

A HALF-YEARLY JOURNAL OF ADVAITA-VEDĀNTA

The VOICE of ŚĀṆKARA

śāṅkara-bhāratī

Chairman, Advisory Board
V.R. Kalyanasundara Sastri

Editor
R. Balasubramanian

Volume TWENTY
Number ONE



January

1995

*esā śaṅkara-bhāratī vijayate
nirvāṇa-saṁdāyini*

victorious is the voice of śaṅkara,
leading, as it does, to liberation.

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ĀDI SANKARA ADVAITA RESEARCH CENTRE
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CONTENTS

	1	Homage to Śaṅkara
H.H. JAGADGURU ŚRI CANDRAŚEKHARENDRA SARASVATĪ	3	Temple Worship
ŚĀSTRARATNĀKARA POLAGAM ŚRI RĀMA ŚĀSTRĪ	11	Some Pre-Śaṅkara Advaitins—I
ŚRI ANANTĀNANDENDRA SARASVATĪ	20	Some Pre-Śaṅkara Advaitins—II
N. RAGHUNATHAN	24	Sadāśiva Brahmendra Sarasvatī
P. MARUDANAYAGAM	36	For Enlightenment and Wisdom: Paramācārya and Tamil Literature
S.L. PANDEY	53	Vedāntic Approach to God
S.O. RAMAKRISHNAN	78	The Paramācārya — Śaṅkarācārya Equation
V. KUTUMBA SASTRY	92	Śaṅkara and Samskrit Literature
S. RANGANATH	104	A Note on the 'Ātman' in the Light of Sadā- nanda's Vedāntasāra
ŚRI ŚĀNKARA BHAGAVATPĀDA	111	The Four Indispens- able Qualifications
R. BALASUBRAMANIAN	118	Advaita

NOTE

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HOMAGE TO ŚAṅKARA

[160]

वेदाविरुद्धमतसाधनबद्धदीक्ष

वादे विजित्य तरसा क्षितिमण्डलं यः ।

अद्वैतरक्षणमहो कृतवांश्च स त्वं

श्रीशङ्करार्य मम देहि पदावलम्बम् ॥

vedāvīruddhamata-sādhana-baddha-dikṣa!
vāde vijitya tarasā kṣitimaṇḍalaṁ yaḥ
advaitarakṣaṇam-aho kṛtavāṁśca sa tvam
śrīśaṅkarārya! mama dehi padāvalambam.

Oh Śrī Śaṅkara! Oh great Guru who has avowedly been intent on upholding the system of thought (Advaita) that is ever fully in consonance with the *Vedas*! You have, indeed, established the Advaita Vedānta by conquering rapidly all the opponents all over the earth. Oh great preceptor Śrī Śaṅkara! offer me the shelter at your benign pair of feet.

[161]

तत्त्वार्थबोधनविहीनहृदम्बुजस्य
 रागादिदोषपरिपूरितचेतसो मे ।
 तत्त्वं विबोध्य विनिवार्यै च रागरोगं
 श्रीशङ्कराय मम देहि पदावलम्बम् ॥

*tattvārthabodhana-vihīna-hṛdambujasya
 rāgādidoṣaparipūrīta-cetaso me
 tattvaṁ vibodhya vinivārya ca rāgarogaṁ
 śrīśaṅkarāya! mama dehi padāvalambam.*

Oh Śrī Śaṅkara! as I am without the valid knowledge of truth, and as my mind is always full of blemishes such as lust, etc., kindly ward off my disease of lust, etc., and make me realise the supreme Truth. Oh Śrī Śaṅkara! please give me shelter at your benign lotus-like pair of feet.

Jagadguru Śrī Saccidānanda Śivābhinava Nṛsimhabhāratī
 in *Śrīśaṅkarāryapadāvalambastava*

TEMPLE WORSHIP*

H. H. Jagadguru Śrī Candrasekharendra Sarasvatī

Our country abounds in *punya kshetras* (holy temples) and *punya tirthas* (holy bathing places). The temples and *tirthas* are places where sages of old had dedicated their *tapas* (spiritual powers) so that erring mortals, who are incapable of observing the austerities necessary to gain spiritual power and who are susceptible to sins may be purified and blessed, when they make pilgrimage to these temples and take their bath in the *tirthas*.

Our sculpture, music, dance, *mantras* and every aspect of our culture are dedicated to the God in the temple, and so the temple has become the repository of all that is best in our heritage.

We have our history also from the inscriptions in temples. The monarchs of those days, great devotees as they were, took pride in raising temples for God and not residential palaces for themselves—as proved by the fact that, while their palaces are now either

* Culled from His Holiness' lectures

dilapidated or not at all to be found, the grand temple edifices stand in glory to this day.

If our religion has survived many vicissitudes in the past, it is because of our temples and the festivals associated with them.

Gratitude for help received is a cardinal virtue. The taxes you pay to the Corporation of Madras and to the Government are your expression of gratitude for the services rendered by those agencies. There are super-human agencies which confer benefits on us. We must express our gratitude to those agencies in the manner prescribed in the *Vedas*. This expression of gratitude is known as *yajña* (sacrifice). Temple worship is just another form of *yajña*, where offerings are made to the super-human agencies on behalf of the entire community. While in the *yajña* the various forces are individually propitiated as *devas*, in the temples the Source of all these forces is worshipped with offerings, which naturally go to all the *devas*. Though schools, hospitals and banks and such other social service organizations may be necessary in the context of our present times, these institutions cannot serve their respective purposes in the absence of devotion. The one cure for all human ills is the power to endure them with faith in God's grace. *Bhakti* alone can give that power of endurance. Temples are the agencies for the cultivation of *bhakti*. Hence the obligation to maintain or build anew temples in every place.

What is the significance of making offerings to the idols installed in temples? This is done as an expression of gratitude to the Power that created all things. We

will be guilty of gross ingratitude if we do not offer first to God, what we eat or wear. It is not everyone that can do *pūjā* (worship) at home and make these offerings to God. It is here that temples come into the picture. Offerings are made to God in the temples on behalf of the entire community.

It is not even necessary that every one should worship inside the temples every day. *Gopura darśanam* (seeing the tower of the temple) will itself elevate our minds and make us remember the source from which we derive all the earthly benefits. At the same time, it is necessary for the community to see that worship at the temples is conducted properly. We should make it a point to see the temple tower every day and thereby concentrate a while in the contemplation of God. At least once a week we should go round the temple reciting *nāmas* (God's names) and doing *bhajan*. If we do so, we will derive real and lasting benefit.

The five sense organs, namely, eyes, ears, nose, tongue and touch, give us an awareness of the fundamental elements, which, in diverse combinations, constitute the universe. Like a receiving radio set, these organs receive the various impulses from outside and carry them to our brain. That is why they are called the *jñānendriyas*. Each of the five senses contributes to our joy in life. Good food, delectable music, fragrant smell, beautiful art, cool breeze and soothing moonlight add to our joy and happiness. All these good things in life come to us through God's grace, for by ourselves, we cannot produce even a grain of rice. That being so, it behoves us to think of Him from whom they emanate, the God whose aspects are the divinities presiding over the elements, which deter-

mine the senses and their respective sensation. It is our duty to gratefully offer all those things which afford us the right kind of joy to God, the Giver, first, and then enjoy them as His *prasāda* or gift. According to the *Gītā*, if we enjoy these things without offering them first to the Giver, it would be tantamount to theft. It is this offering of the objects of the five-fold joys that is known as *Pañcopacāras* to God, the five offerings, namely the offering of *gandha* (sandal), *pushpa* (flowers), *dhūpa* (incense), *dīpa* (lamps) and *naivedya* (food). If our *jñānendriyas* and their stimuli are reverentially offered to the Paramātmā, then we shall not be inclined to misuse these sense organs. By such dedication to God, we deflect them from evil propensities and sublimate them to a divine goal.

Besides requirements which are the minimum sources of material pleasure, there are other things which make for life's comfort, like house, clothes, conveyance, etc. These too are to be used only after they have been offered to God. All such offerings are included in, what is known as, *ṣoḍaśopacāras* (16 offerings). And then there are other sources of enjoyment like music, dance, chariot, elephant, horse, etc., applicable in the case of highly-placed persons and which may be regarded as luxuries for the common man. All these should also be offered to God before being appropriated for use by us and they are included in the 64 or *Catus-shasṭī upacāras*.

All these *upacāras* come within the ambit of the rituals of worship. It may be asked, "Why all these elaborate rituals? Will not silent prayer do?" The answer is to be found, if we rightly understand

the significance of these ritualistic offerings, namely, that a true devotee acknowledges the ultimate source and the inner substance of these objects of his enjoyment and uses them only after tendering them to that source in humble gratitude. Since only the best and the purest should be offered to God, and since nothing should be enjoyed which is not so offered, this practice will ensure that every man will seek and take delight only in such things as can be fit objects of such offering. This will go a long way in making our lives perfect and pure.

God is the source of all the pleasures that we enjoy in this world and they reside in Him in their excellence and perfection. He will vouchsafe them to us, warding off our afflictions, if we would but resign ourselves absolutely at His holy feet. It is in this consciousness of deriving our joys and pleasures from Him, that we offer various things to Him in our *pañcopacāras*.

There is a *sthalapurāṇa* (mythological account) for each temple. The Śaivite and the Vaiṣṇavite saints have also sung about many of our temples and places of pilgrimage. This temple literature contains a fund of information which, when understood properly, will help us to approach the *Purāṇas* with the reverence they deserve.

In this country, there are, what may be called, community temples. In fact all the temples help promote community consciousness by bringing together people of all walks and stations of life in the holy bond of devotion. Especially the great festivals bring together people from far and near. In the Car Festi-

val, rich and poor alike, Brahmin and peasant alike, draw the rope of the car. It is a rule that no pollution should be observed for the proximity of the out-caste in the Car Festival. Such is the bond of devotion!

Apart from this there are, what may be called, regular community temples. For instance, at Āvuḍayārkoil, it is the custom to offer large quantities of cooked rice to the presiding deity and this rice is made available to all at a nominal cost. In many temples the sense of community life is fostered by devoting special days and occasions for it. Consecrated food is made available through them to all these in need.

There is some special feature associated with the worship in each temple. For instance, the special feature of Tirumalai is the offering of wealth, which takes the form of dropping cash or jewels in the hundi. In Palani, people carry and offer *kāvaḍi*. At Rāmeswaram, the bathing of the deity with water brought from the Ganga is considered sacred. In the West Coast, each temple has its special form of offering. At Ambalapuzha, the offering to Sri Krishna takes the form of *paal paayasam* (a sweet preparation with milk and rice). The favourite offering to Sri Mahadeva at Vaikom is the conduct of feasts, at which hundreds of people are fed sumptuously. During the annual festival at another Sri Krishna temple, boat races are conducted in the water course in front of the temple. At Tirupparayar, where the presiding deity is Sri Ramachandra, offerings take the form of detonation—a number of cylinders packed with gun-powder, are set fire to and they explode one after another in quick succession with a loud report. At Ettumanur, money is offered, as is being done at Tirumalai. At

Trichur, ghee offered by devotees is poured over the deity, with the result that the Deity remains practically hidden under the solidified ghee. The accumulated ghee within the *sanctum sanctorum* is removed periodically, and this ghee, often a hundred years old, is purchased by Ayurvedic physicians, as *purāṇa gṛtam* (old ghee) is a specific medicine for skin diseases. It is at this temple that the parents of Sri Śaṅkara Bhagavatpāda prayed and obtained the blessings of the Lord for getting a son.

Another sacred and historic temple in Kerala is that of Lord Sri Krishna at Guruvāyūr. The Lord enshrined in this temple is popularly called Guruvāyūrappan and He is pleased to hear the recital of Śrīmad Bhāgavata. This temple and the temple of Sri Ayyappan on the top of the Sabari Hills have become popular in Tamil Nadu also during recent years. It is noteworthy that Śrī Śaṅkara, in his *Śivapādādi-keśastavam*, has also prayed to Śāstā or Ayyappan, referring to Him as the third son of Lord Śiva.

In some temples, the quantity of *naivedyam* (offerings) is in such generous proportion that a devotee can get sumptuous food by paying merely an anna. The Annapūrṇesvari temple in Cherukunnam (Kerala) will be closed every day only after ascertaining that no one has gone without food. There is a custom there to tie a bundle of cooked rice to the branch of a tree near the temple in the night. This practice is to ensure that even a thief does not go hungry.

The lesson that we have to draw from all these forms of worship is that we should do our duty and enjoy the right things of the world, placing the entire responsibility for our not being lured by them, on God. This is not a philosophy of inaction or idleness. It is a philosophy of action, with the emphasis on the dedication of our action and enjoyment to God.

SOME PRE-ŚAṄKARA ADVAITINS — I
ĀTREYA BRAHMANANDĪ AND DRAVIDĀCĀRYA

Śāstra-ratnākara Polagam Sri Rama Sastrī

These two personages who are among the early expounders of the pure Advaitic tradition were born in the beginning of this *yuga*. Of these two, Brahmanandī wrote a work called *Vākya* in *sūtra* form and it was an exposition of the purport of the *Chāndogyopaniṣad*. Dravidācārya embellished that work by his *Bhāshya* on it. On account of this, these authors came to be known as *Vākyakāra* and *Bhāshyakāra* respectively.

In the *Chāndogyopaniṣad* from the first to the fifth adhyāya the following topics are expounded for the benefit of persons of inferior and not-so-inferior qualifications: three kinds of upāsanas namely, *aṅgāvabaddhopāsana* which leads to the fruits of karma, *svatantrapratīkopāsana* which bestows material welfare, and *ahaṅgrahopāsana* which leads to *krama-mukti*. In the sixth, seventh, and eighth adhyāyas are expounded in order *sadvidyā*, *bhūmāvidyā*, and *prājāpatyavidyā*. These have their fruition in *sadyomukti* or immediate

release. These relate to the realisation of nirguṇa Brahman which is *saccidānanda* and are expounded for persons of superior qualification. In the eighth adhyāya, for the benefit of persons of intermediate qualification, *daharavidyā* which relates to saguṇa Brahman is explained again. Thus two kinds of Brahman are treated of in the *Chāndogyaopaniṣad*, the qualified Brahman to be worshipped and the Brahman free from any qualities which is only to be known and realised.

In his *Vākya-grantha* which is an exposition of the *Chāndogyaopaniṣad*, Brahmanandī too clearly brings out, in accord with the Upanishad, the two-fold character of Brahman. Draviḍācārya also in his *bhāshya* on the *vākya*, very clearly expounds the two-fold Brahman and his exposition is in line with the Upanishad and the *vākya*. Unfortunately, these two works are not available.

However, thirty statements of the *vākya* and twenty of the *bhāshya* are available having been quoted in the works of early writers. Of these, eight statements of *vākya-grantha* and nine of the *bhāshya* are found quoted in Advaitic works. Twenty-two of *vākya-grantha* and eleven of the *bhāshya* are quoted in the writings of Śrī Rāmānuja and others. Thus from both the *vākya* and *bhāshya* we are now in possession of only fifty statements. They have been set forth in the work entitled *Draviḍātreyadarśanam*.

Śrī Śaṅkara and others have quoted in their Advaitic works from the *bhāshya* of Draviḍācārya in the context of the explanation of the *madhuvidyā*

and *saṁvargavidyā* found in the third and the fourth chapters of the *Chāndogyopaniṣad*. Śrī Rāmānuja and others quote from the *vākya* and *bhāshya* passages in the context of the *antarādityavidyā* set forth in the first chapter of the *Chāndogyopaniṣad*.

Though Śrī Śaṅkara has not quoted *verbatim* from the *vākya*, yet in his exposition of the *antarādityavidyā* in his *Chāndogya-bhāshya*, and in the *antastaddharmādhi-karaṇa* devoted to an examination of it in the *sūtrabhāshya*, he has expressed the same ideas in similar language. Thus, we find that Śrī Śaṅkara has given expression in his works to ideas similar in language to passages in the *vākya* and the *bhāshya* and having the same meaning. Such parallel passages have been indicated in the work *Draviḍātreyadarśanam*. They have also been separately tabulated in that work for purpose of comparison under the heads of *Brahmanandi-Bhagavatpāda-Vākya-Sāmarasyam* and *Draviḍācārya-Bhagavatpāda-Vākya Sāmarasyam*.

The *vākya-grantha* gives six meanings to the *antarādityavidyā* passage in the *Chāndogyopaniṣad*: *tasya yathā kapyāsam puṇḍarīkam evamakshinī*. In his *Chāndogyopanishadbhāshya* Śrī Śaṅkara gives the conventional (*rūḍhi*) meaning of the word *kapi*. In the work *Draviḍātreyadarśanam* it has been shown that this interpretation is not affected by the criticism made against it by others. Śrī Rāmānuja and others adopt three other meanings of the word from the etymological (*yaugika*) point of view taking them from the *vākya-grantha*. It has to be emphasised that all meanings, the conventional and the etymological, are those stated in the *vākya* itself.

In his *vākya-grantha*, the Vākyakāra observes that for the *anugraha* of the aspirants, the Lord's form which is resplendent (*jyotirmaya*) is imperceivable by the sense of sight, but can be perceived only by those of pure mind who worship concentrating on the form of the sun (*āditya-maṇḍala*). This same meaning accepted by the Vākyakāra is conveyed by Śrī Śaṅkara in the exposition of the *antarādityavidyāvivarāṇa* of the *antastaddharmādhikaraṇa* and of the *Chāndogyopaniṣad*. The Vākyakāra says:

*syādrūpam kṛtakam anugrahārtham taccetasām
aiśvaryāt; rūpam ca atīndriyam antaḥkaraṇa-pratyakṣam
tannirdeśat.*

Draviḍācārya's bhāshya on this passage is: *añjasaiva viśvasriḥorūpam tattū na cakṣuṣā grāhyam
manasā tvakaluṣeṇa sādhanāntaravatī grhyate.*

Śrī Śaṅkara writes in the *antastaddharmādhikaraṇa*: *syāt paramēśvarasyāpi icchāvaśāt māyāmayam rūpam
sādhakānugrahārtham.* In the *Chāndogyabhāshya* he says: *drśyate nivr̥tta-cakṣurbhīḥ samāhita-cetobhīḥ
brahmacaryādi-sādhanāpekṣam.*

'It is seen by those whose eyes have been turned inward and whose minds are steadfast by reason of the practice of brahmacarya, etc.'

It is to be noted that corresponding to the expressions of the Vākyakāra, *taccetasāmanugrahārtham*, *aiśvaryāt* and *kṛtakam*, Śrī Śaṅkara uses the words *sādhakānugrahārtham*, *māyāmayam* and *icchāvaśāt*. Similarly, where the Vākyakāra says *atīndriyamantaḥkaraṇapratyakṣam*, the Bhāshyakāra explains it as: *na cakṣuṣā grāhyam manasā tvakaluṣeṇa sādhanāntaravatā*

gṛhyate, and Śrī Śaṅkara's expressions for them are respectively *dṛśyate nivṛtta-cakṣurbhīḥ*, *samāhitachetobhīḥ* and *brahmacarjādi-sādhanāpekṣam*.

Thus, while the expressions in the *vākya*, the *bhāshya*, and Śrī Śaṅkara's explanations are in accord, not disposed to agree to this, Śrī Rāmānuja and others have altered the words *rūpam cātindriyam* into *rūpam vā atindriyam*. They also maintain that the statement *syād rūpam* is the *pūrvapakṣa* and that *rūpam vā atindriyam* contains the *siddhānta*. They also say that the form of the Lord is not unreally assumed by Him, but that it is His real nature. The *Vākyakāra* says in the previous sentence that it is assumed for purpose of *anugraha* and he follows it in the succeeding sentence that that form is supersensuous, but perceivable in the *antaḥkaraṇa*. There is nothing irreconcilable in the Lord's form being the result of an assumption and also supersensuous and cognisable by the pure mind. Where is the distinction of *pūrvapakṣa* and *siddhānta* between two positions which are not contradictory to each other? Dispassionate consideration will show that this has not been taken into account in a partisan view of this matter. That the Lord's form is eternal has nowhere been stated in the *vākya*. All this has been clearly brought out in the work *Draviḍātreyadarśanam*.

In his *bhāshya*, *Draviḍācārya* says that *bhagavad-rūpa*, the Lord's form is *yathābhūta*, that is, it is existent, and goes on to observe that form is not spoken of a *devatā* which is formless; for *śāstra* speaks only of what is. It is *yathābhūta-vādi*. It informs us of what has *sattā*. True, there is no instruction of *rūpa* in respect of what is *arūpa*, formless. The meditation on the form of the Lord is not based on *adhyāsa* or sup-

position as in the meditation of mind as Brahman, etc., but it is the meditation of the existing *rūpa*. Śrī Śaṅkara too following the same text speaks in the same manner. This is what he says: There is no non-validity in respect of the texts which refer to the subject of *upāsana*. Hence *Śāstra* which speaks of *upāsana* refers only to the actually existing *ātmā*, *Īśvara* and *devatā*, etc. While explaining the third brāhmaṇa of the first adhyāya of the *Bṛhadāranya-kopaniṣad*, he observes, 'As that which is indicated as Paramātmā, Īśvara and devatā is non-empirical, it deserves to be spoken of as actually existing.' Similarly in the Bhāshya on the *sūtra* — *svāpyayasamṃpatyoḥ anyatarāpekṣamāviṣkṛtam hi* Śrī Śaṅkara says: That where this Īśvara's nature is described, it refers to a different state like *Svarga*, etc., and it is the locus of the *saguṇavidyā*.

The empirical reality of the Lord's form subsists till the direct realization of Brahman. It is not transcendental (*pāramārthika*), non-sublatable in all the three periods of time like the qualitless Brahman. This view is based on the passage, *laukikam tadvad-vedam pramāṇam tvātmaniścayāt*, given at the end of the Bhāshya in *samanvayādhikaraṇa*. Śrī Rāmānuja and others maintain, however, that the Lord's form is *pāramārthikam*. They rely on the following passage in Bhāskara's Bhāshya on the *Brahma-sūtra*.

paramēśvarasya sarvaśaktitvāt upāsakānugrahāya rūpopādānasambhavāt, kim māyāmayam rūpam? neti brūmah, pāramārthikamevaitat, yathābhūtajñāpakam hi śāstram.

Attracted by this view, they delude themselves into believing that the same may be the view of the Vākyakāra and the Bhāshyakāra.

But that is not correct. Even as the Vākyakāra upholds the theory of *vyāvahārika*, so does the Bhāshyakāra too. In the context of the explanation of the *sadvidyā*, taking up the *Śruti vācārambhaṇam vikāro nāmadheyam mṛttiket,eva satyam*, Vākyakāra discards the theory that a thing should be either *sat* or *asat* only, and establishes on the basis of *śruti*, the theory of the *vyāvahārikasatya* of the world which is neither exclusively *sat* nor *asat*, *na samvyaavahāramātratvāt*. This conclusion of the Vākyakāra is clearly explained in the *Samkṣepa-śūrīraka*, in the commentaries on it and in the *Kalpataru*. It is pertinent to ask those who proclaim that they are followers of the position of the Vākyakāra, why they have rejected the statements establishing the *vyāvahārikatva* of the world and quoted in the *Kalpataru* and the *Samkṣepaśūrīraka*.

While explaining the *sadvidyā* the Vākyakāra says *yuktam tadguṇakopāsanāt*. He considers that *antarguṇaka brahmaprāpti* is a proper consequence of *antarguṇakabrahmopāsanā*.

The Bhāshyakāra too explains this passage as follows:

antarguṇām pratyak guṇāmeva bhagavatīm paradevatām bhajata iti tatra tadguṇaiva devatā prāpyate.

