


The VOICE of ŚĀNKAṚĀ

Volume SEVENTEEN
Number TWO



July

1992

esā śaṅkara-bhāratī vijagate
nirvāṇa-sandāyini

victorious is the voice of śaṅkara,
leading, as it does, to liberation

The Voice of Śaṅkara
is published under the guidance of
His Holiness Jagadguru Śrī Śaṅkarācārya
of Kāñcī Kāmakōṭi Pīṭha
by Ādi Śaṅkara Advaita Research Centre

Registered Office:

26, College Road,
Nungambakkam,
Madras-600 006.

Subscriptions are to be sent to:

The Administrative Officer,
Ādi Śaṅkara Advaita Research Centre,
26, College Road, Nungambakkam,
Madras-600 006.

Subscription Rates:

	Indian	Foreign
Annual	Rs. 60/-	US Dollars 20
For two years	Rs. 100/-	US Dollars 36
Life	Rs. 500/-	US Dollars 200
Single copy	Rs. 30/-	US Dollars 10

A HALF-YEARLY JOURNAL OF ADVAITA - VEDĀNTA

The VOICE of
ŚĀṆKARA

śāṅkara-bhāratī

Chairman, Advisory Board
V. R. Kalyanasundara Sastri

Editor
N. C. Krishnan

Volume SEVENTEEN
Number TWO

July

1992

ADVISORY BOARD

Chairman

Sri V. R. Kalyanasundara Sastri

Members

Dr. R. Balasubramanian

Dr. P. K. Sundaram

Dr. N. Gangadharan

Dr. V. K. S. N. Raghavan

Dr. S. S. Janaki

Editor

Dr. N. C. Krishnan

CONTENTS

	1 <i>Homage to Śaṅkara</i>
JAGADGURU ŚRĪ CANDRAŚEKHARENDRA SARASVATĪ	4 <i>Births too Welcome</i>
JAGADGURU ŚRĪ JAYENDRA SARASVATĪ	8 <i>Hinduism-I</i>
ŚRĪ ŚAṅKARA BHAGAVATPĀDA	14 <i>Praśnottara-ratnamālikā</i>
S. RANGANATH	21 <i>A Note on the Allusions Found in Śaṅkara's Śivānandalahari</i>
B. R. SHANTHAKUMARI	29 <i>The Interpretation of Scripture</i>
T. P. RAMACHANDRAN	44 <i>Advaita Psychology</i>
R. BALASUBRAMANIAN	57 <i>Peace through Self- Integration and Social-Integration</i>
T. M. P. MAHADEVAN	81 <i>Gaudapāda</i>
V. A. DEVA SENAPATI	109 <i>Govinda Bhagavatpāda</i>
N. RAMESAN	114 <i>Śaṅkara-Bhagavatpāda</i>
ŚRĪ ŚAṅKARA BHAGAVATPĀDA	123 <i>The Four Indispensable Qualifications</i>

<p><i>BHĀṢYABHĀVAṂĀ</i> <i>BRAHMAŚRĪ VARAHŪR</i> <i>KALYĀNASUNDARA</i> <i>ŚĀSTRĪ</i></p>	129	<p><i>'Na Karmanām Phalam</i> <i>Mokṣah'-2</i> <i>(in Sanskrit)</i></p>
	133	<p><i>Liberation is not the</i> <i>Result of Karma-II</i></p>
<p><i>ĀTMAVIDYĀBHŪṢAṂĀ</i> <i>V. S. V. GURUSVĀMĪ</i> <i>ŚĀSTRĪ</i></p>	141	<p><i>Mahākaveḥ Kālidāsasya</i> <i>Gītātrayam</i> <i>(in Sanskrit)</i></p>
<p><i>V. S. V. GURUSVĀMĪ</i> <i>ŚĀSTRĪ</i></p>	145	<p><i>"A Triad of Gītā"</i> <i>of Kālidāsa</i></p>

HOMAGE TO ŚAṆKARA

[150]

हस्ताम्बुजं शिरसि हेतुविहीनपूर्ण-
कारुण्यतोऽतितरसा विनिधाय मत्के ।
स्वाराज्यमाशु वितरात्मपदेऽभिषिच्य
श्रीशंकराय मम देहि पदावलम्बम् ॥

*hastāmbujam śirasi hetuvihīnapūrṇa-
kāruṇyato'titarasā vinidhāya matke
svārājyam-āśu vitarātmapade'bhiṣicya
śrīśaṅkarāya mama dehi padāvalambam.*

Oh Śrī Śaṅkara! out of your motiveless, excessive compassion, may you put your lotus-like hand on my head, thus coronate me on the pedestal of *Ātman*-hood and in this way offer me the ultimate Freedom at once. Hence, Oh Śaṅkara! kindly give me the support of your pair of lotus-like feet.

[151]

माता पिता च भगिनी तनुजश्च जाया
 नैवाश्रयाय पुरुषस्य भवन्ति काले ।
 एकं विना गुरुवराङ्घ्रिपयः प्रभूतं
 श्रीशंकरार्यं मम देहि पदावलम्बम् ॥

*mātā pitā ca bhagini tanujaśca jāyā
 naivāśrayāya puruṣasya bhavanti kāle
 ekam vinā guruvarāṅghripayaḥ prabhūtaṁ
 śrīśaṅkarārya mama dehi padāvalambam.*

Other than the profuse holy water that is got as the remnant of the ablution of the holy feet of one's great master — neither mother, nor father, nor sister, nor son, nor wife would be of any support to any person at the last moment. Therefore, Oh Śrī Śaṅkara kindly give me the support of your holy pair of lotus-like feet.

[152]

सम्प्राप्तयोगसरणिं सदसद्विवेक-
 दक्षं दमादिगुणसम्भृतमानसञ्च ।
 कृत्वा सरोजभवचित्तापयोजभानो
 श्रीशङ्करार्यं मम देहि पदावलम्बम् ॥

*samprāpta yogasaraṇiṁ sadasad-viveka-
 dakṣma damādiguṇa-sambhṛtamānasam ca
 kṛtvā sarojabhavacittapayojabhāno
 śrīśaṅkarārya mama dehi padāvalambam.*

Oh Śrī Śaṅkara! you shine like the sun that blossoms the lotus-like mind of the supreme lotus-born creator, Brahmā. May you make me (i) reach the path of *jñāna-yoga*, (ii) skilful in discriminating the real and unreal, and (iii) my mind endowed with sense-control, etc. (*śamadamaḍisādhana-sampat*). So, Oh Śrī Śaṅkara, give me the support of your pair of holy feet.

[153]

श्रीशङ्करेति सततं परिकीर्तयन्ति
 पादाम्बुजं परगुरोर्हृदि चिन्तयन्ति ।
 ये वै त एव सुखिनः पुरुषा हि लोके
 श्रीशङ्करार्यं मम देहि पदावलम्बम् ॥

śrīśaṅkareti satataṁ parikīrtayanti
pādāmbujam paraguror-hṛdi cintayanti
ye vai ta eva sukhinaḥ puruṣā hi loke
śrīśaṅkarārya mama dehi padāvalambam.

Oh Śrī Śaṅkara! indeed those persons — who chant incessantly your holy name, ‘Śrī Śaṅkara’, and who forever contemplate in their heart the lotus-feet of the great Master — Śrī Śaṅkara — alone ever blissful in this world. Hence, Oh Śrī Śaṅkara, prithee, give me the support of the pair of your lotus-feet.

Jagadguru Śrī Saccidānanda Śivābhinava Nṛsimhabhāratī
 in *Śrīśaṅkarācāryapadāvalambastava*

BIRTHS TOO WELCOME*

Jagadguru Śrī Candrasekharendra Sarasvatī

शास्त्रं शरीरमीमांसा देवस्तु परमेश्वरः ।
आचार्यः शङ्कराचार्यः सन्तु मे जन्मजन्मनि ॥

All Śāstras (scriptures) have been propounded to show the way to get rid of future births. But the *śloka* I have quoted above seems to contradict this universal desire to annul all future births. On the other hand, it seems to contain a prayer for any number of births in the future. But, the prayer also contains a three-fold condition. It says, "If, in every future birth, the sheet-anchor of my faith and understanding is the religion of the *Upaniṣads*, if the God I worship is Parameśvara Himself, if the Guru who will be my refuge is Śrī Śaṅkarācārya, it does not matter how many births, I am to take. May these three be granted to me in life after life."

* Courtesy: *Śaṅkara and Śaṅmata* — Souvenir published in the occasion of the conference on 'Śaṅkara and Śaṅmata' held at Madras during 1-6-'69 to 9-6-'69.

Regarding the qualifications of an Ācārya it has been laid down that he is one who teaches the meanings of the scriptures, puts them into practice himself, and establishes others in those disciplines.*

Our Ācārya traversed on foot all the 56 kingdoms of Bhāratadeśa and established the *advaita-tattva* as the final truth of Vedānta. Prior to him, the Sāṅkhyas propounded the theory of plurality of souls and denied a Paramātman. The Mīmāṃsakas, on the other hand, affirmed the superiority of observing Vedic rituals over *jñāna* (knowledge) as the means to *mokṣa* (Liberation). The Bauddhas said that there was no *satyavastu* (ultimate Reality). The Jains advanced the *sapta-bhaṅginaya* and adopted a shifting criterion of truth. Thus, there were as many as 72 schools of thought. When the Ācārya appeared on the scene, many of them were in conflict with one another. It was in this predicament that the *Īśāna* of *Sarva Vidyās* (Lord of Knowledge) took human form as Śaṅkarācārya.

It is worthy of note that, when Buddhism, Jainism, the Sāṅkhya, and the Mīmāṃsā systems of thought were prevalent and popular, in each case, the philosophies that were propounded prior to it, were still current. But after the advent of Ācārya, all the earlier systems lost their hold on the minds of the people, and Advaita Vedānta, taught in the *mahāvākyas* of the *Upaniṣads*, gained universal acceptance. Other schools of Vedānta that arose and are prevalent in particular

आचिनोति हि शास्त्राणि आचारे स्थापयत्यपि ।

स्वयमाचरते यस्मात् तस्मादाचार्य उच्यते ॥

parts of our country, are only small deviations of Advaita. To Śrī Śaṅkara belongs the distinction of having liquidated all other anterior systems, vaidic and avaidic alike. So conclusively convincing was the *Advaita-tattva*, which he established as *parama-tātparya* (the supreme import) of the *Upaniṣads*, that other thinkers willingly gave up their differing views, and acquiesced in it, whole-heartedly. Great philosophers of foreign countries too were attracted to it in such a measure, that they expressed their undisguised admiration of its sublimity.

It is remarkable that our Ācārya established the *Upaniṣad* "truth of Advaita" within the brief period when he was in his teens. This is a span of life very small compared to that of Sāyaṇācārya, who, treading the path of Śaṅkara, wrote his monumental Bhāṣyas (Commentaries) on all the *Vedas*, and also to that of many other posterior Ācāryas who promulgated one or the other of six paths of devotion proclaimed by our Ācārya in the form of *ṣaṅmata*, and thereby earning the distinction of being *ṣaṅmatasthāpanācārya* (the stabiliser of the six faiths).

Some Personal Observations

People generally feel relieved at giving expression to their sorrows before God. Let the question of God hearing their complaints and removing their sorrow stand. The very act of expressing their difficulties is like a cure to afflicted hearts. They seek after a place where they can feel the divine and unburden themselves.

God is all-prevalent. Divinity is imbedded in every speck of this universe. But the generality is not able to grasp it. They think that divinity is pronounced in certain places.

If people flock around me it is not because they assess my intrinsic merit. They think that divinity is easier of grasp to them through me. They carry their tales of woe to me in the belief that their petitions are heard by God. The believing spirits who hanker after consolation flock around me and open out their hearts. They are consoled to a great measure even while they open out their hearts. Will it be proper for me to discourage such people from approaching me for the simple reason that it eats into my rest? What am I here for? This life is meant only to hear the sorrows of people and console them. Be it night or day, this body is meant only to alleviate the sufferings of people. It does not matter if my body is impaired by meeting anguished people and consoling them for hours on end. Whatever happens to my body in this process, it is this which gives strength to my heart.

There is nothing to feel elated about on seeing the people worshipping me. But when I reflect that it is worship to the God, who they think is approachable through me, I feel glad that there are so many who believe in a compassionate God who will hear them and remove their misery. I am glad at the unreserved faith in God with which they vent out their difficulties. Whether I am godly or not, the faith of people in God which expresses itself on account of me overwhelms me. However much people seem to pester and bother me, it only cheers me, originating as it does on their trust in God. Nobody need stand between me and the suffering hearts, on the score that it tells upon me. Far from weakening me, it is my source of strength.

HINDUISM — I*

Jagadguru Śrī Jayandra Sarasvatī

1. *Who is a Hindu?*

One who wears a *vibhūti* (Tirunīṅṅu), *ūrdhvapuṅḍra* (Tirumaṅ and Śrīcūrṅam) on one's forehead is a Hindu. He adores the God of Fire. Even if he is an ascetic (*sannyāsin*), he has great regard for fire-worship. Many Hindus regard the river, the mountain, etc. which are the important features of Nature as adorable deities. May be the non-Hindus consider them to be scenic beauties creating aesthetic pleasure alone. The Hindu housewife wears ear-ring, *kuṅkumam* on forehead, etc. as auspicious symbols of chastity and as essential part of her marital life.

The Hindus consign the dead bodies to fire or bury them. Only a few dead bodies of very great personages are buried. It is believed that several people,

* Courtesy: *Amudamoli* — Śrī Rām Trust Publication, 145, Linghi Chetti Street, Madras-1, 1987, pp. 124-25; 148-50; 70-72. Free rendering in English: V. K. S. N. Raghavan.

after death, take rebirth to reap their respective fruits of *karma*. The Hindus believe that there are many paths to reach God. God is only one, though he may possess different forms. He is the only supreme Almighty, the basic and supreme support of all. God has different names like supreme Brahman and so on. Hindus have such a notion of God.

It is not possible to attribute just one colour, one taste, etc. to God. The electric current cannot be shown as such and such. But the electric power can be explained through an electric battery or heater, etc. Similarly God is to be intuitively experienced. One cannot give a pin-pointed reply to those who ask about God, whether He is black or red. In every place of worship one is required to follow a unique code of conduct. One should wear a particular white uniform and a fore-head mark, etc. One should not say that he has purity in mind, and so he can do whatever he likes. One should also possess cleanliness and physical purity as well. Whoever strictly adheres to the above disciplines is a Hindu.

2. *The Religious Experience of a Hindu*

Our land is a *punyabhūmi* (holy land). All villages, towns and cities here — throughout the length and breadth of India, from Kāśī to Rāmesvaram, Kashmir to Kanyākumari and Assam to Gujarat — are connected with religious importance in one way or the other. There are many holy rivers, sacred mountains and auspicious abodes of the supreme Deity. Therefore, on all accounts, they add to the sacredness of our holy land.

In ancient India, the temples of God had a pivotal role in the day-to-day life of people. Only very recently, people have begun to imitate the foreigners with regard to some customs and manners in their day-to-day activities. A Hindu strictly relies on God and religion for each and every activity. Almost near every Pipal tree, there is a temple of Lord Gaṇeśa. Even Pipal tree is said to be godly in nature. The ocean is held to be sacred and holy. The sea-bath is called holy bath and the water of the sea is reckoned to be sacred. Hindus regard many worldly things as supreme and godly.

Religious faith gives good health, and influences good human behaviour. We should impart universal religious faith to all the children at the early age. Belonging to a political party should not compel people to follow a particular religion, culture etc. So we should ever hold on to our Hindu religious faith and contribute to the welfare of human society as a whole. If we disregard our religion, only we would be in great danger. The places of worship, *viz.* temples of God are built only for the sake of human welfare and progress. We should go to the temples and participate in the religious festivals celebrated therein. With such a noble cause, these temples have been consecrated in our holy land, several centuries earlier. Huge rock temples and granite statues have been consecrated in many important places worship for the sake of public awareness and public utility alone. So, we should go to the abodes of Gods every now and then, perform the religions duties regularly, and teach young children the proper way of religious life. Conducting religion-classes, and celebrating important

religious festivals will go a long way in contributing to social harmony and human unity and integration.

3. *The Rāmāyaṇa*

In India, the *Rāmāyaṇa* of Sage Vālmīki and the *Mahābhārata* of Sage Vedavyāsa are highly extolled as the two eyes of people, for they guide the people how to live in this world. Both the epics instruct us to follow *Dharma* (righteousness) and *Nyāya* (justice). The *Rāmāyaṇa* portrays the chastity of Śrī Sītā, and the *Mahābhārata* points out the steadfast *dharma* followed by the Queen Draupadī. These epics show us that *adharma* (unrighteousness) *anyāya* (injustice) would eventually come to an end, and would never hold good. Of course, Goddess Śrī Sītā and Queen Draupadī were not of human origin. They had divine birth from Mother Earth and God of Fire respectively. They are *anaghā* and *anavadyā* (free from sins and blemishes). It is said that both of them are *prātarvandaniyā* (worth remembering everyday at dawn)* and their remembrance cleanses us even from heinous sins (*mahāpātaka-nāśanam*).

Each and every character in the *Rāmāyaṇa* instructs us at least one moral. Lord Śrī Rāma, though He is the supreme Being, shows us how to live as a perfect human being, for He has led the life of an ideal man with *mātr̥bhakti*, *pit̥rbhakti* and *gurubhakti* (an ardent devotion to mother, father and teachers), and strict adherence to the wishes of his parents. Śrī Rāma declares that he is ever ready to fulfil the wishes of his parents without any delay.

*Cf. अहल्या द्रौपदी सीता तारा मन्दोदरी तथा ।
पञ्चकं ना क्षरेन्नित्यं महापातकनाशनम् ॥

Śrī Lakṣmaṇa (in the Rāmāyaṇa) is found to lead a life of permanent service to Lord Rāma alone. Bharata is also completely free from any desire to rule the kingdom; and he requests Rāma to give his sandals; and finally he looks after the kingdom after the coronation of Rāma's sandals (*Pādukās*) as the Ruler. Goddess Śrī Sītā invariably follows Rāma as His shadow and accompanies him doing affectionate service to her Lord. Even Guha — the boatman and hunter-chief loves Rāma ineffably and thus attracts the attention of all citizens. Lord Rāma, indeed, says, "Guha is my fifth brother."* Lord Āñjaneya serves Śrī Rāma; and so Śrī Hanumān got the titles of Bhakta Āñjaneya and Vīra Āñjaneya — ever loving and contemplating upon Śrī Rāma alone.

Even though the vulture-chieftain Jaṭāyu was fatally wounded by Rāvaṇa, Jaṭāyu conveys Śrī Rāma about his fight with Rāvaṇa and about the abduction of Śrī Sītā by Rāvaṇa. "One should be ready to sacrifice one's life itself for the sake of friends" — this is the moral exemplified by Jaṭāyu. "Taking refuge under the supreme Lord will secure us all benefits" — is the lesson imparted by Vibhīṣaṇa, the Rākṣasa chief who took shelter under the feet of Lord Śrī Rāma.

We know that Rāvaṇa was a great Śiva-bhakta. All gods became slaves of Rāvaṇa. Nevertheless

*Cf. *Kambarāmāyaṇam*, Yuddhakāṇḍam, (Vibhīṣaṇaśara-
nāgati):

குகனொடும் ஐவரானேம் முன்பு; பின்குன்று தழ்வான்
மகனொடும் அறுவர் ஆனேம்; எம் முழை அன்பின் வந்த
அகனமர் காதல் ஐய! நின்னொடும் எழுவர் ஆனேம்;
புகல் அருங் கானம்தந்து, புதல்வரால் பொலிந்தான்

நுந்தை"

Rāvaṇa committed the heinous sin of wooing Goddess Śrī Sītā. Therefore he himself was the cause of destruction.

The *Rāmāyaṇa* is a great guide to the world at large. We should always imbibe the virtues of Śrī Rāma and thoroughly abandon the vices of Rāvaṇa. Even though all gods and celestial beings extolled Śrī Rāma, the latter declared that he follows *dharma* to be a model to all people in the world. He said:

“ आत्मानं मानुषं मन्ये ”

[I consider myself only as a human being.] Without giving any distortion to the contents of the epics, we should propagate the *Rāmāyaṇa* and the *Mahābhārata* throughout the world.

PRAŚNOTTARA-RATNAMĀLIKĀ*

Śrī Śaṅkara Bhagavatpāda

[1]

कः खलु नालङ्क्रियते
दृष्टादृष्टार्थसाधनपटीयान् ।
अमुया कण्ठस्थितया
प्रश्नोत्तररत्नमालिकया ॥

Inasmuch as one wears this *garland of questions and answers* on one's shoulders, one gets adequately adorned; for this garland makes one know all the seen and unseen objects very clearly.

[2]

भगवन् किमुपादेयं
गुरुवचनं हेयमपि च किमकार्यम् ।
को गुरुरधिगततत्त्वः
शिष्यहितायोद्यतः सततम् ॥

* Courtesy: *Śaṅkara and Śaṅmata* — Souvenir, Madras, 1969.

Sir! what is worth being learnt? The words of the master. What is to be abhorred? The prohibited deeds (pointed out by scriptures and teachers). Who is a good teacher? One who has known the truth and who takes care of the spiritual welfare of his disciples.

[3]

त्वरितं किं कर्तव्यं
 विदुषां संसारसंततिच्छेदः ।
 किं मोक्षतरोर्बीजं
 सम्यग्ज्ञानं क्रियासिद्धम् ॥

What should the wise do at once? The wise should at once untie the knot of the *samsāra* (bondage). What is the seed of the tree of *mokṣa*? The true knowledge that is ever purposeful.

[4]

कः पथ्यतरो धर्मः
 कः शुचिरिह यस्य मानसं शुद्धम् ।
 कः पण्डितो विवेकी
 किं विषमवधीरणा गुरुषु ॥

What has a soothing effect? The performance of righteous deeds (*dharma*). Who is pure here? One whose mind is pure. Who is a pundit (learned person)? One who is a *vivekī* (the realised soul). Which is poison? To insult the elders and preceptors (or disobedience to elders).

[5]

किं संसारे सारं
 बहुशोऽपि विचिन्त्यमानमिदमेव ।
 किं मनुजेष्विष्टतमं
 स्वपरहितायोद्यतं जन्म ॥

What is the essence of life? Whole-hearted meditation upon the supreme Being always. What should a man desire most? A life of dedication fully useful (beneficial) to one and all.

[6]

मदिरेव मोहजनकः
 कः स्नेहः के च दस्यवो विषयाः ।
 का भववल्ली तृष्णा
 को वैरी यस्त्वनुद्योगः ॥

What is it that deludes one like wine? Attachment. Who are the thieves? The worldly objects (of sense). What is the binding rope of *samsāra*? Unquenchable desire. Who is the real culprit (enemy)? Idleness (indolence).

[7]

कस्माद्भयमिह मरणा-
 दन्धादिह को विशिष्यते रागी ।
 कः शूरो यो ललना-
 लोचनबाणैर्न च व्यथितः ॥

Of which are people afraid? The people are afraid of death. Who is more blind than the blind? One who is slave to desires. Who is full of valour? One who guards oneself from vices (who is not shot by the arrows of cupid).

[8]

पातुं कर्णाञ्जलिभिः
 किममृतमिह युज्यते सदुपदेशः ।
 किं गुरुताया मूलं
 यदेतदप्रार्थनं नाम ॥

What kind of nectar should one drink by the ears? Good advice (given by elders and preceptors). What is the main basis of greatness? Asking of no favours.

[9]

किं गहनं स्त्रीचरितं
 कश्चतुरो यो न खण्डितस्तेन ।
 किं दुःखमसंतोषः
 किं लाघवमधमतो याञ्जा ॥

What is ununderstandable (highly secret)? Women's character. Who is intelligent? One who is not condemned by womenfolk. What is misery? To be rid of contentment. What is lowliness? To beg the mean people.

[10]

किं जीवितमनवद्यं
 किं जाड्यं पाठतोऽप्यनभ्यासः ।
 को जागर्ति विवेकी
 का निद्रा मूढता जन्तोः ॥

What is a noble living? To be free from faults (infamy). What is dullness (mediocrity)? Learning which is not put into practice constitutes dullness. Who is always awake? One who has gained the knowledge of discrimination (*viveka*). What is sleep? Ignorance of human beings is sleep.

[11]

नलिनीदलगतजलवत्
 तरलं किं यौवनं धनं चायुः ।
 कथय पुनः के शशिनः
 किरणसमाः सज्जना एव ॥

Which is unstable like the water-drop on a lotus-leaf? Youth, wealth and age. Tell me please: who are pleasing as the rays of the moon? Only the great men.

[12]

को नरकः परवशता
 किं सौख्यं सर्वसङ्गविरतिर्या ।
 किं सत्त्वं भृतहितं
 प्रियं च किम्प्राणिनामसवः ॥

What is hell? To be dependent on others. What is happiness? Renunciation of all attachments. What is goodness? To be kind to all beings. What is lovable? The lives of all beings.

[13]

कोऽनर्थफलो मानः
 का सुखदा साधुजनमैत्री ।
 सर्वव्यसनविनाशे
 को दक्षः सर्वथा त्यागी ॥

What results in dire consequences? Pride (haughtiness). What contributes to real happiness? Company of great men. Who is skilful in getting rid of all miseries? One who renounces everything.

[14]

किं मरणं मूर्खत्वं किञ्चानर्घं यदवसरे दत्तम् ।
 आमरणात्किं शल्यं प्रच्छन्नं यत्कृतं पापम् ॥

Which is worse than death? Foolishness. What is precious? A timely help (gift). What hurts one's conscience till death? A sin committed on the sly.

[15]

कुत्र विधेयो यत्नो
 विद्याभ्यासे सदौषधे दाने ।
 अवधीरणा क्व कार्या
 खलपरयोषित्परधनेषु ॥

For what is endeavour worthwhile? Education, charity, and health. Which persons and objects should one carefully avoid? The wicked persons, wives of others, and riches of others.

[16]

काहर्निशमनुचिन्त्या
 संसारासारता न तु प्रमदा ।
 का प्रेयसी विधेया
 करुणा दीनेषु सज्जने मैत्री ॥

What should one remember day and night? Ephemeral nature of worldly life, but not a woman at all. What should be made the object of endearment? Mercy towards the helpless and the friendship of good and pious men.

