge. Oh Śrī Śaṅkara! may you give me shelter under your benign lotus feet.

Jagadguru Śrī Saccidānanda Śivābhinava Nṛsiṃhabhāratī
 in *Śrīśaṅkarācāryapadāvalambastava*

ŚRĪ RĀMA*

Jagadguru Śrī Candrasekharendra Sarasvatī

To protect *dharma*, the supreme Being appeared in the world as Lord Śrī Rāma. The *Vedas* also came to this world along with Him in the form of His attendant. By the great Sage Vālmīki who was the son of Pracetas, the *Vedas* have been rendered in the form of the *Rāmāyaṇa*.

वेदवेद्ये परे पुंसि जाते दशरथात्मजे ।

वेदः प्राचेतसादासीत्साक्षाद्रामायणात्मना ॥

Therefore, the teachings of the *Rāmāyaṇa* are nothing but the teachings of the *Vedas* — this one should come to know.

The *Vedas* teach us the duties which we should follow. They explain the method to perform *yāga*, *yajña*, *homa* (oblation to fire), *dāna-dharma* (righteous

* Courtesy: Śrī Paramācāryar Aruḷamudam pp. 16-18, Moorthy Publications, 19, Śrīmān Śrīnivāsa Road, Alwarpet, Madras-18. Free rendering: V. K. S. N. Raghavan.

acts like charity), etc. When a great king or an agent performs the *Soma* sacrifice, he is assisted by many great learned persons who are well-versed in the *Vedas*. At the end of the sacrifice the agent of the sacrifice, has to give those great people (who are called *Ṛtviks*) many presents like cows, wealth, grains, gold, etc. The prime agent of the sacrifice accrues the benefits of the performance of the sacrifice, like *yoga* and *kṣema* (new gains and safety/security). However, in the case of the performance of another type of sacrifice called *satrayāga*, the *ṛtviks* (Vedic priests) and all participants share the distribution-fees and presents (*dāna-dharma*); and thus such a performance of *satrayāga* leads to the social good. (Maybe) based on this *satrayāga* custom, nowadays there takes place the free distribution of food and other amenities to the hungry and the needy in the public dwellings called *chatrams* (chowtries). Food distribution is the major activity in *chatrams* and this is the universal sacrifice of social welfare.

The chanting of the Vedic *mantras* relieve the people from their maladies like poverty, diseases and hostilities. The *Vedas* teach the reality of God and the duties of the human beings. God protects those who follow their respective duties. Just as a wrestler takes care of his body through exercises and strict diet regulations, etc., even so the great Vedic pundits (scholars) adopt the strict guidelines prescribed in the *Śāstras* (scriptures) for achieving and preserving Vedic knowledge.

For the control of one's mind, one should inculcate good and righteous habits; and one should be indifferent (rather moderate in response) to joy and

sorrow like a drop of water on the lotus-leaf. One should practise strict Vedic observances in accordance with the teachings of the *Vedas* and *Śāstras*. Good behaviour (*ācāra*) is the first and foremost requisite in one's Yogic practice of controlling one's mind. The Yogic practice for the sake of mind-control is different from the physical exercise needed for upright body. The attitude of mind one needs for the mind-control is expatiated by Lord Krishna in the *Bhagavadgītā* (VI. 22) as:

यं लब्ध्वा चापरं लाभं मन्यते नाधिकं ततः ।
यस्मिंस्थितो न दुःखेन गुरुणापि विचाल्यते ॥

By such a Yogic practice, the mind becomes pure, one becomes enlightened and is able to vanquish evil tendencies. In such a stage, even if one faces death, one will not be afraid of it; *i.e.* one would welcome death with gentle smile. Then one will not have rebirth and thus will continue to live with smile; such a mental equipoise constitutes a mature *yoga*. If we study the *Vedas* (or even *Śāstras*) properly and follow the precepts laid down there, we can surely conquer mind from its infirmities (weakness).

Through such a strict discipline, Lord Śrī Rāma followed *dharma* throughout his life-time. He welcomed many a great difficulty with open arms and quiet composure. He shone as the great model for all the humanity to follow truth and righteousness. When Śrī Rāma started to go to the (Daṇḍaka) forest, Kausalyā, his mother bid him farewell as "May the *dharma* that you follow protect you well wherever you go."

यं पालयसि धर्मं त्वं धृत्या च नियमेन च ।
स वै राघवशार्दूल धर्मस्त्वामभिरक्षतु ॥

As we go out, the dog — which we take along — protects us from thieves and others. Therefore we should look after the dog well. Even *dharma* protects us like the dog. We should follow *dharma*. Then it will be of help to us. When Lord Śiva appeared (before Śrī Śaṅkara Bhagavatpāda) in the form of a *Caṇḍāḷa*, He came along with the four *Vedas* that took the form of four dogs. Then Lord Śiva gave enlightenment to Śrī Ādi Śaṅkara. Therefore it is said:

धर्मो रक्षति रक्षितः ।

“Dharma protects us when we follow *dharma*.”

The Mahārāṣṭra *chatrapati* (Emperor) Shivāji followed the teachings of his teacher Śrī Rāmadāsa. When Shivāji arrested his adversaries (enemies), he treated their womenfolk with courtesy and handed them over to their respective family.

The supreme Brahman, the main purport of the *Vedas* is *pūrṇa* (ever full and infinite), and is the supreme Monarch and Almighty. He made the advent as Lord Śrī Rāma. In the case of Lord Śrī Rāma, nobody can point out any demerit or blemish in Him. To such a great Lord Śrī Rāma, came Śrī Hanumān (son of Añjanādevi), well-versed in *Vyākaraṇa* (grammar), *Vedas* and *Śāstras*. Śrī Āñjaneya strictly adhered to *brahmacarya* (rigorous codes of celibacy) and always chanted the Lord's divine name, “Rāma” — the *tāraka-mantra* (hymn of success). In the *Rāmāyaṇa* the follow-

ing topics are dealt with in detail: political science, statecraft, moral codes, devotion towards great persons (especially: father, mother, brothers, friends, and teachers/saints), how to deal with enemies, codes of conduct with regard to war, principles of *śaraṇāgati* (self-surrender) and many other *dharmas*. There is no path of *dharma* (righteous conduct) that is not mentioned in the great epic, the *Rāmāyaṇa*.

ŚRIMAD RĀMĀYAṆAM

कौसल्याजननं क्रतुघ्नहननं सीताकरोत्पीडनम्
 पट्टारम्भणं अम्बिकानिरसनं कान्तारसञ्चारणम् ।
 जानक्या हरणं प्लवङ्गमपतेः सख्यं कपिप्रेषणं
 सेतूच्छ्वनं अक्षतातनिधनं ह्येतद्धि रामायणम् ॥

The birth of Śrī Rāma (through Kausalyā), the slaying of demons (Subāhu and others), the marriage of Śrī Rāma and Śrī Sītā, the arrangement for the coronation of Śrī Rāma as Crown-Prince, Śrī Bharata's scolding of Kaikeyi, Śrī Rāma's wandering in the forest, the abduction Śrī Sītā by Rāvaṇa, friendship of Sugrīva, sending of Hanumān (in search of Śrī Sītā, crossing the bund (*setu*), and slaying of Rāvaṇa (father of prince Akṣa) — this in brief is the story of the *Rāmāyaṇa*.

SOME THOUGHTS ON MARRIAGE*

Jagadguru Śrī Jayendra Sarasvatī

1. *Evils of Dowry*

The problem of marriage of daughters is solved by some people by marrying the sister and brother from one family to the brother and sister respectively of another family. Of course, thereby, the problem of dowry is solved. The term 'dowry' goes by the name of *Varadakṣiṇā*. We think that this means giving some *dakṣiṇā* to the bridegroom. But actually that is not the idea at all.

There are six types of marriages which have been prescribed. Only in one form, the bridegroom gives something for the sake of the bride. The daughter is given by way of *dāna* or charity to the bridegroom. The person who accepts the charity acquires some *doṣa*

* Courtesy: pp. 243-255, *Heritage of Bhāratavarṣa and Sanātana Dharma* (Discourses of Śrī Jayendra Sarasvatī Swāmi at Delhi delivered in 1973. Pub: Oriental Cultural Educational Society, 20, I Canal Road, Gandhi Nagar, Madras-20)

and in order to get rid of that *doṣa*, the bridegroom gives some money to the bride. But now things have taken a different turn. Actually, even this is not regarded as the best form of marriage. The best marriages are those done according to the *Śāstras* where the actions are only *Vaidika* actions. These *Vaidika* actions have no relation to dress, dowry and other things. These are not recognised as part of *Vaidika* marriages at all.

In some parts of our country, the bridegroom earns some money and gives it to the bride at the time of marriage. But the present-day marriages do not belong to any of these types, because we think that *dakṣiṇā* is to be given to the bridegroom by the bride's father or her family. This is the funny distortion that has come about in the institution of marriage.

Even in my younger days, the amount of dowry demanded was not very much. In those days, for one educated in the ordinary way, not much amount had to be spent on marriages. But, now the facilities for education have gone up and the educational standards of the boys have also gone up, or rather the educational qualifications of the boys have also gone up; and naturally people have started demanding more by way of dowry.

All this is due to the social changes which we have brought about on ourselves. These have nothing to do with our *dharma* at all. When a parent spends a lot of money on the education of his boy, say up to B.A. or M.A., he feels that somehow he must extort that money or if possible even a higher amount, say twice or thrice or even four times, so that he may have sufficient money to educate even his grandchildren.

The practice of taking dowry is itself bad and it is a sinful act. There are many other sins which are committed by us daily, but this sin is the highest type of sin; if one can so call it. I would not call it the worst type of sin, because people may get frightened, and therefore, I am using the term 'the highest type of sin'.

When there is an unmarried girl in a house, the sin of not marrying her goes not only to the whole family, but it extends to the whole society as well. So, the responsibility for having her married is not confined to the bride's or girl's family only, but it extends to the society as a whole. All the members of the society should ponder over this and try to reform our society, and see that they get redemption from this sin. This is a responsibility cast on all members of society and not merely the girl's parents or her family only.

The word *Vivāha* means:

विशेषेण ब्राह्म्यतीति विवाहः ।

Before marriage, a boy being a bachelor and a single individual, could go about as he liked; he could go to the cinema as frequently as he liked, live in a hotel and eat as he liked. But, after marriage, he acquires a special or additional responsibility. After marriage, he cannot go about as he likes. Till marriage, he had the responsibility of looking after his parents only, but now he has got to look after his parents and his wife. After marriage, nowadays people think that they can have a separate family establishment, and live separately from their parents. In fact, some people marry early for this purpose. This creates certain problems

also in our society. Some boys think that since they have started earning, they should not be a source of trouble to their parents, and so they start living separately after their marriage. But that is a wrong idea.

One should remember that it was the parents who had taken care of the boy from his childhood, given him education and medical care and attended to so many of his needs, and brought him up so well by spending so much money on him that he has now been able to stand on his own. So, the boy should never think of forsaking his parents after marriage. After all if he starts forsaking his parents, naturally his children will also forsake him in his old age. After marriage also, therefore, the boy should live with his parents. Then only, life will go on well.

The word *Kanyādāna* used for our Vedic marriage is very significant from another point of view also. The term means giving a *kanyā* or a girl in charity or by way of *dāna*. We give something which we possess with great affection to somebody else. When we give charity, we abandon our feeling of ownership and possession, and offer it to somebody else. In the same way, a girl is given by way of charity by her parents to the bridegroom. Till then, the bride belonged to her parents. But after *Kanyādāna*, the bride belongs to the bridegroom's family, and it is the duty of the bridegroom to look after her.

Suppose we sell a cow or a house or give something by way of *dāna*, do we bother about it afterwards? Do we bother about the repairs to the house or maintaining it in a proper state of repair afterwards? We never do so. But in the case of *Kanyādāna*, we find a

different story. We find the strange phenomenon of the parents-in-law of the bride sending her back to her parents' house to get something more, every now and then either by way of cash or ornaments or vessels and so on. This kind of thing is a sinful act. Once a thing is given in charity, it belongs to the recipient only and the donor has no further responsibility in regard to the thing given, and there is no further *vyavahāra* or activity relating to that afterwards on the part of the donor.

Very often, people write to me, or come and complain to me that they are not able to celebrate their daughters' marriage because of the practice of extortion of dowry. I thought that the position was different in North India, but I am sorry to hear that here dowry is taken not only in the form of cash, but also in the form of kind. Thus, unfortunately, this evil of dowry is spreading like a poison in different places, and that is why people are suffering everywhere and there is so much difficulty everywhere.

There are two types of suffering to which we are generally subjected. One is suffering which is created by ourselves, and the other is suffering which comes by itself in a natural way. The evil of dowry is a suffering which we have created by our own efforts.

Parents who may have daughters to marry may feel happy at what I have said. But they should remember this also at the time of the marriage of their sons. They should not feel that since they are suffering from this evil for the marriage of their daughters they should extract dowry for their sons. The parents should see both sides of the picture.

Natural difficulties and natural sufferings are something which we can control and we can take steps to avert them. But we should not add to these difficulties and sufferings by our own creation. We ourselves should be able to reform our society in the right direction. There is no need to set up any organisation with a president and secretary and so on for this purpose. We can ourselves remedy or rectify this situation; instead of adding to our sufferings and difficulties, we should take steps to see that these sins are averted by all possible means. We spend so much and yet we suffer. This is the paradox in our society today. We should realise that after all no part of this money is going to accompany us afterwards. Therefore, there is no need to depend so much upon money. Even millionaires are suffering as much as the ordinary people are suffering. So, there is no need to depend so much upon money.

After all, what are the essential things required for a marriage? Only some *Maṅgaladravyas* are required. The giving of a *Maṅgalasūtra* at the time of marriage is all that is prescribed. This is the *niyati* or injunction. The rest is all *āḍambara* or ostentation only. In the olden days, the yellow thread bedecked with turmeric and vermilion used to be given to the bride. But nowadays, we start worrying about the golden *maṅgalasūtra* that we have to give, which is expected to weigh a substantial amount. All that is required in Vedic marriages is only this yellow thread. That is a symbol of holiness and purity. There is no need for any golden *maṅgalasūtra*. The *maṅgalasūtra* is a holy and auspicious ornament. There is no need to change it into a golden chain.

It looks odd that I, a *sannyāsi*, should have to speak about these *dharmas* relating to marriage. Yet, as the

head of a *maṭha* I am obliged to speak about these things, for otherwise, the sin of not explaining the correct position would attach itself to me. I am just trying to get freed from that sin by explaining these things to you. These are small things which all of you can understand and also put into effect, because it is good for you and for the society as well.

As I was saying, to have an unmarried daughter in a house is a sin not only for that family but for the whole of society and in fact for the whole country. In the case of a boy, Brahmacharya or continence is not prohibited, but in the case of girls, marriage is a necessity and is a 'Must'. Thus, we have the concept of *kadalīvivāha*, and then *Śāligrāmavivāha* etc. Some people may be suffering because of physical ill-health or diseases and so on. To cover such cases, these two *dharmas* have been prescribed. In *Kadalī Vivāha*, a plantain tree is cut off and the marriage performed and the *maṅgalasūtra* is offered. Then the marriage is deemed to have taken place. A similar thing is done in the case of *Śāligrāmavivāha* also. The marriage is done with the *Śāligrāma*. Then the *Śāligrāma* is given by way of charity to a *Brahmacāri*.

Even in the olden days, this kind of thing used to be done, but of course, the reason at that time was different. Such marriages were done only in cases of extreme bodily deformities or infirmities or serious diseases etc. where normal type of marriages could not take place. These are, however, only *āpad-dharmas* or emergency *dharmas* which have been prescribed.

The problem of dowry has been accentuated by our own creation. As the boy starts earning more, his

expectation of dowry also increases, and, therefore, the problem becomes more acute. One does not know whether this kind of spiralling up of the dowry amount with the increasing educational attainments of the boy is going to lead to any solution at all. We should ponder over this and see that we do our actions in accordance with the *Dharmaśāstra* and the *Smṛtis*.

The *vivāha-samskāras* would not take even a few hours, and yet this problem has acquired a big proportion due to other reasons. The difficulties have arisen because we are giving education up to B.A. or B.Sc. or M.A. or M.Sc. or even Ph.D. There is no need for all this. There are many other ways in which money can be earned, and our family can still be saved, and there can be marriage also without spending much amount.

In some cases, the daughters earn and support their parents, and the parents start worrying about what would happen to them after their daughters are married. It is because the daughters are earning that they are facing this difficulty. This problem is again of our own creation.

If we have faith in our *dharma* and our unity, we can easily overcome all these difficulties. Because of one evil we have started, we are forced to encounter a hundred other difficulties. It is because of the problem of dowry and the consequent difficulties of marriage that we are facing a hundred other difficulties. We have converted small problems into major difficulties now. If we remove the small problems, then automatically the major difficulties will also go away.

If we remedy these small things, then our society can still save itself. Our society is expected to be a

model society which should serve as a guide to others. If the guide himself misses the way, then how can he hope to guide others?

