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śāṅkara-bhāratī



Chairman, Advisory Board

V.R. Kalyanasundara Sastri

Editor

R. Balasubramanian

Vol XX No 2

July 1995

esā śaṅkara-bhāratī vijagate
nirvāṇa-saṁdāyini

victorious is the voice of śaṅkara,
leading, as it does, to liberation.

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HOMAGE TO ŚAṄKARA

[162]

ओमिति दिविषत्प्रवराः

शीर्षे कुर्वन्ति शासनं यस्य ।

ओंकारपद्मभृङ्गं

तमहं प्रणमामि शंकराचार्यम् ॥

Omiti diviṣat-pravarāḥ

śīrṣe kurvanti śāsanam yasya

oṅkāra-padmabhṛṅgam

tamaham praṇamāmi śaṅkarācāryam.

Let me pay my obeisance to Śrī Śaṅkara Bhagavatpāda (i) whose orders are carried out by the host of gods saying, "okay", and (ii) who is the honey-bee hovering around the lotus of "oṅkāra" (*praṇava*).

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नत्वा यत्पदयुग्मं
 वाचस्पतिगर्वहारिवाक्तयः ।
 प्रभवन्ति हि भुवि मूका-
 स्तमहं प्रणमामि शंकराचार्यम् ॥

*natvā yatpadayugmaṁ
 vācaspati-garvahāriivāk-tatayah
 prabhavanti hi bhuvi mūkāḥ
 tamahaṁ praṇamāmi śaṅkarācāryam.*


Let me bow to the lotus feet of Śrī Śaṅkarā-
cārya — having bowed to whose pair of feet, even the
 dumb persons on earth become eloquent and defeat
 the proud Bṛhaspati in speech.

Jagadguru Śrī Saccidānanda Śivābhinava Nṛsiṃhabhāratī
 in *Śrī-śaṅkarācārya suvarṇamālāstava*


The Voice of Sankara



HH Shri Jayendra Saraswati Swami giving Anugrahabhashanam at Kumaran Kundram, Chrompet.



*HH Shri Sankara Vijayendra Saraswati Swami
at the top of the golden vimanam of
Kamakshi moolasthanam.*



The golden vimanam of Adi Sankara shrine

BHAKTI

Jagadguru Śrī Jayendra Sarasvatī

PART-I

THE CHARACTERISTICS OF BHAKTI

The goal of human life is to realise God, which is the true nature of one's own self. There are many methods to get that awareness. And the path of *bhakti* is one such.

Now, what are the characteristics of true *bhakti*? What is the state of a *bhakta*? What are the stages through which he passes before he becomes aware of his own true nature? What is the core of *bhakti*? Ordinarily, we would say that *bhakti* means doing some *bhajans* or reciting God's name, or doing *pūjā* and so on. Ādi Śaṅkara Bhagavatpāda gives a beautiful description of all this in the *Śivānandalaharī*, and says that *bhakti* is that state of mind which withdraws itself from all other things and fixes itself constantly at the feet of *Paśupati*, the Lord of all creatures, namely *Parameśvara*. Ādi Śaṅkara says:

अंकोलं निजबीजसंततिरयस्कान्तोपलं सूचिका
 साध्वी नैजविभुं लता क्षितिरुहं सिन्धुः सरिद्वल्लभम् ।
 प्राप्नोतीह यथा तथा पशुपतेः पादारविन्दद्वयं
 चेतोवृत्तिरुपेत्य तिष्ठति सदा सा भक्तिरित्युच्यते ॥

*aṅkolaṁ nijabīja-sāntatir-
 ayaskāntopalaṁ sūcikā
 sādhvī naijavibhuṁ latā
 kṣitiruhaṁ sindhuḥ saridvallabham
 prāpnotīha yathā tathā paśupateḥ
 pādāravindadvayaṁ
 cetorttirupetya tiṣṭhati
 sadā sā bhaktirityucyate.*

The first stage of *bhakti* which we ordinary people are having is symbolised by the attachment between the *Aṅkola* tree and its seeds. It is said that the seeds of the *Aṅkola* tree (*Yerezhinjil* in Tamil) fall down from the tree when it becomes dark and again they go and attach themselves to the tree when there is sunrise and in course of time become part of the tree once again. We have tried to verify the existence of this tree but we have not been successful so far. But foresters have confirmed that the seeds do move towards the tree but very imperceptibly.

Just like the seeds of the *Aṅkola* tree, we are all *aiśas* or parts of the *Paramātman* only. The *Jivātman* comes from the *Paramātman* which is the root cause of everything. We have come from the *Paramātman*; we fall down from Him when there is ignorance. Again, when knowledge comes of our oneness we get

up and attach ourselves again to God. Here it is significant that darkness is compared to ignorance and knowledge to sunrise. During darkness, the seeds fall down from the tree, and similarly, during ignorance, we fall down from the *Paramātman*. During sunrise, after sunrise the seeds go back to the tree and similarly when there is knowledge, we attach ourselves to God once again.

Normally, we think of God and seek knowledge only at times of difficulty. When we are having a comfortable life, we feel happy and we feel that we have done everything, and we do not think of God at all. It is only when we are in difficulties that we start thinking of God. When we are in adversity, we realise that we are in darkness and that is the state of ignorance. At that time, we feel the need for God and the need for knowledge. So, we try to remember God. At the time of difficulty, we pray to the Lord "Oh, Lord, I am in difficulty, please do something for me." When there is darkness, there is need for light, and similarly, when we are in difficulty we think of the Lord. This is the first stage of *bhakti*.

Ādi Śaṅkara describes the next state of *bhakti* as :

अयस्कान्तोपलं सूचिका

ayaskāntopalam sūcikā

First, we have to think of God, and then God Himself comes and attracts us towards Himself. *Vallabhācārya* and others have developed this as their main *siddhānta* and woven a philosophy round it based on *Īsvāra-bhakti*.

The attraction between a magnet or lodestone and an iron needle symbolises the second stage of *bhakti*. During our younger days, we used to play with magnets and iron filings or iron needles. Magnet has got the property of attracting iron pieces to itself. If we bring the iron pieces very close to the magnet, they cling to the magnet and magnet attracts them to itself. For some time, the pieces keep on clinging and after some time they fall down. Again, the magnet draws the iron pieces to itself. In this way, we used to play with iron pieces and magnet. This illustrates many important philosophical truths to us. Just as a magnet has got the property of attracting iron pieces, similarly, the Lord also takes us towards Himself by attraction and leads us forward in life.

During times of difficulty, when we fall down, we are just like the iron needle which has fallen down from the magnet. But the iron piece is an inert object, and still the magnet attracts it to itself. But we human beings have more *śakti* within ourselves, and we are not so inert, and therefore, the Lord can lift us up again more easily towards Himself.

The moment the Lord comes in our mind immediately we get His grace. Just like the magnet, God attracts us towards himself and bestows on us His grace. Therefore, all of us should make effort to install the Lord in our minds. Then just like the iron needle, our minds will also be attracted by God and held fast to Him. The needle gets drawn to the magnet and it also remains magnetised as long as it is in contact with the magnet. In the same way, so long as we have our mind diverted and attracted towards

the Lord and our mind remains fixed in God, we also enjoy a state of bliss.

The third example given for *bhakti* is :

साध्वी नैजविभुम्
sādhvī naijavibhum

A *pativrata* lady or a chaste wife is doing ever so many things in the household, attending to the children doing cooking and other household work and so on, and yet all the time her mind is thinking only of her husband. She does not do anything without the thought of her husband. Similarly, a true devotee does not do anything without the thought of God. In the same way, our minds should also be merged in God. Our actions may go on as before, but our minds should be immersed in God all the time. We should pray to God and do our work as before. If we have the grace of God with us all the time, then our actions, also will become more successful and we can do them better and more efficiently as well.

Here, in addition to *bhakti*, *strīdharmā* is also indicated. A chaste wife remembers only her husband all the time and does all the work. She does not think of other persons. We are reminded of great *dharmas* here. If we remember God and do our work, we shall get all prosperity and all good things in life.

Then, Ādi Śaṅkara gives the example of a creeper entwined round a tree, and He says :

.लता क्षितिरुहम्
latā kṣitiruham

A creeper which is meandering on the ground ultimately searches for a tree to serve as its support and it starts twining itself round it in such a crisscross maner that it is difficult to separate it from the tree. The creeper looks for the support of a tree and twines itself round it and the tree becomes its support. The creeper cannot remain and survive, separated from the tree. If the creeper does not have the support of the tree, it will perish. In the same way, without the support and sustenance of God, we shall come to grief. If the creeper is forcibly removed from the tree, very often we find that there is a scar on the tree also. Similarly, we attach ourselves to God and carry on our lives with His support. When we fall down from God or we are separated from God, not only do we suffer and get into difficulties, but even God also experiences some sense of sorrow for us. Just like the creeper, we should also have our support and base in God and then live. We all come from the Lord only and ultimately we go back to Him only. Until somebody separates the creeper from the tree, the creeper cannot by itself be separated from the tree. Similarly unless a third person separates us from God, we cannot be separated from Him. Like the creeper, we should attach ourselves very closely to God. This is the fourth example of *bhakti*, which Ādi Śaṅkara has given.

Everyone experiences some sorrow or some suffering or some difficulties in life. We find even *Mahā-puruṣas* experiencing such difficulties and sorrows. Difficulties are there for all. But if we attach ourselves to God then our sufferings will become less. Just like the creeper which is attached to the tree, the mind should be attached to the *Paramatman*. The

creeper can live only if it is attached to the tree. In the same way, the *Jīvātman* cannot live by itself, separated from the *Paramātman*.

रसान्तराणि एकरसं यथा दिव्यं पयोऽश्नुते ।

rasāntarāṇi ekarasam yathā divyam payośnute.

Then, Ādi Śaṅkara Bhagavatpāda says:

सिन्धुः सरिद्धुभम्

sindhuḥ sarid-dhubham

There are many rivers flowing, like the Gaṅgā, the Sone, the Godāvarī, the Kāverī, the Kṛṣṇā and so on. These rivers have different names, but they flow in torrents and cascades, roaring with fury through diverse routes, and in diverse directions and pass through diverse places; their waters also taste differently because they pass through different types of land; their colours are also different; for instance, the river Sone is supposed to have red water, Kṛṣṇā is supposed to have black water, the Gaṅgā is supposed to have white water and so on, the colour of the water depending on the terrain through which the river passes. But finally, all these rivers get merged in the ocean, and they lose their individual names and colours and they just become the ocean only; they then have only one taste, or *rasa* namely the saltish taste. They lose their individual names and acquire one common name, namely, the ocean, and they then have only one form and one shape, one colour and one taste. When they get mixed up with the ocean, they are called the ocean only.

Just like the different rivers all approaching towards the ocean, so also, we worship God and are approaching Him in various ways and in various forms, but ultimately our aim is to get merged in God. The paths that devotees follow are different and yet the goal is the same for all, namely God. Thus, we have *Rāmabhakti*, *Kṛṣṇabhakti* and so on. They are all different paths, but yet when they are related to the *Paramātman* they get the same form. There are many roads leading to a temple but the goal is the temple only.

Similarly, God's grace is our final goal, but we get it by going through diverse paths, such as *Rāmabhakti*, *Kṛṣṇabhakti* and so on. There are many methods to attain God, such as the path of *Bhakti*, the path of *Jñāna*, the path of *Karma*, the path of *Yoga*, the path of *Ātmavicāra* or thinking about the *Ātman*, etc., including *bhajan*, recitation of the Lord's name and so on. But the final goal of all these paths is merger in *Brahman* only. Just as the rivers merge in the ocean, likewise, we merge ourselves in *Brahman*, our individualities then disappear completely, and we just become *Ānandasvarūpa* only, become of the nature of Bliss and Happiness only. Each person takes the road which is best suited to him to get God's grace which is the final goal of all.

As Śrī Kṛṣṇa says in the *Gītā*:

ये यथा मां प्रपद्यन्ते तांस्तथैव भजाम्यहम् ।

*ye yathā mām prapadyante
tāmstathaiva bhajāmyaham.*

Whatever paths men may follow, the Lord gives His grace unto them by that very path.

Once we have awareness of God and we merge ourselves in Him all our sufferings and sorrows will vanish. How do we attach ourselves to God in the *bhaktimārga*?

Ādi Śaṅkara says:

प्राप्नोतीह यथा तथा पशुपतेः पादारविन्दद्वयम् ।

prāpnotīha yathā tathā
paśupateḥ pādāravindadvayam.

Two examples are usually given in this behalf, telling us how to fix our mind at the lotus feet of God. Ādi Śaṅkara says that only if we fix our minds on the lotus feet of God, our *bhakti* is meaningful.

The first example that is given is of the baby monkey and its mother.

The mother monkey jumps from one tree to another or from one branch to another and all the time the baby monkey is holding itself so firmly to its mother's belly that it never falls down. It is clasping its mother and so tightly clinging to it that it never falls down and it has no fear of falling down also. In the same way, if we firmly attach ourselves to God, wherever we may be moving in the world, we shall not be subjected to any suffering.

The example of the monkey is significant from another point of view also. Our mind is also like monkey which is jumping from one object to another

all the time and it is wandering all the time just like the monkey. If the mind can be got fixed on the lotus feet of Rāma or Kṛṣṇa or Parameśvara, then the mind becomes steady, and as Śrī Kṛṣṇa says in the Gītā:

तेषां नित्याभियुक्तानां योगक्षेमं वहाम्यहम् ।

*teṣāṃ nityābhiyuktānām
yogakṣemaṃ vahāmyaham.*

If we think of the lotus feet of Lord Kṛṣṇa or Rāma and we hold on to them steadfastly, just as the baby monkey holds on to its mother, then in spite of the difficulties and sufferings like diseases, etc., we shall be able to overcome all the difficulties, and we shall get prosperity thereby. Once we attach ourselves to God, there need be no fear in regard to our welfare at all.

The next example given is that of a cat and its kitten. A cat which has given birth to kitten keeps such a close watch on its kitten that none can dare to snatch even one kitten away from its presence. It would not allow any visitor to come anywhere near its kitten at all. In the same way, God takes care of His devotees so keenly that He would not allow anyone to come and give any trouble to them.

In case the cat smells or apprehends any danger to its kitten at the place where it is staying, immediately, it will lift its kitten by its mouth and carry them away to some safer place. In the same way, if a devotee is likely to get into difficulty, the Lord takes full care of him and takes him away to a safer

place. If a devotee thinks of the lotus feet of the Lord all the time, then the responsibility for the devotee's welfare is taken fully by God. In this way, the moment we have steadfast *bhakti* towards God, the Lord takes full responsibility for our welfare and gives us His protection, just as a cat gives its protection to its kitten.

Today, we are thinking that it is we who are doing everything and God does not do anything at all. That is why there is so much of shortage of water, food scarcity, absence of rains, diseases and so on. When something good happens, we do not say that it is because of God, but it is because of our efforts. When something bad happens, then immediately we start blaming God for all this. This is the natural tendency of the human mind.

Ādi Śaṅkara says that we have to fix our mind at the feet of God. But we know that our mind is always in a wandering state, as Arjuna says in the *Gītā*:

चंचलं हि मनः कृष्ण

coñcalam hi manah Kṛṣṇa

The nature of the mind is to wander all the time. But we have to bring it back again and again and get it fixed at the feet of God. It is in this manner that we have to do *Īśvarabhakti* and think of the Lord's real form and His lotus feet all the time.

Then, we have the example of the Bhramara and the insect, or the wasp and the insect or worm. This is called *Bhramara-kīḷanyāya*. The wasp catches

hold of a small worm and puts it inside a mud cell and goes on stinging it frequently. After some time, out of a sense of fear, the worm itself becomes a wasp or *Bhramara*. In this way, if we get God's grace frequently, ultimately we shall also get the *svarūpa* of God Himself, just as the worm by getting stings frequently from the wasp, itself becomes a wasp after some time.

If we do recitation of the Lord's name and think of God all the time, we shall be able to realise Him. It is not necessary that we should do this for all the 24 hours of the day, but even half an hour or fifteen minutes for this purpose would do, provided it is done with *Trikaranaśuddhi*, that is, with purity of mind, speech and body.

Often our mind is wandering here and there. We hear with our ears something, but our mind is not there and it is wandering elsewhere; similarly, our eyes also are wandering somewhere. Our ears also start hearing something else. If only all the five sense organs could be concentrated at the lotus feet of God, even for one minute, even that would produce great results. So, it is not expected of a devotee, that he should spend the whole day in *bhakti*. Even a small part of time devoted to God with *Trikaranaśuddhi* is enough to ward off all our difficulties and sufferings.

At the moment, most people do not have that type of *bhakti* with triple purity. Normally, people take their bath and think that they have acquired purity. As a result of bath, it is true that the body becomes pure and it becomes healthy. But for remembering, God's name, we need mental purity

also. For this, merely taking bath is not enough. Mental purity cannot be had by washing ourselves with water. We may clean our clothes with soap in our houses or in a laundry, but for cleansing the mind there is no soap and there is no laundry available, but only the thought of God can purify our mind. There is no other method for this. Money cannot purify our mind; the laundry cannot purify our mind. Even Ganges water cannot purify our mind and clean it. It is only when we start thinking of God that we shall be able to clean it. It is only when we do *bhakti* towards God's form, we shall be able to clean our mind and then only our mind becomes pure.

Along with cleaning of the teeth and cleaning of the face, etc., we should also clean our mind. If we do any work with mental purity, then whatever work we do will be good; otherwise, nothing will be good. Mental purity is thus absolutely necessary to attain God.

So, to sum up, we find that Ādi Śaṅkara has defined *bhakti* as that tendency of the mind which goes in an one-pointed way towards the lotus feet of God and gets merged in God, that God who is our friend at all times, who pardons us all the time for our sins, to whom we should be grateful for all the good things that He has given us, and who is always ready to bestow His grace on us if only we start thinking of Him. This *bhakti* is *ahetukī* and it should be done without expectation of any reward, and not motivated by any personal gain or expectation of anything by way of return. Such is the highest state of *Bhakti*.

A true devotee pines all the time for union with God and places his mind at the lotus feet of *Paśupati*, and any separation from Him keeps the devotee in a state of anguish and suffering. The consummation of *bhakti* is reached when the devotee realises his true Self which is God. All the attractions described in the examples given by Ādi Śaṅkara in His *śloka* are natural and spontaneous and not artificial or calculated ones. The Aṅkola seed, the chaste wife, the creeper, the river, the monkey and kitten cannot subsist in separation; they find fulfilment of their being only in their union and identity with that which alone makes for their true fulfilment.

There is another thing also to be noted here. We have all come from God, and ultimately we go back to God only. *Bhakti* is the easiest means, though only one of the means, to reach God. The Aṅkola seed is born out of the tree, it falls down, but again it goes back to the tree. Similarly, the rivers rise from the mountain tops where clouds pour out rain which is nothing but the water that had collected in them as a result of evaporation of water from the ocean, and when these rivers merge in the ocean the waters of the rivers again go back to their source. Similarly, a *pativratāstrī* finds perfect happiness only when she is in union with her husband all the time. Further, as one approaches God, one gets the radiation of peace and calmness from God. For instance, the rivers which are turbulent and noisy and flow with roaring fury become subdued and stilled when they reach the ocean and merge peacefully in the ocean which itself offers a welcome towards the rivers in a loving way.

So, the consummation of *bhakti* is to be oneself, to realise one's own true nature, and this is precisely what is achieved in the highest state of *bhakti*, and this is what one true devotee says, when he says :

मदीयं एव स्वरूपं देहि

madiyam eva svarūpam dehi

“Give me what is my own, that is, Yourself which is my true nature.”

Bhakti is a means or *sādhana* for reaching the final goal of awareness of one's true nature. It is *svasvarūpa-anusandhāna*, and the goal is *svasvarūpa-avabōdha*.

So, let everyone get up in the morning and after cleaning his teeth, develop *bhakti* towards God, and follow the *Sanmārga* or the right path and follow the *Sanātana dharma*. *Bhakti* should be developed towards some *saguṇa* form of the Lord, whether it be Rāma or Kṛṣṇa, think of the Lord all the time and do everything with His thought and with His memory only. This will definitely give everyone prosperity and ensure his well-being also.

PART-II

BHAKTI AS A MEANS OF REALISATION

There are many living beings in this world. There are birds which fly in the sky. There are aquatic animals like fish, whales, sharks, etc., which live in water. Similarly, there are land animals like the dog, cow, cat, elephant, etc., which live on the earth. Besides these, we, human beings, also live on this earth.

All living beings have their sense-organs like eyes, ears, mouth, etc. They have their perception through these sense-organs. They see with their eyes, hear with their ears and make sounds with their mouth. But the difference between man and the other living beings consists precisely in this. While the other living beings are not capable of (i) having *darśan* of the Lord (ii) reciting the Lord's name and hearing his name, as they have no capacity to speak out the Lord's name, only human beings have the capacity to do these two things. Animals can only make some sound and they cannot recite the Lord's name. Therefore, to be born as a human being is indeed a rare thing. That is why it is said :

जन्तूनां नरजन्म दुर्लभम्

jan̄tūnāṃ narajan̄ma durlabham

Among all births, human birth is something very rare.

Therefore, *Īsvara*bhakti should be done by all human beings. If a human being does not speak out the Lord's name, through his mouth, he would, in all possibility, be born as a dumb person in his next birth.

We have seen some children who have ears but who are deaf. This is so because these children had not listened to the Lord's name in their previous births. Similarly, we have seen children who are blind though they have eyes. This is because they did not have *darśan* of the Lord in their previous births, and, therefore, they are suffering now.

If a person develops the capacity to speak out the Lord's name, he will acquire the power to sing even music later on. As the prayer *ślōka* says :

मूकं करोति वाचालं पंगुं लंघयते गिरिम् ।
यत्कृपा तमहं वन्दे परमानन्दमाधवम् ॥

mūkam karōti vācālam
paṅguṁ laṅghayate girim
yatkṛpā tamaham vande
paramānandamādhavam.

Lord Kṛṣṇa has the capacity to make even a dumb person speak and a lame man climb up a mountain. Such is His capacity to bestow His grace on a devotee. On the other hand, if a person does not speak out the Lord's name or does not hear the Lord's name or does not see the Lord, then he would not even have ordinary vision or the ordinary sense perception for worldly pursuits. For instance, we have seen children afflicted by polio. What is the reason for this? If only they would have used their feet for going round the temple in *pradakṣiṇa*, they would not have developed this disease now. If they would use their feet only to go to the cinema-hall all the time, naturally only polio would come to them. If a

human being does not use his organs of perception for seeing God, for listening to God's name, and for speaking out God's name, as the case may be, then he gets a birth lower down in the scale of evolution next time.

Since human birth is something very rare, whatever sense organs are here should be dedicated to God and should be used for God. Unless that is done, we shall not be using our sense organs properly. If these sense organs are all dedicated to God, everything will turn out to be good for us. If, on the other hand, they are used only for worldly activities, then the next birth of the individual will not be a good birth.

So *Īśvarabhakti* is most important for human beings. In the earlier *yugas* like *Kṛtayuga*, for instance, people used to do a lot of penance for thousands of years to realise God. In the *Tretāyuga*, people were doing *Viṣṇubhakti* by performing sacrifices, etc. In the *Tretāyuga*, God had incarnated Himself in the form of *Rāmacandramūrti*, while in the *Dvāparayuga* he had come in the form of Kṛṣṇa. So, along with the birth of Kṛṣṇa, the school of Kṛṣṇabhakti developed. Kṛṣṇa actually lived amidst the *Gopīs* and *Gopālas* just like an ordinary person, and, therefore, the scope for *Kṛṣṇa-bhakti* was much there.

In our *yuga*, namely *Kaliyuga*, there has been no such incarnation so far. So, we can only think of the *svarūpa* of God, and for this, *bhakti* is very much necessary. So, we have the idea of *Rama-bhakti*, *Kṛṣṇa-bhakti*, etc. It is said:

भक्तिरेव कलौ युगे

bhaktireva kalau yuge

In other words, *bhakti* is the only means for realising God in *Kaliyuga*. So, in *Kaliyuga*, *bhakti* is primary. There is no other means which is to be practised very much these days, but it is only the *bhakti* cult which is very much popular and which is being practised on a large-scale during these days.

In the words of Ādi Śaṅkara Bhagavatpāda, the goal of human life is :

स्वस्वरूपावबोध

sva svarūpāvabōdha

Awareness of one's own true nature. The means to attain this are many. The path of *bhakti* is also one. Regarding *bhakti*, Ādi Śaṅkara says :

स्वस्वरूपानुसन्धानं भक्तिरित्यभिधीयते ।

sva svarūpānusaṅdhānam

bhaktirityabhidhīyate

Bhakti is a means of realisation of the true nature of oneself. It is not the final end or *sādhya*, but only a *sādhana* or *anusandhāna* for realising it. And in *Kaliyuga*, it is an easy means for all people. Therefore, we are asked to do *bhakti* towards *Īśvara* as Rāma or Kṛṣṇa and so on, and thereby come to an awareness of our own true nature.

VEDĀNTIC MOTIFS OF THEISM

*S.L. Pandey **

The Absolute is called Brahman in the *Upaniṣads*. It is further described there that it has two forms, primary (*parā*) and secondary (*aṣarā*).¹ The mutual relationship of these two forms is the central problem of Vedānta philosophy. The problem has been aggravated by the translations of the Sanskrit words *parā* and *aṣarā* as higher and lower respectively in English. These translations have generated the impression that the primary form is higher, earlier or causal and the secondary form is lower, later or created. They have further generated a mistake that the secondary form is unreal when compared to the primary form. But the *Upaniṣads* do not sustain any of these positions. They have clearly laid down that the primary form and the secondary form are the two aspects of the same Being called "Brahman". We can say that

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Brahman *sub specie temporis* is the secondary form and the primary form is Brahman *sub specie aeternitatis* with the rider that the two forms are inseparably united with each other. The secondary form is unmanifestly present in the primary form and the primary form is implicitly latent in the secondary form. There can be no secondary form without the primary form. Nor can the primary form remain still without the secondary form.