[17]

कण्ठगतैरप्यसुभिः
 कस्य ह्यात्मा न शक्यते जेतुम् ॥
 मूर्खस्य शङ्कितस्य च
 विषादिनो वा कृतघ्नस्य ॥

Who cannot turn their minds into the right path, even if their lives are at stake? The scoundrels, the ever-doubting, the pessimists, and the ungrateful persons.

(to be continued)

A NOTE ON THE ALLUSIONS FOUND IN
ŚAṆKARA'S ŚIVĀNANDALAHARĪ

*S. Ranganath**

The *Śivānandalaharī* and the *Saundaryalaharī* are the two beautiful poems of Śrī Śaṅkarācārya. Both of them have one hundred stanzas each, and have their own philosophic approach. An attempt has been made herein to bring out the significance of some of the allusions found in the *Śivānandalaharī*. The stanzas considered for this purpose are: 23, 31, 37, 63, 65, 73, 85 and 89.

Stanza 23

करोमि त्वत्पूजां सपदि सुखदो मे भव विभो
विधित्वं विष्णुत्वं दिशसि खलु यस्याः फलमिति ।
पुनश्च त्वां द्रष्टुं दिवि भुवि वहन् पक्षिमृगताम्
अदृष्ट्वा तत्खेदं कथमिह सहे शङ्कर विभो ॥'

* Professor of Sanskrit, NMKRV College for Women, Jayanagar, Bangalore-11.

Oh, all pervading One, unto me who am engaged in thy worship, vouchsafe eternal bliss at once. How could I possibly bear the grief, if, as a result of thy worship, thou bestowest on me the position of Brahmā or Viṣṇu, and still I fail to find thee in heaven or earth after searching for thee as a bird and a beast?²

Here the allusion is to the episode in the *Purāṇas* — of Brahmā and Viṣṇu taking the form of a Swan and a Boar respectively and going up and down to find out the extremities of Śiva who appeared as a tower of light. Both of them failed in their effort to discover the limits of divine glory. This allusion reveals the truth that divine glory is limitless.

Stanza 31

नालं वा परमोपकारकमिदं त्वेकं पशूनां पते
 पश्यन् कुक्षिगतान् चराचरगणान् बाह्यस्थितान् रक्षितुम् ।
 सर्वामर्त्यपलायनौषधमतिज्वालाकरं भीकरं
 निक्षिप्तं गरलं गले न गलितं नोद्गीर्णमेव त्वया ॥³

O thou master of all souls, in order to protect the living and the non-living beings that are within and without thee, thou didst neither swallow nor vomit but retained in thy throat, that terrible flaming poison which scared away all the celestials. Is it not this one supreme act of service enough to establish thy greatness?⁴

Here the allusion is regarding the churning of the ocean by the Devas and Asuras, using the serpent Vāsuki as the churning cord, and mount Mandara as

the churning rod. In the course of the churning emerged the deadly poison Kālakūṭa which threatened to destroy the worlds. It was only Śiva who could swallow it and thus save the worlds.

This allusion reveals the truth of the nature of great men. परोपकारार्थं हि सतां विभूतयः or परोपकारार्थमिदं शरीरम् ।

Stanza 37

आम्नायाम्बुधिमादरेण सुमनस्सङ्घाः समुद्यन्मनो
मन्थानं दृढभक्तिरञ्जुसहितं कृत्वा मथित्वा ततः ।
सोमं कल्पतरुं सुपर्वसुरभिं चिन्तामणिं धीमतां
नित्यानन्दसुधां निरन्तरमासौभाग्यमातन्वते ॥⁶

Just as the Devas churned the ocean and obtained Soma, the wish-fulfilling tree, the cow of plenty, the magic gem, nectar and Lakṣmī, so the wise men churn the ocean of *Vedas*, using their virtuous mind as the rod and firm devotion as the rope-string and obtain thee, who art in union with divine mother; thee — who fulfillest all wants like the wish-yielding tree and the cow of plenty, who grantest all desires like the magic gem, who conferest perpetual bliss on the wise like nectar, and who givest liberation like Lakṣmī.⁶

Here again, the allusion is to the Purāna story about the churning of the ocean by Devas and Asuras. The many rare things that came up in the course of the churning are referred to here. The practice of devotion to Śiva and its fruits are compared to this episode and the results got from it.

Stanza 63

मार्गावर्तितपादुका पशुपतेरंगस्य कूर्चायते
 गण्डुषांबुनिषेचनं पुररिपोर्दिव्याभिषेकायते ।
 किञ्चिद्भक्षितमांसशेषकवलं नव्योपहारायते
 भक्तिः किं न करोत्यहो वनचरो भक्तावतंसायते ॥'

A worn-out footwear becomes the indicator betwixt Śiva's eye-brows; the pouring of the water carried in the mouth becomes His sacred bath; a piece of meat, a part of which has been bitten off, takes the place of fresh food-offering; and the erstwhile hunter becomes the best of devotees; what is there that the love of God cannot accomplish?'

Here the allusion is the story of Kaṇṇappa, the wild hunter who by the Lord's grace became the prince of devotion in a moment. He knew none of the scriptural forms of worship, and so he made offerings to Śiva's image in his own wild fashion. When he found that the eyes of the image were bleeding, he pulled out his own eyes and placed them in their place. Since he would have no eye-sight himself when placing the second eye he marked the proper place beforehand with his worn-out sandal.

This allusion highlights the supreme devotion of a devotee towards the Lord.

Stanza 65

वक्षस्ताडनशङ्कया विचलितो वैवस्वतो निर्जराः
 कोटीरोज्ज्वलरत्नदीपकलिका नीराजनं कुर्वते ।

दृष्ट्वा मुक्तिवधूस्तनोति निभृताश्लेषं भवानीपते
यच्चेतस्तव पादपद्मभजनं तस्येह किं दुर्लभम् ?⁹

O Lord of Bhavāni, whosoever worships thy lotus feet, from him the god of death runs away fearing another kick at the chest; him the immortals adore by performing the light-waving ceremony with the gems of lamplike brilliance studding their crowns; him the damsel of liberation holds in her tight embrace; for him what is there difficult of achievement in the three worlds?¹⁰

Here, the allusion is to Mārkaṇḍeya who was saved by Śiva from the God of Death. It is implied that Śiva is equally merciful towards all devotees and so the God of Death should beware, knowing that a devotee is deathless in Spirit.

This Mārkaṇḍeya allusion makes us remember the following Subhāṣita:

वज्रादपि कठोराणि मृदूनि कुसुमादपि ।
लोकोत्तराणां चेतांसि को नु विज्ञातुमर्हति ॥

which incidentally occurs in the drama, the *Uttara-rāmacarita* of Bhavabhūti wherein he acclaims एको रसः करुण एव ।

Stanza 73

भूदारतामुदवहयदपेक्षया श्री-
भूदार एव किमतस्सुमते लभस्व ।

केदारमाकलितमुक्तिमहौषधीनां
पादारविन्दभजनं परमेश्वरस्य ॥¹¹

O my good mind, may you worship the lotus feet of Śiva that constitutest the well watered field, yielding the valuable herbs of liberation desired by you — the field for the attainment of which even Vishnu, the husband of Śrī and the Goddess of earth, took the form of a Boar.¹²

This allusion again goes back to the first allusion discussed earlier in this note (Stanza-23).

The allusion refers to the Purānic story of Brahmā and Vishnu starting to find out the head and feet of Śiva respectively. Brahmā took the form of a Swan and flew up, while Vishnu took the form of a Boar and burrowed down. Both of them are said to have failed to find their goals.

Stanza 85

जलधिमथनदक्षो नैव पातालभेदी
न च वनमृगयायां नैव लुब्धः प्रवीणः ।
अशनकुसुमभूषावस्त्रमाख्यां सपर्यां
कथय कथमहं ते कल्पयानीन्दुमौले ॥¹³

O the crescent crested Lord, I am not skilled in churning of the ocean. I cannot penetrate into the nether worlds, I am not a hunter skilled in chase. Pray tell me, how shall I therefore, perform thy worship, which consists in offering food, dress, ornaments, clothes and the rest?¹⁴

Here, the allusion is to the various habits and performances associated with Śiva in Hindu Mythology. When the milky ocean was churned, of the many things that came out of it, Śiva drank the poison Kālakūṭa and wore the moon on his matted locks. Serpents are his ornaments; they can be secured only from their home, the nether world. In one of his aspects, he is pictured as wearing the elephant skin. The devotee confesses his incapacity to procure these rare things for the Lord.

Kālidāsa refers to the appearance of Śiva in his *Kumārasambhava* as

विभूषणोद्भासि पिनद्धमोगि वा गजाजिनालंबि दुकूलधारि वा ।¹⁵

Stanza 89

नतिभिर्नुतिभिस्त्वमीशपूजा-
विधिभिर्ध्यानसमाधिभिर्न तुष्टः ।
धनुषा मुसलेन चाश्मभिर्वा
वद ते प्रीतिकरं तथा करोमि ॥¹⁶

O Lord of the worlds, thou wert not so pleased with prostration, praise, worship, meditation and ecstasy as well as the offering of resistance to thee with bow. Say what is it that pleases thee, and I shall do accordingly.¹⁷

Here the allusion is to Arjuna's encounter with Śiva as a hunter. Arjuna was performing worship and austerities with great concentration in order to propitiate Śiva, but before he revealed Himself, He appeared before Arjuna as a hunter and fought with him. At

that time, Arjuna hit him with his bow. As if more pleased with this, than his austerities Śiva revealed Himself to Arjuna.

Based on this Śiva-Arjuna encounter Bhāravi has written a whole Mahākāvya namely, *Kirātārjunīyam*, which is considered as one of the five Mahākāvyas where Śiva presents पाशुपतास्त्र to अर्जुन being pleased with his valour,

Thus, a study of the allusions in Śaṅkara's Śivānandalaharī is thought-provoking and useful. Here, this note is only an eye-opener in that direction and by no means it is an exhaustive and a comprehensive study.

NOTES

1. *Śrī Śaṅkara Granthāvali*, Volume II, Vani Vilas Press, Srirangam, Fourth edition, 1972, p. 28.

2. *Śivānandalaharī or the Inundation of Divine Bliss* of Śaṅkarācārya, Translation and transliteration with notes by Swami Tapasyananda, Sri Ramakrishna Math, Mylapore, Madras-4, First edition, 1985, p. 19.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 26.

10. *Ibid.*, p. 59.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 26.

11. *Ibid.*, p. 65.

5. *Ibid.*, pp. 31-32

12. *Ibid.*, p. 66.

6. *Ibid.*, p. 32.

13. *Ibid.*, p. 75.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 57.

14. *Ibid.*, p. 75.

8. *Ibid.*, p. 57.

15. *Ibid.*, p. 78.

9. *Ibid.*, p. 59.

16. *Ibid.*, pp. 78-79.

17. *The Kumārasambhava of Kālidāsa*, edited with various readings by Vasudev Laxman Shastri Pansikar, Seventh edition, Nirnaya Sagara Press, Bombay, 1917, p. 95.

THE INTERPRETATION OF SCRIPTURE

*B. R. Shanthakumari**

1. *The Importance of Scripture*

According to Advaita, there are six means of knowledge (*pramāṇas*). They are: perception (*pratyakṣa*) inference (*anumāna*), scripture or verbal testimony (*śabda*), similarity (*upamāna*), postulation (*arthāpatti*), and non-cognition (*anupalabdhi*). Of all these means, primary importance is given to verbal testimony. With regard to matters non-empirical or spiritual, scripture alone is the final authority. It has trans-empirical validity (*pāramārthika-prāmānya*), because it is free from error (*viparyaya*) and is super-human in origin (*apauruṣeya*). In Advaita there is, therefore, a clear dichotomy with regard to the scope and function of the means of knowing. Except scripture, all the other five *pramāṇas* have only empirical validity (*vyāvahārika-prāmānya*).

* Senior Research Fellow, Śrī Aurobindo School of Eastern and Western Thought, Pondicherry University, Pondicherry.

2. Principles of Interpretation

In interpreting the scripture and elucidating it, purport, the Advaitin employs six criteria (*ṣaḍ-tātparyaliṅga*). The interpretation of the import of the *mahāvākyas* "requires a searching analysis of the contents of the *Upaniṣads*." According to Advaita, "the real teaching is (1) that which is set forth in the initial passage and reaffirmed in the concluding passage (*upākrama* and *upasāmhāra*), (2) which is repeatedly declared (*abhyāsa*), (3) which is novel (*apūrvā*), that is to say, which is not within the reach of the ordinary sources of valid knowledge like perception or inference, (4) which holds out the highest and really abiding reward (*phalam*) of the realisation of Brahman and release from all bondage, (5) which is borne out by frequent glorification (*arthavāda*), and (6) which is rendered probable to reason by means of analogies (*upapatti*)."² Applying these six tests, the Advaitin concludes that identity of the soul and Brahman (*jīva-brahma-aikya*) is the import of the *Upaniṣads*. According to Maṇḍana, the dissolution of the world is taught by scripture (*prapañcasya pravilayaḥ śabdena pratipādyate*). Śaṅkara declares that the negation of the world of diversity, conjured up due to ignorance is taught by the *Upaniṣads* (*avidyā-kalpita-bheda-nivṛtti-paratvāt sāstrasya*). With the annihilation of plurality, the non-dual Truth is simultaneously realised.

3. Kinds of Meaning

Advaita recognises two kinds of meaning — the primary and the secondary meaning. (a) The primary meaning (*mukhyārtha*) is directly known through the application of the four essential conditions for significant combination. But when the primary meaning

is contradicted by another *pramāṇa* (*pramāṇa-bādha*) and is inappropriate, the secondary or figurative meaning is instead adopted; e.g. "He is a lion among men," does not mean that the person has a mane, whiskers and claws similar to that of a lion; but implies that the person is courageous and endowed with leadership abilities. (b) The secondary or implied meaning (*lakṣyārtha*) is resorted to in three ways. (i) In exclusive implication (*jahallakṣaṇā*) the primary meaning is entirely dropped due to contradiction by perception, e.g. "The village on the Gaṅgā." Since a village cannot exist on a flowing river, the secondary meaning of "Gaṅgā," "The village on (the bank of) the Gaṅgā," is instead adopted. (ii) In non-exclusive implication (*ajahal-lakṣaṇā*), e.g. "The red is running," the primary meaning of "red" is retained, but it is supplemented by the secondary meaning, to imply that "The red (horse) is running." (iii) In exclusive-non-exclusive implication (*jahad-ajahal-lakṣaṇā*), e.g. "This is that Devadatta," a part of the primary meaning of "Devadatta" is given up and a part of it is retained. Hence the name "*bhāga-tyāga-lakṣaṇā*." The incompatible determinants — time, place and context qualifying "this" and "that" of the one and the same Devadatta — are dropped, and his individuality alone (*vyakti-mātra*) or identity which is the purport (*tātparya*) of the sentence is retained. "This is that Devatta" is a secular example, whereas "*tat tvam asi*" is a scriptural statement.

According to Advaita, the well-known *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* text proclaims "There is no plurality whatever here" ("*na iha nānāsti kiñcana*").³ But all scriptural texts do not declare non-duality. Some passages teach the existence of plurality as well as creation of the

universe. Although the *Upaniṣads* teach creation yet they do not declare that creation is real. They also teach the illusory nature of manifoldness and non-duality of the self. This latter teaching will become meaningless, if creation were real. Therefore, the true aim of the *Upaniṣads* is to be seen here. Only if creation is interpreted as illusory (*māyā-mātra*), will the Upaniṣadic teaching be intelligible; it will otherwise be meaningless. But no Upaniṣadic statement is superfluous or meaningless. The postulated purport of the *Upaniṣads* must, therefore, be established through inquiry and reason. The creation texts are only a device (*upāya*) preliminary to the true teaching of the non-dual reality.' They teach origination of things to comfort those who fear the doctrine of non-origination, and believe that objects really exist because they are perceived and are practically useful in daily life. The intention of these texts is to rescue the deluded souls and enable them to pursue the right path, following which, they can reach the realm of truth which is unborn (*ajāti*).⁹ Advaita maintains that the aim of creation texts is not to teach creation, but only to indicate non-duality indirectly. All contradictions that we may come across in the *Upaniṣads* are therefore only apparent and not real.

Scriptural passages declaring difference (*bheda-vākyas*) too should be interpreted in the figurative sense. Śaṅkara observes that the primary sense of difference for the *bheda-vākyas* does not stand rational analysis. They are only restatements of the duality perceived by the souls due to ignorance.⁹

According to Śaṅkara, *bheda-vākyas* lack novelty, because they only repeat what occurs commonly in

ordinary experience; and are not sought as a human end. Śaṅkara gives two examples of figurative usage— (i) “He cooks food”, and (ii) the difference between ether-at-large (*mahākāśa*) and pot-ether (*ghaṭākāśa*). The word “food” does not mean food in the primary sense but figuratively implies the rice-grains which become food on being cooked. Likewise the initial description of the distinction made by the *Upaniṣads* between the individual soul (*ghaṭākāśa*) and the supreme reality (*mahākāśa*) is only apparent and figurative, because the identity of these is subsequently declared.

4. *Classification of Sentences*

A *pramāṇa* is a special source of knowledge (*asādhāraṇa kāraṇam pramāṇam*). According to Advaita, a *pramāṇa* is that which conveys knowledge characterised by unsublatability (*abādhitatva*) and novelty (*apūrvatā*) (*anadhigatatva*), and which cannot be got through another means of knowledge (*abūdhita-viṣayaka-jñānam pramāṇam, pramā-kāraṇam pramāṇam*). Therefore, passages which convey neither novelty nor utility, cannot be purportful. According to Advaita, texts which convey identity, non-difference (*abheda*) or non-duality (*advaita*) alone are purportful, because identity or non-duality is novel and cannot be attained through any other means of knowledge; perception and conception cannot know the self. Knowledge got through the *mahāvākyas* can be destroyed only by a *pramāṇa* greater than it. But there is no *pramāṇa* greater than the *Vedas*, according to Advaita. Moreover, realisation of the identity (of the self and Brahman), is regarded as the highest human value (*paramapurusaṛtha*) as well. Therefore, Advaita declares that the final purport of the *Vedas* is conveyed only by the *mahāvākyas*. In the

hierarchy of Vedic statements, the *mahāvākyas* which are identity judgements are hence accorded the foremost place. Lower than these in significance are the creation texts describing the origination of things. The texts of the *karma-kāṇḍa* of the *Vedas* occupy the lowest position.

Advaita classifies all meaningful sentences (*vākyas*) under two broad heads.

(1) Sentences which are relational in meaning (*bhedasamsarga*): e.g. "(You) bring the cow (here) using a stick." The relation (*samsarga*) between the words constituting the sentence conveys difference (*bheda*) — between the agent or subject (you), the object (cow), instrument (stick) etc., which are different from one another. The relational meaning of the sentence conveys difference.

(2) Sentences which are non-relational in meaning (*abheda-samsarga*). These are of two types.

(a) Non-difference is conveyed by the relation between the words of the sentence (*samsarga-abheda*), e.g. "This lily is big, blue and fragrant." The "lily" is the logical subject of the three attributed predicates "big, blue and fragrant." Although the connotations of the three predicates are different, they yet denote one and the same logical subject "lily".

(b) Identity or individuality alone (*vyaktimātra*) is the purport (*tātparya*) of the sentence in identity judgments (*svarūpa-abheda*). e.g. "This is that Devadatta". There is no relation whatsoever involved in this statement. On

this model, identity of the self and Brahman is elicited as the purport of the *mahāvākyas*, e.g. “*tat tvam asi.*”

Another classification of meaningful statements is also possible.

(1) Sentences which are relational in meaning (*samsargāvagāhi-vākyas*) include those exhibiting subject-predicate, whole-part, cause-effect, spatial and temporal relations etc. For example, consider the following statements:

“Rose is red.” (subject-predicate relation).

“He ate half of the apple.” (whole-part relation)

“This pot is made of clay.” (cause-effect relation)

“The pot is in this room.” (spatial relation)

“He came here yesterday.” (temporal relation)

(2) Identity judgements (*akhaṇḍārtha-vākyas*) whose purport is identity alone exhibit no relation whatsoever; e.g. “This is that Devadatta” is a secular statement, whereas “*tat tvam asi*” is a Vedic proposition. According to Advaita, *akhaṇḍārtha-vākyas* are very important, for they constitute the ultimate aim of the *Upaniṣads*. In arriving at their unitary purport, Advaita employs *bhāga-tyāga-lakṣaṇā*.

5. *Stages in the Interpretation of the Mahāvākya*

The identification of Ātman and Brahman conveyed by the text “*tat tvam asi*” needs much exegetical analysis. Both in intention and execution, the statement represents the spirit of Vedāntic scholasticism. It strengthens itself by affirming that self-realisation as described in the *Upaniṣads* alone can emancipate the

soul from ignorance, and that a rejection of the scriptures on the basis of exclusive rationalism is untenable and ill-conceived. The immediate experience of the import of the *mahāvākya*s is the consummation of all spiritual endeavour.

There are three stages in the interpretation of the *mahāvākya* "tat tvam asi," occurring in the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*.

(1) In the first stage of *sāmānādhikarānya*, the identity of "that" ("tat") and "thou" ("tvam") is indicated by bringing them into grammatical co-ordination with one another. There is a syntactical apposition (*sāmānādhikarānya*) between the two terms whose denotations are different, but whose connotation is the same. The word "that" denotes *sat* or Brahman, the changeless Absolute (which is the substratum of the universe), the metaphysical Truth which is non-dual and infinite. The term also indicates that it is something mediately known and remote transcending experience. The word "thou" implies the self, immanent in the mind of the person hearing the *mahāvākya*. It also denotes the most immediate and self-luminous pure consciousness characterised by the imperfections and finitude of phenomenal life. The verb "is" ("asi") puts the two words in grammatical co-ordination and appositional relation with one another.

(2) In the second stage of *viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣyatā-jñāna*, the meaning of "that" is qualified by the meaning of "thou" and vice-versa. Therefore "self-hood" is attributed to Brahman, and Brahman-hood is attributed to the self. The primary meaning of the words "that" and "thou" do not convey identity, because they are

two entities characterised by two sets of incompatible determinants. The self (*jīva*) and God (*Īśvara*) are limited by adventitious adjuncts (*upādhis*), and are therefore qualified entities (*sopādhika tattvas*). The parviscient self (*jīva*) is pure consciousness characterised by *avidyā* (*avidyā-upahita-caitanya*). God or *Īśvara* is pure consciousness qualified by *māyā* (*māyā-viśiṣṭa-caitanya*).

According to Advaita, the soul and God are not attributes of Brahman. Advaita declares that Brahman is attributeless (*nirguṇa*). Brahman which is of the nature of pure consciousness is not a substance having attributes. If Brahman were qualified (*saviśeṣa*), then such a composite entity is liable to perish. Such a state of affairs will falsify and contradict the *Upaniṣads* — the Real (*sat*) would then become unreal (*asat*) and non-eternal, contrary to what is proclaimed in the *Upaniṣads*. Hence the reason why scriptures describe Brahman as homogeneous (*ekarasa*) and as devoid of all distinctions, both internal and external. The *jīva* is not a part of *Īśvara*; the *jīva* and *Īśvara* are both in essence identical with Brahman. Advaita teaches oneness of the self and Brahman (*jīva-brahma-aiḱya*) and not oneness of the self and *Īśvara* (*jīva-aiḱya*). The self which is self-revealing and immediate in experience cannot be the same as the omniscient *Īśvara*. Nor can Brahman be secondless and yet simultaneously be one with the empirical self (*jīva*), limited by objects, space and time.

(3) In the third stage of *lakṣaṇa-lakṣya-sambandha-jñāna*, the self which is mistaken as limited by the psycho-physical complex, and Brahman which is falsely attributed with having created the world are shown as

identical and non-different. The two terms "that" and "thou" cannot be synonymous in their primary sense. They initially differ in their import. If identity is to be affirmed the meanings of "that" and "thou" must be pruned and revised to meet the requirements of identity. Such a radical reduction of connotation is also justified by the consideration of what is adventitious and essential in the connotation of the two words. Infinite being and immediacy constitute the essential nature of the self. But the parviscience and mediacy of the self is due to its false identification with the psycho-physical vesture, an evolute of *avidyā*. *Īśvara* and the self must be stripped of their adventitious limiting adjuncts — *māyā* and *avidyā* — through exclusive-non-exclusive implication (*jahad-ajahal-lakṣaṇā*). When the finite knowledge, existence and bliss of the *jīva*, and omniscience, creatorship etc. of *Īśvara* are negated as mere superimpositions, what remains is pure consciousness which can be called neither *jīva* nor *Īśvara*, but only Brahman. The *jīva* and *Īśvara* are realised as identical in essence with Brahman, and non-different from one another. Although 'that' and 'thou' are not synonymous and have different denotations, when the *upādhis* are dropped they connote the same non-dual unitary Absolute. This signification through *lakṣaṇa-lakṣya-sambandha-jñāna* is the last stage in the interpretation of the *mahāvākya*.

Infinite and immediacy are not two different attributes inhering in the same Absolute. A comprehension of the implication of immediacy automatically leads to the conclusion that what is immediate must really be infinite and non-dual. Similarly what is non-dual and infinite ultimately must be one with the

immediately real. The wrong belief in the finitude and mediateness of the immediate self is due to insufficient appreciation of the self's immediacy. Failure in understanding the Absoluteness of Brahman is also the cause of the misconception that Brahman is other than the self. In self-realisation which is immediate and absolute all distinctions such as subject-predicate, knower-known, cause-effect, etc., are dissolved.

A point worth of appreciation is that Bādarāyaṇa in his first *sūtra* speaks of inquiry into the nature of Brahman (*jijñāsā*). The problem arises of a knowledge of Brahman. Is Brahman already known or is it something unknown? If Brahman is already known there is no need for inquiry; if it is unknown there can be no inquiry into it. The solution to the dilemma is to escape between its horns. The alternatives are only exclusive, but not exhaustive; for they admit a third possibility of partial knowledge. According to Advaita, Brahman is both known and unknown. Advaita affirms that everyone knows the self generally and superficially, but not its essential nature as constituting the very being of the individual himself. Since the Self is self-luminous and fundamental to all experience, there is no need or possibility of it being revealed newly by any of the six *pramāṇas*.