We have good *samskāras* in our society even now and we should be able to preserve them and be a guide to other societies. We have been nurtured and brought up in a certain tradition, and we should know how to give our guidance to others. But if we ourselves lose faith in our heritage, then it would be bad for us and bad for the country as a whole. So we have to be careful in this matter. First, we should set right our own family. Then our country and our society also will become all right. Everyone should bear this in mind all the time.

One may say that after all, we *sannyāsis* have no problem of dowry, and therefore we can speak like this on this question of marriage. It is true that as *sannyāsis* we have no problems. But all these discourses are meant only for you, householders. These are good for you, and it is for you to ponder over these things. If you do so, then to that extent, my burden would be less, and that is the only benefit that I derive by speaking about these things.

So, people should take earnest steps to practise their *dharma* and to preserve their *dharma* and their tradition, and thus bring about a reformation of society and free it from the evils that have crept into it.

2. *No Barter in Brides*

According to our cosmology, the world is created, and it is maintained and then it is destroyed. The question may be asked whether creation and destruc-

tion alone are not enough and why maintenance also should be there. After all, the person who creates will also maintain. So, why should there be somebody in charge of maintenance separately?

The answer to this question forms the basis of the *śaktitattva*, and there are many special *dharmas* explained here. The world is first created, and then it is maintained or protected, and then it is destroyed. There is an interesting story in the *Upaniṣads* in this connection.

The disciple asked the teacher: 'So many people are there! What happens to those people? Where do they come from? Where do they go after their death? Will the world not be affected by all this? Will the world not become full of bad things only, after some time? The answer to this is this: All people cannot stay in the same place for all the time. If there is decrease of population at one place, then automatically there will be an increase in population somewhere else. This population may be in the form of trees or animals etc. As you are all aware, 50 years ago in the place where we are meeting today, namely the Uttarāsvāminī temple, there were only trees and shrubs and animals. But now men have started living here. Surely, the trees here have been felled down and the animals living here would have gone to some other place where no men are living. So, there is no destruction of anything, as such.

For creation, maintenance and destruction of the world, three *śaktis* are required.

Creation belongs to activity based on *rajoguṇa*. Maintenance belongs to activity based on *sattvagūṇa*

and destruction belongs to activity based on *tomoguna*. Brahmā who creates the world is therefore having *rajoguna* predominant in him. In fact, that is the only *guna* prominent in him. The colour of *rajas* is red, and therefore, *Brahmā* is symbolised as being red in colour, and He is also seated on the red lotus. He gets thereby the power to create.

Vishnu does maintenance of the world. Maintenance belongs to *sattvaguna*, and *sattva* is white but we find Vishnu is actually black. He is *nīlameghaśyāmaḷa* in colour.

Śiva is responsible for the destruction of the world, and destruction belongs to *tamoguna*, and the colour of *tamas* is black, but we actually find that Śiva is not black but white in colour; He is wearing also white *Vibhūti*, and He is living in Kaliasa which is full of snow and therefore white in colour. His bull is also white in colour. It looks strange that Śiva is associated with *tamoguna*, though He is white in colour and His nature is also indicative of *sattvaguna* because He gives us knowledge in the form of Dakṣiṇāmūrti and Śaṅkara.

In the case of *Brahmā*, his colour, and his *guna* and function are all in unison, but in the case of Vishnu and Śiva, we notice some difference between their colours, *gunas* and functions.

Śiva performs the function of destruction of the world. The fact that He is white in colour makes us think that perhaps He is doing some work based on *sattva* also, that is, in the nature of maintenance or protection. There is an actual incident in recent history

which in fact confirms this idea of ours. One poet sings about this in a beautiful way. *Māṅikkavācagar*, who was a great *Śaivite Nāyanmār* or *Śaivite saint* was asked to stand once on the River Vaigai and in the hot sun as a matter of punishment. Immediately, there were floods in the river which actually cooled him. The poet reminds us of this incident in the following *śloka* of the *Śivalīlārṇava* (21, 88):

त्राणे योऽधिकृतः समस्तजगतां तस्याम्बुराशौ सुखं
निद्राणस्य तथाविधेऽपि समये प्रष्टैव नालक्ष्यते ।
विष्टिं कुर्वति ताम्यति श्रमभराद्वेत्राहतिस्त्वय्यभूत्
कस्याग्रे कथयिष्यसीममनयं स्वामिन्ननाथो ह्यसि ॥

He says: "Mahāvishnu is supposed to maintain the whole world and it is his duty to maintain the world. There is so much of flood in the Vaigai river, and it may even wash away the whole city. But Vishnu whose duty is to protect the city, is actually sleeping on his serpent couch. On the other hand, I find that Paramesvara whose duty it is only to destroy has come to save me now." This is how he describes Śiva's *līlā*.

Thus, we find that even though Śiva is associated with *tamoguna*, yet he does also some maintenance. Similarly, in the case of Vishnu, we find that He is associated with *sattvaguna* and yet he has also done some destruction. For instance, Vishnu has taken ten *avatāras* or 21 *avatāras* and killed so many demons like Rāvaṇa, Hiraṇyākṣa, Hiraṇyakasipu, Kaṁsa and so on.

Thus, in the case of Vishnu and Śiva, we find a dichotomy between their functions and their *gunas*. But actually if Vishnu does any destruction, it is for

the purpose of maintenance only. He does destruction of the wicked people in order to protect the good and virtuous people. Although Vishnu is associated with *sattva*, yet, he has to do some destruction in order to bring the wicked people to the right path. So, even if he kills a person, He does so only to protect the rest of the world. That is His nature; with His *sattva* nature He protects the whole world, if necessary even by killing some bad or wicked people.

There is also another strange thing that we notice in the case of Vishnu. The poet says:

त्राणे योऽधिकृतः समस्तजगतां तस्याम्बुराशौ सुखम्
निद्राणस्य तथाविधेऽपि समये प्रष्टैव नालक्ष्यते ।

Mahāvishnu is sleeping. Sleep is associated with *tamo-guṇa*. But Vishnu's function is maintenance associated with *sattva*. When He is doing destruction of wicked people, His actions partake of the nature of *saṁhāra* or destruction which is associated with *tamoguṇa*. So, for protecting people He has got *sattva* and for destroying wicked people, He has got some trace of *tamoguṇa* also.

In the case of Brahmā, His action and *guṇa* are in unison and there is no dichotomy at all.

In the case of Śiva also, we find some dichotomy. The action of Śiva is one of destruction. But the result of his action is actually one of compassion to save humanity which is suffering, and it partakes of the nature of *sattva* only. After destruction, the whole world is absorbed in the *Paramātman*, and at that stage, all the suffering humanity is placed in a state of bliss and happiness. Like a kind father, out of compassion, Śiva

says: "You have been moving about in this cycle of happiness and sorrow in this world, and in this cycle of birth and death for so long. Now, have some sleep." Thus, Śiva puts us to sleep and gives us some happiness by merging us with Brahman or the Paramātman. Thus, Parameśvara also has a mixture of *tamas* and *sattva*.

Now, let us analyse the nature of the *śaktis* associated with these three *mūrtis* or forms. First, Pārvatī is the consort of Rudra, or Śiva. Rudra is *Samhāramūrti*. Pārvatī is *Mahiṣāsuramardīnī*, and She has also taken the form of Durgā. Just as Vishnu has killed many demons, likewise Devī has also taken many *avatāras* and killed many demons.

Thus, Pārvatī has also a mixture of *sattva* and *tamas*, and so also Parameśvara has a mixture of *tamas* and *sattva*. And Pārvatī's colour is black, just like that of Vishnu.

Sarasvatī who is the consort of Brahmā, has *suddha-sattva* and therefore, her colour is white. She is wearing white sari, and She is seated also on a white lotus. Sarasvatī gives us *jñāna* which again partakes of the nature of *sattva*. She is the consort of Brahmā who has pure *rajas* only and whose job it is to do only creation.

Then, Lakṣmī who is the wife of Vishnu is pure *rajas*, and her function is also creation. Just as Brahmā creates the world, likewise, She also creates wealth. She also wears a red sari and She is seated also on a red lotus.

All these *śaktis* have actually come from one *śakti* only, namely *Māyāśakti*. It is *Māyā* which has taken

these three forms. Just as the question is often asked whether the waking and sleeping state are not enough and why the dream state is also there; likewise, the question is asked why creation and destruction alone are not enough and why there is need to do maintenance separately.

An important principle of the *Dharmaśāstra* is indicated here. It is only when all the three functions are there that the world will be stable. A very big principle is driven home to us here. If only two *guṇas* are there, it would look strange and funny. Since Brahmā and Lakshmī are both pure *rajas* only, both of them are red in colour and both of them are seated on the red lotus and both do the function of creation, the one creating the world and the other creating wealth, so both of them could be considered to be brother and sister. Somehow, we do not have much evidence for this that Lakshmī is Brahmaśahodarī and so on.

Similarly, Vishnu and Pārvatī both appear to be doing the same function, namely *samhāra* as well as maintenance, and both have the same colour namely black, which is indicative of *tamas*, and both do destruction which is associated with *tamas*; and at the same time, they also do maintenance which is associated with *sattva*. Pārvatī is actually the Divine Mother of the whole world, and as such She protects the world. Thus, both of them can be considered to be brother and sister.

There is proof for this idea in the form of Durgā. Durgā appears with conch, wheel, and sword, which are usually associated with Vishnu only, and She also bears other weapons. That reminds us that She is also

sainhāramūrti. We also often talk of Pārvatī as being *Rāmacandrasahodarī*, *Padmanābhasahodarī*, *Mādhavasodarī*, *Śyāmakrishnasodarī* and so on. In fact, we have many songs containing these appellations for Pārvatī. Thus, based on function and *guṇa*, Pārvatī can be regarded as the sister of Vishnu.

Further, in the *Ardhanārīśvara* form, Pārvatī is on the left side of Śiva. At Śaṅkaranārāyaṇarkoil in Tamil Nadu, where the deity is in the form of Vishnu as well as Śiva in one idol, Vishnu is situated only on the left side of the idol. This also gives credence to the belief that Vishnu and Pārvatī are brother and sister.

Then, Paramesvara and Sarasvatī both give *jñāna* or knowledge, which is based on *sattva*. Paramesvara gives us knowledge in his form as Dakṣiṇāmūrti and Śaṅkara. So, they also can be regarded as brother and sister. The question may be asked why we should introduce this notion of brother and sister. There are three forms of Īśvara and three forms of the *śaktis*. Are these not enough? Here again, a great principle regarding marriage is indicated to us.

In many houses, the problem of marriage is solved by the brother and the sister in one family marrying the sister and the brother respectively in another family, because thereby at least the problem of dowry is solved automatically. In many cases, such alliances do take place. But according to the *Dharmaśāstras*, such alliances are prohibited. As the saying goes: "Do not give a daughter in one family and take a daughter from the same family; in other words, do not have a barter deal in brides." This idea of a barter in brides is totally prohibited by our *Dharmaśāstras*.

Some people may argue sometimes that even in the case of Trimūrtis, such a barter has taken place; e.g., Śiva has married Pārvatī who is the sister of Vishnu and so on; and on that basis they may try to argue that such barter of brides is justified. If their argument were correct, then since Vishnu's sister has married Paramesvara, Paramesvara's sister Sarasvatī should have married Vishnu. But we know that such a thing has not taken place. Śiva's sister Sarasvatī has actually married Brahmā, and Brahmā's sister Lakshmī has married Vishnu.

This is how the Trimūrtis and their *śaktis* have had alliances between themselves. These are dealt with beautifully in the work called *Lalitopākhyāna*. From our side, we have added a little bit of *Dharmaśāstras* to this, to drive home this point that exchange of brother and sister from one family through marriage to sister and brother of another family is not permitted by our *Dharmaśāstras*.

IN PRAISE OF VIṢṆU

सूनुः सच्चरितः सती प्रियतमा स्वामी प्रसादोन्मुखः
 स्निग्धं मित्रमवञ्चकः परिजनः निष्केशलेशं मनः ।
 आकारो रुचिरः स्थिरश्च विभवः विद्यावदातं मुखम्
 तुष्टे विष्टपकष्टहारिणीष्टदहरौ सम्प्राप्यते देहिना ॥

A well-behaved son, a chaste and loving wife, a master ready to bestow favours, an affectionate friend, an honest servant, the mind free from the least trouble, a lovely form, abiding prosperity, and a face effulgent with learning — all this can be obtained by a mortal if Lord Hari who gratifies desires and pleases the world is propitiated.

Bhartṛhari's *Nītiśataka*, 25

[English translation by Professor M. R. Kale]

MAṆIKARṆIKĀṢṬĀKA*

Śrī Śaṅkara Bhagavatpāda

Introduction

Among the rivers of India, the Ganges is the foremost on account of its sanctity. Although, every place on its banks is holy, Vārāṇasī has its own exalted glory on account of the flow of the river from south to north (Uttaravāhinī) at Vārāṇasī. Among the many bathing *ghaṭṭas* (ghats) at Vārāṇasī, the Daśāśvamedha and Maṅikarṇikā are very wellknown. Maṅikarṇikā-ghaṭṭa gains its prominence on account of its location as the middle one among the many ghaṭṭas. Moreover it is one of the places where the bodies of the dead are cremated. This hymn in nine verses describes the efficacy of this holy spot conducive to the elevation of one's soul.

मणिकर्णिकाष्टकम्

[1]

त्वत्तीरे मणिकर्णिके हरिहरौ सायुज्यमुक्तिप्रदौ
वादन्तौ कुरुतः परस्परमुभौ जन्तोः प्रयाणोत्सवे ।

*Translated by Dr. N. Gangadharan

मद्रूपो मनुजोऽयमस्तु हरिणा प्रोक्तः शिवस्तत्क्षणा-
त्तन्मध्याद्भृगुलाञ्छनो गरुडगः पीताम्बरो निर्गतः ॥

Oh! Maṅikarṇikā! Lords Hari and Hara are the bestowers of intimate union (with the god) and liberation on your banks. They engage themselves in an argument at the time of the festive occasion of the departing of the being (from this world). Lord Hari states, "May this mortal being attain my form." At that very moment Lord Śiva emerges from the middle of that (body) with the mark of Bhṛgu, riding the Garuḍa and wearing the yellow robes.

The Maṅikarṇikā, one of the many sacred *ghaṭṭas* on the banks of the Ganges at Vārāṇasī is personified here. Lords Hari (Viṣṇu) and Hara (Śiva) wait at this place to convey the soul of the dead to their regions.

The mark of Bhṛgu denotes the mark made by Sage Bhṛgu on the chest of Viṣṇu. The Mark and Garuḍa (the mount of Viṣṇu) associated with Viṣṇu are taken over by Śiva in his anxiety to confer union with Himself on the soul of the dead at this place.

[2]

इन्द्राद्यास्त्रिदशाः पतन्ति नियतं भोगक्षये ये पुन-
र्जायन्ते मनुजास्ततोऽपि पशवः कीटाः पतङ्गादयः ।
ये मातर्मणिकर्णिके तत्र जले मज्जन्ति निष्कल्मषाः
सायुज्येऽपि किरीटकौस्तुभधरा नारायणाः स्युर्नराः ॥

Oh! Mother Maṅikarṇikā! Indra and other celestials who fall down after the end of enjoyment and are

born as the mortals, animals, insects and birds, and those men who would have a dip (in your water) would become free from their sins. Although they attain intimate union with the Lord (Śiva), they would be adorned with the *kaustubha* and crown (the insignia of Lord Viṣṇu) and hence themselves (become) Lord Viṣṇu.

Kaustubha is one of the gems that came out from the milky ocean when it was churned. *Tridaśāḥ* denotes the thirty-three gods together with their Lord Indra.

[3]

काशी धन्यतमा विमुक्तनगरी सालंकृता गङ्गया
 तत्रेयं मणिकर्णिका सुखकरी मुक्तिर्हि तत्किकरी ।
 स्वर्लोकस्तुलितः सहैव विबुधैः काश्या समं ब्रह्मणा
 काशी क्षोणितले स्थिता गुरुतरा स्वर्गो लघुत्वं गतः ॥

Kāśī (known also as) the city of Avimuktā is the most fortunate one as it is embellished with the river Ganges. Therein, this Mañikarñikā is the conferer of happiness. Indeed liberation is its servant. The heaven together with the celestials was weighed by Lord Brahmā equally with Kāśī. Kāśī remained heavy on the earth, while the heavens attained lightness.

The holy Vārāṇasī is known also by other names such as Kāśī and Avimuktā. Kāśī means that it is shining. Avimuktā denotes that the Lord never leaves the place. Now, the entire city is known by the name Vārāṇasī and Kāśī is one of its suburbs.

[4]

गङ्गातीरमनुत्तमं हि सकलं तत्रापि काश्युत्तमा
 तस्यां सा मणिकर्णिकोत्तमतमा यत्रेश्वरो मुक्तिदः ।
 देवानामपि दुर्लभं स्थलमिदं पापौघनाशक्षमं
 पूर्वोपार्जितपुण्यपुञ्जगमकं पुण्यैर्जनैः प्राप्यते ॥

The banks of the Ganges are indeed unsurpassed. Even there, Kāśī is the foremost. Even there, the Maṅikarṇikā is most excellent, where the Lord is the bestower of liberation. This place, capable of destroying multitudes of sins, difficult to be gained even by the celestials, and that which confers the collection of merits acquired in the previous births is attained by the meritorious men.