Here the word *tadguṇakam* in the *vākya* is explained as *antarguṇa*. And, the expression *antarguṇa* in the Bhāshya is explained as the *pratyagātman*. *Antaḥ* (inner) is a correlate of *bahiḥ* (outer), i.e. inner as

opposed to outer. So we get the equation: *tadguṇa-kopāsanāt antarguṇakopāsanāt pratyagrūpabrahmopāsanāt*. By the 'Tatkratu-nyāya' it is proper to say *tadguṇaiva antarguṇaiva pratyaksvarūpaiva*. By this *pratyaksvarūpa* the *paradevatā*, the supreme deity which is *parabrahma-rūpa* is attained. This reasoned conclusions of the Vākyakāra and the Bhāshyakāra is established beyond doubt. That the consciousness of the non-difference of the *pratyagātman* and *Brahman* arises from the knowledge of the identity of the two which is the purport of the Mahāvākya *tattvamasi* is expounded by both of them.

The same is explained by Śrī Śaṅkara in his commentary on the *Chāndogyopanīṣad*. That this is the view of the Bhāshya of Draviḍācārya is clearly stated in the *Saṅkṣepaśārīraka* also.

Explaining the Mahāvākya *tattvamasi*, the Vākyakāra puts it in the form of a Sūtra *siddhantu nivartakatvāt*. The Bhāshyakāra explains it thus: A prince brought up among hunters thinks that he is a hunter. But when he is told on the basis of proper reasons that he is a prince, he realises his true nature. Even so the *jīva* thinks that he is a *saṁsārī*. But when a Guru tells him of his *brahmabhāva* of which he was ignorant so long, he realises his true nature upon the removal of that nescience. Thus is established the validity of the declaration *tattvamasi*. The Vākya is not to be understood as illumining what was not luminous itself. No other light can illumine what is already luminous. Thus this elucidation of Draviḍācārya in the form of the story is found in several Advaitic works.

The fact that Advaita Sannyāsins specially worship Draviḍācārya at the time of Vyāsapūjā, proves his association with the propagation of the Advaita Sampradāya.

And so, it is concluded with the prayer that every one may derive benefit according to his capacity by the study of the Advaita *darśana* which is the central teaching of the Upaniṣad, proclaimed in the *Jñānavāsiṣṭha* by the great sage Vasishṭha, enunciated by Bādarāyaṇācārya in his *Brahmasūtra*, clearly explained by Vṛittikāras like Upavarṣa, made definite by Gauḍapādācārya in his Kārikās on the *Māṇḍūkyaopaniṣad*, established by Śrī Śaṅkara Bhagavatpāda who stands for the pure Advaita Sampradāya in his Bhāshyas, etc., annotated in their *ṭīkā*, *vārtika*, etc., by ācāryas like Padmapāda and Suresvara, by the authors of the *Saṅkṣepaśārīraka* and *Vivarana* and by Vācaspati Misra, expounded in simple language by Śrī Vidyāranya and which has been transmitted through a holy and beginningless tradition and which dowers its votaries with supreme joy and eternal peace.

SOME PRE-ŚAṄKARA ADVAITINS—II

PRTHVĪDHARA

Śrī Anantānandendra Sarasvatī

In the last part of the first Ullāsa of the work *Tattvacandrikā*¹ by Vellālakula Umāmaheśvarasāstrī, we come across the following passage:

*ekonaśatam bhāṣyānyanārṣāṇi pṛthvīdhara-abhinava-
guptapraṇītāni tatkālam vidyamāna kartṛkāni chinnānti
prasiddham.*

It appears from the above that Pṛthvīdhara, Abhinavagupta and ninety-seven others, had written, *bhāṣyas* on the *Brahmasūtra*, that the authors were living in the time of Śrī Śaṅkarācārya and that those *bhāṣyas* were so completely refuted by Śrī Śaṅkarācārya that they ceased to gain further currency. In the opinion of the author of *Tattvacandrikā*, Pṛthvīdhara, who was the author of one of *anārṣa bhāṣyas* is more respected than Abhinavagupta; for he mentions his name first in accordance with the *Pāṇinisūtra* 'abhyarhitam pūrvam' which states that a revered person must be referred to first.

While we know of Abhinavagupta as the author of several works on *Tantras* nothing is known of *Pṛthvī dhara* or of his works. The only two references to him that have been traced are in the Catalogues of Aufrecht. In his catalogue² of Sanskrit manuscripts in the Bodleian Library at Oxford, Aufrecht describes a work *Dvādaśa-mahāvākya-vivaraṇa* by one Vaikuṅṭhapuri in which the name of Pṛthvīdhara is found among the best disciples of Śrī Śaṅkarācārya. Vaikuṅṭhapuri also ascribes to Pṛthvīdhara the foundation of the order of sannyāsins in Kaliyuga. The wellknown ten orders of Advaita sannyāsins are: (1) *tīrtha*, (2), *āśrama* (3) *vana*, (4) *araṇya*, (5) *parvata*, (6) *sāgara*, (7) *sarasvatī*, (8) *giri*, (9) *bhāratī* and (10) *purī*. The sannyāsins of these orders are the *śiṣyas* of Pṛthvīdhara.

*pṛthvīdharācāryaḥ tasyāpi śiṣhyāḥ daśa:—
tīrtha-āśrama-vana-araṇya-giri-parvata-sāgarāḥ
sarasvatī-bhāratī ca purī nāmāni vai daśa.*

He is also reported to have written a commentary on the *Śrisūkta* published in Banaras.

From the above it may be inferred that after his *bhāshya* was refuted by Śrī Śaṅkarācārya, Śrī Pṛthvīdhara like Maṇḍana and others became a disciple of Śrī Śaṅkarācārya.

While the other disciples like Suresvara, Padmapāda and Hastāmālaka wrote *Vārtikas*, *Vivaraṇas* and so on, to expound the principles of Advaita as established by Śrī Śaṅkarācārya, the constitution along with the administration of the Advaita Sannyāsins was undertaken by Pṛthvīdhara in whom the great teacher apparently discovered the capacity for

organization and all the qualities required to inspire reverence, obedience and faith necessary for the maintenance of discipline.

The other reference to Pṛthvīdhara is found in Aufrecht's Catalogue³ of Sanskrit manuscripts in the Leipzig University Library. In the course of describing the manuscript *Gurupādādinamaskāra* Aufrecht says⁴ that Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya, Troṭaka and Pṛthvīdhara are mentioned in the manuscripts. By the kindness of Prof. Dr. Jobs Schubert of the Leipzig University, a microfilm copy of the manuscript was obtained. The reference to Pṛthvīdhara in the manuscript runs thus:

*anubhūtiśvarūpācāryo—troṭakācārya
śṛṅgeripṛthvīdharācārya.*

Here too Pṛthvīdhara is stated to have been one of the disciples of Śaṅkarācārya and from the context it appears that Pṛthvīdhara after constituting the ten orders of Advaita sannyāsins was himself ordained as the head of the Śṛṅgeri Mutt.

We have to pay homage to Pṛthvīdharācārya who was held in such esteem by Śrī Śaṅkarācārya that he was entrusted with the organisation and administration of the sannyāsins who from his time to this day have so worthily discharged their functions by writing works on Advaita and propounding the teaching of Advaita philosophy.

It is also, I think, necessary that further and careful search should be made to find out more about the respected ācārya, Śrī Pṛthvīdhara, and his works especially his *Bhāṣya* on the *Brahmasūtra*.

Whatever be the fact about Pṛthvīdhara — having been the first head of the Śringeri Mutt, we have a definite and undisputed fact that Pṛthvīdhara was the author of an *anārṣa bhāshya* on the *Brahmasūtra*, that he established the order of Advaita sannyāsins and that he was very highly respected. Further research is however necessary especially to trace his *bhāshya* which should have been considered so valuable that he was placed above Abhinavagupta by Umāmaheśvara when referring to the authors of the *anārṣa-bhāshyas*.

NOTES

1. The *Tattovacandrikā* has been printed at M/s. G. Ramaswami Chetty Printing Works, Madras in the year 1907. Another name of this work is *Rāmānujabhāshya-bhañjani*. Manuscripts of this work are available in the Government Oriental Manuscripts Library, Madras, and Theosophical Society Library, Adyar.

2. *Catalogi Codicum manuscriptorum Bibliothecae Bodleianae Codices Sanscriticos*. Th. Aufrecht (1864).

3. *Katalog Der Sanskrit—Handschriften Der Catalogue of Sanskrit Manuscripts of Universitat Bibliothek zu Leipzig*. Von Theodor Aufrecht (1901).

4. Manuscript No. 231 Script of 1807.

SADĀŚIVA BRAHMENDRA SARASVATĪ

*N. Raghunathan**

Sadāśiva Brahmendra Sarasvatī, the *mahāyogin* and *jīvanmukta*, became a legend in his own lifetime. The seventeenth and eighteenth centuries saw a great flowering of the spirit in the Tamil country, especially in the Tanjore region under the enlightened rule of the Nayak and Maharashtra dynasties. Under the aegis of Sahaji (1684-1711) flourished a brilliant galaxy of poets and makers of music, scholars and thinkers who were noted alike for their personal purity and acuteness of intellect. Many of them, including it is believed Sadāśiva's father, were settled in Sahajirājapuram, a royal grant for the encouragement of learning. Great saints sojourned among them, providing the inspiration to the higher life. In Sadāśiva, all the varied talent of that time of awakening seems to have met and blended harmoniously. His output as a poet and writer in the Vedāntic tradition was slender. But he touched the imagination of the people in a unique way, only Bodhendra and Śrīdhara Veṅkaṭeṣa, affectionately known as 'Ayyāvāl', being comparable to him in this respect.

* M.A., B.L.

Many miraculous tales are told about him, but only a few concrete facts are known. He was the disciple of Paramasivendra Sarasvatī, the fifty-seventh head of the Kāñcī Kāmakoti Śaṅkarācārya Pīṭha, whose greatness he repeatedly extols. Paramasivendra seems to have been a contemporary of the great poet Nīlakaṇṭha Dīkshita (born in 1612 A.D. or earlier); for his disciple Rāmanātha was a contemporary of Rāmabhadra Dīkshita, the accomplished poet and grammarian, who was a pupil of Nīlakaṇṭha, and won his praise. And Rāmanātha's pupil Nallā Adhvarī, a younger relation of Rāmabhadra Dīkshita, acknowledges, in his *Advaita-rasamañjarī*, Sadāsiva as his spiritual preceptor after his Guru Paramasivendra. So we may take it that Sadāsiva was born about the same time as Rāmabhadra, in the early years of the seventeenth century.

He mastered all the Śāstras at an early age and was a formidable debater. But a mild word of rebuke from his Guru, says tradition, made him a *maunī*. He spent his time mostly in the secluded, peace and charm of the Kaveri banks as an *avadhūta*; only occasionally emerging, to bestow his grace on some fortunate individuals such as Malhari Pandita, who requested him to bless his patron Serfoji (1911-29), who was childless, or Vijaya Raghunātha Toṇḍaimān of Pudukkoṭṭah, or passing through the countryside like a silent benediction, radiating kindness and compassion. He seems to have lived far beyond the Vedic span of a century and attained beatitude at Nerur near Karur on the Kaveri.

And now for a brief survey of his works: Appayya Dīkshita's works had great influence in that age of

intellectual ferment and vigorous polemic. His *Siddhāntaleśa-saṅgraha* is a survey of the development of Advaitic doctrines after Śaṅkara. Sadāsiva made a verse compendium of it, evidently to serve as a refresher to the serious student engaged in *manana*. His commentary, *Kesaravallī* is an integral part of the work. It supplements the text, as well as elucidating it. The verses convey, as the author justly claims, a depth of meaning in simple words. Indeed all his expository work is both concise and lucid.

Of his method in this work we can give but one instance here. The first section of the text treats of a question of Vedic exegetics—whether the study of the Vedānta is enjoined as an *apūrva-vidhi*, a *niyama-vidhi*, or a *parisaṅkhyā-vidhi*. Three verses are devoted to the statement of the first and the last views and to the conclusion (Vācaspati Misra's), which is that there is no *vidhi* at all involved here. But as there are as many as nine varieties of the view that it is a *niyama-vidhi*, the five major ones are set out in as many verses: while the minor varieties are relegated to the commentary, or altogether omitted, as being but derivatives or extended applications. Thus the seventh verse puts forward the *Vivarana* view that the injunction is restrictive, aiming at confining the study of the Vedānta to the traditional mode under a *guru* by a proper *adhikāri*. And the commentary mentions three possible violations of this injunction, which are prohibited by implication. These are (a) that an intelligent man might be tempted to rely on his own powers of mind to intuit the Vedāntic truth, instead of studying and reflecting on it as revealed by the Upanishadic texts; or (b) he might dispense with the guidance of a

guru; or (c) that a dullard might be content to study Vedānta through uncanonical expositions in the vernacular.

In such summary statement there is naturally no room for scholastic subtleties. But this may have the advantage of highlighting the main threads of argument. This is found to be eminently the case in the *Brahma-tattva-prakāśikā*, the brief but splendid gloss on the *Brahma-sūtra*. While faithfully adhering to the *Bhāshya*, Sadāsiva makes no attempt to follow the master into the fascinating by-paths. To take an instance at random, in explaining the *sūtra*, "It (the *Prāna*) is designated as having five functions, like the mind" (II-iv-11) Śaṅkara, after examining and rejecting as unsatisfactory a number of alternative reasons why the word 'five' in the *sūtra* as applied to mind should be taken literally, concludes that it is intended merely to suggest, not a specific number, but plurality. Sadāsiva skips the discussions and simply states the conclusion, and he brings out the *Bhāshya* view of the *sūtra* in these pithy words: "Because of its special and manifold functions, *prāṇa* is subsidiary to the soul, resembling the mind in this respect."

The *Bhāshyakāra* is occasionally laconic when from the context the meaning is fairly clear; as for example in III, ii, 25, especially when it is considered along with the succeeding *sūtras* 29 and 34 where the word *karmaṇi*, which he leaves unexplained, obviously refers to the act of wrapt worship (*samārādhana*), which has the adjuncts (*upādhis*) of *dhyāna*, etc. In fact the *Bhāmatī* and its sub-commentaries simply pass over the word. But Sadāsiva, following the *Ratnaprabhā*, elucidates *karmaṇi* as *dhyānādyupādhou karmaṇi*. Apparently

he anticipated that there might be people like Thibaut, who, puzzled by the fact that "*karmanī* is as good as passed over by him", confidently concluded, "It certainly looks here as if the Bhāshyakāra did not know what to do with the words of the *sūtra*."

Commenting on II, ii, 37, the Bhāshyakāra reviews and refutes the schools that maintain that the Lord is only the efficient cause of the universe, not the material cause. Though he includes the Sāṅkhya and the Yoga in this indictment, and in this is followed by the *Bhāmatī* and its sub-commentaries, Sadāsiva in his gloss does not refer to them but takes the attack as mainly directed against the Māheśvaras. This is in all probability due to his view, set out in his work on the *Yoga-sūtras* (described below) in commenting on the *Yoga-sūtra* IV, 3. His view is that the Sāṅkhya does not recognise Īśvara at all, holding that the subserving of the interests of the *puruṣa* alone is the teleological cause of the restarting of the heterogeneous activities of the *guṇas* in *pradhāna* after *pralaya*; while the yogis, though they do regard Īśvara as the final cause, acting in the interests of the *puruṣas*, assign to 'dharma' and 'adharma', the role of efficient cause, which is a rather negative one in this system. If the view here put forward is right, it should be clear that Sadāsiva could take an independent line when he felt it necessary.

While thus unobtrusively condensing, elucidating, supplementing and qualifying, his main aim in his gloss is to give the student a bird's eye-view of the system. He brings out the coherence of the thought and the cogency of the argument, showing how, as the teaching develops through all its ramifications, the

central thesis, the Brahman-ātman equation, is never lost sight of. Particularly helpful is his practice of bringing out the logical connection (*saṅgati*), between *adhyāya* and *adhyāya*, *pāda* and *pāda*, *sūtra* and *sūtra*. His method of exposition is to set out under each *sūtra* the subject, the doubt that necessitates the enquiry, the consequences that would flow from either of two possible conclusions, and the leading arguments in support of the *prima facie* view and the view that is ultimately arrived at. In beautifully simple verses he sets out the kernel of every major section. The *Vṛtti* is thus an ideal handbook for the student.

The *Yogasudhākara*, an extremely valuable gloss on the *Pātañjala-sūtras*, is undoubtedly Brahmendra's work. But this is the one major work of his, in which he does not anywhere mention Paramasivendra Sarasvatī as his Guru. He pays homage, instead, to an *unnamed guru* by whose grace, he says, he got the *vidyā* and, having "churned it in his mind" (*vilodya*), wrote this *Vṛtti*. Paramasivendra Sarasvatī has not left any work on Yoga. The references to Yoga and Kaivalya in his *Dahara-vidyā-prakāśikā* suggest, rather, that his primary preoccupation was with the Upanishadic *vidyās*. Brahmendra may have studied Ashtāṅga-yoga under some other *guru*. We need not be surprised that one who attained the summits of Vedāntic realisation should have practised Ashtāṅga-yoga, for the Bhagavatpāda repeatedly points out that the Advaitin accepts such teachings of the yoga and other similar '*smṛtis*' as are not opposed to the Vedānta, and often refers to the fruits of Ashtāṅga-yoga.¹ But

1. Vidyāranya in his commentary on Aparokṣānubhūti however, only grudgingly concedes subordinate and ancillary use for Pātañjala-yoga in the case of manda-adhikāris.

Brahmendra, with his Vedāntic background, and from personal *anubhava*, seems to have reached conclusions regarding 'Īśvara-praṇidhāna' and the state of Kaivalya, which are not strictly in conformity with the orthodox doctrine as expounded in the Vyāsa Bhāshya and Vācaspati's gloss, *Tattvavaiśāradi*. While verse 63 of *Ātmavidyāvilāsa* says that he is transmitting the Upanisadic vidyās taught by his guru Paramasiva, his familiarity with *Pātāñjala* yoga is clear from other ślokas.

Modern scholars have been puzzled by the seeming inconsistency between *Yoga-sūtra* I-23 and *Yoga-sūtra* II-1. 'Īśvara-praṇidhāna' and 'kriyā-yoga', terms which occur in the later *sūtra*, are interpreted by the *Bhāshya* and the *ṭikā* as pointing to the well-known *Gītā* teaching of karma-yoga. But 'Īśvara-praṇidhāna' in *Yoga-sūtrā* I-23 is taken by them to mean 'special adoration' (*bhakti-viśeṣha*). Brahmendra, however, interprets the term in the same way in both contexts, as meaning loving devotion only. Sadāsiva was a student of the *Bhāgavata* and wrote a *Bhāgavata-sāra*. This probably had a decisive influence on his taking to the *avadhūta* life. He, it seems, made a collection of all the texts bearing on 'Pāramahamsyacaryā'. His interpretation of *kriyā yoga* seems to be based on the rather specialized and restricted significance that term has in the eleventh skandha (see especially Ch. xx-6 to 9, and Ch. xxvii-1 & 9). Taking all the *yoga-sūtras* bearing on the subject together, he thinks three grades of authorities are distinguished. To him who cannot free himself from the lure of the world, *karma-yoga* is prescribed as part of *niyama* (see comment on ii-28, 32 and 45). *Yoga-sūtra* II-1 has

in view the man whose mind is rather better controlled though not yet completely purified. *Yoga-sūtra* I-23, applies to the man who has fully succeeded in that. When the mind is purified by devotion to "the Paramaguru who has in sport assumed an exceedingly winsome form," says Sadāsiva Brahmendra (on *Yoga-sūtra* II-1), *prema-bhakti*, the intensified and exclusive devotion referred to in I-23, comes naturally. Pleased with that, the Lord grants the devotee the one-pointed concentration he yearns for, and that leads in due course, to *kaivalya*.

How exactly this works is thus explained in his comment on I-29. Intense and sustained *praṇava-japa*, which is the praise of the Lord, when accompanied by loving concentration on Him, leads successively to the cessation of verbal activity (including *japa*), the inclining of the mind, by the grace of the Lord, towards quiescence and the detachment of the mind even from Him, for it achieves direct perception of the self (*pratyāsatti*). Recognising the similarity (*sādrśya*) between the self, "its own master", which in its pristine state is free spirit (*asaṅga-cidrūpa*) and Īsvara, who is eternally and unchangeably that, it reminds the self of its true status; and then, its task done, it sinks down, like fire that has consumed its fuel. When *abhyāsa* and *vairāgya* have destroyed subliminal impressions, the *pratyak-citi* (pure spirit) shines forth, established, says Brahmendra, in language reminiscent of the *Upaniṣads*, in its own glory (*sve mahimni niranantaram nirvighnam avatishthate*). From the above, it will be seen that Brahmendra's view of *kaivalya* is closer to the Vedāntic conception of *mukti*, which is eternal bliss, than that of the Sāṅkhya-Yoga, where it means a passionless and passive isolation for the *purusha*.

This impersonal joy that goes with super-consciousness is in fact the key-note of all the creative work of Brahmendra. His poems and songs represent this totality of experience. Flashes of poetry illuminate the philosophical poems, even as mystical ecstasy communicates itself through an unforced lyricism in the *kīrtanas*. And the golden thread of *bhakti* runs through them all.

While in a sense all his poems are in adoration of the Guru, whom he looked upon as his God, the short *Navamaṇi-mālā* is specifically in praise of Paramasivendra, "who from the purest compassion bestowed on me the dazzling gem of the *Ātmavidyā*." In the *Svapnoditam*, he describes how the duality of seer and seen disappeared, "when by the grace of the moon, my Guru, I was submerged in the swelling sea of the *cit* and I saw nought but Self." In the beautiful *Dakṣiṇāmūrti-dhyānam*, he describes the glorious form of the Paramaguru and how He should be meditated upon as the Nirguṇa, the One without a second. But the most important work of Sadāsiva in this class is his brilliant *Gururatna-mālikā* in eighty-seven verses which he wrote at the instance of Ātmabodha, his fellow-disciple and successor of Paramasiva on the Śaṅkara-pīṭha. Following the *Puṇyaśloka-mañjarī* of his *parama guru*, Sarvajña-sadāsiva-bodha, fifty-sixth head of the Kāñcī pīṭha, he celebrates that long and brilliant succession of yogis and *jīvan-muktas*.

The age in which Sadāsiva lived was one of keen theological controversy. His own Guru was a master of polemic. In his *Dahara-vidyā-prakāśikā*, and his commentary on the *Śiva-gītā*, Paramasiva, while paying his homage to Viṣṇu, vigorously maintains the

supremacy of Para-sīva, as “the Paramātmā seated in the heart.” At the same time, as his special contribution to the literature of Nāma-siddhānta, he collected from the Upanishads and other sacred texts, in his *Svarūpānusandhāna* which is not yet published, more than a thousand names connoting Brahman, with extensive commentaries thereon. Of this latter work Sadāsīva offers a selection in his short poem *Ātmānusandhāna*. His heart was drawn to Śīva, “*yoginām paramam gurum*,” even as Appayya’s was; but he remained unshaken in his *Advaitic* conviction, which is incompatible with the kind of sectarian mentality that depreciates Viṣṇu at the expense of Śīva and *vice versa*. His poems on Paramesvara in the *Navaratnamālā*, the *Svānubhūti-prakāśikā* and the *Śīva-mānasa-pūjā* show ecstatic devotion. But in these, as in the *kīrtanas*, his mind passes with effortless ease from surrender to the Divine Personality to absorption in the Bliss of Brahman.