According to Suresvara, attaining is of two kinds. (a) Something yet to be accomplished, *e.g.*, a distant village yet to be reached. But arrival and departure are meaningless in the attainment of Brahman (*brahma-prāpti*). Liberation is not a pilgrimage to the *Ātman*. Brahman is not something yet to be reached or attained, because it is immanent in the individual and constitutes one's very being. Therefore attainment is not real,

but only attaining what is already attained or accomplished (*kṛtakṛtya*), e.g., a chain round one's neck which as wrongly thought to be lost and is presently discovered. Similarly Brahman, ever existent in oneself is wrongly thought of as yet to be attained, because it is lost through ignorance (*avidyā*) and discovered as one's own self in self-realisation. Sures'vara also clarifies that what is removed is of two kinds—(a) The removal of the factual, e.g., removing a thorn embedded in the flesh. (b) The elimination or negation of the imaginary, e.g., the sublation of the illusory 'snake' superimposed on the rope. Likewise bondage is only an imagination or illusion conjured up by the mind. The mind alone is responsible for one's own bondage or liberation, according to Advaita. Ignorance (*avidyā*) conceals the self's true nature. The *jīva* which is in essence identical with Brahman only appears to be bound due to *avidyā*. The proposition of removing something will be meaningful only if there is something other than Brahman. But this is not so, because Brahman is non-dual or secondless (*advaitīya*) and devoid of all differences. Removing bondage is, therefore, an instance of removing what is already removed. In *mokṣa*, therefore, "what is ever free gets liberated, and that bondage which is not really there get removed." What is needed for self-realisation is only a negation of the misconceptions made on the self. This is what is accomplished by the scriptures. The identity judgements only expose and negate the unreal masquerading as the real. The ego is to the self what the "snake" is to the rope. Just as the snake is sublated through a right knowledge of the rope, the ego too is destroyed when the self is realised. By annihilating the delusion, scriptures enable the soul to apprehend Reality immediately in experience by

merely eliminating the obstacles in the path to self-realisation.

The "cobwebs of ignorance and prejudice...must be swept by the broom of doubt, before one becomes fit to receive the final knowledge." The final step of comprehending the purport of "*tat tvam asi*" can be undertaken only by one who has already distinguished the self from the not-self through reasoning (*yukti*). Inquiry into the nature of the *Ātman* is very important for spiritual progress, and must be continued till Brahman is intuited. The seeker must not be duped by external appearance. One must have a discerning intellect and a metaphysical bent of mind. The aim of all inquiry is to arrive at a knowledge of Brahman characterised by certainty. When the five sheaths are negated as the not-self, the self reveals itself as the eternal witness (*sākṣin*) of all being and non-being, it is self-effulgent, homogeneous and devoid of distinctions. We are convinced that Brahman is undivided homogeneous pure consciousness which is immediate and non-dual. We also experience the patent indisputable fact of mutual superimposition of the not-self on the self. Therefore, one is forced to necessarily presuppose and acknowledge *avidyā*. When the "snake" is sublated through a right knowledge of the rope, we presume inevitably that when we mistook a rope for a "snake", we missed the essential features of the rope in our initial cognition. Hence ignorance is a basic presupposition of ordinary experience. In its annihilation lies our salvation. This can be accomplished only through a realisation of the purport of "*tat tvam asi*."

"There is no admittance into the shrine of Vedānta for those who are intellectually indolent, and cannot or would not think." Reason has to function vigor-

ously at every stage in the interpretation of the scriptures. Through introspection it can be seen that the application of the six canons of interpretation depend on reason, *e.g.*, we can harmonise the initial and the concluding passages, only after we determine through reason which the initial and the concluding passages are. It is through reason that we determine which meaning — primary or secondary, or which mode of secondary interpretation is to be adopted to elucidate the purport of the text. Reason plays an effective role in determining which the condemnatory and eulogistic passages are. All this involves systematic analysis of language and concepts.

Reason is an indispensable aid in unravelling the purport of *śruti*, and is subservient to it. Reason is valid only as long as it does not conflict with the *Vedas* but even to discern when reason is in conflict and when it is not, reason is required. Reason and revelation are not opposed to one another. Just because intuition evades the grasp of reasoning, it is not to be disregarded as nonsensical. "Intuition does not negate the intellect. It includes and transcends it. It is not a-logical but supra-logical. Hence logic and life, rational cognition and intuitive experience, must go hand in hand. Advaita aims at a synthesis of the head and the heart. It is neither barren intellectual nor a mere mysticism. It is a *darśana*, an insight into the real, a vision of truth."¹⁰ In the words of S. Radhakrishnan, Advaita is "a system of great speculative daring and logical subtlety. Its austere intellectualism, its remorseless logic, which marches on indifferent to the hopes and beliefs of man, its relative freedom from theological obsessions, make it a great example of a purely philosophical scheme."¹¹

NOTES

1. T. P. Ramachandran, *The Concept of the Vyāvahārika in Advaita Vedānta*, University of Madras, Madras, 1980, p. 21.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 21.
3. *Bṛhadāranyaka-upaniṣad*, IV.iv.19, and *Māṇḍūkya-kārikā*, III. 24.
4. *Māṇḍūkya-kārikā*, III. 15.
5. *Ibid.*, IV.42 and 43.
6. *Vide* Śaṅkara's commentary on the *Māṇḍūkya-kārikā*, III. 14.
7. *Vide* R. Balasubramanian, *The Taittirīyopaniṣad-bhāṣya-vārtika of Sureśvara*, University of Madras, Madras, 1974, p. 191.
8. T. M. P. Mahadevan, *Gauḍapāda*, University of Madras, Madras, 1975, p. 86.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 87.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 3.
11. S. Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. II, George Allen & Unwin, London, 1940, p. 445.

ADVAITA PSYCHOLOGY

*T. P. Ramachandran**

1. *Introduction*

Modern psychology claims to be a distinct science independent of philosophy. In its attempt to be as exact as possible it confines itself to the study of such mental phenomena as are observable in bodily changes and behaviour patterns. Such a pursuit has its own uses in ordinary life. But the psychology pursued by traditional schools of philosophy goes deeper. It is a part of their metaphysics. It is one of the avenues to the understanding of the nature of reality. What is the true nature of the self? This is the basic problem for philosophical psychology. This article deals with the outlines of the psychological approach to reality in Advaita.

The criterion which the Advaitin applies for distinguishing the real from the non-real is non-contradiction or unoblatability (*abādhitatva*). The justifica-

* Former Professor of Philosophy, Radhakrishnan Institute for Advanced Study in Philosophy, University of Madras, Madras-5.

tion of this criterion is beyond the scope of this paper. We are here concerned only with the application of the criterion in one (the mental) sphere. The method of applying the criterion is co-presence and co-absence (*anvaya-vyatireka*). It consists in sifting whatever is variable and inconstant from what is abiding and unsublated. This method is resorted to by the Advaitin in the objective and in the subjective spheres. The objective application is the analysis of the external world — the world of objects which we perceive by our senses. (This constitutes the ontology of Advaita). Such an analysis leads to the conclusion that pure existence (*sat*) is the reality underlying the objective world. A similar analysis of the subjective realm leads to the conclusion that pure consciousness (*cit*) is the nature of the self. This does not mean that there are two realities, *sat* and *cit*. As the *Upaniṣads* show, *sat* and *cit* are alternative ways of describing the same reality, *viz.* Brahman. Thus Brahman is the whole and sole culmination of Advaita metaphysics. We shall now take up the psychology of Advaita.

2. *The Physical and the Mental*

There are two aspects in the life of the individual soul, or *jīva*. There is the physical, or biological, side which includes involuntary activities, such as breathing, and there is the mental, or psychological, side. The biological activity of the self goes on even when the mind is at rest, as in sleep. The principle by which it works is the vital energy (*prāṇa*), and the medium through which it works is the physical body. The term *jīva* (derived from the root 'jīv', which means 'to continue breathing') primarily stands for the biological aspect of life. But the *jīva* is also referred to as the

kartā, or agent of actions, and the *bhoktā*, or the experient of results. It is also involved in knowledge, though the subject of knowledge (*jñātā*) is, strictly speaking, the *jīvasākṣi*. Knowledge, action, and enjoyment together emphasize the other aspect of the *jīva*'s personality, namely the mental, or psychological, or conscious. The principle of its psychological function is the mind (*manas*), or the internal organ (*antah-karāṇa*). *Manas* is the chief organ of consciousness. It carries on the conscious side of the soul's activity with the aid of the ten organs (*indriya*), five of knowledge (*jñānendriya*) and five of action (*karmendriya*). It coordinates impressions received through the former and acts with the aid of the latter.

The biological activity of the *jīva* is non-real, as it begins with the birth of the body and perishes with the death of the body. Whatever has a beginning and an end does not exist in the middle either. Hence the body is not the real self of man.

Coming to the psychological, or mental, aspect, this aspect reveals itself in the three states of waking, dream, and deep sleep. And so an analysis of these states will enable us to discover the real nature of the self.

3. *The Waking State*

In the waking state we meet with various objects of the external world. We act with reference to them and also enjoy them as the fruits of our actions. But activity and enjoyment presuppose knowledge. We cognize things before we act upon them or enjoy them.

Since cognition is fundamental to action and enjoyment, it would be useful to analyse the waking state in respect of the cognitive function of the mind.

In waking life we form a series of particular cognitions. We acquire a knowledge of this object or that or about this or that aspect of the same object. The cognition of one object, say a pot, is different from the cognition of another object, say a cloth. The particular cognitions vary according to the nature of the objects cognized. But a little examination of the particular cognitions shows that consciousness is uniformly present in all of them. Now, judged by the criterion of unoblatability, the particular cognitions cannot be real. Whatever varies, is non-real, and whatever is constant is real. Hence the particular form of each cognition, which depends on the nature of the object, and by virtue of which one cognition is distinguished from another, is non-real. Consciousness as such, or pure consciousness, *i.e.* consciousness unrelated to anything of which it is a subject, alone is real. That the differences among cognitions are extrinsic to consciousness is evident from the fact that these differences arise from differences in the objects cognized. The particularities of the objects, which themselves exist only in name and form, are superimposed on pure consciousness, and the latter appears as the different cognitions given in waking life. If the particularities of cognition are absent, consciousness would reveal itself as one undivided reality. But such a circumstance can never be expected in waking life. And, so, the distinction between pure consciousness, which is real, and particular cognitions, which are non-real, is not evident in waking life. In the dream

state it is partially evident, and in the sleep state it is fully evident. Hence, although the objects experienced in the dream state are contradicted by the waking state, and are therefore less real than the objects of waking, from the stand-point of comprehending the real nature of the self, the dream state is considered superior to the waking state and intermediate between the waking and deep sleep states.

4. *The Dream State*

In the dream state the organs become wholly quiescent and united with the *manas*. In the dream state, therefore, the self is virtually free from the limitations imposed by the body. The relative freedom is evidenced by the fact that the self creates for itself a world of objects not ordinarily met with in the waking life. The self in dream is, therefore, compared to a sword drawn from its sheath.¹ Hence the essential difference between waking and dreaming is that, while in the former the *manas* receives impressions from the outside, which it builds up into ideas, in the latter it fashions a world of ideas by itself unaided by the senses, but using as material the impressions gathered during waking moments.² This creation by the mind is only apparent, as the mind is not in contact with the organs. That is why the objects created in dream are repudiated by waking experience.³

Now, although the mind is active in dream, it is clear that there is an inner core of reality which the mind leaves untouched. This is evident from the fact that a man is not really bound by the creative activity of the dream state. It is a well-known fact that a man is not followed by deeds done in dreams, such as kill-

ing or stealing. Nobody considers himself a sinner for the sins committed in dreams; nor do people to whom the dream is narrated condemn or shun him. Hence in dreams it is only the mind that is active, and not the real self of man. The real self merely witnesses the creative activities of the mind.⁴ In other words, cognition is not associated with action and enjoyment. Consequently, there is a more or less clear distinction between the modification undergone by the instrument of cognition, *viz.* the mind, and pure consciousness, which stands apart as a spectator of particular cognitions. The modifications, because they are varying, are non-real. Pure intelligence, which remains constant, alone is real.

The significance of this feature of dream experience to waking life is that the self in its true nature is neither an agent nor an enjoyer, but only pure intelligence, a witness of action and enjoyment.⁵ In waking life cognition is associated with action and enjoyment. The pure intelligence gets wrongly identified with the changing *buddhi*. That is why the consequences of action, of which the cause is the *antaḥkaraṇa* aided by the organs, are imagined to pertain to the self of man. The self is bound by actions and becomes an agent and enjoyer only because of wrong identification with the *buddhi*. There is no doubt that in dream the detachment of the pure consciousness from the changing *manas* is not absolute. There is a partial identification of the two as is evidenced by the fact that sometimes a man shouts or weeps on seeing a terrible dream. But as the organs are quiescent, the identification is less complex than in the waking state. Hence the real nature of the self as dissociated from the adjuncts is

better understood by the study of the dream state than by the examination of the waking state.⁹

5. *The Deep Sleep State*

In deep sleep even the partial identification of the self with the adjuncts is absent. In this state there is neither the play of the external world nor that of the impressions of waking. As in dream, the senses do not function. But unlike in dream, even the mind does not function in sleep. Profound sleep is the state in which the modification of the mind (*vṛtti*) is suspended and the mind remains in a subtle seed-like form. Hence all kinds of perception cease in this state, *i.e.*, there is neither the perception of external objects nor that of the modes of the mind. That there is the cessation of all kinds of perception in sleep is evidenced by the verdict of all — “I did not know anything then.” But this absence of cognition does not mean the absence of the cognizing consciousness.¹⁰ If consciousness were absent during sleep, the person waking from sleep would not have been able to say “I did not know anything then.” Consciousness must be present to bear witness not only to the presence of cognition, but to the absence of cognition as well.⁹ So we can safely conclude that consciousness continues during deep sleep as before and after it. As Śrī Śaṅkara explains, the absence of the cognizing activity is due to the absence of objects, not to the absence of intelligence, just as the light pervading space is not manifest owing to the absence of things to be illumined, not to the absence of its own nature. (*viṣayābhāvāt iyam acetayamānatā na caitanyābhāvāt iti. yathā viyadāśrayasya prakāśaysa prakāśyābhāvāt anabhivyaktiḥ, na svarūpābhāvāt tadvat*).¹⁰ The mind being inactive, consciousness is

without a content. But the absence of a content does not affect pure consciousness. Though consciousness is not manifest in the ordinary way, that is as the threefold factor of subject, object, and means, it is still present to show that it is free from any content and undivided. The *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* passage IV, 3, 23 indicates this by saying that, though the self does not see in deep sleep, the sight of the seer is imperishable, and its loss never takes place.¹¹ The mind, which is absent in sleep, cannot be the real self; consciousness, which is present even when the mind is absent, alone must be the real self.

Deep sleep reveals the independence of consciousness from its adjuncts. The *Praśna Upaniṣad* passage IV, 2 speaks of the absence of the activities of seeing and so on, in the state of sleep. Śrī Śaṅkara explains that this is spoken of with the purpose of declaring the non-attachedness of the self with the adjuncts. (*yaḥ api asau susuptāvasthāyām darśanādi-vyavahārābhāvaḥ uktah saḥ api ātmanah eva asaṅgatva-vivakṣayoktah...*)¹²

The complete detachment of the intelligence from the adjuncts in sleep is evidenced by the absence of all desire in that state. In the waking and dream states ignorance is active. Hence the objects are, as it were, separated from the self. Their apparent separation creates desire for them in the perceiver. And desire leads to pain. In deep sleep ignorance, being undifferentiated, cannot project the idea of difference. As nothing other than the self, whether physical or mental, is perceived, there are no desires except 'the desire of the self' (*ātmakāma*). The desire of the self is not the opposite of the desire for objects. Since all objects of desire are nothing but the self, all desires

are said to be fulfilled (*āptakāma*) in the desire of the self. Moreover, the term 'desire' used with reference to the self is only figurative. It has not the conventional meaning of 'desire', which implies some things yet to be attained. The meaning of the expression is that the self, which in reality has nothing apart from itself, is free from desires (*akāma*) and, therefore, perfectly devoid of grief (*śokāntara*).¹³

As desire leads to pain, absence of desire is pure bliss. Hence in the state of deep sleep the self enjoys perfect bliss. The evidence for this is the memory of blissful experience in sleep which one has on waking. There is the reflective cognition of that bliss by the person who wakes up from sleep, as expressed in the statement "I slept happily."¹⁴

There is no doubt that, by the very nature of the case, the bliss of sleep cannot be cognized as an object while it is experienced; for the mind does not function in sleep. But it is cognized reflectively through the mind, or the *antaḥkaraṇa*, when one returns to the waking state. The calm and collected disposition of one who has woken up is the residual impression left on the mind by the bliss of sleep.¹⁵ If the bliss of sleep were dependent on the mind for being known, it would not have left such an impression on the mind when the latter was inactive. This shows that the bliss experienced in sleep is self-luminous.¹⁶

There is also an indication prior to the condition of sleep of the coming enjoyment of bliss; for, in anticipation of it, the *jīva* runs for this state when it is weary with experiencing the results of action in the waking and dream states in order to remove the

fatigue.¹⁷ Hence pure bliss is the permanent nature of the self, which becomes manifest during sleep when the restrictive association of the mind is suspended.¹⁸

The self as pure bliss is identical with Brahman, and it is this identity which the *jīva* experiences during deep sleep.¹⁹ But it experiences Brahman quite unwittingly. Although daily we experience Brahman-bliss in sleep, we are unaware of the significance of this experience, because ignorance is not destroyed.²⁰ Since *avidyā* is present, though in a latent state, the Brahman-bliss is not experienced directly but only as a reflection in the latent *avidyā*.²¹ Hence, though experiencing Brahman, we are yet ignorant of what we experience. And by the force of *karma*, which operates on the basis of *avidyā*, the temporary experience of non-difference is disturbed, and we return to the waking state to perceive diversity and experience the mixture of pleasure and pain attendant on it.²² Nevertheless, there is no doubt that in deep sleep we experience Brahman-bliss. Śrī Śaṅkara says that the purpose of scripture in mentioning the bliss of sleep (as for example, in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* IV, 3, 32) is to show that bliss constitutes the nature of the self. (*yadāpi tasyāṁ avasthāyāṁ sukhāṁ uktāṁ, tadāpi ātmanaḥ eva sukhārūpatva-vivakṣayuktam*).²³

Thus the analysis of deep sleep, which points to pure consciousness, also reveals that pure consciousness is pure bliss. As the only uncontradicted factor in sleep, pure consciousness, which is also pure bliss, is the only reality.

6. Review

We have seen that pure intelligence is the unsublated reality in each of the states of waking, dream,

and deep sleep. But the intelligence underlying one state is not different from the intelligence underlying the others. If that were so, there would be no self-identity at all when a person passes from one state to another. The witness of one state is also the witness of all the states. It is the same self which cognizes the objects of waking, the dreams, and the absence of the two in sleep. We saw that in waking as well as in dream, when various objects come and go, the intelligence which cognizes them remains the same. Hence the particular cognitions are non-real, and pure consciousness alone is real. Similarly, while the three states themselves flit and pass alternately, the pure intelligence (*samvit*) which witnesses them all reveals itself as the only constant reality.²⁴

In the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, the passages, IV, 3, 15 to 19 describe how the self passes alternately between the states of waking, dream, and deep sleep, untouched by whatever is perceived in the dream and waking states, and remaining merely as a witness in them as in sleep. That the self is untouched by its apparent experiences in the dream and waking states is shown by the fact that the 'experiences' of one state are not repeated in another state. Hence, even as in deep sleep, in all the three states the self is really unattached with the adjuncts, *viz.* the body and the mind. The self is the one uniform consciousness which witnesses the activities of these adjuncts in waking and dream and their non-activity in sleep. Thus, when we consider the three states together, the comprehensive view that emerges is that the self is 'by nature eternal, free, enlightened, and pure' (*nitya-mukta-buddha-śuddha-svabhāvatā...*)²⁵; the relative existence of

the self in the three states is only due to its limiting adjuncts and is superimposed by ignorance.

Thus by the subjective analysis we find that the reality of our self is pure consciousness. Just as a mass of salt is saltish through and through, and not something possessing saltishness, the self is nothing but consciousness.²⁹ Consciousness is not an attribute of the self. An attribute is what depends on a substance and cannot exist independently. But we have found that while all our experiences in the three states depend on consciousness, consciousness itself is not dependent on anything else. It shines in its own glory.³⁰ Thus the self *is* consciousness, and not *has* consciousness.

NOTES

1. *Vide Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, IV, 3, 9-10, and Śrī Śaṅkara's commentary thereon.

2. *Vide ibid.*

3. *Vide Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, II, 1, 18, and Śrī Śaṅkara's commentary thereon.

4. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, IV, 3, 15, and Śrī Śaṅkara's commentary thereon.

5. *Vide Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, IV, 3, 16 and 17 and Śrī Śaṅkara's commentary thereon.

6. *Vide Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, IV, 3, 7.

7. *Vivekacūḍāmaṇi*, vv. 120-21.

8. Referring to the expression *vināśamevāpīto bhavati*, occurring in the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* passage VIII, 11, 1, Śrī Śaṅkara says that it means only the annihilation of all specific cognition, not the annihilation of the cognizer. (*viśeṣa-vijñāna vināśābhiprāyam eva, na vijñātr vināśābhiprāyam.*): Śrī Śaṅkara's commentary on the *Brahmasūtra*, I, 3, 19.

9. *Vivekacūḍāmani*, vv. 125-26.
10. Śrī Śaṅkara's commentary on the *Brahmasūtra*, II, 3, 18.
11. *Vide* Śrī Śaṅkara's commentary on this passage.
12. Śrī Śaṅkara's commentary on the *Brahmasūtra*, I, 3, 9.
13. *Vide Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, IV, 3, 21, and Śrī Śaṅkara's commentary thereon.
14. *Vide Pañcadaśī*, XI, 59-60.
15. *Vide ibid.*, XI, 74.
16. *Vide ibid.*, XI, 37 and 38.
17. *Vide Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, IV, 3, 19; *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, VI, 8, 2.
18. *Vide Pañcadaśī*, XI, 43.
19. *Vide Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, VI, 8, 1.
20. *Vide Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, VIII, 3, 2. (Referring to this passage, Śrī Śaṅkara says that the term 'Brahma-loka' here does not mean 'the world of Brahman', but 'the world which is Brahman'. Hence the import of this passage is that in deep sleep one is identical with Nirguṇa Brahman and not that one goes to the world of Saguṇa Brahman, *i.e. satya-loka*: Śrī Śaṅkara's commentary on the *Brahmasūtra*, I, 3, 15); *vide* also *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, VI, 9, 1 and 2.
21. *Vide Pañcadaśī*, XI, 72.
22. *Vide ibid.*, XI, 72 and 75.
23. Śrī Śaṅkara's commentary on the *Brahmasūtra*, I, 3, 9.
24. *Vide Pañcadaśī* I, 3-6.
25. Śrī Śaṅkara's commentary on the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, IV, 3, 18.
26. *Vide Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, IV, 5, 13.
27. *Samvedana-svarūpatvāt samvedanāntarāpekṣā ca na sambhavati yathā prakāśasya prakāśāntarāpekṣāyā na sambhavaḥ tadvat*: Śrī Śaṅkara's commentary on the *Kena Upaniṣad*, II, 4.

PEACE THROUGH SELF-INTEGRATION AND SOCIAL-INTEGRATION

R. Balasubramanian

1. *Mind: The Immediate Source of Peace*

Wars, says the UNESCO constitution, begin in the minds of men. What is sought to be conveyed by this statement is that the origin of war must be traced to human agency which desires, wills, and executes it. What is true of war is equally true of peace. After explaining the constitution of a human being and also outlining a theory of human nature, I shall try to show in this paper that, *first of all*, one whose mind is not under control is a dis-integrated person incapable of peace with oneself and also with society; that, *secondly*, it is impossible to have peace unless human beings pursue it through inner and outer action which, in the final analysis, is the work of the mind; and that, *thirdly*, self-integration and social-integration which can be achieved through a disciplined mind are the *sinequa non* of peace.

There is a familiar saying that it is the mind that is responsible for the freedom as well as the bondage

of the human being.' If what binds a person leading to suffering of various kinds at different levels is the work of the mind, what liberates a person from suffering is, again, the work of the mind. That is why we have to say that peace, like war, originates in the minds of human beings. One who has no control over the mind, which is the internal organ (*antahkaraṇa*), cannot control the outer senses and the external body, which are directly involved in the outward action. It follows that the mind which is the internal organ controls not only the inward action, but also the outward action. *What* a person thinks of an object, which is the first link in the causal nexus between the mind and the outward action, leads to a series of actions, one following another, culminating in one's freedom or ruin as the case may be. The link between the thought of a person and self-ruin is set forth in the *Bhagavad-gītā* as follows:

When a person thinks of objects, attachment for them arises. From attachment arises desires; from desire arises wrath. From wrath arises delusion; from delusion, failure of memory, from failure of memory loss of discriminating intellect, and from loss of the discriminating intellect; he is utterly ruined.²

In the course of his commentary on these texts, Śaṅkara observes:

A human being is human only so long as his internal organ (*i.e.* the mind) is competent to discriminate between right and wrong. When it is unable to do so, the human being is utterly ruined. Thus, by loss of the discrimi-

nating intellect, he is utterly ruined; he is, that is to say, debarred from attaining human aspirations.³

What is suggested by the scriptural text and the commentary thereon is that the wrong thinking, the unwholesome mentality, of a person leads to self-destruction. It means that one given to wrong thinking or unwholesome mentality cannot be a self-integrated person living in harmony with society; such a one, it is obvious, cannot have peace with oneself and also with society of which one is a member. On the contrary, right thinking or wholesome mentality is conducive to both self-integration and social-integration. One who achieves both the kinds of integration will contribute to peaceful life for others as well as for oneself.