The Ganges at Vārāṇasī, is held to be sacred on account of the greatness of Vārāṇasī and the uncommon flow of the river from the south to the north. Among the many *ghaṭṭas* on the banks of the Ganges at Vārāṇasī, the Maṅikarṇikā is reckoned to be the foremost on account of its location in the middle of the row of *ghaṭṭas*.

[5]

दुःखाम्भोधिगतो हि जन्तुनिवहस्तेषां कथं निष्कृतिः
 ज्ञात्वा तद्धि विरिञ्चिना विरचिता वाराणसी शर्मदा ।
 लोकाःस्वर्गसुखास्ततोऽपि लघवो भोगान्तपातप्रदाः
 काशी मुक्तिपुरी सदा शिवकरी धर्मार्थमोक्षप्रदा ॥

How can there be escape for the multitude of beings got into the ocean of grief? Having known this

indeed, Vārāṇasī has been established by Viriñci as conferring happiness. The worlds beginning with the heaven and the like are light and are conferrers of a fall after the enjoyment (of pleasures). But Kāsī is the city that confers liberation. It bestows auspiciousness always. It yields *dharma*, *artha* and *kāma* and *mokṣa*.

The *Dharmaśāstra* texts recognise four principal goals of human life — *dharma*, *artha*, *kāma* and *mokṣa* which step by step takes the man to his final goal, the liberation (*mokṣa*). *Dharma* denotes righteous conduct; *artha* the acquisition of wealth by rightful means; and *kāma*, the enjoyment of pleasures with wealth as acquired above. Viriñci denotes Lord Brahmā.

लोकाः स्वर्गसुखाः has been corrected as for
सोकाः स्वर्गमुखाः better sense.

[6]

एको वेणुधरो धराधरधरः श्रीवत्सभूषाधरः

योऽप्येकः किल शंकरो विषधरो गङ्गाधरो माधवः ।

ये मातर्मणिकर्णिके तव जले मज्जन्ति ते मानवाः

रुद्रा वा हरयो भवन्ति बहवस्तेषां बहुत्वं कथम् ॥

One is the holder of the flute, the person that lifts the mountain and adorned with the curl of hair (*śrīvatsa*) on the breast. The other one is indeed the conferrer of happiness, the person that holds back the poison, the bearer of the Ganges and the Lord of Umā (Pārvatī). Oh! Mother Mañikarṇikā! those men that have a dip in your water become either Rudras are Haris. How can there be manifoldness of them?

In this verse, the first line gives the epithets of Lord Viṣṇu referring to him as the holder of the flute and as lifting the mountain in his manifestation as Kṛṣṇa. The second line refers to Lord Śiva as retaining the poison in his throat.

All those having a dip in the water at this place assume the form of either Śiva or Viṣṇu. Hence there cannot be any distinction of men from one another.

[7]

त्वत्तीरे मरणं तु मङ्गलकरं देवैरपि श्लाघ्यते
 शक्रस्तं मनुजं सहस्रनयनैर्द्रष्टुं सदा तत्परः ।
 आयान्तं सविता सहस्रकिरणैः प्रत्युद्गतोऽभूत्सदा
 पुण्योऽसौ वृषगोऽथवा गरुडगः किं मन्दिरं यास्यति ॥

Death on your banks confers auspiciousness. It is commended even by the celestials. Indra has that person as the highest goal in order to look at him with his thousand eyes always. Savitā (Sun) goes forth towards that coming person in order to welcome him always with his thousand rays. (They) doubt as to which temple this meritorious person that rides a bull or rides a Garuḍa would go.

'Śakra' denotes Indra and is often referred to as having thousand eyes. If one does a rare feat, it is common for people to stare at him. The celestials do not wink their eyes. Hence we may hold that there is an implication of poetic fancy (*utprekṣā*) that Indra is looking at such a person always.

[8]

मध्याह्ने मणिकर्णिकास्नपनजं पुण्यं न वक्तुं क्षमः
 स्वीयैरब्धशतैश्चतुर्मुखधरो वेदार्थदीक्षागुरुः ।
 योगाभ्यासबलेन चन्द्रशिखरस्तत्पुण्यपारंगत-
 स्त्वत्तीरे प्रकरोति सुप्तपुरुषं नारायणं वा शिवम् ॥

It is not possible to describe the merit of bathing at the Mañikarnikā during midday. The four-faced God (Brahmā), the preceptor that imparts the sense of the *Vedas*, has acquired enormous merit as high as a lofty mountain by means of the practice of *yoga* for 100 years of His life. He renders a person died here as Lord Viṣṇu or Śiva.

[9]

कृच्छ्रैः कोटिशतैः स्वपापनिधनं यच्चाश्वमेधैः फलं
 तत्सर्वं मणिकर्णिकास्नपनजे पुण्ये प्रविष्टं भवेत् ।
 स्नात्वा स्तोत्रमिदं नरः पठति चेत्संसारपाथोनिधिं
 तीर्त्वा प्लवलवत्प्रयाति सदनं तेजोमयं ब्रह्मणः ॥

The annihilation of one's sin by means of numerous expiations, the fruits of (the performance of) the *Aśva-medha*, (the horse-sacrifice) — all this is gained by the meritorious person who bathes in the Mañikarnikā. One that recites this hymn after bathing would cross the ocean of mundane existence as a puddle and would enter the luminous mansion of Brahmā.

OUR KITH AND KIN

सत्यं माता पिता ज्ञानं
 धर्मो भ्राता दया सखा ।
 शान्तिः पत्नी क्षमा पुत्रः
 षडेते मम बान्धवाः ॥

These six are our kith and kin: truth is mother, knowledge is father, virtue is brother, compassion is friend, peace is wife, and patience is son.

Cāṇakyanītiḥ

THE FOUR INDISPENSABLE
QUALIFICATIONS

*(An extract from Sarva-vedānta-siddhānta-sāra-saṅgraha
of Śrī Śaṅkara Bhagavatpāda)*

Free rendering by

Dr. V. K. S. N. Raghavan

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THE HISTORY OF THE
CITY OF BOSTON

FROM THE FIRST SETTLEMENT TO THE PRESENT TIME
BY SAMUEL JOHNSON

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[180]

कर्त्रा कर्तुमकर्तुं वाप्यन्यथा कर्म शक्यते ।
न तथा वस्तुनो ज्ञानं कर्तृतन्त्रं कदाचन ॥

An agent can do, undo or even mar an act; but never does the knowledge of an object depend on an agent; *i.e.* knowledge depends on what is in itself.

[181]

यथा वस्तु तथा ज्ञानं प्रमाणेन विजायते ।
नापेक्षते च यत्किञ्चित्कर्म वा युक्तिकौशलम् ॥

Knowledge — as it is — about an object springs forth through the aid of a valid means. The rise of knowledge does not depend on any action or skill of reason.

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ज्ञानस्य वस्तुतन्त्रत्वे संशयाद्युदयः कथम् ।
अतो न वास्तवं ज्ञानमिति नो शङ्क्यतां बुधैः ॥

प्रमाणासौष्टववृत्तं संशयादि न वास्तवम् ।
श्रुतिप्रमाणसुष्ठुत्वे ज्ञानं भवति वास्तवम् ॥

The wise need not raise an objection as "If knowledge depends on the thing in itself, how does one get doubt, etc? As doubt, etc. arise knowledge cannot be real in itself;" for, doubt, etc. which arise out of fallacious or invalid means are not real, whereas knowledge

that is well-based on *śruti* is indeed real and valid by itself.

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वस्तु तावत्परं ब्रह्म नित्यं सत्यं ध्रुवं विभु ।
श्रुतिप्रमाणे तज्ज्ञानं स्यादेव निरपेक्षकम् ॥

Brahman-knowledge alone is real, eternal, certain and all-comprehending. This knowledge, based on *śruti*, does not depend on any other means.

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रूपज्ञानं यथा सम्यग्दृष्टौ सत्यां भवेत्तथा ।
श्रुतिप्रमाणे सत्येव ज्ञानं भवति वास्तवम् ॥

Just as through the clear and perfect sense of sight one gets the right knowledge of the colour/form of things, even so through the right scriptural knowledge alone one gets the real knowledge (of Brahman).

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न कर्म यत्किञ्चिदपेक्षते हि रूपोपलब्धौ पुरुषस्य चक्षुः ।
ज्ञानं तथैव श्रवणादिजन्यं वस्तुप्रकाशे निरपेक्षमेव ॥

Just as a right sense of sight does not depend on any other action, with regard to the cognition of the colour or form of things, even so the knowledge arising out of Vedic study does not depend on any external activity, with regard to the realisation of Brahman which is self-revealed.

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कर्तृतन्त्रं भवेत्कर्म कर्मतन्त्रं शुभाशुभम् ।
प्रमाणतन्त्रं विज्ञानं मायातन्त्रमिदं जगत् ॥

As action depends on the agent, so also joy and sorrow depend upon the action; knowledge depends upon the means thereof, so also the world depends upon *māyā* or delusion (illusion of reality).

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विद्यां चाविद्यां चेति सहोक्तिरियमुपकृता सद्भिः ।
सत्कर्मोपासनयोर्न त्वात्मज्ञानकर्मणोः कापि ॥

According to the wise, when the *śruti* speaks of the *jñāna-karma-samuccaya* (knowledge and action combined together), the *śruti* refers to the knowledge of gods and action as a means to obtain their favours. So the *śruti* does not enjoin action as a means to attain the knowledge of *Ātman*.

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नित्यानित्यपदार्थबोधरहितो यश्चोभयत्र स्रगा-
द्यर्थानामनुभूतिलग्नहृदयो निर्विण्णबुद्धिर्जनः ।
तस्यैवास्य जडस्य कर्म विहितं श्रुत्या विरज्याभितो
मोक्षेच्छोर्न विधीयते तु परमानन्दार्थिनो धीमतः ।

Actions (rituals) are prescribed only to those who cannot distinguish between the eternal and the non-

eternal (ephemeral), who seek enjoyment here or hereafter, and who are desirous of the fruit of actions. But the rituals are not meant for those who have overpassion, who could analyse things cleverly, who are firmly bent upon securing *mokṣa*, and who seek supreme bliss (beatitude) alone.

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मोक्षेच्छया यदहरेव विरज्यतेऽसौ
 न्यासस्तदेव विहितो विदुषो मुमुक्षोः ।
 श्रुत्या तथैव परया च ततः सुधीभिः
 प्रामाणिकोऽयमिति चेतसि निश्चितव्यः ॥

As a result of firm resolve to obtain *mokṣa* alone, when one becomes thoroughly detached from worldly pursuits, *at once one (the wise seeker of *mokṣa*) become eligible to take to *sannyāsa* (renunciation). For such an aspirant, *śruti* (the *Veda*) alone forms the *pramāṇa* (sole right means of knowledge) to know the supreme Brahman.

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स्वापरोक्षस्य वेदादेः साधनत्वं निषेधति ।
 नाहं वेदैर्न तपसेत्यादिना भगवानपि ॥

Even Lord Kṛṣṇa has, in the *Gītā* (11.53), “Neither by the *Veda*, nor by austerity, nor by study of scrip-

* Cf. “*vad-ahareva virajet, tad-ahareva pravrajjet.*”

tures, nor by gifts, nor by sacrifice, can one see Me in this form as you (Arjuna) have seen Me," refuted the view that "Vedic study and observances of religious duties would help one to realise the *Ātman*."

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प्रवृत्तिश्च निवृत्तिश्च द्वे एते श्रुतिगोचरे ।

प्रवृत्त्या बाध्यते जन्तुर्निवृत्त्या तु विमुच्यते ॥

Pravṛtti, the path of acquisition, and *nivṛtti*, the path of renunciation — both are spoken of in the *Śruti*. The former leads one to bondage, whereas the latter leads one to liberation.

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यन्न स्वबन्धोऽभिमतो मूढस्यापि क्वचित्ततः ।

निवृत्तिः कर्मसंन्यासः कर्तव्यो मोक्षकाङ्क्षिभिः ॥

However dullard one may be, one does not want to be bound; so it is better that the seeker of *mokṣa*, must renounce everything* and take to *sannyāsa*.

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न ज्ञानकर्मणोर्यस्मात् सहयोगस्तु युज्यते ।

तस्मात्त्याज्यं प्रयत्नेन कर्म ज्ञानेच्छुना ध्रुवम् ॥

None can tread the path of action and knowledge simultaneously, for those two paths are mutually

* "*tasmāt nyāsam eṣām tapaśm atiriktam āhuḥ*"

exclusive and contradictory. So, it is essential on the part of *mumukṣu* (aspirant of liberation) to renounce everything and be a *sannyāsin* (ascetic).

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इष्टसाधनताबुद्ध्या गृहीतस्यापि वस्तुनः ।
विज्ञाय फल्गुतां पश्चात्कः पुनस्तत्प्रतीक्षते ॥

There is no one who would knowingly seek that which merely seems to be good, but which is actually of no avail (that is: which is transient).

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उपरतिशब्दार्थो ह्युपरमणं पूर्वदृष्टवृत्तिभ्यः ।
सोऽयं मुख्यो गौणश्चेति च वृत्त्या द्विरूपतां धत्ते ॥
वृत्तोद्देश्यपरित्यागो मुख्यार्थ इति कथ्यते ।
गौणार्थः कर्मसन्यासः श्रुतैरङ्गतया मतः ॥

The word -'sannyāsa' refers to the abandonment of all *karma* which seemed earlier to lead to happiness. It (*sannyāsa*) has a twofold meaning, direct and indirect. First it means: abandonment of objects that allure the mind. Secondly, as the *śruti* indicates, it (*sannyāsa*) means to give up *karma* such as the rituals.

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पुंसः प्रधानसिद्धयर्थं अङ्गस्याश्रयणं ध्रुवम् ।
कर्तव्यमङ्गहीनं चेत् प्रधानं नैव सिद्धयति ॥

To achieve and obtain one's main ambition, one has to make use of the required means to it; otherwise one cannot even hope to go near one's avowed ambition.

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संन्यसेत् सुविरक्तः सन्निहामुत्रार्थतः सुखात् ।
अविरक्तस्य संन्यासो निष्फलोऽयाज्ययागवत् ॥

A true renunciant must be indifferent towards the good things of this world and those of the next one; he should also refrain from doing all Vedic ceremonies. Renunciation rid of *vairāgya* (dispassion) yields nothing, just as sacrifice performed by an ineligible person yields no fruit at all.

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संन्यस्य तु यतिः कुर्यान्न पूर्वविषयस्मृतिम् ।
तां तां तस्मरणे तस्य जुगुप्सा जायते यतः ॥

Therefore having renounced everything, an ascetic (*sannyāsin*) should not even recall to his mind any previous action (done by him). For, inasmuch as he thinks of them, there arises acute aversion towards any such thing.

(to be continued)

FAITH

यो यो यां यां तनुं भक्तः श्रद्धायार्चितुमिच्छति ।
 तस्य तस्याचलां श्रद्धां तामेव विदधाम्यहम् ॥
 स तथा श्रद्धया युक्तस्तस्याराधनमीहते ।
 लभते च ततः कामान् मयैव विहितान्हि तान् ॥

(Lord Kṛṣṇa says:) When any devotee wants to worship me faithfully in any form — as one likes —, then I make his/her faith (in me) stronger and stronger.

He/she (such a devotee) likes to propitiate his/her tutelary deity with firm faith; and from the latter he/she attains the respective desires fulfilled — the desires which are made ripened by me alone.

(*Bhagavadgītā*, VII, 21-22)

THE ADVAITA VIEW OF LIBERATION

R. Balasubramanian

Liberation is the supreme end of human endeavour. According to Advaita Vedānta, liberation consists in the attainment of the right knowledge of the Self (*ātman*). The self is sole reality. It is of the nature of unsurpassed bliss (*ānandam*) and unconditioned consciousness (*viññānam*). It is immutable (*akṣaram*), trans-empirical all (*sarvam*) and the otherless perfection of security (*abhayam*). But its real nature is veiled and the non-real sorrow which is *samsāra* is projected on account of the perception of the illusory plurality of things which are related as causes and effects. Ignorance is the root cause of our pursuit of the non-real. The perception of the non-real world of diversity and the resultant attachment to it are responsible for the wanderings in the wilderness of *samsāra*. That is why the condition of ignorance is rightly characterised as *samsāra*. Ignorance is bondage and its removal is release. The removal of ignorance takes place when there is the realisation of the Self as the sole reality. Since the rise of the right knowledge itself is the removal of ignorance release can be characterised either as the removal of

ignorance (*avidyā-astamaya*) or as the attainment of the right knowledge (*vidyā*).¹

Is knowledge the means to release?

It is necessary to clear certain erroneous notions about liberation before we elucidate our standpoint. It is sometimes argued that knowledge is the means for the attainment of release. Various *śruti* texts are cited in favour of this view. The *Īśāvāsya Upaniṣad* says: "He attains life eternal through knowledge."² The *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* declares: "He who has found out and who understands that Self obtains all worlds and all desires."³ These scriptural texts, it is claimed, purport to show that knowledge is the means through which release is attained. Knowledge itself is not release. If that were the case, the *Upaniṣad* would not have said that *mokṣa* is attained through knowledge. In so far as it maintains that knowledge is the means through which release is attained, the two are different and they are related as cause and effect.