About twenty-five of his *kīrtanas* are available; half a dozen of these sing Rāma,—“He sports within me in the cave of the heart, with Peace, the daughter of Videha, for his companion.” He devotes an equal number of songs to the Vanamālī, Nanda’s darling. And the bliss of the unconditioned Absolute is celebrated in a dozen songs. It is not possible to explain in words, the charm of songs like “*mānasasañcara re*”, “*sarvam brahmamayam*”, or “*cintā nāsti kila*”. They rain down a gentle influence on the heart, laying all doubts, lulling the ego, and bringing the passionless peace that rejoices the sophisticate and the simple alike.

It is in the *Ātmavidyā-vilāsa*, which enshrines the quintessential experience of the *mukta*, that Brahmendra's soul engages in its loftiest flight. There are two versions—one in sixty-two lovely Āryā verses, which is far better known, and perfect as a pearl; though the other, in forty-six verses, like another poem, the *Bodha-ārya-prakaraṇa* attributed to Brahmendra, is not without flashes of beauty, it is versified philosophy rather than metaphysical poetry.

The *Ātma-vidyā-vilāsa* is a spiritual autobiography, from which the merely contingent and ephemeral have been excluded. The quest, the practice and the perfection are all recorded, not systematically, but with the higher logic of poetry. It is the canticle of praise by the soul that has found itself, returned to its own home, its long odyssey done—the nightmare travail on the phantom sea of *saṅkalpa* and *vikalpa*. To him who knows their use all things are useful. The world of phenomena, when it ceases to be a snare, is a source of delight; the Self-realised has become a child again.

*tvamaham-abhimāna-hīno modita-nānājanācārah
viharati bālavadeko vimāla-sukhāmbhonidhau magnaḥ.*

He is a *rasajñā*, tasting the eternal sweetness of the *cit*. Nature “red in tooth and claw” for us—ministers to him, the fine river sand a softer bed than eider-down:

*viññāna-nadī-kuñja-gṛhe
mañjula-pulinaika-mañjutara-talpe
śete ko'pi yatindraḥ
samarasa-sukha-bodha-vastu-nistandraḥ.*

He no longer takes; he gives. Bringing us wisdom and joy like some supernal sun and moon, cooling the consuming fire of passion like the breeze of heaven, he realises for us the transcendent glory that is symbolised by the song of the cuckoo, the dance of the peacock, the serenity of the swan. He knows *samādhi* with and without object, he has practised *tapas* and *vairāgya*: he has borne without resentment the jeers and flouts of the ignorant. But all that is past. He neither praises nor blames, neither rejects nor requests. He is always and everywhere at home, nothing is alien to him. He is the king established in his own kingdom, the Peace that passeth understanding; he who, being nothing, is everything:

*vastunyastamitākhila-viśvavihāre vilīnamanāḥ
rājati parānapekṣo rājākhila-vītarāgāṇām.*

It was this *pūrṇatva*, plenitude of light and bliss, that made men say, who had a fleeting vision of that Śuka-like spirit:

sadāśiva-brahma-rūpaṁ brahmādrākṣam cirepsitam.

FOR ENLIGHTENMENT AND WISDOM:
PARAMĀCĀRYA AND TAMIL
LITERATURE

*P. Marudanayagam **

As one may be tempted to think, Paramācārya's incredibly vast erudition was not confined to theology, philosophy, the *Upaniṣads* and Sanskrit literature. His speeches and writings bear ample testimony to his thorough acquaintance with Tamil language and literature also. As a *sannyāsin par excellence*, he was totally free from racial, regional and linguistic prejudices and expressed his love for the entire mankind and prayed all the time for the well-being of the whole world reiterating the faith of his supreme master, Ādi Śaṅkara that all the three worlds are ours. But it cannot be denied that his heart had a soft corner for Tamil, Tamilnadu and the Tamils. On all relevant occasions, he would emphasize the grandeur of Tamil literature, the glory of the Tamil land, the achievement of the Tamils in various spheres and the need for them to awaken and to work for the survival of the great tradition of which they are the proud inheritors.

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The great saint often spoke with admiration of the ancient Tamils as they set store by a life dominated by religious values, especially by love for God.

More than one half of the temples in the world are to be found in India. Of these Tamilnadu has a majority. More than one half of the *Śāstras* and *Bhakti* poems in the world are to be found in India. Of these, a majority belongs to Tamilnadu. The manuscripts gathered from the Cauvery region surrounding Kumbakonam alone account for more than one half of the *Śāstras* in the world. Just as a refrigerator preserves things, the Tamil land has protected many civilisations and languages. The Dravidian region has the unique merit of tolerating other cultures on its soil without imposing itself on them. From time immemorial, the Vedic way of life has found a suitable home in Tamilnadu... Vedic *dharma* was born here. (Vol I, p. 433)

He once went to the extent of stating that if the Vedic education continues to flourish in Kerala even now, it is because Kerela was once part of the Tamil land. (Vol II, p. 419)

No Tamil scholar can help marvelling at the range and depth of Paramācārya's knowledge of Tamil literature. Besides the *Bhakti* writings by Nāyanmārs and Ālvārs, he was well-versed in all the Tamil classics including the *Tirukkural* and *Kambārāmāyaṇam*. Being a persuasive speaker endowed with a penetrating intellect and a fine critical sensibility, he could put his close knowledge of these masterpieces to very subtle uses.

Whenever he dealt with the Advaita philosophy, he would point out how it is poetically presented in some of the Tamil classics such as the *Tirumantiram*, the *Kambarāmāyaṇam* and Aruṇagiri's *Kandar Anubhūti*.

Giving an illustrative example, Tirumūlar explains how Paramātmā and the world are not two different entities :

The elephant hides the tree;
 In the tree is hidden the elephant;
 The world hides the Great Being;
 In the Great Being is hidden the world.

The *Tirumantiram* also asserts that "what is offered to the human beings who are but mobile temples reaches the Supreme Being." (Vol I, p. 23)

The great poet Kamban, though known to be a devout Vaiṣṇavite, gives a more direct expression to the Advaitic view in one of his exquisite stanzas in Sundara Kāṇḍam using the famous serpent-rope analogy: "In whose presence does the ignorance about the world disappears and the wisdom that it is seeing a serpent in a rope dawns upon the individual? He is none but Lord Rāma who, bearing a bow, fought in Lanka; He is at the summit of all the *Vedas*." Commenting on the poem, the Sage of Kanchi adds that what Kaṇṇan says in the *Bhagavad-gītā* is repeated by Kamban who describes the Paramātmā's identity in a lucid Advaitic language. (Vol I, p. 51)

Even Aruṇagiri, an ardent devotee of Muruga, describes the latter in his *Tiruppugal* and *Kandar Anubhūti* in Advaitic terms only.

You are not different from me,
 Nor am I from you...
 You and I united together,
 Deriving supreme delight
 in a tight embrace...
 Swallowing what was me
 The Supreme Being imperishably
 stood all alone...

Quoting these melodious utterances, Paramācārya observes that the *Kandar Anubhūti* celebrates the Advaitic bliss experienced by Aruṇagiri. (Vol I, pp. 590-645)

While expounding Śaṅkara's views on *Bhakti* and praising his hymns, Paramācārya never fails to mention parallel passages from the vast corpus of Tamil *Bhakti* poetry. Because of lack of reliable historical studies and definitive biographies of our poets in Sanskrit and Tamil, he avoids discussing the question of influence. This enables him to steer clear of possible controversies and unpleasant debates about who inspired whom and what served as the model. He is not interested in examining the relative merits of the poems he quotes from the two languages, as his main intention is not to demonstrate the superiority of this or that literature or author, but to emphasize the supremacy of our common cultural heritage and to persuade his listeners to realize the urgent need to choose the right path and to adhere to the higher values of life advocated in a poetic language by the masters of the *Bhakti* movement.

It is with supreme joy that Paramācārya quotes Śaṅkara's homage to Tirujñāna Sambandar in the *Saundaryalaharī*:

O, Daughter of Himagiri and my mother !
 the child that drank the milk of *amṛta* that
 flows from your bosom in a spate has been
 able to release a flood of poetry. You gave
 milk to the Dravida Child with supreme com-
 passion. Because of the supreme power of
 that milk, the Child has become greater than
 all great poets and captivated the hearts of
 many. (Vol I, p. 631)

The mention of Ādi Śaṅkara's whole-hearted
 praise of Sambandar is often followed by a few
 strikingly common ideas found in the poems of
 Śaṅkara and the Nāyanmārs. Appar, for example, in
 one of his *Tēvāram* hymns, requests Lord Śiva "to
 grant him the boon that he should not fail to keep the
 Lord's feet in his mind even when born as a small
 worm." Śaṅkara in his *Sivānandalaharī*, begs for
 the same boon from Lord Śiva:

What does it matter if I am born as
 a worm, as a mosquito, as an animal?
 If my heart can continue to experience
 the bliss of being conscious of your feet,
 the physical shape that I may assume may
 not at all matter. (Vol II, p. 172)

Appar, in another moving hymn, declares:
 What avails if one bathes
 in the Ganges, in the Cauvery,
 in the cool Kumari's ghats,
 in the waters of the great sea,
 when one is not aware of
 Śiva's omnipresence?

Śaṅkara in his *Bajagovindam* gives an equally beautiful
 poetic expression to the same idea:

Even if a person passes through a hundred births he may not attain salvation if, without thirsting for the spiritual awareness of Śiva's omnipresence, he bathes in the Ganges or undertakes penance or liberally gives alms to the needy. (Vol II, p. 989)

To emphasize the greatness of the *Vedas* and to drive home the idea that the religion of the Tamils is in no way different from the Vedic religion, he quotes profusely from Tamil writings of diverse ages. Nakkīrar in his *Tirumurugārruppadaḥ* contends that Lord Muruga has one of his six faces just to seek delight from the sight of *yajñas* performed by the brahmins without deviating from the injunctions stipulated in the *Vedas*. (Vol I, p. 608)

Śēkkiḷār in his *Periyapurāṇam* avers that Tiru-ñānā Sambandar came to this world to see to it that the Vedic way of life prospers as it had become the target of attack of the Jains and the Buddhists. The young saint who fought a relentless fight against the two groups called himself "Sambandan of the four *Vedas*". In his poems there are numerous tributes to the *Vedas* and violent denunciations of the Jains and the Buddhists who are condemned as terrible sinners because they spoke ill of the Vedic code and the Vedic sacrifices. (Vol I, p.609)

Paramācārya was of the firm view that the distinction between the Aryans and the Dravidians was made only on a regional and not racial basis, and that the ancient Hindu Śāstras do not refer to the Aryans as a different race. He argued that the racial interpretation was the mischief done by the English historians who, for obvious reasons, came out with

grossly distorted versions of Indian history. From the Hindu scriptures we learn that the word 'Ārya' means nothing more or less than 'honourable' and that the people of the entire Bhārat belonging to a single race were given different names depending upon the region in which they lived. All those who lived south of the Vindhya were called Dravidians just as all those who lived north of the Vindhya were originally known as Gaudas.

Chiding those who claim that the Tamil religion differs from the Vedic, he asserts that they are the same and cites numerous Tamil texts in support of his argument. He points out how the ancient Tamil writings use meaningful Tamil terms such as "Maṟai", and "Eḷutākkilavi" for the *Vedas* and "Vēḷvi" for *yajña*. If the Vedic civilization had no roots here, and if it had been alien to the Tamil country, these pure Tamil words would not have come into being so early in the Tamil history. (Vol I, p. 272). In the great Sangam classic, the *Puraṇānūru*, there is a poem by Avvaiyār which celebrates the united presence of the Chera, Chola and Pandya kings in the same place. As they were frequently found fighting one another, this rare sight pleases the old poetess so much that she sings a song using an apt simile: "Your presence together is like the threefold fire lit by the twice-born priests in their *yajña*." (Vol II p. 409)

Another Tamil classic, the *Paripādal* has a poem eulogising Madurai for a peculiar reason: "Unlike Kanchi, the Chera capital, and Uraiūr, the Chola capital, which are awakened by the crowing cock, our place, Madurai wakes up after a sweet slumber listen-

ing to the delightful chanting of Vedic *mantras*." (Vol II, p. 392).

Paramācārya observes that the *Tirukkuraḷ* also abounds in favourable references to the Vedic religion. It has often been compared with the *Vedas* and its message has been accepted as the Vedic message by his contemporaries and succeeding generations of Tamils. For example, the *Tiruvaḷḷuvamālai*, a collection of poems in praise of Vaḷḷuvar's work, has a short piece highlighting this comparison:

It is impossible to utter which of the two languages — Sanskrit and Tamil — is superior to the other though you may do a lot of research. For, Sanskrit has the *Vedas* to its credit, whereas Tamil can boast of Tiruvaḷḷuvar's *Kuraḷ* (Vol I, p. 276)

Some of the *kurals* are taken up for close analysis to substantiate the view that Vaḷḷuvar had faith in the Vedic religion. *Kuraḷ*, 56 refers to those who perform the Vedic rituals as 'Aṟutoḷilōr', a direct translation of a corresponding Sanskrit term that was commonly used: "The udders of the cow will be dried up and the Brahmins devoted to the Vedic rituals will forget the *Vedas* if the king does not rule with justice." Even in the *Kuraḷ* in which Vaḷḷuvar is supposed to have condemned the Vedic sacrifices that entail the slaughter of animals, he has only indicated his faith in the Vedic practices: "It is better to abstain from the killing and eating of animals than to perform a thousand sacrifices kindling the sacrificial fire." Paramācārya is of the view that this *Kuraḷ* does not condemn sacrifices just because it states that

abjuring of meat is better than performing sacrifices since to emphasize the value of the former the poet would have chosen for comparison something which he considered extremely valuable. (Vol I, pp. 311-12)

In Paramacarya's view, what the Vedic religion mentions as "Manuṣya Yajñam" is celebrated by Vaḷḷuvar as "Viruntōmpal" (hospitality) which, in its extended form, would include free distribution of food.

The other major argument that he presents in support of his contention that the Tamil religion is the same as the Vedic religion and that Lord Muruga who is worshipped in all parts of this country and hailed as a supreme deity in the *Ṛg Veda*, the *Rāmāyaṇa*, in numerous Purāṇas and by Kālidāsa endeared himself to the Tamil hearts even during the times of the *Tolkāppiyam* and Sangam lyrics, which recognized him as the god of the Kuṟiñci land. From time immemorial, he has been considered the favourite god of the Tamils who, in their legends and myths, associated him with with Tamil language and literature. It is claimed that he it was who taught Agastya Tamil grammar and served the Tamil cause himself becoming a Sangam poet. All his six war-camps are located in Tamilnadu. If, in the recent past, Aruṇagiri sang his glory in all his poems, in the distant past Nakkīrar's *magnum opus*, the *Tirumurugārruppadaḱai*, was devoted to him. Śaivite Nāyanmārs never lagged behind in showering their encomiums on Muruga. Appar, for instance, describes Pārvati, in one of his hymns, as "the one who gave birth to our *Kaḱamban*." Citing these and many more passages from Tamil works, ancient and modern, Paramācārya shows the

Muruga cult as one of the oldest and undeniable links between the Tamils and the Vedic religion.

It is a commonplace that the Tamil savants found great pleasure in stressing the unity of the world, the oneness of mankind and the common fate of the human race. Their land was confined to a small corner in the southern part of the Indian subcontinent, but they had the vision and the largeness of heart to realise that the world, though divided by diverse forces, is a single entity where man is concerned, since his salvation lies in a life bound by love, compassion and tolerance. Almost all great Tamil works glorify these virtues and many of them begin with a reference to the world. The Tamils' understanding of the human condition is beautifully recorded in the following poem by the *Puran̄in̄uru*:

To us all towns are one, all men our kin,
 Life's good comes not from others' gift, nor ill;
 Man's pains and pains' relief are from within.
 Death's no new thing; nor do our bosoms thrill
 When joyous life seems like a luscious draught.
 When grieved, we patient suffer; for, we deem
 This much praised life of ours a fragile raft
 Borne down the waters of some mountain stream
 That O'er huge boulders roaring seeks the plain
 Tho' storms with lightning's flash from darken'd
 skies
 Descent, the raft goes on as fates ordain.
 Thus have we seen in vision of the wise!
 We marvel not at greatness of the great;
 Still less despise we men of low estate.

(Tr. G.U. Pope)

Paramācārya was especially impressed with the ancient Tamil's emphasis on the one-world concept

as well as with their interest in seeking unity in diversity. He underscored the wisdom of Nāyanmārs and Āḷvārs who, though subscribing to two different faiths within the fold of Hinduism, took pains to tell the common people that ultimately Śaivism and Vaiṣṇavism lead us to the same destination. Appar, one of the seniormost Śaivite saints, frequently quoted by Paramācārya, represents the quintessence of the *Bhakti* Movement. In one of his many moving poems, he declares that even if some narrow minded men, out of jealousy, speak of a new religion, in addition to the six existing ones, it will be acceptable to our God.

Paramācārya used to stress the importance of *Bhakti* which, in his view, holds the central position in every religion. This enabled him to demonstrate the unity of religions, let alone the various sects within a single religion. Has not Kṛṣṇa said in the *Gītā*: "Whoever worships God in whatever form, I, promoting his earnestness, entrench him in his mode of worship." Paramācārya, while expatiating on the need to accept all religions, would quote this and other similar passages from the Tamil works ranging from Avvaiyār to Kamban. In her *Āttisūḍi*, the grand old woman of Tamil literature, in her characteristically commanding tone, directs everyone to serve Tirumāl as a slave and not to forget Śiva. Appar asserts that there is no partner for Aran except Ari. If an Āḷvār sings that "the Lord with the crescent moon on his head is kept on the right," one of the Nāyanmārs, as though echoing the same sentiment, observes, "With Tirumāl on the left." But the merging of Aran and Ari into each other is celebrated by *Peyāḷvār* in an immortal piece:

Śiva's flowing plaits of hair
 Vishnu's huge crown
 the axe of the one
 the chakra of the other
 the serpent on one's body
 the other's golden waist-band
 all appear together;
 In Tirumalai with springs full of water
 the two shapes fused together
 suit my Lord.

Poygaiāṅvār also has a poem on the same subject:

The graceful Śiva with
 his golden complexion
 and long hair
 and the world-measuring Tirumal
 may differ in shape;
 but each is forever
 in the other's body.

Kamban's verdict is that "the small-minded who blabber about the relative superiority of Aran or Ari will never attain bliss." Āṇḍāḷ who aspired for the hand of no less a being than Tirumāl refused to recognize any hostility between the two groups of devotees and delightfully dreamt that, when her wedding with Tirumāl took place, Pārvati, Lord Śiva's wife, garlanded her as she happens to be the bridegroom's sister.

Paramācārya made an extremely profitable use of his wide and deep knowledge of the Tamil texts to guide the Tamil people in the right path and to help them reject sinful ways. For this purpose, he had all the choice verses at his beck and call. But it was never a mechanical recitation of poems and songs

without the thoughts being felt or the poetic aspects being enjoyed. He had too fine an aesthetic sense and too profound a knowledge of literature to ignore the beauty of the poem quoted. If the philosophical arguments had the stamp of his intellect, their poetic corroborations were charged with the required emotional current. He never believed in a dry-as-dust presentation of theology; nor did he fail to draw the attention of his audience to the sheer aesthetic joy provided by the poems quoted. The Tamil *Bhakti* poems, known for the fusion of religion, poetry and music, a rare combination according to T. S. Eliot, served the twin aims of instruction and delight in an ideal manner.

Paramācārya's love for poetry is evident not only in his frequent citations, but in some of his explicit statements about the art of writing poetry. He once humorously mentioned the pathetic case of a philosopher who had mourned that he was deprived of his creative power when he had to struggle with the discipline of logic as developed by the Southerners and that he had to bid farewell to *prāmānyā-vāda* itself since it did the mischief. (Vol II, p. 673) One is reminded of Coleridge's plight as it is expressed in his "Ode to Dejection" :

But now afflictions bow me down to earth;
 Nor care I that they rob me of my mirth;
 But oh! each visitation
 Suspends what nature gave me at my birth,
 My shaping spirit of imagination.
 For not to think of what I needs must feel,
 But to be still and patient, all I can;
 And haply by abstruse research to steel
 From my nature all the natural man.

Paramācārya was pained to note that under the pretext of freedom of writing, creative artists indulged in all kinds of meaningless experiments. He was particularly dissatisfied with the new poetry in Tamil which dispensed with metre (Vol. II, p. 656). Though he felt that this was bound to happen in an age that had opted for indiscipline in every sphere of activity, he never failed to point out that not many people seem to realize that freedom lies in discipline. (Vol. II, p. 656) The soundness of this remarkable insight has been attested by many great poets including Wordsworth, who, while defending the sonnet form with all its rigidity, praised the freedom it confers on the poet:

Nuns fret not at their convent's narrow room;
And hermits are contented with their cells;
And students with their pensive citadels;
Maids at the wheel, the weaver at his loom,
Sit blithe and happy; bees that soar for
 bloom,

High as the highest peak of Furness fells,
Will murmur by the hour in foxglove bells.
In truth, the prison, unto which we doom,
Ourselves, no prison is; and hence for me,
In sundry moods, 'twas pastime to be bound
Within the sonnet's scanty plot of ground;
Pleased if some Souls (for such there needs
 must be)
Who have felt the weight of too much liberty,
Should find brief solace there, as I have
 found.

It is a pity that many of our contemporary poets clamouring for total freedom with regard to prosodic rules have not paid heed to Paramācārya's observations on the nature and function of poetry.

As a *rasika* also he showed his wisdom and his critical acumen. He never allowed his philosophic mind and saintly disposition to affect his judgment of the *Bhakti* poems which, mildly satirical in nature, took liberties with Lord Śiva himself. On the other hand, he quotes with immense delight a poem of that type by Sundarar, who is reported to have enjoyed a unique friendly relationship with Śiva. While worshipping the deity at the place called Onakāntantali in Kanchipuram, Sundarar asks him in a matchless song of his why he should go with a begging bowl when the world-saving Pārvatī is by his side. (Vol. I, p. 803)

At times Paramācārya, because of his intense love for great poetry, would not mind digressing from the central theme of his speech in order to share with his audience a critical appreciation of the hymn quoted by him. Here again his favourites were the *Tēvāram* trinity. Once he explicated Appar's song beginning with the phrase "Mālai Madhiyamum." The similes in this jewel of a poem had already attracted the attention of many Tamil critics who contend that the five objects compared with Lord Śiva's feet may be associated with the five senses which they delight.

The music from a perfect vīṇā,
the coolness of the evening moon,
the southern breeze,
the early spring,
the bee-haunting river -
Like these is the refuge
my father Śiva's feet affords.

They claim that the *vīṇā*, the moon, the breeze, the spring and the river gratify the senses of hearing, sight,

touch, taste and smell respectively as the spring season represents the mangoes that arrive during that time and the bee-haunting river stands for the sweet-smelling flowers in it. Paramācārya's approach is different as his interest lies elsewhere. In his view, it is true that Appar mentions objects that give sensuous pleasure to describe the bliss that is experienced by the one that has attained the feet of God. But while choosing his similes, the great saint-poet takes care to give priority to those objects which almost give everlasting delight. And the list is headed by music which has always been considered the most sacred of arts in our tradition. (Vol. I, p. 399) Paramācārya's insight adds a new dimension to the poem.

Though Paramācārya unequivocally condemned the present-day misuse of mass-media and art forms, especially the film, the novel and the short story whose corrupting influence is increasingly felt among all sections of the Tamil society, he was ready to concede the value of our literature and mastered it so that his message may reach a wide audience. He was not impressed with the art-for-art's-sake cult, but was not averse to the aesthetic pleasure that we derive out of art though he was primarily interested in it as a source of wisdom. Kenneth Burke, an outstanding modern critic, spoke of literature as equipment for living and proposed sociological categories that would consider works of art as "strategies for selecting enemies and allies, for socializing losses, for warding off evil eye, for purification, propitiation and desanctification, consolation and vengeance, admonition and exhortation, implicit commands or instructions of one sort or another." But Paramācārya, like Sri Aurobindo,

believed that literature had not only life-values, but mind-values and soul-values and wanted the Tamils to benefit by the riches they possess.