Right from the time of birth, every one is conditioned by the family, the immediate neighbourhood, and the larger society in which one lives. Apart from the stock of merit and demerit with which one is born as one's personal asset, one is greatly influenced by the heritage of the parents on the one hand, and the socio-cultural impact of the environment on the other. Just as society contributes to the development of an individual, even so an individual contributes to the growth of society. Both of them, through their mutual interaction, are the beneficiaries. A person who achieves both self-integration and social-integration is, no doubt, an ideal; and many of us fall short of this ideal. However, the ideal is necessary as it is at once a paradigm and a power — a paradigm to show us the direction and a power to inspire and impel us to action. Lord Kṛṣṇa in the *Bhagavad-gītā*⁴ speaks of

such an ideal person as "one by whom the world is not afflicted and who is not afflicted by the world." Also, he adds that such a one who is "free from exultation, envy, fear, and sorrow is dear to me." Exultation, envy, fear, and sorrow are states of the mind. Fulfilment of an object of desire results in exultation (*harṣa*). Feeling of resentment at the fortunate condition of another person is envy (*amarṣa*). The thought of anything considered to be undesirable produces fear (*bhaya*). The feeling of existential predicament is sorrow (*udvega*). The Hindu tradition holds that the ideal person who is not a problem to society and to whom society is not a problem, who, as a result of the control of the mind, is free from exultation and envy, fear and sorrow, and who is, therefore, dear to God, is a renunciant (*sannyāsin*), one who has totally overcome selfishness, *i.e.* one who is free from the sense of "I" and "mine". A renunciant who leads a selfless life is an ideal for emulation. While selfish life endangers peace, selfless life ensures it. The closer one moves to the ideal, the greater is one's enjoyment of, and contribution to, peace. So the problem of peace in the final analysis will resolve itself into the problem of selfless life *versus* selfish life. To achieve peace we have to root out the ego.

2. *The Constitution of a Human Being*

Since the human being is credited with the potentiality of leading a selfless/selfish life, it is necessary at this stage to go into the question of the constitution of a human being. A human being is a complex of Spirit and matter. These two components are otherwise called the Self (*ātman*) and the not-Self (*anātman*) with a view to underscore their diametrically opposed

nature. The chief elements of the material component with which the Spirit or the Self is associated are mind, senses, and body. Among the three elements constituting the material adjunct which serves as the outfit, as it were, of the Self, the most important is the mind, which is called the internal organ (*antaḥkaraṇa*) with a view to contrast it with the five external sense organs. Though the internal organ is one, it is spoken of in four different ways as *manas* (mind), *buddhi* (intellect), *citta* (memory-stuff), and *ahaṅkāra* (ego) depending upon the function it does: that is to say, entitatively it is one, but functionally fourfold. The manifold mental operations or the cogitations of the mind are the functions or states of the internal organ in its fourfold form. The mind is the most important one, because it is the most powerful capable of exercising a tremendous control over the functioning of the external sense organs and the gross physical body. A few Upaniṣadic texts are relevant in this context. Using the imagery of the chariot, which is the psycho-physical vehicle, the *Upaniṣad* says:

Know the Self as the lord of the chariot and the body as, verily, the chariot; know the intellect as the charioteer and the mind as, verily, the reins. The senses are called the horses; the objects of senses are the paths (they move about)... To one who has no understanding, whose mind is always unrestrained, the senses are out of control, as wicked horses are for a charioteer. But to one who has understanding, whose mind is always restrained, the senses are under control, as good horses are for a charioteer.*

Life becomes chaotic and disintegrated when the mind is dragged by the senses; on the contrary, it becomes orderly and peaceful when the mind exercises its control over the senses.

There is also a second reason for the special importance of the mind. As an instrument of cognition, it is required not only for knowing things external, but also for knowing the inward Self. That the inward Self can be known only through a steady and subtle mind (also called the intellect) is conveyed by the following texts of the *Upaniṣad*:

This (Self) is to be attained by the mind alone.⁶

By the seers of subtle things, He (the Self) is seen through a pointed and subtle intellect.⁷

The human being is preeminent among all creatures because of the possession of mind which plays a decisive role in the day-to-day life. Śaṅkara points out that the eligibility for knowledge and religio-moral duties (*jñāna-karma-adhikārah*) is the differentia of a human being;⁸ and he justifies this unique competence or eligibility of a human being on three grounds. First of all, a human being, through the instrumentality of the mind, has the *ability* for acquiring knowledge not only of the things of the world, but also of the supreme Being which is the ground of everything. Secondly, a human being has the distinctive quality of *desiring* certain ends after discrimination, deliberation, and choice. After cognizing something, one desires It and is engaged in activity with a view to fulfil one's desire.

The sequence of cognition, desire, and action, that is to say, cognition leading to desire, and desire culminating in overt action, is characteristic of the goal-seeking activity of a human being. Thirdly, after choosing an end a human being makes use of the appropriate means for achieving the end. In all these cases — the pursuit of knowledge and the performance of religious-moral action, the conscious desire for certain goals and its fulfilment through proper means — the instrument which helps a human being is the mind. It may be noted that the mind is subject to modifications of various kinds from time to time. The modifications which the mind undergoes are called *vr̥ttis* (modes or states). While the Vedānta speaks of them as *antaḥ-karāṇa-vr̥ttis*, the Yoga system speaks of them as *citta-vr̥ttis* (*citta* being a name of the internal organ). When the *Upaniṣad* says that “desire, resolve, doubt, faith, want of faith, steadiness, unsteadiness, shame, intelligence and fear — all these are but the mind,” it gives an account of the mental states or operations, which constitute the nature of the mind. The list given by the *Upaniṣad* is only suggestive, but not exhaustive. Broadly speaking, the mental states are three, *viz.*, knowing, feeling, and willing, and the various mental operations such as sensing, doubting, imagining, dreaming, enjoying, resolving, and so on can be brought under these three mental states.

3. *A Theory of Human Nature*

Any discussion about the inner and outer action for achieving peace should be based upon a theory of human nature — a theory which will throw light on what a human being is and what he/she ought to do.

First of all, a human being is a rational agent who is capable of deliberate action. Being inspired by the Self or Spirit which is of the nature of consciousness, the mind though material, is the instrument which does the work of deliberation followed by decision to perform an act in a given situation in order to achieve an end which may be personal and/or social. Human life is what it is because of thinking or rational activity and it will lose its significance in the absence of thinking. It is through reasoning that a human being makes all kinds of distinctions such as the knower and the known in epistemology, substance and attribute, whole and part, etc., in metaphysics, the right and the wrong, the good and the bad in ethics, and also works out the relations among the objects which are distinguished from one another.

Secondly, a human being is not only a rational agent, but also a moral agent who has responsibilities for oneself as well as for others. A rational action is also a moral action, since it is an action determined by a conception, on the part of the agent, of a good, personal and/or social. And so it is different from an instinctive action which, in the words of T.H. Green, is one which is *not* "determined by a conception, on the part of the agent, of any good to be attained or evil to be avoided by the action."¹⁰ In other words, a rational action is one which is morally imputable, *i.e.* it is an action which can be called good or bad. Further, a deliberate action of a rational-cum-moral agent has its impact on others, known or unknown to the agent; and so the moral significance of every deliberate action must be taken note of by the agent who performs the action and also by others who evaluate the action. This

point has been well brought out by Mahatma Gandhi when he observes:

There is not a single virtue which aims at, or is content with, the welfare of the individual alone. Conversely, there is not a single moral offence which does not directly or indirectly affect many others besides the actual offender. Hence, whether an individual is good or not is not merely his own concern, but really, the concern of the whole community, nay, of the whole world.¹¹

Thirdly, the personality of the human being is an end in itself and so is the ultimate standard of value. Though it is true that an individual owes so much to society for the development of his/her personality, the worth of an individual as a person can never be subordinated to society. It is meaningless to speak about the worth or value of society apart from the individuals who compose it. "Our ultimate standard of worth," declares T.H. Green, "is an ideal of personal worth. All other values are relative to value for, of, or in a person."¹²

Fourthly, though an individual is able to realize a personal good through the rational activity, what is achieved is not, strictly speaking, *private* to him/her, but good to him/her as a member of the community of persons. It is a good for others as well, for they are also rational and moral agents like him/her. Every person is capable of conceiving an absolute good of himself/herself as identical with the good of the rest of the community. In fact, it can be shown that the *personal good* of an individual is not different from the *common*

good of the community of which the individual is a member. The more one contributes to the common good, the more one enriches one's personal good. It is from this perspective that we have to bring out the significance of self-integration and social-integration.

Finally, the commitment of a human being as a rational and moral agent extends as far as all beings, both living and non-living, as a whole. Without being swayed by narrow prejudices and restricted loyalties, one should think of all living beings and the entire physical realm as falling within the scope of one's action, for every voluntary act is both self-regarding and other-regarding. The true good, it is necessary to emphasize, is good for all human beings, and good for them all in virtue of the same nature and capacity, and so in respect of the pursuit of the common good from which the personal good is not different, there can be no competition of interests. It is worth quoting T.H. Green once again in this context:

... the only good in the pursuit of which there can be no competition of interests, the only good which is really common to all who may pursue it, is that which consists in the universal will to be good — in the settled disposition on each man's part to make the most and best of humanity in his own person and in the persons of others.¹³

It means that a human being who is a rational and moral agent is capable of performing inner as well as outer action which is conducive to peace in society through self-integration and social-integration.

4. *The Uncommon and the Common Ways*

On the basis of the distinction between higher wisdom (*parā vidyā*) and lower knowledge (*aparā vidyā*),¹⁴ we can speak of two ways—the one based on higher wisdom leading to liberation (*mokṣa*) and the one based on lower knowledge (otherwise called “ignorance”) leading to suffering. The former which is trod only by a few is the uncommon way, while the latter is pursued by the many. Paul Brunton writes:

The uncommon is familiar enough: it consists in reacting egoistically and emotionally with self-centred complaint, irritability, fear, anger, despair, and so on. The uncommon way is taken by a spiritually minded few: it consists in making something good out of something bad, in reacting selflessly, calmly, constructively, and hopefully. This is the way of practical philosophy, this attempt to transform what outwardly seems so harmful into what inwardly at least must be markedly beneficent. It is a magical work. But it can only be done by deep thought, self-denial, and love...¹⁵

The main distinction between the two ways is the distinction between selfless and selfish life. Whether one would care to lead a selfless life or indulge in a selfish one, depends upon the condition of the mind of the person concerned. Every spiritual tradition not only insists on the need for the control of the mind, but also formulates a discipline which is philosophico-ethical involving the cognitive, affective, and conative aspects of the mind for the purpose of controlling it.

The preliminary discipline formulated in two of the systems of Vedānta — Advaita and Viśiṣṭādvaita — are worth considering here.

The four requirements of the discipline (*sādhana-catuṣṭaya*) as set forth in Advaita are discrimination, dispassion, self-control, and a longing for spiritual freedom.¹⁴ A brief explanation of each of these requirements will be helpful. The first requirement, which is basically cognitive, calls for a sense of discrimination on the part of the aspirant between the permanent and the impermanent. Though a value judgment about the eternal and the ephemeral is, to a large extent, subjective and will, therefore, vary from person to person, quite a few things which are considered to be important in the value system will fall off sooner or later on reconsideration. That every one of us goes through this process of transvaluation of values is a matter of common experience. What is required is a deliberate exercise of the cognitive side of the mind for the purpose of unburdening oneself from objects which stand in the way of self-integration and social integration and which are, therefore, dis-values.

The second requirement calls for a life of dispassion, detachment, renunciation. A passionate life with emotional involvement deprives one of calmness of mind and thereby of rational judgment. "Detachment" does not mean indifference to the world, insensitivity to men and matters. What binds a person is not the objects of the world, but a person's *attitude* to them, which is a state of the mind. It is, therefore, possible to change the attitude, to modify it in a way

that is conducive to peace with oneself and also with society. In the words of Paul Brunton:

We must use the material things, yes, and not abandon them; but we must do so without attachment. We may love the good things of life like other men, but we ought not to be in bondage to this love. We should be ready to abandon them at a moment's notice, if need be. It is not things that bind us, not marriage, wealth, or home, but our *craving* for marriage, wealth, or home. And, what is such craving in the end but a line of thinking, a series of mental images?''

No other word is much misunderstood as the word "renunciation". A life of renunciation is an inner life in the outer world. A renunciant is *in* the world, but not *of* the world; and such a life will be possible only if one is able to overcome the sense of "I" and "mine". It is only when one is attached to the Self and not to the ego that one can be detached from the not-Self. Attachment as well as detachment is a matter of degree. The more one is attached to the Self, the more is the detachment from the things of the world; the closer one is to the Self, the greater is the distance between oneself and the world. Answering a question about *sannyāsa* (renunciation) from a disciple, Ramana Maharshi said:

Sannyāsa is only renunciation of "I" thought and not the rejection of the external objects. He who has renounced (the "I" thought) thus remains the same whether he is alone or in the midst of the extensive *samsāra*.''''

Paul Brunton, in his own characteristic way, provides an explanation for the Maharshi's observation with suitable illustrations:

Those activities which belong to a human existence in the world may go on and need not be renounced, although they may be modified or altered in certain ways as intuition directs. His business, professional, family, and social interests need not be given up. His appreciations or creations of art need not be abandoned. His intellectual and cultural life can remain. It is only demanded of him that none of these should be a self-sufficient thing, existing in total disregard of the Whole, of the ultimate and higher purpose which is behind reincarnation.¹⁹

The third requirement relates to the control of the mind and the control of the senses, and also to the cultivation of certain mental attitudes such as calmness and equanimity. What is suggested here is that through self-control one will be able to perform the inward journey though moving about in the external world.

The last requirement refers to the longing for spiritual freedom called *mokṣa* which is totally different from other kinds of freedom such as political, economic, social, and religious. The longing for spiritual freedom must be spontaneous. One who does not have such an urge cannot be forced to have it from any external agency. The absence of such an urge is a pointer to the want of discrimination between the eternal and the ephemeral. It may be noted that of the four require-

ments mentioned above the preceding one is the cause of the succeeding one. It means that a person who is able to discriminate the permanent from the transitory will develop a spirit of detachment with regard to the things of the world; and the spirit of detachment will lead to self-control and the quest after spiritual freedom.

The Viśiṣṭādvaita system has formulated a discipline comprising seven requirements (*sādhana-saptaka*) for the purpose of controlling the mind in the context of the practice of devotion (*bhakti*).²⁰ A devotee thinks of God and God alone. Unless there is total control over the mind, one-pointed devotion to God to the exclusion of other things will be impossible for a devotee. As in the case of Advaita, the sevenfold discipline is also intended to chasten the mind in its entire ramifications — thinking, feeling, and willing. Purification of the body is the first requirement. Since bodily purity is conducive to mental purity, the discipline starts with it. The first requirement is technically called *viveka*. The second requirement known as *vimoka* calls for mental detachment through overcoming desire and aversion. *Abhyāsa*, which is the third requirement, refers to the repeated contemplation on God as the indwelling Self in everything, sentient as well as insentient. The fourth requirement called *kriyā* insists on the performance of fivefold duty to gods, preceptors, forefathers, fellow human beings, and subhuman beings. *Kalyāṇa*, which is the fifth requirement, is a complement to the previous one, since it takes care of the inner side of a person. It calls for the cultivation of virtues such as truthfulness, integrity, compassion, benevolence, and non-violence. It may be noted that these virtues, so far as

their scope is concerned, are not only self-regarding, but also other-regarding. While the sixth requirement called *anavasāda* refers to the absence of despair in a devotee, the seventh one called *anuddharṣa* refers to the absence of exultation.

Two observations about the sevenfold discipline are necessary at this stage. First of all, what is implicit in the fourfold discipline of Advaita has been brought out explicitly here. While the former does not make any reference to the body, the latter explicitly refers to the bodily aspect of the discipline. Inasmuch as the mind functions in the body, the body too must be controlled as part of the total discipline. Secondly, the scope of the sevenfold discipline is wider than that of the fourfold discipline. Human life must be viewed in the context of the past, the present, and the future, of those who are living and those who are dead, of those who are above and those who are below in the scale of evolution. The fourth requirement called *kriyā* has special significance in the context of the cultural, spiritual, parental, social, and natural heritage which moulds the life of every person; and so everyone is called upon to discharge one's obligation to the gods who have bestowed the cultural heritage, to the preceptors who have transmitted the spiritual heritage, to the forefathers who have contributed to the psycho-physical heritage, to the fellow human beings and subhuman species who have provided the social heritage in the larger sense of the term, and to the physical world which has provided the natural heritage. So the personal and the trans-personal dimension of one's life gets regulated in the total discipline as envisaged here. In other words, the disci-

pline aims at self-integration and social-integration of a person.

5. *The Meaning of Self-integration*

The philosophical explanation of the term "self-integration" has not been given so far, though its significance in the present context has been conveyed. The two schools of Vedānta to which reference was made earlier explain it in two different ways; and both the explanations highlight the importance of self-integration. The verb "disintegrate" means to separate into component parts, to lose cohesion. To "integrate" means to make a whole, to gain cohesion. The term "self-integration" means achieving wholeness, or unity, or cohesion, by oneself. The prefix "self" is used here in the sense of "by oneself". The term also means integration of the Self, *i.e.* wholeness, or cohesion, or unity, of the Self. Here, the use of the expression "self-integration" in the sense of the integration of the Self is similar to the use of the expression "self-knowledge" in the sense of the knowledge of the Self.

Let us first consider the explanation of the term from the standpoint of Viśiṣṭādvaita. As pointed out earlier, a human being is a complex entity consisting of Spirit and matter, or the Self and the not-Self. The chief components of matter are mind, senses, and body. All these three, as components of matter, are different from the Self. Without going into the complicated discussion about the different bodies (*śarīra*), we may speak of these three components collectively as "body", which is the material adjunct of the Self. Rāmānuja gives a

philosophical definition of "body" in terms of three criteria." "Body", according to him, is that which is supported by the Self, which is controlled by the Self, and which exists in order to subserve the purpose of the Self. On the basis of this definition he holds that the body is subordinate to the Self, which is the principal. A human being in whom the principal-subordinate relation between the Self and the body is not upset is one who functions as an integrated whole, one who maintains cohesion or unity of the two — the spiritual and the material; such a person will lead a purposive life treading the uncommon path. Understanding the nature of the Self in relation to the body on the one hand, and the nature of God in relation to the Self and the entire physical world, a human being can achieve integration by oneself (*i.e.* self-integration) taking advantage of the sevenfold discipline. It follows that one who achieves self-integration will, spontaneously, be in harmony with the society, *i.e.* will integrate oneself with the society. Such a one, in the words of the *Bhagavad-gītā*, will not afflict society and also will not be afflicted by society."

Like Viśiṣṭādvaita, Advaita also maintains that the Self is different from the mind-sense-body complex with which it is associated in the empirical life. However, in our daily life, not knowing the real nature of the Self we identify it with the body, the senses, and the mind and transact our business of life. Consider, for example, the various claims that we make such as (1) "I am fat/lean," (2) "I am blind/deaf," (3) "I am happy/miserable," and so on. The "I" which signifies the Self is spoken of as characterized by the bodily feature in (1), by the features of the senses in

(2), and by the characteristics of the mind in (3), though the Self by its very nature does not possess any of these features which belong to the not-Self. In all these cases we commit the mistake of "false identification" because of ignorance. To identify the mind/senses/body with the Self, or to superimpose their characteristics on the Self is *adhyāsa* (superimposition)." According to Advaita, we carry on our daily life on the basis of "superimposition" to which we are not sensitive. It is, therefore, necessary to know the real nature of the Self, which is non-relational and to realize it through inward journey. To separate the Self from the not-Self and be one with it is to be integrated with the Self: it is to keep the Self which is a homogeneous whole as a homogeneous whole. One who achieves this is self-integrated. On the contrary, to non-separate the Self from the not-Self, *i.e.* to identify it with the not-Self, is to be dis-integrated. Dis-integration is a state in which one loses cohesion, the purpose of life. So, "isolation" or "separation" of the Self from others is the means of self-integration; and "identification" of the Self with others is the way to dis-integration. This is, indeed, true, though paradoxical. One who fails to achieve self-integration will be at the mercy of the mind and cannot, therefore, have peace. Consequently, such a one cannot live in harmony with society. So, the concept of the Self as enunciated in Advaita must be borne in mind in order to understand the paradoxical way in which self-integration and dis-integration are sought to be explained in this system.

6. "Destruction of the Mind"

We come across the expression "destruction of mind" (*manonāśa*) in the philosophico-spiritual tradi-

tion. What is meant by this expression is not the destruction of the mind, but the control of the mind. Sometimes the expression "purification of the mind" (*citta-suddhi*) is also used. For example, the Yoga system defines "Yoga" as the cessation of the modifications of the mind (*cittavṛtti-nirodha*). When the modifications of the mind are stopped, then the mind becomes quiet facilitating inward journey. Stopping the object-oriented modifications of the mind is controlling the mind. Removal of the modifications of the mind as well as the latent impressions therein is called "purification of the mind". After giving an account of the five levels of mental life (*cittabhūmi*), the Yoga system formulates a technique known as "the eight limbs of *yoga*" for the purpose of controlling the mind. It is not necessary to go into the details of the technique here.

The mind functions in three ways. Claiming individuality and separate existence, it develops the "I" - sense and plays its role as the subject of knowledge, the agent of action, and the enjoyer of the consequences of action. Secondly, it assumes manifold modifications from time to time in the form of thoughts, feelings and volitions. Thirdly, being a storehouse of latent impressions (*vāsanās*), it releases them from time to time and thereby determines the course of actions. In the words of Paul Brunton:²⁴

The persona, the mask which he (an individual) presents to the world, is only one part of his ego. The conscious nature, composed of thoughts and feelings, is the second part. The hidden store of tendencies, impulses, memories, and ideas – formerly expressed

and then reburied, or brought over, from earlier lives, and all latent — is the third part.

To unmask the mind, one has to trace the source of "I" and find out the basis from which it operates. The discovery of the source of "I", according to Ramana Maharshi, has to be made through the method of enquiry. What the Maharshi suggests is the traditional method formulated in Advaita. Since the method of enquiry proceeds backward from the mind to the Self, which is the source/ground/support of the mind, it can be called "regressive enquiry". Since the mental operations in the form of thoughts, feelings, and volitions take place as a result of *attachment* to the objects of the world, these can be overcome through the development of the spirit of detachment which, again, requires discrimination between the eternal and ephemeral. What is now left over to be tackled is the "latent impressions" stored up in the mind. Not all latent impressions are bad. Some which are good will impel the person in the right direction. The difficulty is with the bad or impure impressions (*malina-vāsanā*). The Yoga system suggests overcoming the impure impressions. Patañjali says:"

The mind becomes clarified by the practice of friendship, compassion, joy, and indifference respectively towards happiness, misery, virtue, and vice.

The mind is always troubled by desire and aversion, virtue and vice. According to Patañjali, these states can be removed by developing certain appropriate mental dispositions. All of us would like to have as much

happiness as possible, even though we do know that we do not have the adequate means or the knowhow therefor. By developing *friendly* disposition (*maitrī*) towards those who are happy and thinking that their happiness is our happiness, we can overcome desire (*rāga*). Everyone of us would like to be free from all kinds of pain; but we cannot be really free as we cannot remove all the causes of pain such as disease, enemies, and so on. The aversion/hatred (*dveṣa*) for others can be overcome by developing *compassionate* disposition (*karuṇā*) towards those who experience pain like us. Again, we regret, at some time or other, for not having done the right action, *i.e.* for not being virtuous, and also for having done the wrong action *i.e.* for being virtuous: we develop, that is to say, the feeling of remorse (*tāpaḥ*). It is possible to overcome this feeling by developing the joyous disposition (*mudita*) towards those who are virtuous, and indifference (*upekṣā*) towards those who are vicious.

Thus, the mind can help as well as hinder. It can help through the development of good mental dispositions which can counter bad mental dispositions. It can also help by remaining quiet. When it remains still, it is no more the villain, for the mind has become a non-mind. It is such a mind that is conducive to peace. Peace, therefore, originates in the mind.

NOTES

1. *Amṛtabindu Upaniṣad*, 2: "mana eva manṣyāṇām kāraṇam bandha-mokṣayoh."

2. *Bhagavadgītā*, 2.62-63.

3. *Ibid.*, Śaṅkara's commentary on these texts.
4. 12.15.
5. *Kāṭha Upaniṣad*, 1.3. 3-6
6. *Ibid.*, 2.1.11.
7. *Ibid.*, 1.3.12.
8. See Śaṅkara's commentary on the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad*, 2.1.1.
9. *Bṛhadāranyaka Upaniṣad*, 1.5.3.
10. T. H. Green, *Prolegomena to Ethics* (Oxford: 1899, Fourth Edition), p. 108.
11. See N. K. Bose, *Selections from Gandhi* (Ahmedabad: Navajivan Publication House, 1948, First Edition), p. 27.
12. T. H. Green, *op. cit.*, p. 218.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 296.
14. See *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad*, 1.1.4 and Śaṅkara's commentary thereon.
15. Paul Brunton, *The Notebooks of Paul Brunton: Volume I - Perspectives* (New York: Larson Publications, 1984), p. 134.
16. See Sadānanda, *Vedānta-sāra*: Edited and Translated by M. Hiriyanna (Poona: Oriental Book Agency, 1929), p. 2 (Sanskrit text).
17. Paul Brunton, *op. cit.*, p. 334.
18. Arthur Osborne (Ed.), *The Collected Works of Ramana Maharshi* (Tiruvannamalai: Sri Ramanasramam, 1979, Fifth Edition), p. 14. The following answer given by Ramana to a disciple is interesting: "Maturity of thought and enquiry alone removes attachment to the body, not the stations of life (*āśramas*) ... For the attachment is in the

mind while the stations pertain to the body... In order to fix the mind in the Self which is its true nature it is necessary to separate it from the family of fancies (*saṅkalpas*) and doubts (*vikalpas*), that is to renounce the family (*saṁsāra*) in the mind. This is the real asceticism." *Ibid.*, p. 63.

19. Paul Brunton, *op. cit.*, p. 334.

20. See Rāmānuja, *Śrībhāṣya*, 1.1.1. Rāmānuja quotes the authority of Vākyakāra for the sevenfold discipline. See George Thibaut (Tr.), *The Vedānta-Sūtras* with the Commentary by Rāmānuja (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1984 Reprinted), pp. 16-17.

21. Rāmānuja, *Śrībhāṣya*, 2.1.9. The three criteria are called *ādheyatvam*, *vidheyatvam*, and *śeṣatvam*.

22. 12.15.

23. Śaṅkara defines *adhyāsa* as "*atasmin tad buddhiḥ*." See the introduction in his commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra*.