This way of conceiving *mokṣa* is not satisfactory. On this view, *mokṣa* would cease to be eternal, for it seeks to reduce *mokṣa* to the status of an effect (*sādhya*) brought into being by a cause. Anything that comes into being as an effect of a cause has a beginning; and whatever has a beginning has an end. If *mokṣa* were to be an effect like a pot, it would cease to be eternal; and if it is not eternal, it would be followed by the state of bondage. But *mokṣa* is an eternal condition characterised by the total absence of *saṃsāra*. Therefore, the view that *mokṣa* is an effect brought into being by knowledge militates against its eternality.

It might be suggested that *mokṣa* could be looked upon as an effect like annihilative non-existence (*pradh-*

vaiṁsābhāva). *Pradhvaṁsābhāva* has a beginning, but no end. If *mokṣa* is treated as *pradhvaṁsābhāva*, it is undoubtedly an effect; nevertheless, it has no end. What this suggestion aims to show is that *mokṣa* is an effect without, however, ceasing to be eternal. This way of characterising *mokṣa* as an *abhāva* is wrong. *Mokṣa* is *bhāva-rūpa*; it is to be described positively as of the nature of incomparable and unsurpassable bliss. If any positive existent is an effect, it cannot escape the end; sooner or later it will be destroyed. It should be pointed out here that there is no contradiction between what we said about *mokṣa* earlier and what we are maintaining now. *Mokṣa* is a state in which there is the total absence of *samsāra*. This description is negative. Though *mokṣa* is positive, we have resorted to the negative characterisation for the simple reason that *samsāra* disappears at the advent of *mokṣa* and that its removal is total and final. It is characterised negatively only in the figurative sense. There is, therefore, no contradiction between what we said earlier and what we now maintain.

Let us now consider another interpretation which seeks to show that *mokṣa* can be treated as an effect brought into being by a cause without any danger to its eternality. *Avidyā* is the cause of bondage; and the destruction of the cause of bondage is *mokṣa*. Its destruction is caused by knowledge. *Mokṣa*, that is to say, is *pradhvaṁsābhāva*. Though it is an effect, it is eternal like the destruction of a pot. This way of interpreting *mokṣa* is equally untenable. It is based upon the assumption that the destruction of *avidyā* which is the cause of bondage is different from *vidyā*, while it is not. Maṇḍana equates the removal of ignorance (*avidyā*-

niṛṭti) with Brahman-realisation (*vidyā* or *tattva-jñāna*).¹ The rise of the right knowledge itself is the removal of *avidyā*. It is, therefore, not different from *vidyā*; only if it is different, it can be the effect of *vidyā*.

To remain in one's own state (*svarūpa-sthiti*) is *mokṣa*. The *Upaniṣad* brings out this idea when it says: "Having reached the highest light, he becomes merged in his own true form."² If *mokṣa* is an effect, something that is brought into being by a cause, its nature cannot be what the *Upaniṣad* makes it out to be. What is accomplished cannot be of the nature of the Self which is eternal. *Mokṣa* is attained when the knower of the truth remains what he has always really been, *viz.*, the eternal, self-luminous Brahman remains, that is to say, in his own state. The view that *mokṣa* is an effect brought into being by a cause runs counter to the Upaniṣadic teaching.

Release is not going to Brahman, after departing from the body

Release, according to others, is the attainment of Brahman by the individual soul. Just as a person would go by a particular path in order to reach his destination, so also the individual soul departing from the body, takes to a particular path in order to reach Brahman. The individual will get release only when it reaches Brahman. There are *śruti* texts which seem to lend support to this view. It is said in the *Kaṭhopanīṣad*: "A hundred and one are the arteries of the heart; one of them leads up to the crown of the head; Going upward through that, one becomes immortal, the others serve for going in various other directions."³ The *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* says: "When he thus departs

from this body, he goes upwards these very rays ... As his mind is failing, he goes to the sun. That verily is the gateway of the world.”⁷ A passage in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* reads: “Those who know this as such and those too who meditate with faith in the forest on the truth, pass into the light, from the light into the day, from the day into the half-month of the waxing moon...”⁸ These *śruti* texts, it is claimed, which describe the course after death make it clear how the individual soul, after departing from the body, goes by a certain path, reaches Brahman and attains immortality. Depending on the authority of these texts, it is argued that liberation consists in the attainment of Brahman by the individual soul proceeding along a particular path after death.

This way of conceiving *mokṣa* is untenable. It is intelligible to say that a person reaches his destination, by proceeding along a particular path. His destination say a certain village, is away from him. Limited as it is in space, the person must move towards it from his place, if he wants to reach it. But the same does not hold good in the present case. There is no need for the individual to go by a certain path to reach Brahman, for the latter is all-pervading; and if it is all-pervading, transcending the limitation of space, it is always attained. Only if it is away from the individual by being restricted in space, the latter, it could be said, should reach it by taking a particular path. There are *śruti* texts which refer to Brahman as all-pervading. The *Īśāvāsya Upaniṣad* says: “It (Brahman) is within all this.”⁹ The *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad* speaks of Brahman as “eternal, all-pervading, omnipresent.”¹⁰ For another reason also this view is not satisfactory. The

village which a person wants to reach is different from him. Only if he proceeds along a certain path, he can reach it. Whereas the person is different from the village which he wants to reach, the *jīva*, is not different from Brahman which is to be attained. On the other hand, the *jīva*, in its true form, is Brahman itself. Only if it is taken to be non-different from Brahman, the *śruti* text which declares most emphatically that "when verily the Self is...known, then all this is known"¹¹ will be significant. If the two are different, the knowledge of the one will not entail the knowledge of the other. The non-difference of the *jīva* and Brahman is brought out directly by the *Upaniṣad* when it says: "That art thou."¹²

Release is not absorption in Brahman

According to another view, release consists in the individual soul losing its identity and merging itself in Brahman. This point will be clear, if we consider certain examples. The rivers which flow into the sea lose their identity and separate individuality by becoming one with it. They merge in the sea and become the sea itself. Bees prepare honey by collecting the juices of different flowers and reducing them into one essence. The juices of different flowers lose their identity as soon as they are mixed to form one essence. The different juices are not seen with their distinguishing marks in the one essence which is a blend of different juices. In the same way, the *jīva* merges in Brahman and loses its identity. When it merges in Brahman in such a way that it cannot be discriminated from Brahman, it attains release. The authority of *śruti* texts is invoked in support of this view. Uddālaka Āruṇi instructs his son Śvetaketu, in the following way.

He says: "Just as, my dear, the bees prepare honey by collecting the juices of different trees and reducing them into one essence, and so these possess no discrimination (so that they might say) 'I am the essence of this tree, I am the essence of that tree,' even so, indeed, my dear, all these creatures though they reach the Being do not know that they have reached it." "These rivers, my dear, flow the eastern toward the east, the western toward the west . . . They become the sea itself. Just as these rivers which do not know 'I am this one' 'I am this one', in the same manner whatever they are in the world that they become."¹³

Even this view of *mokṣa* cannot stand examination. It proceeds on the assumption that the *jīva* and Brahman are different, while they are not. We can talk about the rivers which flow into the sea becoming one with it, when they merge in it, or the different juices losing their identity in the one essence to which they are reduced, since the two — the rivers and the sea, or the different juices and honey — are different. But Brahman is not different from the *jīva*, but is identical with it. If they are different, we can talk about the latter merging in the former and losing its identity. Since they are non-different, the very idea of the one merging in the other is meaningless. There is also another reason to show that this view is absurd. It is possible to say that two things possessing form and parts get mixed with each other, losing their individual distinguishing marks. The Self or Brahman has no form and parts. The *Upaniṣad* declares that the Self is "without parts, without activity."¹⁴ The very conception, then, of the *jīva* becoming one with Brahman by losing its form and parts is meaningless.

Attaining the causal condition of Brahman by jīva is not release

Some others conceive of *mokṣa* in a different way. The individual soul comes forth from Brahman; for *śruti* declares that "as small sparks come forth from the fire, even so from this Self come forth ... all beings."¹⁵ The *jīva*, that is to say, is the effect of Brahman. It attains release when it acquires the condition of its cause, *viz.*, Brahman from which it has come forth. In support of this view, a text from the *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad* is cited: "Being a knower, shaking off good and evil and free from stain, he attains supreme equality with the Lord."¹⁶ Release is, therefore, the attainment of the condition of Brahman, which is the cause, by *jīva* which is its effect. This view also does not stand to reason. The effect is always of the nature of its material cause. If so, the *jīva* is always of the nature of Brahman from which it has come forth. Since the *jīva* is always of the nature of Brahman, it is meaningless to say that it must attain the condition of its cause. Only if it is different from Brahman, can we say that it acquires the nature of Brahman which is its material cause and thereby attains release. In so far as it is not different from it, the nature of Brahman is always attained.

Release is not transformation of jīva into Brahman

According to another view, the *jīva* should undergo transformation and become Brahman to attain release. Just as a person transforms himself into a tiger by means of the yogic powers, which he has developed, so also the *jīva* changes itself into the form of Brahman. *Śruti* itself speaks of such a transformation of the *jīva* into Brahman. The *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad* says:

“He, verily, who knows the supreme Brahman becomes Brahman himself.”¹⁷ “The transformation of the jīva into Brahman is therefore release.” This view also like the earlier one cannot bear examination. The term “transformation” signifies that one thing becomes another. When a thing undergoes transformation, it changes into something quite different from the one it was previously. A person who is an adept in yogic practices transforms himself into the form of a tiger; he assumes a new form which is different from the one which he had previously. Transformation indicates that the thing which undergoes change and the object into which it is changed are different. Since the jīva is not different from Brahman, it is wrong to speak of the transformation of the jīva into Brahman. Further, whatever object undergoes transformation will acquire new characteristics which serve to distinguish it from its previous condition. Brahman is of the nature of consciousness and as such is not different from the jīva whose real nature is also consciousness. The jīva which is supposed to change into Brahman does not differ from it at all.

It may be argued that there is a vital difference between the jīva and Brahman. Even though the jīva, like Brahman, is of the nature of consciousness, it differs from the latter in one important respect. It is subject to grief and delusion, while Brahman transcends all these. When the jīva changes into Brahman, there is the absence of grief and delusion in that condition. Thus the condition of the jīva is different from that of Brahman and we can, it may be argued, without any inconsistency talk about the transformation of the one into the other. This argument is untenable.

The critics should be asked whether the *jīva* by its very nature is subject to grief and delusion or not. If it be said that the *jīva* by its very nature is consumed with grief and is afflicted by delusion, it can never get rid of them. If they constitute its nature, they can never be destroyed and the *jīva* will always be subject to them. If, on the other hand, they are treated as characteristics foreign to its nature; they cannot stick to it as permanent possessions; they will disappear of their own accord, and no special effort need be taken to remove them.

Release is the realisation of the nature of the self

So far we examined several views of *mokṣa* and all of them are erroneous. Release is not something to be accomplished through the agency of a cause. It does not signify the attainment of Brahman by the *jīva* proceeding along a particular path after departing from the body. It does not consist in the merging of the *jīva* in Brahman by losing its identity. The attainment of the condition of Brahman which is the cause by the *jīva*, which is the effect, is not even release. Nor does release mean the transformation of the *jīva* into Brahman. According to the Advaita, the realisation of the true nature of the Self is release. The Self or Brahman which is non-dual is of the nature of knowledge, bliss and existence. It is ever free; it is of the nature of eternal release. But its real nature is missed due to *avidyā*. The *jīva* is Brahman itself. It is on account of the limiting adjuncts that it appears to be different from it. Birth and death, finitude and limitation do not belong to it, for it is of the nature of Brahman which is infinite and immutable, unborn and homogeneous, but they pertain to the psycho-physical complexes, the

limiting adjuncts like the body, the sense-organs, etc. The psycho-physical complexes which make for finitude and limitation are non-*ātman* and therefore non-real. Attachment to the non-real is responsible for desire, sorrow and sufferings. And the root cause of all these is *avidyā* which obscures the real nature of the *jīva*. The obscuration is removed through knowledge. When the veil which covers the truth falls off at the onset of knowledge, the *jīva* shines in its own true form, as the real, as knowledge, and as the infinite, in the same way as a crystal (*sphaṭika*) shines in its own true form when the *japā* flower which is responsible for the red colour which it has assumed is removed from its vicinity. The crystal by itself is not red; but it appears to be red when it is kept against the *japā* flower which is red. What its true nature is cannot be known so long as it is kept against the red background provided by the flower. The flower not only conceals the real nature of the crystal but also makes it appear red. No sooner is it removed from the vicinity of the crystal than the red colour of the crystal disappears and the crystal shines in its own true form. When the flower is removed, the crystal remains what it has always really been; it has not attained a new form. When *avidyā* which has been obscuring the true nature of the *jīva* disappears at the onset of *vidyā*, the *jīva* shines in its resplendent glory and supernal excellence; the knower of the truth remains what he has always really been — the eternal, free, self-luminous Brahman.

Brahma-prāpti or the attainment of Brahman is said to be release. Since the *jīva* is of the nature of the eternal, free, self-luminous Brahman, what is required for *brahma-prāpti* is just the knowledge of the truth.

The jīva should realise its true nature by destroying the false belief in the psycho-physical complexes which serve to limit and particularise it. When the false belief which is *avidyā* is destroyed, release is said to be attained by the knower of the truth. For release what is needed is the knowledge of the truth and nothing else.

If release signifies the realisation of one's real nature, how can it be said to be originated or brought into being? We can throw light on this question by considering an example. The dirt which has settled upon the cloth does not allow it to appear in its white colour. When it is removed, the cloth shines in its original colour and we say: "The cloth has *become* white." Here there is no origination of a new colour. The cloth was white even earlier. But still we say that it has become white as if it was not white previously. In the same way, the knower of the truth gives up the notion of the identity of the Self with the body, etc. and becomes Brahman himself. A passage in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* reads: "Being Brahman, he attains Brahman."¹ If release is not interpreted as realising one's real nature, realising what one has always been, the expression "being Brahman" (*brahmaiva san*) would be void of meaning.

NOTES

1. *Vide The Brahmasiddhi* (Madras Govt. Oriental Manuscripts Series No. 4, 1937) edited by S. Kuppaswami Sastri, Part I, p. 119.

2. 11

3. 8-7-1

4. *The Brahmasiddhi*, p. 78

5. *Chândogya Upaniṣad*, 8-12-2
6. 2-3-16
7. 8-6-5
8. 6-2-15
9. 5
10. 1-1-6
11. *Bṛhadāranyaka Upaniṣad*, 4-5-6
12. *Chândogya Upaniṣad*, 6-8-7
13. *Ibid.*, 6-9. 1-2, 6-10. 1-2
14. *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad*, 6-19
15. *Bṛhadāranyaka Upaniṣad*, 2-1-20
16. 3-1-3
17. 3-2-9
18. 4-4-6

ON THE DEFINITION OF AVIDYĀ*

J. Krishnan**

Citsukha in his *Tattvapradīpikā* has defined *avidyā* as follows:

*anādibhāvarūpaṁ yad-vijñānena vilīyate
tadajñānamiti prājñāḥ lakṣaṇam sampracakṣate.*

“That which is beginningless, *bhāvarūpa* and is removable by knowledge is *avidyā*.” It comes to this: beginningless (*anāditva*), of the form of existence (*bhāvarūpatva*) and removability by knowledge (*jñānanivartyatva*) — these three together constitute the definition of *avidyā*.

Of the above three factors, *jñānanivar yatva* is the substantive feature or *viśeṣyāmśa* and *anāditva* and *bhāvarūpatva* constitute the adjectival feature or *viśeṣaṇāmśa*. The purpose of these adjectival and substantive features is to ward off the over-application of the

* This paper is based on the *Advaita-siddhi* of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī.

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definition in the cases of (i) a cognition which arose earlier, and which is removed by a subsequent cognition; (ii) the antecedent negation of knowledge; and (iii) Ātman respectively. Let us make an analysis in detail.

1. If it is said that that which is *bhāvarūpa* and *jñānanivartya* is *avidyā*, then the cognition of a pot which arose earlier and which is removed by the subsequent cognition of a cloth must be treated to be *avidyā*. It is because the cognition of a pot is *bhāvarūpa* and *jñānanivartya*. Thus the definition of *avidyā* would be applicable in the case of the cognition of a pot which arose earlier, but which is not of the nature of *avidyā*. Hence there is the over-application of the definition in the case of an object where it should not apply.

To ward off this over-application, the adjectival phrase — *anāditva* is given. The cognition of a pot which arose earlier is no doubt *bhāvarūpa* and *jñānanivartya*. But it is not *anādi* or beginningless. Since one of the adjectival features, namely, *anāditva* is not present in it, it does not come under the purview of the definition as a whole. As a result there is no *ativyāpti* in its case.

2. If it is said that that which is *anādi* and *jñānanivartya* is *avidyā*, then this definition would be applicable in the case of the antecedent negation of knowledge (*jñāna-prāgabhāva*). The latter is not *avidyā*. But since it is *anādi* and is removable by knowledge (*jñānanivartya*), this definition of *avidyā* would be applicable in its case, and so there is the defect of over-application of the definition.