NOTES

All translations of Tamil poems quoted in the essay, unless otherwise stated, are mine. Most of the citations from Paramācārya's speeches and writings are from the first two volumes of *Teyvattin Kural*.

VEDĀNTIC APPROACH TO GOD

S. L. Pandey *

Dissemination of Vedānta all over the world since the last decade of the eighteenth century has been a major influence of the East upon the West. It has brought about a revolution in the world which is no longer the same after it. The new disciplines like Comparative Religion, Comparative Mythology, Comparative Philology, Philosophy of Religion, Philosophy of Culture and Philosophy of the world social order are, by and large, the products of this revolution. 'One world, one Humanity and one God' is its proclaimed slogan and East-West Studies and East-West Meet in all walks of life are its programmes. In philosophy, however, this revolution has created a still deeper stir that has placed philosophy over religion

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and spread Absolute Idealism throughout the world. Nevertheless the view of God *a la* Advaita philosophy is yet enigmatic and has led contemporary philosophers to a variety of views. First, Indian Idealists like Dr. S. Radhakrishnan, Prof. K. C. Bhattacharya, Prof. A.C. Mukerji and Dr. T.R.V. Murti have interpreted Advaita Vedānta as Absolute Idealism that is distinct from Personalistic Idealism. Second, most of the western orientalist have taken it for pantheism. Third, a few of them like Arthur Venice have called it solipsism or Subjective Idealism *par excellence*. Fourth, Max Muller has coined a new word 'Henotheism' to describe the Advaitic view of God. Fifth, Heinrich Zimmer has coined the word 'Transtheism' to explain it. Sixth, Prof. R. D. Ranade has understood it as super-personalism. Lastly, Ninian Smart describes it as Trans-Polytheistic Absolutism. These neologisms indicate, *inter alia*, that in the recent past there have been very serious attempts at the proper understanding of the Advaita perspective on God. Nevertheless, its idea of God is still elusive and plagued with difficulties; it remains a moot problem to be solved.

I shall endeavour in these lectures to throw some new light on this problem and indicate that Advaita philosophy is as much theistic or monotheistic as any other form of theism. In this way I shall show that there is no need of any neologism to describe its view of God. The misunderstanding that is occasioned with regard to it is largely due to the fact that there is no Advaita treatise that exclusively deals with its view of God. But it is a fact that God is regarded by Advaita philosophy as the sole object of worship or worshipful meditation. A number of meditational

practices have been discovered by Advaita philosophers. They are called *Vidyas* or *Mantras*. But the *milieu* of meditation is not the place where the idea of God is analysed and articulated, for there it is simply pressed into its service. It is, however, analysed in different contexts where attempts to understand its relation to the Absolute, the individual souls and the world are made. To glean the statements about God from all these contexts, to analyse their meanings and verify their truth are some of the activities that are undertaken by Advaita philosophers. I shall review their methods and findings in the spirit of an Advaita philosopher who sees them directly at work, and not in the spirit of an outsider analyst who has simply heard them from afar and tried to understand them.

Furthermore, every philosophy has its own methodology and Advaita philosophy is no exception to this rule. Its methodology is semantic, because it is the linguistic philosophy of the *Veda*. As such it shares its view with the school of Mīmāṃsā and uses many of its rules of interpretation. But mainly it investigates into the meaning of the Upaniṣadic statements and believes that there is the unity of meaning (*ekavākyatā*) among all the statements of the *Upaniṣads*. In order to distinguish this investigation from the investigation into the meaning of ordinary language it may be called Vedāntic investigation. Its object language is the language of the *Upaniṣads* that is perfect or complete in the sense that its words and sentences are all fixed and there is no further addition to it or subtraction from it. But the meaning of this language is not that fixed. The more it is understood and interpreted, the newer it appears. The more it is

known, the more wondrous and surprising it becomes. Consequently, there is no better object of study than it.

Now, Vedāntic investigation has two methods which are called the method of investigating the meaning of the term 'That' (*tatpadārtha śodhana*) and the method of investigating the meaning of the term 'Ego' (*tvampadārtha śodhana*). We shall call the former OM or the objectivistic method and the latter AM or the anthropological method. Both these methods lead independently to the same conclusion that the Self with capital S is God.¹ But they represent two alternative approaches to the problem of God and indicate two alternative pathways to God-realization. Advaita philosophers themselves have laid equal emphasis upon the use of both the methods. But, by and large, they have been misunderstood and AM alone has been taken as the method of Vedāntic investigation. Consequently OM has been completely misunderstood, ignored and neglected. The critics of Advaita philosophy in particular have committed this mistake, *i.e.*, the elimination of OM from Vedāntic discipline. The description of OM to-day, therefore, will go a long way in restoring the original position of Advaita philosophy. Particularly, it will remove all misunderstandings that surround the idea of God, because this is the method *par excellence* that gives an adequate knowledge about God.

At the very outset it can be maintained that OM lays down that God or *Īśvara* is the direct meaning of the term 'That'. The Sanskrit word for that is '*tat*' which is the predicate of the statement 'Thou art that' (*Tat tvam asi*). But logically speaking, it is a noun that

refers linguistically to existence that cannot be the predicate of any statement. To bring out the nondescript sense of the term 'That', it is identified with existence. Hence, 'That' is taken to be the subject of all statements and cannot be a predicable. The only word that stands for existence (*Sat*) other than the word 'existence' (*Sat*) itself is 'that' (*Tat*). Hence *Tat* is *Sat*. To be means 'that' and 'that' means to be. Being or existence is thus a synonym of 'that'.

Empirically speaking, the 'that' is the 'this' of all sense-experience. That is why when we perceive any thing, our first question is 'what is this?' The fact that is before us is referred to by the word 'this' or 'that'. We want to know the 'this', but we are told what this is. F.H. Bradley, therefore, like an Advaita philosopher, makes a distinction, between That-meaning and What-meaning of words and points out the discrepancies between them.⁵ He says that "thought, in its actual processes and results, cannot transcend the dualism of the 'that' and the 'what'.....in desiring to transcend this distinction, thought is aiming at suicide."⁶ Hegel has also said that "the 'this' of sense cannot be reached by language."⁷ But Advaita philosophers will not agree with Hegel and Bradley and argue that the 'this' of sense can be understood by means of language because the words have immense powers of revealing the nature of things to us. The reality that is referred to by the word 'this' or 'that' is not only known through it, but is also described or explicated by it. The reality is, therefore, verbal (*śabda*), whether its sense is known directly (*vācyaḥ*) or indirectly (*lakṣyaḥ*). Furthermore, very significantly Max Muller has discovered that the word 'Brahman' means the same as the word

Verbum', i.e., philologically the Sanskrit word 'Brahman' is the same as the Latin word '*Verbum*' or English word 'Word'. 'Brahman', 'verbum' and 'word'—all the three terms are derived from Sanskrit 'root "*Brh*". So Brahman is the linguistic fact *par excellence*. When the *Upaniṣads* declare that *Tat* is Brahman (*Tad brahma*), they mean that *Tat* is linguistically graspable. Advaita philosophers have gone a step further from the *Upaniṣads* and maintained that there are two senses, primary and secondary, of a word and that both the senses are linguistically graspable. Hence the method that has been discovered to bring out the true object of all Upaniṣadic statement is OM. It demonstrates that God is the real import of all Upaniṣadic statements. But how is it possible? Do all the Upaniṣadic statements describe one and the same object? Don't they describe a plurality of objects? Or don't they intend a plurality of rituals as the Mīmāṃsā holds? Don't they describe the *Puruṣa* and *prakṛti* as the a Śmṛkhyā states? Don't they describe the various categories that Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika advocate? Don't they describe the various physical elements that the materialists maintain? Aren't there natural, historical, biographical and cosmological descriptions in the *Upaniṣads*? To all these and similar questions Advaita replies that the *Upaniṣads* describe only one object or thing-in-itself and that it is Brahman or God. But how is this thesis supported?

To prove it Advaita philosophy has used several forms of OM. First, it has used the six rules of samantics to show that God is the sole import of all Upaniṣadic statements. These rules are as follows."

- (i) The rule of sameness of the initial and final statements: For example, the introductory statement of an *Upaniṣad* is to the effect that existence is one and without a second. Similarly its conclusion is that this existence is perfectly known. Thus the identity of the initial and final statements of every *Upaniṣad* shows that they describe the non-dual reality.
- (ii) The Rule of Repeated Assertions: Every *Upaniṣad* repeatedly asserts that Brahman is one and without a second in so many words.
- (iii) The Rule of Uniqueness: The meaning of a text like the *Upaniṣad* is the same that is not properly described elsewhere. Cosmology, history, poetry, biography and other genres of literature have their own unique subject-matters. Analogously, the *Upaniṣads* have a subject-matter that is unique in itself. It is *Brahmavidyā* or ontology, pure and simple.
- (iv) The Rule of Result: The result of understanding all Upaniṣadic statements is the attainment of liberation. The Upaniṣadic idea of liberation indicates that it is related to the idea of God inasmuch as God is the cause of liberation.
- (v) The Rule of Eulogy of *Brahmavidyā*: The Upaniṣadic statements which are not the ontological description of God, in fact, are either the praise of *Brahmavidyā* or the condemnation of its opposite. In other words, such statements have no primary sense of

their own. They have only secondary or figurative sense that refers to their primary sense that there is the sole reality of Brahman.

- (vi) The Rule of Arguments and Illustrations: The *Upaniṣads* give different arguments and illustrations to show that everything that exists is Brahman. Hence *Brahmavidyā* is the essence of the *Upaniṣads*.

On the basis of these six rules Advaita philosophy has argued that the *Upaniṣads* are ontological treatises describing the sole reality of Brahman and that there is no other purport of the *Upaniṣads*.

These rules constitute the bare rudiments of *Vedānta* methodology. The Advaita philosophers lay more stress on their use than on the testimony of the *Vedas*. In fact, not the *Veda* or *Śruti*, but *Vedānta* is the proper and exact means of the knowledge of Brahman,⁷ for, only a comparative and critical study of the Vedic statements makes them consistent. The meaning obtained from such a study is the meaning of the *Veda*, and nothing else.⁸ The uninterpreted *Veda* is meaningless for us and interpreted *Veda* is *Vedānta*. Hence, *Vedānta* goes beyond the *Veda*. The latter, as a body of statement, is the first order inquiry and the former as a search for meaning is the second order inquiry. But *Veda* and *Vedānta* are to be taken as inseparably related with each other like a word and its meaning.

Second, Advaita philosophers have contended against all those philosophers who have interpreted the *Upaniṣads* otherwise. Particularly, they have argued against Mīmāṃsā which maintains that the purport of

the scriptures is religious action, against Sāṃkhya which holds that the purport of the scriptures is the metaphysical dualism of *Prakṛiti* and *Puruṣa*, against Vaiśeṣika which believes in the seven categories of substance, quality, action, universal, particular, inherence and negation, against Pāsupata which believes that God is only the efficient cause of the world, and against Bhāgavata theism which believes in four forms of God. Their argument is for the view that God alone is both the efficient and the material cause of the world and that He is free from all sorts of differences. Thus *Tat* is undoubtedly the First Principle of the world. But this First Principle cannot be identified with any thing other than God. Particularly, it cannot be identified with the *Prakṛiti* of Sāṃkhya, the atoms of Vaiśeṣika, the fourfold God of Bhāgavatas and the Personal Deity of Pāsupatas. All these theories are logically inconsistent and semantically inadequate to describe the reality that is dealt with in the *Upaniṣads*. The use of reason in refuting all sorts of cosmology is a rational version of OM. It is further helpful in another form of OM that uses *adhyāropa* (attribution) and *apavāda* (elimination) extensively.

Third, the *Upaniṣads* themselves have used a form of OM that harnesses together the ideas of transcendence and immanence. For example, the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* has laid down the dictum that the reality is both transcendent (*anyaḥ*) and immanent (*antaraḥ*).⁹ Then it has described *seriatim* that Brahman is *Annamaya*, *Prāṇamaya*, *Manomaya*, *Vijñānamaya* and *Ānandamaya*. Śaṅkara here points out that Brahman is in each of these veils and at the same time other than each of them. Rāmānuja and other *Vaiṣṇava* philosophers, however, hold that reality is *Ānandamaya* and

not other than *Ānandamaya* at all. But if their position is accepted, then the texts describing the reality as *Ānandamaya*, *Prāṇamaya*, *Manomaya* and *Vijñānāmaya* will be void. Moreover, their interpretation will be semantically unjustifiable because it splits the context (*vākyaabhedā*) and takes the same hen for laying eggs as well as for preparing a delicious dish. The fallacy committed here is known in Indian logic as *Ardhajaratī nyāya* according to which the one half of a maiden cannot be taken to be old and the other half, young. Hence the Upaniṣadic texts in question are to be taken as a whole. Some of them cannot be rejected for establishing the truth of the *Ānandamaya* text. When judged by these criteria, it will be clear that Śaṅkara's interpretation does full justice to all texts because it holds that the reality is described by every text equally. The reality is immanent in *Annamaya* as well as transcendent from it. Similarly, it is immanent in *Ānandamaya* as well as transcendent from it. Hence, as far as immanence is concerned, every text is true, but as far as transcendence is concerned, every text falls short of it and does not denote the Absolute or God.

Fourth, the most widely used form of OM in Advaita literature is the method of *anvaya* and *vyatireka*. This method resembles the method of showing immanence and transcendence. But that is the metaphysical method and *anvaya-vyatireka* is a logical method. It shows that every object of knowledge presupposes the unity of God. This is the meaning of the method of *anvaya*. Further, the method of *vyatireka* points out that, if there is no God, there is no world or, for that matter, no object of knowledge at all. God is the light of the world. If this light is absent the whole world will be blind. This light is know-

ledge. Hence, if God is not there, there will be no possibility of knowledge at all. The fallacies that arise from the assumption that there is no God include the predicament of the blindness of the whole world, the suppression of the explicit assertion of the Upaniṣadic texts and the postulation of that which is not stated by these texts.

The method of *anvaya* and *vyatireka* may be taken to be the most logical method for arriving at the existence of God. It rightly shows that the idea of God is the objective unity that is presupposed by experience. It is a version of Kant's transcendental deduction of the unity of objects. As such it is perfectly comparable with his transcendental deduction of the objective unity of knowledge. On analysis our knowledge situation reveals that the object that is known has a unity which transcends all empirical knowledge and is, therefore, transcendental. Kant also could have shown that the idea of God is not merely regulative, but also constitutive of experience in so far as it is the transcendental unity of all objects. But as he has no *Śruti* to proceed further, he could not move from the idea of an objective unity to its existence. Vedānta that does so becomes the coping stone of the critical philosophy of Kant.

Now, the question 'What is God?' can be tackled. The first answer is that the whole universe that is characterized by order, life and mind and purposiveness is itself God. This is the very idea of God which Spinoza had. He said '*deus sive natura*' or the world is God and God is the world. But Vedānta calls this pantheistic reality as *Virāt* and conceives it as consciousness having the whole universe as its gross body. Moreover,


this idea of God relates itself only to the waking state and is sublated in dreaming where the totality of objective consciousness is found in the form of a subtle and universal body creating objects at its will. Vedānta calls it *Sūtrātman* or *Hiranyagarbha*. But this idea is further sublated in the state of dreamless sleep where in its place the mass of bliss alone is experienced. Vedānta calls it *Īśvara* or God.

Now, at this juncture some observations are in order to clear the prevailing misunderstanding about Advaita philosophy. First, it is not *Īśvara* but *Virāt* that is the God of pantheism. Second, it is not *Īśvara* but *Hiranyagarbha* that is the Creator of the world, Demiurge or the God of Deism. Third, *Virāt* and *Hiranyagarbha* have a *locus standi* that is *Īśvara*. Fourth, even *Īśvara* has its *locus standi* in Brahman. So by a hypothetical syllogism it is rightly established that Brahman is the locus of all these deities. Fifth, *Virāt*, *Hiranyagarbha* and *Īśvara* along with their ultimate locus, i.e. Brahman, are indistinct *inter se* like a fiery piece of iron and therefore numerically they appear to be one. Just as the piece of iron in question reflects fire from every part of it, so *Virāt*, *Hiranyagarbha* and *Īśvara* reflect the same consciousness. This unity in trinity is the direct meaning of the word 'That'. Lastly, the implied meaning of the word 'That' is Brahman that is the *locus* of this trinity. When this meaning is revealed and understood, it is found that it is the real of all reals, the truth of all truths, the meaning of all meanings and the value of all values.

Lastly, the most effective form of OM is the method of *adhyāropa* and *apavāda*. The Absolute is

known by theorization and falsification.¹⁰ At first, we attempt a theory to describe it and then we try to verify it. On verification, however, we find that the theory is false and fails to describe the Absolute. But negatively this process removes the clouds of unknowing and leaves the Absolute as it is. The problem of knowing the Absolute is, thus, dissolved rather than solved. According to this method, a 'What' is predicated to the 'That', but on a critical scrutiny it is found that this predication is not the correct description of the 'That'. So a second 'What' is predicated to the 'That' and so on and so forth. But every such predication is found falling apart from the 'That'. In this way, all predicates are denied and the 'that' is found beyond all predicates. It is then realized, not discursively, but intuitively. There is an intuitive leap from the series of 'What' and their denials to the knowledge of the 'That'. This leap is either gradual or sudden. In the former case it is a slow and gradual or smooth walk over from the what-series to the 'That' and is known as the Way of Ants (*pipīlikā-mārga*). It is the way of *Krama-mukti* or asymptotic liberation. In the second case there is a jump that is like that of a frog from one place to another (*maṇḍūkapluti*). In this way there is a sudden and not gradual, awakening to the 'That'. This is, the way of *Sadyomukti* or spontaneous liberation. It is called the Way of Birds (*Vihāṅgama-mārga*). Be what it may, the fact is that no predication of a 'what' to the 'that' is justifiable. The word 'That' itself is quite sufficient to denote its meaning. It does not need a pair of crutches to do its job. But the realization of this fact is not easy. Unless all clouds of unknowing are withered away, it is hard to be discovered.

The denotation of 'That' is necessarily textual and contextual. The text in question is "That thou art" (*Tat tvam asi*). And the context in question is the *milieu* of a seeker who has all requisite qualifications for knowing the truth of the text, "That thou art". Most of the Vedāntists have transformed this method of *adhyāropa* and *apavāda* into the method of cosmological thought and its dissolution. At first, they propound a cosmological theory in the following order:



As this order shows, God creates *Māyā* or *Prakṛti* which further creates the five elements from ether to earth in the ascending scale of increased attributes. From earth is produced vegetation and thereafter are produced all the creatures and furniture of the world. The reverse order, again, is the order of meditation that is the result of Vedāntic investigation into the meaning of the ultimate Reality. In other words, vegetation is merged into earth, earth into water

water into fire, fire into ether, ether into *Māyā* and *Māyā* into God. By means of repeated meditation this series of mergers is brought about and finally God is realised as He is. There is nothing other than God, nothing beside, outside and inside Him. Incidentally, the method of *adhyaṛopa* and *apavāda* demonstrates that cosmology is simply a heuristic device¹¹ to understand the reality that is absolute, omnipresent, and omniscient. It is not ontology. Nor is it a value theory.

Now, after discussing the various ways of OM we may relate it to AM inasmuch as both OM and AM are mutually adjusted and assimilated. AM tries to understand the nature of the self that is pure consciousness. It also uses the methods of *anvaya-vyatireka*, *adhyaṛopa-apavāda* and immanence-transcendence. There is no difference between the two in so far as their intentionality is concerned. But it is emphatically laid down in Advaita literature that both of them are mutually supplementary and so, after the completion of the one the use of the other must be made. At any cost, neither of them is to be neglected. The idea of God is gained and understood fully only by the utilization of both OM and AM. If it is gained from OM, it is verified by AM; and if it is gained from AM, it is verified by OM. Hence the value of both OM and AM can be established for their reciprocal functioning.

But what is clearly meant in this context is the view that the idea of God can properly be gained neither from *Śruti* nor from *Āgama* nor from *anumāna* (reasoning). For example, take the view that God is the material cause of the world. This view cannot be gained from the bald assertions of the *Śruti* because

Śruti also says at several places that *Prakṛti* is the material cause of the world. But Vedānta interprets all these assertions synthetically and settles that God alone can be taken as the material cause of the world. It assigns different senses to the apparently conflicting statements of *Śruti*. Similarly, the idea of God cannot be gained from *Āgama* which has its origin in some Man-God or God-Man or prophet, because the Man-God is known from *Āgama* and the truth of *Āgama* is known by the faith in the Man-God. Thus, all attempts to derive the idea of God from an *Āgama* are vitiated by the fallacy of *petitio principii*. Finally, the idea of God cannot be known by any inference inasmuch as inference is limited only to the realm of phenomena and when it goes beyond it to the noumenal reality it falls into antinomies. God is not an object of the phenomenal world. It is the noumenal reality, unconditioned by, and unrelated to, phenomena. Furthermore, if God is inferred as the creator of the world as a potter is inferred from a pot, then God would suffer from likes and dislikes; and this suffering would make Him ungodly. So God is not an object of inference. In fact, all means of knowledge like perception, etc., as Śaṅkara says, are infected with a transcendental illusion at their very origin. As such, they contain the elements of both truth and falsity. Unless their truth is sifted from falsity and purified and verified by Vedāntic investigation, they cannot fruitfully be used to demonstrate the existence of God. But when these processes are performed, every means of knowledge can be used for the confirmation of the truth that is known by Vedāntic investigation. Consequently, Vedānta maintains that all inferences that are consistent with *Śruti* are acceptable and reliable.

So, inference plays a vital role in the acceptability and reliability of the *Śruti*. It makes the Vedāntic conclusions acceptable to others on the one hand and protect them from all sorts of onslaughts on the other hand.

Furthermore, two more observations on the use of inference in Vedāntic methodology are in order. First, there is *Mahāvīdyā Anumāna*, or in short MA, that is advanced to prove the existence of God. Second, there are the uses of *Sāmānyatodṛṣṭa Anumāna*, or in short SD, that is used to settle the meaning of the Upaniṣadic statements. We shall dwell on each of them in order.

MA is a *Kevala-anvayī anumāna* that can deduce anything whatsoever from the reason 'knowable'. In the case of the existence of God it runs as follows :—

Dharma is the object of an immediate intuition which has a substratum other than that of an illusion.

Because it is knowable as a pot.

Therefore God *qua* the Substratum of *Dharma* exists.¹²

Here God is proved to be the substratum of *Dharma*. The *probandum* is 'the object of an immediate intuition which has a substratum other than that of an illusion'. The qualifying clause in the *probandum* is added to exclude the intuitions of Yogins and Seers; for, they can also have an immediate intuition of *Dharma* although their intuition may be shown to be illusory. So the *probandum* excludes the existence of Yogins and

Seers and mentions the specific characteristic of the substratum of *Dharma*.

This argument can be named as MA₁ for our ready reference. It is a sort of moral argument for the existence of God, for it makes God the locus of *Dharma*, the source and ultimate authority of moral knowledge. But Amalānanda, the author of the *Vedānta Kalpataru*, refutes MA₁ on the following ground :—

What is the meaning of the clause “which has a substratum other than that of an illusion”? Particularly, what is the meaning of the phrase “other than that”. The advocate of the argument may say that it means the mutual exclusion of the substratum of the intuition of *Dharma* and the substratum of the intuition of an illusion. But then another question will arise as to what this mutual exclusion is. This mutual exclusion will require another mutual exclusion to be articulated and so on. Thus the fallacy of *regressus ad infinitum* will vitiate the argument.¹³ Consequently the clause “which has the substratum other than that of an illusion” is defective. So the argument is too specious and cannot exclude the existence of Yogins and Seers. Hence it does not necessarily prove the existence of God.