In Advaita philosophy that is systematically formulated by Śaṅkara and elaborately developed by his immediate successors, the primary form is precisely called Brahman or the Absolute and the secondary form, Īsvara or God. The former is qualityless (*nirguṇa*), non-particular (*nirviśeṣa*), formless (*nirākāra*), nameless (*anāma*), and unrelated to any thing (*asaṅga*). The latter, on the other hand, has several qualities and relations, names and forms. But despite these distinctions, Brahman and Īsvara share the same being, the same consciousness, the same bliss, and the same infinitude. Hence Īsvara is identical to Brahman. Perfection (*pūrṇatā*) is equated with each of them.

But then a problem arises : why are they called two forms ? Why is Īsvara distinguished from Brahman and *vice versa* ? To this problem several answers have been attempted. First, it is said that the distinction between Īsvara and Brahman is due to *māyā*, because Īsvara is the wielder of *māyā* (*māyin*) and Brahman is free from *māyā*. In later Advaita philosophy, Īsvara is called Being conditioned by *māyā* (*māyopādhika*) and Brahman is called Being, pure and unconditioned (*nirupādhika*). It is further said that

Īsvara is the direct meaning of the term 'That' (*tat*) and Brahman is the secondary meaning of the same term. Consequently Īsvara can be described by words directly. But Brahman can only be indicated and it cannot be described by words at all.

Hence it is clear that there are two modes of knowing. The mode of knowing Īsvara is empirical and that of knowing Brahman is intuitive. But both of them refer to the same numerical unity of existence. This unity, it must be noted, is basically objective and transcendental. It is the referential meaning of what is called panenhenic feeling in mystical literature.

Secondly, the distinction between Īsvara and Brahman is said to be due to ignorance (*avidyā*). According to this view, Īsvara is the consciousness that is conditioned by *avidyā* (*avidyopahita*) and Brahman is the consciousness that is unconditioned by *avidyā* (*avidyā anupahita*). In this view God is the archetype that is reflected in *ajñāna* which is only one. Its ectype is reflected in the intellect (*buddhi*) and this reflection is the individual soul (*jīva*). This view is held by the Vivaraṇa school of Prakāśātman and is known as archetype-ectype theory (*bimbapratibimba-vāda*).

The second view, as a matter of fact, hardly differs from the first view, if *māyā* and *avidyā* are taken as synonyms and Being and Consciousness are understood as having identical meaning. But if a distinction is made between *māyā* and *avidyā*, the two views are definitely distinguishable from each other. We shall see in the sequel the implications of the distinction between *māyā* and *avidyā*.

Thirdly, Īśvara is said to be the consciousness that is conditioned by universal nescience (*samaṣṭi-ajñāna upahita*), while Brahman is regarded as the consciousness that is not so conditioned. The conditioning factors (*upādhis*) are first classified as universal (*samaṣṭi*) and particular (*vyasṭi*). Each of them is further classified into three conditions of waking, dreaming, and sleeping. So God or Brahman conditioned by universal nescience assumes three forms in and through these conditions. Conditioned by the state of waking and its paraphernalia, Brahman is called *Virāṭ* or *Vaiśvānara*; when conditioned by dreaming and its paraphernalia, the same is called *Hiranyagarbha*; and finally when conditioned by sleep, the same is called *Īśvara*. This is the real and eternal state of Īśvara. The other two states are adventitious. They simply conceal the existence of Īśvara. It is also mentioned in Advaita literature that the real meanings of *Virāṭ* and *Hiranyagarbha* are not in the sense of their separate existences, but in the sense of *arthavāda*, i. e. they are a stimulus to the spiritual life and intend to confirm the authenticity of renunciation.² For *Virāṭ* and *Hiranyagarbha* are said to suffer from birth, etc. If such great and high personages suffer because of their indulgence in the affairs of the universe, is not the renunciation of all interest in the affairs of the world the real import of their being, the real lesson from their lives?

But again if *ajñāna* is not distinguished from *māyā* and *avidyā*, the third view is hardly distinguishable from the first two views. We shall see in the sequel, however, the implication of maintaining a distinction between *avidyā* and *ajñāna*, or between *avidyā* and *māyā*.

Fourthly, Brahman and Īsvara are called respectively as *Kāraṇa Brahman* and *Kārya Brahman*. But this does not mean that Īsvara is produced out of Brahman as a pot is produced out of clay. In Advaita philosophy, causal relation is a conditioning factor (*upādhi*) and properly speaking, it is Īsvara that is the first cause of everything. In this sense He is called the Being as conditioned by causality (*kāraṇopādhi*). Brahman, in this context, is the ground or locus of all causation. The world, or for that matter, anything that is produced, is the apparent transformation (*vivarta*) of Brahman on the one hand, and the real transformation (*pariṇāma*) of Īsvara on the other hand. It is to be noted carefully in this context that Brahman is both the material and the efficient cause of the world. But this causation is not necessarily real. It can be understood as accidental and apparent also. In the latter sense, it is Brahman that is the cause of the world. As causality can be interpreted in either way, Advaita has tried to combine both the sense of causation in the concept of identity between Īsvara and Brahman.

Furthermore, the doctrine of *Kāraṇa Brahman* and *Kārya Brahman* is a key idea of Advaita philosophy. It is this doctrine upon which is based the rational synthesis of Vaiṣṇavism, Śaivism, and Śāktism. It maintains that in Vaiṣṇavism, *Viṣṇu* is regarded as *Kāraṇa Brahman* and *Śiva* is regarded as *Kārya Brahman*, while in Śaivism *Śiva* is taken to be *Kāraṇa Brahman* and *Viṣṇu* is taken as *Kārya Brahman*. So no Vaiṣṇava or Śaiva worships the *Kārya Brahman*. He, in fact, worships the *Kāraṇa Brahmān* although he names it differently. So in this view Īsvara or God is conditioned by cause. On the testimony of

this intuition Advaitins are called traditionalists (*smārtas*) and believe that *Viṣṇu*, *Śiva*, *Brahmā*, *Śakti*, *Sūrya* or *Gaṇeśa* can well be regarded as God. There is no quarrel over the names of God, because the named is one and the same Being. The real meaning of all of His names is thus the same.³ This view has made Advaita Vedānta a champion of the unity of all religions or rather of all mode of worship.

Fifthly, it is 'Aum' which is both the primary form and the secondary form of Brahman. This view is clearly advanced in the *Praśnopaniṣad*⁴ and developed by Gauḍapāda⁵. Some of the later *Upaniṣads* have further elaborated it and constructed a detailed symbolism of meanings. Consequently the symbol 'Aum' has occupied a central place in Advaita philosophy and has become an epitome of all of its doctrines. For our present purposes, however, what is relevant is the relationship between Īsvara and Brahman that is articulated by the symbol 'Aum'. It is a mystical dialogue, communication or communion that precedes all conceivable and describable objects, concepts, and propositions. To say that it is *a priori* is a factual description no doubt, but it hardly removes the obscurity that surrounds the relation. Furthermore, those who have realized it have said that it is indescribable, but at the same time communicable. But this communicability requires a language that is suggestive and resembles the language of poetry, art, or mythology. This means that there is an element of immediacy in the experience of the dialogue between Brahman and Īsvara. Nothing more than this can be said about it.

The mystics see all things as one; they see Īsvara everywhere. They further experience the communion with Him in the depths of their consciousness. Both these types of mystical experiences can be obtained intuitively by the meditation on the symbol 'Aum'. This is the practical value of the symbol which has been used by all Advaitins. Its theoretical value consists in its elaborate symbolism that stands for the identity of *Viśva* and *Virāṭ* in the walking state, of *Taijasa* and *Hiranyagarbha* in the dream state, of *Prājña* and *Īsvara* in sleep state, and of *Ātman* and *Brahman* in the fourth state. The whole of Advaita philosophy, thus, is the hermeneutic of 'Aum.' To understand this interpretation and concentrate on it is, as a matter of fact, to unravel the mystery of the intimate relation of Īsvara and Brahman.

The symbol 'Aum' consists of three letters and four measures (*mātras*). Each letter stands for an idea of God. But all the three letters taken together stand for Brahman. Further, each letter is identified with one measure and the fourth measure is silent after the third measure. The phonetics of each measure except the last one stands for the function of God. The silence, on the other hand, stands for Brahman that is realized in the fourth state.

Sixthly, according to the school of Suresvara, Īsvara is an appearance (*ābhāsa*) of Brahman. This view reminds us of a similar view held by F.H. Bradley. But there is a distinction between the view of Bradley and the view of Suresvara. For Suresvara, God is the absolute *in toto* and He is an appearance (*ābhāsa*) in the sense that the Absolute appears as God. So this appearance is that real. For Bradley,

however, appearance is unreal and therefore, God is also unreal. But Suresvara does not say that Īsvara is unreal. Whenever, the Absolute appears before any person, it appears in the form of God. Hence, God-realization is a condition of the realization of the Absolute. But this appearance is not necessary. It is a fact as much contingent as any other fact of experience.

But some Advaitins accept the view that the realization of the Absolute or the primary form of Brahman is possible without God-realization or the realization of the secondary form of Brahman Amalānanda⁶, the author of the *Vedānta-kalpataru* and Vidyāraṇya⁷, the author of the *Pañcadaśī*, for example hold this view. For them, God-realization is not a necessary condition of the realization of the Absolute. Tulasidāsa, for example throws a challenge to the former to demonstrate their case which he regards as impossible. To speak about Brahman without referring to God is as impossible as to describe knowledge without any reference to illusion or ignorance.⁸ In fact, wherever the term Īsvara is used, it has two meanings, the first meaning is called the sense and the second meaning is called reference. The term 'God' has both sense and reference, but the term 'Brahman' has only reference and no sense of its own. It has a sense that is not distinct from that of the term 'Īsvara'. So Tulasidāsa is right when he says that God-talk is a necessary condition of making any statement about Brahman. The medieval Advaitins have gone a step further and maintained that, even if God-realisation be not a necessary condition of the realization of the Absolute, it is the sufficient condition of the latter. That is why they have made

a distinction between liberated persons who have achieved liberation without worshipping God and the liberated persons who have achieved liberation through worshipping God and maintained that the former have to worship God even after their liberation in order to avoid the re-appearance of the phenomenal world. Even Śaṅkara points out that worship is either the beginning or the end of the realization of the Absolute in the case of every *jīvanmukta* or a person who has realized the Absolute here and now in his own life.⁹

In other words, if it is the beginning, then it ends with, or leads to, the knowledge of the Absolute. And if the knowledge of the Absolute is the beginning of the realization of the Absolute, then it leads to, or ends with, the worship of God. Worship, therefore, is as much authentic as knowledge. To stress this fact it is said that Brahman is to be known and Īsvara is to be worshipped and both are the aspects of the same being. Therefore *jīvan-muktas* worship God and find no conflict between God-realization and realization of the Absolute. The *Upaniṣads* have rightly maintained that the bondage of the individual soul is cut off, all its doubts are removed and all its *karmas* are destroyed, when it intuitively perceives the primary and the secondary form of Brahman.¹⁰ So the reality of God is the reality of Brahman. In no case unreality can be attributed to God. The proposition that God is *saṁsārī* or subject to birth and death is false. He is so only under certain *upadhis*.¹¹ He is called *saṁsārī* in a secondary sense that precisely means the *saṁsārī* character of the individual souls. The statement that forest is floral does not mean that

the forest is a flower. It simply means that the forest contains flowers. So the statement that God is *samsārī* simply means that God contains the *samsārī* souls that are individuals. God himself is not a *samsārī*.

Seventhly, Vācaspati Misra, who upholds that *avidyā* is multiple (*nānā*) and that its seat is the individual soul, argues that God is the object of *avidyā*. He does not make any distinction between *māyā* and *avidyā* or *ajñāna* and uses *ajñāna* and *avidyā* as synonyms. As *ajñāna* is many and its seat is the individual soul, so the individual souls are also many. Furthermore as God is the object of the *ajñāna* of an individual soul and as individual souls are many, so there are many gods also. This lands him into polytheism. But Vācaspati Misra can argue against it: just as the numerical identity of an object that is perceived by several individual souls really consists of similarity among the perceptions of those souls, so there is a fundamental unity of all gods that consists of the similarity of the objects of *ajñāna* of the individual souls. This unity is all that is meant by the term God.¹² Alternatively, he says again that the individual soul is the material cause of the world and Īsvara is just the ground of that causation. In this way he identifies Īsvara with Brahman and saves its reality from being phenomenal. Īsvara is as much transcendental as Brahman.

Eighthly, the view of Vācaspati Misra has been developed into a fullfledged solipsism by Prakāśānanda who argues that there is only one individual soul and that all other manifestations of consciousness are its fabrications. That soul is, as a matter of fact, Brah-

man which itself assumes different names and forms. Thus Brahman is the same as Īsvara. So even solip-sists like Prakāśānanda believe in the unity and reality of one God.

Ninthly, there is the reflection theory (*pratibimba-vāda*) that is held by the author of the *Prakāṣārthavivaraṇa* who makes a distinction between *māyā* and *avidyā*. In his opinion the former is predominant with the quality called pure *sattva* and the latter is soiled by the predominance of the qualities called *rajas* and *tamas*. This view is also held by the author of the *Pañcadaśī* in the chapter called *Tattvaviveka*. It equates God with the individual soul since it regards both of them as reflection of consciousness in *māyā* and the individual soul is the reflection of the same consciousness in *avidyā*.

Furthermore, the reflection theory of God is upheld by Sarvajñātman who does not make a distinction between *māyā* and *avidyā*. For him God is the reflection of consciousness in *avidyā* and the individual soul is the reflection of the same consciousness in the *antaḥkaraṇa* which itself is a product of *avidyā*. Thus, Sarvajñātman saves the reality of God from being equated with the individual soul. God has more reality than the individual soul, more proximity to Brahman than the individual soul.

But in this view the individual soul is more real than the individual soul in the archetype-ectype theory, where it is the reflection of God, and not of Brahman.

Lastly, there is a view that God and the Absolute, or Īsvara and Brahman are just names which are at best descriptive phrases or symbols in different perspectives and refer to one and the same being or consciousness. This view is critical of all theories that use reflection, archetype, or appearance to explain the relation between Brahman and Īsvara. It rests on the referential theory of meaning and maintains that all sense-meaning is baseless mental constructions. According to this theory Īsvara is Brahman just as Rādheya (the son of an unmarried woman) is Kaunteya (the son of Kunti).¹³ Rādheya and Kaunteya both refer to Karṇa, a hero of the *Mahābhārata*. The sense of Rādheya is different from the sense of Kaunteya. But both the terms refer to the same person. All other meanings are merely mental constructions meant to make a reference to Karṇa. Similarly Īsvara and Brahman have the same referential context and all senses associated with these terms are mental constructions in various conditions.

This theory has been reinforced from an unexpected quarter, *i.e.* by the findings of the German logician, Frege, who has propounded the theory of reference by the classical formulation that the morning star is the evening star. If we combine Russell's theory of description with Frege's theory of reference, we find a new theory that does justice to the Advaita view of the Absolute and God. All sense is a description of something which can only be referred by the logical noun 'that' (*tat*). Advaita philosophers have been maintaining this theory long before Frege and Russell. They have rightly maintained that what exists is 'that', or *Ṣat* is *Tat* and all sense that is attri-

buted to existence or 'that' is, as a matter of fact simply a description aiming at the reference to 'that' in the long run.

Now, even a bird's eye-view of the above ten theories will show that there is a mysterious relationship between Brahman and Īsvara. Each theory tries to unravel this relationship. It retains the Vedāntic position that consciousness is one and the same in all its manifestations and that both contemplation and knowledge are the pathway to its full and significant realization.

But more importantly, it can be observed that Advaita philosophers have taken great pains in maintaining the reality of God and the belief in monotheism. Mahādevānanda Sarasvatī, an Advaita philosopher of the 18th century, says that there is no controversy among Advaitins over the existence and unity of God.¹⁴ He, thus, becomes an eloquent spokesman of all Vedāntins and gives a good reply to all those who level the charge that Advaita Vedānta is atheistic, agnostic, or pantheistic. Each of the ten theories detailed earlier indicates that Advaita Vedānta is as much theistic as any other school of Indian philosophy, or for that matter, any sound philosophy of theism.

Even Śaṅkara admits that the difference between Īsvara and Brahman is for the sake of worship and that it does not signify any reality of difference at all.¹⁵ It denotes, on the other hand, the non-difference (*abheda*) of Īsvara with Brahman. In other words, there is no ontic difference between them.

But when two terms are mentioned and well defined and distinguished from each other, a logical question arises as to what is the relation between them. Aren't there two meanings? The Advaitins face this question boldly and logically demonstrate that the relation between them can be neither *saṁyoga* (conjunction) nor *samavāya* (inherence), because these relations obtain among substances and qualities and both Brahman and Īsvara are neither a substance nor a quality. Furthermore, the relation between the two cannot be difference or negation.

Moreover, Advaita philosophers have adduced a number of arguments against difference and negation that have been epitomized in the works like the *Brahmasiddhi* of Maṇḍana, the *Bhedadhikkāra* of Nṛsiṁhāśrama, the *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyā* of Śrī Harṣa, and the *Advaitasiddhi* of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī. In short, Īsvara is neither a cognate, nor a rival, nor an organ, of Brahman. Nor is Brahman the antithesis, contrary, contradictory or negation of Īsvara. Furthermore, in certain quarters which are undoubtedly Advaitic, it is understood that the relation between them is *tādātmya*. But Śaṅkara has rightly denied it, because *tādātmya* obtains between the subject and an object and Īsvara is not an object of Brahman that is pure consciousness.¹⁶ Thus rejecting all the above relations, Advaitins have maintained the relation of *abheda* or non-difference between Brahman and Īsvara. It must be stressed further that this is the relation that obtains between *jīva* and Brahman also, but it is not the relation that obtains between *jīva* and the world, or between Īsvara and

the world. Nor is it the relation between *jīva* and *Īsvara*.

Hence, if the relation between Brahman and *Īsvara* is *abheda*, then the difference of these names and functions must be explained. In this context, therefore, Śaṅkara uses the term *māyā* or *avidyā* and thereby explains that they are non-essential (*an-aupādhika*). He does not make any distinction between *māyā* and *avidyā* and puts them under *upādhi* which is another key idea in his philosophy. This means that the differences of the names and functions of *Īsvara* and Brahman are not essential or real. Nor are they necessarily entailed by the requirements of knowledge situation. They are, on the other hand, accidental, conditional, circumstantial, contextual, or heuristic. In short, they are not something *sui generis*, but something *ad hoc*. At this juncture a comparison of the Advaita view of the world with the phenomenological reduction is illuminating. Phenomenologists try to explain every object of knowledge without believing that these objects exist somewhere and maintain that existence of worldly objects is not relevant to knowledge. In fact, existence cannot be a predicate and all knowledge that is useful for us in our scientific and logical pursuit is the knowledge of predicates. We need to distinguish among our concepts and propositions and this need of distinction is well provided for by the belief that they do not refer to existence. They are essences which have only sense and no reference. Similarly, Advaitins argue that the objects of the world and all propositions about them have a sense of their own although they have no reference of their own. In this way they are regarded

as conditional. Thus, Advaitins have attempted an intellectual construction of the *ad hocism* or *upādhi* theory and advanced different perspectives of *māyā* or *avidyā* or *ajñāna*. Some of them have made a distinction between *māyā* and *avidyā*. For example, the author of the *Prakaṣārtha-vivaraṇa* holds that *avidyā* is only an aspect of *māyā* and that it has the double power of obscuration and projection. Vidyāranya holds that *māyā* has the preponderance of pure *sattva*, while *avidyā* has *sattva* soiled by *rajas* and *tamas*. Some Advaitins believe that only the power of projection is *māyā* and that it belongs to God, whereas the power of obscuration is *avidyā* and it belongs to *jīva*. A few Advaitins further state that both *māyā* and *avidyā* are the two kinds of *ajñāna* and maintain one of the above distinctions between them. But a majority of them make no distinction between them and prefer the word *ajñāna* to the words *māyā* and *avidyā* in their precise formulation. This *ajñāna* is taken by a few Advaitins to be twofold, universal (*samaṣṭi*), and particular (*vyasṭi*). Vācaspati, however, believes that *ajñāna* is many. His rivals, on the other hand, believe that *ajñāna* is one. But they also distinguish its causal form (*mūla avidyā*) from its created form (*tūla avidyā*). These distinctions have their implications in the formulation of the theory of the material cause of the world. At first the *Upaniṣads* state that Para Brahman is the material cause. But Śaṅkara interprets it in the sense that both Brahman and Īsvara constitute the material cause. But he distinguishes between two ideas of material cause, the essential and the non-essential or the transformative and the non-formative. Īsvara is the material cause in the former sense and Brahman, in the latter sense. This is what Śaṅkara means.

Sarvajñātman makes and an improvement upon his theory when he says that only Brahman is the material cause of the world and that *māyā* is simply its instrumental cause. He assigns the role of intervening medium to *māyā* and makes the creativity of Brahman completely free from *māyā*. But Vācaspati says that *jīva* and its *avidyā* are the material cause of the world. The school of *Vivaraṇa*, however, maintains that Īsvara and its *māyā*, and not Brahman, is the material cause of the world. Thus the *Vivaraṇa* school is in sharp contrast to the *Bhāmatī* school of Vācaspati. But both the schools have left Brahman untouched and unconcerned with the creation of the world. The author of the *Padārthatattvanirṇaya* sees this point and says that Brahman and *māyā* are material cause of the world. The author of the *Vedānta-siddhāntamuktāvalī*, however, finds fault like others, with the creativity of Brahman and says that only *māyā* is the material cause of the world. Thus, each of the ten theories that have been discussed above has its own view of *māyā* or *avidyā* in regard to its role in the material cause of the world. Now, those who have made a distinction between *māyā* and *avidyā* have advanced the reflection theory of God and the individual soul in some form. But those who have not made this distinction, by and large, have put forward the appearance theory (*ābhāsavāda*) or limination theory (*avacchedavāda*) of God and the individual soul. But whatsoever be the status of *māyā* or *avidyā* or both, the basic position is that it is something that is neither real nor unreal nor both. In this sense a new technical term *anirvacanīya*, is coined and widely used by all Advaitins. What is *anirvacanīya* is *māyā* or *avidyā* or *ajñāna*. In medieval Advaita Vedānta it is also called *mithyā*.

Māyā as a go-between has like Janus two faces, the one directed towards God and the other directed towards Brahman. The former face is called projection (*vikṣepa*) because it projects the whole world of objects and is identified with the creative power of God. The latter face is called obscuration (*āvaraṇa*) because it obscures the nature of Brahman. In fact, neither Brahman is obscured nor is there any projection *per se*. The projection of the world and all attempts to explain it have simply a *heuristic* value. Their purpose is to convey the knowledge of Brahman and Īsvara. The moment this purpose is served, *māyā* disappears along with its whole world of objects. But what is to be noted in this context is the fact that *māyā*, far from obscuring the nature of Brahman, really reveals what Brahman is. As the knowledge of illusion is not itself illusory, so the knowledge of the nature and functions of falsity called *māyā*, is not itself false. This *māyā*, like Brahman and Īsvara is beginningless. But it is not eternal, for it can be terminated by knowledge. As beginningless it obscures the relation of Brahman and Īsvara but as terminated, it reveals their nature in bold reliefs. The termination of *māyā* amounts to the death of the body. Therefore, death is more authentic and existential than life. The real meaning of *māyā* is not the sense of what it is, but what it conveys through its suicidal sacrifice. Its meaning is the purpose that it serves. And that purpose is the intuitive apprehension of the double aspect of Brahman.

NOTES

1. *Bṛhadāraṇyakaopaniṣad*, 2.31; *Praśnopaniṣad*, 5.2 & *Sāṅkhyabhāṣya*, 1.1.12.

2. Mahādevānanda Sarasvatī *Advaita-cintākaustubha*
p. 42:

हिरण्यगर्भादीनां मुक्तिप्रतिपादकशास्त्रस्य प्रवृत्तिकरत्वेन

स्वार्थतात्पर्य-भावात् ।

3. Nīścalādāsa, *Vicārasāgara*, Bombay, 1954, pp. 462,
468 for the illustration of the maxim “*śyāla-sārameyanāya.*”

4. *Praśnopaniṣad*, 5.2.

5. Gauḍapāda, *Āgamaśāstra*, 1, 26:

प्रणवो ह्यपरं ब्रह्म प्रणवश्च परः स्मृतः ।

अपूर्वोऽनन्तरोऽबाह्यो नापरः प्रणवोऽव्ययः ॥

6. *Vedāntakalpataru* quoted in *Advaitacintākaustubha*
p. 88 :

निर्विशेषं परं ब्रह्म साक्षात्कर्तुमनीश्वराः ।

ये मन्दास्तेऽनुकुप्यन्ते सविशेषनिरूपणैः ॥

वशीकृते मनस्येषां सगुणब्रह्मशीलनात्

तदेवाविमंवेत् साक्षादपेतोपाधिकल्पनम् ॥

7. *Pañcadaśī (Dhyānadīpa, 54)* :

अत्यन्तबुद्धिमान्द्यात् सामग्रथाप्यसम्भवात् ।

यो विचारं न लभते ब्रह्मोपासीत सोऽनिशम् ॥

8. Tulasīdās, *Dohāvālī*, 251 :

ज्ञान कहे अज्ञान विनु तम विनु कहे प्रकास ।

निर्गुण कहे जो सगुण विनु सो गुरु तुलसीदास ॥

9. Śaṅkarācārya, *Sārirakabhāṣya*, 4.1.1:

विद्योपास्तयोश्च वेदान्तेषु अव्यतिरेकेण प्रयोगो दृश्यते ।

क्वचिद् विदिनोपक्रम्य उपासिनोपसंहरति, यथा ‘यस्तद्देद यत्स वेद
स मयैतदुक्तः’ (छान्दोग्योपनिषद् 4.1.4) इत्यत्र ‘अनु म एतां भगवो
देवानां शाधि यां देवतामुपास्ते’ (छान्दोग्योपनिषद् 5.2.2) इति ।

क्वचिच्च उपासिनोपक्रम्य विदिनोपसंहरति, यथा—‘मनो ब्रह्मेत्युपासीत’ (छान्दोग्योपनिषद् 3.18.1) इत्यत्र ‘भाति च तपति च कीर्त्या यशसा ब्रह्मवचंसेन य एवं वेद’ (छान्दोग्योपनिषद् 3.18.3) इति ।

10. *Muṇḍakopaniṣad*, 2.2.8.

11. Śaṅkarācārya, *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad-bhāṣya*, 1.4.6.