24. Paul Brunton, *op. cit.*, p. 102.

25. Patañjali, *Yoga-sūtra*, 1.33.

GAUḌAPĀDA*

T. M. P. Mahadevan

1

Gauḍapāda, like most of the classical Indian thinkers, lives in our memories mainly through his work. Tradition regards Gauḍapāda as Śaṅkara's *paramaguru* (preceptor's preceptor). A verse which contains the succession list of the early teachers of the Advaita gives the names of those teachers in the following order: Nārāyaṇa, the lotus-born Brahmā, Vasiṣṭha, Śakti, his son Parāśara, Vyāsa, Śuka, the great Gauḍapāda, Govinda-yogīndra, his disciple Śaṅkarācārya, and then his four pupils Padmapāda, Hastāmalaka, Troṭaka and the Vārtikakāra (*i.e.* Sures'vara).¹

From this list we learn that Gauḍapāda was the preceptor of Govinda who was Śaṅkara's *guru*. The first teacher is Nārāyaṇa, the Lord himself; and the line of succession, which is from father to son up to

*Courtesy: *Preceptors of Advaita*, Secunderabad, 1968, pp. 22-42.

Śuka, consists more or less of mythical persons. The first teacher of whose historicity we may be sure is Gauḍapāda; and from him onwards we have the rule *sannyāsins* succeeding to the Advaita pontificate. With him commences, according to tradition, what may be called the *mānava-saṁpradāya* in the present age of *Kali*; he was the first *human* preceptor to receive the wisdom of the One and impart it to his pupils. Ānandagiri, in his gloss (*ṭīkā*) on the *Māṇḍūkya-Kārikā-bhāṣya*, says that the teacher Gauḍapāda in those days spent his time in Badarikāsrama, the holy residence of Nara-Nārāyaṇa, in deep meditation on the Lord, and that the Lord, Nārāyaṇa, greatly pleased, revealed to him the Upaniṣadic wisdom. Bāla-kṛṣṇānanda Sarasvatī (17th century A.D.) writes in his *Śārīrakamīmāṃsābhāṣya-vārtika* that there was in the country of Kurukṣetra a river called Hīrarāvātī, on whose banks there were some Gauḍa people (people of Gauḍadesa, the modern North Bengal); that the pre-eminent of them, Gauḍapāda, was absorbed in deep meditation beginning from the *Dvāpara* age; and so, as his proper name is not known to the moderns, he is celebrated by the class-name of the Gauḍas.

Gauḍapāda, after he was blessed with the intuitive wisdom of the Absolute, must have taught those who gathered round him the truth he had discovered and embodied it in a work which came to be called the *Āgamaśāstra* or *Gauḍapāda-kārikā*. It is an exposition of a short but important Upaniṣad called the *Māṇḍūkya*, which is counted as one of the principal Upaniṣads by all the schools of Vedānta. Besides the *Māṇḍūkyakārikā*, six other works are attributed to Gauḍapāda. They are: a *vṛtti* on the *Uttaragītā*, a

bhāṣya on the *Sāṅkhyakārikā*, a commentary on the *Nṛsiṃhottaratāpinyupaniṣad*, a *bhāṣya* on *Durgāsaṣṭaśatī* and two independent Tāntric treatises, viz., *Subhagodaya* and *Śrīvidyāratnasūtra*. Since nothing definite can be said regarding the authorship of these other works, we shall here attempt a study of the philosophy of Gauḍapāda as it is set forth in the *Māṇḍūkyakārikā*.

2

Gauḍapāda's *Kārikā*, which is more than a verse-commentary on the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad*, contains the quintessence of the teaching of Vedānta.² The work consists of 215 couplets arranged in four chapters. Following the Upaniṣad, the first chapter, Āgama-prakaraṇa, analyses the three *avasthās*, waking, dream, and deep sleep, and finds that the Self which is referred to as the Turiya underlines and transcends these changing states. The second chapter, Vaitasthya-prakaraṇa, seeks to establish the illusoriness of the world of plurality, on the analogy of dreams, and through a criticism of creationistic hypotheses. The third chapter, Advaita-prakaraṇa, sets forth the arguments for the truth of non-dualism, gives citation from scripture in support thereof, and discusses the path to the realisation of non-duality, called *Asparśa-yoga*. The last chapter, *Alātasānti-prakaraṇa*, repeats some of the arguments of the earlier chapters, shows the unintelligibility of the concept of causality through dialectic, explains the illusoriness of the phenomenal world, comparing it to the non-real designs produced by a fire-brand (*alāta*) and pressing into service modes of Bauddha reasoning, and establishes the supreme truth of non-duality which is unoriginated, eternal, self-luminous bliss.

3

The central theme of Gauḍapāda's philosophy is that nothing is even born (*ajāti*), not because 'nothing' is the ultimate truth, as in Śūnya-vāda, but because the Self is the only reality. 'No *jīva* is born; there is no cause for such birth; this is the supreme truth, nothing whatever is born.' From the standpoint of the Absolute there is no duality, there is nothing finite or non-eternal. The Absolute alone *is*; all else is appearance, illusory and non-real. They are deluded who take the pluralistic universe to be real. Empirical distinctions of knower and object known, mind and matter, are the result of Māyā. One cannot explain how they arise. But on enquiry they will be found to be void of reality. If one sees them, it is like seeing the foot-prints of birds in the sky.⁴ The Self is unborn; there is nothing else to be born. Duality is mere illusion; non-duality is the supreme truth.⁵

4

Gauḍapāda expounds his philosophy of non-origination or non-birth in several ways and through many an argument. The reality of the non-dual self he first establishes through an enquiry into the purport of the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad*. Though extremely brief, the *Māṇḍūkya* contains the essentials of Vedānta. For the liberation of those who desire release, says the *Muktiko-paṇiṣad*, the *Māṇḍūkya* alone is enough.⁶ The *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad* begins with the equation 'Om = all = Brahman = self' and proceeds to describe the three states of the waking, dream and sleep, as well as the fourth (*turīya*) which is not a state alongside the others but the transcendent nature of the self — the non-dual

peace, the self *per se*. Gauḍapāda makes this declaration of the Upaniṣad the basis of his metaphysical quest and seeks to show through reasoning that non-origination is the final truth.

Viśva, Taijasa, and Prājña are the names by which the self is known in the three states, waking, dream, and sleep. Viśva is conscious of the external world, enjoys what is gross and is satisfied therewith. Taijasa is conscious of what is within,⁷ enjoys what is subtle and finds satisfaction there. Prājña is a consciousness-mass without the distinction of seer and seen; its enjoyment and satisfaction is bliss. The three, Viśva, Taijasa, and Prājña, are not distinct selves. It is one and the same self that appears as three.⁸ To show that all the three aspects are present in waking, Gauḍapāda assigns localities to them. Viśva has its seat in the right eye; Taijasa in the mind; and Prājña in the ether of the heart.⁹ And the three should also be thought of as identical with the three cosmic forms of the self, Virāṭ, Hiraṇyagarbha, and Avyākṛta or Īśvara. It is to indicate this identity that the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad* describes the Prājña-self as the lord of all the knower of all, the controller of all, the source of all, the origin and end of beings.¹⁰ The recognition of Viśva, Taijasa, and Prājña in the waking state, and the identification of the three individual forms of the self with the three cosmic forms, are for the purpose of realising non-duality.

The non-dual reality is the Turīya. It has no distinguishing name; hence it is called 'the forth' (*turīya*).¹¹ It is the self-luminous self, changeless, non-dual, one without a second. The states that change and pass, with their words and enjoyments, are illusory, products

of *Māyā*. *Māyā* is two-fold in its functioning; it veils the one and projects the many. Non-apprehension of the real (*tattva-'pratibodha*) and the apprehension of it otherwise (*anyathā-grahaṇa*.) For the Prājñā in the state of sleep there is non-apprehension alone, and not misapprehension. It knows neither the self in its real nature for the not-self. The Turīya is free from both the aspects of *Māyā*. It is consciousness *per se*, without even a trace of ignorance. It is unfailing light, omniscient sight.¹³ The metaphysical implication of sleep is that it hides the true, and of dream that it projects the untrue. *Viśva* and *Taijasa* are associated with dream and sleep; Prājñā is associated with dreamless sleep; for the Turīya there is neither dream nor sleep. Real awakening comes with the realisation of the Turīya, with the transcendence of *Māyā* in its double role of veiling the real and showing up the non-real. When the jīva wakes from the beginningless sleep of illusion, it knows its true nature as unborn, as that in which there is neither sleep nor dream nor duality.¹³

In the *Alātaśānti-prakaraṇa*,¹⁴ Gauḍapāda teaches the same theory of the three *avasthās*, employing Bauddha terminology. Waking, dream, and sleep are there called *laukika*, *śuddha-laukika*, and *lokottara* respectively. The difference between the first two is that while in the former there are external objects (*śavastu*), in the latter there is none (*avastu*); but in both there is consciousness of duality (*sopālamḃha*). In the *lokottara* there is neither the external world of things nor the internal world of ideas, and consequently there is no apprehension of duality; ignorance, however persists. It is only he who knows these three as non-real states that knows the truth. For him there is no duality, nor

ignorance, the seed of duality. When the real is known, there is not the world of duality.¹⁵

As a result of the inquiry into the *avasthās* it must be evident that the pluralistic world is illusory, as the self alone is real. That the world which we take to be real in waking is illusory, Gauḍapāda seeks to establish in the Vaitasthya-prakaraṇa on the analogy of the dream-world. Judged by the standards of waking, it will be readily seen that the world of dreams is unreal. A person may dream of elephants and chariots, but on waking he realises that all of them must have been illusory because they appeared within him, within the small space of his body.¹⁶ The dream-contents do not form part of the external world which we take to be real in waking; and so they are illusory. Nor do they conform to the laws of space and time which govern the waking world. In a trice of waking time one may travel far and wide in dream. There is no real going to the place of dream, for on waking one does not find oneself there. Nor are the objects experienced in dream real, for when the dream-spell is broken one does not see them.¹⁷ Because chariot, etc. seen in dream are non-existent, they are illusory.¹⁸

The world of waking is in many respects similar to that of dream. The objects of waking are *perceived* as the dream-objects are; and they are evanescent as well, like the contents of dream. What is non-existent in the beginning and at the end, is so even in the present.¹⁹ That is real which is not conditioned by time. *Per contra* that which is conditioned by time cannot be real. Just as the dream-objects are experienced in dream alone neither before nor after, even so the objects of waking are experienced in the state of

waking alone. A difference between the two states cannot be made out on the ground that, while the objects experienced in waking are practically efficient, those seen in dream are not; for even the objects of waking experience are fruitful in practice only in that state and not in dream; and the dream-objects are useful in their own way in the state of dream. It is true that the dream-water cannot quench actual thirst. But it is equally true that the so-called actual water cannot quench the dream-thirst either.²⁰ It may be argued that the contents of dream are unreal because, unlike the objects of waking, they are strange and abnormal. But when and to whom do they appear abnormal? To him who has returned to waking after a dream. In the dream state itself the contents are not realised to be strange. With perfect equanimity the dreamer may watch even the dismemberment of his own head. We are told that the denizens of heaven have their own peculiarities which to us are all abnormal. Similarly, from the side of waking the dream-contents may seem abnormal; but in themselves they are quite normal.²¹ That there is an essential similarity between the contents of dream and the objects of waking may be shown by a closer scrutiny of the two states. In the state of dream, the dreamer imagines certain ideas within himself and sees certain things outside; and he believes that, while the former are unreal, the latter are real. But as soon as he wakes from the dream, he realises the unreality of even the things which he saw in dream *as if* outside. Similarly in waking, we have our fancies which we know to be unreal, and we experience facts which we like to be real. But when the delusion of duality is dispelled, the so-called facts of the external world will turn out to be

illusory appearance.²² Therefore it is that the wise characterise waking as a dream.²³ Just as the dream-soul arises and perishes, the souls of waking come into being and pass away.²⁴ It is the self that posits the dream-contents as well as the external world. The things created in the mind within and those posited in the world without—both these are the illusory imaginations of the Ātman. The difference between the two sets of things is that while the dream-contents last only till the mind of the dreamer imagines them (*cittakālāh*) and are peculiar thereto, the objects of the external world are perceived by other subjects²⁵ as well (*dvaya-kālāh*) and are cognised through the sense-organs. Illusoriness (*vaitathya*), however, is common to both.²⁶ In dream as well as in waking it is the mind that moves impelled by *māyā*, and creates the appearance of plurality. As identical with the self the mind is non-dual; but owing to nescience duality is figured and there is the consequent *samsāra*.²⁷

Illustrations for illusoriness are to be found even in the state of waking. Just as in the dark a rope which is not determinately known is imagined to be a snake or a streak of water, the self is imagined to be the world through nescience. And as when the rope is known as rope the posited snake, etc., vanish, so also when the self is known as non-dual, that pluralistic world disappears.²⁸ Like the Palace city of Fairy Morgana (*gandharva-nagara*), the universe is seen but is not real.²⁹ The things of the world are believed to exist because they are perceived (*upalambhāt*) and because they answer to certain practical needs (*samācārat*). But these two reasons cannot make them real; for even the objects like the elephant conjured up by the necromancer are

observed and are practically efficient but are not real."⁹ One more illustration Gauḍapāda gives in the fourth chapter, viz., the *alāta* or fire-brand. When a fire-brand is moved, it appears to be straight, or crooked, and so on; and when the movement stops, the appearances vanish. They do not really come from the fire-brand in motion, nor do they enter into it when it comes to rest. The patterns of fire that appear with the movement of the fire-brand are illusory; they have no substance whatsoever. Similarly, consciousness appears, in manifold forms due to *māyā*. These do not come out of it, in reality, nor do they return to it; for they are naught."¹⁰ There is no dissolution, no origination; no one in bondage, no one who desires release, no one who is released — this is the supreme truth."¹¹

5

The establishment of the non-reality of the world by Gauḍapāda does not mean that the great teacher subscribes to the view of ontological unreality (*Śūnyavāda*). We have already seen how in the *Āgama-prakaraṇa* he expounds the meaning of the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad* and shows through an inquiry into the nature of three *avasthās* that the Self (*turiya*) is the sole reality. That this is so Gauḍapāda argues through reasoning in the *Advaitaprakaraṇa* and cites in support the evidence of passages from other scriptural texts as well.

The self is unlimited like ether, undivided and the same throughout. The *jīvas* are apparent distinctions therein, as pots, etc., produce in ether divisions as it were. We speak of a plurality of souls and multiplicity of material objects, even as we speak of pot-ether,

pitcher-ether, and so on. The one Ātman appears as the many jīvas, as the same ether seems divided, enclosed in different things. When the things are destroyed, the distinctions in ether too vanish; so also when the jīvas are realised to be manifestations due to *māyā*, the self alone remains. There is no contingency of the defects of the jīva being occasioned in the other jīvas or the defects of the jīvas defiling the purity of the self. It must be noted that Gauḍapāda's theory is not *ekajīva-vāda* but *ekātma-vāda*. Since the empirical plurality of jīvas is recognised, there is not the contingency of the defects of one jīva being occasioned in the others or the experiences of one being confused with those of the rest. And by the defilements of the jīvas the self is not affected, as dust, smoke, etc., present in the pots or pitchers do not make ether foul. Forms, functions, and names differ from object to object; but there is no difference in ether. Similarly, the jīvas vary in their physical make-up, mental and moral endowment, in station and status; but the self is unvarying, formless, functionless, and nameless. Just as children attribute wrongly dirt, etc., to the sky, the ignorant superimpose on the unsullied self defects like birth and death, pleasure and pain. But these are changes that are not real and do not touch the self. The birth of the jīvas and their death, their coming and going, do not alter the Ātman. They are not products of the self, nor are they parts thereof. The non-dual reality is partless; it neither cause anything, nor is caused by anything."

Scripture in many places proclaims the non-duality of the self and deprecates the delusion of duality. Through an inquiry into the five sheaths (*kośas*) that cover the soul, the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad*" exhibits the

self as the non-dual bliss, not to be confused with the mutable coverings. In the 'Honey section' of the *Bṛhad-āraṇyaka*³⁵ the principle behind the cosmic elements is identified with the self which is the substrate of the body and its functions. What is without is within as well. The same 'honey' pervades all beings. It is immortal, the self, Brahman, the all. As the spokes are fixed in the nave of a wheel, so are all beings centred in the self. Thus scripture declares the non-difference of the jīva from the self and denounces plurality. Difference is illusory; the one appears as many through *māyā*. "There is no plurality here."³⁶ "Indra through *māyās* assumes diverse forms."³⁷ "Though unborn he appears variously born."³⁸ The *Īśāvāsya*³⁹ denies birth of the self and the *Bṛhad-āraṇyaka* asks, "Who indeed could produce him?"⁴⁰ Of what is real birth incomprehensible; and what is unreal cannot even be born.⁴¹

It is true that in some contexts scripture speaks of creation. Through the illustrations of clay, metal, sparks, etc., creation of the many from the one is described. But this is only to enable those who are dull-witted and muddled to understand the fundamental unity of reality. Śruti declares creation in some places, and non-creation in others. The two sets of passages cannot have equal validity. That teaching should be taken as the purport of scripture which is ascertained through inquiry (*niścitam*) and is reasonable (*yukti-yuktam*). If birth is predicated of the real, it must be in the sense of an illusion, and not in the primary sense. The self is unborn, sleepless and dreamless, nameless and formless, self-luminous and all-knowing.⁴²

6

That the self is unborn and that nothing else there is which is born, Gauḍapāda seeks to demonstrate through a dialectical criticism of the causal category in the fourth chapter. Causation, like all other relations, falls within the realm of nescience, because on analysis it turns out to be unintelligible. There are two rival views on causation which are totally opposed to each other. The Sāṅkhya theory is that the effect is pre-existent in the cause and is not produced *de novo*. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view is that the effect is non-existent prior to its production. On either of these hypotheses there will not result causation. If the effect is already existent, there is no need for any causal operation; it is meaningless to say that what is existent is born. If the effect is non-existent, it can never be produced; what is non-existent like the barren woman's son is not at any time seen to take birth." Even without their knowing the two rival schools, *satkārya-vāda* and *asatkārya-vāda*, are thus seen to support the view of non-creation or non-origination."

Of what is really unborn the disputants predicate birth. But this is a flagrant violation of the law of contradiction. How can that which is unborn and therefore immortal become mortal? The immortal cannot become mortal, nor the mortal immortal; for it is impossible for a thing to change its nature. If what is by nature immortal were to become mortal, then it would cease to be changeless, and attain artificiality, illusoriness. But this is impossible for what is immortal by nature. The Sāṅkhya thinks that the unborn and beginningless Prakṛti evolves itself into the manifold evolutes that constitute the universe. But

this view cannot be justified by any canon of logic. If Prakṛti becomes the world, it cannot be unborn (*aja*) and eternal (*nitya*). Even to admit that there is a first cause is to confess the failure of causation as a principle of explanation. To add to the confusion the Sāṅkhya says that the effect is non-different from the cause. Now, is the effect born or unborn? If it is born, it cannot be non-different from the cause which is unborn. If it is unborn, then it cannot be called 'effect', as the effect is that which is *produced*. And if the effect is produced and is non-different from the cause, the cause cannot be permanent or unchanging. There is no illustration that could be instanced to prove the production of the effect from the unborn cause. If to avoid this difficulty it be said that the cause too is born, then there should be a cause for that cause, a still further cause for that other cause, and so on *ad infinitum*.⁴⁵

The Mīmāṃsakas maintain that the cause and the effect are reciprocally dependent. Merit and demerit are responsible for producing the body; and the body occasions merit and demerit. The chain of causes and effects is without beginning, each alternating with the other, like the seed and the sprout. Here again we meet with insuperable difficulties. If the antecedent of a cause is its effect and the antecedent of an effect is its cause, then both cause and effect are begun. How can they be beginningless? Moreover, there is a paradox in the very thesis that is proposed. To say that the antecedent of the cause is its effect is like saying that the son begets his father.⁴⁶ There must be some definite sequence recognised as between cause and effect. It is no use believing that the two are reciprocally dependent. If the cause and the effect can be indifferently

antecedent or consequent, there would be no distinction whatever between them," and to call one a cause and the other an effect would be entirely arbitrary and void of meaning. Now, there are three possible ways of stating the sequence. It may be said that first there is the cause and subsequently the effect takes place (*pūrva-krama*); or it may be held that the effect is followed by the cause (*apara-krama*); or it may be thought that the cause and the effect are simultaneous (*saha-krama*). None of these alternatives is intelligible. That the cause cannot produce the effect we have shown already. If the cause is unborn, it cannot change and therefore cannot produce; if it is born there is infinite regress. The reverse order too is impossible; for, as we said, it is just like making the son antecedent to the father. The effect by definition is that which is produced by the cause; and if the cause is not there before the effect, how can the effect be produced? And from the un-produced effect how can the cause come into being? The third alternative also is untenable. If what are simultaneous be causally related, there must be such a relation between the two horns of an animal. But as a matter of experience it is well known that the two horns are not so related. This, then, is the crux of the problem. Without settling the sequence, the distinction of cause and effect would be unintelligible. And it is impossible to settle the sequence. In despair, appeal might be made to the illustration of seed and sprout. But a little thought would reveal that these — seed and sprout — cannot serve as illustration. It is only when the causal sequence has been settled that the relation between seed and sprout would become intelligible. Since the latter is a particular falling under the wider relation of cause and effect, it cannot

be used as an illustration. It is, in short, *sādhya-sama*, still to be proved.⁴⁷

A thing is not produced either from-itself or from another. A pot is not produced from the self-same pot, nor from another pot. It may be urged that pot is produced from clay. But how is pot related to clay. Is it non-different, different, or both different and non-different from it? If pot is non-different from clay, it cannot be produced, since clay is already existent. If it is different, there is no reason why it should not be produced from another pot or a piece of cloth which are also different. And it cannot be both different and non-different, because of contradiction. Similarly, neither the existent nor the non-existent nor what is existent and non-existent can be produced. It is meaningless to say that what exists is produced. The non-existent cannot be produced even because of its non-existence. The third alternative involves us in contradiction⁴⁸

It is true that empirical distinctions are observed between knower and known, pain and the source of pain, etc. From the standpoint of reasoning based on relative experience (*yukti-darśanāt*), there is difference as also causal relation governing the different. But from the standpoint of the Absolute (*bhūta-darśanāt*) there is no difference and the concept of cause is unintelligible.⁴⁹

7

Gauḍapāda admits creation in the sphere of the empirical. But creation, according to him, is neither *de novo* nor transformation of an original stuff. It is of the nature of *māyā*, illusory manifestation or transfi-

guration. The world is not related to the self either as a piece of cloth to the threads or as curds to milk. In fact, no relation is intelligible. The one reality somehow appears as the pluralistic universe through its own *māyā* (*ātma-māyā*). The complexes that constitute the world are projections, like the dream-contents; effected by the illusion of the Ātman.¹⁰ Things are said to be born only from the standpoint of empirical truth (*samvrtīsatya*); they have therefore no permanence. Just as an illusive sprout shoots from an illusive seed, all things arise from *māyā*.¹¹

There are several theories of creation. Some philosophers favour materialistic origins for the world. For example, there are thinkers who attribute the origination of the universe to Time. Theists, however, regard God as the first cause of things. Some of them ascribe to Him efficient causality alone, others both efficient and material causality. The former say that creation is the mere volition of the Lord, while the latter hold that it is His expansion. Some maintain that God creates for the sake of His enjoyment. Others urge that creation is His sport. But how can desire be in God who is *āpta-kāma* and has no end to achieve? In our ignorance we must content ourselves with saying that creation is His nature or *māyā*. Like dream and magic it is illusory.¹² The non-dual is imagined to be the manifold world. The latter is neither different from the self nor identical therewith. Hence it is declared to be indeterminable.¹³

The philosophers of the different schools characterise the real in different ways and give their own schemes of categories. Each emphasises one particular aspect of reality and holds on to it as if it were the whole.

The self has been variously conceived as life, elements, constituents of Primal Nature, things, worlds, Vedas, sacrifice, what is subtle, what is gross, what has form, what has no form, and so on. According to the Sāṅkhyas, there are twentyfive *tattvas* or principles. To these, the followers of the Yoga system add one more, *viz.*, God. In the view of the Pāsupatas, there are twenty-one categories. There are others who make the categories endless in number. All these theories are but the imaginations of their respective advocates.⁶⁶ There is only one self which appears as many through self-delusion as it were.⁶⁷ First the *jīvas* are imagined and then the various things, external and internal. The world of souls and things is an appearance superposed on the self, as the snake-form is imposed on the rope-substance in the dark.⁶⁸

The teaching of creation has no final purport. As has been shown already, what is real cannot really be born. If it is said to be born, it must be in the sense of an illusory appearance.⁶⁹ Ordinarily it is stated that *samsāra* which has no beginning comes to an end when release is attained. But this is figurative language. If *samsāra* had no beginning, it could not have an end. If release is attained, it is liable to be lost again.⁷⁰ If the universe really existed, it would be destroyed. As we have observed, duality is *māyā-mātra*, mere illusion. Removal of *samsāra* and attainment of *mokṣa* are figurative. These have to be taught in language which needs must relate to duality. When the real is known, there is no duality whatever.⁷¹

8

True to its character as an *upadeśa-śāstra*, the *Gauḍapādakārikā* contains practical teaching at the end

of each chapter. The purpose of a *śāstra* is to enable the aspirant to cross the sea of *samsāra* and reach the shore of blessedness which is the highest human goal (*parama-puruṣārtha*). The vicious circle of empirical life dependent on the law of cause and effect is evil (*anartha*). This, however, as has been shown above, is a product of *avidyā* or *māyā*. As long as there is an obstinate faith in causality which is illusory (*āvidyaka*), the chain of birth and death will not cease. When that false belief is destroyed through knowledge, *samsāra* is removed.⁶⁰ The cause of birth and death is ignorance as regards the ultimate truth which is causeless. When this is realised, there is no further cause for metempsychosis, and we attain release which is freedom from sorrow, desire, and fear. Attachment to the non-real is responsible for the illusory wanderings in the wilderness of *samsāra*. When one becomes non-attached through knowledge, one turns back from the false pursuit of the non-real and reaches the non-dual reality which is homogenous and unborn.⁶¹

The real bliss is veiled and the non-real sorrow is projected on account of the perfection of illusory plurality. Enshrouded by the darkness of ignorance, those of immature knowledge (*bāliśāḥ*) dispute about what they consider to be the nature of reality. Some say, it is; some, it is not; others, it is and is not; yet others, it neither is nor is not.⁶² All these are *krpaṇas*, narrow-minded, who see fear in the fearless,⁶³ and follow the way of difference, getting themselves engrossed therein. Opposed to these are the great knowers (*mahājñānāḥ*) who are settled in their wisdom about the unborn, unchanging reality.⁶⁴

The knowledge which saves is not that which remains a mere theoretical comprehension, but that which has become a direct experience. Study of scripture, ethical discipline, detachment from objects of sense and intense longing for release — these are essential for realising the self. The aspirant should learn the purport of the Veda and acquire freedom from passions like attachment, fear, and anger (*vīta-rāga-bhaya-krodhaḥ*); and he should fix his thoughts on the non-dual reality. Gauḍapāda teaches two methods of concentrating the mind on the non-dual, Praṇavayoga in the first chapter and Asparśa-yoga in the third. These are to serve as auxiliaries to the knowledge of the Absolute, methods to loosen the cords of ignorance.