We can further show the paradoxical character of MA₁. On the one hand, it assumes that moral knowledge is *a priori* and explains this character by assuming the existence of God that is the substratum of this

knowledge. But on the other hand, it assumes that moral knowledge is also an object of human knowledge, *i.e.*, it is an object of knowledge like a pot. So it is both *a priori* and *a posteriori*, which, of course, is a patent contradiction. So Amalānanda rightly warns that all forms of MA are to be refuted.¹⁴

A second form of MA which has been favoured by the modern commentators of the *Khandana-khandakhadya* may be called as MA₂. It runs as follows:—

This earth is an object which has a substratum (i) that is other than the substratum of man-made (*sakartṛka*) objects and non-man made (*akartṛka*) objects, (ii) that is other than the substratum of many uncreated objects (*aneka-akartṛka*) and, (iii) that is the substratum of many words and their meanings (*aneka-tanniṣṭha*), because it is knowledge as a pot.¹⁵

Now on analysis, it will be found that MA₂ has three probandums which are described here as (i), (ii) and (iii). There is much controversy over the interpretation of (ii). But all the probandums are meant to exclude the characteristics that are not attributable to earth and streamline the specific characteristic of the substratum of earth. As this characteristic is indispensable for the existence of earth, there must be a substratum of it. That substratum is God. Hence God exists.

But Amalānanda's refutation of MA₁ is applicable *mutatis mutandis* to MA₂ also. His warning has fallen flat on the ears of the commentators of Śrī Harṣa since

Ānandapūrṇa, the author of *Vidyāsāgarī*, has commented on this philosophical *magnum opus*. They have made a rigorous defence of MA₂, which establishes the existence of the ultimate substratum of earth.

MA₂ is a sort of cosmological argument for the existence of God. Its *probandum* excludes objects like pots, water, etc. on the one hand, souls and the like, on the other. MA₂ thus shows that God has to be postulated to explain the substratum of earth.

Now both MA₁ and MA₂ presuppose a difference between the substratum and its furniture. But Advaita philosophy maintains that the substratum *qua* consciousness or existence is the same as, and non-different from, the furniture *qua* consciousness or existence.

So these arguments, far from proving the existence of God, in fact presuppose it, for, existence is one and the same. What they demonstrate is the distinction between two essences. But existence cannot be derived from any amount of essence. To demonstrate one essence by means of another essence is no proof for the existence of the former. Had there been two existences, there would have been the scope of demonstration of the one by means of the other. But as it is not the case, so no inference is valid to prove the existence of the God of Advaita philosophy. The argument that will show that God is the *prius* of every object may be acceptable to Advaita philosophy, but even this argument does not necessarily prove the unity of God. Hence the unity and existence of God are to be known from the *Śruti* itself.

Furthermore, Śaṅkara and his commentators maintain that an SD cannot be given to prove the existence of God either.¹⁶ The reasons are explained by Śaṅkara himself in the following words:—

Brahman is not the object of sense-experience. Hence it cannot be comprehended by means of any relation that is based upon sense-experience. The objects of sense-experience are natural objects or phenomena. Had Brahman been an object of sense-experience, there would have been the cognition that this effect is related to Brahman. But only the effect is cognized and there is no certain cognition whether this effect is related to Brahman or anything else. Hence, the aphorism mentioning that Brahman is the cause, the ground and the goal of the world is not the statement of an inference.¹⁷

Here what Śaṅkara says is essentially applicable to both cosmological argument and physico-theological argument for the existence of God that are advanced by Udayana, or for that matter, by any philosopher whatsoever. These arguments cannot demonstrate that God is one, omniscient and omnipotent. For, we see that there are beautiful and well-planned cities that are constructed by a number of persons who are neither omniscient nor omnipotent. Similarly, the world which is well-planned and beautiful may be the work of a number of persons who are neither omniscient nor omnipotent. So unity, omniscience and omnipotence of God are to be known only from the *Vedas*, and not from any other source at all.

But as we have shown earlier, some sort of reasoning is needed to get at the right interpretation of the *Vedas*. So a question arises as to what this reasoning is. Here Vācaspati Misra says that Vedāntic investigation is a sort of *tarka*.¹⁸ Amalānanda further explains that *tarka* used in Vedāntic investigation is either inference (*anumāna*) or presumption (*arthāpatti*).¹⁹ So *tarka* plays a vital role in Vedānta.

But it may be urged, as for example, by Bādarāyaṇa, that *tarka* is inconclusive and baseless (*apratīṣṭhita*).²⁰ So how can *tarka* be useful to Vedāntic investigation? To solve this problem Vācaspati Misra makes an important clarification in this context. He states, "We do not demonstrate the invalidity of *tarka* elsewhere. We show its invalidity only in demonstrating the existence of the cause of the world. In fact where *tarka* is based on mere similarity or dissimilarity, there it cannot be cleaned from the fallacy of baselessness (*apratīṣṭha*)."²¹ But SD is, by definition, an argument that is based on similarity or dissimilarity? So is it always invalid?

To this question the Advaitins have replied in the negative. For, there are numerous illustrations of SD given by *Śruti* itself. For example, the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* says that a man of Gāndhāra who had once been left blind-folded in a forest used *tarka* to reach his country. Śaṅkara further states that every inference, let alone SD, that is in agreement with *Śruti* is not only acceptable, but also respectable in Vedānta. Furthermore, Mahādeva Sarasvatī, the author of *Tattvānusandhāna* and its commentary *Advaitacintākaustubha*, maintains that the uses of SD remove the con-

tradiction, if there be any, between *Śruti* and perception, and thus offer such an interpretation of the *Śruti* passages as is consistent with the common experience of the people.²² So SD is used in Vedāntic investigation for the following purposes :—

- (i) To confirm the result of Vedāntic inquiry concerning God or the Self.
- (ii) To remove the contradiction between *prima facie* meaning of a *Śruti* passage and common sense-experience.
- (iii) To settle the meaning of *Śruti* passages in general.

The third use of SD is inescapable from every interpretation of language. Vedāntic investigation is essentially an interpretation of the language of the *Vedas* and the *Upaniṣads*. So in settling the meaning of the statements of this language it is inevitable that SD is widely used in Vedānta. A number of popular maxims which are known as *Laukika Nyāya* (LN in short) serve as the argument forms of SD and are widely used in Vedāntic investigation. Śaṅkara, however, places a restriction on their use. He says that precisely speaking the standpoint of the scriptures cannot be controlled by LN. Wherever their meaning is clear and certain beyond an iota of doubt, there is no scope of LN. But where a doubt lingers about their precise meaning, the use of LN is uncontradicted.²³ Thus Śaṅkara favours the use of LN in the cases of doubt about the meaning of the scriptures. It is used to clear this doubt and get hold of the true meaning.

NOTES

1. आत्मेत्येव परमेश्वरः प्रतिपत्तव्यः । शंकराचार्यः
शरीरकभाष्य 4.1.3
2. F. H. Bradley, *Appearance and Reality*. Oxford, 1941 Edition, p. 143.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 148.
4. *The Phenomenology of Mind*, English Trans., J. D. Bailli (1910). New York, 1964 Edition, p. 80.
5. F. Max Muller, *Vedānta Philosophy*. Calcutta, 1955 Third reprint, p. 80.
6. उपक्रमोपसंहरावभ्यासोऽपूर्वताफलम् ।
अर्थवादोपपत्ती च तात्पर्यनिर्णयहेतवः ॥
7. अयं तु सन्तु वेदान्ता मानं ब्रह्मात्मवस्तुनि । अमलानन्द,
शास्त्रदर्पण, 1.1.4
8. पौर्वापर्यपर्यालोचनाभ्याम् आम्नायो यत्र समञ्जसः । स तदर्थः,
नेतरः ॥ *Ibid.*, 1.1.10
9. अन्योऽन्तर आत्मा । तैत्तिरीय उपनिषद् 2.2
10. अह्यारोपापवादाभ्यां निष्प्रपञ्चं प्रपञ्चयन् । शंकराचार्यः
सर्वसिद्धान्तसारसङ्ग्रहः 1951
11. उपायः सोऽवताराय । गौडपाद, आगमशास्त्रं 3.15
12. भ्रमसमानाधिकरणधर्मविषयरहितसाक्षात्कारविषयः, मेयत्वात्
घटवत् । अमलानन्द, वेदान्तकल्पतरु 2.2.37
13. *Ibid.*, 2.2.37
14. एवं सर्वा महाविद्यास्तच्छाया वाऽन्ये प्रयोगाः खण्डनीया इति ।
Ibid., 2.2.37

15. इयं पृथिवी, सकर्त्तृकाकर्त्तृकवृत्तित्वरहितानेकाकर्त्तृकवृत्तित्वरहितानेकतनिष्ठधर्माधिकरणम्, मेयत्वात्, घटवत् । सूर्यनारायणशुक्ल, खण्डनमालिका, चौखम्भा, वाराणसी 1935, p. 5
16. सामान्यतोद्दृष्टमपि अनुमानं ब्रह्मणि न प्रवर्तते । वाचस्पतिमिश्रः, भामती 1.1.2
17. शारीरकभाष्य 1.1.12
18. वेदान्तमीमांसा तावत् तर्क एव । भामती 1.1.1
19. अर्थापत्तिरनुमानं चात्र तर्कोऽभिमतः, तद्रूपवेदान्तमीमांसा । वेदान्तकल्पतरु 1.1.1
20. ब्रह्मसूत्र 2.1.11
21. न वयम् अन्यत्र तर्कम् अप्रमाणयामः, किन्तु स्वाभाविकप्रतिबन्धवन्न लिङ्गमस्ति । यत्तु साधर्म्यवैधर्म्यमात्रम् तदप्रतिष्ठादोषात् मुच्यते इति । भामती 2.1.11
22. सामान्यतोद्दृष्टानुमानेन श्रुत्यर्थवाधार्थगात् । महादेवानन्द सरस्वती, अद्वैतचिन्ताकोस्तुम, कल्कत्ता, 1901, p. 14
23. न च लौकिकन्यायेन शास्त्रीया दृष्टिर्नियन्तुं युक्तेति । अत्र उच्यते निर्धारिते शास्त्रार्थे एतदेवं स्यात्, सन्दिग्धे तु तस्मिन् निर्णयं प्रति लौकिकोऽपि न्याय आश्रीयमाणो न विरुध्यते । शङ्कराचार्यः, शारीरकभाष्य 4.1.5

ABBREVIATIONS

AM	:	Anthropological Method
LN	:	<i>Laukika Nyāya</i>
MA	:	<i>Mahāvīdyā Anumāna</i>
MA ₁	:	A form of MA
MA ₂	:	" "
OM	:	Objectivistic Method
SD	:	<i>Sāmānyato Dṛṣṭānumāna</i>

THE PARAMĀCĀRYA - ŚAÑKARĀCĀRYA EQUATION

S. O. Ramakrishnan*

I. *Paramācārya - The "Śaṅkarācārya-Incarnate"*

Bertrand Russell, while defining philosophy chooses to describe it as a "no-man's land" between theology and science.¹

Advaita, when viewed from the Russellian angle, is not mere theology, nor mere science, but something more than theology and science. It is an *experience* (*anubhava*). It is not mere *Brahma-vidyā*. It is also a *Yoga-śāstra*. It is not enough if one has a mere intellectual cognition of Reality. On the other hand, one should have a direct vision of it, an experience of it in one's life-time, and practically orient that experience in every field of his activity. Both Śaṅkarācārya and the Paramācārya revelled in that *experience* and brought to bear that experience in every aspect of their life. Not only in this but also in other aspects, there was such a marked one-to-one identity

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between them that one is tempted to equate both and regard the Paramācārya as "Śaṅkarācārya-Incarnate".

II. *Treatment of the Topic*

Once, I along with my department students went to Kancheepuram to have *darshan* of, and pay our respects to, the Paramācārya. The Ācārya enquired, quite humorously, if the students who opt for philosophy course do so because of their failure to get admission in other courses. I said "yes" but added that one or two students actually opt for the course out of their choice, to which the Paramācārya quipped "It is because you teach values.....Is that so?"

This conversation led me to conclude that, according to the Paramācārya, values and philosophy are so interlinked that they should always go together and sans values, philosophy as an academic discipline, in the Wittgensteinian terminology, is just a "language-game".

The Paramācārya was always fond of insisting that mere comprehension of values at the intellectual level is of no avail, unless it is accompanied by application in one's life in such a way that it is serviceable to others. Crossing the ocean alone is not sufficient. Others also should be helped in crossing it. In this endeavour, both Śaṅkarācārya and the Paramācārya handled the oars so dextrously and diligently that they can be rightly christened "*oarsmen par excellence*".

Keeping the applicability of values as the backdrop, this paper is so designed as to explore the identity of the Paramācārya and Śaṅkarācārya in their

methods of application of the values, rooted in their "self-experience", to life's problems.

III. *Advaitic Experience and Their Life-styles*

Advaitic experience and life-styles cannot be different. Since both Śaṅkarācārya and Paramācārya had accomplished this inner personal experience in their life-time, their life-styles also, strictly speaking, could not be different. But, since the times in which they lived were different, there might appear some differences, though hair-line, consequent on their interpretation and codification of the Advaitic experience to others.

IV. *Illustration - Their Interpretation of Value-scheme*

Indian culture is reputed for its antiquity; its age is fixed around 4500 B.C. It is the only oldest surviving culture, flowing from the past to the present with the prospect of flowing into the future, like the perennial river, the Ganges. But in its long years of existence, it has been subjected to, and have survived, many challenges. This has been possible by virtue of its strict adherence to certain basic eternal values.

The nature of the culture of a nation very much depends upon its philosophy. If culture is a way of life, then it should have as its backdrop a view of life, *viz.*, philosophy. Both the way of life, *viz.*, culture and the view of life, *viz.*, philosophy, are determined by certain eternal values on which they are based. This clearly indicates the triangular relation among philosophy, culture and values.

If Indian culture had been successful in converting the challenges into achievements, it was because of its strong basis in eternal values. Every time it

faced a challenge, it was able to *accept, accommodate,* and *assimilate* the challenge without in anyway disrupting and disturbing the basic alignment *viz.*, the values. And those who, time and again, energised Indian Culture, were not merchants, warriors, or politicians; on the contrary, they were “*messengers of spirit,*” men who, by virtue of *self-realisation,* saw themselves in everything. In the long line of such “messengers” were Śaṅkarācārya and the Paramācārya.

Śaṅkarācārya was able to stabilise Indian Culture by reinterpreting the eternal values, to suit the needs of his age. What he accomplished centuries ago, the Paramācārya achieved in contemporary times. To take for instance the Paramācārya’s re-interpretation of economic values in relation to spiritual. His interpretation rests on the contention that economic values should be structured in such a way that they should be firmly rooted in, and spring forth from, the spirit or self. By way of illustration, he takes up the oft repeated term, “standard of living”. In his words: “To translate ‘standard of living’ in Tamil as ‘*Vāzhkaitaram*’ (வாழ்க்கைத்தரம்) is not proper. *Vāzhkaitaram* is something noble. Living a life with noble qualities and devotion to Īsvara alone is ‘standardised’ (*taram-தரம்*) living. So, ‘standard of life’ is tantamount to ‘quality of life’. But, presently, increasing economic needs alone goes by the name ‘standard of living’. More than this, raising oneself spiritually is the real standard of living and this should be given top priority.”

The technique of integrating tradition with modernity forms the characteristic feature of their reinter-

pretation. All the changes that they permitted were only within the bounds of *Dharma-śāstras*. In the words of the Paramācārya: "Some people, in all good faith, tell me that *Dharma-śāstras* are spelt out by the Ṛshis. You are also like the ṛshi. So suited to the needs of the age give us a revised version of the *Śāstras*. It is their opinion that like taking out the weeds in a field, some of the dharmic practices should be removed. But, if I remove some practices thinking that they are weeds, after sometime, someone else might weed out some other practices. If this is allowed to continue, at some point of time, the entire crop will be weeded out. It should be very clearly understood that we do not follow the *Dharma-śāstras* just because they were given out by the Ṛshis. We adhere to them because the Ṛshis established the *Dharma-śāstras* in consonance with the eternal *Vedas* which are nothing but the dictates of Īsvara. It should be our endeavour to protect them as they are. I am not empowered to alter them"

V. *Their Life-style and Their Expressions*

A. *Life-style*

1. *Taking to Asceticism*: Both took to asceticism as a very tender age; the former at the age of 8 and the latter at 13.

2. *Living Examples of Asceticism*: Both were personifications of asceticism. As the verse in the *Īśopaniṣad* goes, they "enjoyed by renouncing" (*tyaktena bhujñjīthāḥ*).

A look at the articles used by him which are kept in the tiny museum got up near the Mahāsamādhi of the Paramācārya indicates how an individual can live

peacefully with minimum requirements. We are reminded that, after all, happiness in life does not depend on material possessions; it is only a state of mind. The Dalai Lama is reported to have expressed his amazement at the Paramācārya's ascetic way of living.

3. *Self-effort*: Both the Ācāryas rose to the dizzy height of self-realisation and enjoyed the Advaitic experience by sheer self-effort.

4. *Let the World also Enjoy This Happiness*: Impelled by this noble longing for sharing, both the Ācāryas walked the length and breadth of this country not once, but many times, to put people on the right track, integrating the diversified cultures of our land.

B. *Expression of Their Life-styles*

Their life-styles found their expression in the *Equanimity of Vision* that they radiated. In the myriad reflections of the equanimity of vision, two are noteworthy: (a) harmony and (b) humility.

(a) *Harmony*: Both the Ācāryas were able to give expression to this quality of harmony in every sphere of their activity. To cite a few: (1) harmony within themselves; (2) harmony in society; (3) harmony among religions, (4) harmony among philosophies; (5) harmony in politics.

1. *Harmony within Themselves*:

Bertrand Russell, the noted British philosopher-mathematician humanist, admits that, "By means of a political and economic unification an external harmony of man with man can be established but it will

not be a stable harmony until men have achieved a genuine harmony within themselves.”² That self-harmony, about which Russell speaks so eloquently and which alone forms the basis of other harmonies in the world, according to Śaṅkara, should be firmly established in the Self (*Ātman*) by virtue of its being eternal and unchanging, if it is to be long-lasting. A person who has accomplished this self-harmony is called a “*yogi*” and, in the words of the Paramācārya, is like a “Kazhakoḍi”.³ Well-known for his simple illustrations, the Paramācārya illustrates his point thus: “Even as the Kazhakoḍi is able to roll on the floor without attaching itself to any dirt and even when we smear it with a little sacred ash (*Vibhūti*) it rolls on leaving the ash behind, the *Yogi* also rolls towards the Paramātman without attaching himself to pleasure and pain.”

Such a self-harmony was accomplished by the Ācāryas. Both were like the proverbial “Kazhakoḍi”, transcending the polarities of pleasure-pain, joy-sorrow, likes-dislikes, etc.

2. *Societal Harmony*

Ādi-Śaṅkara realised the fundamental non-difference among differences in the society. Though he had known that the man standing opposite was of a low caste (*caṇḍāla*), because of the ‘one’ question that he raised, he felt that he should be a self-realised person which prompted him to accept him as his ‘Guru’ and proclaim to the world with all humility that he would accept any self-realised person as his mentor, no matter to which denomination of societal classification he might belong. On many occasions, the

Paramācārya also gave expression to this noble quality.

In the Paramācārya's words: "That everything should elevate itself equally is not practically feasible. That everything should stand differentiated is also not advisable. There should be a way of moderation... whatever might be the differences externally, if there is love in our bosom, then peace alone will prevail in the country. If only each one, without being selfish, were to act in the world with the frame of mind that he is working for the welfare of humanity, then there can be no differentiation "

3. *Religious Harmony*

Ṣaṇmata-Sthāpanācārya was the other name given to Ādi Śaṅkara. At the time of Śaṅkara, the six cults, viz., Gāṇāpatyam, Kaumāram, Śaivism, Śāktam, Sauram and Vaiṣṇavam, in a bid to gain supremacy, were vying with each other. And it was given to Ādi Śaṅkara to harmonise these faiths under the canopy of the philosophy of Advaita, which he accomplished by evolving a scheme of worship called "*Pañcāyatana Pūjā*" arousing in the process '*national consciousness*' in the pūjā room. The salient features of this scheme of worship are the following:

1. Harmonisation of the six sects of the Sanātana-dharma.
2. Worshipping of the presiding deities in different stones.
3. The stones do not have any definite shape. They are just rockous formations. Lord Gaṇapati, for example, is worshipped in a

piece of stone, sans the form with which Lord Gaṇapati is normally associated.

4. It is a formless form worship.
5. Each piece of stone, used for worship in this Pūjā-scheme, is brought from the four different corners of India, so much so that this harmonisation of various cults at once nourishes national integration.

But, in the case of the Paramācārya, the scope of harmonisation in the field of religion has assumed a wider significance. In consonance with his times, he had taken upon himself the task of harmonising the different world-religions and even succeeded in his endeavour. In his case, this was possible because he understood the various religions in their proper perspectives. He says: "There may be a difference in the structure among a temple, a church, a mosque and a vihāra, in the presiding deity inside or the symbol, or in their rituals. But there cannot be a difference in the Lord who showers His grace. After all, depending upon the attitude and the ways of life of the particular set of people, these different religions have come into existence."

In this context, it is necessary to ask the question: Is proselytisation necessary? The Ācārya's answer is an emphatic "no". According to him, those who convert themselves to other religions not only degrade their parent religion, but also the religion to which they have converted themselves. The Paramācārya very vehemently denounces proselytisation and calls it totally meaningless.

The Present Need: There is nothing wrong in allowing certain differences between religions in their ideologies and practices. It is not necessary to equalise all religions by a road-roller. Instead of indulging in the process of equalisation, it is but necessary that the followers of the different religions are united mentally. Unity and not uniformity is the need of the hour.

No Gulf between Precept and Practice

There is a mosque adjacent to the math premises at Kancheepuram. When it was suggested to the Paramācārya that the mosque be shifted to some other place, he opposed the proposal. On the contrary, whenever the "namaz" went on in the mosque, he used to keep silent.

That after the Paramācārya attained Mahāsamādhi, there were among the crowd who came to pay their homage to his mortal remains, people belonging not only to the other sects in Hinduism, but also to other religions, clearly showed how in his case there was no hiatus between precept and practice.

4. Harmonising Philosophical Conclusions

Many scientists have, after deep deliberations, come to the conclusion that Advaita Vedānta as expounded by Śaṅkara and modern science are fundamentally identical. This is how the Paramācārya expresses the view: "Eminent scientists like Einstein and Sir James Jeans have come closer to the conclusions of Advaita expounded by the *Upaniṣads* and Śaṅkara Bhagavatpāda. That the 'world is *Māyā*' only signifies that the 'world is not absolutely real', that it is true only from the empirical standpoint and

that its existence is totally dependent upon Brahman. The afore-mentioned scientists also express the same view. What the Advaita has said, *viz.*, that Brahman alone is transcendently real and that the world is only empirically real, is expressed differently by these scientists thus: The whole world order is dependent on something else and hence only relative; not absolute truth."

Science and Human Progress

To quote the Paramācārya again: "It is quite pathetic that the atomic scientists who found out the truth that energy and matter are identical have also, with the same rationality, brought out the atomic bomb. The non-difference established by science in respect of the external world, should also percolate in the expressions of the people. If only the knowledge that the entire creation is basically non-different is established through science, then the very same science which has brought out the atomic bomb, instead of self-destruction can be said to have contributed to self-prosperity."