12. Mahādevānanda Sarasvatī, *Advaitacintākaustubha*, p. 49:

एवं प्रकृतेऽपि स्वस्वाज्ञानकल्पितप्रपञ्चस्य स्वस्वाज्ञानोपहितचैतन्यम् ईश्वर एक एवेति नानेकेश्वरकल्पनापत्तिः सर्वतन्त्रविरोधो वा ।

13. Gaṅgādharendra Sarasvatī, *Vedāntasūktimañjarī* I. 42:

कौन्तेय इव राधेयो

जीवः स्वाविद्यया परः ।

नाभासो नाप्यवच्छिन्न

इत्याहुरपरे बुधाः ॥

14. *Advaitacintākaustubha*, p. 51:

ईश्वरविवादाभावे । Also *ibid.* pp. 44 ff.

15. *Sārīrakabhāṣya*, 3.2.12:

भेदस्य उपासनार्थत्वाद् अभेदे तात्पर्यम् ।

16. For this definition, see Śaṅkara's commentary on the *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad*, 2.4.7:

यत्स्वरूपव्यतिरेकेण अग्रहणम् यस्य, तस्य तदात्मत्वम् लोके दृष्टम् ।

SUBJECTIVE SELF-LESS-NESS:
THE MESSAGE OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY*

M. Hiriyanna

The subject that I have selected for the address, which it is customary to deliver on such an occasion, possesses little technical importance. It is the old and familiar theme of the ideal of life; only I deal with it here from the Indian standpoint. I trust that what I say will be found to be of some interest to all, and not merely to those who are conversant with Indian Philosophy.

One of the most striking features of Indian thought is its many-sidedness. It includes all possible types of solutions of the chief problems of philosophy. We have monism and pluralism, idealism and realism of diverse shades represented in it. What is yet more noteworthy is that this variety, which characterises Indian philosophy as a whole, appears over again in more than one system. Thus when Buddhism came to be taught, it soon split up in much the same

* General President's address delivered in the Hyderabad Session (1939) of the Indian Philosophical Congress. Courtesy: Indian Philosophical Congress.

fashion, giving rise to various kinds of realistic and idealistic views within it. History repeated itself when still later the Vedānta emerged in its classical form, and became divided into several schools. Many of these doctrines have disappeared in the course of the long and chequered history of Indian thought, but even those that have come down to our time are sufficient to illustrate the wide variety of its forms. It may be that such speculative diversity redounds greatly to the credit of the Indian mind. I propose, however, to dwell at present not on that side of the subject, but rather on the element of unity which is found to run through all this diversity. That these systems are not altogether heterogeneous and admit of being unified is by no means a new idea. It was held by the old Indian thinkers themselves, and they tried in more than one way to reconcile the differences among them.¹ But those reconciliations were generally effected from a theoretical standpoint. There is, however, one view among them which, though neither so fully worked out nor so familiar, is of a different kind; and my present purpose is to draw attention to it.

It is well known that the West has for long believed that philosophy aims at satisfying the impulse of curiosity or the desire to know. To judge from the attitude towards the universe revealed in the earliest of the philosophic hymns found in the Veda, the first efforts at philosophising in India also seem to have been directed to the same end. But soon this interest in mere speculation ceased, and philosophic truth came to be sought mainly for the light which it might throw upon the ultimate significance of life. This practical interest has, as it is now well recognised,

ever since been the distinguishing feature of Indian philosophy. The remarkable unanimity in this respect among the various systems shows that the aim of Indian philosophy, as a whole, is to determine the ideal of practical life rather than merely to formulate a set of theoretical views of the universe.² And since this ideal, so far as it is realisable in the present life, is, as I shall try to point out, essentially the same according to the several systems, its inculcation may be regarded as the element which is common to them all. To the modern student, who has been nursed in the belief that philosophy is 'the child of wonder', such close linking together of theory and practice may appear to hinder the proper investigation of philosophical questions by importing notions like those of good and evil, higher and lower, which are, in his opinion, irrelevant to it. Whether or not it has proved a hindrance in the present case does not really concern us now, for I am speaking of the lesson of Indian philosophy as we find it; and it is not therefore necessary to enter into a discussion of the correctness of the standpoint which it has adopted. Besides, any attempt to do so will take us too far away from our subject. So I shall proceed to state what I consider to be the common features of the ideal of life which the Indian systems generally have in view.

The first and foremost of these features is unselfishness. Suresvara, whose place in the history of Vedāntic monism is next only to that of Śaṅkara, states that it characterises the ideal of practical life according to not only the Vedic but also the non-Vedic systems.³ And he adds that one of the latter, namely, Buddhism denies the very existence of the

self in order to impress on the minds of its adherents the importance of this feature. If the belief in a persisting self were false, it is obvious that all selfish activity would become utterly meaningless. Thus the Buddhistic doctrine of 'no self' (*nairātmya-vāda*) according to Suresvara is, what is termed 'a fiction of ethical value'. Other schools may not have pushed their metaphysical views so far as Buddhism, but they do not, in the least, lag behind it in the emphasis they lay upon this feature of the ideal. But we must remember that by unselfishness here is to be understood the *entire* abnegation of self-interest. An ancient law-giver,⁴ who belongs to the pre-Christian period, defines a cultured person (*śiṣṭa*) as one whose heart is free from all personal desires. That is also the implication of the exalted place which the orthodox and the unorthodox schools alike assign to *sannyāsa*. The merits of detachment are not unknown to doctrines propounded elsewhere, and all of them teach it with equal fervour. Even the idea of complete or absolute self-denial is not foreign to some of them. A witty bishop, in speaking to children, is stated to have asked 'What is the Cross?' and answered it himself by saying 'It is the 'I' crossed out'. But the uniqueness of the Indian view consists in the special emphasis placed upon such self-denial.

This emphasis on the total exclusion of self-interest may suggest that it is a purely ascetic ideal which is here held up before the aspirant—an ideal which is negative and means a voluntary forsaking of the world. That, indeed, is now the prevalent belief regarding the Indian view of life. There is no doubt that the ideal is ascetic; but, according to most of the

schools, it is so in a positive and not in a negative sense. By 'positive asceticism', I mean such asceticism as goes hand in hand with altruistic activity and is never divorced from it. That is, the aim of life is not mere detachment, but detachment and service. We have here a second feature of the common Indian ideal, namely, service, which shows that the pursuit of it does not mean running away from society and seeking passive isolation. Man's temptation, according to it, is not the world; rather his temptation, to put it compendiously, is the flesh. In other words, what is commended here is self-renunciation and not world-renunciation; and the common belief that the Indian ideal is mostly negative is not in accord with the prevailing spirit of Indian teaching. The greatest warrant for this conclusion is found in the *Gītā* which all orthodox systems, without any exception, reckon as a scripture of the highest authority. It insists upon the necessity of leading a life of incessant activity, although one may have no object to attain thereby for oneself. Life without action, it reckons, as almost a sin. The divine teacher here, who is necessarily also the exemplar of the teaching he imparts, says "There is nothing in the three worlds which I have to toil for; and yet I act."⁵ The influence of this teaching is, in all probability, to be traced even outside orthodox thought as, for example, in the Bodhisattva conception of latter Buddhism, according to which, Buddhahood, the very pinnacle of human aspiration, is sought because of the fitness it secures for rendering true service to others.

It may appear from what I have stated that renunciation and service are separate aims, which are

to be pursued independently. But it is really not so, for they are conceived as standing in an intimate and vital relation to each other. Service is not regarded here as a mere concomitant of renunciation but the very means of cultivating it. Consequently the aim is not renunciation *and* service, but renunciation *through* service.⁶ It means that true detachment cannot be achieved, except by living an active life in the midst of others and devoting oneself to their welfare; only the activities, which such a life signifies, should be carried on without the least thought of advantage to oneself, if they should lead to complete detachment. As active service then, the discipline involves self-affirmation; and as tending to complete detachment, it also involves self-denial. The excellence of the teaching is in bringing these opposites into harmony; and it is able to do so by purifying the one of egoism and the other of passivity or inaction. But these activities are not left to be determined by the choice or opinion of the individual, for the service which is to be the means of cultivating the spirit of renunciation is defined as consisting in the doing of *sva-dharma* or the duties of the station which one fills in society.⁷ There is nothing, indeed, in the view precluding a person from engaging himself in any altruistic activity he may like; but the point is that, under all circumstances, he should perform his own immediate duties first. This insistence on the performance of one's own duties implies the abolition of all distinctions of high and low among them for, when we consider duties as means to renunciation, it is not their content that matters, but the selfless spirit in which they are done. All can therefore be *sannyāsins* in this sense, because all have their places in society

and the duties pertaining to them. Accordingly, we find the *Mahābhārata* representing as a pattern of true asceticism a pedlar who fulfils his functions in society conscientiously and with absolute disinterestedness.⁸

Renunciation and service, however, are not the only features of the ideal. There is a third feature also; but before specifying it, it is desirable to find out in what respect the above training, which is meant to further the moral life, is incomplete. A great deal will, no doubt, be gained by a person that goes through this discipline; but, though he may thereby be able to renounce all self-interest, he will continue to be aware of his agency. To state the same in the terminology of the *Gītā*, though he may free himself from the idea that he is an enjoyer (*bhoktr*), he will remain conscious that he is a doer (*kartr*).⁹ Such self-consciousness is, indeed, necessary inasmuch as the disciple in this stage sets before himself a definite purpose, namely, the overcoming of selfishness through performing his duty. But all such activity, by its very character, involves the possibility of an internal constraint or strife within the self. Disinterested activity, even when it is the result of strife, may be quite commendable; but it cannot be regarded as the ultimate ideal. The need for striving which may, at any moment, be felt in such activity is rather an index that the goal has not been reached. To reach it which, according to all Indian thinkers, is a state characterised by peace of spirit, 'a repose that ever is the same', this need for effort must wholly disappear. Hence it is not enough for attaining the ideal to dismiss self-interest; the notion of agency also must be given up. In other words, the agent should transcend

the sense of duty itself by rising above himself completely. As the *Mahābhārata* puts it, we should first forswear all selfishness, and then "forswear that by which we do so."¹⁰ The thought here is that unselfishness which is conscious of itself is not the perfect form of it. We have a sample of such a totally impersonal attitude, though but a transient one, in art experience, where the object is contemplated, neither as related to oneself nor as related to others, but solely for its own sake¹¹ It is only when we succeed in liberating us from ourselves in this sense that we might

‘Love all loveliness, nor yearn
With tyrannous longings; undisturbed might live
Greeting the summer’s and the spring’s return,
Nor wailing that their joy is fugitive.’

But here the question may be asked whether such transcendence is at all possible in the case of moral activity, whatever be the truth as regards aesthetic experience. The answer is that it is quite possible as seen, for example, in a mother devoting herself to the care of her child. In bestowing that care, she acts as she ought to; but yet it is not a mere sense of duty that actuates her, as it may be in the case of a nurse. Her response is on a higher plane where the sense of duty merges in love, and she grows completely unself-conscious in attending to the needs of the child. This is what is meant by the saying that love is stronger than duty. The same purpose is present in both the mother and the nurse, namely, the welfare of the child; but, in the case of the mother, the service gains a new significance as the spontaneous expression of a unique attitude towards the object of devotion. The attainment of a similar level of action, in respect not

of this person or that but of all, represents the Indian ideal of life. The agent passes in it from a state of striving morality to that of spontaneous service where he acts as he does, because he cannot but do so. The activity then becomes the natural manifestation of an inner attitude of soul, and is consequently characterised not by constraint or strife but by supreme joy which is the sign of liberation from it. The merely outward life, the common conventional morality which may not always point to a corresponding inner urge, altogether disappears. That marks the culmination of the discipline, and he, who has reached it, is no longer an aspirant (*sādhaka*) but is perfected saint (*siddha*). Some of the best portions of the *Gītā* are taken up with a description of this super-individual or universal life.¹²

If such be the final ideal, then there is a wide gulf separating it from the discipline of the first stage and further training becomes necessary to transform the moral activity of that stage into spontaneous and selfless service. It may seem, from the example given above of a mother's care for her child, that love will suffice for such transformation; but it cannot. It may suffice in her case, because the service is quite restricted in its scope. Her solicitude for the welfare of her child does not necessarily imply equal solicitude on her part for the children of others. But the service, which the complete achievement of the goal of life signifies, cannot be thus restricted. It can know of neither exclusions nor preferences. This service also undoubtedly involves love; and an old Sanskrit verse describes the attitude of a person, who has reached the goal, as that of a parent to whom the whole

world is like his own household.¹³ But it is a love which is mediated by comprehensive knowledge. To know all, it may be said, is to love all; or to use the words of the poet 'Utter knowledge is but utter love'. If one form of love is notoriously blind, all forms of it operate more or less instinctively and not with complete understanding. The only key to such understanding is philosophy. That is, the gulf between common morality and the ideal, referred to above, can be bridged only by philosophic knowledge; and for the acquisition of such knowledge, a further course of discipline, which is predominantly intellectual, becomes necessary.

Here we see the relation of philosophic theory to the ideal of practical life. It serves to consummate the aim which is involved in the moral life.¹⁴ For this purpose of consummating the ideal any one of the doctrines, which commends unselfish service, will suffice, provided it embodies, at the same time, a self-consistent view of the universe. Further, since we are now occupied with the ideal of life realisable here, under empirical conditions and not elsewhere, it will suffice to take into consideration the teaching of the systems chiefly in so far as it concerns the place of the individual in the universe as a whole and to his relation to other living beings. This does not mean that the other parts of the doctrines are unnecessary or useless, but only that divergences there, however important they may be for those who are concerned with the exclusive validity of particular doctrines, do not matter for our present purpose. There are, we know, such differences as, for instance, in regard to the ultimate nature of the self; but for us they only mean

that the doctrines assign different metaphysical reasons to show the need for renunciation and service, which all of them alike admit as essential to the ideal. But whichever be the doctrine chosen, it is absolutely necessary that its teaching should, as a whole, be properly assimilated, if it is to have effective influence on everyday conduct. It is not enough to think and know; one must also feel and experience. That is, the knowledge conveyed by the teaching should be transformed into an immediate conviction, if it is to issue in unbidden action, like a mother's love. In her case also, there is a similar realisation. It is only such a living awareness, and not a merely conceptual knowledge of reality that can inspire love which will transmute conduct. But it is necessary to remember that the two types of love are quite different. The one, namely, instinctive love is really a form of attachment (*mamatā*) as shown by the exclusions it implies, whereas the other signifies, as we know, complete detachment and therefore equal love for all. The latter resembles what theistic creeds like Christianity term 'divine love'; but even from that, it differs in some vital points. To mention only one of them: we are there in the realm of faith and not, as here, of knowledge or insight into the ultimate nature of the universe. It is this insight or abiding enlightenment that forms the third and last feature of the common Indian ideal of life to which I desire to draw attention now.

When the ethical training of the first stage comes to be aided by such enlightenment, renunciation, instead of being merely an aim externally regulating conduct, becomes the natural expression of an inner

conviction; and, in like manner, service, instead of being a means to an end, becomes the necessary consequence of that conviction.¹⁵ Or, to state the same otherwise, the constraint of obligation is replaced by the spontaneity of love. Owing to this total metamorphosis, moral action passes into a higher form. To a person that has reached this stage, the duties of his station, as such, to whose importance in the earlier stage of the discipline I drew attention, lose their special significance; and he reacts to presented situations without relating them, as before, to himself. It is this transcending of all subjective or personal valuation which is the significance of the Upaniṣadic saying that a knower is not troubled by thoughts like 'Have I not done the right?' or 'Have I done the wrong?'¹⁶ It means that he rises above the moods of self-approbation and self-condemnation. Consequently, though still an actor on the stage of the world like others, his point of view becomes that of an impartial spectator.¹⁷ He will necessarily continue to work and help others, but the service which he renders will extend to all without any distinction whatsoever. Thanks to his enlightenment and the new perspective he has thereby gained, it will also be the best of its kind. That is, whatever particular form it may take — whether it be directed to soothing others' sorrow or furthering others' joy — it will not aim merely at their material well-being but will also tend towards their spiritual uplift. And by these efforts to raise others to a higher plane of life, he becomes their true benefactor. Even more important than this direct good will be the influence which he silently exerts on them by his life led in entire consonance with the ideal. This is the *Gītā* conception of *loka-saṅgraha*: "What the best

men do, that becomes the standard for the rest".¹⁸ It is this ideal which is the culmination of the twofold training, moral and intellectual, that the Indian doctrines hold before us as *jīvanmukti*. Even those who do not formally accept this type of release and maintain that the ideal can be attained only hereafter agree that this feature of enlightened and self-forgetting service characterises the final state attainable in the present life.

Many a sage whose memory is preserved in Indian tradition, we learn, led a life of such disinterested and loving service. Of the instances that spring at once to mind, we may mention Vālmīki whose great epic of the *Rāmāyaṇa* has been the source of inspiration to successive generations of men and women. When Sīta, the queen of Rāma, was all too cruelly banished, he proved a ready refuge to her. He brought up her twin sons, restored them to Rāma and realising how pure she was, he vindicated her against the infamy that had so unjustly been cast upon her. His sympathies, indeed, extended beyond human kind to all sentient beings; and, as recorded in the epic itself, it was his pity at the sight of a bird killed by a heartless fowler, when it was disporting itself, that was the occasion for the birth of India's classical poetry. This ideal of practical life, we also come across every now and then in the works of great Indian poets. Kālidāsa, in more than one place, expresses his conception of the supreme God in terms of it — as ever intent on the welfare of his creatures but with never a thought of himself.¹⁹ Some of the best characters again which the poet has created, are meant to illustrate this ideal of what may be described as morality touched with vision. Kaṇva, for exam-

ple, whose serene and benignant influence is felt throughout the play of *Sākuntalam* is a selfless sage who watches over the welfare of all about him and is in particular, the help of the helpless, as shown by the belief prevalent in the whole hermitage that he looks, upon the heroine, who is an orphan thrown on his compassion, as his life's all (*jīvita-sarvasva*). In the *Nāgānanda* of another poet, while the ascetic life is admired on account of its freedom, purity and simplicity, the negative form of it is condemned on the score that it shuts out opportunities for doing good to others.²⁰ In our own time, Tagore has immortalised the same ideal of disinterested care for the good of others in various poems. It will suffice to refer to one where a young ascetic, Upagupta is portrayed as rushing to the aid of a castaway woman, whose enticing invitation he had once declined, saying that he would come when the time was ripe. One day thereafter, finding her lying in the shadow of the city wall 'struck with the black pestilence, her body spotted with sores,' he was moved by love and 'taking her head on his knees, he moistened her lips with water and smeared her body with balm.' 'Who are you, merciful one?' asked the woman. 'The time, at last, has come to visit you, and I am here' replied the ascetic.

The message of Indian philosophy is that man should seek for the fulfilment of his highest being in such service. The distinctive features of this service, as I have tried to point out, are that it should be rendered in a spirit of absolute disinterestedness and that it should be rooted in an all-comprehensive love which is the outcome of complete enlightenment.

Circumstances have in recent times tended to weaken the emphasis once laid on these features; and the consequence has been the subordination, on the whole, of spiritual to worldly ends in the pursuits of life. The idea of altruistic service is, indeed, there; but its scope has been narrowed in various soul-cramping ways. Its quality also has deteriorated, particularly on account of attempts made to reconcile service to others with what is called 'reasonable self-love'. But though, by reason of these radical modifications, the old ideal has been much obscured, it has not fortunately died out, for our own generation furnishes an outstanding example of it in one whose unselfish labours in the case of not merely his countrymen but of all humanity is shedding fresh light upon our land. The great need of the hour is to revivify our faith in this ideal. Though it is a characteristic feature of the Indian teaching, there is nothing racial or credal in this ideal to restrict its applicability to India. It seems, on the other hand, to possess a permanent value for all. When we remember that the teaching starts with the watchword, "Prefer not yourself to others," we see that its value should be particularly great in guiding the present-day world, and saving it from the heart-breaking experiences like those through which it is now passing.

REFERENCES

1. See e.g., *Nyāya-mañjari*, pp. 267-72. Jainism also, in its *Syādvāda*, may be said to have attempted a kind of synthesis of the various doctrines.

2. Cf. *Āgamānām virodho'pi nātīva vidyate puruṣārthe sarveṣām avirodhāt*, *Nyāya-mañjari*, p. 267.

3. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad Vārttika*, pp. 513-5.

4. Vasiṣṭha — See his *Dharma-sūtra*, (i.6) *Siṣṭaḥ punar-akāmātmā*, Cf. also Āpastamba: *Dharma-sūtra*, I-xx 1-4.

5. iii. 22.

6. Here a few Indian doctrines differ. They teach that social service is not essential to the cultivation of renunciation, but that renunciation is a necessary precondition of all true service. Though the preliminary discipline thus becomes negative, it does not signify indifference to others as shown, e.g., by the rule of *ahiṃsā* which is binding on all ascetics, no matter to what school they belong.

7. The conception of *sva-dharma* is wider than that of 'my station and its duties.' It includes the cultivation of self-regarding virtues also like humility and fortitude. But for the sake of simplicity in treatment, we confine our attention here to the predominant part of it

8. xii. 267-70.

9. Cf. Ānandajñāna's gloss on Śaṅkara's commentary on iii.25 and v.3.

10. *Tyaja dharmam adharmam ca ubhe satyānrte tyaja*
Ubhe satyānrte tyaktvā yena tyajasi tat tyaja.
 (Śānti-parva)

11. Cf. *Sambandha-viśeṣa-svīkāra parihāra niyamānadhya-
 sāyāt sādharmaṇyena pratītaiḥ: Kāvya-prakāśa*, iv.27-8.

12. See e.g., ii. 55 ff; xiv.22 ff.

13. *Ayam nijah paro veti gaṇanā laghucetasām*
Udāra-caritānām tu vasudhaiva kuṣumbakam.

14. Cf. *Sarvaṃ karmākhilam pārtha jñāne parisamāpyate, Gītā, iv. 33.*

15. Cf. *Sarvatraiva hi adhyātma-śāstre kṛtārthalakṣaṇāni yāni tānyeva sādhanāni upadiśyante — Śaṅkara on Gītā, ii. 54.*

16. See *Taittirīya Upaniṣad, ii. 9.*

17. Cf. *Sāṅkhyakārikā, 65.*

18. iii. 21.

19. See e.g., *Mālavikāgnimitra, i.1.;* *Kumārasambhava, vi. 26.*

20. iv. 2.

ASPECTS OF ADVAITA*
III. PRACTICAL ADVAITA
THE ETHICO-RELIGIOUS APPROACH

P. N. Srinivasachari

Section I. Theological Advaita

Practical Advaita stresses degrees of truth and goodness and the progression in knowledge or *jñāna* till *jñāna* transcends the subject-object relation and shines by itself. Pure Advaita employs the method of the logical and the psychological analysis of the Self and Pure Practical Advaita accepts empirically the cosmological view and explains the relation between the *jīva* and *Īśvara* in the light of the Illusion, the Limitation and the Phenomenon theories. In the orders of reality, namely, *prātibhāsika* (illusory), *vyāvahārika* (phenomenal) and *pāramārthika* (absolute), the stage of *vyāvahārika* or real reality is stressed in this aspect of Advaita. The world is unreal, but not illusory and its unreality is cognised only in the state of *mukti*. Practical Advaita adopts the ethico-religi-

* Courtesy: Sri Krishna Library Series 8: Sri Krishna Library, Mylapore, Madras, 1949.

ous method and traces the development of the unitive consciousness till the sense of duality is self-transcended. It accepts the authority of the Veda in its three-fold aspect of *karma*, *upāsanā* and *jñāna* and insists on the truth that the ethical performance of duty or *dharma*, the religious meditation on *Īśvara* or *dhyāna* and the philosophical knowledge of *nirguṇa* Brahman are not self-contradictory, but continuous and complementary. The performance of *niṣkāma karma* is a preliminary stage or indirect means to the awakening of the unitive consciousness and the worship of *Īśvara* or the Personal God is the way of realising Advaita by the *sāstraic* knowledge of the identity of *jīva* and *Īśvara*. The *mumukṣu* is equipped with the four *sādhanas* of *viveka* (discrimination), *vairāgya* (dissociation from sensual desires), a disciplined mind and desire for *mukti*. *Sāstraic* knowledge is itself mediate and indirect and it is fulfilled in the immediate intuition of the self-identity of Brahman. This method may be called negation by fulfilment and it means that each stage, when it is reached or fulfilled, transcends itself and points to the higher stage. The lower is not transmuted or absorbed into the higher by the reblending of material but it annuls itself in the very act of self-transcendence. It is the Advaitic faith that truth gets revealed by degrees until truth itself is revealed. There is no longer any going or goal and this faith is verified in Advaitic experience which is the one and only test of truth.

The performance of Vedic duties as prescribed in the *Karma Kāṇḍa* is preliminary to the awakening of Advaita *jñāna* and it is a necessary process of purification of the mind. It is no doubt true that action is

the purport of the Veda and that the subject of enquiry in the *Karma Kāṇḍa* is *dharma* or Vedic duty which ought to be done and that of the *Jñāna Kāṇḍa* or the *Vedānta Śāstra* is the ever-existent Brahman. Vedic imperatives and Vedāntic affirmations are therefore opposed as darkness and light. *Jñāna* is not an end to be attained by effort nor an activity of the mind, but is the knowledge of the self-realised Brahman. Brahman is not an object of injunction, but is the eternal subject which never becomes the object. But there is really no discrepancy between *karma* and *jñāna* as long as there is no awakening of the non-dual consciousness or *abhedajñāna*. The performance of Vedic duties like *yajña*, *dāna* and *tapas* is helpful in acquiring *śabdajñāna* of a *mahāvākya* like 'Thou art That' and awakening a thirst for *Brahmajñāna*. While *kāmya karma* or action prompted by desire makes a man a slave of sensual objects and confounds his reason, *niṣkāma karma* or the performance of duty for duty's sake purifies the mind and makes it disinterested and detached. The *karma yogī* thus realises that the knowledge and performance of *dharma* yield only transient and perishing pleasures and becomes eager to know the non-dual Self and secure eternal bliss. *Karma* presupposes the distinction between the means and the end and between the doer and the deed and makes a man realise in the long run that the bliss which he seeks is not in the object or in the subject-object relation but is only in the pure non-dual subject. The utility of *karma* thus consists in knowing its futility and in the awakening of the desire for the absolutely accomplished Brahman. But, as long as there is duality and dual consciousness, duty ought to

be done in the interests of world-welfare and as a worship of the Deity that is the real actor.