Asparśa-yoga is the yoga of transcendence, whereby one realises the supra-relational reality. *Saṅkalpa* is the root of activity and bondage. The mind contemplates objects and gets distracted and shattered with the result that there is no peace or happiness. Acceptance and desistance are motivated by the centrifugal tendency of thought-process. The out-going mind should be called back and controlled. Controlling the mind is difficult, indeed, as difficult as emptying the ocean drop by drop by the tip of *kuśa* grass. But it is not an impossible task; only it requires relentless effort. If the mind is restrained through discrimination, the end will certainly be reached. One must remember first that all is misery and turn back from desires and enjoyments. The mind that moves out must be brought to unity. But in this process care must be taken that it does not fall into sleep. When the mind goes to sleep, it must be awakened; when it tries to go out, it must be calmed. When the stormy mind is stilled, there is the

thrill of quietitude. But one should not revel even in this *yogic* trance. Anything that is *enjoyed* must belong to duality; it cannot be unlimited or lasting happiness. The mind must become non-mind (*amanībhāva*); the relations of subject and object, enjoyer and enjoyment must be transcended. This will come only through the knowledge of the non-dual self. Knowledge and the self are not different. Knowledge is the self or Brahman. Hence it is said that through the unborn (knowledge) the unborn (Brahman) is known.⁶⁶ Self-established, the unborn knowledge attains its natural equanimity or sameness. This is called *Asparśa-yoga*, the yoga which is pleasing and good to all beings, and which is beyond dispute and contradiction.⁶⁷

The same end may be reached through meditation on OM (*Praṇavayoga*). 'Om' is the term indicative of the Brahman-self. It consists of three *mātras*, *a*, *u*, *m*, and a soundless fourth which is *amātra*; *a* stands for *Viśva*, *u* for *Taijasa*, and *m* for *Prājña*. Meditation on the significance of the three sounds respectively will lead to the realisation of the three aspects of the self. The sound 'om' proceeds from and is resolved in the soundless *amātra*. Similarly, the *turīya* is the absolute which is unchanging and non-dual, but which appears as many and changing. When the meaning of the soundless culmination of Om is realised, there is leading to or attainment of anything; for the *turīya* is no other than real and only self. Thus the *Praṇava* is to be meditated upon and known. It is the beginning, middle and end of all things. It is the lord established in the heart of all beings. There is nothing before it nor anything after it, nothing outside it nor anything other than it. Understanding the *Praṇava* in this manner, one attains the Supreme.⁶⁸

Mokṣa or release is not a *post-mortem* state; it can be realised even here (*iha*), while in embodiment.⁶⁹ To speak of it as an attainment or realisation is but figurative. It is the eternal and inalienable nature of the self. He who knows this is realised, he is a *jīvan-mukta*. Because he has attained full omniscience and is free from the delusion of duality, there is nothing for him which he can desire.⁷⁰ He is not elated by praise nor depressed by blame. He does not offer obeisance to any, nor does he perform any rite. He has no fixed home, and subsists on what comes his way. He lies like a non-conscious being, and lives as he likes.⁷¹ Though he has no obligations, his conduct can never be immoral. Virtues like humility, equanimity, calmness, and self-control are natural to him.⁷² His is the immortal state which is difficult to be seen, very deep, unborn, ever the same, and fearless.⁷³ He sees the truth everywhere. He delights in the truth and does not swerve from it. He is the truth.⁷⁴

9

From the account of Gauḍapāda's philosophy given above it will be clear that this great teacher was an Advaitin, the earliest known to us — who in his *Kārikā* laid the foundations of a philosophy which was to become a glorious edifice through the immortal work of Śaṅkara. While making use of logical reasoning and the dialectical method, he does not deviate from the teaching of the Upaniṣads. Even where he employs Bauddha terminology, he takes care to point out that his system should not be confused with Buddhism. While denying absolute reality to the world, he is firm in proclaiming that the non-dual Brahman-self is the supreme truth. He has no quarrel with any system of

philosophy because, in his view, all systems if properly understood are pointers to non-duality. While the dualists oppose one another, the doctrine of non-duality does not conflict with them.¹⁹ *Ajāti* or the unborn reality is the final goal of all metaphysical quest.

NOTES

1. नारायणं पद्मभुवं वसिष्ठं शक्तिञ्च तत्पुत्रपराशरञ्च
 व्यासं शुकं गौडपदं महान्तं गोविन्दयोगीन्द्रमथास्य
 शिष्यम् ।
 श्रीशङ्कराचार्यमथास्य पद्मपादञ्च हस्तामलकञ्च शिष्यम्
 तं त्रोटकं वार्तिककारमन्यान् अस्मद्गुरुन्
 सन्ततमानतोऽस्मि ॥

*nārāyaṇam padma-bhavam vasiṣṭham śaktim ca
 tat putra parāśaram ca,
 vyāsam śukam gauḍapadam mahāntam
 govīna yogīnram atnāsya-śiṣyam,
 śrī-śaṅkarācāryam athāsya padmapādam, ca
 hastāmalakam ca śiṣyam,
 tam troṭakam vārtikakāram anyān asmad-gurūn santatam
 ānato'smi.*

2. वेदान्तार्थसारसङ्ग्रहभूतम् ।

The commentator on the *Kārikā* says: *vedāntārtha-sāra-saṅgraha bhūtam.*

3. न कश्चिज्जायते जीवः सम्भवोऽस्य न विद्यते ।
 एतत्तदुत्तमं सत्यं यत्र किञ्चिन्न जायते ॥

III, 48; IV, 71.

*na kaścij-jāyate jīvaḥ sambhavo 'sya na vidyate,
 etat-tad uttamam satyam yatra kiñcin-na jāyate.*

4. IV, 28.

5. मायामात्रमिदं द्वैतं अद्वैतं परमार्थतः ।

I, 17, *māyā-mātram idam dvaitam advaitam paramārthataḥ.*

6. *Muktikā*, I, 26.

7. The distinctions of 'within' and 'without', it must be remembered, are from the standpoint of waking experience; for it is in this state that inquiry is possible.

8. एक एव त्रिधा स्मृतः ।

I, i.: *eka eva tridhā smṛtaḥ.*

9. I, 2. See commentary.

10. *Māṇḍūkya*, 6.

11. Here again it must be noted that the real is called 'the fourth' from the empirical standpoint; in truth, the category of number is inapplicable to it.

12. तुरीयः सर्वदृक् सदा ।

I, 12, *turīyaḥ sarvadyk sadā.*

13. I. 13. 16.

14. IV, 87, 88.

15. ज्ञाते द्वैतं न विद्यते ।

I, 18, *jñāte dvaitam na vidyate.*

16. II, i; IV, 33.

17. II, 2.

18. II, 3; see *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, IV, iii, 10

19. आदावन्ते च यन्नास्ति वर्तमानेऽपि तत्तथा ।

II, 6; IV, 31.

ādāvante ca yan-nāsti vartamāne'pi tat tathā.

20. II, 7; IV, 32.

21. II, 8. See J. A. C. Murray, B. D.: *An Introduction to a Christian Psycho-Therapy* (T. & T. Clark), p. 252. Waking consciousness is, after all a limited affair, narrowed by the immediacies of the five senses, and concentrated at every

moment on but one moving point. In dreams, we seem to enter a wider kingdom, freed from the fears and restraints of normal life, a field where earthly forces and laws are set at naught, and where the whole immensity of the sub-conscious can have freer speech, and like a rising tide, submerge the petty logics of our daily life.

22. II, 9 & 10; IV, 63-66.

23. स्वप्नजागरिते स्थाने ह्येकमाहुर्मनीषिणः ।

II, 5. *svapna-jāgarite sthāne hyekam āhur manīṣiṇaḥ.*

An ancient Chinese sage said: "Last night I dreamt that I was a butterfly and now I do not know whether I am a man dreaming that he is a butterfly or a butterfly dreaming that he is a man."

24. IV, 68.

25. Who are also positions of the supreme Self.

26. II, 11-15.

27. III, 29, 30; IV, 61, 62.

28. II, 17, 18.

29. II, 31.

30. IV, 44.

31. IV, 47-52.

32. न निरोधो न चोत्पत्तिर्न बद्धो न च साधकः ।

न मुमुक्षुर्न वै मुक्त इत्येषा परमार्थता ॥ II, 32.

*na nirodho na cotpattirna baddho na ca sādhaḥ
na mumukṣurna vai mukta ityeṣā paramārthatā.*

33. III, 3-9.

34. Second vallī.

35. II, v.

36. Bṛh. Up., IV, iv, 19; Kaṭha Up., IV, 11.

37. R̥g Veda, VI, 47, 18; Bṛh. Up., II, v, 19.

38. Tait. Ār., III, 13, 1.
 39. Īśa, 12.
 40. III, 9, 28.
 41. GK, III, 11-13, 24-26.
 42. III, 14-16, 23, 36.
 43. भूतं न जायते किञ्चिद्भूतं नैव जायते ।
 IV. 4: *bhūtaṁ na jāyate kiñcid abhūtaṁ naiva jāyate.*
 44. IV, 3-5.
 45. IV, 6-8, 11-13.
 46. पुत्राज्जन्म पितुर्यथा ।
 IV, 15, *putrāj janma pituyathā.*
 47. IV, 14-18, 20.
 48. IV, 22.
 49. IV, 24, 25.
 50. सङ्घाताः स्वप्नवत् सर्वे आत्ममायाविसर्जिताः ।
 III, 10. *saṅghātāḥ svapnavat sarve ātma-māyā-visar-*
jitāḥ.
 51. IV, 57-59.
 52. I, 7-9.
 53. II, 33, 34.
 54. II, 20-29. For details see *The Āgamaśāstra of Gauḍa-*
pāda, edited by Vidhushekhara Bhattacharya, pp. 30-37.
 55. मायैषा तस्य देवस्य ययायं मोहितः स्वयम् ।
 II: 19. *māyaiṣā tasya [dvaasya yayāyam mohitaḥ*
svayam.
 56. II, 16, 17.
 57. सतो हि मायया जन्म युज्यते न तु तत्त्वतः ।
 III, 27. *sato hi māyayā janma yujyate na tu tattvataḥ.*
 58. IV, 30.

59. I, 18.
 60. IV, 56.
 61. IV, 78-80.
 62. IV, 82-84.
 63. अभये मयदर्शिनः ।
 III, 39, *abhaye bhaya-darśinaḥ*.
 64. IV, 94, 95.
 65. II, 35, 36.
 66. अजेनाजं विबुध्यते ।
 III, 33. *ajenājaṃ vibudhyate*.
 67. III, 31-46; IV, 2.
 68. I, 19-29.
 69. IV, 89.
 70. IV, 85.
 71. II, 36, 37.
 72. IV, 86.
 73. IV, 100.
 74. II, 38.
 75. III, 17.

ŚRĪ SUREŚVARA ON ŚRĪ ŚAṆKARA

विष्णोः पादानुगां यां निखिलभवनुदं शङ्करोऽवाप योगात्
 सर्वज्ञं ब्रह्मसंस्थं मुनिगणसहितं मम्यगभ्यर्च्य भक्त्या ।
 विद्यां गङ्गामिवाहं प्रवरगुणनिधेः प्राप्य वेदान्तदीप्तां
 कारुण्यात्तामवोचं जनिमृतिनिवहध्वस्तये दुःखितेभ्यः ॥

Just as Śaṅkara (Śiva) obtained through His power of *yoga* the *Gaṅgā* which emanates from the feet of Viṣṇu and which purifies the entire world, even so Śaṅkara obtained through his power of *yoga* the knowledge which reveals the abode of Viṣṇu and which destroys the entire world of bondage. Having duly worshipped with devotion the omniscient Śaṅkara, who is ever-established in Brahman, who is surrounded by a host of sages, I obtained from him, a treasure of excellent qualities, the knowledge revealed by the *Vedānta*, even as Bhagīratha obtained from Śaṅkara (Śiva) the *Gaṅgā* spoken about in *śruti*; and I have declared it (the knowledge revealed in *Vedānta* in the *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi*) out of compassion for the benefit of the suffering people so that the course of innumerable births and deaths may be put an end to.

The *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi*, IV, 76

GOVINDA BHAGAVATPĀDA*

V. A. Devasenapati**

To be known to all posterity as the preceptor of a world teacher — Jagadguru Śrī Śaṅkarācārya — is indeed a rare honour. It evokes our sense of wonder. When we remember that Īśvara Himself was born as Śrī Śaṅkara for the spiritual rejuvenation of Hinduism, our wonder knows no bounds. But it may be asked whether a world teacher — especially if He is none other than the Supreme Lord Himself — needs a teacher. The answer is that the world will learn more readily by example rather than precept. The need for a teacher, especially in spiritual matters, is generally recognised. It is he who dispels the darkness of ignorance and frees us from all sorrow. He quickens our understanding and makes us see either what we had not seen before or what we had seen all too dimly. He makes the effulgence of wisdom which is latent in us shine forth in all its splendour. To make us realise this need for *guru*, He who is the preceptor of all pre-

* Courtesy: *Preceptors of Advaita*, pp. 43-46.

** Former Director, Radhakrishnan Institute for Advanced Study in Philosophy, University of Madras, Madras-5.

ceptors set an example by Himself sitting at the feet of a *guru*. He wants us to realise that one who has not learned to obey is not fit to command, and that one who has not himself sat at the feet of a worthy teacher, cannot become a teacher himself.

The preceptor who enjoys this honour of being the preceptor of Śrī Śaṅkara is Śrī Govinda Bhagavat-pāda. In his *pūrvāśrama*, he was Candra Śarmā, a handsome Brahmin of Kashmir. Yearning to hear Patañjali's exposition of the *vyākaraṇa* at Chidambaram, he was coming to the South. On the bank of the River Narmadā, he saw Gauḍapāda who under a curse from Patañjali for leaving the place of instruction without permission had become a Brahmarakṣas. Patañjali had decreed that the curse would be lifted when Gauḍapāda found a disciple fit enough to learn the *vyākaraṇa*. It so happened that till the arrival of Candra Śarmā, every scholar who came that way went wrong in giving the ending of a tricky word and was eaten up by the Brahmarakṣas. Candra Śarmā proved an exception. He gave the correct ending. The time for the lifting of the curse had come. Gauḍapāda asked Candra Śarmā where he was going. On being told that he was going to Chidambaram to learn at the feet of Patañjali, Gauḍapāda said that the exposition at Chidambaram was over and that he would himself teach the young man. But the condition was that without getting down from the tree on which the Brahmarakṣas sat, and without sleeping, the disciple should learn what he was taught as quickly as possible. Having no access to writing materials, Candra Śarmā made a deep scratch in his thigh and with the blood that oozed out wrote on the leaves of the tree all that he was taught.

The instruction continued night and day without a stop for nine days. The disciple thus had to go without food and sleep for nine days. On the completion of his instruction, he gathered up the leaves and tying them up into a bundle, took leave of his teacher.

According to the *Patañjali-vijaya*, a work by Rāmabhadra Dīkṣita written about 200 years ago, Candra Śarmā is none other than Patañjali himself. Feeling that Gauḍapāda was not likely to secure a suitable disciple and thus might have to languish under his curse, Patañjali took pity on him and was himself born as Candra Śarmā. This was but one more of the many roles that Patañjali played. Patañjali is none other than Ādiśeṣa. Among the roles he played, those of Lakṣmaṇa and Balarāma may be remembered.

To continue the narrative, Candra Śarmā walked some distance with his precious bundle. Overpowered by sleep and hunger, he slept for a while. On waking, he found that a sheep had eaten away part of the leaves in his bundle. He took the bundle with the remaining leaves and on reaching Ujjain, he lapsed into a state of unconsciousness on the pial of a Vaiśya. The daughter of the Vaiśya who was struck by the radiant face of Candra Śarmā found him in this state of unconsciousness on account of complete starvation and exhaustion. She fed him by applying on his body curd rice. The nourishment entered his body through the pores of the skin and Candra Śarmā woke up. He wanted to resume his journey. But the Vaiśya wanted him to marry his daughter who had saved his life. On finding him disinclined for marriage, the Vaiśya took Candra Śarmā to the king. The king who was favourably impressed by the striking appearance of Candra Śarmā wanted him to marry his own

daughter. He sent for his minister to consult him in order to see whether there was sanction in the Dharma Śāstra for such a marriage. It so happened that the minister himself had a daughter; and so he was keen on giving her in marriage to this stranger. Thus, Candra Śarmā had to marry all the three girls. He stayed with them till each of them had a son by him. Then he continued his journey to find his teacher — Gauḍapāda, from whom he had learnt the *vyākaraṇa*. Gauḍapāda had become a sannyāsin and was in Badarikāśrama. Candra Śarmā also became a sannyāsin, receiving dīkṣā from his preceptor and henceforth came to be known as Govinda Bhagavatpāda.

While Govinda Bhagavatpāda was with his teacher at Badarikāśrama, Sage Vyāsa, the author of the *Brahma-sūtra* visited them. He asked Govinda Bhagavatpāda to go to the bank of the River Narmadā and await the arrival of Śrī Śaṅkara who was the incarnation of Lord Śiva. The purpose of this incarnation was to write a commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra*. Prior to that, Śrī Śaṅkara was to be accepted formally as a disciple by Govinda Bhagavatpāda. Govind Bhagavatpāda came to the bank of the River Narmadā. It is significant that Gauḍapāda was his teacher both before and after he became a sannyāsin. It is significant again that to play the role of the teacher he was at the foot of the same tree on which he had sat earlier to receive instruction from Gauḍapāda.

Śrī Śaṅkara came to the bank of the River Narmadā and offered his salutations at the lotus-feet of Govinda Bhagavatpāda. Govinda accepted Śaṅkara as his disciple and initiated him in all *mahāvākyas*. Śaṅkara lived with his *guru* for sometime and learnt

the spiritual truth and disciplines under him. After mastering all that had to be learnt from the *guru*, Śrī Śaṅkara took leave of his master to go to Benaras, where he wrote an authoritative commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra* and preached the Advaita doctrine.

The *Patañjalicarita* which narrates briefly some facts of the life of Śaṅkara says in the last verse —

गोविन्ददेशिकमुपास्य चिराय भक्त्या
तस्मिन् स्थिते निजमहिम्नि विदेहमुक्त्या ।
अद्वैतभाष्यमुपकल्प्य दिशो विजित्य
काञ्चीपुरे स्थितिमवाप स शङ्करार्यः ॥

*govindadeśikamupāsya cirāya bhaktyā
tasmin sthite nijamahimni videhamuktyā
advaitabhāṣyamupakalpya diśo vijitya
kāñcīpure sthitim avāpa sa śaṅkarāryaḥ.**

* The writer wishes to place on record his deep sense of gratitude to His Holiness the present Śaṅkarācārya of Kāñcī for the material of this biography. (*Vide His Holiness' Madras Lectures, 1932*).

ŚAṄKARA-BHAGAVATPĀDA*

*N. Ramesan***

Ādi Śaṅkara, otherwise known as Bhagavatpāda, had a remarkable career within a short span of lifetime of thirty-two years. He was not merely an intellectual philosopher of the highest calibre, but also an ardent devotee and a mystic poet singing in ecstasy of the bliss and beauty of the Divine Mother. The austere and serene philosophy of the Upaniṣads was combined by him with a mystic ardour and fervour to produce a balanced system which would satisfy the deepest religious instincts of the people and which to this day stands unrivalled in its brilliance and mystic appeal.

Śaṅkara was, in addition, a practical reformer. He re-established the Ṣaṅmatas or the worship of the six ancient Gods, *viz.*, the Śaiva, the Śākta, the Gāṇāpatya, the Vaiṣṇava, the Saura and the Kaumāra,

* Courtesy: *Preceptors of Advaita*, pp. 47-52. Secunderabad, 1968.

** M.A., I. A. S., Secretary to the Government of Andhrapradesh, Hyderabad.

and restored the influence of Hinduism among the people, with a belief in itself and in its capacity to satisfy the religious needs of its adherents. Just before Śaṅkara appeared on the scene, there was a medley of confused religious thinking in the country. On the one hand were the groups of Karma-mīmāṃsakas who concentrated on the precise and meticulous performance of the Vedic rites and rituals, independent of meditation and the soul's worship of God. On the other were the nihilism of the Buddhists and the indeterminism of the Jainas. Kumārila Bhaṭṭa and Maṇḍana Miśra denounced the value of 'jñāna-mārga' and were exaggerating the importance of the strict observance of the outward forms of Vedic rites. The times were therefore ripe for an incarnation to appear on the scene and to re-establish the eternal truths of the Upaniṣads on a foundation of logical reasoning that could stand the severest tests of dialectical experts.

To this difficult task Śaṅkara applied himself and by his remarkable commentaries on the *Prasthānatraya*, he has produced a system of philosophy based upon the strictest logical reasoning, that, to this day, stands unparalleled for the brilliance of its logic and the greatness of its universal conception. There have been few souls in the history of thinking in the world that have produced such a remarkable combination of qualities. As Dr Radhakrishnan says:

“It is impossible to read Śaṅkara's writings packed as they are, with serious and subtle thinking, without being conscious that one is in contact with a mind of very fine penetration and profound spirituality — The rays of his genius have illumined the dark places of

thought, and soothed the sorrows of the most forlorn heart. And whether we agree or differ, the penetrating light of his mind never leaves us where we were."

As is common with the lives of our great men in the past, Śaṅkara was more concerned with his teaching than with himself, and as such it is an extremely difficult task to weave into an acceptable pattern the events of his life. Śaṅkara himself was a great writer, and has left us a remarkable collection of his writings, including his classic commentaries on the Brahma-sūtra, the Gītā, and the Upaniṣads, and such general works as the 'Vivekacūḍāmaṇi', the 'Upadeśasāhasrī,' etc., which all reflect his general tenets. Unfortunately these do not contain even stray references to the biographical details of his life. However, a number of biographies (by his disciples) called 'Śaṅkara-Vaijayas' are available, the oldest and most trustworthy being Ānandagiri's *Śaṅkaravijaya*. Other works like the *Śivarahasya*, the *Patañjalivijaya*, *Śaṅkarābhyudaya*, etc., also give us some broad events of his life.

As is the case with all of our historical personages it is difficult to determine with any finality or accuracy the date of Śaṅkara. The following evidences are generally alluded to:—

(a) The Cambodian inscription mentions one Śivasoma who styled himself as a pupil of Bhagavān Śaṅkara. This Śivasoma was the Guru of Indravarmā who is said to have lived from 878 to 887 A.D. It is therefore assumed that Śaṅkara must have lived a short while before Indravarmā and hence this Cambodian inscription is said to support the theory first propounded by Teile and Phatak that Śaṅkara was born in 788 A.D. and died in 822 A.D.

(b) The 75th verse of Saundarya-laharī of Śaṅkara contains a reference to 'Draviḍas'isu' which is said to be a reference to Tirujñāna Sambandhar who is known to have lived in the 7th century A.D.

(c) Kumārila Bhaṭṭa is generally assigned to a date earlier than 700 A.D., and hence Śaṅkara is supposed to have lived sometime after him.

(d) Śaṅkara refutes the doctrines of Asaṅga, Nāgārjuna, Diṅnāga and Asvaghōṣa who are known to have lived not earlier than the 3rd century A.D.

(e) Śaṅkara came later than Bhartṛhari who is generally assigned to 600 A.D. on the authority of I-tsing.

(f) There is the chronogram 'Nidhi Nāgebha Vahni' which reversed, gives 3889 of Kali or 778 A.D. as Śaṅkara's birth date. Similarly the other chronogram 'Candra Netrāṅka Vahni' gives his date of Siddhi as 820 A.D.

The above are generally given as evidence in support of the theory of the Western scholars that Śaṅkara was born in 778 A.D., and died in 820 A.D. However, the evidence is far from being absolutely correct. The difficulty of identifying Bhagavān Śaṅkara of the Cambodian inscription, with Ādi Śaṅkara is there. Draviḍa Śisu is said to refer to Śaṅkara himself in Lakshmīdhara's authoritative commentary. The date of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa is not also free from doubt, as is also the date of Bhartṛhari. Though Śaṅkara refutes the Vijñānavāda, he does not refer to Nāgārjuna, Asaṅga and others by name. Hence it is possible that he may be refuting the earlier exponents of the same doctrine. The chronogram is also not free from doubt since the

verse which contains it gives the date of Śaṅkara's birth, as Cyclic year Vibhava, Vaisākha-māsa, and Daśami-tithi. This goes against the accepted tradition of his being born in Nandana year in Pañcami-tithi. Moreover this chronogram may not refer to Ādi Śaṅkara but perhaps to Abhinava Śaṅkara who was a renowned Jagadguru of the Kāñcī Kāmakoṭi Pīṭham of the 8th century A.D.

Internal evidence about Śaṅkara's date is practically nil. There is a reference in the *Brahma-sūtra Bhāṣya* (II. 1.18) to the cities of Srughna and Pāṭaliputra. But Pāṭaliputra was destroyed only in 756 A.D., and hence this does not help us to determine when Śaṅkara was born except that it must have been before 756 A.D. Similarly in the same *Bhāṣya* of the *Brahma-sūtra*, there is a reference to a king called Pūrṇavarman. However, confirmation of Pūrṇavarman's date is also not forthcoming.

There are the Guruparamparās kept in the Dvārakā, Pūrī, Śṛṅgeri and Kāñcī Maṭhas. Out of these, the generally accepted date is about 500 B.C. whereas the ancient tradition of the Śṛṅgeri Maṭha takes it to 44 B.C.

It is difficult to determine with finality the date of Śaṅkara in view of the above conflicting evidence, though several attempts have been made by several scholars in the past.