Dvaita ÷ Bauddha = Advaita

The Paramācārya's philosophical conclusion is in consonance with the spirit of Indian culture — acceptance, accommodation and assimilation — which aimed at fostering harmony among the different philosophical views. The Paramācārya establishes Advaita with the help of a mathematical formula. In his own words: "Brahman which is eternal alone is real, says Advaita. The world which *appears* eternal also is real, says Dvaita. In the absence of any difference between Brahman and world, everything is

śūnya, māyā, pūjyam, says Bauddham. The formula that Brahman \times *Māyā* (Śūnyam) = *Prapañcam* can also be interpreted as Advaita \times Bauddham = Dvaita or Dvaita \div Bauddham = Advaita".
(Prapañcam) (Māyā) (Brahman)

5. *Political harmony*

In contemporary political scenario, 'socialism' is considered as the ideology par excellence aimed at establishing *samadharmā-samudāyam*. There cannot be a greater committed socialist than Śaṅkarācārya who proclaimed that "Pārvati was his mother, Mahesvara his father, Śiva-bhaktas, his kith and kin and the three worlds, his world."* No wonder, Dr. Radhakrishnan very aptly described him as a "super-socialist."⁴

A rational explanation for the many slogans that we hear nowadays, such as "Seeing Divinity in the smile of the poor," "Service to men is service to God", etc., can be offered only on the basis of Śaṅkara's Advaita. Otherwise, they are mere jumble of words. If human fraternity should become meaningful and be of any significance, it should be firmly rooted in the Self. If not, it will be like a body without a soul. Only then, love and 'dharma' will be the expressions of human fraternity which alone should form the basis of any political set up.

The Paramācārya puts this idea very succinctly in the following words: "It should be the duty of a Government to keep the society in such a way that it should enable the people of that society to carry on

* माता च पार्वती देवी पिता देवो महेश्वरः ।
बान्धवाःशिवभक्ताश्च स्वदेशो भुवनत्रयम् ॥

their activities without any friction, keeping an eye at the same time on their self-upliftment. It should also be the duty of a Government to set right their daily life and increase the possibilities for their self-upliftment. Whatever might be the nature of work, the mind of the doer should be filled with love and nothing but love, setting aside desire (*kāma*), anger (*krodha*), hatred (*dveṣa*) and deceit, and should perform his work for the welfare of his fellow human beings. If only love becomes the guiding light for all activities, the bad will be reduced gradually in the world. It was this message that the Paramācārya gave to humanity through the UNO, by his musical composition "*maitrim bhajata*".

(b) *Humility*: Both Śaṅkarācārya and the Paramācārya were the personification of humility, "humbler than even dust" as Gandhiji would observe. While Śaṅkarācārya would say that he only voiced the views of the Rshis and Brahmavādins, the Paramācārya was fond of repeating that he was only carrying out the orders of Śaṅkara Bhagavatpāda.

Coincidence

It is a strange 'divine' coincidence that both Śaṅkara and the Paramācārya attained "*consummation*" at Kancheepuram; while the former ascended the 'Sarvajñapīṭha', the latter attained 'Mahasamādhi'.

The Paramācārya - An Avatāra of Śaṅkarācārya

The foregoing account clearly reveals that the lifestyles of both the Acāryā were firmly rooted in the Advaitic experience. Though we are not fortunate to have had darshan of Ādi Śaṅkara in gross form, we are at least privileged to have lived at the time of the

Paramācārya. And observing the life-style of the Paramācārya we are led to infer that if ever there was a man by name Ādi Śaṅkara who traversed the length and breadth of this country, he should have been like this only.

Conclusion

Ādi Śaṅkara is said to be the incarnation of Paramesvara. The Paramācārya can be said to be the incarnation of Ādi Śaṅkara. So, logically we can conclude that the Paramācārya is the incarnation of the Lord Paramesvara. With regard to such an eternal, unchanging, transcendent, para-Brahman, we rejoice over the celebration of its Birth Centenary, and lament over its attainment of Mahasamādhi. Is this not a paradox? Is this the *māyā* that Śaṅkarācārya refers to?

NOTES

1. Russell, Bertrand, *History of Western Philosophy*, p. 13.
2. Russell, Bertrand, *On Education*.
3. "Kazhakodi" is a small round shaped marble-like thing with a very soft surface capable of rolling round without the dirt sticking to its surface.
4. Radhakrishnan, S., *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. 2.

ŚAṄKARA AND SAṂSKRIT LITERATURE

V. Kutumba Sastry*

The descendance of Śrī Śaṅkara Bhagavatpāda on this earth was an event of great significance. It is recorded in golden letters in the cultural and spiritual history of India. The impetus he has given to the development of various aspects of Indian life is everlasting. It is so powerful that no branch of knowledge is left untouched by its influence. In fact, Śaṅkara paved the way for the new schools of thought, both favourable and unfavourable to his thought. His three types of writings, namely, *bhāṣyas*, *stotras*, and *prakaraṇagranthas*, completed before his attaining sixteen years of age, became standard examples to emulate. His magnificent effort to ward off misleading interpretations of Vedic literature and to synthesize it in the most coherent way is beyond not only one's capacity to describe in words, but also one's imagination. Surely, Śaṅkara is a legendary figure whom we cannot fully evaluate.

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I understand the title of the paper, namely, "Śaṅkara and Śaṅskrit literature," in two ways. Identifying Śaṅkara with his theory of Advaita, I presume that the scope of the paper is to evaluate the influence of Advaita on Śaṅskrit literature of the pre-Śaṅkara as well as post-Śaṅkara periods. I also understand that the scope of the paper is to evaluate how Śaṅkara exercised his influence on the later poets and *śāstrakāras*.

Before going into further details, I wish to make two important general observations. First of all, there is a misunderstanding that Śaṅkara, as a strong upholder of the theory that *jñāna* alone will help one to realize the ultimate Reality, is opposed to *karma* and *bhakti*. Secondly, because of his unambiguous stress on the view that Brahman, and Brahman alone, is real, he is misrepresented as one who does not accept the world and its reality.

These two basic misunderstandings made Śaṅkara unacceptable to his critics. The truth is that there cannot be a greater upholder of *karma* and *bhakti* than Śaṅkara. Also, according to Śaṅkara, the world exists and enjoys some sort of reality, technically called *vyāvahārikasatya*. All that he establishes through arguments is that this world is sublatale as and when the realization of Brahman takes place. But, he is very clear that, within the realm of *vyāvahārika*, all epistemological, theological, and axiological theories are acceptable to him, as to anybody else. In fact, the greatest contribution of Śaṅkara is to evolve the methodology of the theory of three levels of reality, which alone would be able to solve the hermeneutical problems of *śruti* and *smṛti* texts. As the *Vedas* and the

Upaniṣads which are well-known are the very foundations of Advaita, I wish to make a few references to the less known sources of Advaita, namely, the *Śrīmadbhāgavatam* and the *Viṣṇupurāṇam* with a view to trace the Advaitic thought in them, as they are considered to be the main sources of authority to post-Śaṅkara theologians. I quote a few passages to make this point clear.

Consider the following passages from *Śrīmadbhāgavatam*:

- “ सम्पद्यमानमाज्ञाद्य भीष्मं ब्रह्मणि निष्कले ।
सर्वे बभूवुस्ते तूष्णीं वयांसीव दिनात्यये ॥ ” (1.9.44.)
- “ स वै किलायं युक्त्वः पुरातनो य एक आसीद्विशेष आत्मनि ”
(1.10.21)
- “ तदिदं भगवन् राजन् एक आत्माऽऽत्मनां स्वदृक् ।
अन्तरोऽनन्तरो भाति पश्य त्वं माययोरुधा ॥ ” (1.13.47)
- “ विशुद्धं केवलं जानं प्रत्यक् सम्यगवस्थितम् ।
सत्यं पूर्णमनाद्यन्तं निर्गुणं नित्यमद्वयम् ॥ ” (2.6.39)
- “ तस्मादिदं जगदशेषमसत्स्वरूपं
स्वप्नाभमस्तद्विषणं पुलदुःखदुःखम् ।
त्वय्येव नित्यसुखबोधतनावनन्ते
मायात उद्यदपि यत्सदिवावभाति ॥ ”

एकस्त्वमात्मा पुरुषः पुराणः

सत्यः स्वयंज्योतिरनन्त आद्यः ॥ ” (10.14.22,23)

“ निर्गुणे केवसे साक्षात् आत्मनो यद्विपर्ययः ।

सैषा भगवतो माया ययेदं निमंमे विभुः ॥ ”

“ घटे भिन्ने यथाकाशः आकाशः स्याद् पथा पुरा ।

एवं देहे मृते जीवो ब्रह्म सम्पद्यते पुनः ॥ ” (12.5.5)

Since space is limited, I prefer to give the gist of these *ślokas* in a consolidated form without attempting word to word meaning and explanation.

In the passage quoted from the *Bhāgavata*, it is stated that Bhīṣma got dissolved into Brahman which is “*niṣkala*”, that is without any attribute. The words, “*aviśeṣam*”, “*viśuddham*”, “*nirguṇam*”, “*kevalam*”, etc. clearly state that Brahman is attributeless. By the phrases qualifying the world, “*māyayorudhā*”, “*māyāta udyadaṇi yat sadivāvabhāti*”, “*svapnāvabhāsam*”, “*māyā, yayedam nirmame*”, etc., it is clear that the world comes into existence only through *māyā* and hence sublatale. In other words, the world has only *vyāvahārika* reality. The words, “*ātmā, pratyak*”, which mean the *jīva*, are used in such a way so that the identity of *jīva* and Brahman can be established. The simile of *ākāśa*, that is delimited by pot, merging into, and becoming one with, the omnipresent *ākāśa* when it is broken, and the statement which says that *jīva*, after death, becomes Brahman, or remains as Brahman, states expressively that *jīva* is none but Brahman. In this way the most important teachings of Advaita, viz., that Brahman is the only reality and that it is attributeless; that the world which is *vyāvahārika* is a superimposition on Brahman; that the *jīva* in its essential nature is none but Brahman, are expressively stated in the quoted passage.

Let us consider the following passages from *Viṣṇu-purāṇam* :

“ परः पराणां परमः परमात्मात्मसंस्थितः ।
रूपवर्णादिनिर्देशविशेषणविवर्जितः ॥ ” (1.2.10)

- “ अहं ममेत्यविऽद्येयं व्यवहारस्तथानयोः ।
परमार्थस्त्वसंल्लाप्यः गोचरो वचसां न यः ॥ ” (6.7.100)
- “ परमार्थस्तु भूपाल ! संक्षेपाच्छरूयतां मम ।
एको व्यापी समश्शुद्धो निर्गुणः प्रकृतेः परः ॥
जन्मवृद्ध्यादिरहितः आत्मा सर्वगतोऽव्ययः ।
वेणुरन्ध्रविभेदेन भेदपट्टादिसंज्ञितः ॥
अभेदव्यापिनो वायोः तथा तस्य महात्मनः ।
एकत्वं रूपभेदस्तु बाह्यकर्मप्रवृत्तिजः ॥ (2.14.28-33)
- “ तदेतदुपदिष्टं ते संक्षेपेण महामते ।
पराथसारभूतं यत् तदद्वैतमशेषतः ॥ ” (2.16.20)
- “ सर्वभूतान्यभेदेन ददर्श स तदात्मनः ।
तथा ब्रह्मपरो मुक्तिमवाप परमां द्विजः ॥ (2.16.20)
- “ परमार्थस्त्वमेवैको नान्योऽस्ति जगतः पते ।
तवैव महिमा येन व्याप्तमेतत् चराचरम् ॥
यदेतत् दृश्यते मूर्तमेतत् ज्ञानात्मनस्तवः ।
भ्रान्तिज्ञानेन पश्यन्ति जगद्रूपमयोगिनः ॥
ज्ञानस्वरूपमखिलं जगदेतद्वुद्ध्यः ।
अर्थस्वरूपं पश्यन्तो भ्राम्यन्ते मोहसंश्लेवे ॥
ये तु ज्ञानविदः शुद्धचेतसः तेऽखिलं जगत् ।
ज्ञानात्मकं प्रपश्यन्ति त्वद्रूपं परमेश्वर ॥ ” (1.4.38-41)
- “ शद्धस्संल्लक्ष्यते भ्रान्त्या गुणवानिव योऽगुणः ।
तमात्मरूपिणं देवं नतास्स पुरुषोत्तमम् ॥
अविकारमजं शुद्धं निर्गुणं यन्निरञ्जनम् ।
नतास्स तत्पदं ब्रह्म विष्णोर्यत्परमं पदम् ॥
अदीर्घमह्वमस्थूलमण्वश्यामलोहितम् ।
अस्नेहच्छायमतनुमसङ्गमशरीरिणम् ॥
अनाकाशमसंस्पर्शमगन्धमरसं च यत् ।
अचक्ष्यश्रोत्रमचलमवाक्पाणिममानसम् ॥
अनामगोत्रमसुखमतेजस्कमहेतुकम् ।
अभयं भ्रान्तिरहितमनिद्रमजरामरम् ॥ ” (11.14.37-41)

- “ सितनीलादिभेदेन यथैकं दृश्यते नमः ।
 भ्रान्तदृष्टिभिरात्मापि तथैकस्सन् पृथक्कृतः ॥ ” (2.16.22)
- “ एकस्समतं यदिहास्ति किञ्चित् तदच्युतो नास्ति परं ततोऽन्यत् ।
 सोऽहं स च त्वं स च सर्वमेतत् आत्मस्वरूपं त्यज भेदमोहम् ॥ ”
 (2.16.23)
- “ इतीरितस्तेन स राजवर्यः तत्याज भेदं परमार्थदृष्टिः ।
 स चापि जातिस्मरणाप्तबोधः तत्रैव जन्मन्यपवर्गमाह ॥ ”
 (2.16.24)

In the *ślokas* cited above from the *Viṣṇupurāṇa* the basic tenets of Advaita Vedānta are transparently clear. The nature of Brahman is clearly stated as attributeless by the adjectives such as “*rūpa-varṇādinirdeśa-vivarjitaḥ*” “*śuddhaḥ*”, “*nirguṇaḥ*”, “*śuddhaḥ saṁlakṣyate bhrāntyā guṇavāniva yoguṇaḥ*”. The chain of negative adjectives, negating the mutually opposed qualities such as *adīrgham*, *ahrasvam*, etc., point to the *śruti* teaching of “*neti-neti*”. By the sentences, “*bhrāntijñānena paśyanti jagadrūpamayoginaḥ*”, “*bhrām-, yante mohasaṁplave*”, “*bhrāntyā guṇavāniva*”, “*ahaṁ mametyavidyeyam vyavahāraḥ*” etc., the empiricity of the world, because of its superimposition on Brahman, is explicitly stated. The expressions such as “*ātmā*”, “*paramātmā ātmasaṁsthitaḥ*”, “*amātmārūpiṇam devam*”, drive home the point of the identity of *jīva* with Brahman.

Before I get into the details of post-Śaṅkara literature, I wish, once again, to make a few general observations. There is a vast literature in the form of commentaries and sub-commentaries as well as independent works to explain the theory of Advaitic interpretation of the *Upaniṣadic* teachings. Indeed, it is these writings that have triggered the explosion of a vast

Vedāntic literature. The explosion was of two kinds, favourable to the Advaitic thought and unfavourable to it. Nevertheless, these writings alone are responsible for both the types of explosion of writings. The schools of Rāmānuja and Madhva, and also other Vedāntic schools are, to a large extent, reactionary in their nature. But for Śaṅkara and his writings, there would not have been a variety of Saṁskrit Vedāntic literature of Advaita, Viśiṣṭādvaita, and so on.

This is in respect of technical and *sāstraic* literature. On the other hand, Śaṅkara has triggered the explosion of *stotra* literature through his magnificent hymns. Except some *stotras* in the *purāṇas*, we do not find any cognizable amount of *stotra* literature prior to Śaṅkara. Śaṅkara was a great *bhakta* of various Gods and he described and prayed to them in his moving *stotras*. This aspect of Śaṅkara being a great *bhakti* poet is as powerful as that of his being a marvellous writer of *bhāṣyas*. He has set an example of writing *stotras* in various patterns, namely, *aṣṭakas*, *bhujāṅga-prayātas*, *karāvalamba stotras*, *laharis*, *pañcaratnas*, *śatakas*, and *sāhasrīs*, which have been emulated by later Advaitins as well as by the opponents of Advaita. Thus, a large amount of post-Śaṅkara *stotra* literature came into existence. Śaṅkara is responsible for the development of this vast literature, which has no parallel in the world. The imagination, visualization, and poetization of beauty and devotion which one can notice in this literature is beyond our ability to describe.

बहन्ती सिन्दूरं प्रबलकबरीभारतिमिर-

द्विषां वृन्दैर्ब्रन्दीकृतमिव नवीनार्ककिरणम् ।

तनोतु क्षेमं नः तव वदनसौन्दर्यलहरी-
परीवाहस्रोतस्सरणिरिव सीमन्तसरणिः ॥

The *simanta* of Goddess Tripurasundarī has been imagined as the canal for the out-flow of the heavy currents of streams of beauty of her face. The *simanta*, which is red because of the application of *sindūram* on it, is exactly in the midst of heavy and thick hair of deep black colour. This fact led to the imagination that it looked as if one single first ray of the sun has been arrested by its powerful foes, *viz.*, darkness. The suggestion of beauty and the charm of face of Goddess Tripurasundarī, as reflected in this *śloka*, are beyond one's power of expression. The beauty and charm of this and many such *ślokas* of Śaṅkara's have come down the centuries and inspired many writers resulting in *bhakti-stotra* literature.

Not only this. Śaṅkara has set a trend of writing philosophical works through *stotras*, which are called *adhyātmastotras* such as the *Dakṣiṇāmūrti stotra*, *Bhaja-govinda stotra*, etc. This has also been imitated by later writers belonging to his tradition as well as by others. The influence of Śaṅkara on the later writers of this branch of literature is so great that they ascribed their writings to him thus creating an unending problem for researchers to differentiate the original and ascribed texts of Śaṅkara.

The development of *adhyātma stotras* paved the way for the *adhyātmadramas* such as the *Prabodhacand-rodāyam*, the *Saṅkalpasūryādayam*, etc.

All this is about the direct influence of Śaṅkara on later Saṅskrit writers who have attempted to imi-

tate him. Apart from this, Śaṅkara has influenced many a later poet in an indirect way. Glimpses of his Advaitic thought were incorporated in their works sometimes expressively and sometimes suggestively. I select Śrī Harṣa as an example in this regard.

“नेत्राणि वैदर्भसुतासरथीनां विमुक्ततत्तद्विषयग्रहाणि ।
प्रापुस्तमेकं निरुपाख्यरूपं ब्रह्मेव चेतांसि यतव्रतानाम् ॥”
(3.3)

“प्रसूनवाणाद्वयवादिनी सा काचित् द्विजंनोपनिवत्पिकेन ।
अस्याः किमास्यद्विजराजतो वा नाधीयते भैक्षभृजा तरुभ्यः ॥”
(7.48)

“ब्रह्माद्वयस्यान्वमवत्प्रमोदं रोमाग्र पवाग्रनिरीक्षितेऽस्याः ।
यथौचितीत्यं तदशेषदृष्टावथ स्मराद्वैतमुदं तथासौ ॥” (7.3)

“मुनिर्यथात्मानमथ प्रबोधवान् प्रकाशयन्तं स्वमसावबुध्यत ।
अपि प्रपन्नां प्रकृतिं विलोक्य तामवाप्तसंस्कारतथासृज-
दिगरः ॥” (9.121)

In the above quoted *ślokas*, the statement “*nirupākhyarūpaṁ brahmeva*” makes it clear that Brahman is attributeless. By saying “*advayavādinī upaniṣad*” Śrī Harṣa opines that the *Upaniṣads* have purport in Advaita only. Similarly, the word “*brahmādvayasya*” suggests that the secondless Brahman is the ultimate Reality. In the simile “*muniryathātmānamatha prabodhavān*”, Śrī Harṣa suggests the identity of the *jīva* and Brahman through the use of the word “*ātmānam*”.

In addition to these stray references, the central idea of the entire *Naiṣadhakāvya* is stated to be the realization of Brahman according to the traditional interpretation * *Hamsa* stands for *prāṇaśakti*, *jīva* and

* M. Jayaseetarama Sastry, *Śrī Harṣa Naiṣadham-Darśana Parāmarśaḥ*, 1987, Repalle.

paramātman, Nala stands for *jīva*, Bhīma stands for *vairāgya*, and Bhaimī stands for *vidyāśakti*. Indra and other Gods are observers and supporters. Kali stands as an obstacle to attaining *vidyā-siddhi*. Thus, the *Naiṣadhakāvya* narrates the story of a person who, by overcoming all obstacles of various sorts, attains *siddhi* or realization of Brahman. This type of suggestion is called *prabandhavyaṅgya*.

Regarding the influence of Advaitic thought on other *śāstras*, it is commonly observed that in the texts of the Nyāyasāstra, etc., wherever presentation of any theory of the *Upaniṣads* takes place by name, "*aupaniṣadāḥ*" or "*aupaniṣadam matam*", etc., the theory thus set forth seems to be a re-statement of Advaitic thought only. This proves that it is only the Advaitic interpretation that is acceptable to the *Upaniṣads*, according to the general understanding of other *śāstrakāras*.

In the history of Indian philosophy the philosophy of Śāṅkhya has influenced every other school. For example, his *guṇatrayavāda*, his concepts of *prakṛit* and evolution, his *satkāryavāda*, and so on have been adopted, either partially or totally, by most of the schools of Indian philosophy including Advaita. Among the *āstika darśanas*, Śāṅkhya was ruling the reign till Śaṅkara came into the picture. After Śaṅkara, the influence of Śāṅkhya on the other *darśanas* has certainly diminished in all its aspects. Particularly, in respect of the nature of Brahman, *mokṣa*, etc., his influence has been wiped out by the Advaitic thought. This establishes the great impact of Advaita on the other systems.

To cite another example. The most important theory of the Ālaṅkārikas, namely, the theory of *rasa-niṣpatti* or theory of aesthetic experience is influenced by the Advaitic thought. Jagannāthapaṇḍita elucidates the theory of *rasa-niṣpatti* as follows. When the concealing cover is removed from a lamp, it illumines itself and illumines the objects around it. Similarly, the pure consciousness, when its cover is removed because of contemplation of poetic objects, illumines itself and illumines the *rati*, etc., which come into contact with it. In this way, *rasa* has been described as similar to, or identical with, the self-luminous eternal Self. The concealing cover, which is called *avidyā* in Advaita, has been accepted as it is. Just as in the context of Brahman-realization it is said that the *āvaraṇa* or concealing cover is dispelled by the direct experience of sentential meaning of the *śruti* text, “*tat tvamasi*,” even so the *āvaraṇa* or concealing veil of *rasa* is dispelled by *carvaṇā* or contemplation of poetic beauty in the case of aesthetic experience. The experience is also pure in its essential nature, as *rati*, *vibhāvas*, etc. are presented to it as objects. But unlike *brahmānubhava*, it is *saviṣayānubhava*. All this explanation of experience of *rasa* shows the influence of Advaita on the Ālaṅkāra-sāstra.

Any discussion on the topic like influence of Śaṅkara on Saṁskrit literature will be incomplete without any reference to Kālidāsa. I have reserved it to the end. His Holiness Paramācārya once advised some one of his devotees to read a *śloka* of Kālidāsa’s everyday and contemplate on it. It is the *nāndī śloka* of the *Vikramorvaśīya*:

वेदान्तेषु यमाहुरेकपुरुषं व्याप्य स्थितं रोदसी

यस्मिन्नीश्वर इत्यनन्यविषयः शब्दो यथार्थाक्षरः ।

अन्तर्यंश्च मुमुक्षुभिः नियमितप्राणादिभिर्मृग्यते

स स्थाणुः स्थिरभक्तियोगसुलभो निःश्रेयसायास्तु वः ॥

In this verse, poet Kālidāsa clearly states that there exists only one ultimate Reality described in the *Upaniṣads*, which is also befittingly called *Īśvara*, because He controls everything; and the people, who want to liberate themselves, do find Him within themselves by the arduous exercise of *sthirabhakti*. There cannot be a more simple, effective, and meaningful summary of Advaitic standpoint of identity of *jīva* and Brahman than this description of Kālidāsa.