To ward off this, the adjectival phrase — *bhāvarūpatva* is given. The antecedent negation of knowledge

is no doubt *anādi* and *jñānanivartya*. But being an *abhāva*, it does not have *bhāvatva*. It is the absence of this adjectival feature that precludes the over-application in the case of the antecedent negation of knowledge.

3. If it is said that that which is *anādi* and *bhāvarūpa* is *avidyā*, then this definition would be applicable in the case of Ātman which is *anādi* and *bhāvarūpa* but which is different from *avidyā*.

To avoid the over-application of this definition in the case of Ātman, the substantive feature — *jñānanivartyatva* is given. When it is given, the definition will not be applicable in the case of Ātman. The latter is *anādi* and *bhāvarūpa*, but it is not *jñānanivartya*.

It comes to this: *avidyā* is beginningless, *bhāvarūpa* and is removable by knowledge.

Śrī Vyāsātīrtha in his *Nyāyāmṛta* rejects the above definition of *avidyā* on the following grounds:

1. It is not applicable in the genuine case of *avidyā* or *ajñāna* which conceals the consciousness conditioned by shell and which is thereby the material cause of the illusory silver. Although consciousness as such is beginningless, yet as conditioned by shell which has a beginning it is also to be viewed as having a beginning. And *avidyā* that is present in such a consciousness must also be taken as having a beginning. Hence the definition of *avidyā* involving reference to it as beginningless is not applicable in the case of *avidyā* veiling the consciousness conditioned by the shell.

2. On the floor there exists pot. And there arises the erroneous cognition that there is no pot on the floor. The erroneous cognition of the absence of pot

being occasional (*kādācitka*) must have a material cause and it must be *avidyā*. The latter being the material cause of the illusory cognition of an *abhāvapadārtha* must also be of the nature of *abhāva*. It is because there is an invariable rule that the material cause and effect must belong to the same kind. Primal nescience or *mūlāvidyā* is admitted by the Advaitin chiefly to account for the appearance of the illusory world; and, *mūlāvidyā* and the world are of the same kind. If it is held that the invariable rule that the material cause and effect must belong to the same kind need not be admitted, then the Advaitin could very well admit that Brahman — the absolute real entity — itself is the transformative material cause of the world which is illusory. And the postulation of *avidyā* to account for the appearance of the world would be quite unwarranted. Hence the material cause and effect must belong to the same kind. When viewed in this light, the material cause of the erroneous cognition of the absence of pot must be an *abhāvapadārtha*. *Avidyā* is admitted to be its material cause; and, it must therefore be an *abhāva* and not a *bhāvapadārtha*. Hence the definition of *avidyā* involving reference to it as a *bhāvapadārtha* is not applicable in the case of *avidyā* which is the material cause of the erroneous cognition of the absence of pot on the floor.

3. It might be held that the erroneous cognition of the absence of pot need not have a material cause. But this assertion is not correct. It is because in that case there will not be the possibility of the removal of erroneous cognition by the direct knowledge of its substratum. An erroneous cognition is always removed by the removal of its cause, namely, *ajñāna* by the direct knowledge of the substratum. Thus if *ajñāna* as

the material cause of erroneous cognition is not admitted then there will not be the removal of the erroneous cognition by the correct knowledge of its substratum and it is opposed to common experience.

Śrī Madhusūdana Sarasvatī in his *Advaita-siddhi* rejects the criticisms (of Śrī Vyāsatīrtha) which were set forth above in the following way:

1. In the first place, he argues that pure consciousness alone is the substratum of *avidyā* which is beginningless. And when it gets transformed into the form of shell, the latter is falsely identified with the consciousness conditioned by *avidyā*. In pure consciousness, the state of being the content of *avidyā* exists. And the shell too exists therein. The shell—thus being co-existent with the state of being the content of *avidyā*, in pure consciousness — is not the content of *avidyā*. On the other hand, it limits the scope of consciousness being the content of *avidyā*. It is *viṣayatāvachchedaka*. Hence the material cause of illusory silver, namely, *ajñāna*, is present in pure consciousness only. And it is beginningless. It would be evident from this that the definition of *avidyā* involving *anāditva* is applicable in the case of *avidyā* present in the consciousness delimited by shell serving as the material cause of illusory silver.

2. In regard to the second objection raised by Vyāsatīrtha, Madhusūdana argues that when it is said that *avidyā* is *bhāvarūpa* what is meant is that it is something different from being a negation of knowledge. The Advaitin never maintains that the characteristic of being a *bhāvapadārtha* (*bhāvatva*) exist in *avidyā*. The latter is admitted to be *anirvacanīya* in

the sense that it is not the locus of either *bhāvatva* or *abhāvatva*.

It has been said by Vyāsatīrtha that there must be an amount of similarity in nature between a material cause and its effect. The effect, the absence of pot which is the content of erroneous cognition is an *abhāvapadārtha* and its material cause must also be an *abhāva*.

Madhusūdana argues that the absence of pot, the content of erroneous cognition is illusory, that is, it is *bhāvābhāvavilakṣaṇa*. *Avidyā* too is admitted to be *bhāvābhāvavilakṣaṇa*. It is this common feature of *bhāvābhāvavilakṣaṇatva* that exists in both *avidyā* and the absence of pot, the content of erroneous cognition that explains the causal relation between the two.

It has been said by Vyāsatīrtha that if there is no similarity in nature between the material cause and its effect, then there could be the origination of the world from Brahman which is real. And the Advaitin need not admit *avidyā* to explain the origination of the world from Brahman.

This criticism is trivial. It has been said by Bhartṛhari that if a real entity is the material cause of a non-real entity then there would be no possibility of the removal of the non-real entity. It is because the removal of an effect is based upon the removal of its cause. Here the effect is an illusory entity. The cause is a real one. There cannot be the removal of the cause in the present case, as the cause being real cannot undergo sublation. The result of this argument is that the effect cannot be removed. Further, the real being immutable cannot serve as the material cause. Hence the Advaitin maintains that *avidyā*

present in Brahman is the transformative material cause of the world and Brahman being the substratum of *avidyā* and its effect — the world, is the transfigurative material cause. The *kārikā* of Bhartṛhari setting forth the above view is:

*Suddhatattvam prapañcasya na hetuḥ anivṛttitah
jñānajñeyādirūpasya māyaiva jananī tataḥ.*

It follows from the above that *avidyā* present in Brahman is the transformative material cause of the world. It is beginningless, *bhāvarūpa* and is removable by the knowledge of Brahman. In the same way, *avidyā* present in the consciousness conditioned by the shell is beginningless *bhāvarūpa* (that is, it is not absence of knowledge), and it is removable by the direct knowledge of its substratum — the consciousness conditioned by the shell. Thus there is no *avyāpti* for the definition of *avidyā* in the case of *avidyā* that serves as the material cause of the erroneous cognition of the absence of pot.

Vyāsatīrtha further proceeds to point out the defect of *ativyāpti* in the definition of *avidyā* in the case of the relation between pure consciousness and *avidyā*. This relation which is different from *avidyā* is beginningless and *bhāvarūpa*; and it is removable by the knowledge of Brahman too. Thus the definition of *avidyā* is applicable in the case of the relation of *avidyā* to pure consciousness and hence suffers from the defect of *ativyāpti*.

Madhusūdana points out that in the definition, the expression — removable by knowledge — is used in the sense of direct removability by knowledge. The relation between *avidyā* and consciousness is removed not directly by knowledge but through the removal of

avidyā by the knowledge of Brahman. Since the substantive feature in the definition — removability by the knowledge of Brahman directly — is not applicable in the case of the relation between *avidyā* and consciousness, the whole definition is not applicable, and hence there is not the defect of *ativyāpti*.

To sum up: the definition of *avidyā* as *bhāvarūpa*, beginningless and removable by knowledge does hold good.

Having given the first definition of *avidyā*, as above Madhusūdana takes up another definition for discussion. And, that definition is: *avidyā* is that which is the material cause of illusory cognition. This definition is based upon the view that Brahman is the substratum of *avidyā* which is the material cause of the illusory world.

Now, Vyāsātīrtha argues that this definition is not applicable in the case of *avidyā* which is stated to be *bhāvarūpa*. It is thus: *avidyā* which is *bhāvarūpa* cannot be the material cause of the erroneous cognition of an *abhāvapadārtha*. It is because there is no similarity between the material cause and the effect. The material cause is a *bhāvapadārtha* and the effect is an *abhāvapadārtha*. Thus the definition of *avidyā*, namely, that it is the material cause of erroneous cognition is not applicable in the case of the material cause of the erroneous cognition of an *abhāvapadārtha*. Hence there is *avyāpti*.

Madhusūdana rejects this contention by saying that one must admit that valid knowledge removes erroneous cognition of an *abhāvapadārtha* too. And for the erroneous cognition of an *abhāvapadārtha* which is removed by valid knowledge, *avidyā* must be admitted to be the material cause.

Vyāsatīrtha also states that in regard to erroneous cognition, the antecedent negation of knowledge itself may be admitted as the material cause and not *ajñāna*, *abhāvapadārtha*.

Madhusūdana states that antecedent negation is known to be the productive factor (*janaka*) of its counter-positive alone. It is not known to be the productive factor (*janaka*) of erroneous cognition. Material cause is the specific form of a productive factor. It is a productive factor and at the same time it pervades the effect. When it is proved that antecedent negation cannot even be a productive factor, then the question whether it is a material cause which is the specific form of productive factor does not arise at all. Hence the causal relation between *avidyā* and erroneous cognition is based upon their having the characteristic of *sad-vilakṣaṇa*, that is, different from being real.

Vyāsatīrtha argues that if *avidyā* is admitted to be the material cause of erroneous cognition, then the latter will be manifested as *avidyā*. This is similar to the manifestation of a pot as *mṛd*, as the latter is the material cause of the former.

Madhusūdana argues that there is no invariable relation that an effect must be manifested in association with its material cause. *Prakṛti* or *pradhāna* is the material cause of *mahat-tattva* according to the Sāṅkhya. But the latter is never manifested in the form *prakṛtiḥ-mahān*. So it is not necessary that an erroneous cognition which has *avidyā* for its material cause should manifest as associated with *avidyā*. Therefore, the second definition of *avidyā* also holds good.

अध्यासविचारसंग्रहः

भाष्यभावज्ञः ब्रह्मश्री बरहृर् कल्याणसुन्दरशास्त्री

अध्यासो हि नाम अतस्मिंस्तद्वुद्धिः । अयथार्थज्ञानम् । यथा सर्परूपे रज्ज्वात्मनि वस्तुनि सर्पवुद्धिः अयं सर्प इति । यथा वा रजतात्मनि शुक्तिरूपे वस्तुनि रजतवुद्धिः इदं रजतमिति । एवमनात्मभूते जडे देहादिवस्तुनि आत्मवुद्धिरहं जानामीति । तथाऽजडात्मनि आत्मवस्तुनि अनात्मवुद्धिः अहं अनुष्यः अहं करोमीति वेदान्तिनः ॥

उक्तश्चायमर्थः शारीरकमीमांसाभाष्ये संग्रहविस्तराभ्याम् 'स्मृतिरूपः परत्र पूर्वदृष्टावभासः' इति 'अन्योन्यास्मिन्नन्योन्यात्मकतामन्योन्यधर्माश्चाद्यस्येतरेतराविवेकेनात्यन्तविविक्तयोर्धर्मधर्मिणोर्मिथ्याज्ञाननिमित्तः सत्यानृते मिथुनीकृत्य 'अहमिदं' 'ममेदमिति' नैसर्गिकोऽयं लोकव्यवहारः' इति ॥

अत्र केचित्सर्वं ज्ञानं यथार्थमित्यभिमन्यमाना एवं वदन्ति । एतदाशयसंग्राहकाः श्लोकाः श्रीशङ्कराशङ्करभाष्यविमर्शाभिधे ग्रन्थे बेल्लङ्गोण्डरामरायकविभिरेवं निर्दिष्टा उपलभ्यन्ते —

‘यथार्थं सर्वविज्ञानमिति वेदविदां मतम् ।

श्रुतिस्मृतिभ्यः सर्वस्य सर्वात्मत्वप्रतीतितः ॥

बहुस्यामिति संकल्पपूर्वसृष्ट्याद्युपक्रमे ।
 तासां त्रिवृतमेकैकामिति श्रुत्यैव दर्शितम् ॥
 त्रिवृतकरणमेवं हि प्रत्यक्षेणोपलभ्यते ।
 यदग्नौ रोहितं रूपं तेजसस्तदपामपि ॥
 शुक्लं कृष्णं पृथिव्याश्चेत्यग्नावेव त्रिरूपता ।
 श्रुत्यैव दर्शिता तस्मात्सर्वे सर्वत्र संगताः ॥
 पुराणे चैवमेवोक्तं वैष्णवे सृष्ट्याद्युपक्रमे ।
 नानावीर्याः पृथग्भूतास्ततस्ते संहतिं विना ॥
 नाशक्नुवन्प्रजाः स्रष्टुं असमागम्य कृत्स्नशः ।
 समेत्यान्योन्यसंयोगं परस्परसमाश्रयाः ॥
 महदाद्या विशेषान्ता ह्यण्डमित्यादिना ततः ।
 सूत्रकारोऽपि भूतानां त्रिरूपत्वं तथावदत् ॥
 ज्यात्मकत्वात्तु भूयस्त्वादिति तेनाभिदा भिदा ॥

किञ्च —

सोमाभावे च पूतीकग्रहणं श्रुतिचोदितम् ।
 सोमावयवसद्भावादिति न्यायविदो विदुः ॥
 व्रीह्यभावे च नीवारग्रहणं व्रीहिभावतः ।
 तदेव सदृशं तस्य यद्यद्रव्यैकदेशभाक् ॥
 शुक्त्यादौ रूप्यसद्भावः श्रुत्यैवेह प्रबोधितः ।
 रूप्यशुक्त्यादिनिर्देशभेदो भूयस्त्वहेतुकः ॥

रूप्यादिसदृशश्चायं शुक्त्यादिरुपलभ्यते ।
 अतस्तस्यात्र सद्भावः प्रतीतेरपि निश्चितः ॥
 कदाचिच्चक्षुरादेस्तु दोषाच्छुक्त्यंशवर्जितः ।
 राजतांशो गृहीतोऽतो रजतार्थी प्रवर्तते ॥
 दोषहानौ तु शुक्त्यंशे गृहीते स निवर्तते ।
 अतो यथार्थं रूप्यादिविज्ञानं शुक्तिकादिषु ॥
 बाध्यबाधकभावस्तु भूयस्त्वेनोपपद्यते ।
 शुक्तिभूयस्त्ववैकल्यसाकल्यग्रहरूपतः ॥
 नातो मिथ्यार्थसत्यार्थविषयत्वनिबन्धनः ।
 एवं सर्वस्य सर्वत्र व्यवहारव्यवस्थितिः ॥'

इति ॥

अयं च पक्षस्तैरेव तत्र सुनिपुणं पराकृतः । पराकरणप्रकारो-
 ऽपि श्लोकैरेव तत्र प्रथमं प्रदर्शितः —

ब्रह्मैकमेव सकलात्मकमित्यखण्ड -
 मुद्घोषयत्सु भुवने श्रुतिमस्तकेषु ।
 सर्वं च सर्वमयमित्यवदत्कथं नु
 रामानुजः फणिपतेरवतारभूतः ॥
 सर्वं मुकुन्दमयमित्यभिभाषमाणे
 श्रीमत्पराशरकृतेऽपि पुराणरत्ने ।
 सर्वं च सर्वमयमित्यवदत्कथं नु
 रामानुजः परमवैष्णवसार्वभौमः ॥

लोकस्त्रिवृत्कृतधराजलपावकाश्च
 भूतत्रयात्मकमिति प्रतिपन्नमेव ।
 नैतावता च सकलं सकलात्मकं स्या-
 त्स्वर्णात्मकः किमु घटो भुवि मार्तिकः स्यात् ॥
 सर्पः पशुश्च मकरः पुरुषो महीजो
 ग्रावा घटश्च कनकं रजतं किमु स्यात् ।
 तस्मादतद्विषयतद्विषणा यथार्था
 नैवेति सर्वविषणा नु कथं यथार्था ॥
 नैवान्यगावयवसन्ततिरन्यगा स्यात्
 तत्सन्निभावयवसन्ततिरन्यदीया ।
 सोमो यथा परिपुनाति जनं तथैव
 पूतीक इत्यभिमतं मतमागमस्य ॥
 शुक्त्यां वसन्त्यवयवा यदि राजतास्त -
 ह्यग्निस्थशुक्त्यवयवप्रलयेऽपि तेषाम् ।
 नाशं विना द्रवपदं समुपागतानां
 दृश्येत दाहविरमे ननु पिण्डभावः ॥
 रूप्ये च शुक्त्यवयवा यदि तर्हि वह्नौ
 तेषां क्षयाद्रजतमल्पतरं भवेच्च ।
 नैवादुताद्रुतमिदं भजतेऽल्पभावं
 तस्मान्मृषैव रजते ननु शुक्तिसत्वम् ॥