The next stage in spirituality is the passage from work to worship as described in the *Upāsanā Kāṇḍa* and it consists in devout meditation of the Personal God or the God of religion as contrasted with the meditation on *nirguṇa* Brahman or the Absolute. God as *saguṇa* Brahman is the object of meditation (*dhyeya*) and is different from *nirguṇa* Brahman which is the eternal subject (*jñeya*) of the *Upaniṣads*. Religious knowledge got by such meditation is higher than mere moral discipline or *karma vidyā* and *Śāstraic* knowledge, as it leads the *upāsaka* to the path of Devayāna. Brahman is *nirviśeṣa* and *niravayava* (indeterminate and formless) but it is conjoined with *māyā* and is objectified and spatialised in the interests of devout meditation. The world of nature is external to the mind and not constructed by it. *Īśvara* is entirely free from evil and other imperfections unlike the embodied *jīva* who is enveloped by *avidyā* and He should be sought as the cosmic source and the eternal *sākṣin* of the phenomenal show. The *Upaniṣadic vidyās* or meditations on *saguṇa* Brahman may vary with the nature of the *upāsaka* and the form and content of the *vidyās*, but the different cognitions subserve the same end of God-realisation. Vedānta insists on the ceaseless meditation on God as the antecedent condition of the realisation of Brahman. But it applies only to the slow-minded *upāsaka* who has progress in knowledge step by step by ceaseless reflection and one-pointed meditation. The chief value of *upāsanā* is to show the futility of *dvaita-jñāna* and point to self-enquiry as the true meaning of *bhakti*. There

is a type of Advaita called *Dhyāna-niyoga-vāda* referred to by Rāmānuja in his 'Śrī Bhāṣya' which insists on the unity of the two *Mīmāṃsās* dealing with injunction and intuition by relying on the *Upaniṣadic* injunction, namely, 'The self is to be heard, to be reflected and to be meditated upon' and this realistic view is favoured by pre-Śaṅkara Advaita. The Advaitic intuition of the *mahāvākya* 'Thou art That' is a progressive realisation of Brahman by means of reflection and meditation or *upāsanā* and is not obtained by immediate knowledge of the text. Just as the fear aroused by mistaking the rope for the snake is dispelled not by mere cognition but by actual perceptual evidence, *avidyā* can be removed not by sublation or the test of non-contradiction, but by the process of moral discipline and philosophic reflection or *samuccaya*. *Mukti* is thus an endeavour and end; it is immediate knowledge of identity mediated by reflective introversion. But this view is self-contradictory owing to the discrepancy between injunction and intuition and the theory of *niyoga* is a mechanical device without any metaphysical or spiritual import and all the Vedāntins agree in rejecting it as false and futile.

An allied school of *Niyogavāda* called *Niṣprapañcīkaraṇa Niyogavāda* asserts the world-negating view that Brahman is realised by the dissolution or destruction of the universe. *Prapañca* is an illusory projection of Brahman and when the effect is destroyed, Brahman, the cause, remains identical with itself, as whatever is originated is illusory and non-existent. This view is more objectionable than the former as *niyoga* is only a fabrication of the *Mīmāṃsaka* and as it lands us in acosmism. The Bhedābhedavādins like

Bhartṛprapañca, Bhāskara and Yādava reconcile the two *Mīmāṃsās* dealing with *jñāna* and *karma* by their theories of identity in difference and *jñāna-karma-samuccaya*. But Śaṅkara combats and repudiates these half-way houses to Advaita by exposing the fissure between *jñāna* and *karma* and establishing the absolute reality of the non-dual consciousness. *Karma* and *upāsanā* are meant only for the empirically-minded people and are preliminary stages to *jñāna* which transcends all stages. In the case of the quick-witted person who has *Advaita-vāsanā* or is born with it, all this elaborate moral and religious discipline is pre-supposed and he is supremely qualified to enquire into and intuit *nirguṇa* Brahman. He is a true *mumukṣu* who thirsts for *mukti* and he has *viveka*, *vairāgya* and self-control. Knowing that Brahman or *ātman* is real and *jagat* or non-self is false, he renounces all the desires for the pleasures of life here and hereafter and is firmly fixed in Advaitic faith. The essential *sādhana* for attaining *ātma-jñāna* is, however, *vairāgya* or renunciation of the non-self or objective consciousness, and renunciation and realisation are the negative and positive aspects of the same spiritual process. The *mumukṣu* is a metaphysician-mystic who enquires into Brahman and longs to realise it by following the negative logic of *neti, neti* and the mystic way of *via negativa* in terms of the Advaitic triad. Brahman or *atman* is the absolute in the appearances and yet beyond them and there are degrees of truth and reality and stages of knowledge though reality as such does not admit of degrees and stages. *Ātman* cannot be realised by the three *pramāṇas*, *pratyakṣa*, *anumāna* and *Śāstra*, or known by the three *Śāstraic* stages of *karma*, *upāsanā* and *jñāna*. It cannot be explained

causally by *ārambhavāda*, *pariṇāmovāda* or even *vivartavāda*. It is beyond the logical ideas of *sajātīya*, *vijātīya* and *svagatabheda*, beyond *tripuṭi* or the relation between the knower, knowing and the known. It is beyond existence, *prātibhāsika-satya*, *vyāvahārika-satya* and even *pāramārthika-satya*, as the Real is real in itself. It is beyond the three bodies, *sthūla*, *sūkṣma* and *kāraṇa*, the three *guṇas*, *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*, the three stages of *jāgrat*, *svapna* and *susupti*, the three states of the psyche, namely, *viśva*, *taijasa* and *prājña*. It is beyond the defects of *anṛta*, *jaḍa* and *duḥkha* or the three kinds of sorrow, namely, *ādhyātmika*, *ādhidai- vika* and *ādhibhautika*, the three *vāsanās*, *lokavāsanā*, *dehavāsanā* and *śāstra vāsanā*, the three processes of *utpatti*, *sthithi* and *laya*. *Ātman* is *niravayava*, *nirguṇa* and *ananta*. *Ātman* is thought of in a positive way as *sat-cit-ānanda* as *ekam*, *kūṭastha* and *advitīya*, secondless. It is being as such and it never becomes. To apprehend *sat* or being as such, the Hegelian method of thesis, antithesis and synthesis should be reversed and the *mumukṣu* should go from synthesis which is the becoming of *saṁsāra*, to the moment of antithesis which is the renunciation of the non-self or *anātmā*, to being as such which is Brahman. To comprehend the meaning of *cit*, he should transcend relational knowledge and know that the subject can never become an objective presentation or predicate and that the knower cannot be known. Relational knowledge is self-contradictory and false and truth is a progression from the external relations to the internal relations and from internal relations to self-relation or identity-consciousness. Sense-pleasures, inner happiness and the eternal bliss of Brahman differ in kind and the *mumukṣu* should reject the lower values and seek the highest. Duality and non-duality are polar opposites and the *mumukṣu*

should go from *karma* and *dhyāna* to *jñāna* and go beyond the relativity of good and evil and of the worshipper and the worshipped. Suresvara, a disciple of Śaṅkara and the author of 'Naiṣkarmya Siddhi', refutes the *Bhedābheda* theory of *jñāna-karma-samuccaya* and insists on *jñāna* as the only means to *mukti*. The two ways, *pravṛtti* and *nivṛtti* or secular and spiritual modes of life are incompatible as no man can serve God and mammon at once. The *mumukṣu* should renounce the world and the more the life of *sannyāsa*, the more is spirituality. In this way he reflects on the confusions and sorrows of the divided life or duality and yearns for the absolute which is his true nature. By denying every empirical experience given in sense-perception, reasoning and dualistic scriptural texts, he realises *nirguṇa* Brahman or *ātman* as implied in the *mahāvākya* 'Thou art That.' By denying the false and renouncing the empirical and contingent, he affirms truth and attains eternal life or *mukti*. In his commentary on *Sūtra* III. iii. 9, Śaṅkara distinguishes between *adhyāsa* and *apavāda*. *Adhyāsa* arises when the idea of one of two things not being dismissed from the mind, the idea of the second thing is superimposed on that of the first thing. For example, the idea of God Viṣṇu is superimposed in a statue of Viṣṇu. *Apavāda* arises when one idea previously attached to some object is recognised as false and driven out by the true idea springing up later after the false one. For example, the false idea of the body being the self is driven out by the true idea springing up later as expressed in the truth 'Thou art That.'¹

1. Thibaut's translation, Vol. II, p. 197.

To the middling type of the *mumukṣu* whose mind is not completely freed from the evils and illusions of *vikṣepa* and *āvaraṇa*, there is a progression in knowledge starting with *karma* and *upāsanā* and ending in *jñāna* and it itself admits of two stages, *parokṣa* and *aparokṣa* or the intellectual and the intuitional. Owing to the grace of the *guru* and God (who are *kārya* and *kāraṇa guru* in one) he discerns the implied meaning of the *mahāvīkya* 'Thou art That' in the light of the rule of interpretation known as *jahadajahad lakṣaṇā*. 'That' refers to *Īśvara* or Brahman reflected in *māyā* and 'Thou', to the *jīva* or Brahman reflected in *avidyā* and owing to *adhyāsa* or superimposition, there arises the contradiction between the omniscience and omnipotence of *Īśvara* and the ignorance and impotence of the *jīva*. By eliminating this contradiction arising from the sense of duality, the absolute identity of *Īśvara* and *jīva* as Brahman is established as in the case of personal identity implied in the proposition 'This is that Devadatta'. At first this knowledge is only *parokṣa* or mediate or intellectual and gradually it becomes immediate, intuitive experience or *aparokṣa jñāna*. Advaitic thought leads to and expires in the bliss of *anubhavādvaita*. In the super-conscious state called *nirvikalpa samādhi*, all duality and difference vanish and Brahman shines by itself as the one without a second, as existence-consciousness-bliss absolute. The *mumukṣu* now becomes a *jīvanmukta* who realises that he is Brahman and has practically transcended all stages of relational thought and is Infinite bliss. In that super-conscious state, there is no longer any distinction of knower, actor, or enjoyer, of bondage and *mukti*, of progression and attainment of Brahman, and Dvaita and Advaita. It

is a state of pure being and boundless bliss in which existence, experience and enjoyment become identical. Time expires in eternity or *sat*. *Cit* shines in eternal self-effulgence beyond subject-object consciousness and thought is immersed in absolute bliss. Even *aparokṣa jñāna* admits of stages of self-transcendence like those of *Brahmavid*, *Brahmavidvara*, *Brahmavidvariya*, and *Brahmavidvariṣṭha*. Like the arrow shot at an object, the body caused by *prārabdha karma* has its effect and persists even after *jñāna*. But one who is absorbed in *Brahmajñāna* is not affected by any kind of *karma* just as a man who awakes from dreams is not affected by the unreal objects of the dream state. If the *jīvanmukta* descends to the *vyāvahārika* plane or the world of relativity, he is not in any way touched or tainted by any bodily attachment and *Īśvara* works through him in the interests of world-welfare and *sarva mukti*. Death is the end of the whole drama and the dissolution of the body means *videhamukti* and the realisation of the state of *turiyātīta*. What is is and what is not is not. Brahman is and the *jagat* is not.

The term *māyā* may be interpreted from three standpoints in the light of Practical Advaita and the theory of the progression in knowledge, namely, the ethical, the metaphysical and the intuitional. According to the first view, *māyā* refers to the evanescence of life like the ripples in a river. As Śaṅkara observes in a *stotra* to Śiva, life perishes daily before our very eyes, youth passes away, days never come back. Time consumes all things, fortune is as transient as the ripples on the waves of the ocean and life is fleeting like lightning. When the philosopher reflects on these

passing shows of being, he concludes that life is self-contradictory and *māyā* in the second sense refers to the contradiction between reality and appearance. Every category of thought like space, time, cause and self appears to be real but is not real. *Māyā* is a frank statement of the fissure between the noumenal and the phenomenal. It is impossible to say whether the world is real, unreal or both real and unreal and it is like the riddle that arises when the rope is mistaken for the snake. When the philosopher changes into a *jīvanmukta*, the whole riddle is dissolved and then Brahman is and the world is naught or *tuccha*. What is is and what is not is *māyā*. In the ethico-religious stage, the *mumukṣu* is a *karma yogin* and an *upāsaka*; in the metaphysical aspect he takes to *vicāra* and reflecting on the meaning of the monistic texts knows that the self becomes the non-self though it cannot be the non-self; and in the *anubhava* stage he intuits that he is Brahman. Then he goes beyond all standpoints and stages and dialectics and counter-dialectics and is consciousness-bliss-absolute.

There is a school of Advaita known as *Anubhavādvaita* based on a work called "Tattva-rasāyana" and expounded by Appayya Dīkṣitar which lays more stress on evolution or *pariṇāma* than on illusion or *vivarta* and the theory of *kramamukti* or progressive realisation of Advaita. It refers to the state of *nirguṇātīta* which is beyond that of *nirguṇa* Brahman. The *Brahmavid* realises the infinite consciousness of *akhaṇḍākāra* revealed in *turiya*. In the expanding experience, there are three stages known as *Brahmavidvara*, *Brahmavidvariya* and *Brahmavidvarisṭha* and the last state is the fulfilment of Advaita and it is

called *turiyātīta* or *Anubhavādvaita*, which transcends even the stage of *turiya*.

Section II. Realistic Advaita — Non-Dualism

The realistic aspect of *Advaitavāda* as presented by some of its exponents like Kokilesvara Śāstri is opposed to the schools of subjective idealism and illusionism which regard the world of *nāmarūpa* as a mere mental construction and illusory appearance. According to it, the *Vedas* and the *Upaniṣads* which are the source of the foundational truths of Advaita insist on the reality of the world-order though they deny its independent existence. Śaṅkara, on this view, rejects Buddhistic idealism and affirms the reality of the external world¹. On the authority of the *Sūtra* which relies on the evidence of sense-perception, every perceptual experience testifies to the existence of the external world. The distinction between the object and the idea of it is given in consciousness itself. The waking and the dream states differ in kind and not in degree as the objects experienced in the dream state are negated by the waking consciousness. *Śāstra* is the only *pramāṇa* for affirming the existence of Brahman and reason is subservient to *Śāstraic* faith. It is not the word of God or any trustworthy person like a *ṛṣi* but is *apauruṣeya* (impersonal) and eternal (*nitya*). Whatever has a beginning has an end, but Vedic truths are true for ever. Whatever is composed by man is imperfect, but Vedic knowledge is impersonal and therefore infallible. The logical intellect may explain causal or empirical truths which are true at a particular time and place and to a particular person.

1. *Vide Śaṅkara Bhāṣya*, ii, 2. 28.

But the knowledge of Brahman is absolute and eternal as it transcends the limitations of language and logic. Reasoning has no finality and as Śaṅkara affirms, *Śāstra* alone reveals the nature of Brahman. Even Śaṅkara gives only a secondary place to the logical intellect or *tarka*. *Śāstra* has specialised in *Brahmajñāna* and is therefore the only adequate *pramāṇa* for proving its existence and nature. Though Brahman cannot be grasped by thought, it can be directly intuited and the Veda embodies these intuitions which are sometimes said to be the mystical experiences of the absolute. But *Brahmajñāna* is not the same as mystic experience though it is also supra-rational. Besides, Vedic knowledge being impersonal cannot be a mere body of subjective intuitions. Though it transcends thought, it can be tested and evaluated in the light of *mahāvākyas* which are absolutely true. Besides, reasoning or *vāda* proves its own futility and points to Veda as the source of *Brahmajijñāsā* and Śaṅkara insists on *śraddhā* or rational faith in *Śāstra* as a necessary *sādhana* for the *mumukṣu*.

According to this aspect of Advaita, the main text of Advaitic truth is its direct experience or *anubhava* and not metaphysical enquiry nor faith in *Śāstra*. The existence of Brahman is proved by immediate experience or *sākṣātkāra anubhava* and not by rational speculation and theological faith. Intellect has its completion in intuition and then what is inferred by *tarka* is immediately realised in *Brahmānubhava*. Though this state is often identified with mystic experience on account of its supra-rational and ineffable nature, it is different from it and it is identity consciousness emptied of intellectual and emotional content. In so

far as mysticism transcends sentient experience and logical thinking, it is practically the same as *parā vidyā*.

The Advaitic theories of *māyā* and *avidyā* and Brahman and *Īśvara* seek to establish the reality of the world of space-time-cause and the need for developing the unitive consciousness. The world is real but not real apart from Brahman. Truth is based not on the principle of non-contradiction and sublation but on the principle of unity or non-difference. The test of truth presupposes the distinction between *avidyā* in the subjective sense of *adhyāsa* and *avidyā* in the objective sense of phenomenal reality or *māyā*. What is viewed as *anya* or separate is *avidyā* and false and what is *ananya* or inseparable is true. It is owing to *avidyā* that *adhyāsa* arises and we mistake the *ātman* for the body and the senses. This error is purely subjective and it does not affect the reality of the objective world. *Māyā* refers to the world of *nāmarūpa* and it has no reality apart from Brahman. The world has its locus in Brahman and is its self-expression and it is owing to *avidyā* that we think it is different from and external to Brahman. *Māyā* has no *svarūpa* or nature of its own and it is indistinguishable from Brahman and it is not self sufficient. Many followers of Śaṅkara hold the realistic view that *māyā* is a positive stuff or something which accounts for the world and is not a mere idea or illusion or non-existence.

The theory of *māyā* is closely connected with that of causality. Brahman is the substratum of *māyā* and the two may be distinguished but not divided. In the causal state, *māyā* is one with Brahman; but in the manifested state, the one becomes the many, and the

effects are viewed as separate from the cause. The cause is not external to the effect but is immanent in it. Brahman is the cause of all the changes or *vikāras* of *nāmarūpa*, but is itself beyond the causal series and is *avikāri*. The many change but the one remains identical with itself. Unity explains difference and does not explain it away. Reality is one but it manifests itself in manifold ways. Owing to *avidyā* the *vikāras* or manifestations are treated as self-sufficient entities existing in their own right and not as the self-expression of the absolute. Why the absolute appears as phenomenal variations is inexplicable.

The nature of Brahman cannot be defined logically as it is *nirguṇa* and *niravayava*, characterless and formless, but it is not the negative infinite got by abstracting the infinite from the finite. Brahman is not being as such, but is the being of all beings and it is the infinite that is in the finite and yet beyond it. It is the presupposition of every subject-object relation and is yet the subject that is beyond the object. There is no other subject than Brahman; *Īśvara* is Brahman itself and it is false to say that *Īśvara* is only an illusory appearance of Brahman created by *avidyā*. The finite alone changes and it is accidental and perishing, but the infinite remains identical with itself in and through its changing states. The play varies, but the player is one and the same. The Vedic gods should not be conceived pluralistically or polytheistically but should be regarded as the phenomenal revelations of the same reality which is behind and beyond them, Brahman is the one that is in the many but it is not the many as the pantheists say. It exists in its manifestations but exceeds their content and charac-

ter. It is the eternal that is in the time series and is yet beyond it. This view avoids dualism but it does not establish monism or singularism. It denies the many as such but does not affirm bare identity.

The finite self by itself is separate from the infinite and this sense of separateness is traceable to *avidyā* and *adhyāsa*. The true self is the eternal subject beyond the subject-object relation but owing to *avidyā*, the *ātmā* becomes the object and mistakes itself for the body and the mind and becomes the empirical self or the *jīva*. It identifies itself with the *kośas*, namely the physical object, the mind, the logical intellect and the blissful relation, and suffers from the ills of *samsāra*. The confusion can be avoided by *advaitajñāna* or the non-dual experience of Brahman in the state of *mukti*. In *mukti* the world is not negated but the false view that the world is different from Brahman alone disappears. The infinite, as the *Upaniṣad* says, is immortal bliss. The knowledge by which one sees, hears, knows something else, that is the finite. That by which one sees, hears, knows nothing else, that is the Infinite. Obscuration or *āvaraṇa* is removed and not the cosmic order which persists even after *mukti*, on account of the force of *vikṣepa*. This aspect of Advaita brings out the affinity between the theory of *ananyatva* and the Viśiṣṭādvaitic ideas of inseparability contained in the causal relation of *ananyatva* and *apṛthaksiddhaviśeṣaṇa* and the theory of *mukti* as *avibhāga*. In *mukti*, the self is inseparable from Brahman as in the divine experience of the *mukta* 'I am Brahman without any division.' It is the unitive state of consciousness in which the self-feeling expires in enjoyment.

Amongst the realistic Advaitins who tried to reconcile the non-dualism of Śaṅkara with the non-dualistic tendencies of Śaivism and Vaiṣṇavism, the most important are Appayya Dīkṣitar and Madhusūdana Sarasvatī (1553). Śrīkaṇṭha's commentary on the *Brahma Sūtras* is a form of Viśiṣṭādvaita known as *Śivādvaita* and in his exposition thereof called 'Śivārka Maṇi Dīpikā', Appayya Dīkṣitar tries to prove that Advaita cannot be realised without the grace of Parameśvara. Madhusūdana Sarasvatī in his 'Advaita Siddhi' upholds the philosophy of Śaṅkara, but, as a practical Advaitin, he is inclined towards Supertheism and *Kṛṣṇa-prema*, as is evidenced by his other works. He stresses the theory of *adhikāra-bheda* or differences in qualification and the ladder theory and reconciles the claims of *bhakti* and *jñāna*.

Section III. Mystic or Intuitional Advaita

One aspect of Advaita that is of inestimable value to the student of comparative Vedānta is the direct spiritual realisation by saints like Śrī Rāmakṛṣṇa Paramahansa, of Brahman as *saguṇa* and *nirguṇa* and the practical unity of the *sādhana*s and *siddhi*. It was his unique mission to demonstrate to the present age by practice and precept, the truth that, behind the varieties of religious experience, there is an underlying unity and that Vedāntic *darśana*s are not contradictory but are complementary. Traditional philosophy, Eastern and Western, favours the method of constructing a new system by the destruction of the old or establishing a *siddhānta* by the refutation of other theories which are called *pūrvapakṣa*. It applies the law of the excluded middle to rival or opposing

systems and arrives at a conclusion by eliminating other alternatives. But Śrī Rāmakṛṣṇa had a genius for intuiting truth directly and not inferring it by laborious logical thinking. It was an epoch-making period in the history of comparative Vedānta when he showed a middle path by avoiding the ambiguous middle between the extremes of theistic fanaticism shown by his *guru* Bairavi Brāhmaṇī and the monistic rationalism insisted on by Totāpuri, his Advaitic *guru*. He often lived in the borderland between the two states and discovered the value of non-dualism as the meeting ground between dualism and monism. It is the aim of this section to bring out the affinities between *Śāktaism*, Bengal *Vaiṣṇavism* and monism as expounded by Śrī Rāmakṛṣṇa and the philosophic implications of this triadic movement, namely, Bhedābheda, Acintya Bhedābheda and Advaita.

Initiated into the inner meaning of *Tāntric sādhana* by his *guru*, Bairavi Brāhmaṇī, Śrī Rāmakṛṣṇa, who was the very pattern of purity, began to practise the *sāttvic* state of *divyabhāva* without any taint of sensuality or tinge of selfishness. The underlying principle of this *sādhana* lies in the *yogī* transcending sensibility by satisfying its demands and not renouncing them as in *jñāna yoga*. Sublimation and not sublation is its main aim and it is transmuting the animal instinct into the instinct for the infinite. Every woman including his wife was worshipped by Śrī Rāmakṛṣṇa as an emblem or embodiment of the Divine Mother. *Kuṇḍalinī Śakti* is coiled up in the lower extremity of the spinal cord and as the result of *yoga*, it ascends from the animal plane to the human and the spiritual and finally to the seventh

plane of *sahasrāra* or Divine state of super-consciousness. It is a progression from consciousness to the more of itself till it expands into infinity. *Śāktism* is the philosophic form of *Tāntric* worship and it is a variety of *Bhedābheda* which is midway between theism and absolutism. Its method is realistic as well as idealistic and it accepts identity as well as difference as the two moments of Reality. Reality is the one in the many as *Śivaśakti* which can be distinguished but not divided. The former is the static absolute and is impersonal and the latter is dynamic and concrete. *Māyā* is not an illusion that infects Brahman somehow, but is the energising *śakti* that is immanent in it and becomes the cosmic source. It is the finitising principle of the infinite like the icebergs in the ocean and like sparks from the blazing fire. By adoring *śakti* as the Divine Mother, the *sādhaka* rises by grace from the sundered state of consciousness in *saṁsāra* to the seamless state of Śiva. Śrī Rāmakṛṣṇa, relying on the authority of the philosophy of *Śivasakti*, insists on the truth of *Bhedābheda* teaching that Kālī the Mother is the same as impersonal Brahman.

Śrī Rāmakṛṣṇa's devotional ardour was manifest even in his childhood, and under the guidance of his teacher, Bairavi Brāhmaṇī, he dived into divinity and was immersed in the immortal bliss of *bhakti*. The *bhakta* seeks no boons from God and he loves God for the sake of love and even *mukti* without *bhakti* has no charms for him. *Bhakti* grows from more to more and it is a ladder of love in the increasing order of intimacy ranging from *sānta*, *dāsya*, *sakhya* and *vātsalya* culminating in *madhurabhāva* or *mahābhāva*. Love

of God develops into a longing for Him or *rati* and deepens into *prema* or mad frenzy like the *mahābhāva* which Rādhā and Caitanya had for Śrī Kṛṣṇa. Love of God is at first *vaidhībhakti* which insists on conformity to rigid disciplines; but as it gathers momentum, it bursts all bounds and the soul is caught up in the furnace of love. *Kṛṣṇa-prema* burnt itself into the heart of Śrī Rāmakṛṣṇa and consumed his very being. Brāhmaṇī discerned in him all the nineteen symptoms of *mahābhāva* like the flow of tears, bodily tremour, trance and the superconscious rhapsodies of God-intoxication. "For six months he was lost in frenzy and spiritual agony. He felt a strange burning sensation all over the body and minute drops of blood began to ooze out from the pores of his skin. The joints of the body seemed at times to be loosened. The senses stopped functioning and he looked like a corpse." At long last, he had a vision of Śrī Kṛṣṇa who merged himself in his inner nature and he was lost in the bliss of Divine communion.