Although the biographical works on Śaṅkara do not agree completely in all their details, still it is possible to ascertain the main events of Śaṅkara's life. He was born in Kālaḍi in Malabar to Śiva Guru and Āryāmbā. At an early age he lost his father. He was a precocious

child who could pick up easily anything that came to his notice. One day while having his bath in the river, a crocodile caught his feet and he was saved from an untimely death by adopting the Sannyāsa order and thereby attaining as it were a new life. He travelled all over the country and found his master in Śrī Govinda Bhagavatpāda on the banks of the river Narmadā. After being initiated by him and mastering all that he had to learn from him, Śaṅkara went to Benaras or Kāśī and lived for some years there. It was during this period that his great works came to be written. Śaṅkara then set out on a mission of conquest and met Kumārila Bhaṭṭa at Allahabad. Kumārila directed him to Maṇḍanamisra living in the town of Māhiṣmatī. After conquering him in debate, Śaṅkara moved southwards and reached Śrīśailam. From there he went to Gokarṇa, Harihar, Mūkāmbi, etc., and reached Śṛṅgeri. He was so charmed by the natural beauty of the scenery of Śṛṅgeri that he is said to have lived there for 12 years. At about this time he learnt that his mother Āryāmbā was on her death bed and went to Kālaḍi to attend to her funeral rites. He then set out on a second *digvijaya* and touched Ramesvaram, Cidambaram and Tirupati, and then started on a journey to Kailāsa. *En route* he also visited Nasik, Somanath, Dvaraka, Ujjain, Mathura and Kashmir. Finally, he reached Badrinath and Kailāsa. It was here that he obtained from the Lord the famous five sphaṭikaliṅgas. From there he went to Kāñcī after touching other Kṣetras. At Kāñcī he ascended the Sarvajña Pīṭham and ultimately attained his Siddhi also there. He established for the continuance and the correct interpretation of the Advaita doctrine propagated by him many Maṭhas and monastries all over the

country, the most important of them being Śṛṅgeri, Dvārakā, Badri, Purī, and Kāñcī.

During his *digvijaya* Śaṅkara's main purpose was to propagate the tenets of Advaita. He expounded his views by the well-known method of debate, in order to win round persons of the opposing view. Śaṅkara derived his tenets from a strict interpretation of the truths contained in the Vedas and Upaniṣads. The truths of his doctrine are as simple as they are profound. According to Advaita, Reality is one, *viz.*, Brahman. This is immutable, inscrutable and without qualities. This by its own power of Māyā appears to exhibit itself as the various phenomena of the seen world, though ultimately the entire corpus of universal existence is nothing but the original substratum. This principle of Māyā is also inscrutable. Śaṅkara does not deny the validity of the known world as is generally thought. He accepts it but denies any original and separate existence for it, apart from and independent of Brahman. He propagated levels of truth, *viz.*, the Vyāvahārika Satya, the Prātibhāsika Satya and the Pāramārthika Satya. Thus, the relative existence of the known world is not a total non-existence, like the son of a barren woman. Some measure of reality is given even to the phantom world of apparitions and dreams — it is called Prātibhāsika Satya. Reality, being the plenary unconditional experience beyond the concepts and the categories of the mind, it is only Śruti that can testify to its truth. All the same a rational explanation of the contradictions that we see in the relative world becomes necessary and this reconciliation of the two seemingly irreconcilable principles is done in terms of the doctrine of Māyā and Adhyāsa. Adhyāsa means superimposi-

tion, as for example the superimposition of the serpent on the reality of the rope. The problem of error has been very thoroughly discussed by Śaṅkara, who concludes that the existence of error, though from the standpoint of ultimate Reality, has to be denied, still has its own practical purposes. Thus Māyā is 'tuccha' or negligible from the standpoint of Brahman, and the question of its existence or non-existence at that level does not arise. But from the standpoint of common experience Māyā is 'Satya' or real and of the worlds. The three ideas of truth, illusion and absolute non-existence, or in other words, 'Satya', 'Mithyā', and 'Atyantāsat', are expounded with the illustrations of the 'Supreme One', the serpent in the rope, and the son of a barren woman, etc. The 'Atyantāsat' is never associated with the word 'is' or '*asti*', *Sat* is never associated with the word 'is not' or '*nāsti*'. It is the second alone — Mithyā, which is associated with both *asti* and *nāsti*, as for example, the serpent in the rope is at one time associated with the word '*nāsti*', from the point of view of ultimate Reality, and at another time with the word '*asti*' from the point of view of limited reality. The mundane world belongs to this category. Thus Śaṅkara's definition of the world is not that of an illusionist as has been misrepresented by some, who deny reality to that which is seen and felt by us, in our daily activities. Śaṅkara has never said so. On the other hand, he reconciles our various experiences by the device of the various levels of truth.

Śaṅkara was not a mere dreamer but a practical missionary and an organiser of no mean ability. Within the short span of thirtytwo years he travelled all over India, destroyed the unholy accretions and the other cults and established the *Ṣaṅmatas* on a proper footing.

He was responsible for establishing the order of Sannyāsa and the institution of the Maṭhas which to this day have survived the onslaughts of time and change. As Dr. Radhakrishnan so nicely puts it: "Even those who do not agree with his general attitude of life, will not be reluctant to give him a place among the immortals."

BHAJA GOVINDAM

पुनरपि जननं पुनरपि मरणं
 पुनरपि जननीजठरे शयनम् ।
 इह संसारे बहुदुस्तारे
 कृपयाऽपारे पाहि मुरारे ॥

In this world, there takes place birth and death in quick succession; after a person dies, very soon he enters the womb of a mother again. This cycle of birth and death is very hard to cross over. One cannot see the other bank of the ocean of *samsāra*. Therefore, Oh Lord Viṣṇu (Slayer of Mura)! may You please protect me.

THE FOUR INDISPENSABLE
QUALIFICATIONS

*(An extract from Sarva-vedānta-siddhānta-sāra-saṅgraha
of Śrī Saṅkara Bhagavatpāda)*

Free rendering by
Dr V. K. S. N. Raghavan

(Contd. from Vol. XVII, No. 1)

THE FOUR INDISPENSIBLE
QUALIFICATIONS

The extent to which these four conditions are satisfied
is the measure of the quality of the work.

By the author of
"The Four Indispensable Qualifications"

Copyright, 1911, by the author.

[236]

अन्तर्बन्धेन बद्धस्य किं बहिर्बन्धमोचनैः ।
तदन्तर्बन्धमुक्त्यर्थं क्रियतां कृतिभिः कृतिः ॥

What is the use of releasing oneself from external bonds, when one is bound by the internal bondage? Hence one must strive hard to release oneself from internal bondage.

[237]

कृतिपर्यवसानैव मता तीव्रमुमुक्षता ।
अन्या तु रञ्जनामात्रा यत्र नो दृश्यते कृतिः ॥

The firmness of the desire to get release (liberation) consists in the serious endeavour to attain *mokṣa*. Any other form of (*viz.* weak) desire to attain *mokṣa* — where there is not seen any endeavour at all — is only a case of fun.

[238]

गेहादिसर्वमपहाय लघुत्वबुद्ध्या
सौख्येच्छया स्वपतिनानलमाविविक्षोः ।
कान्ताजनस्य नियता सुदृढा त्वरा या
सैषा फलान्तगमने करणं सुमुक्षोः ॥

An aspirant of *mokṣa* (liberation) should possess steadfast earnestness in making all endeavour to arrive at his goal and consider everything else as a trifle. The aspirant after *mokṣa* must be similar to a woman (i) who abandons everything like house and other com-

forts, and (ii) who is ready to commit *sati* along with her husband — that is: he should be ready to abandon everything completely for the sake of *mokṣa*; then alone, he can be sure of attaining liberation.

[239]

नित्यानित्यविवेकश्च देहक्षणिकतामतिः ।

मृत्योर्भीतिश्च तापश्च मुमुक्षावृद्धिकारणम् ॥

(i) The knowledge of the discrimination between what is eternal and what is ephemeral, (ii) the understanding of the body as purely momentary, (iii) fear from death, and also (iv) miseries — these four enhance one's desire of *mokṣa* more intensely.

[240-241]

शिरो विवेकस्त्वत्यन्तं वैराग्यं वपुरुच्यते ।

शमादयः षडङ्गानि मोक्षेच्छा प्राण इष्यते ॥

ईदृशाङ्गसमायुक्तो जिज्ञासुर्युक्तिकोविदः ।

शूरो मृत्युं निहन्त्येव सम्यग्ज्ञानासिना ध्रुवम् ॥

For the main life-breath of *mumukṣā* (desire for liberation), the prime cause, *viz.* head is *viveka* — the discrimination of what is eternal and what is non-eternal; intense *vairāgya* (dispassion) is the body; and the six limbs are the cardinal virtues *viz.* *śama* (calmness of mind), *dama* (self-restraint), etc. The person — who possesses all the four (*mumukṣā*, *viveka*, *vairāgya* and *śama-damādi-ṣaṭ-sampat*), who has earnest desire to know Brahman, who is skilful in *yukti* (right reasoning), and who is extremely brave — can surely conquer death by the sharp sword of right knowledge.

[242]

उक्तसाधनसंपन्नो जिज्ञासुर्यतिरात्मनः ।

जिज्ञासायै गुरुं गच्छेत्समित्पाणिर्नयोज्ज्वलः ॥

One who is equipped with the above-mentioned essential requisites, who is intent on knowing Brahman, and who has taken to the vow of asceticism (*sannyāsa*) — for the sake of fulfilling his desire to know the Brahman-Ātman — should approach a learned preceptor; before approaching the *guru*, he should take *samits* (fag-gots) in his hand;* and also he should be full of modesty (*vinaya*) (*lit.* shining with the brilliance of modesty = *nayojjvalah*).

[243-244]

श्रोत्रियो ब्रह्मनिष्ठो यः प्रशान्तः समदर्शनः ।

निर्ममो निरहङ्कारो निर्द्वन्द्वो निष्परिग्रहः ॥

अनपेक्षः शुचिर्दक्षः करुणामृतसागरः ।

एवंलक्षणसम्पन्नः स गुरुर्ब्रह्मवित्तमः ॥

उपासाद्यः प्रयत्नेन जिज्ञासोः स्वार्थसिद्धये ॥

He who is a *śrotriya*, steadfast in Brahman-knowledge, highly tranquil, full of equanimity (equipoise),** thoroughly free from *mamakāra* (sense of 'mine') and *ahaṅkāra* (sense of 'I'-ness), bereft of the knowledge of duality, without the greed of acquisition, free from wants, excessively pure and skilful, ocean of the nectar of compassion — such is the preceptor *par excellence* best among the *Brahma-jñānins*. To such a preceptor,

*Cf. "tadvijñānārtham sa gurumeva abhigacchet samitpāṇih śrotriyam brahmaniṣṭham" - *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad*, I. ii. 12.

**Cf. *Gītā*, V, 18; XII, 16.

should one go with utmost humility to quench the thirst (desire) for the knowledge of Brahman-Ātman, *i.e.* to fulfil one's own fruitful aim (goal).

[245]

जन्मानेकशतैः सदादरयुजा भक्त्या समाराधितो

भक्तैर्वैदिकलक्षणेन विधिना सन्तुष्ट ईशः स्वयम् ।

साक्षाच्छ्रीगुरुरूपमेत्य कृपया दृग्गोचरः सन्प्रभुः

तत्त्वं साधु विबोध्य तारयति तान् संसारदुःखार्णवात् ॥

When the supreme Lord becomes pleased with the incessant devotion and steadfast worship made by the devotees throughout their innumerable births — as prescribed in the *Vedas* and *Śāstras*, He (the supreme Lord) takes the descent in this world as a great preceptor. This preceptor is an embodiment of compassion, and he gives a full elucidation of the knowledge of Reality, and he leads the *mumukṣu* (aspirant of liberation) across the ocean of sufferings of birth and death (*samsāra*).

[246]

अविद्याहृदयग्रन्थिविमोक्षोऽपि भवेद्यतः ।

तमेव गुरुरित्याहुर्गुरुशब्दार्थवेदिनः ॥

Those who know the right meaning of the word *guru* hold that “*guru* is one who is able to untie the knot of *avidyā* (nescience) that is lurking in the heart of every being.”*

*Cf. *Muṇḍakopaniṣad*, II. ii. 8: *bhidyate hṛdayagranthih chidyante sarvasamśayāḥ; kṣīyante cāsya karmāṇi tasmin drṣṭe parāvare.*

[247]

शिव एव गुरुः साक्षाद्गुरुरेव शिवः स्वयम् ।
उभयोरन्तरं किञ्चिन्न द्रष्टव्यं मुमुक्षुभिः ॥

Lord Śiva alone is the preceptor. The preceptor himself is Lord Śiva. The aspirants of liberation (*mokṣa*) should never find any difference between them.

[248]

बन्धमुक्तं ब्रह्मनिष्ठं कृतकृत्यं भजेद्गुरुम् ।
यस्य प्रसादात् संसारसागरो गोष्पदायते ॥

One should approach and resort to such a great preceptor (i) who has got release from bondage, (ii) who is steadfast in Brahman-knowledge, (iii) who is self-established/ self-accomplished, and (iv) by whose benevolent grace everyone finds the ocean of *samsāra* (bondage) very easy to cross over (*lit.* very much small similar to the breadth of a cow's footstep).

[249]

शुश्रूषया सदा भक्त्या प्रणामैर्विनयोक्तिभिः ।
प्रसन्नं गुरुमासाद्य प्रष्टव्यं ज्ञेयमात्मनः ॥

After doing all kinds of service, with utmost devotion to him always, and by paying obeisance to him several times one should approach, and resort to the great *guru* in a pleasant mood; and through polite and humble words, the disciple should enquire the *guru*, whatever he wants to know from him

[250]

भगवन् कर्हणासिन्धो भवसिन्धोर्भवांस्तरिः ।
यमाश्रित्याश्रमेणैव परं पारं गता बुधाः ॥

(to be continued)

AN INVOCATION TO SUPREME BRAHMAN

दिककालाद्यनवच्छिन्नानन्तचिन्मात्रमूर्तये ।
 स्वानुभूत्येकमानाय नमः शान्ताय तेजसे ॥

Salutations to the self-effulgent serene supreme Brahman (i) Who is beyond space, time, etc., (ii) Who is infinite, (iii) Who is of the form of Knowledge alone, and (iv) Who can be cognized through one's own *anubhūti* (innate experience/intuition).

Bharṣhari, *Nītiśataka*, 1

न कर्मणां फलं मोक्षः - २

भाष्यभावज्ञः ब्रह्मश्री चरहृत् कल्याणसुन्दरशास्त्री

तदयं पूर्वपक्षसङ्ग्रहः — मुमुक्षुणा निषिद्धानि काम्यानि च वर्जयित्वा नित्यनैमित्तिकानि कर्माणि प्रायश्चित्तरूपाणि च कर्माण्यवश्यमनुष्ठेयानि । निषिद्धकर्माभावात् हीनलोकप्राप्तिः । काम्यकर्माभावात्साध्युत्तमलोकप्राप्तिः । नित्यनैमित्तिककर्मानुष्ठानजन्यप्रत्यवायरूपपापं तदनुष्ठानेन नैवोत्पद्यते । इह जन्मनि जन्मान्तरे वा प्रागनुष्ठितानि पापानि सर्वाण्यपि साधारणासाधारणप्रायश्चित्ताभ्यां निश्शेषं विनश्यन्ति । नित्यनैमित्तिककर्मानुष्ठानजक्लेशैरपि सञ्चितानि निषिद्धकर्माणि विनश्यन्ति । सञ्चितकाम्यकर्माण्यपि मुमुक्षोरिदानीं तत्फलेच्छाया निवृत्तत्वात्स्वफलं न प्रयच्छन्ति । तस्मान्मुमुक्षोरनायासेन विनैव ज्ञानं जन्माभावरूपमोक्षः सिद्ध्यतीति ॥

विना ज्ञानं कर्मणैव मोक्ष इत्येतन्न युज्यते । नित्यनैमित्तिककर्मणामपि फलावश्यंभावनियमस्य तत्र तत्र भाष्येषु युक्त्या प्रमाणेन च सम्यङ्निरूपितत्वात् । अतो नित्यनैमित्तिककर्मभिः प्राप्येतैव उत्तमलोकः फलम्, न तु जन्माभावः सिद्ध्यति । नित्यनैमित्तिककर्मणां फलानभ्युपगमे तद्बोधकवेदो निष्फलो भवेत् । यदि नित्यनैमित्तिककर्मानुष्ठानात्पापं जायेत, तदा तदनुष्ठानात्पापानुत्पत्तिस्तत्फलत्वे नेष्येत । न च नित्यनैमित्तिककर्मानुष्ठानात्पापं जायते इति वक्तुं युक्तं, अभावाद्भावोत्पत्त्यदर्शनात् । तेषामननुष्ठानमभावः, पापञ्च भावरूपम्, न ह्यभावाद्भाव उत्पद्येत । तस्मान्नित्यनैमित्तिककर्मानुष्ठानात् पापोत्पत्तिवचनमसङ्गतमेव । नित्यनैमित्तिककर्मानुष्ठानात् पापोत्पत्त्य-

भ्युपगमे “कथमसतः सञ्जायेत” (छा. 6-2-2) “नासतो विद्यते भावो नाभावो विद्यते सतः” (भ. गी. 2-16) इत्यादिश्रुतेर्भंगवद्वचनस्य च विरोधः स्यात् । तस्मान्नित्यनैमित्तिककर्मानुष्ठानरूपाभावाद्भावरूपपापोत्पत्तिस्त्वनुपपन्नैव । इत्थं च नित्यनैमित्तिककर्मणां प्रत्यवायानुत्पत्तिरेव फलमिति वचनमसङ्गतम्, विनापि नित्यनैमित्तिककर्माणि पापानुत्पत्तेः सिद्धेः । किञ्च, नित्यनैमित्तिककर्मणां स्वर्गादिफलानङ्गीकारे निष्फलानि तानि स्युः, निष्फलं कर्म विदधच्छास्त्रमपि विफलं भवेत् । तस्मान्नित्यनैमित्तिककर्मणां स्वर्गादिफलमवश्यमभ्युपगन्तव्यमेवेति सिद्धम् ॥

यदुक्तं साधारणासाधारणप्रायश्चित्तात्सकलाशुभकर्मक्षयो भवतीति, तन्न सम्भवति । विचित्राण्यनेककल्पानुष्ठिताशुभकर्माण्येकस्मिन्नेव जन्मनि न युगपत् प्रायश्चित्तेन विनश्येयुः । सकलपापक्षयकरत्वेनोक्तगङ्गास्नानेश्वरनामोच्चारणादिसाधारणप्रायश्चित्तमपि चित्तशुद्ध्यादिद्वारा सकलपापक्षयकरज्ञानोत्पत्तिहेतुत्वाद्गौण्या वृत्त्या पापक्षयकरमित्युच्यते, न तु साक्षात् । सकलपापानां युगपत् साक्षान्नाशकन्तु ब्रह्मज्ञानमेव । “क्षीयन्ते चास्य कर्माणि तस्मिन् दृष्टे परावरे,” (सु. 2-2-8) “ज्ञानाग्निः सर्वकर्माणि भस्मसात्कुरुते तथा” (भ. गी. 4-37) इत्यादिश्रुतिस्मृतिभ्यः ॥

यच्चोक्तं जन्मान्तरसञ्चितकाम्यकर्माणि, इदानीं मुमुक्षोः तत्फलेच्छाऽभावमात्रेण न फलाय कल्पन्त इति, तदप्यसङ्गतमेव । तथा हि कर्मरूपबीजादङ्कुरद्वयं जायते, अदृष्टं वासना चेति । धर्माधर्मयोरदृष्टमिति नाम । शुभकर्मणः शुभवासना धर्मरूपोऽङ्कुरश्च जायते । अशुभकर्मणोऽशुभवासना अधर्मरूपोऽङ्कुरश्च जायते । शुभवासनया पुनरपि शुभकर्मणि प्रवृत्तिर्जायते । तादृशशुभकर्मजन्येन धर्मेण सुखोपभोगो जायते । एवमेवाशुभवासनया पुनरप्यशुभकर्मणि प्रवृत्तिः, तादृशाशुभकर्मजन्येनाधर्मेण दुःखोपभोगश्च जायते । इत्थं वासना चादृष्टञ्चेत्यङ्कुरद्वयं कर्मरूपबीजाज्जायते । तत्र वासनारूपोऽङ्कुरः उपायेन नश्यति । अदृष्टरूपोऽङ्कुरस्तु नादत्वा फलं विनश्यति केनचिदप्युपायेन । अयमेव शास्त्रसिद्धान्तः । अशुभकर्मणो

जायमानाशुभवासनारूपोऽङ्कुरः सत्सङ्गाद्युपायैर्विनश्यति । शुभकर्मणो जायमानशुभवासनारूपोऽङ्कुरः दुस्सङ्गादिना विनश्यति । शास्त्रीय-सर्वपुरुषार्थसाधनैः स्वाभाविकप्रवृत्तिहेतुवासनाः विनश्यन्ति । अतः पुरुषार्थसाधनानुष्ठानमपि सफलमेव । भोगहेत्वदृष्टन्तु भोगं विना न विनश्यति । तस्मात् 'स्वं फलमदत्त्वा नैव कर्म क्षीयत' इति शास्त्रोक्तं न विरुद्धव्यते । इत्थमज्ञानां फलभोगमन्तरा न विनश्यति कर्म । ज्ञानिनां त्वन्तरापि फलभोगं कर्म निःशेषं समूलं विनश्यति । यस्मात् कर्ता कर्म फलञ्चेत्येतत् त्रयमपि न परमार्थतोऽस्ति । अपि त्वविद्यया स्वप्नवत्कल्प्यते ; अस्या अविद्यायाः ज्ञानं विरोधि । तस्माद-विद्याकल्पितानि कर्मादीन्यपि ज्ञानेन नश्यन्त्येव । यथा निद्रया कल्पित-स्वप्नोपलब्धपदार्थाः जाग्रति निद्राक्षये नोपलभ्यन्ते, तथाऽविद्या-रूपनिद्रया प्रतिभासमानकर्मकर्तृफलात्मकत्रिपुटव्यपि ज्ञानात्मकजाग्रद्-शयामविद्यानिवृत्तावभावीभवति । न ह्येतेषां ज्ञानमन्तरा निःशेषतो नाशः कदापि संभवति ॥

किञ्चेदानीं भोक्तरिच्छाऽभावमात्रेण सञ्चितकर्मफलभोगो यदि न जायेत, तद्देश्वरसङ्कल्पो मिथ्या भवेत् । 'फलोपभोगमन्तराऽ-ज्ञानां कर्म न नश्यति' इतीश्वरसङ्कल्पः । भोक्तरिच्छाऽभावमात्रेण कर्मफलनाशाभ्युपगमे ईश्वरसङ्कल्पो मिथ्यैव स्यात् । ईश्वरः "सत्यकामः सत्यसङ्कल्पः" (छा. 8-1-5; 8-7-1.) इति हि श्रुतिः । तस्मादिच्छाऽभावमात्रेण सञ्चितं काम्यकर्म न फलिष्यतीति विरुद्ध-मेवोच्यते ॥

अपि चेच्छाऽभावमात्रेण सञ्चितं काम्यकर्म न फलाय कल्पत-इति चेत् तर्ह्यशुभकर्मणोऽपि फलं न कस्यचिदपि संभवेत्, अशुभ-कर्मफले दुःखे कस्यापीच्छानुदयात् । तस्माज्ज्ञानाभावे कर्मफलाभावो न केनचिदप्युपायेन संभवति । अवश्यं च कृतं कर्म स्वफलं दद्यादेव ॥

कर्मानुष्ठानकाले निष्कामस्य पुरुषस्य फलेच्छाऽभावात् कर्म फलाय न कल्पत इति वेदान्तनिश्चयो यथा, तथैवैकमविकवादे कर्मानुष्ठानानन्तरमपि यस्य पुरुषस्य सञ्चितकर्मफलेच्छा निवर्तते तस्य

मुमुक्षोः कर्मफलं न जायते इति यदुक्तं पूर्वं, तद्वेदान्तसिद्धान्तान-
भिन्नतयैवोक्तम् । फलामिसन्ध्यनभिसन्धिपूर्वकं कृतवतोरुभयोरपि
कर्मावश्यं फलं ददात्येव । तत्र निष्कामनयानुष्ठितं कर्म
मुमुक्षोश्चित्तशुद्धिमात्रं फलं जनयेत् । फलामिसन्धिपूर्वकमनुष्ठितं
सकामस्य कर्म भोगरूपमेव फलं प्रयच्छति, न तु चित्तशुद्धिम् ।
निष्कामनयानुष्ठितं कर्म मुमुक्षोः सत्त्वशुद्धिश्रवणादिद्वारा अपरोक्षज्ञान
जनयति, न तु काम्यफलम् । निष्कामनया कृतमपि कर्म श्रवणाद्य-
भावाद्वा, कारणान्तराद्वाऽनुत्पन्नज्ञानस्यानिच्छतोऽपि भोगरूपफल
प्रयच्छत्येवेति वेदान्तसिद्धान्तः । तस्माज्ज्ञानाभावे फलमदत्त्वा नैव
कर्म क्षीयते । नित्यनैमित्तिककर्मानुष्ठानजनितक्लेशस्य पूर्वसञ्चितनिषिद्ध-
कर्मफलरूपत्वात् तेषां न पृथक् फलमस्तीति यदुक्तं, तन्न । सञ्चित-
निषिद्धकर्मणामनेकप्रकारत्वात् तत्फलस्य दुःखस्याप्यनेकविधत्वनियमात्
कर्मानुष्ठानजनितक्लेश एव तेषां फलमिति वक्तुं न शक्यते ॥

किञ्च, सकलसञ्चितकाम्यकर्मणां फलत्वेन समुच्चित्यैकमेव
शरीरं जायते इति यत्पूर्वमुक्तं, तन्न सम्भवति । सञ्चितनानाकाम्य-
कर्मणामनेकविरुद्धफलत्वात्तेषां फलमेकेनैव जन्मनाऽनुभवितुं न शक्यते ।
एकस्मिन्नेव जन्मनि युगपदेव नानाशरीरैः सकलभोगाननुभवतीति तु
सिद्धयोगिविषये घटते, न त्वितरस्य विषये । सिद्धयोगिनोऽपि ह्यष्टै-
श्वर्यादिसर्वसिद्धिसामर्थ्ये सत्यपि विना ज्ञानं न मोक्षः सिद्धय-
तीति वेदान्तसिद्धान्तः ॥

अथ च निष्कृष्टार्थः । इत्थं च काम्यकर्माणि निषिद्धकर्माणि
च विहाय नित्यनैमित्तिककर्माण्यनुतिष्ठतोऽज्ञस्य तत्तन्नित्यनैमित्तिक-
कर्मणां फलानुभवाय, जन्मान्तरार्जितशुभाशुभकर्मणां फलानुभवाय च
प्रत्येकमनेकशरीराण्युत्पद्येरन्नेव, न तु मोक्षः संभवेत् । तस्माज्ज्ञानद्वारा
बन्धनिवृत्तिरेवास्य वेदान्तशास्त्रस्य प्रयोजनमिति युक्तमेवोक्तम् । यथा
स्वप्ने उपलभ्यमानमिथ्यावस्तु जाग्रत्प्रबोधमन्तरा न निवर्तते, तथा-
ऽविद्यादशायामुपलभ्यमानमिथ्याप्रपञ्चोऽपि ज्ञानात्मकजागरणमन्तरा
न निवर्ततेति सिद्धम् ॥

LIBERATION IS NOT THE RESULT OF
KARMA — II*

Bhāsyabhāvajña Brahmaśrī
V. R. Kalyāṇasundara Śāstrī

The opponent's view may be summarised as follows. A spiritual aspirant, after giving up prohibited and desire-prompted *karmas*, should perform daily and occasioned *karmas* and also expiatory *karmas*. Since prohibited *karmas* have not been done, there is no attainment of the lower world. Because of the absence of desire-prompted *karmas* there is no attainment of higher world either. The demerit in the form of sin arising as a result of non-performance of daily and occasioned *karmas* can never take place, since these deeds have been done. All kinds of sin due to actions done in this life as well as in the previous lives perish by the performance of ordinary and extra-ordinary expiatory *karmas*. The prohibited *karmas* as well as those which are in store perish due to the sufferings arising from the performance of daily and occasioned *karmas*. Also, the *karmas*-in-store and prohibited *karmas*

*English rendering: Dr. R. Balasubramanian

do not produce their fruits, since the spiritual aspirant is free from the desire for the fruits of these actions. So, liberation in the form of the absence of future birth takes place easily to a spiritual aspirant even without knowledge.