किं नीलगा अवयवा गगनेऽपरूपे
 तिष्ठन्ति येन गगनं मलिनं विभायात् ।
 शुक्तचंद्रादिरजतासितमुख्यभासा
 मिथ्यैव सत्यमतिभिः परिबाधितत्वात् ॥

इति ॥

स्पष्टार्थाः श्लोकाः । विस्तरभियात्र नैते वितन्यन्ते । तदेवं
 यथार्थं सर्वविज्ञानमिति पक्षो निराकृतो वेदितव्यः । अयथार्थज्ञान-
 मभ्युपगच्छन्तोऽप्यनिर्वचनीयख्यातिमसहमानाः केचन वादिन एव-
 मभिप्रयन्ति ॥

अन्यथाख्यातिमतविचारः

न हि रज्ज्वादौ दोषवशादपूर्वः सर्पादिर्जायते । अन्यत्र सत
 एव सर्पादिरन्यत्र ख्यातत्वमित्यन्यथाख्यातिरेव । भ्रमापगमानन्तरं
 हि लोकः प्रत्येति रज्जुं दृष्ट्वा सर्पोऽयमित्यहं भ्रान्तोऽभवं न तु
 तत्र सर्पं आसीदिति । नैतत्साधु ॥

ते हि इन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षजन्यं ज्ञानं प्रत्यक्षमिति प्रत्यक्षभ्रम-
 प्रमासाधारणं लक्षणं कथयन्ति । तत्र च बल्मीकादिस्थसर्पादि-
 गृहाङ्गणगतदेवदत्तचक्षुरिन्द्रियस्य च संनिकर्षसंभवेन रज्ज्वादौ
 सर्पादिभ्रमो न संभवत्येव । न तु तत्र सर्पं आसीदिति प्रत्ययस्य च
 व्यावहारिकः सर्पो विषयः न तु प्रातिभासिकः । प्रतिभासिकसर्पादौ
 व्यावहारिकसर्पादिवुद्धिस्त्वतस्सिस्तद्वुद्धित्वाद्भ्रान्तिः । रज्जुसर्पादि-
 प्रत्ययस्य रज्ज्वाद्यद्यस्तसर्पादिरेव विषयो न केवलो रज्ज्वादिः
 नापि देशान्तरस्थो सर्पादिः । तस्मादन्यत्र सतोऽन्यत्र ख्यातत्वा-
 योगात् नान्यथाख्यातिसिद्धिः । किन्तु अनिर्वचनीयख्यातिरेव ॥

न च रज्ज्वादौ प्रातिभासिकसर्पदिः कथमुदय इति शक्यम् ।
दोषादिवशाद्भवेदेवोदयः । निद्रादोषवशादात्मनि रथगजादिपदार्थाः
प्रातिभासिकाः प्रतिदिनमुत्पद्यन्ते हि ।

‘ न तत्र रथाः ’ ‘ अथ रथान् सृजते ’

इति श्रुतिर्हि नः प्रमाणम् । ईश्वरसृष्टत्वाभ्युपगमेऽपि दोषवशादेव
सृष्टिः ।

‘ ययेदं निर्ममे विभुः ’

इत्यादिसरणात् । अतोऽन्यथाख्यातिवादोऽसंगत एव ॥

अख्यातिमतविचारः

ते हि रज्जुसर्पाद्यध्यासस्थले स्मर्यमाणानुभूयमानयोः सर्परज्ज्वो-
भेदाग्रहात्सर्पप्रतीतिः । तद्भेदग्रहात्तु सर्पवाद्य इत्यभिमन्यन्ते ।
तदप्यसंगतम् । सति रज्ज्वनुभवे सर्पभ्रमस्यैवानुदयात् । किं
चान्तरस्य स्मर्यमाणस्य बाह्यस्य दृश्यमानस्य चाभेदग्रहो न युज्यते ।
रज्जुसर्पयोर्द्वयोः पुरःस्थितयोः कदाचित्साम्यवशाद्रज्जौ सर्पाभेदग्रहः
सर्पे वा रज्ज्वाभेदग्रहः सम्भवेत् नान्यथा कथमपि । अतोऽख्याति-
वादोऽप्यसंगत एव ॥

असत्ख्यातिमतविचारः

असत् एव वस्तुनः सर्वत्र संबुत्त्या भानं सम्भवतीति तेऽभि-
मन्यन्त उत्तमा बुद्धशिष्याः शून्यवादिनः शशशृङ्गादिवदत्यन्तासतः
पदार्थस्य ख्यातिर्न कथमपि युज्यते इत्ययमपि वादोऽसङ्गत एवेति
प्रज्ञावद्भिरुपेक्षणीय एव ॥

आत्मख्यातिमतविचारः

आन्तर एव सर्पादिदोषवशाद्ब्राह्म इव प्रतिभातीति तेऽभिमन्यन्ते मध्यमा बुद्धशिष्या विज्ञानवादिनः । तच्चायुक्तम् । बल्मीकादौ स्थितस्य सर्पादेरन्तस्स्थितत्वे मानाभावात् । न च वासनारूपेण हृदयस्थित एव सर्पादिरिति वाच्यम् । यदि तादृश एव सर्पादिः ब्राह्मवदवभासेत तर्हि ब्राह्मरज्वाद्यपेक्षा व्यर्थैव स्यादिति कृत्वा ब्राह्मरज्वाद्यभावेऽपि सर्पादिभ्रमो जायेत । न च तद्दर्शनसहकृत एवान्तरः सर्पादिर्ब्राह्मवदवभासते इति वाच्यम् । सति ब्राह्मरज्वादिदर्शने सर्पादिभ्रमस्यैवानुदयप्रसंगात् । न चान्तरं विज्ञानमेव बहिः सर्पादिवदवभासत इति वाच्यम् । सर्पादिवदेवेति कोऽयमिह नियमः । रज्वादिवदप्यवभासत एव । किञ्च विज्ञानवादिमते सर्वस्याप्यान्तरत्वेन ब्राह्मार्थस्यैवाभावात् । न च तवापीदमेव मतमिति वाच्यम् । न वयं ब्राह्मार्थमपलपामः । किन्तु मिथ्येत्येव प्रतिपादयामः । किञ्च ते विज्ञानं क्षणिकमित्यभ्युपगच्छन्ति । अत एव तेष्वस्माकं प्रद्वेषः । न हि क्षणिकं विज्ञानमाकल्पस्थायि गगनादि जगद्रूपं भवितुं क्षमते । नापि मुक्तयन्त्रयि जीवरूपमपि भवितुमर्हति । न चापि त्रिकालाबाध्यमुक्तोपसृप्यब्रह्मरूपमपि भवितुं युज्यते ॥

तदेवं अनिर्वचनीयख्यात्याश्रयणं विना न केनापि प्रकारेण प्रतीति-
बाधयोरुपपत्त्यसिद्धेस्तात्सद्ब्रह्मार्थमनिर्वचनीयख्यातिरवश्यमेवाश्रयणीया,
गत्यन्तराभावात् । अभ्युपगतायां च तस्यां यथा रज्वादौ सर्पादि-
दोषवशाज्जातस्तथा ब्रह्मणि दोषवशादेव जगज्जातमिति सिद्धम् ।
यथेदं जगत्तथाऽविद्यापि ब्रह्मण्यध्यस्तैवेति कृत्वा सदसद्विलक्षणत्वा-
न्मिथ्यैव ॥

एतावानप्यर्थः तं केचिदन्यत्रान्यधर्मद्वयास इति वदन्ति ।
केचित्तु यत्र यदध्यासस्तद्विवेकाग्रहनिवन्धनो भ्रम इति । अन्ये तु
यत्र यदध्यासस्तस्यैव विपरीतधर्मत्वकल्पनामाचक्षते इति । सर्व-

थापि त्वन्यस्यान्यधर्मावभासतां न व्यभिचरति । तथा च लोके-
ऽनुभवः — शुक्तिका हि रजतवदवभासते , एकश्चन्द्रः सद्वितीय-
वदिति शारीरकमीमांसाभाष्ये श्रीशङ्करभगवत्पादैः संगृहीत इति
सुधीभिर्धिभावनीयम् ॥

आत्मख्यातिरसत्ख्यातिः ख्यातिरन्यथा ।

तथानिर्वचनख्यातिरित्येतत्ख्यातिपञ्चकम् ॥

इत्येता एवाधोनिर्दिष्टाः पञ्च ख्यातयः यथार्थख्यातिव्यतिरिक्ताः
संगृहीता इत्यनुसंधेयम् । आद्याश्चतस्रः ख्यातयोऽत्र वैपरीत्येन
निर्देशक्रममुल्लङ्घ्य विचारिता वेदितव्याः ॥

भ्रमस्थले रज्जादावधिष्ठाने प्रातिभासिकसर्पादेः कथमुदय इत्या-
शङ्कायां दोषवशादिति संग्रहेणात्र सदृशान्तं समाधानं पूर्वमुक्तम् ।
इमे एव शङ्कासमाधाने वेदान्तपरिभाषायां शुक्तिरजतस्थलमालम्ब्य
किञ्चिद्विस्तृततया प्रतिपादिते । ते चात्र बोद्धवोघसौलभ्यार्थमद्या-
नूद्यते ॥

‘ ननु रजतोत्पादकानां रजतावयवानामभावे शुक्तौ कथं तवापि
रजतमुत्पद्यते इति चेत् , उच्यते । नहि लोकसिद्धसाक्षरी प्राति-
भासिवरजतोत्पादिका , किन्तु विलक्षणैव । तथा हि — काचकाम-
लादिदोषदूषितलोचनस्य पुरोवर्तिद्रव्यसंयोगात् इदमाकारा चाकचिक्या-
कारा च काचिदन्तःकरणवृत्तिरुदेति । तस्याश्च वृत्तौ इदमव-
च्छिन्नचैतन्यं प्रतिबिम्बते । तत्र पूर्वोक्तरीत्या वृत्तेर्निर्गमनेन इदमव-
च्छिन्नचैतन्यं वृत्त्यवच्छिन्नचैतन्यं प्रमातृचैतन्यं चाभिन्नं भवति ।
ततश्च प्रमातृचैतन्याभिन्नविषयचैतन्यनिष्ठा शुक्तित्वप्रकारिकाऽविद्या
चाकचिक्यादिसादृश्यसन्दर्शनसमुद्बोधितरजतसंस्कारसध्रीचीना काचा-
दिदोषसमवहिता रजतरूपार्थाकारेण रजतज्ञानाभासाकारेण च परि-
णमत’ इति । भ्रान्तिज्ञानस्य प्रत्यक्षत्वोपपत्त्यर्थं सर्वैरेव वादिभि-
रकामैरप्येतदवश्यमङ्गीकार्यमेव ॥

एवं प्रसाधितेष्वध्यासे स्थूलदृशः केचन इदंप्रत्ययगोचरयो-
 विषयभूतयोः संभवत्सादृश्ययोरत एवाविरुद्धस्वभावयोः पुरोवर्तिनो-
 रक्षग्रहणयोग्ययोरेव शुक्तिरजताद्यात्मनोरयमध्यासः सम्भवन्सम्भवेत्,
 न तु कदाचिदपि इदमस्मत्प्रत्ययगोचरयोर्विषयविषयिणोर्विरुद्धधर्मा-
 कान्तत्वेन तमःप्रकाशवद्विरुद्धस्वभावयोः पुरोऽपुरोवर्तिनोरक्षग्राह्याग्राह्य-
 योरात्मनात्मनोरिति मन्यमानाः तयोः परस्पराध्यासं परस्परधर्मा-
 ध्यासं चाक्षिपन्ति । शारीरकमीमांसाभाष्योपक्रमे तदनन्तरं चाय-
 मेवाक्षेपो भगवत्पादैः प्राधान्येन प्रदर्शितः । तद्यथा — 'युष्मदस्म-
 त्प्रत्ययगोचरयोर्विषयविषयिणोः तमःप्रकाशवद्विरुद्धस्वभावयोरितरेतर-
 भावानुपपत्तौ सिद्धायां तद्धर्माणामपि सुतरामितरेतरभावानुपपत्ति-
 रित्यतोऽस्मत्प्रत्यगोचरे विषयिणि चिदात्मके युष्मत्प्रत्ययगोचरस्य
 विषयस्य तद्धर्माणां चाध्यासस्तद्विषय्येण विषयिणस्तद्धर्माणां च
 विषयेऽध्यासो मिथ्येति भवितुं युक्तम् — इत्युपक्रमे सामान्यतः तद-
 नन्तरं च 'कथंपुनः प्रत्यगात्मन्यविषयेऽध्यासो विषयतद्धर्माणाम् ।
 सर्वो हि पुरोऽवस्थिते विषये विषयान्तरमध्यस्यति । युष्मत्प्रत्ययापे-
 तस्य च प्रत्यगात्मनोऽविषयत्वं ब्रवीषीति' च विशेषतः ॥

समाधानभाष्यं चैवं दृश्यते — 'उच्यते । न तावद्यमेकान्ते-
 नाविषयः । अस्मत्प्रत्ययविषयत्वात् । अपरोक्षत्वाच्च प्रत्यगात्मप्रसि-
 द्धेः । न चायमस्ति नियमः । पुरोऽवस्थिते एव विषये विषया-
 न्तरमध्यसितव्यमिति । अप्रत्यक्षेऽपि ह्याकाशे बालास्तलमलिनता-
 द्यध्यस्यन्ति । एवमविरुद्धः प्रत्यगात्मन्यप्यनात्माध्यासः । तमेतमेवं
 लक्षणमध्यासं पण्डिता अविद्येति मन्यन्ते । तद्विवेकेन च वस्तु-
 स्वरूपावधारणं विद्यामाहुः ॥'

अनयोराक्षेपसमाधानयोरन्तर्हिता नानाप्रकारा आशयाः क्व-
 चिदतिविस्तृततया विशदीकृताः । ते चात्र बोद्धव्यसौकर्यार्थमुप-
 क्षिप्यन्ते ॥

(अनुवर्तते)

BRAHMAN — ĀTMAN

यो ब्रह्माणं विदधाति पूर्वं यो वै वेदांश्च प्रहिणोति तस्मै ।
तं ह देवमात्मबुद्धिप्रकाशं मुमुक्षुर्वै शरणमहं प्रपद्ये ॥

Desirous of Moksha (complete freedom—physical, mental, and spiritual), I seek refuge in that self-effulgent One, who projected Brahmā at the beginning of creation and revealed the meaning of the *Vedas* to him, and whose inspiration (alone) turns my understanding towards the Ātman.

पूर्णमदः पूर्णमिदं पूर्णात्पूर्णमुदच्यते ।
पूर्णस्य पूर्णमादाय पूर्णमेवावशिष्यते ॥

That (transcendental Brahman) is infinite; so also is this (Brahman immanent in the) perceptible universe. The immanent is based on the transcendent. In spite of Its immanence in the finite universe, the transcendental Brahman remains infinite. It does not in any way alter Its infinitude.

ESSENCE OF THE INQUIRY INTO SUPERIMPOSITION*

*Brahmaśrī Varahūr Kalyāṇasundara Śāstri***

Superimposition is, indeed, cognition of something as something else. It is not cognition of an object as it is like the cognition of snake in the form, "This is a snake," in the rope which resembles a snake, or the cognition of silver in the form, "This is silver," in the shell which resembles silver. In the same way, the cognition of the Self in the form, "I know," in the body and other objects which are not-Self and material, or the cognition of the not-Self in the form, "I am human," "I do," etc. in the Self which is immaterial, is a case of superimposition, according to the Advaitin.

This view stated above has been set forth briefly as well as elaborately in the commentary on the *Śārīraka-mīmāṃsā* as follows: "the apparent presentation

* Sri V. Vaidyasubramania Iyer Shashtiyabdapurthi Endowment Lecture delivered on Friday, the 17th May 1991 at Sri Sringeri Jagadguru Pravachana Mandiram, Madras-28.

**Sāhitya-viśārada, Sāhitya-Vedānta-Śiromaṇi,
Śāstra-bodhana-catura, Bhāṣyabhāvajña,
The President's Certificate of Honour Awardee

in the form of remembrance to consciousness of something previously observed, in some other thing;" and "Not to distinguish the two entities (object and subject) and their respective attributes, although they are absolutely distinct, but to superimpose upon each the characteristic nature and the attributes of the other, and thus, coupling the real and the unreal, to make use of expressions such as, 'I am that,' 'that is mine.' This kind of worldly life is quite natural to man."

In this connection some who hold the view that all knowledge is of the real argue as follows. The purport of their view has been brought out by Bellangonda Rāmarāya Kavi in his book called *Śrī-Śaṅkarāśaṅkara-bhāṣya-vimarśaḥ* as follows: "Those who understand the *Veda* hold that all cognition has for its object what is real, for *śruti* and *smṛti* teach that everything participates in the nature of everything else. *Śruti* has stated that the resolve of the Creator before the beginning of creation was that each of these elements was made tripartite; and this tripartite nature of all things is apprehended by perception also. The red colour in burning fire comes from fire, the white colour from water, the black colour from earth — in this way *śruti* itself explains the threefold nature of burning fire. So all objects are composed of elements of all objects. The *Viṣṇu-purāṇa*, in its account of creation, says: 'The elements possessing various powers and being unconnected could not, without combination, produce living beings, not having mingled in any way. After combining with one another, and entering into mutual relation — beginning with *mahat* and extending down to the gross elements — they formed an egg. This tripartiteness of the elements, the Sūtrakāra also declares."