Owing to this experience of transcendental love of *mahābhāva*, Śrī Rāmakṛṣṇa is regarded as a super mystic. The philosophy of mysticism is a coherent exposition of the intuition of *bhaktas* who claim to contact God, commune with Him and enjoy the eternal bliss of union. It is, however, rejected by the metaphysician as a feminine philosophy that favours emotionalism with elations and depressions and by the medical materialist as mental aberration rising from psycho-physical disorders and self-hypnotisation. Philosophy as a rational enquiry into experience as a whole is not determined by the psychology of sex or by the genetic account and just as in metaphysics reality is different from appearances, in mysticism,

spirituality is distinguished from its semblances. The heart has its logic which constrains us to think in a coherent way. Mysticism dealing with transcendental love in terms of *acintya bhedābheda* is as philosophic as identity philosophy. Every variety of *Brahmānubhava* is supra-rational but not irrational. In the highest state of *prema* or *parābhakti*, dualistic thought expires in the bliss of union, and though the lover and the beloved are different existentially, they become one essentially in the unitive experience. As the *Bṛhad-āranyaka Upaniṣad* puts it, just as in conjugal felicity, the idea of inside and outside is swallowed up, the sense of finite-infinite is lost in the bliss of *Brahmānanda*. Śrī Rāmakṛṣṇa's experience of *mahābhāva* is true to type.

Śrī Rāmakṛṣṇa's entry into *nirvikalpa samādhi* was the consummation of his spiritual experiments and divine experiences. Initiated into the meaning of *mahāvākya* of Advaita by his *guru*, Totāpuri, and equipped with the four *sādhana*s, Śrī Paramahansa had no need for laborious thinking and theorising and he attained *nirvikalpa samādhi* which is beyond the plane of duality. The following are his immortal words describing the indescribable state. 'For six months at a stretch, I remained in *samādhi*. I was not conscious of day and night. Flies would enter my mouth and nostrils just as they do in a dead body, but I did not feel them. The hair became matted with the accretions of dust and the body would have perished but for the kind ministrations of a monk.' Then he came down to body-consciousness at the command of the Mother that he should for the sake of humanity remain at the threshold of relative consciousness. Śrī Rāmakṛṣṇa attained *Brahmajñāna* which is not *jñāna*

of Brahman but *jñāna* that is Brahman and became a *jīvanmukta* who realised freedom in embodiment. He was divinely commissioned to be in the world and communicate his spirituality to others.

Though Advaita is the experience of the identity of *Jīva* and *Īśvara* and therefore logically indefinable in terms of genus and species and differentia, the philosophic intellect seeks to go beyond its own phenomenal realm and explain the noumenal state in a negative way. The terms *sat*, *cit* and *ānanda* are employed by the Advaitic philosopher as a negative definition of Brahman that is really *niravayava* (formless) and *nirguṇa* (indeterminate). The transcendental state is sought to be explained by the empirical categories of space, time, causality, quality, quantity and relation. Finite intellect transcends itself and commits suicide at the very entrance to the supra-intellectual state of *samādhi*. This process of explaining the inexplicable is described in a variety of ways though the final result is the same. The three terms, *sat*, *cit* and *ānanda* serve as convenient intellectual devices and may be considered in more detail than before.

The term *sat* refers to the eternal beyond the temporal; the temporal series, past, present and future, is swallowed up in eternity (*trikalābādhitam satyam*). *Sat* refers to the spaceless space of *cidakāśa* and the causeless cause of bare being. The categories of space, time and causality are empirical views and are not applicable to the absolute which sublates them. *Sat* is the secondless one (*ekamevādvitīyam*) beyond the mathematical ideas of the one and the many and the metaphysical concepts of unity and diversity. *Sat* is being beyond becoming and beyond the cosmic process

of creation, preservation and destruction. It is the change which knows no change (*nirvikāra*) and is therefore beyond the dual concepts of being and becoming. Reality is different from existence and *sat* is the real in itself and it transcends the world of *nāmarūpa* consisting of an infinity of existences varying in structure and function. *Sat* is Reality beyond the appearances which exist but are not real. The three bodies, the three *guṇas* and the three states of consciousness are phenomenal and fictitious and are *asat*. *Sat* alone is real and *asat* is unreal and non-existent.

The term *cit* brings out another aspect of the nature of Reality or Brahman in terms of absolute idealism. Brahman is equated with *jñāna* or pure consciousness (*nirviśeṣa cinmātra*). *Sat* is *cit* as being and consciousness are identical. In Advaita, the theory of knowing is the same as the theory of being. Brahman is beyond the logical way of thinking and the theorising activity itself. Every process of thought in the different levels of sense-perception, reasoning and scriptural knowledge is a subject-object relation. It involves the three factors of the knowing subject, the known object and knowledge. Every such relation is self-contradictory and was shown to point beyond itself to the real in itself. A relation is a relation between two terms, external or internal and in either case, it betrays self-discrepancy. It cannot be external as the terms are related; it cannot be internal as the relata are outside the relation. It cannot be both external and internal. This self-contradiction can be removed only by transcending relational knowledge. *Cit* is pure consciousness beyond this

tripuṭi or logical thinking and it is self-realised in *nirvikalpa samādhi* beyond all thought including the relation between the absolute and the relational. It is not even the 'I' in '*Aham Brahmāsmi*' ('I am Brahman') as the moment the 'I' posits itself, it becomes the opposite or 'non-I' and is caught up in self-contradiction. *Cit* is not a substance having the quality of *caitanya* as the relation between the two is a fissure between the 'that' and the 'what'. It is therefore *nirviśeṣa* or *nirguṇa*. *Cit* is not self-determined or determined by anything outside it, and it is *akhaṇḍa cīnmātra*. It shines by itself as *svayamjyotis* in *cidākāśa* in which there is neither the shining *cit* nor the illuminated object or *acit*. Śrī Rāmakṛṣṇa's trance is thus beyond the thought plane.

Brahman is not mere *sat* and *cit*, but is also *ānanda* or bliss absolute. *Brahmānanda* is pure bliss beyond the duality and dualism of pleasure and pain. *Ānanda* is not to be regarded as supreme happiness, rapture or ecstasy as it is different from sense enjoyment, mental happiness or contentment and does not admit of calculus or evaluation. It is not even the blissful quality resulting from divine communion as every quality implies a subject and involves a relation and a dualism between the enjoying subject and the object of enjoyment. *Brahmānanda* is not the bliss of Brahman but the bliss that is Brahman and is thus ineffable and absolute. It is the *śānti* or peace that passeth understanding in which all doubts are solved and all conflicts are dissolved. In *ānanda*, thought is dissolved in enjoyment and like the salt doll immersed in the sea and the iceberg melting in the sunlit ocean, the limitations of personality are lost in infinite and eternal bliss.

The traditional schools of Vedānta like Dvaita, Viśiṣṭādvaita and Advaita, differ in their exposition of the nature of Brahman and the means of realising it. The chief points of controversy are whether Brahman is *saguṇa* or *nirguṇa* and whether *bhakti* or *jñāna* is the means to *mukti*. The opposing attitudes of the two *gurus* of Śrī Rāmakṛṣṇa, namely Bairavi Brāhmaṇī and Totāpuri, were clearly traceable to their extreme views on these two problems. As a staunch dualist and Vaiṣṇavite, the former refuted and rejected Advaitic monism as dry-as-dust intellectualism, dealing with arid abstractions without any emotional warmth. Totāpuri was equally strong in his condemnation of theism as anthropomorphism and in his rejection of *bhakti* as an emotional effusion. He scoffed at the devotion of Śrī Rāmakṛṣṇa when he clasped his hands in chanting the names of God, by the remark that he was flattening dough for making bread. It was the rare mission of Śrī Paramahaṃsa to avoid the extremes and to show by his life and teachings that the Absolute of Advaita is the God of religion and that *bhakti* and *jñāna* lead to the same goal. *Māyā* is *vidyā-māyā* and is real *śakti* and not *avidyā-māyā* which is illusory and she is the Divine Mother, by whose grace duality can be self-transcended. He practised the *tāntric sādhana* and its philosophy of *Bhedābheda* and insisted on the unity of Brahman as both personal and impersonal in the twin aspects of *Śiva-Śakti* like the *bhedābheda* relation between the snake and its coils and the ocean and its waves. *Saguṇa* Brahman is *sat-cit-ānanda*, concretised. Consciousness which is now sundered can become seamless when it reaches *sahasrōra*. *Bhakti* of the dualistic type becomes a non-dualistic experience in

the mysticism of *mahābhāva* when the lover and the beloved become one and when thought expires in bliss. They may be two in philosophical thinking but they become one in mystic experience or *unio-mystico*. In monistic experience, *jīva* and *Īśvara* are identical and *jñāna* is Brahman and not attaining Brahman. To Śrī Rāmakṛṣṇa, the only proof of the existence of Brahman is the direct experience of Brahman and whether *mukti* is union or identity, there is no doubt that it is release from suffering. In the state of union the *ahaṅkāra* of the self disappears and in identity *ahaṅkāra* as the self passes away and the distinction between the two is without any practical difference. Thus Śrī Rāmakṛṣṇa proved by the varieties of his Vedāntic experience that there is unity in variety and that the *sat* is the same though it may be experienced in different ways.

ADVAITA AND OTHER ORTHODOX SCHOOLS

*S. Revathy**

This paper attempts to present a history of philosophical controversy rather than to compile an annotated catalogue or a narration of isolated items of thought unconnected with one another. The continuity and connection, action and reaction, thesis and antithesis that exist between the philosophy of Advaita on the one hand and the other schools of thought, namely, the *bhedābheda* of Bhartṛprapañca—a pre-Śaṅkara Vedāntin, the *bhedābheda* of Bhāskara, the Pūrva-mīmāṃsā, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, the Sāṅkhya, the Viśiṣṭādvaita and the Dvaita show that no philosophy can fully be understood unless it is studied in the light of its connection with other systems.

The formulation of the doctrine of Advaita by Śaṅkara on the basis of the theory of *avidyā* has paved

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the way for viewing knowledge as the sole means to liberation. The central philosophical position of Advaita that revolves upon the view may be summed up as follows: the ultimate reality is free from all attributes, God, soul, and the world are only seeming diversifications of the only reality through *avidyā*, the world is indeterminable, the soul is non-different from Brahman, and liberation consists in realizing here and now one's true nature as Brahman. All this is in sharpest contrast with the philosophical position of the *bhedābheda*vāda of Bhartṛprapañca according to whom the world is real, there is difference-cum-identity between Brahman on the one hand and the souls and the world on the other, the reality is endowed with attributes, liberation is to be achieved in a hereafter not through knowledge alone, but by a combination of knowledge and action.

Śaṅkara's review of this view of *bhedābheda* in his commentary on the *Bṛhadāraṇyakoṇiṣad* has been elaborated by Suresvara in his *Vārttika* on the latter work. Hiriyanna in his celebrated article entitled "Fragments of Bhartṛprapañca" has given a detailed, clear, and judicious account of the philosophy of *Bhedābheda* advocated by Bhartṛprapañca.¹ Śaṅkara's criticism of the theory that the combination of knowledge and *karma* (*jñānakarmasamuccaya-vāda*) leads to liberation in his commentary on the *Bhagavadgītā* is directed against the philosophy of Bhartṛprapañca. And it may be added that the criticism of the above theory is chiefly based upon the vital difference that exists between knowledge and action. In his commentary on the *Īśāvāsyoṇiṣad*, Śaṅkara addresses the *bhedābheda*vādīn thus: "Are you

not cognizant of the difference—the difference fundamental as a rock—between *jñāna* and *karma* which you have had it called to your attention?” (*jñānakarmaṇoḥ virodham parvatavadakampyam yathoktam na smarasi kim.*)²

And in his commentary on the *Brahmasūtra*, Śaṅkara states that according to Advaita, knowledge as well as meditation—a form of mental activity—constitutes the mode of mind. Yet there is stronger reason that precludes the possibility of viewing knowledge too as a form of mental activity. It is because an activity comprises within itself the processes by which one makes one's choice, resolves it into an intention, and puts that intention into effect. But in the process of the rise of knowledge the act of making a choice or decision and the determination to put one's choice or decision into an effect—these are not at all involved. It is with this in view Śaṅkara says that, while activity depends upon the will of the person, knowledge depends upon the object concerned. In the case of activity one has the freedom to act in a particular manner or in a different manner or not to act at all. And this sort of freedom one does not have in the realm of knowledge. For, knowledge would arise of its own accord—independent of any external compulsions—provided the necessary auxiliary causes and the instrument of cognition are present. Śaṅkara observes:

*kartum akartum anyathā vā kartum śakyam laukikam vaidikam ca karma.....na tu vastu evam naivam asti nastīti vā vikalpyate. vikalpanāstu puruṣabuddhyapekṣāḥ. na vastuyāthātmyajñānam puruṣabuddhyapekṣam. kim tu vastutantrameva tat.*³

Elsewhere he states:

*dhyānam cintanam yadyapi mānasam tathāpi
puruṣeṇa kartum akartum anyathā vā kartum
śakyam puruṣatantratvāt. jñānam tu pramāṇa-
janyam. pramāṇam ca yathābhūta-vastuviśayam.
ato jñānam kartum akartum anyathā vā kartum
aśakyam. kevalam vastutantrameva tat. na coda-
nātantram. nāpi puruṣatantram. tasmāt mānasat-
vepi jñānasya mahadvailakṣaṇyam.*⁴

It must be noted here that Śaṅkara is fully aware of the fact that in certain Upaniṣadic texts the word “*jñāna*” is used interchangeably with the “*upāsanā*” or “*dhyāna*” which is a mental activity. It is used with reference to meditative worship on the conditioned Brahman.⁵ Śaṅkara has not at all set himself against the combination of this kind of *jñāna* with *karma*. Nor is he opposed to the practice of *karma* along with the mediate knowledge of Brahman. But he is against the combination of *karma* and *jñāna*, the latter being understood in a specific sense. He clarifies his conception of *jñāna* with which, he feels, *karma* can never be associated in the famous passage: “*avagatiparyantam jñānam sanvācyāyaḥ icchāyāḥ karma.*”⁶ Here he feels keenly the presence of subtleties between *avagati* and *jñāna*. By *jñāna* he means the direct knowledge of the partless ultimate—the knowledge which the enlightened soul is endowed with and which transcends the notions of the characteristics of being an agent and an experient and which serves as an impassable barrier that hampers the pursuit of *karma*—the pursuit which solely depends upon the conviction that one is an agent and the experient of the results of actions. By the word *avagati*, Śaṅkara means pure conscious-

ness which is free from the veil of *avidyā* and which manifests of its own accord. The whole text would thus mean: the serious study of the Upaniṣadic texts with a view to ascertain their import (*śravaṇa*), the profound and valid reasoning on the import with a view to ascertain that that import is true (*manana*), and a centered fixing of the mind on the truth since arrived at with a view to discard the false notions of 'I' and 'mine' (*nididhyāsana*) — all this has for its definite aim the immediate knowledge of Brahman (*jñāna*) which effects the removal of the veil of *avidyā* thus enabling the true nature of Brahman — the true nature of the soul too — to manifest in its pristine nature (*avagati*).⁷ And Brahman which thus manifests is liberation (*brahmabhāvaśca mokṣah*).⁸

From the foregoing discussion it would be clear that knowledge of such nature can never be associated with *karma*. Thus, while Bhartṛprapañca is of the view that there is no stage in the life of a man where performance of *karma* could be dispensed with, Śaṅkara is of the view that in the case of the enlightened one *karma* has no significance at all. The enlightened one has transcended every obligation to perform any *karma* whatsoever. Not only this, Śaṅkara emphasizes the view that one must give up the performance of *karma* when one has attained what is known as the cleansing of the heart or *sattva-suddhi*. Then one must pursue *śravaṇa*, *manana* and *nididhyāsana* referred to earlier with a view to attain the knowledge of Brahman.

The Pūrvamīmāṃsā school is of the view that an existent entity like a *soma* creeper is subsidiary to the thing that is to be achieved, namely, sacrifice or the

nīyoga or *kārya* that results from the performance of sacrifice. Śabara in his commentary on the *Pūrvamīmāṃsā-sūtra*⁹ states: *bhavyāya bhūtam upadiśyate*. Śaṅkara, however, affirms, on the basis of the Upaniṣadic text that prescribes the duties relating to one's stage and class of life with reference to the direct knowledge of Brahman, that according to Advaita, *karma* which is a thing to be attained is subsidiary to the existent entity, namely, Brahman (*bhūtāya bhavyam upadiśyate*).

Sarvajñātman, an younger contemporary of Śaṅkara, states in his *Saṅkṣepaśūrīraka*:

*bhavyāya bhūtamiti kiñca vidhipradhāne kāṇḍe
nayo'yam, iha tadviparītamāhuḥ bhūtāya bhavya-
miti bhūtaparam hi sarvaṃ vedāvasānamiti sūtra-
kṛdācacakṣe.*¹⁰

It might be asked as to how *karma* which is well-known as the means to heaven, etc., can be held as leading to cleansing of heart. The Advaitin applies the maxim of *saṃyoga-prthaktva* arrived at in the *Pūrvamīmāṃsādhikaraṇa* entitled "*saṃyogaprthaktvādhikaraṇa*"¹¹ to explain this position. The aphorism that constitutes this *adhikaraṇa* is: "*ekasya tu ubhayatve saṃyogaprthaktvam.*" The word *saṃyoga* means a sentence: "*saṃyujyate padārthaḥ padārthāntareṇa viśiṣṭaḥ bodhyate yatra saḥ vākyaṃ.*"¹²

And the word "*prthaktva*" means *dvirūpatā*. One and the same factor serves a two-fold purpose; and for this, the text that admits of the dual role of that particular factor is the authority. When viewed in this light, *karma* prescribed as the means to heaven

and the like would give forth the result of cleansing of the heart when performed without any desire for its fruit.

The Pūrvamīmāṃsā school holds the view that a sentence is valid only when the knowledge it gives rise to is helpful towards activity or abstinence which would lead to some human end. The knowledge of Brahman that results from the Upaniṣadic texts does not lead one toward any activity, nor makes one desist from committing an interdicted action. Hence the Upaniṣadic texts are not valid.

Śaṅkara states that it constitutes glory to the system of Advaita that the knowledge of Brahman which arises from the *Upaniṣads*, by annihilating *avidyā* which is the root-cause of passion and hatred that prompt one to activity leads one to the highest human end, namely, liberation (*alaṅkārohyasmōkam yadbrahmātmāvagatau satyām sarvakartavyatāhāniḥ kṛta-kṛtyatā ca*).¹³

The concept of *avidyā* and the non-real character of the world are but a corollary of the Upaniṣadic view that Brahman which is the sole reality is non-dual. The world is considered to be an appearance of Brahman; and Brahman is taken to be the material and the efficient cause of the world. The *Upaniṣads* first speak of Brahman as associated with the world and later negate the world in it mainly to prove the non-real nature of the world and thereby the absolute nature of Brahman. The concept of *avidyā* is introduced to account for the relation of Brahman to the world. It is clear, therefore, that Śaṅkara had to reject the theories of creation advocated by the other

schools as their admissions would clearly contradict the absolute nature of Brahman.

In the history of Indian thought there are three theories of creation: (i) the *asat-kāraṇavāda* of the Buddhistic school; (ii) the *asat-kāryavāda* of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika; and (iii) the *sat-kāryavāda* of the Sāṅkhya school.

The Buddhistic school upholds the view that it is non-existence that is the material cause of an effect. A sprout comes into existence only when the seed sown is disintegrated and loses its form. A cause is that which exists in the moment immediately preceding the rise of the effect. Here it is only non-existence that exists in the moment immediately preceding the rise of the effect. Hence non-existence is the material cause of every effect. This view of the Buddhists is referred to in the *Nyāyasūtra*—“*abhāvāt bhāvotpattiḥ na anupamṛdya prādurbhāvāt.*”¹⁴ This theory is known as *asat-kāraṇavāda* as, according to this, non-existence is the material cause of effects.

The theory of Buddhists referred to now is not sound. A seed which is sown leaves out its earlier form and becomes swollen on account of its association with mud and water. It is from the seed which has attained a new configuration that the sprout comes into existence. Thus it is only the seed that is the cause of sprout. Hence the view that non-existence serves as cause is untenable. This is stated in the *Nyāyasūtra*—“*na vinaṣṭebhyaḥ anispatteḥ.*”¹⁵

The *Brahmasūtra*, “*na asato’dr̥ṣṭatvāt,*”¹⁶ rejects the theory of creation admitted by the Buddhists. Śaṅkara, while commenting on this aphorism, states.

“If an effect could come into existence from non-existence, then since non-existence could be found anywhere, anything may come into existence from any source. In ordinary experience, we notice that a particular effect comes into existence from a particular cause and this would not hold good according to the present theory. Never indeed is the absence of seed different from the hare’s horn. If the sprout is admitted to be originated from the non-existence of seed, then it could very well come into existence from hare’s horn too.”

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school maintains the view that a positive entity is the inherent cause of an effect. According to this school, an effect, say cloth, comes into existence over and above the threads through the relation known as inherence. Hence the cause is known as inherent cause. But this school holds that in the cause, namely, the threads, the effect, *viz.* cloth does not exist prior to its origination. In other words, there is prior non-existence of the effect in its cause. This prior non-existence is only an efficient cause and not the material cause as in the Buddhistic system. The effect is totally different from its cause. This view is criticised by the Sāṅkhya school on the ground that people who desire cloth are seen to be seeking only the threads and not clay. This recourse to a specific cause would be intelligible only when the effect is admitted to be existing in the cause prior to its production. According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school, since prior non-existence of an effect would be present everywhere there is the unwelcome position of anything arising from any factor whatsoever. Since it is not so and since recourse to an appropriate material cause is noticed, it

is to be admitted that an effect pre-exists in its cause. Hence the theory of creation admitted by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school is not sound.

The Sāṅkhya school argues that the effect pre-exists in the cause. And there is identity between cause and effect. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika would argue that, since the effect pre-exists in its cause, it need not and cannot be produced. The causal operation of the efficient cause would be futile.

The Sāṅkhya would argue that an effect exists in a latent form in its cause prior to its production and in order that it may be manifested into a gross form causal operation is necessary. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika would argue that manifestation which is said to be brought forth by causal operation means addition of certain excellences and removal of certain defects. According to the basic position of the Sāṅkhya, excellences and defects are already present. Hence the former need not be added and the latter cannot be removed. In other words, causal operation is unnecessary.

Gauḍapāda, while reviewing the view-points of the Sāṅkhya and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, states that the arguments put forward by each of the two schools against the other seem to be quite convincing. The rejection of each of the two views by the other leads one to conclude that there can be no real origination of any object.¹⁸

Thus, the logical difficulties in the theories of creation advocated by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and the Sāṅkhya have led the Advaitin to formulate his

theory known as *vivarta-vāda* according to which no object ever originates from a cause really. But there is merely the appearance of the effects. In the wake of this basic theory, the Advaitin maintains that Brahman, the partless entity, *appears* as the world through *māyā* or *avidyā*.

Bhāskara who came immediately after Śaṅkara and who wrote commentaries on the *Gītā* and the *Brahma-sūtra* was of captious disposition. He sets forth his chief aim in writing the commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra* thus: "The present commentary on the *Brahmasūtra* is composed chiefly with a view to reject as untrue and unauthorized of acceptance the commentary composed by some wherein the import of the *Brahma-sūtra* has been consciously and forcibly suppressed and grossly distorted" (*sūtrābhiprāyasamvṛtṭyā svābhiprāyaparakāśanāt vyākhyātam yaiḥ idam śāstram vyākhyā iyam tannivṛttaye*).¹⁹

In the wake of Bhāskara there appeared one Kesava, Amṛtānanda and the author of the text, *Brahmaprakāśikā*. They maintained, as against the Advaitic position, that Brahman actually undergoes transformation into the form of the world. The *prakṛti-pariṇāma-vāda* of the Sāṅkhya has been superseded by the *Brahma-pariṇāma-vāda* of Bhāskara. This theory, however, does not hold good. If Brahman undergoes transformation in its entirety into the form of the world, then there is no possibility of its regaining its original form. If parts of Brahman were to undergo transformation, then Brahman, being composed of parts would become non-eternal. Bhāskara, in spite of these obvious defects, advocates the above theory as he is opposed to the introduction of

the principle of *avidyā* to explain that Brahman is the material cause of the world in the sense that it is the substratum of the appearance of the world. He is of the view that the doctrine of *avidyā* bears the impress of the Māhāyānika Buddhism, and states that some — obviously referring to Śaṅkara — base their philosophical position on this doctrine and mislead the entire world by clouding its mind and making its thinking absurdly incoherent (*māhāyānikabauddhagandhinām māyāvādam vyāvṛṇayantaḥ lokān vyāmohayanti*).²⁰

It may be added here that many of the criticisms levelled against Advaita by its critics during the later period could easily be found in the writings of Bhāskara. Till 13th century, the Advaitic writers were chiefly concerned with critically examining and finally rejecting the objections raised by Bhāskara against Advaita. Udayana in his *Nyāya-kusumāñjali* refers to the *Brahma-pariṇāmavāda* of Bhāskara and derisively states that the view that Brahman undergoes transformation may gratify those who come in the 'impressive' line of Bhāskara (*brahma pariṇateriti bhāskaragotre ynjyate*).²¹ In fact no system of Vedānta can satisfactorily explain the concept of material cause. The latter involves the theory of transformation which, for the reasons set forth above, cannot be admitted in the case of Brahman. The Advaitin, therefore, admits *māyā*, identical with *avidyā*, as present in Brahman. It undergoes transformation into the form of the world and Brahman, being the substratum of *māyā*, is figuratively spoken of as the material cause of the world. Rāmānuja does accept *māyā*, but not in the sense in which the Advaitin admits. While the Advaitin identifies *māyā* with *ajñāna* or *avidyā* on the basis of the *Nṛsiṃhottaratāpinī* text—“*māyā ca avidyā*

ca svayameva bhavati"²²—and treats it as indeterminable, Rāmānuja makes a distinction between the two and holds that *māyā* is the wondrous power of Brahman²³ identified as Lord Nārāyaṇa and that it is real. And *avidyā*, he equates with *karma*.²⁴ *Prakṛti* which is real is an inseparable attribute of the Lord and it has the Lord as its self; it is the body of the Lord. And it is this *prakṛti* that undergoes modification into the form of the world. Brahman is spoken of as the material cause in the sense that its attributive part, *viz. prakṛti*, undergoes change. Thus we see that Rāmānuja too does not attribute material causality to Brahman in a direct manner.²⁵ Madhva has totally dispensed with the concept of material cause itself in the case of Brahman.