The view that liberation can be attained through *karma* alone without knowledge is not tenable, for it has been well-established in many places in the *Bhāṣya* by means of reasoning and scriptural authority that it is necessary to accept fruit even for daily and occasioned *karmas*. So, the fruit, *viz.*, the higher world is undoubtedly attained by the performance of daily and occasioned *karmas*; on the contrary, the absence of birth does not take place. If the fruit for daily and occasioned *karmas* is not accepted, the *Veda* which teaches about it will become futile. If it be said that sin will arise as a result of the non-performance of daily and occasioned *karmas*, then it must be admitted that sin does not arise as a result of their performance. It is not right to say that sin arises as a result of the non-performance of daily and occasioned *karmas*, for the origination of something positive from *abhāva* is not seen. Their non-performance is *abhāva*; and sin is something positive, *i.e.* *bhāva*; indeed, *bhāva* does not arise from *abhāva*. So, to talk about the origination of sin from the non-performance of daily and occasioned *karmas* is not apt. If it is accepted that sin originates from the non-performance of daily and occasioned deeds, then it will go against the *śruti* text which says, "How can *sat* arise from *asat*?" (*Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, 6.2.2) as well as the declaration of the Lord, "for non-being there is no existence, and for being there is no non-existence" (*Bhagavad-gītā*, 2.16). So, the origination of sin which

is positive from the non-performance of daily and occasioned *karmas*, which is negative, is untenable. In the same way, the statement that the fruit of the performance of daily and occasioned *karmas* is the non-origination of sin alone is also not right, for the non-origination of sin will be there even without daily and occasioned *karmas*. Further, if fruits such as heaven are not accepted as the fruits for daily and occasioned *karmas*, then these (actions) will be fruitless, and scripture that enjoins an action which is fruitless will become futile. Hence, it is established that heaven, etc., must be accepted as the fruits of daily and occasioned deeds.

It was stated that the destruction of all bad actions takes place by ordinary and extra-ordinary expiatory *karmas*. This is not so. The evil deeds of various kinds performed in many *kalpas* cannot be destroyed at the same time by expiatory *karmas* in one life. Even the ordinary expiatory *karmas* such as bathing in the *Gaṅgā*, the utterance of the name of the Lord, etc., which have been referred to as capable of destroying all sins are conducive, through the purification of the mind, to the origination of *jñāna* which destroys all sins; and so they are said to be capable of destroying all sins not directly, but only in the secondary sense. Brahman-knowledge alone destroys at the same time all sins, as stated in *śruti* and *smṛti* texts such as "All his *karmas* get destroyed when Brahman the higher and the lower, is seen," (*Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad*, 2.2.8) "The fire of knowledge reduces all *karmas* to ashes." (*Bhagavad-gītā*, 4.37).

It was stated that the desire-prompted *karmas* done in the previous lives will not give rise to their fruits to the spiritual aspirant in this life merely because of the absence of desire therefor. Even this is not

proper. It is for this reason. Two kinds of sprout called *adr̥ṣṭa* and *vāsanā* arise from the seed of *karma*. *Dharma* and *adharma* are called *adr̥ṣṭa*. From a good *karma* arises good impression as well as the sprout in the form of *dharma*. From a bad *karma* arises bad impression as well as the sprout in the form of *adharma*. From the good impression, once again, the pursuit of good *karma*. And by the *dharma* produced by the good *karma* there takes place the enjoyment of happiness. In the same way, there is the pursuit of bad *karma* once again due to the bad impression; and by the *adharma* produced by the bad *karma* there takes place the enjoyment of suffering. Thus, the two kinds of sprouts, *viz.*, *vāsanā* and *adr̥ṣṭa*, originate from the seed of *karma*. This being the case, the sprout in the form of impression gets destroyed through the appropriate means. However, the sprout of *adr̥ṣṭa*, without giving rise to its fruit, gets destroyed through the appropriate means. This is the standpoint of scripture. The sprout in the form of bad impression produced by bad *karma* is destroyed by the means such as association with good people. The sprout in the form of good impression produced by good *karma* is destroyed by association with bad people. The impressions which lead to the pursuit of natural activities are destroyed by the means of all *puruṣārthas* enjoined by scripture. So, the performance of the means of *puruṣārthas* also is fruitful. However, the *adr̥ṣṭa* which is the cause of enjoyment is not destroyed without enjoyment. So, the statement of scripture, “*Karma* does not die at all without producing its fruit” is not contradicted. Thus, the *karma* of the ignorant people does not perish without the enjoyment of fruit. But the *karma* of the enlightened people gets destroyed without any remainder along with its cause without

the enjoyment of its fruit. The reason for this is that all the three, *viz.*, the agent, action, and the fruit do not exist really; on the contrary, they are projected by *avidyā* like a dream. Knowledge is the enemy of this *avidyā*. So, the *karmas* which are the products of *avidyā* are, indeed, destroyed by means of knowledge. Just as the objects which are experienced in dream, being the projection of sleep are not experienced in the waking state at the termination of sleep, even so the three factors, *viz.*, the agent, the action, and the fruit, which appear, being the projection of the sleep of *avidyā*, cease to exist, when *avidyā* is removed in the waking state of knowledge. The destruction of these factors, without any remainder, can never take place without knowledge.

Moreover, if it be the case that the enjoyment of the fruit of the *karma*-in-store will not take place merely because of the absence of desire on the part of the enjoyer now (in this life), then the resolve of *Īsvara* would become untrue. It is *Īsvara*'s resolve that "the *karma* of the ignorant people will not perish without the enjoyment of the fruit." If the destruction of the fruit of action by the mere absence of desire on the part of the enjoyer is accepted, then *Īsvara*'s resolve would be untrue. *Śruti*, indeed, says that *Īsvara* is one "whose desire is true, whose resolve is true" (*Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, 8.1.5; 8.7.1). Therefore, the statement that the desire-prompted action which is in store does not produce its fruit by the mere absence of desire is opposed to the scriptural position.

Further, if it be said that the desire-prompted *karma* which is in store does not give fruit due to the mere absence of desire, then the fruit of bad action

should not accrue to anyone, for no one has a desire for suffering which is the fruit of bad *karma*. So, in the absence of knowledge, the absence of the fruit of *karma* can never take place through any means. A *karma* that has been done is bound to give its fruit.

It was stated earlier that, just as it is maintained in the Vedānta that, in the case of a person who is free from desire for fruit at the time of the performance of *karma*, the *karma* that is performed is not supposed to give fruit, even so according to *aikabhavika-vāda* it is maintained that, in the case of a spiritual aspirant who, even after the performance of *karma*, is free from the desire for its fruit, the fruit of action does not accrue to him. Such a statement must be from one who is ignorant of the standpoint of Vedānta. Both the kinds of *karma* — the one that is done aiming at the fruit and the other that is done without aiming at the fruit — do certainly give their fruits. Of these two, the *karma* that is done disinterestedly produces the purification of the mind alone, which is the fruit, to the spiritual aspirant. But the *karma* that is done aiming at the fruit by one who has the desire produces the fruit in the form of enjoyment, and not the purification of the mind. The *karma* that is performed disinterestedly produces the direct knowledge (of Brahman-Ātman) through the purification of the mind, hearing of the text, and so on, and not the fruit desired. According to the standpoint of Vedānta, even though *karma* is performed disinterestedly, it does produce the fruit of enjoyment, though it is not desired, to one who has not attained knowledge either because of the absence of the hearing of the text, or because of some other cause. Hence, in the absence of knowledge, *karma* does not perish without producing its fruit.

It was stated that, since the suffering due to the performance of daily and occasioned *karma* is the fruit of the prohibited *karma* done in the previous birth, they do not have separate fruits. This is not so. Since the prohibited *karmas* done in the previous birth are of various kinds, the sufferings which are their fruit must necessarily be of various kinds; and so it can be said that the suffering due to the performance of *karmas* is their fruit.

Further, it was stated that only one body is produced as their fruit collectively by all the stored up desire-prompted actions done in the previous birth. This also does not take place. Since the many desire-prompted *karmas* which are in store have fruits which are opposed to one another, it is not possible to experience their fruits in one life itself. That all the different kinds of enjoyment are experienced by many bodies simultaneously in one life itself are tenable in the case of the *siddhas* and *yogins*, but not in the case of others. According to the standpoint of Vedānta, even the *siddhas* and *yogins*, though they are competent to have all the eightfold supernatural powers, etc., cannot attain liberation without knowledge.

We can sum up as follows. In the case of an ignorant person who, giving up desire-prompted and prohibited *karmas*, performs daily and obligatory *karmas* many births will take place for the enjoyment separately of the fruits of daily and obligatory *karmas* and also for the enjoyment of the fruits of good and bad deeds of the earlier lives acquired by him, but not liberation. Hence, what has been stated, *viz.*, the removal of bondage alone through knowledge is the aim of the Vedānta is very apt. So it is established

that, just as the illusory objects experienced in dream do not disappear without the awakening in the waking state, even so the illusory world experienced in the state of *avidyā* cannot be removed without the awakening of knowledge.

AN INVOCATION TO LORD HARI

सर्वैकशरणमक्षयमधीशमीशं धियां हरिं कृष्णम् ।
चतुरात्मानं निष्क्रियमरिमथनं नमत चक्रधरम् ॥

May you bow to Lord Hari, *i.e.* Śrī Kṛṣṇa, the wielder of the wheel (discus), who is the sole refuge of all beings of the world, the undecaying (imperishable), the almighty, the only controller of all senses (organs), the pure intelligent Self, the One beyond all actions and the slayer of all enemies.

MAHĀKAVEH KĀLIDĀSASYA
GĪTĀTRAYAM

[in Sanskrit]

of

Ātmavidyābhūṣaṇam

V. S. V. Gurusvāmī Śāstrī

with an English translation by

Dr. V. K. S. N. Raghavan

(Contd. from Vol. XVI, No. 1)

MAHAKAVI RAVI VARMA

MITRA

(in Sanskrit)

is

translated

by

with an English translation by

Dr. N. K. S. Varma

and

[249]

परिणामोपक्रमेण विवर्तेनावसायिनीम् ।
 सोपानारोहणगतां क्रमविन्यासपद्धतिम् ॥
 वर्णयामास सुश्लिष्टं सम्प्रदायविदग्रणीः ॥

[250]

प्रस्थाप्यमाने "परिणामवादे स्वयं समायाति विवर्तवादः" ।
 इत्याह सर्वज्ञमुनिः प्रबन्धे संक्षेपशारीरकनामके स्वे ॥

[251]

इति सम्प्रतिपन्नार्थं महाकविविवक्षितम् ।
 त्वामामनन्तीति पद्यं व्याख्यायाहं प्रकाशये ॥

[252]

सर्वज्ञं चेतनं सन्तमाम्नायास्त्वां वदन्ति हि ।
 प्रकृतिं सर्वजगतः परिणामि च कारणम् ॥

[253]

त्वामेव पुरुषं न्यायवेदिनो ब्रह्मवित्तमाः ।
 विकारवत्याः प्रकृतेर्विजानन्त्यपि साक्षिणम् ॥

[254]

परिणामे भवेद्द्रव्यं सविकारं विनश्वरम् ।
 दधिभावं गतं क्षीरं विकृतञ्च विनश्यति ॥

[255]

ब्रह्मणः परिणामित्वे विकारित्वमनित्यता ।
भवेतां, ब्रह्म नित्यं च निर्विकारं श्रुतिर्जगौ ॥

[256]

कारणस्य स्वरूपं तु यद्विकृत्य प्रजायते ।
कार्यं तत्परिणामि स्याद्दध्याद्यत्र निदर्शनम् ॥

[257]

प्रपञ्चभानकालेऽपि ब्रह्म नित्यञ्च निष्क्रियम् ।
निर्विकारं साक्षिमात्रमिति वेदान्तनिश्चयः ॥

[258]

लोकदृष्ट्यनुरोधेन ब्रह्मणः परिणामिता ।
शास्त्रदृष्ट्यनुसारेण वर्णिता च विवर्तता ॥

[259]

प्रकृत्यपरपर्यायमायासंबन्धमात्रतः ।
परिणामिकारणत्वं ब्रह्मणो ह्युपचर्यते ॥

[260]

विवर्तकारणत्वं च मायाश्रयतयोच्यते ।
मायान्वयानन्वयाभ्यां ब्रह्म द्वेषा निगद्यते ॥

[261]

शास्त्रार्थचर्चाभीरूणां बालानामेव तुष्टये ।
व्याकरोद् मल्लिनाथस्तु पद्यं सांख्यमतानुगम् ॥

[262]

व्याख्यानं मल्लिनाथीयं सर्वथा नोपपद्यते ।
प्रधानपुरुषैक्यं तु सांख्यानां नैव सम्मतम् ॥

[263]

पद्येऽस्मिन् त्रिदशैः सर्वैरेकस्यैव हि वेधसः ।
प्रकृतित्वं पूरुषत्वमुक्तं पूर्वोत्तरार्धयोः ॥

[264]

अत्यन्तेभेदोपगमात् प्रकृतेः पुरुषस्य च ।
सांख्यानां खलु सिद्धान्ते नैवेदमुपपद्यते ॥

[265]

सर्वज्ञश्चेतनो ब्रह्माऽचेतनं प्रकृतिर्जडा ।
तन्मयं स्तुतिः नन्दा स्यात् सुरकल्पिता ॥

[266]

प्रकृत्यभेदमारोप्य पुरुषे सांख्यकल्पिता ।
स्तुतिर्भ्रमात्मिकेत्येवं कल्पनापि सुबाधिता ॥

[267]

अख्यातिवादिनः सांख्याः भ्रमकल्पत्यसहिष्णवः ।
स्वप्नेऽपि ते भ्रमकथां न कुर्वीरन्कथञ्चन ॥

[268]

किञ्चात्र ब्रह्मणःस्तोत्रे कर्तारस्त्रिदशाः परम् ।
नैव प्रसक्तिः सांख्यानां कथञ्चन विधिस्तवे ॥

[269]

औदासीन्यं प्रवृत्तिश्चेत्येकस्योक्तं द्वयं पुनः ।
मायाशबलितं शुद्धं ब्रह्मैकमिति वादिनाम् ॥
अद्वैतिनामेव मते भृशं सङ्गच्छतेतमाम् ॥

तदयं निर्गलितोर्थः —

[270]

सदेवेत्यादिवाक्यं यच्छान्दोग्योपनिषद्गतम् ।
तस्यार्थः कविनात्वेतत्पद्येन प्रतिपाद्यते ॥

[271]

सद्वाक्यस्थितसच्छब्दः वक्ति विश्वस्य कारणम् ।
केवलां प्रकृतेः शक्तिं न बोधयति सत्पदम् ॥

[272]

तथा चैतन्यमात्रं न शुद्धमप्याह सत्पदम् ।
किन्त्वाह शक्तिसम्बद्धमीश्वरं विश्वकारणम् ॥

[273]

प्रकृष्टा प्रकृतिः शक्तिसम्पूर्णात्परमेश्वरात् ।
नैकान्तं भिद्यते तद्वन्नाप्यत्यन्तं न भिद्यते ॥

(अनुवर्तते)

[249]

Being the foremost among the knowers of tradition (*sampradāya*), the great poet, Kālidāsa has explained vividly a pattern of sequential progress through staircase climbing process, *viz.* beginning with *pariṇāma* (transformation) theory, and ending with *vivarta* (projection) theory.

[250]

“Inasmuch as one establishes *pariṇāma* theory in the natural sequence, there gets established even the *vivarta* theory on its own accord” — thus indeed has Sarvajñātmamuni elucidated this standpoint in his *opus magnum*, the *Saṅkṣepaśārīraka* (II, 61).

[251]

In the above-mentioned way, let me explain the *śloka* “*tvāmāmananti ...*” (*Kumārasambhava*, 2.13) appropriately, with due regard to the intention of the great poet.

[252]

The Vedic texts say that “You (the supreme Brahman) are the omniscient, sentient and ever-existent Being.” They say that “You are the prime cause of transformation for the effect, *viz.* the whole of the other worlds, You form the essential nature of all the worlds].”

[253]

The best knowers of Brahman, those who know the rules of *Mīmāṃsā* (Vedic exegesis), know “Yourself

(Brahman) as the foremost *puruṣa* (Person) and sa main witness-self (*sākṣin*) of the *prakṛti* which has many *vikāras* (internal modifications).”

[254]

As and when a substance gets transformed, in the effectual state the substance does not last long for it is already in a transformed state; *e.g.*, the milk — when it gets transformed into curd — in its changed state it becomes spoilt.

[255]

If one accepts the transformation of Brahman, there would be mutation and evanescence of Brahman. But the Vedic texts portray Brahman to be eternal and immutable.

[256]

After the change of the original nature of *kāraṇa* (cause), there is the *kārya* (effect) which is only a transformation; *e.g.*, there are curd, etc. the illustrations here.

[257]

The *Upaniṣads* declare decisively that Brahman is eternal, free from actions, unchanging and only a witness (*sākṣin*) — even when there is the appearance of the world.

[258]

Only in accordance with the appearance of the world (in the parlance of the worldwide view), Brahman is held to be the transformatory cause (of the world). But in accordance with the scriptural testi-

mony Brahman is only the *vivarta* cause (of the projection of the world).

[259]

Just because Brahman is said to be related to *māyā* — which is also called *prakṛti* —, Brahman is said to be a transformatory cause in a secondary sense.

[260]

Even when Brahman is said to be *vivartakāraṇa* (cause of projection), it is only with regard to *māyā* (nescience), *i.e.* Brahman intended as a locus of *māyā*. So Brahman is reckoned to be twofold with regard to its association and non-association with *māyā*: (i) *pariṇāmi-kāraṇa*, and (ii) *vivarta-kāraṇa*.

[261]

Just to please the students (readers) who are afraid of terse dialectics with regard to *sāstraic* discussion, (the great commentator) Mallinātha commented ~~on the tenth~~ verse (the *Kumārasambhava*, 2.13) in conformity with the Sāṅkhya system of philosophy.

[262]

However, Mallinātha's explanation is not tenable on the whole. The followers of the Sāṅkhya never accept the identity of *pradhāna* (*prakṛti*) and *puruṣa*.

[263]

Through the first and second line of this *śloka* (tenth verse), all the gods, in unison, speak of Brahmā

(*Vedhāh*), the one supreme Lord-simultaneously constituting both *prakṛti* and *puruṣa*.

[264]

The above contention cannot hold good according to the Sāṅkhya system; for, the followers of Sāṅkhya speak of *prakṛti* and *puruṣa* as different from each other altogether.

[265]

(To give an explanation of this verse in the Sāṅkhya perspective is not sound; for) Brahmā is sentient and an omniscient being, whereas the inanimate *prakṛti* is an insentient matter. So if the gods praise Brahmā to be both *prakṛti* and *puruṣa*, then it could be only an instance of (apparent) censure.

[266]

If it be said that this verse consists of an illusory praise dealing with *puruṣa* in the Sāṅkhyan perspective — for there is only a ~~superimposition of non-differences~~ of *prakṛti* on *puruṣa* — then even such a view is quite unfounded.

[267]

For, the Sāṅkhyas are *akhyātivādins* (strict adherents of *akhyāti* — non apprehension). They do not agree with any form of illusion (*bhrama*). Never do they accept any case of illusion even with regard to dream (*svapna*).

[268]

Moreover, only the gods sing in praise of Brahmā, hence there is no chance of Sāṅkhyas to eulogise ahmā.

[269]

Therefore the praise of Brahmā, sung by gods, is most tenable in the case of Advaita standpoint, viz. Brahman is reckoned to be twofold as interspersed with *māyā* (*māyāśabalita*) and the Pure Brahman (*śuddham*); i.e. Brahman is really untainted (*lit.* indifferent) and so it is Pure Brahman; however, when any action (*pravṛtti*) is spoken of Brahman, then it is with regard to *māyā* that has its locus in Brahman.

[270]

A Resumé

The present *śloka* (*Kumārasambhava*, 2. 13) of Kālidāsa incorporates the main idea conveyed by the *Chāndogya* (6.2.1) text, "*sadeva somya idamagra āsit kameva advitīyam brahma.*"

[271]

The word, 'sat' in the above text speaks of Brahman as the cause of the universe; and, *इति वाक्ये* they the me *इति वाक्ये* *prkṛti*.

Nor does the *śaitanya* of the *prkṛti* convey that *Īśvara* is the cause of the universe.

merely imply sentience (*śuruṣa*). Rather it (*sat*) possessing power is the

[273]

Neither is the potent *prakṛti* completely different from the supreme *Īśvara* that is full of power, nor is it (*prakṛti*) absolutely identical with the supreme God.

(to be continued)

FROM THE PURANĀNĪR

ஈயென இரத்தல் இழிந்தன்று, அதனெதிர்
 ஈயேன் என்றல் அதனினும் இழிந்தன்று
 கொள்ளெனக்கொடுத்தல் உயர்ந்தன்று, அதனெதிர்
 கொள்ளேன் என்றல் அதனினும் உயர்ந்தன்று

iyēna irattal ilindanru adanēdir
iyēṇ enral adaninum ilindanru
kolḷenak koḷuttal uyarndanru adanēdir
kolḷēṇ enral adaninum uyarndanru

It is demeaning to beg saying 'Give'.

It is more demeaning to say, 'I won't give'.

It is ennobling to say 'Take'.

It is more ennobling to say 'I won't take'.

From a song (204) in
 King Valvil Ōri,
 Kaḷaidiṅ Yāṅ

ABOUT THE PUBLISHERS

The Ādi Śaṅkara Advaita Research Centre was established in 1975 under the guidance and with the blessings of His Holiness Jagadguru Śrī Śaṅkarācārya of Kāñcī Kānakoti Pīṭha. The main objectives of the Centre, among other things, are:

- (1) to undertake the carrying on of scientific research for the extension of knowledge in the fields of Natural and Applied Sciences generally, and in particular in the fields of Physics and Metaphysics.
- (2) to undertake and carry on scientific study and analysis of the Advaita system of thought as expounded by Ādi Śaṅkara and to conduct research as regards the relevance of his teaching in solving present day ills of mankind.
- (3) to undertake, promote, and encourage the study of ancient philosophical systems of India.
- (4) to undertake research for the purposes of establishing norms necessary for realising the divinity in man through moral, spiritual and cultural infra-structure.

THE VOICE OF ŚAṅKARA (ŚAṅKARA-BHĀRATĪ) is the half-yearly journal published by the Centre in pursuance of its many objectives.

The following are its office-bearers:—

President:

Sri V. D. Swami

Vice-Presidents:

Sri P. R. Ramasubrahmaniya Rajah

Sri S. V. S. Raghavan

Secretary:

Dr. N. C. Krishnan

Jt. Secretary-cum-Treasurer:

Sri S. Subramanian

Editor: N. C. Krishnan. Published by: S. Chandran on behalf of Ādi Śaṅkara Advaita Research Centre, 1-E, Rosewood Offices, Nungambakkam High Road, Madras - 600 034. Printed by: V. Seshachalam, Avvai Achukkoodam, Madras - 600 013.

संसाराध्वनि तापभानुकिरणप्रोद्भूतदाहव्यथा-
 खिन्नानां जलकाङ्क्षया मरुभुवि भ्रान्त्या परिभ्राम्यताम् ।
 अत्यासन्नसुधाम्बुधिं सुखकरं ब्रह्माद्वयं दर्शय-
 त्येषा शङ्करभारती विजयते निर्वाणसन्दायिनी ॥

*saṁsārādhvani tāpabhānukiraṇaprodhūtadāhavyathā-
 khinnānām jalakāṅkṣayā marubhuvi bhrāntyā
 paribhrāmyatām
 atyāsannasudhāmbudhiṁ sukhakarain brahmādvayain
 darśayaty-
 eṣā śaṅkarabhārati vijayate nirvāṇasandāyini.*

To those who are afflicted, in the way of the world, by the burning pain given rise to by the scorching sun-shafts of misery, and who through delusion wander about in the desert (of worldliness) seeking water — showing the felicitous ocean of nectar, which is very near, the non-dual *Brahman*, this — the Voice of Śaṅkara — is victorious, leading, as it does, to liberation.