Also, the following account is given: "For the same reason *śruti* enjoins the use of Pautīka sprouts when no Soma can be procured; for, as those who know the principle say, there are some parts of the Soma plant in the Pautīka plant. Also, for the same reason *nivāra* grains may be used as a substitute for rice grains. That thing is similar to another which contains within itself some part of that other thing; and *śruti* itself has thus stated that in shell, etc., there is some silver, and so on. The reason for calling one thing as 'silver' and another 'shell' is the relative preponderance of one or the other element. We see that shell is similar to silver; thus perception itself informs us that some elements of the latter actually exist in the former. Sometimes it happens that, due to a defect in the eye, the silver-element only is apprehended, not the shell-element; and then the perceiver, desirous of silver, moves to pick up the shell. If, on the other hand, his eye is free from such defect, he sees the shell-element and then refrains from action. So the cognition of silver in shell is a true one. In the same way, the sublation of one cognition by another can be explained in terms of the preponderant element, according as the preponderance of the shell-element is apprehended partially or fully, and does not, therefore, depend on one cognition having for its object the false thing and another true thing. Thus, everything participating in everything else is justified by the order in our business of life."

This view has been thoroughly refuted by him in the same context. The method of refutation also has been stated by him first of all in verses as follows: "When it has been declared in the *Upaniṣads* that Brahman alone which is one and impartite is the Self of all in the world, how could, indeed, Rāmānuja, the

incarnation of Ādiśeṣa, say that everything is in everything else? When it has been said, in the *Viṣṇupurāṇa* written by Śrīmat Parāśara that everything is of the nature of Mukunda, how could, indeed, Rāmānuja, the supreme among the great Vaiṣṇavas, say that everything is of the nature of everything else? It is certainly accepted that the world as well as the earth, water, and fire which have been made tripartite are of the nature of the three elements. It does not follow from this that everything is of the nature of everything else. Will a jar which is of the nature of gold become earthen in the world? Snake and animal, crocodile and man, plant, stone, pot and gold — does any of these become silver? So, since a cognition of something as something else is not a true one, how, indeed, could it be said that all cognitions are of the real? The series of particles of one thing can never be that of another thing. Nor can the series of particles of one thing, due to similarity, belong to another? Just as the Soma plant protects the people, so also the Pūtīka — this view of scripture is accepted. If the particles of silver are in shell, then when the particles of shell disappear due to the shell being placed in fire, they should be seen in a melting stage without destruction; and when there is no heat, they should, indeed, be seen as a piece. If the particles of shell are in silver, then when they get destroyed in fire, silver should become less. The silver does not become less when it is in the liquid state transforming from the solid one. So the presence of shell in silver is, indeed, illusory. Do the particles of blue colour exist in ether which is devoid of colour such that the sky becomes dirty? The presence of silver in shell and that of dirt in ether is certainly illusory, because of the sublation of each by the true cognition."

The meaning of the verses is clear. It is not elaborated for fear of length. It should be noted that the view which holds that every cognition is of the real is refuted in this manner. Some others who will not accept *anirvacanīya-khyāti*, even though they are willing to accept erroneous cognition, hold the following views.

Inquiry into the Theory of Anyathā-khyāti

According to this theory, it is not the case that a new snake, etc., comes into being in rope, etc., due to defect. Since snake, etc. which do exist elsewhere are seen in other places, it is only a case of *anyathā-khyāti*. After the cessation of illusion, people, indeed, realize, "After seeing the rope, I was under the illusion thinking of it as a snake; but there was no snake there."

This argument is not satisfactory. They (*i.e.* the Naiyāyikas who advocate this theory) define perception as knowledge which arises from the contact between the sense-organ and the object — a definition common to erroneous perception and valid perception. Since the visual sense of Devadatta which is in the courtyard of the house cannot come into contact with the snake, etc., located in the ant-hill, etc., the illusion of snake, etc., can never take place in the rope and other objects. The content of the cognition "There was no snake there" is the empirical snake and not the apparent snake. The cognition of empirical snake, etc. in the apparent snake, etc. is illusory, because it is a case of cognizing something which is not there. The content of the cognition of rope-snake, etc. is the snake, etc. superimposed on the rope, etc., but not mere rope, etc., nor snake, etc. located in some other place. So, since it is not possible to cognize in one place what is else-

where, the theory of *anyathā-khyāti* is untenable. On the other hand, only *anirvacanīya-khyāti* is tenable.

There is no room for the question how the apparent snake, etc., can originate in rope, etc., for the origination (of such apparent objects) does take place because of defect and other factors. It is well-known that apparent objects such as chariot and elephant originate in the self everyday due to the defect of sleep. *Śruti* texts such as "Chariots are not there," "Then chariots are created," are, indeed, our authority. Even if it is accepted that they are the creations of Īsvara, the creation is because of the defect alone, for there is the *smṛti* text, "The Lord created this through (*māyā*)." So, the theory of *anyathā-khyāti* cannot at all be accepted.

Inquiry into the Theory of Akhyāti

The advocates of this theory (*viz.* the Prābhākaras) maintain that in the case of the superimposition of snake in the rope, etc., there is the cognition of snake because of the non-apprehension of the difference between snake and rope, which are the objects of memory and perception respectively. But when their difference is apprehended, the snake is sublated. Even this view does not hold good. When the rope is perceived, the illusion of snake cannot at all arise. Further, it is not tenable to maintain that there is apprehension of non-difference between that inward object which is in memory and that external object which is perceived. In respect of the two objects, the rope and the snake, which are in front, sometimes there may be apprehension of snake in the rope, or the apprehension of rope in the snake, due to similarity but never otherwise. So, the theory of *akhyāti* too is untenable.

Inquiry into the Theory of Asat-khyāti

The Śūnyavādins, the best disciples of Buddha, hold the view that the non-existent object, due to the concealment of truth, appears to be existent everywhere. This theory, too, is unsound, because the cognition of the object which is totally non-existent like the sky-flower, etc., is not at all tenable; and so this theory has to be ignored by the wise.

Inquiry into the Theory of Ātma-khyāti

The Vijñānavādins, the middling disciples of Buddha, hold the view that snake, etc., which are only inside, appear to be outside due to defect. This theory, too, is untenable, for there is no evidence to say that snake, etc., which are in ant-hill and other places, are inside. It is no argument to say that snake, etc. are in the heart (mind) alone in the form of impressions. If, in that way, snake, etc. appear as if they are outside, then there is no need for the external rope, etc., and so the illusion of snake, etc. must take place even in the absence of the external rope, etc. It is no argument to say that the inward snake, etc. appear as external only when they are helped by the perception of the external objects, for when the external rope, etc. are perceived, there is no scope for the rise of the illusion of snake, etc. It cannot be said that the cognition alone which is inside appears externally as snake, etc. Why is it that there is the restriction that it appears as snake, etc. alone? It can also appear as rope, etc. Further, according to the view of the Vijñānavādin, since everything is inside, there is no external object at all. It cannot be said that the Advaitin also holds the same view. We do not deny

the existence of external object. On the contrary, we hold the view that it is *mīthyā*. Moreover, they accept that cognition is momentary. That is why we do not like them. Indeed, the momentary cognition is incapable of appearing as the world comprising sky, etc. which exist from the beginning of the *kalpa*. Nor can it be in the form of the *jīva* which continues in liberation or in the form of Brahman which is attained by the liberated and which exists unsublated in all the three periods of time.

Thus, without resorting to *anirvacanīya-khyāti* it will not be possible to account for cognition and sublation in any other manner; and for this purpose *anirvacanīya-khyāti* has to be adopted, as there is no other way. And when this theory is accepted, it is established that just as snake, etc. appear in the rope, etc. due to defect, even so the world appears in Brahman due to defect. Just as the world is a superimposition on Brahman, even so *avidyā* too is a superimposition on Brahman; and so it is *mīthyā* alone because it is different from both *sat* and *asat*.

Some explain what has been stated above as the superimposition of the characteristic of something on something else. But some others say that illusion arises because of the non-apprehension of the distinction between the superimposed and that on which it is superimposed. Again, there are some who say that that on which something is superimposed is thought of as having the opposite characteristic. In all these explanations the idea that there is appearance of one thing in something else is not deviant. That our experience also is in this way — a shell, indeed, appears as silver

and the moon which is one appears as two — has been well-stated by Śrī Śaṅkarabhagavatpāda in his commentary on the *Śārīrakamīmāṃsā* (*Brahma-sūtra*). The intelligent should carefully understand this position. It should be borne in mind that the five theories other than *yathārtha-khyāti* which have been stated above are enumerated as follows: “*Ātma-khyāti*, *asat-khyāti*, *akhyāti*, *anyathā-khyāti*, and *anirvacanīya-khyāti* are the five theories of erroneous cognition.” It may be noted that the first four theories of erroneous cognition have been inquired into in the reverse order.

To the doubt as to how apparent objects such as snake can come into being in the substratum such as rope in the context of perceptual error, it was stated by way of brief reply with illustration that it was due to defect. The doubt and the reply stated above have been set forth a little more elaborately in the *Vedānta-paribhāṣā* on the basis of the example of shell and silver. They are restated here for the convenience of the understanding of the learner.

“There is the objection: ‘In the absence of the silver-particles, etc. which produce silver, how, even according to you, is silver produced in shell?’ The reply to this objection is as follows. What produces the apparent silver is not, indeed, the causal aggregate known to us in ordinary experience, but certainly something different. It is thus. In the case of a person whose eyes are affected by such defects as *kāca*, there arises, because of conjunction with the object in front, a certain mental mode in the form of ‘this’ as well as in the form of glitter. And in this mental mode, consciousness defined by the this-aspect

(of the object) is reflected. That being the case, in the manner stated above, because of the out-going of the mental mode, the consciousness defined by the this-aspect, consciousness defined by the mental mode, and cognizer-defined consciousness become non-different. And then, *avidyā*, which is present in the object-defined consciousness non-different from the cognizer-defined consciousness, which has shellness for its mode, which is aided by the impression of silver called up by the sight of similarity in respect of glitter, etc. and which is associated with defects like *kāca* transforms itself into an object with the form of silver and into an apparent cognition of silver." With a view to show that erroneous cognition is perceptual, all the disputants, though unwilling, have to accept this mode of explanation.

Even though superimposition has thus been established, those who are of shallow understanding raise the following objection: "Superimposition such as silver in the shell is possible only in the case of objects which are apprehended as 'this', which, because of their similarity, are not opposed to each other, and which are in front such that they are fit enough to be perceived by the sense-organ; but in the case of objects which are apprehended as 'this' and 'I' which are object and subject, which are opposed to each other like light and darkness, which are outside and inside, which can be apprehended and non-apprehended by the sense organ, which are the Self and the not-Self, it is not possible to superimpose mutually the nature of the one on the other, or the characteristic of the one on the other. At the commencement of the commentary on the *Śārīrakamīmāṃsā* and also in

the sequel this objection has been mainly stated by Śrī Śaṅkarabhagavatpāda. First of all the objection is formulated in a general way as follows: "It is a matter not requiring any proof that the object and the subject, whose respective spheres are the notion of the 'thou' and the 'ego', and which are opposed to each other as much as darkness and light are, cannot be identified. All the less can their respective attributes be identified. Hence, it follows that it is wrong to superimpose upon the subject — whose Self is intelligence and which has for its sphere the notion of the ego — the object whose sphere is the notion of the non-ego, and the attributes of the object, and *vice versa* to superimpose the subject and the attributes of the subject on the object." Subsequently, it has been stated specifically as follows: "But how is it possible that on the inward Self which itself is not an object there should be superimposed objects and their attributes? For everyone superimposes an object only on such other objects as are placed before him, and you have said earlier that the inward Self which is entirely disconnected with the idea of the 'thou' is never an object." The reply to this objection in the commentary is as follows: "It is not, we reply, non-object in the absolute sense. For it is the object of the notion of the ego, and the inward Self is well-known to exist on account of its immediate presentation. Nor is there a rule that objects can be superimposed only on such other objects as are before us, *i.e.* in contact with our sense-organs; for non-discerning men superimpose on the ether, which is not the object of sense perception, dark-blue colour, etc. Hence it follows that the superimposition of the not-Self on the inward Self is not unreasonable. This superimposition, thus defined,

learned men consider to be *avidyā*, and the ascertainment of the true nature of that which is (*viz.* the Self) by means of discrimination of that (which is superimposed on the Self), they call *vidyā*."

The different ideas which remain implicit in the objection and the reply have been made clear through some further elucidation. They are set forth here for the convenience of the understanding of the learner.

(to be continued)

VIDYĀ — AVIDYĀ

विद्याञ्चाविद्याञ्च यस्तद्वेदोभयं सह ।

अविद्यया मृत्युं तीर्त्वा विद्ययाऽमृतमश्नुते ॥

(*Īśāvāsyopaniṣad*, 11)

Knowledge and ignorance, he who knows the two together, crosses death through ignorance and attains life eternal through knowledge. [Ignorance: by the performance of rites, we overcome death].

MAHĀKAVEH KĀLIDĀSASYA
GĪTĀTRAYAM

[in Sanskrit]

by Ātmavidyābhūṣaṇam

V. S. V. Gurusvāmī Śāstri

with an English translation

by Dr. V. K. S. N. Raghavan

(Contd. from Vol. XV, No. 2-3)

कालिदासीया द्वितीयगीता
देवकृतब्रह्मस्तुतिरूपा
(द्वादशश्लोकरूपा
कुमारसम्भवद्वितीयसर्गान्तर्गता)

[160]

तारकोपद्रुतैर्देवैः कलितां ब्रह्मणः स्तुतिम् ।
कुमारसम्भवगतां द्वादशश्लोकरूपिणीम् ॥
द्वितीयां कालिदासस्य गीतामथ निरूपये ॥

अवतारिका

[161]

श्रोतृणामवधानाय बहुमानपुरस्सरम् ।
ब्रह्मस्तुतिं प्रारभते ह्लादमानो महाकविः ॥

[162]

अथ विश्वस्य धातारं ते सर्वे सर्वतोमुखम् ।
वागीशं वाग्भिर्ध्याभिः प्रणिपत्योपतस्थिरे ॥

(कुमारसम्भवम् २ - ३)

[163]

उपस्थानविधेः पूर्वं विधातारं दिवौकसः ।
अहम्पूर्वमहम्पूर्वमिति प्रणमनैषिणः ॥

[164]

न पर्यायप्रणमनाद् विलम्बक्लेशमाप्नुवन् ।
चतुर्मुखं तेऽभिमुखं ह्यनमन्युगपत्सुराः ॥
इत्थं कविध्वनयति सर्वतोमुखशब्दतः ॥

[165]

“सर्वतः पाणिपादं तत्सर्वतोक्षिशिरोमुखम्” ।
इति गीतावर्णितं यत्तदेवात्र विवक्षितम् ॥

[166]

इत्यपि व्यञ्जयत्यत्र सर्वतोमुखशब्दतः ।
मन्येऽहं कविरेवात्र वागीशः सर्वतोमुखः ॥

कुमारसम्भवे २ - ४

(१)

नमस्त्रिमूर्तये तुभ्यं प्राक्सृष्टेः केवलात्मने ।
गुणत्रयविभागाय पश्चाद्भेदमुपेयुषे ॥

[167]

नमस्त्रिमूर्तयेवं प्रयुञ्जानो महाकविः ।
सर्गस्थाननिरोधेषु विधिविष्णुशिवात्मना ॥

[168]

एकमेवेश्वरं विश्वकारणं प्रत्यपादयत् ।
रजः सत्त्वतमोरूपगुणैः सृष्टेरनन्तरम् ॥

[169]

एकोऽपि सन्स एवेशो नैकभेदमुपेयिवान् ।
स एव सर्गात्प्रागीशः केवलो निर्गुणोऽद्वयः ॥

[170]

इत्यब्रुवत्कविव्यक्तं प्राक्सृष्टेरितिशब्दतः ।
'आत्मैवेदं' 'सदेवेदं' 'सलिलो' 'ब्रह्म वा' इति ॥

[171]

अद्वैतब्रह्मविषयाः कविः स्मारयति श्रुतीः ।
औपाधिकानेकधर्मैर्भिन्नोऽप्येकः स ईश्वरः ॥

[172]

धर्मैरौपाधिकैर्नैव सम्बद्धः परमार्थतः ॥
इति तत्त्वं कविः प्राह श्रुतिसूत्राध्वपारगः ।

-
1. बृहदारण्यकोपनिषत् १ - ४ - १
 2. छान्दोग्योपनिषत् ६ - २ - १
 3. बृहदारण्यकोपनिषत् ४ - ३ - ३२
 4. बृहदारण्यकोपनिषत् १ - ४ - १०

[173]

इत्येवमत्रान्यत्रापि तत्र तत्रासकृद्ब्रुवन् ।
भेदबुद्धिं सनिर्बन्धं महाकविरगर्हत ॥

[174]