The Advaitin contends that reality is attributeless and that the texts that speak of the reality as endowed with attributes refer to the conditioned Brahman. The qualities mentioned in the *Upaniṣads* in the case of Brahman are only illusory as they are presented upon Brahman by *māyā*.²⁶ The soul is non-different from Brahman. The text "*tat tvam asi*" signifies the non-difference between the true nature of the soul and of God which is pure consciousness. The primary meaning of the word *tat* is God who is omniscient, while that of *tvam* is the soul which has finite knowledge. Any identity between the two is not possible. So the words "*tat*" and "*tvam*" secondarily convey the consciousness-element in both God and the soul and the logical significance of the text, "*tat tvam asi*" is the non-difference between the true nature of the soul and that of God.

The world is illusory as it is a transformation of *māyā*. The Upaniṣadic texts such as "*sarvam khalu idam brahma*"²⁷ convey Brahman not as identical with the world, but as free from any relation to the world.

Rāmānuja is of the view that just as there are texts which proclaim the identity of the soul and of the world with Brahman, in the same way there are texts which state the difference between the soul and Brahman and also the world and Brahman.²⁸ The Advaitin contends that the texts that speak of the difference between the soul and Brahman as well as the world and Brahman refer to the difference that exists only in the realm of *avidyā* or *māyā*. But the apparent contradiction between the two sets of the Upaniṣadic texts can be resolved, Rāmānuja affirms, by taking recourse to the texts that are known as *ghaṭaka-śrutis* which speak of the relation of *śarīra-śarīribhāva* between God and the soul and between God and the world. The text "*tat tvam asi*" would mean that the soul has Brahman, that is, God, as its self. The text, "*sarvam khalu idam brahma*" means that the world has Brahman as its self.²⁹ Rāmānuja feels that, according to this interpretation, one could avoid recourse to secondary signification which is adopted by the Advaitin. Thus, according to Rāmānuja, the word "*tvam*" which the ordinary people think as conveying the soul as such, conveys the sense, *viz.* the soul which has Brahman as its self. This, of course, is an extended meaning of the word; and Rāmānuja says that this is the meaning of the term "*tvam*" which is known only to those who are engaged in the study of Vedānta.³⁰

In regard to the nature of the soul, Rāmānuja holds that it is atomic in size; but it has *dharmabhūtajñāna* or attributive consciousness. Hence the soul has no difficulty in experiencing sensations throughout the body with the aid of *dharmabhūtajñāna*. The latter streams forth from its substratum — the soul through the sense-organ when the latter is in contact with its object and manifests the object. The Advaitin holds that mind comes out through the sense-organ when the latter is in contact with its object, reaches the place of the object, and undergoes modification in the form of object. This is known as *vṛtti* and the consciousness that is reflected therein is known as knowledge. Thus we see that Rāmānuja admits *dharmabhūtajñāna* in the place of *vṛtti* or the modification of mind. It is evident that the differences between the Advaita and Viśiṣṭādvaita in some of their details are not as vast as they are sought to be made out. Since the entire edifice of Advaita is based on the concept of *māyā*, when the latter is not admitted, the entire metaphysical structure of Advaita would lose its significance. That is why we have the vast amount of literature both in the Advaita and the Viśiṣṭādvaita schools in regard to the concept of *māyā*. Rāmānuja is much obsessed with the doctrine of *māyā* as advocated by the Advaitin; and this has led him to characterize Advaita as a sinful view. He says thus when he contrasts the philosophy of Advaita with that of Yādavaprakāśa which he characterizes as more sinful than Advaita (*brahmājñānapakṣādapi pāpīyānayan bhedābhedapakṣaḥ*).⁵¹

Madhva accuses the Advaita of barrenness, emptiness and futility. He argues that the text of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, “*yatra tu sarvam ātmaivābhūt*

tat kena kaṁ paśyet"³² does not glorify the state of liberation wherein it is said by the Advaitin that for the liberated soul everything would be of the nature of Brahman and that the conscious activity of one perceiving an object through a specific instrument would be totally absent. On the other hand, it repudiates the above view of the Advaitin by saying that, if everything would become of the nature of Brahman, then there is no possibility of one seeing another, etc. The experience of bliss in the state of liberation is not possible without difference which the Advaitin says that the realized soul has already transcended. Madhva, therefore, has to interpret the earlier text, "*yatra hi dvaitamiva bhavati taditaraḥ itaram paśyati*"³³ in the sense that one must have the experience of bliss, etc., and this could be had only when there is difference. And the word "*iva*" must be taken in the sense of "*eva*". There is a text of the *Gauḍapāda-kārikā*, "*upadeśādayaṁ vādo jñāte dvaitaṁ na vidyate*," which the Advaitin interprets in the sense that, when Brahman is realized, then duality vanishes. Madhva reads the text as *upadeśādayaṁ vādo (a)jñāte dvaitaṁ na vidyate* and states that it is only in the view of *ajñānin*, that is the Advaitin, the world does not exist; in the case of *jñānin* like us—the Dvaitins—duality does exist.³⁴

Madhva further proceeds to say that the etymological derivation of the word *prapañca* is:

prakṛṣṭaḥ pañcavidho bhedaḥ prapañcaḥ.

The five-fold difference characterising the entire world is: 1. difference between God and souls; 2. difference between God and the world; 3. diffe-

rence between the souls and the world; 4. difference between one soul and another soul; and 5. difference between one object of the world and another object. The Advaitin, however, considers these five kinds of difference as only fancied by *avidyā* and hence not real.³⁶

Madhva accuses that the Advaitin considers the soul as identical with God. He states that, in ordinary experience, if one considers one's superior to be one's equal then one will be punished. On the other hand, if one recognizes the qualities of one's superior, one will be rewarded. Hence the Advaitin who considers the soul to be one with God will be punished, and punished severely, — this is his conclusive rejoinder.³⁷

It must be noted here that the Advaitin never says that the soul is identical with God. On the other hand, he affirms that the true nature of the soul, namely, *Ātman*, which is pure consciousness is non-different from the true nature of God which, too, is pure consciousness. In his commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra* "*adhikam tu bhedanirdeśāt*"³⁸ Śaṅkara emphasizes the Advaitin's view that, as long as one is in the realm of *avidyā*, there is difference between God and soul. But when one realizes one's true nature which is pure consciousness, *avidyā* is removed and the so-called *jīva* and the so-called God become free from soul-hood and God-hood respectively; and what remains then is pure consciousness.

Thus we see that Advaita Vedānta stimulated in reaction the most notable developments in the history

of Indian philosophy. Each one of the three schools of Vedānta has been criticized by the other schools and it is gratifying to note that none of these has been swept away by the waves of criticisms. Indian thought, therefore, may be represented as full of metaphysical systems unreconciled with one another. We shall take this as a tribute; for, that is precisely the characteristic of what is called philosophy.

NOTES

Abbreviations

Bh. Bh.	—	Bhāskarabhāṣya
Bṛh. Up	—	Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad
BS	—	Brahma-sūtra
BSB	—	Brahmasūtrabhāṣya
Chānd.Up	—	Chāndogyopaniṣad
Nṛ.Up	—	Nṛsiṃhottaratāpinyupāniṣad
NS	—	Nyaya-sūtra
PMS	—	Pūrvamīmāṃsā-sūtra
RP	—	Ratna Prabhū — Commentary on the Brahmasūtrabhāṣya of Śrī Śaṅkara, Niraaya Sagar Press, Bombay, 1907
SS	—	Samkṣepaśāstraka: edited with Introduction, English Translation, Notes and Indexes by Dr. N. Veezhinathan, Madras University Philosophical Series No. 18, University of Madras, 1985
Śrī.Bh.	—	Śrībhāṣya
Śvet.Up	—	Śvetāsvataropaniṣad

- VP — Vedāntaparibhāṣā
 VS — Vedārtha-saṅgraha
 VTV — Viṣṇutattva-vinirṇaya : translated into English with detailed notes by Professor K.T. Pandurangi, published by Dvaita Vedānta Studies and Research Foundation, Bangalore, 1991

1. M. Hiriyanna, *Fragments of Bhartṛprapañca*, Indian Philosophical Studies, (Kavyalaya Publishers, Mysore, 1972), pp 6-16

2. Commentary on the *Īśāvāsyaopaniṣad*, in *Complete Works of Śaṅkarācārya*, Vol. VIII, Samata Books, Madras, verse no. 2, p.9

3. *BSB*, pp. 90-91

4. *Ibid.*, p. 129

5. *BSB*, 1.1.4

6. *BSB*, p. 77

7. *RP*, Commentary on *BSB*, p. 40

8. *BSB.*, 1.1.4

9. *PMS*, III.iv.40

10. *SS*, I.312

11. *Adhvāra-mīmāṃsā-kutūhalavytti*, Sri Lalbahadur Sastr Rashtriya Sanskrit Vidyapith, Delhi, 1969-70, on *PMS*, 4-3-6

12. *Ibid.*, p. 681

13. *BSB.*, p. 130

14. *NS*, 4.1.14, *Nyāya-sūtras* of Gautama with *Vātsyāyana-Bhāṣya*, edited by Dwarikadas Sastri, Bauddha Bharati, Varanasi, 1984

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15. *Ibid*, 4.1.17
16. *BS*, 2.2.26
17. *BSB*, p. 539
18. *Gaṇḍapāda-kārikā*, edited by R. D. Karmarkar, GOS, Class B, No. 9, p. 32
19. *Bh.Bh. on Brahmasūtra*, (Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, Benares. 1903) 1-4-25
20. *Ibid*.
21. *Nyāyakusumānjali*, edited by Uttamūr Vīrarāghavācārya, Kendriya Sanskrit Vidyapitha, Tirupati, 1980, Stabaka II. p 137
22. *Nṛ Up.*, 9.3
23. *Śrī Bh. on BS.*, 3.2.3
24. *Viṣṇupurāṇa*, 6-7-60; *vide: VS*, Pub. by Ram Dhulare Sastri, Gorakhpur (Vikrama Saka, 1998) p. 80
25. *VS*, p. 119
26. *BSB* 3.1.11 and 3.2.15
27. *Chānd Up* 3.14.1
28. *Śvet Up*, 1.25
29. *VS*, p. 141
30. *Ibid.*, pp. 39 and 41
31. *Ibid.*, p. 102
32. *Bṛh Up.*, 4.5.15
33. *Bṛh. Up*, 2.4.14
34. *VTV*, p. 31
35. *Ibid.*, p. 30
36. For details see S. Revathi, "Critique of Difference" in the *Voice of Sañkara*, Vol. XV, No. 1 pp, 50-56
37. *VTV*, p 12
38. *BS*, 2.1 22

ŚRĪ ŚAṆKARA AND KASHMIR ŚAIVISM: A PERSPECTIVE

S. Sankaranarayanan*

Ācārya Śrī Saṅkara, in his *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*, cites the theory 'All beings are sentient' of an unnamed philosophical school and defends it against the attack of the Sāṅkhya. That school remains still to be properly identified. Hence in the present paper an attempt is undertaken to study that theory, to identify its propounders, and to examine the tenability and implication of the identification suggested.

I

The second chapter of the *Brahmasūtra* is traditionally known as *avirodhādhyāya* because it establishes that the thesis propounded so far on the basis of *śruti*, (scriptural authority) is not inconsistent with *smṛti* (the writings of the sages) and with *tarka* (reasoning), and so on. The third *adhikaraṇa* (section or topic) in the first *pāda* (quarter) of this chapter goes by the name *na vilakṣaṇatvādhikaraṇa*. It consists of eight *sūtras* (aphorisms nos. 4-11). It is meant to establish:

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the nature of Brahman, as explained so far, is not inconsistent with our fundamental thesis that the supreme Brahman, the supreme consciousness is both the efficient and material cause of the world. Here, an objection comes from the Sāṅkhya philosopher. His points may be summarised as follows. First, Brahman cannot be the material cause of the phenomenal world. For, the nature of the world is fundamentally different from that of Brahman: the world is *acetana* (non-sentient) and *aśuddha* (impure), while Brahman is *cetana* (sentient) and *śuddha* (pure). Secondly, this basic difference of these two is well indicated by a scriptural sentence itself. Hence the *pūrvapakṣasūtra* (aphorism, raising the objection) runs as “न विलक्षणत्वादस्य तथात्वं च शब्दात् ।” (2.1.4). While commenting upon this aphorism, Śaṅkara points out the seriousness of the first point of the Sāṅkhya. He brings to our notice the idea that the basic nature of the material cause always continues to exist in its effect. For example, the earthness, smell, etc. of the clay and the goldness and brightness of the lump of gold are found to exist in their respective effects, namely the pot and the ornament. The Ācārya ends this line of argument with the finale:

Indeed, the classification of the sentient and the non-sentient beings, because of their fundamental disparity, is well known to one and all. Hence the material cause of this insentient world cannot be the sentient Brahman.

प्रसिद्धश्चायं चेतनाचेतनविभागो लोके । तस्मात् ब्रह्मविलक्षणत्वात् नेदं जगत् तत्प्रकृतिकम् ।

Proceeding further, the Ācārya refers to an objection of a philosopher (not named) against the above Sāṅkhya point. The objection goes:

Some one might declare: on the strength of the scriptural declaration let me view the world of objects as being born of a material cause that is sentient. On the basis of the same scriptural authority, let me also logically conclude that the world is sentient only. For, the basic nature of the material causes should continue in their effects. No doubt, we do not perceive sentiency in the objects of the world. But this non-perception may be due to the peculiar nature of the modification of the cause. For example, we do not observe sentiency even in the admittedly sentient human beings while they are at deep sleep or in a faint. In the same way, the sentiency, though it really exists, is not observed in a log of wood, in a lump of clay, and so on. This fact may very well explain the well-known classification of the universe into the sentient and the non-sentient.

योऽपि कश्चिदाचक्षीत — “श्रुत्या जगतश्चेतनप्रकृतिकतां तद्वलेनैव समस्तं जगत् चेतनमवगमिष्यामि; प्रकृतिरूपस्य विकारेऽन्वयदर्शनात्। अविभावनं तु चैतन्यस्य परिणामविशेषाद्भविष्यति । यथा स्पष्टचैतन्यानामप्यात्मनां स्वापमूर्च्छावस्थासु चैतन्यं न विभाव्य, एवं काष्ठलोष्टादीनामपि चैतन्यं न विभावयिष्यते । एतस्मादेव विभावितत्वाविभावितत्वकृतविशेषात् ... [चेतनाचेतन]प्रविभागप्रसिद्धिरत एव न विरोत्स्यते” — इति ।

Thereupon the Sāṅkhya is shown to answer the objection in the following way: "In the above manner one may somehow explain away the disparity of characters between the sentient and the non-sentient. But, one cannot account for the disparity based on the purity of Brahman and the impurity of the world of objects. In fact, even the former disparity cannot be satisfactorily explained. For, simply surrendering to the scriptural authority one may assume the entire world as sentient. But the scripture itself classifies beings under two different heads, *viz.* the sentient and the non-sentient. From this, it naturally follows that the non-sentient world cannot be the result of a sentient material cause like Brahman. So says the later part of the *pūrvapakṣasūtra*:

तेनापि कथंचित् चेतनाचेतनत्वलक्षणं विलक्षणत्वं परिहिरयेत्।
 शुद्धयशुद्धित्वलक्षणं तु विलक्षणत्वं नैव परिहियते। न
 चैतदपि विलक्षणत्वं परिहर्तुं शक्यत इत्याह — तथात्वं च
 शब्दात् — इति। अनवगम्यमानमेव हीदं लोके समस्तस्य
 वस्तुनश्चेतनत्वं चेतनप्रकृतिकत्वश्रवणत् शब्दशरणतया केव-
 लयोत्प्रेक्षेत। तच्च शब्देनैव विरुद्ध्यते। यतः शब्दादपि तथात्व-
 मवगम्यते। ... शब्द एव "विशानं च" (तै.उ.2.6) इति कस्य-
 चिद्भागस्याचेतनतां श्रावयन् चेतनात् ब्रह्मणो विलक्षणम-
 चेतनं जगत् श्रावयति।

After completing the objection of the Sāṅkhya in full, under two *sūtras* (2.1.4-5), Śaṅkara comments on the *siddhāntasūtra* (the aphorism containing the conclusion): "दृश्यते तु।" (2.1.6). While commenting on this, the Ācārya first refutes in his own inimitable manner all the criticisms levelled by the Sāṅkhya. Then, he takes up that theory of the philosopher of

the unnamed school which has been refuted earlier by the Sāṅkhya under the *pūrvapakṣasūtras*. He defends that theory against the opponent. Here the Ācārya argues as follows:

Even he, who on the basis of the scriptural authority, assumes that the entire world is itself sentient, he too might conveniently explain the scriptural classification of beings into *cetana* and *acetana*. For, he could as well assert that the common fundamental nature, *viz.*, sentiency is evident in some and it is not so in certain others. But the Sāṅkhya opponent cannot even dream of explaining the Vedic statement that asserts: the supreme sentient Brahman manifested both the sentient and the non-sentient.

योऽपि चेतनकारणत्वश्रवणबलेनैव जंगतश्चेतनतामुत्प्रेक्षते,
तस्यापि "विज्ञानं चाविज्ञानं च" इति चेतनाचेतनविभाग-
श्रवणं विभावनाविभावनाभ्यां चैतन्यस्य शक्यत एव योज-
यितुम्। परस्येव तु इदमपि विभागश्रवणं न युज्यते। कथम्
परमकारणस्य ह्यत्र समस्तजगदात्मना समवस्थानं श्राव्यते
"विज्ञानं चाविज्ञानं चामवत्" इति।

Then follow the other *sūtras*, other arguments, counter arguments and refutations, etc., connected with the topic of the section. Thus in the *Brahma-sūtra-bhāṣya* of Śaṅkara we find a theory of a certain philosopher, who, like the Advaitins upholds that the sentient supreme Brahman is the material cause of the world and that cause manifests both as the sentient and the non-sentient beings of the world. That philosopher also maintains that the disparity between the sentient and the non-sentient is due to the fact

that the sentiency is manifest in some, but unmanifest in others. This theory must have been current before and during the time of Śaṅkara. In fact the tenor of the *Bhāṣya* of Śaṅkara strongly suggests that even the Sāṅkhya philosophers were quite familiar with this theory. It should be clearly noted that the Ācārya defends this theory against the attack of the Sāṅkhya philosopher, even though he himself, being a *vivartavādin* (he who upholds the view that the cause manifests its appearance as effect without itself undergoing any change in the process) cannot own it.

II

The source of this theory remains yet to be identified properly. The commentators like Ānandagiri, the author of the *Nyāyanirṇaya* and Advaitānanda, the author of the *Brahmavidyābharana* seem to view the theory as the one being offered by Śaṅkara himself by way of providing a suitable preamble to the expression "*tathāitvam ca śabdāt*" that constitutes the later part of the *pūrvapakṣasūtra* quoted above. They do not say anything about the theory under the *siddhāntasūtra*. So also the celebrated Vācaspati Miśra, the author of the commentary *Bhāmātī*, does not take the trouble of identifying the author of the theory, while commenting upon the *Bhāṣya* under the *siddhāntasūtra*. However, under the *pūrvapakṣa-sūtra* Vācaspati views the upholder of the theory as an assumed interrogator who has been shown, throughout in the context, as one arguing with Sāṅkhya. But, the style and flow of the *Bhāṣya* seem to indicate the theorist who is introduced by the passage "योऽपि कश्चिदाचक्षीत etc." is a real, and

not an assumed, interrogator, whose theory, as we saw a little earlier, was known to Śaṅkara as well as to the opponent, the Sāṅkhya philosopher. Perhaps viewing in this line, Govindānanda, the author of the *Bhāṣyaratnaprabhā*, calls the upholder of the theory as an *ekadeśī*, i.e. one who belongs to one of the schools of Advaita philosophy. The other commentators like Nārāyaṇasarasvatī, the author of the *Vārttika*, Citsukha, the author of *Bhāṣyabhāvaprakāśikā*, and others, and even the latest commentator Ananta-krishna Sastri, have taken more or less the same stand in their respective commentaries.

George Thibaut seems to have been influenced by Vācaspati Miśra's view. Hence he appears to take the theory in question as an assumption put forward 'merely for argument's sake'. On the other hand, S K. Belvalkar, obviously falling in line with Govindānanda, calls the theorist in question as *ekadeśīya* and *svayūthya* (one who belongs to the Ācārya's own persuasion). However, this scholar quickly confesses: "Whether Śrī Śaṅkara has in view here any particular school of thought, or merely putting forth a possible position that can be maintained, is more than what we can know." But the context and the way in which the upholder of the theory under consideration is introduced in the *Bhāṣya* by the passages "योऽपि कश्चिदाचक्षीत, etc." both under the *pūrvapakṣa* and the *siddhānta sūtras* seem to make it clear that the theorist under consideration was not a mere fictitious interrogator, but was a real philosopher or most probably a school of philosophy. What could have been that school? Let us try to find out an answer.

We know that in the scenic land of Kashmir there developed a school of Śaivism, *viz.*, the Śaiva Advaita or Śaiva Absolutist school of philosophy, which the modern scholars call Kashmir Śaivism. This school was known to the ancient by the names *Trika*, *Spanda* and *Pratyabhijñā*. The students of this school of philosophy would easily identify the above theory cited by Śaṅkara with one of the most fundamental tenets of that school. According to the Śaiva Absolutists, the supreme consciousness, which they named Śiva, manifests as both the sentient and non-sentient beings, starting from the highest of the personal gods, like Brahmā, down to the small grass. Because sentiency, these philosophers maintain, is recognisable in the former, they are called *ajādas*, *i.e.* sentient beings; and because in others it is concealed and hence is not recognisable for ordinary persons, they are known as *jadās*, *i.e.* non-sentient beings. So affirms Abhinavagupta (*c.* 950-1020 A.D), a celebrated teacher of the Kashmir Śaiva Absolutist school;

सोऽयमात्मानमावृत्य स्थितो जडपदं गतः ।
 आवृतानावृतात्मा तु देवादिस्थावरान्तगः ।
 जडाजडस्याप्येतस्य द्वैरूप्यस्यापि चित्रता ॥

— The *Tantrāloka*, 1.134-35

Indeed, the idea conveyed by the above verses bears a striking resemblance to that of Śaṅkara's sentence:

एतस्मादेव विभावितत्वाविभावितत्वकृताद् विशेषात् ...
 प्रविभागसिद्धिः ।

Further, Somānanda (*c.* 900 A.D.) of the same Śaiva Advaita school of philosophy argues:

If you conclude that the pot is non-sentient, on the ground that sentiency and its resultant activities like the movement-of-body, the blinking-of-eyes, etc. are not perceived in the pot, how are you going to explain the same non-observance in the sentient soul during the period of faint? Therefore it must be accepted that sentiency does exist in everything including the pot, but remaining concealed.

घटादेर्भवता ज्ञातमचैतन्यं कथं? यदि ।

चेष्टोन्मेषाद्यभावात्; तन्मूर्च्छिते किं करिष्यसि ।

...

एकैकशोऽस्ति चैतन्यमनभिव्यक्तरूपकम् ॥

— *The Śivadr̥ṣṭi*, 5.18, 21.

Here too one may easily recognise the close similarity that the argument and idea of the verses of Somānanda bear with that of Śaṅkara when he says

समस्तं जगत् चेतनमवगमिष्यामि... अविभावनं तु चैतन्यस्य
परिणामविशेषाद्मविष्यति । यथा स्पष्टचैतन्यानामप्यात्मनां
स्वापमूर्च्छाद्यवस्थासु चैतन्यं न विभाव्यते ...

Now, on the basis of what we have seen so far, it may be safely concluded that the theory Śaṅkara refers to twice and defends also in the *na vilakṣaṇatvādhikaraṇa* is of some school of the Śaiva Advaita philosophy of Kashmir.

III

Now, a student of the history of Indian philosophy may point out an anachronism and an incon-

gruity in the above suggestion. He might argue: The latest research shows us that Śaṅkara flourished either in the beginning or the middle of the eighth century A.D., or in the middle of the seventh century.¹ On the other hand, the beginnings of the Kashmir Śaivism are to be traced to the *Sivasūtras* that are said to have been revealed for the first time by Śiva himself to Vasugupta of Kashmir. The latter is assigned by all scholars roughly to the period 775-825 A.D.² So how could Śaṅkara cite a theory of a philosophical school that was yet to be born, *i.e.* about a century later? Further, the theory quoted by Śaṅkara is clearly stated to be based on the authority of *śruti*, *i.e.* the *Veda*. In fact, the Ācārya's reference to the theory commences as "श्रुत्या जगतश्चेतनप्रकृतिकताम्", etc. (see above). On the other hand, the Śaiva Advaitins of Kashmir built up their theory on the authority of the *Āgamas*, *i.e.* *Śaiva Āgamas* alone, which, according to their tradition, were taught by God Śiva himself. So the suggested identification of the theory under study is hard to maintain logically. Moreover, had Śaṅkara cited the Śaiva Absolutist theory in the context, how is it that great commentators like the universally acknowledged polymath, (*Sarvatāntrasvatāntra*) Vācaspati Misra of the tenth century A.D. should fail to recognise it?

Now let us try to answer these questions.

First of all, it is good to bear in mind that the theory that all beings, the movable and immovable (*carācara*), are manifestations of one supreme consciousness, namely Brahman-Ātman, is not an invention of the Śaiva Absolutists of Kashmir. That idea is at

least as old as the *Upaniṣads* themselves. For in them, besides विज्ञानं चाविज्ञानं चाभवत् (see above), we come across passages like:

- (i) सर्वं खल्विदं ब्रह्म तज्जलान् (*Chānogyā* 3.14.1)
“Indeed this entire world is Brahman, from which this is born forth, into which this gets dissolved and in which this remains alive.”
- (ii) अहमेवेदं सर्वम् । (*ibid.*, 7.25.1)
“I, indeed, am all this.”
- (iii) आत्मैवेदं सर्वम् । (*ibid.*, 7.25.2)
“The Self is, indeed, all this world.”
- (iv) इमानि भूतानि इदं सर्वं यद्यमात्मा ।
(*Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, 2.4.6; 4.5.7)
“These beings and this all are this Self.”
- (v) ब्रह्मैवेदं विश्वमिदं वरिष्ठम् । (*Muṇḍaka*, 2.2.12)
“Indeed, it is this greatest Brahman that is this universe.”