Thus, Śaṅkara has exercised his influence on all aspects and divisions of Saṅskrit literature. The personality and greatness of Śaṅkara have very few parallels in the history of human achievement. Śaṅkara was not only an all-time great person, but also became a mighty institution. Above all, he has become the greatest living tradition.

A NOTE ON THE 'ĀTMAN' IN THE LIGHT OF SADĀNANDA'S VEDĀNTASĀRA

S. Ranganath*

The concept of *Ātman* plays an important role in the Indian philosophy irrespective of whether one is talking about an orthodox system or a heterodox system. An attempt has been made herein to present the different theories pertaining to *Ātman* as a *prima facie* view, and to establish the Vedāntic point of view of *Ātman* by rejecting all the other views, which is in keeping with the dictum "*Paramatanirākaraṇapurassaram svasiddhāntasthāpanam*".

The different views dealt with here are those pertaining to the Cārvākas, Bauddhas, Prābhākaras Mīmāṃsakas, Naiyāyikas, Bhāṭṭas and Vedāntins. Among Cārvākas themselves, there are four different versions, among Bauddhas there are two schools, *viz.*, Vijñānavādins and Śūnyavādins. Now these views will be dealt with one by one in the same order and will be criticised in the same order from the

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point of Advaita Vedānta which is the ultimate *siddhānta*.

First View of Cārvākas

The Cārvākas are of the opinion that the son is the self as there is a *śruti* text, viz., "*ātmā vai jāyate putraḥ*," — verily the self is born as the son. As one loves one's son as one's own self, and further because of the experience that one feels oneself prosperous or ruined as one's son fares well or ill.

*ātmā vai jāyate putra ityādiśruteḥ svasminniva
putre'pi premadarśanāt putre puṣṭe naṣṭe ca ahameva
puṣṭo naṣṭaśceti anubhavācca putraḥ ātmeti vadati.¹*

Here the Cārvāka has quoted three proofs such as scriptural evidence, inference and perception to strengthen his contention which are the proofs acceptable to Vedāntins also thinking that he is adopting the teaching '*paraḍaṇḍena eva paraśya tāḍanam*' which in reality is not so.

Criticism from the Advaita Point of View

This view is criticised from four points of view. First, it is against the *śruti* text:

*asthūlaḥ acakṣuḥ aprāṇaḥ amanāḥ akartā caitanyam
cinmātram sat ityādi prabalaśrutivirodhāt.²*

[That *ātman* is not gross, without eyes, without the vital force, without the mind, not an agent, but consciousness, pure intelligence and existence.]

Here one should note that whenever there is a contradiction between two *śruti* texts, the negative *śruti*

(which describes the Vedāntic view) is more powerful than the *śruti* statement which is affirmative. Secondly, they are material and are illumined by pure consciousness and as such are unreal like a pot, etc.

*asya putrādi sūnyaparyantasya jaḍasya caitanya-
bhāsyatvena ghaṭādivat anityatvāt.*³

Thirdly, the above statement of the Cārvāka is in opposition with the popular experience that "He is Brahman."

*aham brahmeti vidvadanubhavaprābalyācca.*⁴

Lastly, it is contradictory to the inference, verbal testimony and experience.

*śrutiyukti-anubhavābhāsānām bādhitatvāt.*⁵

Second View of Cārvākas

The Cārvāka says that the physical body is the self on account of the *śruti* passages such as "Man is constituted of the essence of food" due to the fact that a man rushes out of a burning house even leaving behind his son and because of such experiences as "I am stout, I am thin," etc.

*sa vā eṣa puruṣo'nnarasamayaḥ ityādiśruteḥ pradīp-
tagṛhāt svaputram parityajyāpi svasya nirgamadar-
śanāt sthūlo'ham kṛṣo'ham ityādi anubhavācca sthūla-
śarīram-ātmeti.*⁶

This view could be criticised on the account that *sthūlaśarīra* is *anitya* whereas *ātman* is *nitya* and to establish this *ātmanityatva* we have such *śruti* passages as "*na jāyate mriyate vā kadācit*" and so on.

Third View of Cārvākas

The Cārvāka says that the sense organs are the *ātman*, “*indriyāṇi ātmā*,” because of such *śruti* passages as “The sense organs went to their father Prajāpati and said, due to the reason that the movement of the body ceases when the organs cease to work, and further because of such experiences as I am blind of one eye, I am deaf, etc.”

*deha prāṇāḥ prajāpatim pitarametya ūcuḥ ityādiśruteḥ
indriyāṇāmabhāve śarīracalanābhāvāt kāṇo’ham
badhiro’ham ityādi anubhavācca.⁷*

In the *Praśnopaniṣad* also there is a passage which says that *ātman* is the greatest, and no sense organs are superior to *ātman*.

If this view is to be accepted, then we will have to accept that *ātman* is also *anitya* just as the sense organs are *anitya*. The sense organs do not have *caitanya* whereas the *ātman* has *caitanya*. An *acaitanya* object can never be compared with a *caitanya* object.

Fourth View of Cārvākas

According to the Cārvākas, the *prāṇa* or vital force is the self: ‘*prāṇaḥ ātmā*’. On account of *śruti* passages like “different from and more internal than this is the Self which consists of the vital force”, ‘*anyo’ntara ātmā prāṇamayāḥ ityādi śruteḥ*’. Owing to the fact that with the cessation of the working of the vital force, the sense organs cease to work, and because of experiences such as I am hungry, I am thirsty, etc.

*prāṇābhāve indriyādicalanāyogāt aham asanāyavān
aham pi pāsāvān ityadi anubhavāt.⁸*

This view is criticised on the basis that "I am hungry, I am thirsty," pertains to the body, which are impermanent, whereas *ātman* is permanent.

The Buddhist View (1) Vijñānavādins

The Vijñānavādin Buddhists say that 'Intellect is the Self' on the basis of the *śruti* passages as '*anyontara ātmā vijñānāma aḥ*'. Different from and more internal than this is the Self which consists of consciousness due to the fact that the instrument becomes powerless in the absence of the agent and from experiences as "I am the agent, I am the enjoyer."

*karturabhāve karaṇasya śaktyabhāvāt ahaṁ kartā bhoktetyādi anubhavācca buddhiḥ ātmā.*³

This view can be criticised as *buddhi* cannot perceive *ātman*; it is not *ātman* in the light of Vedānta as it is contradictory to such *śruti* passages as "*naiva vācā na manasā prāptum śakyo na cakṣuṣā,*" etc.

(2) *Śūnyavādins*

They are of the opinion that "Self is void" which is in keeping with the *śruti* statement "*asadevedamagra āsit*" — "In the beginning there was non-existence" due to the fact that there is an absence of everything during dreamless state and further because of the experience that during the dreamless sleep 'I' was non-existent.

This view can be criticised from the Sāṅkhya point of view itself that from non-existence, existence can never come into being. "Nothing can come out from nothing" — *ex nihilo nihil fit*.

Views of Prābhākara Mīmāṃsakas and Naiyāyikas

According to them, "Ignorance is the Self" due to the *śruti* statements "*anyo'ntara ātmā ānandamayah*", — "Different from and more internal than this, is the Self which consists of bliss" — due to the fact that during sound sleep the intellect merges in ignorance and because of experiences as "I am ignorant," "I am devoid of knowledge."

*buddhyādīnām-ajñāne layadarśanāt ahamajñāḥ aham-ajñānī ityādi anubhavācca.*¹⁰

This view could be criticised on the basis that intellect does not merge in ignorance but in knowledge, and his experience would be "I slept very well" and "I did not know anything" — "*aham sukhamasvāpsam na kiñcidavediṣam.*"

Bhāṭṭa View

The Bhāṭṭas improvised the position of Prābhākaras and Naiyāyikas and say that "Consciousness associated with ignorance is the Self," as there is a *śruti* statement that "During dreamless sleep that *ātman* is undifferentiated consciousness and full of bliss"— "*prajñānaghana eva ānandamayah iti śruteḥ*" and they argue that in dreamless sleep both consciousness and unconsciousness are present and as the experience of "I do not know myself" — "*susuptau prakāśāprakāśa-sadbhāvān māmahaṁ na jānāmi anubhavāt.*" This statement is partly true and not fully true. We agree that he has the experience of "*na kiñcidavediṣam*" which corresponds with "*māmahaṁ na jānāmi,*" but at the same time he has the experience that "*aham sukhamasvāpsam*" which comes only from knowledge and not from ignorance.

Siddhānta or Vedānta View

After criticising all the views, the Vedāntins establish their view firmly that the innermost consciousness which is by nature eternal, pure, intelligent, free and real and, which has the capacity of illumining the unreal entities is the Self and it is in keeping with their experience:

*ataḥ tat tadbhāsakaṁ nityasuddhabuddhamuktasatya
svabhāvaṁ pratyakcāitanjyam-eva ātmā iti vedānta-
vidvadanubhavaḥ.*¹¹

Hence, the Vedānta view is firmly established by taking into account the proofs pertaining to experience and *śruti* statements.

NOTES

1. *Vedāntasāra of Sadānanda* by Swami Nikhilananda, Advaita Asrama, 5 Delhi Entally Road, Calcutta-14, 5th impression, 1968, p.73.
2. *Ibid.*, p.82.
3. *Ibid.*, p.82.
4. *Ibid.*, p.82.
5. *Ibid.*, p.82.
6. *Ibid.*, p.74.
7. *Ibid.*, pp. 74-75.
8. *Ibid.*, p.75.
9. *Ibid.*, p.77.
10. *Ibid.*, p.78.
11. *Ibid.*, p.84.

THE FOUR INDISPENSABLE
QUALIFICATIONS

*An extract from Sarva-vedānta-siddhānta-sāra-saṅgraha
of Śrī Śaṅkara Bhagavatpāda*

Free rendering by
Dr. V. K. S. N. Raghavan

(Contd. from Vol. XIX No. 1-2)

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[259]

रज्जोस्तु तत्त्वमनवेक्ष्य गृहीतसर्प-
 भावः पुमानयमहिर्वसतीति मोहात् ।
 आक्रोशति प्रतिबिभेति च कम्पते त-
 न्मिथ्यैव नात्र भुजगोऽस्ति विचार्यमाणे ॥

This man, who does not cognize the reality of rope, finds the presence of snake out of delusion, and hence he cries out of fear and is shivering. But the cognition of snake is unreal, for when closely analysed there is no snake at all.

[260]

तद्वत्त्वयाप्यात्मन उक्तमेत-
 ऽजन्माप्ययव्याधिजरादिदुःखम् ।
 मृषैव सर्वं भ्रमकल्पितं ते
 सम्यग्विचार्यात्मनि मुञ्च भीतिम् ॥

Similarly is the case of you, with regard to Ātman; it is said: miseries like birth, death, disease, old age, etc.—all this is just unreal; it is just an appearance of your illusion. So, after thorough investigation of Ātman, be rid of fear.

[261]

भवाननात्मनो धर्मानात्मन्यारोप्य शोचति ।
 तदज्ञानकृतं सर्वं भयं त्यक्त्वा सुखी भव ॥

Having superimposed upon the *ātman*, the attributes which do not really belong to the *ātman* at all—you feel sad. All this is out of ignorance. Therefore, be rid of fear and feel happy.

[262]

शिष्यः ---

श्रीमद्विरुक्तं सकलं मृषेति

दृष्टान्त एव ह्युपपद्यते तत् ।

दार्ष्टान्तिकेनैव भवादिदुःखं

प्रत्यक्षतः सर्वजनप्रसिद्धम् ॥

The Disciple replies:

Sir! all you have said is just untenable; for, your illustration may be relevant, but not the illustrated. It is quite evident for all the people that the cycle of birth and death (*samsāra*), etc. are full of miseries, and this holds good through immediate knowledge (perception).

[263]

प्रत्यक्षेणानुभूतार्थः कथं मिथ्यात्वमर्हति ।

चक्षुषो विषयं कुम्भं कथं मिथ्या करोम्यहम् ॥

How could the thing that is experienced through perceptual cognition be mere illusion? How could I consider it as untrue, when I perceive a jar with my eyes?

[264]

विद्यमानस्य मिथ्यात्वं कथं नु घटते प्रभो ।
प्रत्यक्षं खलु सर्वेषां प्रमाणं प्रस्फुटार्थकम् ॥

Oh Lord! how could one think of a really existent object as unreal? The sense-perception is, indeed, a right means of knowledge with regard to all objects for all people.

[265]

मर्त्यस्य मम जन्मादिदुःखभाजोऽल्पजीविनः ।
ब्रह्मत्वमपि नित्यत्वं परमानन्दता कथम् ॥

As (i) I am a mortal being, (ii) I suffer from the miseries of birth, etc., and (iii) I am only short-lived always — how can there be Brahman-hood, eternity and supreme bliss for me?

[266]

क आत्मा कस्त्वेनात्मा च किमु लक्षणमेतयोः ।
आत्मन्यनात्मधर्माणामारोपः क्रियते कथम् ॥

Who is the *ātman*? Who is the non-*ātman*? What is their *lakṣaṇa* (definition)? How could one superimpose the attributes of non-*ātman* upon the *ātman*?

[267]

किमज्ञानं तदुत्पन्नभयत्यागोऽपि वा कथम् ।
किमु ज्ञानं तदुत्पन्नसुखप्राप्तिश्च वा कथम् ॥

What is nescience? How does it arise, how does it create fear, and how could it be removed? What is knowledge? How does it arise, how does it lead to bliss, and how can one attain that bliss?

[268]

गुरुः

घटोऽयमित्यत्र घटाभिधानः
 प्रत्यक्षतः कश्चिदुदेति दृष्टेः ।
 विचार्यमाणे स तु नास्ति तत्र
 मृदस्ति तद्भावविलक्षणा सा ॥

The Teacher answers:

On seeing a jar, one gets the cognition of jar as "This is a jar." On thorough investigation, there is no jar, and there is only clay essentially; but the perceptual cognition is of a distinct transformation of clay.

[269]

प्रादेशमात्रः परिदृश्यतेऽर्कः
 शस्त्रेण संदर्शितलक्षयोजनः ।
 मानान्तरेण क्वचिदेति बाधां
 प्रत्यक्षमप्यत्र हि न व्यवस्था ॥

The Sun which is normally perceived to be of one lakh *yojanas* (of width) is found to be limited to one particular region, because of weapon (lens). Even so, the immediate perception gets stultified by another

valid means of knowledge; and so, there is no hard and fast rule for the validity of any kind of cognition.

[270]

तस्मात्त्वयीदं भ्रमतः प्रतीतं
 मृषैव नो सत्यमवेहि साक्षात् ।
 ब्रह्म त्वमेवासि सुखस्वरूपं
 त्वत्तो न भिन्नं विचिनुष्व बुद्धौ ॥

Therefore, whatever you have cognized out of illusion, is only unreal. Just understand the truth directly. You are, indeed, Brahman which is Bliss in itself. Discern this in your mind: there is nothing different from you, the *ātman*.

[271]

लोकान्तरे वात्र गुहान्तरे वा
 तीर्थान्तरे कर्मपरम्परान्तरे ।
 शास्त्रान्तरे नास्त्यनुपश्यतामिह
 स्वयं परं ब्रह्म विचार्यमाणे ॥

The supreme Brahman is neither in the highest heaven (other world), nor in the inner-most region of the heart (cave-like minute space — of all beings), nor in the holy places (*tīrthas*), nor reached at the destruction of one's *karman* (not got as the ultimate fruit of several rituals), nor within the core of *śāstras* (scriptures) — for the people who probe into them. Everyone who makes an earnest attempt to know the

supreme Being, arrives at the conclusion that one is the supreme Being oneself.

[272]

तत्त्वमात्मस्थमज्ञात्वा मूढः शास्त्रेषु पश्यति ।
गोपः कक्षगतं छागं यथा कूपेषु दुर्मतिः

The ignorant person alone seeks to know the supreme Brahman in *śāstras* (scriptural texts), not knowing that the supreme Truth is within oneself. It is like the parviscient cowherd searching the sheep — which is inside his arm-pit — in the wells, etc.

[273]

स्वमात्मानं परं मत्वा परमात्मानमन्यथा ।
विमृग्यते पुनः स्वात्मा बहिः कोशेषु पण्डितैः ॥

The (unwise) scholars go in search of one's own Self, in the outward shells (enclosures) *i.e.* not within themselves); for they think their own self as something else, and also the supreme Self as otherwise.

[274]

विस्मृत्य वस्तुनस्तत्त्वमध्यारोप्य च वस्तुनि ।
अवस्तुतां च तद्धर्मान्मुधा शोचति नान्यथा ॥

Only an ignorant person — having forgotten the reality of the supreme Truth, and having superimposed the nature of non-entity and all its attributes upon the supreme *Tattva* (*vastu*) — suffers from misery in vain;

and not otherwise. (There is no other reason at all for his misery.)

[275]

आत्मानात्मविवेकं ते वक्ष्यामि शृणु सादरम् ।
यस्य श्रवणमात्रेण मुच्यतेऽनात्मबन्धनात् ॥

Listen carefully! Let me tell you how to distinguish between *ātman* and non-*ātman*. By just hearing this, one is freed from the bondage of non-*ātman*.

[276–277]

इत्युक्त्वाभिमुखीकृत्य शिष्यं करुणया गुरुः ।
अध्यारोपापवादाभ्यां निष्प्रपञ्चं प्रपञ्चयन् ॥
सम्यक्प्रबोधयत्तत्त्वं शास्त्रदृष्टेन वर्त्मना ।
सर्वेषामुपकाराय तत्प्रकारोऽत्र दर्शयते ॥

Having spoken thus, to the disciple, the teacher showered his compassion on the disciple, and explained to him about the world (*prapañca*) as a mere non-entity through the principles of *adhyāropa* (superimposition) and *apavāda* (process of negation). Thus, the teacher enlightened the disciple about the *tattva* through the authority of scriptures. For the benefit of all it will be explained in the sequence.*

* *Translator's note:* The *Four Indispensable Qualification* covers the *ślokas* 20–296 of the *Sarva-Vedānta siddhānta-sāra-tan̄graha* of Śrī ŚaṅkaraBhagavatpāda

ADVAITA

R. Balasubramanian

1. ADVAITA AND OTHER VEDIC SYSTEMS

Student: Recently I attended a public talk on Advaita by a Swamiji who is considered to be an authority on it. His exposition of certain aspects of Advaita was inspiring; his analysis of some problems against the background of Advaita was interesting; and the conclusions that he drew therefrom were convincing. In the course of his talk, he referred to the way in which the philosophy of Advaita has been praised by scholars both in and outside India, and also the greatness of Śaṅkara as a philosopher, dialectician, and spiritual leader. He mentioned in this connection the names of Dr. S. Radhakrishnan and Paul Deussen. I am very much interested in knowing Advaita. With your help and guidance I will study some basic texts on Advaita. Please help me.

Teacher: Certainly I will. Radhakrishnan is undoubtedly one of the best interpreters of Advaita. Paul Deussen, a German scholar and orientalist, has expounded, with insight and sympathy, the philosophy of Advaita in his *The System of the Vedānta*. It is not,

therefore, surprising that the learned Swamiji quoted them.

S: Can you recall, Sir, for my benefit what they have said about Advaita?

T: Yes, I can. What they have said about Advaita will help everyone to think about this marvellous system and the contribution made by Śaṅkara and other preceptors of Advaita. This is what Radhakrishnan says about the philosophy of Advaita: "The Advaitism of Śaṅkara is a system of great speculative daring and logical subtlety. Its austere intellectualism, its remorseless logic, which marches on indifferent to the hopes and beliefs of man, its relative freedom from theological obsessions, make it a great example of a purely philosophical scheme." His assessment of Śaṅkara deserves careful consideration: "Supreme as a philosopher and a dialectician, great as a man of calm judgement and wide toleration, Śaṅkara taught us to love truth, respect reason, and realise the purpose of life... He was not a dreaming idealist, but a practical visionary, a philosopher, and at the same time a man of action, what we may call a social idealist on the grand scale." Radhakrishnan's estimate is suggestive of a number of ideas for our thinking. In a lecture which Paul Deussen delivered in 1893 under the auspices of the Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society he observed: "... the system of the Vedānta, as founded on the *Upaniṣads and Vedānta-sūtras* and accompanied by Śaṅkara's commentaries on them,—equal in rank to Plato and Kant—is one of the most valuable products of the genius of mankind in his researches of the eternal truth..." Deussen is of the view that the philosophy of Advaita, which is

based on the *Upaniṣads*, the *Vedānta-sūtras*, and the commentaries on them written by Śaṅkara, is invaluable. So, you can spend sometime everyday with me for learning Advaita. We can make a beginning today itself.

S: How old is Advaita?

T: It is as old as the *Vedas*.

S: Then, you must tell me about the age of the *Vedas*.

T: There is a lot of controversy about the date of the *Vedas* among the Western scholars who are called 'Orientalists' as well as among Indian scholars. The date of the *Vedas* ranges between 5000 B.C. and 2500 B.C. The generally accepted date is 2500 B.C.

S: When you say that it is as old as the *Vedas*, does it mean that it originated independently of, and existed along with, the *Vedas*?

T: No. Advaita as a philosophical system did not start independently of the *Vedas*. On the contrary, it is rooted in the *Vedas*. It means that the *Vedas* as a whole teach Advaita. So we can say that Advaita is a Vedic system of philosophy.

S: I understand that there are many classical systems of philosophy in India. You said that Advaita is a Vedic system. Are all systems of philosophy in India Vedic?

T: Not all systems of philosophy in India are Vedic. There are also non-Vedic philosophical systems. A brief explanation at this point will be helpful to you,

Classical philosophical systems in India are divided into two broad categories: *āstika* and *nāstika*. The former which is orthodox accepts the authority of the *Vedas*, while the latter which is heterodox does not accept the authority of the *Vedas*. So, while the *āstika* systems are Vedic, the *nāstika* systems are non-Vedic.

S: Sir, I have a doubt. In our day-to-day discourse we use the words "*āstika*" and "*nāstika*" in an entirely different sense, *i.e.* in the sense of belief or non-belief in the existence of God respectively, and not in the sense of acceptance or rejection of the Vedic authority. Should we not say, following this convention, that a system which believes in the existence of God is *āstika*, and a system which does not believe in the existence of God is *nāstika*?

T: No, the distinction between *āstika* and *nāstika* systems is not based on the belief or non-belief in the existence of God. Sāṅkhya and Mīmāṃsā, which do not believe in the existence of a Creator-God are not treated as *nāstika*. On the contrary, they are treated as *āstika* because they accept the authority of the *Vedas*. So, the criterion for calling a system *āstika* or *nāstika* is not its belief or non-belief in the existence of God.

S: How many *āstika* systems are there, and how many *nāstika* systems?

T: There are six *āstika* systems: 1. Nyāya, 2. Vaiśeṣika, 3. Sāṅkhya, 4. Yoga, 5. Mīmāṃsā, and 6. Vedānta. The *nāstika* systems are three: 1. Cārvāka, 2. Jainism, and 3. Buddhism. There are four schools of Buddhism. If these four schools are counted separately, then there will be six *nāstika* systems. There is, thus, parity in number between *āstika* and *nāstika* systems.

S: How old are these non-Vedic systems? Who originated them?