“ एकैव मूर्तिर्विभिदे त्रिधा सा सामान्यमेषां प्रथमावरत्वम् ।
विष्णोर्हरस्तस्य हरिः कदाचित् वेधास्तयोस्तावपि धातुराद्यौ ॥ ”

[175]

कुमारसम्भवे त्वेवं कविः स्वयमभाषत ।
एकत्वेऽप्यजविष्ण्वीशाः लीलाकलितविग्रहाः ॥
वदन्त्यन्योन्यमुत्कर्षमित्यप्याह कविः स्फुटम् ॥

[176]

“ स हि देवः परं ज्योतिस्तमःपारे व्यवस्थितम् ।
परिच्छिन्नप्रभावरधिर्न मया न च विष्णुना ” ॥
इति ब्रह्मा शिवोत्कर्षं प्राहेति कविरब्रवीत् ॥

[177]

“ इत्थं विधिज्ञेन पुरोहितेन प्रयुक्तपाणिग्रहणोपचारौ ।
प्रणोमतुस्तौ पितरौ प्रजानां पद्मासनस्थाय पितामहाय ॥ ”
एवं शिवौ ननामाजमिति स्पष्टं कविर्जगौ ॥

[178]

“कम्पेन मूर्ध्नः शतपत्रयोनिं वाचा हरिं वृत्रहणं स्मितेन ।
आलोकमात्रेण सुरानशेषान् सम्भावयामास यथाप्रधानम् ॥”

[179]

इत्थं वेधोविष्णुशक्रसुराणां बहुमाननाम् ।
चकार तारतम्येन शिव इत्यब्रवीत्कविः ॥

[180]

“तमभ्यगच्छत्प्रथमो विधाता श्रीवत्सलक्ष्मा पुरुषश्च साक्षात् ।
जयेति वाचा महिमानमस्य संबोधयन्तौ हविषेव वह्निम् ॥”

[181]

एवं पुत्रुजतुः शम्भुं जयोक्त्या विधिमाधवौ ।
इति चावर्णयद्धीमान् अगाधहृदयः कविः ॥

[182]

कुमारसम्भवगतैः श्लोकैरेतैर्महाकविः ।
अद्वैतमवदच्छ्रौतं मूर्तिभेदं निराकरोत् ॥
प्रासङ्गिकविचारेण तदलं प्रकृतं ब्रुवे ॥

अवतारिका

[183]

अध्यारोपापवादाख्यन्यायमालम्ब्य विश्रुतम् ।
वर्णयन् विस्तृतां सृष्टिं ब्रह्म निर्देष्टुमिच्छति ॥

(२)

कुमारसम्भवे २ - ५

यदमोघमपामन्तरुतं बीजमज त्वया ।
अतश्चराचरं विश्वं प्रभवस्तस्य गीयसे ॥

[184]

आदौ सलिलमुत्पाद्य तन्मूलमखिलं जगत् ।
ब्रह्मा ससर्ज तेनायं जगत्कारणमुच्यते ॥

[185]

“अप एव ससर्जादौ तासु वीर्यमवासृजत् ।
तदण्डमभवद्धैमं सहस्रांशुसमप्रभम् ॥”

(मनुस्मृतिः, २. ८-९)

[186]

इत्यपां प्रथमां सृष्टिं मनुस्मृतिसमीरिताम् ।
मानयन्सलिलस्याद्यसृष्टिमत्राब्रवीत्कविः ॥

[187]

शाकुन्तलेऽपि “या सृष्टिः स्रष्टुराद्ये”त्यवर्णयत् ।
इदन्तु तत्त्वं बोद्धव्यं वेदान्तार्थविचारकैः ॥

[188]

सृष्टिबोधकवाक्यानि ब्रह्मतत्त्वविवक्षया ।
 सर्वाण्यपि प्रवृत्तानि वेदान्तेष्विति निश्चयः ॥
 कविवाक्येषु तत्तुल्येष्वपि तादृङ्निश्चयः ॥

(३)

कुमारसम्भवे २ - ६

तिसृभिस्त्वमवस्थाभिर्महिमानमुदीरयन् ।
 प्रलयस्थितिसर्गाणामेकः कारणतां गतः ॥

[189]

सृष्टिशक्त्या सृजन्विश्वं स्थितिशक्त्या च पालयन् ।
 संहरन्नाशशक्त्यैकः सर्वकारणमुच्यते ॥

[190]

आदावुत्पद्यते वस्तु कञ्चित्कालं च तिष्ठति ।
 ततश्च नश्यतीत्येवं सृष्टि-स्थिति-लयक्रमः ॥

[191]

लोके विलोक्यते श्रुत्या "यतो वे"त्यनयोदितः ।
 'नमो विश्वसृजे पूर्व'मित्युक्तः कविनापि च ॥

[192]

तल्लोकवेदमर्यादामतिक्रम्य महाकविः ।
प्रलयस्थितिसर्गाणामित्येवं कथमब्रवीत् ॥

[193]

एतद्विमृश्य विशदं कविभावः प्रकाशयते ।
नमो विश्वसृजेत्यत्र कविः क्रमविवक्षया ॥

[194]

वस्तुनः पूर्वमुत्पत्तिस्ततः स्थितिरथो लयः ।
इत्येवमपरित्यक्तश्रौतक्रममवर्णयत् ॥

[195]

उत्पन्नस्य स्थितिलोके स्थितस्य विलयः पुनः ।
एवं विलीनस्य पुनः जनिः कस्मान्न संभवेत् ॥

[196]

इति क्रमविपर्यासाद्विश्वस्यानादितां कविः ।
प्रलयस्थितिसर्गाणामित्यनेन विवक्षति ॥

[197]

भगवानपि गीतायां “ध्रुवं जन्म मृतस्य च ।”
इति नष्टस्य जन्माह तत्समूलं कवेर्वचः ॥

(अनुवर्तते)

THE SECOND "GĪTĀ" OF KĀLIDĀSA
[A hymn in praise of Brahmā, sung by gods]

[160]

Let me explain the second *gītā* (a eulogy on Brahmā) of Kālidāsa, (i) forming part of the second canto of the *Kumārasambhava* (II, 4-15), and (ii) wherein gods, having been affected by the demon Tāraka, extol Brahmā, the creator.

[160 - 166]

Introductory Remarks

The great poet (Kālidāsa) begins the eulogy on Brahmā with great enthusiasm for the sake of the attention of the audience (readers) with high veneration (to God Brahmā).

Then, having bowed to him, who has a face on every side, who is the creator of all, and who is the Lord of speech, they (the gods) propitiated him with appropriate (*lit.* full of sense) speech.

(*Kumārasambhava*, II-3)

Desirous of paying their obeisance to the Creator, Brahmā, the gods approached him with great haste as — “Let me first prostrate, let me first prostrate.” The gods experienced no delay, in conveying their respects to Brahmā, for they bowed to Him simultaneously and *not* one by one. The above, idea is suggested by the poet using the term — ‘*sarvatomukha*.’

(In the *Gītā* XIII. 13, Lord Kṛṣṇa has said:) “That Brahman has hands, feet, eyes, heads, faces on all sides.” The poet has intended to reproduce here the same idea (as referred to in the *Gītā*) through the term, ‘*sarvatomukha*’.

Of course, I feel that, the poet himself is *vāgīśa* and *sarvatomukha* (proficient in speech and well-versed in all learning).

(1)

The Kumārasambhava, II - 4:

Bow to Thee of threefold forms, (existing as) one Spirit before creation, but afterwards betaking thyself to distinctive forms (*lit.* differentiation) for the sake of the division of the three *guṇas*.

[167 - 170 ab]

Using the words, ‘*namaḥ trimūrtaye*’, the great poet intends to suggest that only one supreme God is the cause of the world, and he has taken the three forms of creator (Brahmā), protector (Viṣṇu), and annihilator (Śiva) to function in their respective roles.

After the creation of the world, the supreme God assumed different forms with the respective qualities of *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* — though that supreme God (before creation) is one only, without a second, and free from attributes. This above idea alone seems to be the intention of the poet when he uses the words, ‘*prāk sṛṣṭeh.*’

[170 cd – 171 ab]

“In the beginning, this world was only the self, in the shape of a person...” (*Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, 1.4.1)

“In the beginning, my dear, this was Being alone, one only without a second.” (*Chāndogya*, 6.2.1)

“He becomes transparent like water, one, the seer without duality. This is the world of Brahmā, Your Majesty.” (*Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, 4.3.32) “Brahman, indeed was this in the beginning. It knew itself only as — I am *Brahman.*” (*Ibid.*, 1.4.10)

Thus the poet reminds us of the *śruti* texts, referring to Brahman as non-dual (through the term ‘*kevala*’).

[171 cd - 172]

Even though the supreme God is said to assume different forms — owing to the presence of many attributes which are *aupādhika* (limiting adjuncts) — in an absolute sense, the supreme God (Brahman) has no relation at all to the attributes that are *aupādhika*. This idea has been brought out by the poet who is well-versed in the *śruti* (*Vedas*) and the *sūtras* (*Brahmasūtra*). The poet also considers that there is neither difference, nor superiority, nor inferiority, with regard to the

three forms (Brahmā, Viṣṇu and Śiva) of the supreme Brahman.

[173]

Thus, the great poet has thoroughly condemned the view of *bheda* (concept of difference) forcefully, here and elsewhere, (nay) — everywhere.

[174 - 181]

“That was but one form which divided itself in three ways. Their seniority or juniority is common (interchangeable); sometimes Śiva is prior to Viṣṇu or Viṣṇu to Śiva; sometimes Brahmā to them both; and sometimes the two to Brahmā.”

Thus, the poet himself has portrayed in the *Kumārasambhava* (VII. 44). He has also explicitly stated that though the three gods — Brahmā, Viṣṇu and Śiva — constitute really one supreme Deity [apparently three, really one only], having assumed (three) sportive forms (roles), they mutually attribute superiority of the other over themselves.

The poet has pointed out that Brahmā has described the greatness of Śiva as: “That God (Śiva) is the supreme spirit (*lit.* brightest lustre) reigning beyond the region of darkness (the quality of *tamas*); — he, the extent of whose prowess cannot be accurately gauged either by me or by Viṣṇu.” (*Kumārasambhava*, II. 55)

The poet clearly states (elsewhere) that God Śiva and Goddess Pārvatī bowed in reverence to Brahmā: — “With their marriage function thus performed by the family priest versed in the ceremonial, the two parents

of creation (Śiva and Pārvatī) bowed to the Creator, seated on a lotus.” (*Ibid.*, VII. 86)

“He honoured Brahmā with a nod of the head, Viṣṇu with spoken words, Indra with a smile, and the other gods with a mere look, according to seniority” (*Ibid.*, VII. 46) — thus the poet has mentioned about Śiva’s honouring the Deities — Brahmā, Viṣṇu, Indra and other gods in accordance with their respective seniority.

The poet also has noted that, “The primeval creator (Brahmā) and the God, bearing the mark Śrīvatsa (Viṣṇu), came incarnate to him, magnifying his glory with the words, “be victorious,” like fire with clarified butter.” So the poet, of vast erudition and wisdom, has referred to clearly that Brahmā and Viṣṇu worshipped Śiva with due honour hailing the latter with *jayokti* (proclamation of victory).

[182]

Thus, in the foregoing verses of the *Kumārasambhava*, the poet has established the supreme Vedic doctrine of Advaita and has refuted the concept of difference with regard to *Īśvara*. Refraining from the discussion on “*Trimūrti*,” let us pass on to the next verse (in our exposition).

[183]

Introductory remark

The poet wants to explain about Brahman, while delineating about creation in detail — resorting to the well-known principle of *adhyāropa-apavāda* [first developing a superimposition, and later refuting the same].

(2)

The Kumārasmbhava, II. 5:

Oh unborn One! Thou art glorified as the source of the universe — consisting of the movables and the immovables — which has sprung from the ever prolific seed which was borne by Thee in the midst of waters.

[184]

First Brahmā created water and then, through water, he created the world; so he is referred to be the cause of the world.

[185]

“He (desiring to produce beings of many kinds from his own body) first with a thought created the waters, and placed his seed in them. That seed became a golden egg, in brilliancy equal to the sun.” (*Manusmṛti*, I. 8-9).

[186]

Here the poet has thus endorsed the view of the *Manusmṛti*, with regard to the creation of water as the foremost one.

[187]

Even in the beginning of the *Śākuntala* (the drama), the poet (*viz.* the playwright) has referred to the foremost creation as “*yā sṛṣṭiḥ sraṣṭurādyā*” etc. This should be borne in mind by the exponents of Vedānta.

[188]

It is certain that all the Vedānta texts, that speak of the creation of the world, have their purport in propounding the real nature of Brahman. One should also note that the statements of poets which are on par with the *śruti* texts do convey the same conclusion, *viz.* the reality of Brahman alone (and nothing else).

(3)

The Kumārasambhava, II. 6:

Manifesting the greatness by Thy three conditions (*i.e.* the three forms), Thou alone hast come to be the cause of dissolution, maintenance and creation.

[189]

Brahman creates the world by the power of creation; it protects the world by the power of sustenance; and it annihilates the world by the power of destruction. So the one supreme Brahman is the ultimate cause of everything.

[190]

An entity is born at first, exists for sometime, and later on perishes; and this is the order of creation, sustenance and destruction.

[191]

The meaning of the *śruti* text “*yato vā imāni bhūtāni*” (*Taittirīya*, III. 1) *viz.* ‘from which (Brahman) these beings are born ...’ — is, indeed, seen in this world as the order of creation. Even the poet indicates

the same by the passage, “*namo viśvasrje pūrvam.*” (*Raghuvamśa*, X. 16)

[192]

(It may be asked:) why should the poet change the serial order as *pralaya* (annihilation), *sthiti* (preservation), and *sarga* (creation), instead of *sarga-sthiti-pralaya*, transcending the *śruti* injunction and popular verdict?

[193 - 194]

Let me analyse this and bring forth the intention of the poet presently. Originally the poet wanted to conform to the *śruti* tradition; and so he referred to it by “*namo viśvasrje ...*” — indicating creation of the beings first, then preservation, and then annihilation.

[195 - 196]

But, do we not come across — the existence of a thing after it is born; what exists, perishes later; and what dies is born once again? So one can understand the cyclic nature of the order. The poet has suggested the beginningless nature of the world using the terms ‘*pralaya-sthiti-sargāṇām*’ etc.

[197]

Even Lord Kṛṣṇa has stated in the *Gītā* (II. 27): “It is certain that one who dies is born once again,” and so the poet’s argument has the authority of the Lord’s proclamation with regard to the rebirth of the one who dies.

(to be continued)

BRAHMAN

यतो वा इमानि भूतानि जायन्ते
येन जातानि जीवन्ति,
यत्प्रयन्त्यभिसंविशन्ति,
तद्विजिज्ञासस्व, तद् ब्रह्मेति ॥

That, verily, from which these beings are born, that, by which, when born they live, that into which, when departing, they enter; That, seek to know. That is Brahman.

Taittirīyopaniṣad. III. 1. 1.

LORD ŚĪVA

या सृष्टिः स्रष्टुराद्या वहति विधिहुतं या हविर्या च होत्री
 ये द्वे कालं विधत्ताः श्रुतिविषयगुणा या स्थिता व्याप्य विश्वम् ।
 यामाहुः सर्वभूतप्रकृतिरिति यया प्राणिनः प्राणव्रन्तः
 प्रत्यक्षाभिः प्रपन्नस्तनुभिरवतु वस्ताभिरष्टाभिरीशः ।

May Īśa (the Lord), endowed with the eight visible forms, protect you! (the eight forms, *viz.*) 1. that which is the first creation of the Creator (*i.e.* Water), 2. that which conveys (to the gods) the oblation offered according to customary rites (*i.e.* Fire), 3. that which is the sacrificer, 4 and 5. those two that regulate time (*i.e.* the Sun and the Moon), 6. that which has sound for its quality and which pervades the universe (*i.e.* Ether), 7. that which they call the source of all seeds (*i.e.* the Earth), and 8. that by which creatures possess breath (*i.e.* Air).

Kālidāsa's *Abhijñānaśākuntala*, I. 1.

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संसाराध्वनि तापभानुकिरणप्रोद्भूतदाहव्यथा-
 खिन्नानां जलकाङ्क्षया मरुभुवि भ्रान्त्या परिभ्राम्यताम् ।
 अत्यासन्नसुधाम्बुधिं सुखकरं ब्रह्माद्वयं दर्शय-
 त्पेषा शङ्करभारती विजयते निर्वाणसन्दायिनी ॥

*saṁsārādhvani tāpabhānukiraṇaprodhbhūtadāhavyathā-
 khinnānāṁ jalakāṅkṣayā marubhuvi bhrāntyā
 paribhrāmyatām
 atyāsannasudhāmbudhiṁ sukhakaraṁ brahmādvayaṁ
 darśayatya-
 eṣā śaṅkarabhārati vijayate nirvāṇasandāyini.*

To those who are afflicted, in the way of the world, by the burning pain given rise to by the scorching sun-shafts of misery, and who through delusion wander about in the desert (of worldliness) seeking water — showing the felicitous ocean of nectar, which is very near, the non-dual *Brahman*, this — the Voice of Śaṅkara — is victorious, leading, as it does, to liberation.