More examples are easily available. Further, that all objects in the world, including stone, log-of-wood, are sentient had been accepted as a valid thesis by the *Vyākaraṇa-vārttikakāra*, Vararuci-Kātyāyana (c. 4th century B.C.) and his *Bhāsyakāra*, Patañjali (c. 2nd century B.C.) Hence, under the Pāṇinian rule “घातोः कर्मणः समानकर्तृकादिच्छायां वा ” (3.1.7) a *vārttika* declares “सर्वस्य वा चेतनावत्त्वात् ” (15)³ “Because all this (in the world) has sentiency.” While commenting on this, Patañjali cites seven or eight authentic usages⁴ that would testify the validity of the above statement of Kātyāyana. It is known that, when the *Mahā-*

bhāṣya remained in the books alone elsewhere, it was popularised in Kashmir earlier than the time of Bhartṛhari (c. 400 A.D.) as stated by that grammarian himself.⁵

Thus, the evidences we have with us seem to indicate: the above well-known Upaniṣadic theory must have been adopted and assimilated by the Kashmiri thinkers very early, *i.e.* during the period when some kind of *Trika-Pratyabhijñā* Śaivism was congealing there in Kashmir. These thinkers built up a suitable logic around the theory in order to maintain and defend it, obviously against the formidable opponent, *viz.*, Sāṅkhya, the *pradhānakāraṇavādin*. The same theory along with its Kashmirian logic was taken up for further refutation by the Sāṅkhyas of the pre-Śaṅkara age.⁶ Śaṅkara refers to this proto-Pratyabhijñā theory of Kashmir in the given context and defends it against the Sāṅkhya. And in the post-Śaṅkara period, the Kashmir Śaivism was systematized as a full-fledged independent philosophical school by incorporating into it all the earlier suitable theories of their own including the one under examination. Thus, the question of anachronism does not arise in our suggestion.

The second question has been virtually answered while speaking on the first point. Besides, it may be of interest to note two more points here.

Firstly, all the scriptures we now call Āgamas were born only in an atmosphere fully charged with Vedic thought, then current. Hence, they must have incorporated within themselves, besides new and newer ideas, a good amount of Vedic views also. For

instance, the idea that all is nothing but the supreme consciousness, supreme Brahman, as we saw above, is certainly a Vedic theory though its logical explanation could have been of later Kashmir Śaiva origin. This point becomes clear from Śaṅkara's own words:

श्रुत्या जगतश्चेतनप्रकृतिकताम् ... अवगमिष्यामि ... अवि-
भावनं तु चैतन्यस्य ... भविष्यति ।

(For, complete quotation see above) Further, it is also good to notice that Śaṅkara often uses *āgama* as a synonym of *śruti*. Here are a few instances in the *na vilakṣaṇatvādhikarāna* itself:

- (i) कुतः पुनरस्मिन् अवधारिते आगमार्थे तर्कनिमित्तस्याक्षे-
पस्यावकाशः? (2.1.4)
- (ii) प्रमाणान्तरानवगाह्यः आगममात्रप्रमेयो यीऽयमर्थः
(आत्मा) स्यादनुष्ठेयरूप इव धर्मः (2.1.4)
- (iii) आगमविरोधस्तु प्रसिद्ध एव; चेतनं ब्रह्म जगतः कारणं
प्रकृतिश्चेति आगमतात्पर्यस्य प्रसाधितत्वात् (2.1.6)
- (iv) न हीदमतिगम्भीरं भावयाथात्म्यं मुक्तिनिवन्धनमाग-
ममन्तरेण उत्प्रेक्षितुमपि शाक्यम् (2.1.11)

Here in recognising *āgama* in the sense of *Veda*, the Ācārya seems to follow the tradition set up by earlier writers. For example, Bhartṛhari uses *āgama* as a synonym of *Veda* in

न चागमादृते धर्मस्तर्केण व्यवतिष्ठते (*Vākyapadiya* 1.30)⁷

And the *Mahābhāṣyakāra*, Patañjali too had already used the word in the same way in -

रक्षोहागमलध्वसंदेहाः प्रयोजनम् (*Mahābhāṣya*, *āhnika*, 1)

The *Yogasutrakāra*, Patāñjali also in his *sūtra* “प्रत्यक्षानुमानागमाः प्रमाणानि” (*Yogasūtra*, 1.7) employs *āgama* in a much wider sense of what the other *darśanakāras* call *Śabdapramāṇa* or ‘verbal authority.’ There is one more important point. The Ācārya was very much aware that another set of his opponents, *viz.*, the Māhesvara-Pāsupatas who, according to the Ācārya, held the non-Vedic view, of the world-creatorship of God, and claimed that their scriptures were taught directly by Śiva Paśupati to them. Hence he tells us in the *Pāsupatādhikaraṇa*:

माहेश्वरास्तु मन्यन्ते ... पदार्थाः पशुपतिना ईश्वरेण पशु-
पाशविमोक्षणायोपदिष्टाः (*Sūtrabhāṣya*, 2.2.37)

But what is really interesting is that the Ācārya is not inclined to recognise and call that ‘revealed scripture’ an *āgama*. Not only that; while quoting the view of the Pāsupatas, the Ācārya refers to their claim of *āgamahood* for their ‘revealed scripture’ and dismisses it by pointing out the contingency of mutual interdependence lurking in such a claim.

परस्यापि सर्वज्ञप्रणीतागमसद्भावात् समानमागमबलम्-
इति चेत्, न । इतरेतराश्रयत्वप्रसङ्गात् — आगमप्रत्ययात्
सर्वज्ञत्वसिद्धिः, सर्वज्ञप्रत्ययाच्चागमसिद्धिः — इति ।
(*Ibid.* 2.2.38)

All this perhaps suggest a later origin for the views that *śruti* and *āgama* connote two different authorities often at loggerheads; and that the Vaiṣṇava and Śaiva Āgamas command an authority superior to that of the *Veda*.⁹

IV

A plausible answer to the third question may be suggested by looking into a more or less similar instance available in the works of Sanskrit grammar. We referred to above the Kātyāyana *Vārttika*, “सर्वस्य वा चेतनावत्वात्,” and Patañjali’s *Bhāṣya* thereon. Patañjali’s famous commentator Kaiyaṭa (11th century) was a Kashmiri. Hence in his *Bhāṣya-Pradīpa* he could correctly identify the concept contained in the *Vārttika* with the theory of Absolutism of Ātman (*i.e.* Śaiva Absolutism) because that was current in Kashmir. Hence he could comment on the *Vārttika* as:

“सर्वस्येति — आत्माहृतदशनेनेति भावः ।”

The last two of the eight illustrative sentences¹⁰ cited by Patañjali in support of the statement of the *Vārttika* read: श्रुतिः पठति; शृणोत आवाणः. These, as the context shows, may be better taken to mean respectively, “The Vedic passage reads,” and “Oh stones, please listen.” In both these cases, the *Vedic passage* and *stones*, that are seemingly insentient, ones, are shown to perform the acts of reading and listening, which sentient beings alone are capable of performing. However, Kaiyaṭa, coming under the influence of the Kashmir school of the Ātman or Śaiva Absolutist theory seems to be interested to find here the *Mahābhāṣyakāra*’s approval of a full Vedic sanction for the theory. Hence, he compresses both the sentences into one, conveying the meaning “The Vedic passage reads, “O Stones, please listen,” and thereby teaches the theory of sentiency of all beings.

ऋषिः इति । वेदः सर्वमात्रानां चैतन्यं प्रतिपादयतीत्यर्थः ।

But a pertinent objection to this theory is: "If, on the basis of the *Śruti* alone, you accept that all beings are born of the sentient *Ātman* and hence are sentient, then should not all the beings possess also all the other qualities of the sentient *Ātman*? Will not, then, your theory be an absurd one?" Śaṅkara too raises this point and answers in the *navilakṣaṇatvādhikaraṇa* itself. Having obviously the same objection in mind, Kaiyaṭa quickly adds: "Because beings are found to be of diverse nature, one should not stretch the theory to a point of absurdity by expecting that all the characteristics of the sentient ones should be found in all beings.

वैचित्र्येण पदार्थानामुपलम्भात् सर्वचेतनधर्मप्रसङ्गः सर्वत्र
नोद्भावनीयः ।¹¹

However, Kaiyaṭa's commentator, the most reputed grammarian of the medieval Mahārāṣṭra (18th century A.D.), seems to have missed this spirit of Kaiyaṭa's remark. Hence, while explaining the above passage in his *Pradīpoddyota* commentary, he writes: "Because changes are found occurring in everything, and because those changes are not possible in a given thing, unless it is being inhabited and superintended by sentiency we may have to conclude that all beings are inhabited by sentiency."

सर्वत्र परिणामदर्शनेन चेतनाधिष्ठानं विना च तदसंभवात्
सर्वस्य तदधिष्ठितत्वं ज्ञायते — इति तात्पर्यम् ।

Now it may be fairly clear Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa as well as the great commentators of Śaṅkara's *Bhāṣya* could not identify the theory in question because they were unfamiliar with the Kashmir School of thought. This

unfamiliarity of theirs was most probably due to the long “historical isolation of Kashmir” valley.¹² This historical isolation of the valley perhaps explains why the *Trika-Pratyabhijñā* school of thought should come to earn its present name “Kashmir Śaivism.”

That Śaṅkara was familiar with the Kashmirian philosophical thought may be established by a few more instances. For example, under Bādaraāyaṇa’s aphorism:

आत्मनि चंद्रं विचित्राश्च हि । (2.1.28)

Śaṅkara cites a wordly phenomenon: the gods and the magicians assume many forms, such as elephants, horses and so on, of army with no injury to their own original beings —

लोकेऽपि देवादिषु मायाविषु च स्वरूपानुपमर्देनैव विचित्रा
हस्त्यश्वादिसृष्टयो दृश्यन्ते ।

Further, under the aphorism:

यावदधिकारमवस्थितिराधिकारिकाणाम् (3.3.32)

the Ācārya cites also the another phenomenon: some masters of yoga following the principle of assuming many bodies simultaneously, some of the Brahman-knowers, by means of their yogic power assume many bodies even while residing in their original primary physical frame —

ब्रह्मविदाम् ... केचित्तु स्थित एव तस्मिन् (पूर्वदेहे, देहान्तरमाददते) योगैश्वर्यवशात् अनेकदेहादानन्यायेन ।

Both these ideas the Ācārya combines in a verse in his famous *Dakṣiṇāmurtistotra* also. It reads —

बीजस्यान्तरिवाङ्कुरो जगदिदं प्राङ्निर्विकल्पं पुनः

मायाकल्पितदेशकालकलनावैचित्र्यचित्रीकृतम् ।

मायावीव विजृम्भयत्यपि महायोगीव यः स्वेच्छया

तस्मै श्रीगुरुमूर्तये नम इदं श्रीदक्षिणामूर्तये ॥

(verse 2)

These ideas, indeed, foreshadow what some of the early Kashmir Śaiva teachers of subsequent age say on the point. For example, the Śaiva Somānanda says:

पृथिव्यादिकल्पनया कल्पनावान् शिवो भवेत् ।

इच्छया सर्वभावत्वमनेकात्मत्वमेव च ।

नात्र स्वात्मविकारेण जनयेद्भावमण्डलम् ।

यथा न योगिनोऽस्तीह नानासैन्यशरीरकैः ।

विभागस्तद्वदीशस्य मध्योत्कृष्टनिकृष्टकैः ॥

— *Sivadr̥ṣṭi*, 3.30, 35, 37

Somānanda's son and disciple, Utpaladeva too affirms:

चिदात्मैव हि देवोऽन्तः स्थितमिच्छावशाद्बहिः ।

योगीव निरुपादानमर्थजातं प्रकाशयेत् ॥

— *Īśvarapratyabhijñārikā*, 1.5.7

योगिनामपि मृद्बीजे विनैवेच्छावशेन तत् ।

घटादि जायते तत्तत् स्थिरस्वार्थक्रियाकरम् ॥

— *ibid.* 2.4.10.

In the light of what we have seen so far, one may doubt the view that throws shadow of doubts on Śaṅkara's authorship of the said *Dakṣiṇāmūrtistotra* simply on the ground that the hymn appears to teach doctrines of the Śaivism of the Kashmir brand.¹³

In fact, we have traditions to the effect that Śaṅkara visited the Kashmir country, had serious philosophical debates with many intellectual giants in the centres of learning there, proved his mastery over many subjects and established supremacy of the Advaita philosophy of the *Upaniṣads*. It is said that, being impressed by the Ācārya's multisided personality and polymathy, the Kashmiri scholars recognised him as *Sarvajña*, "the master of all subjects."¹⁴ It appears that with a view to commemorate the above event they even dedicated a hillock, about 300 metres high, in the heart of their capital Śrīnagar, to the memory of Śrī Śaṅkarācārya, named it after him and also built upon it a Śaṅkarācārya temple in simple, but imposing Kashmiri style. Formerly, this temple in its present form had been assigned to 220 B.C. But, now scholars assign it to c. 600 A.D. Both these dates, it is indeed interesting to note, are based on the self-same stylistic features of the temple.¹⁵

To mark his visit to Kashmir, Śaṅkara too, on his part, it appears, composed the famous *Dakṣiṇāmūrti Aṣṭaka*, a hymn of Octad of verses in which the Ācārya sings in praise of Śiva, as the Great Preceptor, Dakṣiṇāmūrti. The concept of this deity is a purely South Indian, that too of Tamilnadu and its adjacent regions. In the above hymn the Ācārya made use of the unique terminology and ideology of the Śaiva Advaita philosophy of Kashmir, which he had not

employed elsewhere in his works. Here in this hymn one finds a unique and pleasing, philosophical and cultural integration of the southernmost tip and the northernmost valley of Indian subcontinent. Indeed, Ācārya Śrī Śaṅkara is a great integrator.

That Śaṅkara was to some extent familiar with the Kashmiri literary tradition could also be illustrated. In his *Bhāṣya* on the *Bādarāyaṇasūtra*: सहकार्यन्तरविधिः पक्षेण तृतीयं विद्यादिवत् (3.4.47), the Ācārya finds it necessary to decide the meaning of the word, “*muni*”. In that context he refutes the view that *muni* signifies a *sannyāsin*, a monk-ascetic. In order to substantiate his refutation he quotes a passage as if it was an authentic one and well-known to the educated community of his time. He writes —

वाल्मीकिर्मुनिपुङ्गवः इत्यादौ व्यभिचारदर्शनात् ।

The Ācārya’s point is: Sage Vālmīki was not a monk-ascetic. Yet he is described in the given passage as “*muniṣuṅgava*” — an eminent *muni*. Hence it is certain that *muni* does not connote a *sannyāsin*. The students of Sanskrit literature know well that this passage — वाल्मीकिर्मुनिपुङ्गवः constitutes the later part of the second hemistich of the very first verse in the *Vālmīki-Rāmāyana*, the earlier part of the hemistich running as — नारदं परिपप्रच्छ. It may be noted that the above reading seems to have been popular only in Kashmir and its adjacent regions, as the manuscripts from this part of the country indicate.¹⁶ For, the manuscripts from other regions generally read the hemistich as —

नारदं परिपप्रच्छ वाल्मीकिर्मुनिपुङ्गवम् ।

According to this reading it is only Sage Nārada, and not Vālmīki who was a *munipuṅgava*. Therefore it could safely be suggested that the Ācārya quotes here most probably from a text that was popular in Kashmir region.

Epilogue

The modern researchers fix Śaṅkara in an age that followed the period during which Dharmakīrti, Kumārilabhaṭṭa and Prabhākara Misra lived, viz. the 7th-8th century A.D. The logic is: the Ācārya's refutations suggest that he clearly knows the *Vijñānavāda* works of Dharmakīrti and the Mīmāṃsā works of Kumārila and Prabhākara and that these authors are usually held to have flourished sometime in the early part of the seventh century.¹⁶ But, we know well that the Vijñānavāda of Dharmakīrti and Mīmāṃsās of Kumārila and Prabhākara too had their own respective proto-forms, and proto-histories. So, if a researcher could now examine the much vexed question of the date of Śaṅkara from an altogether different angle and on some independent internal evidences, he could fix the Ācārya in an age that must have preceded the known dates of Dharmakīrti, Kumārila and Prabhākara, what will he do? He will certainly deduce: just as in the case of the Trika-Pratyabhijñā, so in these cases too, the Ācārya's refutations, on which the researchers depend, are actually aimed at those doctrines pertaining to the period of the proto-history of the Mīmāṃsā of the Bhāṭṭas and the Prābhākaras and the Vijñānavāda of Dharmakīrti. Can he be dubbed outright as illogical?

NOTES

1. See for example Hajime Nakamura: *A History of the Early Vedānta Philosophy* (Eng. Translation of Japanese Original): Delhi, 1933: p.88; *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies*, Vol. III: *Advaita Vedānta up to Śaṅkara and His Pupils*: Ed. Karl H. Potter: Delhi, 1981: p.15; K. Kunjunni Raja: 'On the Date of Śaṅkara and Maṇḍana' in the *Adyar Library Bulletin*, Vol.55 (1991), pp. 104ff.; G.C. Pande, *Life and Thought of Śaṅkarācārya*, Delhi, 1994: p. 52.

2. See for example, *The History and Culture of the Indian People*, Vol.IV: *The Age of Imperial Kanauj*: Ed. R.C. Majumdar etc. (II Ed. BVB, 1964): p.301. K.C. Pandey, *Abhinavagupta — A Historical and Philosophical Study* (II ed. Varanasi, 1963): p. 154.

3. See *Patañjali's Vyākaraṇa-Mahābhāṣya*: Ed. Kielhorn, Vol. II (Bombay, 1883) p. 15,

4. That is

एवं ह्यथाह — कंसकाः सर्पन्ति । शिरीषोऽयं स्वपिति । सुव-
चेला ज्ञादित्यमनुपर्येति । आस्कन्द कपिलक ! इत्युक्ते तृण-
मास्कन्दति । अयस्कान्तम् अयः संक्रामति । ऋषिः पठति ।
शृणोत ग्रावाणः । *ibid.*

5. See P.S. Subrahmanya Sastri: *History of Sanskrit Literature* (in Tamil): Annamalainagar, 1946: p. 229.

6. Perhaps this refutation of the Sāṅkhyas would seem to have been known to the author of the *sūtras* of the *na vi-lakṣaṇatvādhikaraṇa*, if we were to believe that with right historical perspective only Śrī Śaṅkara has written his preamble to the expression *tathātvaṁ ca śabdāt*, i.e., the latter part of the *na vi-lakṣaṇatva-sūtra*. However, one doubts: Had the *Sūtrakāra* himself raised the objection of the Sāṅkhya,

then may we have to expect the former himself answering the objection. But the answer we find under *siddhānta* is of the *Bhāṣyakāra* and not of the *Sūtrakāra*.

7. In fact there are many more such instances in the *Vākya-padiya*. For example (1.30;1.40):

ऋषीणामपि यज्ज्ञानं तदप्यागमपूर्वकम् ।

चैतन्यमिव यश्चायमविच्छेदेन वर्तते ।

आगमस्तमुपासीनो हेतुवादैर्न बाध्यते ॥

8. From this it would appear that the Kashmiri Śaiva Absolutists were not the first to claim for their *Śivasūtra* a status of a scripture revealed by God Śiva Himself.

9. For details see *Śrīmad Bhagavadgītā with Gītārthasaṅgraha of Abhinava-gupta*. Critical Ed. by S. Sankaranarayanan with English Translation (S.V. University, Tirupati, 1985), pt. II, pp. 137-38.

10. See above *note* 4.

11. It is interesting to note that Kaiyaṭa's statement almost coincides with Śaṅkara's refutation of the Sāṅkhya objection in the context.

12. See M. A. Stein, *Kalhana's Rājatarāṅgiṇī* (1961 Ed.), Introduction p. 3.

13. See *Encyclopedea of Indian Philosophies, op. cit.* p. 551.

14. See S. Sankaranarayanan: *Śrī Śaṅkara—His Life, Philosophy and its Relevance to Man in Modern Times* (The Theosophical Society, Madras, 1955): pp. 303-04.

15. See the *Archaeological Report - 1915-16* (Archaeological Survey of India): p. 72, and Plates XLIV and XLVa *The Hindu*, Sunday Supplement, dated 15-10-1989.

16. See *Vālmiki-Rāmāyaṇa, Bālakāṇḍa*, Critical Ed; (Baroda), *av.* It is suggested that Śrī Śaṅkara quotes here *Bālakāṇḍa*, 2.17 (MLJ Press Ed. Madras, 1958) does not seem to be a satisfactory one, as we read there इद् स मुनिपुङ्गवः — cf. *Brahmasūtrabhāṣyam* (Ed. Kāmakoṭikośasthānam, Madras, 1958), p. 605, f.n.

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ADVAITA

R Balasubramanian

2. TEXTS, TENETS, AND TEACHERS

Student: In the last class you explained to me the different systems of philosophy in India, Vedic as well as non-Vedic. You told me that Advaita is a Vedic system, i.e. it is a system based on the *Veda*. Please tell me about the *Veda*.

Teacher: In the Hindu tradition, the *Veda* is called *śruti*. The word "*veda*" means knowledge. The book which conveys knowledge is also called "*Veda*". By knowledge I do not mean secular knowledge, but sacred knowledge relating to *dharma* and Brahman. It is difficult to convey the meaning of *dharma* by one word, or a phrase, or even by a sentence. What one should do is *dharma*. The supreme reality which is the source, support, and end of everything, living as well as non-living, is Brahman. So, the *Veda* imparts knowledge about *dharma* and Brahman. The word "*śruti*" etymologically means what is heard. The sages (*ṛṣis*) who discovered and experienced the truth

spoke about it; and so *śruti* is the record of the experience of truth or reality by the sages. A person, you know, does not create, but discovers the truth or reality in the same way as an explorer in his voyage discovers an already existing island. The existence of truth or reality is impersonal since it is not dependent on the person. The Sanskrit word "*puruṣa*" means "person". What is dependent on a person is *pauruṣeya*; and what is independent of a person is *apauruṣeya*. So, *śruti* which is the record of the experience of truth or reality by the sages is said to be *apauruṣeya* or impersonal. The *Veda* or *śruti* is the book of sacred knowledge. We may translate the word "*Veda*" as scripture.

S: I have heard scholars speak of the *Vedas* in the plural. Please tell me whether the *Veda* is one or many.

T: The answer to this question is both yes and no. There is only one *śruti*, one *Veda*. However, the corpus of the Vedic literature which is extensive and which has gone through the stages of development has been divided into four books; and so we speak of four *Vedas*, viz. *Ṛg-veda*, *Yajur-veda*, *Sāma-veda*, and *Atharva veda*.

S: Please tell me about the structure of the *Veda*.

T: I told you earlier that each *Veda* consists of two parts — the ritual part called *karma-kāṇḍa* which forms the earlier part of the book and the knowledge part called *jñāna-kāṇḍa* which forms the later part of the book. There is another way of explaining the structure of the *Veda*. There are four sections in each

Veda. They are: (1) *Mantras (Samhitas)*, (2) *Brāhmaṇās*, (3) *Āraṇyakas*, and (4) *Upaniṣads*. The *Mantras* are hymns in praise of Gods. The *Brāhmaṇas* deal with sacrificial rites and their significance. The *Āraṇyakas* are concerned with meditation on the significance of the rites practised by those who retire to forests or secluded places. The *Upaniṣads* deal with the knowledge of the ultimate reality called Brahman or Ātman.

S: Is the distinction among the four sections absolute?

T: No, as parts of the *Veda* they are interrelated. The ritualistic aspects contained in the *Mantras* have been developed in the *Brāhmaṇas*. Parts of the *Brāhmaṇas* are called *Āraṇyakas*; and the *Āraṇyakas* shade off into the *Upaniṣads*.

S: Why is it that the non-Hindus say that the Hindus have many scriptures whereas the Christians have only one scripture, viz. the *Bible* and the Muslims have only one scripture, viz. the *Koran*?

T: It will be appropriate to say that the Hindus have many scriptural texts rather than many scriptures.

S: Where is the need for many scriptural texts?

T: First of all, it is necessary to bear in mind that the central teachings of all the Hindu scriptural texts are the same. Secondly, since human beings differ in their mental capacity, there is the need for many scriptural texts so that those whose level of understanding is not high enough to comprehend terse philosophical texts may choose those texts which are narra-

tive and descriptive, which teach through stories and dialogues. That is why we have not only the *Vedas*, but also the *Vedāṅgas*, the *Purāṇas*, and the *Itihāsas*. It means that our scripture is not manifold, but it contains manifold texts to cater to the needs of individuals at different levels of understanding.

S: I understand what you emphasize by the distinction between "many scriptures" and "manifold texts of scripture."

T: Do you think that it is right to impose the study of only one scriptural text on all the people belonging to a particular religious tradition?

S: No. It is desirable to leave the choice of the text to the individual concerned since all scriptural texts, difficult or easy, abstruse or narrative, convey the same teachings.

T: You are absolutely right. I want to impress upon you the principle that commendation of a text should not mean condemnation of other texts. In our tradition, we speak of scripture in two forms, *viz.* *śruti* and *smṛti*.

S: What is *smṛti*? How is it different from *śruti*? What is the relation between the two?

T: The word "*smṛti*" means what is remembered. What is taught in *śruti* is recollected and recorded in the form of a book by some for the benefit of the people. So, *smṛti* derives its authority from *śruti*. Though both *śruti* and *smṛti* are scripture, with a view to distinguish the one from the other we may call *śruti* as primary scripture and *smṛti* as secondary scripture. In case of conflict between the two on any particular

issue, the authority of *śruti* will hold good and not that of *smṛti*. Further, while *śruti* has no author, every *smṛti* work is ascribed to a particular author, divine or human. For example, the *Bhagavad-gītā* is a *smṛti*-work, whose author is the divine Lord *Kṛṣṇa*. *Vyākaraṇa* (the book on grammar) is the composition of Pāṇini. *Kalpasūtra* (the book dealing with the instructions about the performance of *karma*) has been ascribed to sages like Jaimini, Āsvalāyana, and four others. Authoritative works other than *śruti*, which are treated as scripture, come under the category of *smṛti*.