T: Let me start with Buddhism. Siddhārtha who came to be known as Buddha (the awakened one) after his enlightenment was born in *circa* 563 B.C. He is the founder of Buddhism, a non-Vedic school, which originated in India as a protest against the Vedic ritualism. But it has now become a world religion. Jainism, another non-Vedic school, is older than Buddhism. We do not know who originated this school. Vardhamāna, who is well known as Mahāvīra (the great hero), was born in *circa* 540 B.C. The Jaina tradition holds him to be the twentyfourth "Prophet-guide". We do not know anything about the predecessors of Mahāvīra excepting one Pārsvanātha of eighth century B.C., who is supposed to have immediately preceded Mahāvīra. Like Buddhism, Jainism is opposed to the Vedic ritualism. The origin of the Cārvāka school as well as its date is shrouded in mystery. We do not know whether the term "Cārvāka" is the name of a person or the name given to the system because of its apparent attractiveness. According to some, Bṛhaspati taught the Cārvāka, otherwise known as the Lokāyata, philosophy. "Accidentalism" (*yadr̥cchā-vāda*) and "naturalism" (*svabhāva-vāda*), which are mentioned in the *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad* (1.2), are the earlier versions of the later Cārvāka materialism. So, the Cārvāka world-view which is not based on the Vedic authority has existed along with the Vedic tradition. Thus, Cārvāka, Jainism, and Buddhism are the three non-Vedic systems of philosophy.

S: You said that there are four schools in Buddhism. What are these schools?

T: A distinction is made between early Buddhism and later Buddhism. While the former is referred to as Thera-vāda Buddhism, the later as Mahāyāna Buddhism. Sautrāntika and Vaibhāṣika schools belong to the Thera-vāda tradition; and Mādhyamika (otherwise called Śūnya-vāda) and Yogācāra (also known as Vijñāna-vāda) schools belong to the Mahāyāna tradition. These are the four well-known schools of Buddhism.

S: Please tell me about Advaita and other Vedic systems highlighting how these systems are related to each other.

T: These six Vedic systems are classified into three groups each of which consists of two systems. Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika constitute one pair. Sāṅkhya and Yoga form another pair. In the last group we have Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta. The two systems in each group are called "allied systems" (*samāna-tantras*) because there is much in common between them. The Nyāya school, as the name indicates, specializes in logic and theory of knowledge, which provide methods of reasoning. That is why the Nyāya system is quite often referred to as "Tarkaśāstra" (science of reasoning). It is also called "Ānvīkṣikī" since it undertakes a critical study of the means of knowledge and the methods of reasoning. The Vaiśeṣika system, on the other hand, undertakes metaphysical analysis and classification of the constituents of the world in terms of the unique nature or particularity (*viśeṣa*) possessed by the eternal substances. These two systems are "allied" or closely related for the reason that, while the Vaiśeṣika system, *generally* accepted the logic and epistemology (*i.e.* theory of knowledge) of the Nyāya

school, the latter *generally* accepts the metaphysical analysis of the former. I have used the word "generally" in explaining the mutual relation between these two schools with a view to suggest that there are some differences between them. It should not be thought that the Vaiśeṣika system accepts the entire logic and epistemology of the Nyāya and that the Nyāya school accepts everything which the Vaiśeṣika says in its metaphysics. It is the closeness between them that is suggested when it is said that they are "allied systems". Their closeness to each other is also conveyed by calling them hyphenated systems. You will notice the expression "Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika" (combining the two systems by a hyphen) in textbooks on Indian philosophy.

In the case of Sāṅkhya and Yoga, which are allied systems, while the Yoga system *generally* follows the metaphysics of Sāṅkhya, Sāṅkhya accepts the *yoga* discipline formulated in the Yoga system. In spite of their closeness to each other, there are, as in the case of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika, differences between them.

The relation between Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta, which are allied systems, has to be explained on the basis of their rootedness in the *Veda*. The *Veda* consists of two parts. The earlier part (*pūrvā kāṇḍa*) which deals with rituals (*karma*) is called *karma-kāṇḍa*, while the later part (*uttara-kāṇḍa*) which is concerned with knowledge (*jñāna*) is called *jñāna-kāṇḍa*. The word "mīmāṃsā" means inquiry. The words "pūrvā" and "uttara" mean earlier and later respectively. Since the system which is well-known as Mīmāṃsā inquires into the rituals of various kinds which are explained in the earlier

portion of the *Veda*, it is called Pūrva-mīmāṃsā; and the Vedānta system which inquires into knowledge as elucidated in the later portion of the *Veda* is referred to as Uttara-mīmāṃsā. In the philosophical circle whenever the term "Mīmāṃsā" is used as the name of a school or system, it refers only to Pūrva-mīmāṃsā; it is used as a shorter term for Pūrva-mīmāṃsā. The popular name for Uttara-mīmāṃsā is Vedānta, a term which etymologically means the end (*anta*) of the *Veda*. The *Upaniṣad* which occurs in the end-portion of the *Veda* is called "Vedānta". It contains the explanation of the knowledge of the supreme reality. Since Uttara-mīmāṃsā inquires into the subject matter of the later portion of the *Veda*, *i.e.* into the subject matter of the *Upaniṣad* which is Vedānta, it is also called "Vedānta". I must mention in this connection two other names for Uttara-mīmāṃsā. It is also called Brahma-mīmāṃsā; since it inquires into the nature of Brahman, the supreme reality and Śārīraka-mīmāṃsā, since it inquires into the nature of the Self (Ātman) which dwells in the body. So, the subject matter dealt with in the entire *Veda* is divided between Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta for the purpose of inquiry; and it is for this reason that both of them are viewed as allied systems.

S: From the explanation you have given about the three pairs of six Vedic schools, it appears that unlike Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Sāṅkhya-Yoga, Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta are closely connected with the *Veda* because the subject matter inquired into by these two schools is the subject matter of the *Veda*.

T: Your guess is right. Of the six orthodox schools, Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta, which are directly related to the *Veda*, may, therefore, be said to be more Vedic than

the other four schools, and the least Vedic is the Vaiśeṣika school.

S: Now I understand why Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta are considered to be more Vedic than the other Vedic systems. Please tell me why the Vaiśeṣika system is placed at the bottom of the Vedic systems.

T: Scholars are of the view that Vaiśeṣika, which is older than Nyāya, preceded Buddhism and Jainism. It was originally opposed to the *Veda*. Later on, it moved to the Vedic side by accepting the authority of the *Veda* in respect of *dharma*, etc., which cannot be known through perception and inference. Even then, it does not accept Vedic testimony (*vaidika-śabda*) as an independent source of knowledge. Nor is it very much concerned with the problems of theism. It has developed its metaphysics independently of scripture by relying upon only two sources of knowledge, *viz.* perception and inference. So, its allegiance to the *Veda* is to the minimum. As it is, it is not fully heretical. It is for this reason that Śaṅkara characterizes the followers of Vaiśeṣika as semi-nihilists (*ardha-vaināśikas*).

S: Then, how about Nyāya, Sāṅkhya, and Yoga in respect of their allegiance to the *Veda*?

T: Both Nyāya and Sāṅkhya accept Vedic testimony as an independent source of knowledge, which is infallible. The Yoga system alligns itself with Sāṅkhya in this regard.

S: You mentioned that Vaiśeṣika was pre-Buddhistic in origin. Then, what about the date of other systems?

T: Tradition holds that Nyāya also must be pre-Buddhistic in its origin and that the main principles

of the Nyāya system must have taken a definite form about the third century B.C. There are two views with the regard to the origin of Sāṅkhya. Some scholars are of the view that Sāṅkhya developed independently of the *Veda*, while others hold that it has Vedic origin. The ideas and doctrines associated with the Sāṅkhya system are to be found in the *Upaniṣads*, in the *Mahābhārata*, and also in the *Purāṇas*. Like Sāṅkhya, Yoga also must be very ancient. References to the yogic practices are to be found in the *Upaniṣads*, the Buddhist works, the *Mahābhārata*, and so on. So far as Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta are concerned, I have already told you that they are rooted in, and originate from, the *Veda*.

S: Does it mean that these six Vedic schools originated as systems right from the beginning?

T: Certainly not. We must make a distinction between the origin of certain ideas and ways of thinking and the formulation of a system. Some of the concepts of Vaiśeṣika, Nyāya, Sāṅkhya, and Yoga as well as their methods of thinking were prevalent from the Vedic times. The formulation of a system should have taken place later on. Unfortunately, we do not know about the historical development of them prior to the systematic presentation of these ideas and theories in the form of *Sūtras* (aphorisms), which serve as the basic texts for each of these schools.

S: Who organized the concepts and doctrines of Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, and so on in the form of a system? And when?

T: It was Gautama (also known as Gotama and Akṣapāda) who formulated the basic ideas and princi-

ples of Nyāya in the form of a system in his book, the *Nyāya-sūtras* in the first century A.D. Though he is not the originator of Nyāya, still considering the basic work he composed compiling the ideas and doctrines of Nyāya in the form of a system, he is referred to as the "founder" of the Nyāya philosophy. Though the Vaiśeṣika ideas were prevalent in the pre-Buddhistic period, they were organized in the form of a system by Kaṇāda (also known as Ulūka) around 300 B.C. in his *Vaiśeṣika-sūtras*. Scholars are of the view that the *Sūtras* of Kaṇāda were enlarged from time to time. Kaṇāda is referred to as the "founder" of the Vaiśeṣika philosophy in the same way as Gautama is said to be the founder of Nyāya. Kapila who wrote the *Sāṅkhya-sūtras* sometime before 500 B.C. is the founder of the Sāṅkhya philosophy. The usage of the word "founder" here and also with regard to the other systems must be understood in the same way. The *yoga* principles and practices were codified in the form of a system by Patañjali in his *Yoga-sūtras* during the second century B.C.; and so Patañjali is the "founder" of the Yoga philosophy. The "founder" of Pūrva-mīmāṃsā system is Jaimini who composed the *Mīmāṃsā-sūtras* during the fourth century B.C. Some scholars assign this work to about 200 A.D. Bādarāyaṇa who composed the *Vedānta-sūtras* (otherwise called *Brahma-sūtras* and *Śārīraka-sūtras*) sometime between 500 and 200 B.C. is the "founder" of the Vedānta philosophy. There is also the view that the *Vedānta-sūtras* must be pre-Buddhistic. So, each of the six Vedic systems has a "founder" even though the basic ideas of these systems were prevalent before the advent of their founders.

Since your interest is in Advaita, I must tell you what the tradition says about the “founder” of the Vedānta system. Tradition holds that Bādarāyaṇa, the author of the *Brahma-sūtras*, is identical with Vyāsa, the author of the *Mahābhārata*. According to Śaṅkara, the author of the *Brahma-sūtras* is Bādarāyaṇa, who is different from Vyāsa, the author of the *Mahābhārata*. However, Śaṅkara’s followers in the Advaita tradition such as Vācaspati, Ānandagiri, and others hold that Bādarāyaṇa is identical with Vyāsa, the author of the *Mahābhārata*. Rāmānuja and others are of the view that Vyāsa is the author of the *Brahma-sūtras*. We are not concerned at this point with the question of the identity of Bādarāyaṇa. You will agree with me that, whoever Bādarāyaṇa was—whether identical with, or different from, Vyāsa—the Vedānta system that has been bequeathed to us by him in his *Sūtras* is invaluable, because (i) it strings together true to its name (*sūtra* means a string) in a logically connected form the Vedāntic ideas scattered in the *Upaniṣads* just as one strings together the scattered flowers and makes a garland of them, and (ii) it helps us to have access to the Vedic tradition.

S: I understand the literal and figurative use of the word “*sūtra*”. What is claimed for the *Vedānta-sūtras*, I believe, may also be claimed for the other *Sūtra*-texts associated with the “founders” of each system in respect of their own traditions.

T: Yes, you are right. Each *Sūtra*-text has played a significant role in each tradition bringing out the importance of the basic text.

S: What are the characteristics of a *Sūtra*-text, which is foundational or basic for each system?

T: A *Sūtra* work, according to the tradition, will have the following characteristics:

1. It will be brief.
2. It will be free from ambiguity.
3. It will convey the essence of a problem or an issue taken up for discussion.
4. It will, at the same time, be comprehensive mentioning the different aspects of each problem.
5. It will be free from repetition.
6. It will be faultless.

It will be good to remember the traditional definition of the *Sūtra*-work, which conveys these six features. The definition is as follows:

अल्पाक्षरमसन्दिग्धं सारवद्विश्वतोमुखम् ।
अस्तोभमनवद्यञ्च सूत्रं सूत्रविदो विदुः ॥

S: Why is it that our sages in those days wrote in in the *sūtra* form?

T: There are a few reasons for resorting to *sūtra* form of style. First, since the technique of printing was not known at that time, one has to be brief in writing. Second, if what is conveyed, orally or in writing, is brief, it can be easily memorized. Third, the Vedic literature was unwieldly; and when an attempt was made to systematize it in the form of

basic ideas and principles, for simple elucidation and effective discussion, there is the need to be brief.

S: Sir, don't you think that brevity, though advantageous in one way, creates its own problems?

T: Certainly it does. We know in our experience that, whenever a person writes or speaks briefly, it calls for explanation. So a brief statement, which compresses the maximum of thought in the minimum number of words becomes a problem requiring explanation.

S: Then, how did the ancients solve this problem arising from the *Sūtra*-work?

T: The problem generated by the *Sūtra*-work has become a blessing in disguise.

S: Please tell me how?

T: A book which is in the form of *sūtra* creates two kinds of difficulties. First, the aphoristic statements, if not all, but at least, most of them are unintelligible to the readers not conversant with the background of their teachings. The second difficulty is that each aphorism which is pregnant with meaning, both explicit and implicit, admits of more than one interpretation. There is, therefore, need for explanation and interpretation of these aphorisms by competent persons belonging to the tradition. Fortunately for us, we have many explanatory and interpretative works on these *Sūtra*-works by the traditionalists. You may wonder how beneficial it is to have such works, both explanatory and interpretative, on the basic texts. They have

contributed to the richness and variety of the philosophical views in each system. The explanatory and interpretative works on the basic *Sūtrā*-works are generally called "commentaries". The development of Indian Philosophy is through commentaries written by first-rate creative minds. That is why we speak of the *commentarial tradition* in our country, which we are proud of.

S: Please tell me something about the nature of these books called commentaries.

T: I appreciate your inquisitiveness. You want to know more and more about our philosophical heritage. I don't want to go into the various kinds of commentaries that we have in our tradition. I must tell you something about two kinds of commentaries that we have. One is called *Bhāṣya* and the other is called *Vārtika*. The English word "commentary" does not and cannot bring out the significance of these two kinds of works though, for want of better terms, we call both of them commentaries. According to the tradition, a work called "*Bhāṣya*" possesses three special features. First of all, being directly related to the *Sūtra*, it brings out the meaning of the aphorisms. Secondly, it explains the meanings of the words contained therein. Thirdly, it is written by one who follows the tradition of the *Sūtra*-work. A *Bhāṣya* is defined as follows:

सूत्रार्थो वर्ण्यते यत्र पदैः सूत्रानुसारिभिः ।

स्वपदानि च वर्ण्यन्ते भाष्यं भाष्यविदो विदुः ॥

S. I am, indeed, amazed at the precision with which our ancients have defined “*Bhāṣya*”. The English word “commentary” does not convey what the definition of “*Bhāṣya*” states. Before you proceed further, please tell me who wrote the *Bhāṣyas* on the different *Sūtra*-works.

T: Vātsyāyana, Praśastapāda, Vijñānabhikṣu, Vyāsa, and Śabarāsvāmin wrote *Bhāṣyas* on the *Sūtra*-texts of the Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Sāṅkhya, Yoga, and Pūrva-mīmāṃsā schools respectively. We have many schools of Vedānta such as Advaita, Viśiṣṭādvaita, Dvaita, and so on. Śaṅkara wrote his *Bhāṣya* on the *Vedānta-sūtras* from the standpoint of Advaita, while Rāmānuja and Madhva wrote their *Bhāṣyas* on it from Viśiṣṭādvaita and Dvaita points of view respectively. The oldest of the extant *Bhāṣyas* on the *Vedānta-sūtras* is by Śaṅkara.

S. Now, tell me about the other kind of commentary called “*Vārtika*”.

T: A commentary called “*Vārtika*” is expected to perform three kinds of work. First of all, it has to explain the *Bhāṣya* on which it is a commentary. Secondly, it will supplement it wherever necessary. Thirdly, it will provide alternative interpretations by way of examining “what is not well said” in the original text. A “*Vārtika*” is defined as follows:

उक्तानुक्तदुरुक्तानां चिन्ता यत्र प्रवर्तते ।

तं ग्रन्थं वार्तिकं प्राहुः वार्तिकज्ञा मनीषिणः ॥

In the Nyāya tradition, we have Uddyotakara's *Nyāya-Vārtika*. Kumārila Bhaṭṭa of the Mīmāṃsā school wrote *Śloka-Vārtika* and *Tantra-Vārtika*. In the Advaita tradition, Suresvara wrote his celebrated *Vārtikas* on Śaṅkara's *Bhāṣyas* on the *Taittirīyopaniṣad* and *Bṛhadāranyakopaniṣad*.

S: From what you have said about the basic texts and the commentaries thereon, it appears that there is a hierarchical relation among them.

T: You are right. I would like to explain the relation among these works in this way. The basic *Sūtra*-text is the first-order work; the *Bhāṣya* which is a commentary thereon is the second-order work; and the *Vārtika* which is a commentary on the *Bhāṣya* is the third-order work.

S: You mentioned three schools of Vedānta-Advaita, Viśiṣṭādvaita and Dvaita. Are there not such schools in the other systems?

T: In the case of Mīmāṃsā we have two schools—one associated with Kumārila Bhaṭṭa and the other associated with Prabhākara. So we speak of the Bhaṭṭa-Mīmāṃsā and the Prabhākara-Mīmāṃsā. Tradition holds that Prabhākara who differed from Kumārila Bhaṭṭa in certain respects was his disciple.

S: You have been using the word "system" with regard to both *āstika* and *nāstika* philosophies. Such a word is not usually used in Western philosophy either with regard to an individual philosopher (say, Plato) or the school (say, the school of Plato). Is there any special significance in the usage of the word "system" in the context of Indian philosophy?

T: I told you that it took a long time to systematize a cluster of ideas associated with Nyāya, Sāṅkhya, or any other philosophy in India and that some one such as Gautama or Kapila at a particular point of time systematized them; and so we speak of Nyāya, Sāṅkhya, and other systems. The word "system" conveys two ideas. A philosophy is called "system" when its distinguishing ideas and principles are coordinated into a logical whole. Also, every philosophy holds a final position, arrives at an established end called "*siddhānta*" (*siddha* + *ānta*) which does not admit of any compromise, though accommodation is possible in matters of detail without prejudice to the essentials, and so it is called a system. Every philosophy which is called a system can be identified with reference to its essentials.

S: It will be helpful to me, I think, to know the essentials of the other Vedic systems for comparing their philosophical orientation with that of Advaita.

T: Monism, dualism, and pluralism are the three philosophical standpoints. A philosophical system is monistic if it holds that there is only one ultimate principle or reality; it is dualistic if it holds that there are two ultimate principles or reals; and it is pluralistic if it holds that there are many (*i.e.* more than two) ultimate principles or reals. So, monism, dualism, and pluralism are the labels which are affixed to the various philosophical systems. Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika is pluralistic because it admits of seven ultimate principles or reals technically called *padārthas* (objects of knowledge) in terms of which every thing can be explained. Sāṅkhya-Yoga which attempts to explain every thing in terms of two ultimate principles is dualistic in its

philosophical outlook. The Mīmāṃsā system which mostly follows the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory of *Padārthas* is pluralistic. You may recall my mentioning Viśiṣṭādvaita and Dvaita as Vedānta systems like Advaita. Both these Vedānta systems are pluralistic while Advaita is monistic. I must mention in this connection a convention prevalent in the Indian tradition with regard to the use of the word “dvaita” which means two, dualistic. Any philosophical system which admits of two and more than two ultimate realities or principles is called “*dvaita*”. For example, Dvaita, which is a Vedānta system, is pluralistic in its standpoint, but still it is called “Dvaita”. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika is characterized as “dvaita” even though it accepts more than two ultimate principles.

S: So, Advaita is the only system which is monistic.

T: You are right. The word “*advaita*”, which means not-two, is translated as non-dualistic. Though it is not wrong to say that Advaita is monistic, it is the convention to speak of it as non-dualistic following the etymological meaning of the term.

S: If every philosopher other than the Advaitin is a pluralist of some kind or other, does it mean that pluralism is stronger than monism?

T: No. Your question was anticipated by Śaṅkara long ago. In the course of a discussion, the opponent tells Śaṅkara that he cannot establish his Advaita position. At this point, the discussion proceeds along these lines:

Śaṅkara : Why do you say (that I cannot establish my point)?

Opponent : Because there are many opponents to you. You are a monist since you follow the Vedic teaching. But there are many pluralists who are outside the Vedic teaching and who are opposed to you. So I doubt whether you can prove your point.

Śaṅkara : This itself is a benediction to me. You brand me a monist surrounded by many pluralists. Therefore, I shall conquer them all. I shall now commence the discussion.

The above discussion occurs in Śaṅkara's commentary on the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* (2.8). Three points emerge from the above discussion: 1. Advaita is the central teaching of the *Vedas*. 2. Those who advocate pluralism in any form are not the followers of the *Vedas*. 3. The soundness of a philosophical position is not decided by number.

S: I have a question to ask before we close our session today. What is the Sanskrit equivalent for the word "philosophy"?

T: The English word "philosophy" means love of wisdom, pursuit of the Knowledge of truth. However, philosophy has been understood in a restricted, specialized meaning from time to time in the West emphasizing theoretical study. In the Indian tradition, we use the word "*darśana*" which means seeing. One may ask: "Seeing what?" The answer is: "Seeing the truth." It means that philosophy, as understood in

the Indian tradition, is the attainment of immediate or direct knowledge of the truth through appropriate discipline (*tattva-jñāna-sādhana-śāstram*). It is, therefore, both theory and practice. The theoretical side is taken care of by epistemological and metaphysical investigation. This is what is known as *pramāṇa-prameya-vicāra*; and the practical side is taken care of by moral and spiritual discipline. That is why we have in every philosophical system in India four distinct parts: 1. Epistemology, 2. Metaphysics, 3. Ethics and Axiology, and 4. Soteriology (theory of liberation).

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- (2) to undertake and carry on scientific study and analysis of the Advaita system of thought as expounded by Ādi Śaṅkara and to conduct research as regards the relevance of his teaching in solving present day ills of mankind.
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संसाराध्वनि तापभानुकिरणप्रोद्भूतदाहव्यथा-

खिन्नानां जलकाङ्क्षया मरुभुवि भ्रान्त्या परिभ्राम्यताम् ।

अत्यासन्नसुधाम्बुधिं सुखकरं ब्रह्माद्वयं दर्शय-

त्येषा शङ्करभारती विजयते निर्वाणसन्दायिनी ॥

*samsārādhvani tāpabhānukiraṇaprodhūtadāhavyathā-
khinnānām jalakāṅkṣayā marubhuvi bhrāntyā*

paribhrāmyatām

atyāsannasudhāmbudhiṃ sukhakaram brahmādvayaṃ

darśayaty-

eṣā śaṅkarabhārati vijayate nirvāṇasandāyini.

To those who are afflicted, in the way of the world, by the burning pain given rise to by the scorching sun-shafts of misery, and who through delusion wander about in the desert (of worldliness) seeking water — showing the felicitous ocean of nectar, which is very near, the non-dual *Brahman*, this — the Voice of Śaṅkara — is victorious, leading, as it does, to liberation.