S: What are the important scriptural works which come under the category of *smṛti*?

T: Traditionally fourteen works are mentioned as *smṛti*-works. They are (1) four *Upa-vedas*, (2) six *Vedāṅgas*, and (3) *Purāṇas*, *Nyāya-śāstra*, *Mīmāṃsā-śāstra*, and *Dharma-śāstra*, which are counted as four.

S: What are the works included in the four *Upa-vedas*?

T: The *Upa-vedas* which are subordinate to the *Vedas* are (1) *Āyur-veda* (medicine), (2) *Dhanur-veda* (military science), (3) *Gāndarva-veda* (music), and (4) *Sthāpatya-veda* (architecture, etc.)

S: What are the six *Vedāṅgas*?

T: The six *Vedāṅgas* (auxiliaries to the *Vedas*) are (1) *Śikṣā* (the science of pronunciation), (2) *Chandas* (the science of prosody), (3) *Vyākaraṇa* (grammar) (4) *Nirukta* (etymological explanation of difficult Vedic works), (5) *Jyotiṣa* (astronomy), and (6) *Kalpa* (explanation of the method of performance of rituals).

S: What about the *Purāṇas*?

T: They are eighteen in number. I do not propose to give you the list of *Purāṇas*. You may try to find out their names.

S: You have already told me about *Nyāya-śāstra* and *Mīmāṃsā-śāstra*.

T: Yes. the *Nyāya-śāstra* includes *Vaiśeṣika-śāstra*. *Pūrva-mīmāṃsā* and *Uttara-mīmāṃsā* constitute *Mīmāṃsā-śāstra*.

S: What about the *Dharma-śāstra*?

T: They are the works dealing with codes of conduct composed by Manu, Yājñavalkya, Vasīṣṭha, Parā-sara, and other sages.

S: Since both *śruti* and *smṛti* are scripture, we may say that Advaita is based on the authority of both *śruti* and *smṛti*. Am I right?

T: Yes, you are right. Advaita as a philosophical system is based on the authority of *śruti* and *smṛti*. As I told you just now, the *Veda* which is *śruti* consists of four sections, viz. *Mantras*, *Brāhmaṇas*, *Āranyakas*, and *Upaniṣads*. For the purpose of philosophy which is concerned with the knowledge of the ultimate reality, the *Upaniṣads* alone are relevant. Though there are many *smṛti*-works, not all of them are directly relevant to philosophy. Only two of the *smṛti* works, the *Brahma-sūtra* of Bādarāyaṇa and the *Bhagavad-gītā* of Lord Kṛṣṇa, are considered to be relevant to philosophy. So, tradition holds that the *Upaniṣads*, the *Brahma-sūtra*, and the *Bhagavad-gītā* are the basic scriptural sources for Advaita. These three sources are called *prasthāna-trayan*.

S: The *Upaniṣads* which form part of the *Vedas* are *śruti*. The other two sources, viz. the *Brahma-sūtra* and the *Bhagavad-gītā*, are *smṛti*. Is it not enough to choose one of the two *smṛti*-works instead of two?

T: I am happy you have raised this important question for which there is already an answer in the tradition. The word "*prasthāna*" means "way" "method". The *Upaniṣad* represents *śruti-prasthāna*. The *Bhagavad-gītā* represents *smṛti-prasthāna*. Even though the *Brahma-sūtra* is a *smṛti*-work, it is chosen to represent *tarka-prasthāna*, the method of logic or reasoning since it brings together in a logical form the scattered ideas of the *Upaniṣads*, since its focus is on the logical presentation of the thought of the *Upaniṣads*. It means that two *smṛti*-works have been chosen for two different reasons; and so there is no over-emphasis on *smṛti*.

S: Is it the case that the philosophical ideas of Advaita are not contained in the *Purāṇas*?

T: The *Purāṇas*, e.g. the *Viṣṇu-purāṇa*, do contain the central ideas of Advaita. However, tradition holds that the *prasthāna-trayam* is the primary source of authority for the reason stated earlier.

S: Do not other schools of Vedānta rely on *prasthāna-trayam*?

T: Undoubtedly, they too rely on *prasthāna-trayam*. Unlike Advaita, they try to support their position by means of other texts such as the *Pāñcarātra āgama*.

S: I have a doubt. Is not Advaita dogmatic by accepting scripture as a source of knowledge? In fact, there is such a criticism which is applicable to all orthodox systems of philosophy.

T: Your doubt is a serious one. I cannot go into this problem in detail at this stage. We will have occasion to take up this problem later on. My answer at this point will, therefore, be brief. Advaita does not rely only on scripture as a source of knowledge. In addition to scripture, it makes use of reasoning to support its position. The process of reasoning, when rigorously formulated, will be in the form of inference, what is called *anumāna* in the Indian tradition. Scripture which is a source of knowledge is referred to as *śabda* or verbal testimony. Both *śabda* and *anumāna* are accepted as sources of knowledge. It is not possible to know everything by means of *anumāna*. What is trans empirical, other than the empirical, the source of the empirical, cannot be known through *anumāna*. This is its limitation. Reasoning is, indeed, useful to make intelligible what is known through scripture. Advaita brings in experience to test what is conveyed by scripture. It holds that what is known through scripture and what is made intelligible by reasoning must be tested through experience, which is the final court of appeal. Śaṅkara observes that inquiry into Brahman should culminate in experience which is self-certifying; *Brahma-vijñānam* must be *anubhava-avasānam*. So, it is not right to say that Advaita which makes use of scripture as the source of the knowledge of Brahman is dogmatic.

S: Now, I understand how Advaita approaches the philosophical problem.

T: Don't you think that those who maintain that reason alone should be relied upon as our guide despite its inherent limitations and that some other source, though available, should be disregarded are dogmatic?

S: Yes, they are.

T: Advaita accepts many sources of knowledge. However, scripture is our source of knowledge with regard to *dharma* and *Brahman*, which cannot be comprehended through our senses and reasoning.

S: What is the basic philosophical position of Advaita?

T: Advaita holds that there is only one reality.

S: If reality is only one, then it is conveyed by the word "*ekam*". Why, then, is the system called "*advaitam*" and not "*ekam*"?

T: Your question is an important one. The basic position of this system can be stated affirmatively as well as negatively. Affirmatively, it says that reality is one (*ekam*); negatively, it says that reality is non-dual (*advaitam*). Of these two modes of expression, the negative one is preferred to the positive one since it conveys the idea that there is *no second* to the one reality, outside or inside it. Brahman is the only reality that exists; and there is no second entity, outside and inside it; reality is, therefore, non-dual, i.e. *advaitam*.

S: Instead of saying that Advaita is monistic, it is better to say that it is non-dualistic.

T: You are right.

S: What is the dualistic position?

T: To hold that reality is more than one is dualism. In Western philosophy a philosophical system which holds that there are two ultimate realities is said to

be dualistic, and a system which holds that there are many (more than two) ultimate realities is said to be pluralistic. But in the Indian tradition a philosophical system which accepts two or more than two entities as ultimate is called *dvaita-darśana*. So, we say that Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika which accepts seven categories as ultimate is *dvaitam*. Sāṅkhya-Yoga which accepts two ultimate realities is *dvaitam*. The Dvaita system of Madhva which accepts fivefold difference (*pañca-bheda*) as ultimate is also called *dvaitam*. So, Advaita as a philosophical system stands in marked contrast to all other orthodox systems which are *dvaita-darśanas*. If all other systems are dualistic, Advaita alone is non-dualistic.

S: A philosophical system usually discusses God, man, and the world. If Advaita also accepts and discusses these three entities, does it not become pluralistic? In that case, how can Advaita be non-dualistic?

T: I am happy you have raised this question as this will open up the way for formulating the basic tenets of the system. Advaita explains these three categories — God, man and the world — without prejudice to its non-dualistic position, without becoming pluralistic. Instead of using the terms “God”, “man” and “world”, it is better to use the terminology of the Vedānta systems. I propose to use the term “Brahman” for God, “jīva” for man, and “jagat” for the world. A brief explanation of the terms will be helpful. In Advaita, a distinction is made between “Brahman” and “Īsvara”. However, I do not take up this distinction at this point. The term “jīva” means all living beings; and the humans in whom there is the

full development of the mind in the evolutionary process are viewed as representing living beings. "Jagat" is the physical universe consisting of all kinds of material things. The basic tenets of Advaita are three:

1. Brahman alone is real (*brahma satyam*).
2. The world is illusory, an appearance (*jagan-nithyā*).
3. The jīva in its essential nature is Brahman itself and not different from it (*jīvo brahmaiva, na aparah*).

So, the basic teaching of Advaita are: (1) the non-duality of Brahman, (2) the non-reality of the world, and (3) the non-difference between jīva and Brahman.

S: It is not clear to me how Advaita is non-dualistic when there are jīva and the world in addition to Brahman. Are there not totally three entities?

T: I understand your difficulty which is due to the simple, but mechanical enumeration of entities as one, two, and three. Strictly speaking, there are no three entities at all, but only one, *viz.* Brahman. Since the world is an illusory appearance, i.e. *mithyā*, it is not reckoned as real to be counted as a second entity in addition to Brahman. As for the jīva, it is essentially no other than Brahman; and so it should not be counted as an entity different from Brahman. So, what exists is Brahman alone, and there is no second to it. The identity of jīva and Brahman as well as the illu-

soriness of the world will not be clear to you at this stage as they require explanation for which you have to wait.

S: I am interested in knowing the scriptural support for these three basic tenets of the system. Please tell me the texts which support them.

T: In support of the first tenet, there is the *Taittirīya* text (2.1.1) which says: “*satyam jñānam anantam brahma*”. This text which is quoted very frequently defines Brahman as real, knowledge, and infinite. It says that Brahman which is infinite (*anantam*) and which is of the nature of knowledge (*jñānam, caitanyam*) is real (*satyam*).

There is a text of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* (3.7.23) which supports the second tenet. It says: “*eṣa ta ātmā antaryāmi amṛtaḥ, ato anyat ārtam.*” Let me explain the context and then the meaning of the text. The *Upaniṣad* speaks about Brahman as the inner Ruler of everything — earth, water, fire, and so on — including the *jīva*. Then, towards the conclusion it says that He (Brahman) is your Self, the inner Ruler, the immortal (*eṣa ta ātmā, antaryāmi, amṛtaḥ*) and that everything else but Him is perishable (*ato anyat ārtam*). Brahman is the Self. Everything other than Brahman or the Self is material, i.e. the physical universe which is not-Self, is material; what is material is perishable (*ārtam*). There is no end without a beginning. It means that the physical universe appears and disappears; and whatever appears and disappears is illusory, *mithyā*.

As for the identity of *jīva* and Brahman which is the third tenet, there is the famous text, *mahāvākya*

as it is called, from the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* (6.8.7) which says: “*tat tvam asi.*” In this text, Uddālaka tells his son, Śvetaketu, “You (*tvam*) are that (*tat*) Brahman, who is the source, the subtle essence, of the world.”

S: How does Advaita build up its philosophy from these three tenets? Does it not require supporting theories?

T: Yes, you are right. The three ideas, *viz.* the non-duality of Brahman, the non-reality of the world, and the non-difference between *jīva* and Brahman, are supported by a number of doctrines or theories. I shall mention the important ones:

1. The doctrine of *māyā/avidyā*
2. The theory of twofold knowledge/twofold perspective
3. The theory that Brahman is both the material and efficient cause of the world
4. The theory of *vivarta*
5. The theory that consciousness is the only revealing principle
6. The theory of levels of reality
7. The doctrine of *adhyāsa*
8. *anirvacanīya-khyāti*
9. The theory that liberation is possible only through knowledge
10. The doctrine of liberation-in-life

So, there are three basic tenets and ten supporting doctrines. I do not propose to explain the basic tenets as well as the supporting doctrines at this stage

excepting to say that some of these doctrines are metaphysical in character, some are epistemological and axiological, and some are soteriological. In other words, all the four sections of philosophy, *viz.* epistemology, metaphysics, axiology, and soteriology, are taken care of in Advaita.

S: What are the terms used in Indian philosophy corresponding to epistemology, metaphysics, ethics and axiology, and soteriology?

T: Traditionally we use only two terms, *pramāṇa* and *prameya*, by which we cover all these four divisions in philosophy. We say that philosophy involves two kinds of investigation — *pramāṇa-vicāra* and *prameya-vicāra*. The first one covers both logic and epistemology, and the second one covers the rest.

S: Now, tell me about the teachers of Advaita.

T: We have two kinds of tradition of teachers in Advaita. The first one is called *vaiṣṇava-paramparā* or family lineage and the second one called *śiṣya-paramparā* or teacher-disciple succession. The first seven teachers from Nārāyaṇa to Śuka constitute *vaiṣṇava-paramparā*. The first teacher of Advaita is Nārāyaṇa or Sadā-siva, the supreme God. From him the wisdom of Advaita was revealed to his lotus-born son, Brahmā; then Brahmā transmitted this wisdom to his son, Vasiṣṭha, who in his turn conveyed it to his son, Śakti; again, Śakti passed it on to his son, Parāśara, who in his turn revealed it to his son, Vyāsa; and Vyāsa transmitted it to his son, Śuka. So we owe this wisdom of the One to God; and the preceptors in this *vaiṣṇava-paramparā* are more or less mythical per-

sons. Then, we have *śiṣya-paramparā* starting from Gauḍapāda, who was the first *human* preceptor in this tradition; and so this tradition of teachers starting from Gauḍapāda is known as *mānava-sampradāya*. How did Gauḍapāda get this wisdom of the One? According to Ānandagiri, Gauḍapāda practised meditation on Nara-Nārāyaṇa in Badarikāśrama and received the Advaita wisdom from the Lord. Gauḍapāda's disciple was Govinda-yogīndra, who, in his turn, conveyed this wisdom to his disciple, Śaṅkarācārya. And, Śaṅkara transmitted this wisdom to his four disciples, Padmapāda, Hastāmālaka, Toṭaka, and Suresvara (the author of the *Vārtika*). Gauḍapāda is the first preceptor whose work on Advaita is available to us. He wrote a metrical commentary called *Āgama-śāstra* on the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad*. His commentary is also called *Māṇḍūkya-kārikā*.

S: Did not Govinda Bhagavatpāda, Śaṅkara's teacher, write any book?

T: We do not hear of any work composed by Govinda. Do we judge the greatness of a person only in terms of his writings?

S: No, not at all. I think of Sri Ramakrishna Paramahansa in this context. He did not write anything. Still he was great; he was the embodiment of wisdom. Swami Vivekananda was his greatest gift to the world.

T: You are absolutely right. This is what is said of Govinda Bhagavatpada: "To be known to all posterity as the preceptor of a world teacher — Jagadguru Śrī Śaṅkarācārya — is indeed a rare honour. It evokes our sense of wonder."

S: Please tell me about Śaṅkara.

T: I do not propose to narrate the main events in the life of Śaṅkara. I believe that you know the life story of Śaṅkara. It will be good if you read again a good biography of Śaṅkara. I will give you an account of Śaṅkara's writings.

S: Thank you, Sir, for your suggestion to read once again the biography of the great Master.

T: The writings of Śaṅkara can be classified into three groups: (1) major works, (2) minor works, and (3) hymns. The first category comprises his *bhāṣyas* on the *prasthāna-trayam*, his *bhāṣya* on the *Māṇḍūkya-kārikā*, and his *bhāṣya* on the *Viṣṇu-sahasra-nāma*. The second category consists of independent works, what we generally call manuals, such as *Upadeśa-sāhasrī*, *Ātma-bodha*, *Viveka-cūḍāmaṇī*, *Aparoksānubhūti*, and so on, which seek to expound the philosophy of Advaita. In this connection one should understand the terms "major" and "minor" carefully. The distinction between "major" and "minor" is the distinction between greater and lesser units. There is no suggestion that one category of works is important and the other unimportant. A minor work is a *prakaraṇa-grantha*, a treatise which sets forth the established position of a system (*śāstra-siddhānta pratipādaka granthaḥ*). The third category consists of hymns in praise of the Hindu pantheon, the holy rivers, and so on.

S: Is there any significance in this classification of Śaṅkara's works?

T: I think that there are there important points to be borne in mind in understanding this classification. First of all, philosophy is for the benefit of the people: it is intended to uplift, regenerate people. Secondly, its teaching should reach all the people, irrespective of the distinctions of status, class, caste, gender, and so on. Thirdly, since there is difference in the mental capacity of the people, there is the need for different kinds of philosophical works. Hence, the importance of the three kinds of works composed by Śaṅkara. The *bhāṣyas* require serious and prolonged study under the guidance of a competent teacher. The study of minor works such as *Ātma-bodha* will not be as taxing as the study of the *bhāṣyas*. The hymns will fulfil the needs of those who have neither the patience nor the equipment for the study of the major or the minor works.

S: Please tell me about the four disciples of Śaṅkara.

T: Padmapāda wrote a commentary known as the *Pañcapādikā* on Śaṅkara's *bhāṣya* on the first four aphorisms of the *Brahma-sūtra*. The *Pañcapādikā* is important for several reasons. First, it is the earliest commentary on Śaṅkara's *bhāṣya*. Second, being the composition of a direct disciple of Śaṅkara, its presentation of Advaita is authentic. Third, it provides scope for the subsequent development of Advaita.

Hastāmalaka is known not only for his devotion to the Master, but also for a small work, the *Hastāmalaka-stotra*, contributed by him. In the twelve verses of this work Hastāmalaka sets forth the nature of the Self as eternal awareness (*nitya upalabdhi-svarupaḥ*).

The *Toṭakāṣṭaka* which is recited very frequently by us is the composition of Toṭaka in praise of his Guru, Śrī Śaṅkara. The *Śrutisāra-samuddharaṇam* is another work associated with him.

Suresvara was a staunch Mīmāṃsaka and householder, with the name Maṇḍana, before he became a *sannyāsin*-disciple of Śaṅkara. He is well-known as the Vārtikakāra, the author of the *Vārtika*, in the Advaita tradition. I have already told you that the *Vārtika* is a special type of commentary. Suresvara wrote this special type of commentary on Śaṅkara's *bhāṣyas* on the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* and the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*. Also, he wrote a *Vārtika* on Śaṅkara's *Pañcīkaraṇa*. He also wrote the *Mānasollasa* explaining Śaṅkara's *Dakṣiṇāmūrti-stotra*. He composed an independent manual called *Naiṣkarmya-siddhi* in which he set forth the philosophy of Advaita. Suresvara's *Vārtikas* are voluminous; his analysis of the issues are insightful; and his argumentative skill is marvellous. He is greatly respected and reverentially quoted by the post-Śaṅkara Advaitins in all important issues as the spokesman of Śaṅkara.

S: Since you mention about post-Śaṅkara Advaita, I presume that we can also speak about pre-Śaṅkara Advaita.

T: Yes, you are right. Śaṅkara occupies an important place which may be characterized as the dividing line, as the watershed, in the history of Advaita. There must have been quite a few teachers of Advaita before Śaṅkara. In the *Brahma-sūtra*, we come across names of Advaita teachers such as Kāsakṛtsna. In

his commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra* (1.4.14; 2.1.9) Śaṅkara uses expressions such as “*sampradāya-vido vadanti*”, i.e. “those who know the tradition say;” “*atra uktam vedāntārtha-sampradāya vidbhiḥ ācāryaiḥ*,” i.e. “this is said by the teachers who know the tradition of the meaning of the *Vedānta*.” The fact that Śaṅkara in his commentary on the *Bhagavad-gītā* (13.2) speaks about *sampradāya* in the course of his criticism of those who are well-versed in scripture, but who are ignorant of the tradition in interpreting scripture, shows that he comes in the tradition of teachers of Advaita. Advaita makes use of a special method of exegesis called *adhyāropa* (superimposition) and *apavāda* (denial) for elucidating the nature of Brahman which is acosmic, which is free from the distinctions of the world. When Śaṅkara mentions this method in his commentary on the *Bhagavad-gītā* (13.13), he says: “*tathā hi sampradāyavidām vacanam, adhyāropa apavādābhyām niṣprapañcam prapañcyate*,” i.e. “Thus there is the traditional statement that the ‘acosmic Brahman is explained through the method of *adhyāropa* and *apavāda*.” So, Śaṅkara is important not only because of the tradition he represents, but also because of the way in which he consolidated the tradition he inherited. Because of the marvellous work of consolidation which he did, he is the watershed in the history of Advaita.

S: How did Śaṅkara consolidate the Advaita tradition?

T: He did that in several ways. I have to be a little lengthy in my answer to this question. First of all, he established in all his writings that the purport

of the entire *Veda* is Brahman-realization, which is called *mokṣa*. Since the entire *Veda* is authoritative, he brought out the importance of both *karma-kāṇḍa* and *jñāna-kāṇḍa*. Secondly, the distinction that he made between two standpoints, the relative and the absolute, the empirical and the trans-empirical, is very important. These two standpoints are called *vyāvahārika* and *pāramārthika* respectively. Śaṅkara's hermeneutics of the Upaniṣadic texts proceeds on the basis of the distinction between these two standpoints. Thirdly, the distinction that he makes between Brahman and Īśvara on the one hand and jīva and Īśvara on the other helps to develop the metaphysical investigation, which is called *prameya-vicāra*. Fourthly, closely following the distinction among Brahman, Īśvara, and jīva, he has set forth the well-known view that, though the supreme Godhead, called Brahman in the *Upaniṣads*, is one, there are many forms of God such as Śiva, Śakti, Viṣṇu due to *aupādhika-bheda*, the distinctions caused by adjunct; and this view earned him the celebrated appellation "*ṣanmatasthāpanācārya*," one who established the six modes of worship of the Godhead as Śiva, Viṣṇu, Śakti, Gaṇeśa, Subrahmaṇya, and Sūrya. Thus, he has shown that, whatever be the form of God that one worships, it is the same Godhead that one worships, a standpoint which is essential for religious harmony. Fifthly, in the case of *pramāṇa-vicāra*, i.e. epistemological enquiry he showed that, given the Self which is of the nature of consciousness, which is the revealing principle, *pramāṇas* such as perception can function and in the absence of this revealing principle, no *pramāṇas* are possible; and so the entire epistemological enquiry presupposes the Self. This leads to a conclusion of a

far-reaching character. What is presupposed by the *pramāṇas* can never be proved by them: the Self, in other words, does not require any proof and cannot be proved. Sixthly, he spotted the crucial concept of *adhyāsa*, which means superimposition, which plays an important role in *pramāṇa-prameya-vicāra*. With a view to bring out the significance of *adhyāsa* which is pervasive in all aspects of life — in our daily life in which we function as *kartā* and *bhoktā*, as agent and enjoyer of the fruits of action; in our scripture-controlled life in which we submit ourselves to *vidhi* and *pratiṣedha*, i.e. injunctions and prohibitions of *śāstra* which tells us what a house-holder is eligible to do, what a Brāhmaṇa or a Kṣatriya is eligible to do, and so on; in our philosophical life which requires metaphysical and epistemological investigation—he wrote the justly famous introduction called *adhyāsa-bhāṣya* before commencing his commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra*. One who has not understood this *adhyāsa-bhāṣya*, can never understand Advaita. It will be of interest to you to quote a passage from Śaṅkara's *adhyāsa-bhāṣya*:

तमेतम् अविद्याख्यम् आत्मानात्मनो इतरेतराध्यासं
 पुरस्कृत्य सर्वे प्रमाणप्रमेयव्यवहाराः, लौकिका वैदिकाश्च
 प्रवृत्ताः, सर्वाणि च शास्त्राणि
 विधिप्रतिषेधमोक्षपराणि ।

Finally, the cause of *adhyāsa*, according to him, is *māyā-avidyā* which is said to be indescribable (*anirvacanīya*) as either real or unreal. A key-concept in Advaita, *māyā-avidyā* is discussed at great length in Advaita in reply to the objections of the critics. The different ways in which he consolidated the Advaita tradition are the significant contributions he made to

Advaita. Hence, Śaṅkara's importance in the history of Advaita. The post-Śaṅkara Advaitins who drew their inspiration from Śaṅkara contributed to the development of Advaita in numerous ways, but all of them presuppose Śaṅkara. That is why we say that Śaṅkara is the dividing line, the watershed, in the history of Advaita.

S: Please tell me now about post-Śaṅkara Advaita.

T: Two important schools came into existence after Śaṅkara. One is known as the Vivaraṇa school and the other, the Bhāmatī school. I told you that Padmapāda, one of the direct disciples of Śaṅkara, wrote the *Pañcapādikā*, which has become the basic text of the Vivaraṇa school. Prakāśātman (A.D. 1000) wrote a commentary on it called *Pañcapādikā-vivaraṇa*, from which this school got its name. Vidyāraṇya (A.D. 1350) wrote a commentary on the *Vivaraṇa* called *Vivaraṇa-prameya-saṅgraha*. Akhaṇḍānanda wrote a gloss called *Tattva-dīpana* on the *Vivaraṇa*. These are the important works of the Vivaraṇa school. The Bhāmatī school derives its name from Vācaspati's (A. D. 841) commentary known as *Bhāmatī* on Śaṅkara's *Brahma-sūtra-bhāṣya*. Amalānanda (A.D. 1250) explained the *Bhāmatī* in his *Kalpataru*, which in turn was explained by Appayya Dīkṣita (A.D. 1600) in his *Parimala*. So, the Vivaraṇa and Bhāmatī schools which came into existence in the post-Śaṅkara period elucidate, develop, and defend the standpoint of Advaita following Śaṅkara's *Sūtra-bhāṣya*.

S: Are there not other commentaries on the *Sūtra-bhāṣya* in addition to the works mentioned in the Vivaraṇa and Bhāmatī schools?

T: There are some other commentaries too on the *Sūtra-bhāṣya*. I will mention only three of them. Sarvajñātmamuni, said to be a contemporary of Śaṅkara, wrote a metrical commentary called *Samkṣepaśārīraka* on the *Sūtra-bhāṣya*. This work itself has eight commentaries. Advaitānanda (A. D. 1450) wrote a commentary called *Brahma-vidyābharāṇa* on it. *Ratnaprabhā* is yet another commentary on it written by Govindānanda.

S: Then, what about other teachers and their works?

T: There is a class of works called the *Siddhi*-works, so-called because their titles end with the suffix "siddhi". I have already mentioned one important work belonging to this category: Suresvara's *Naiṣkarmya-siddhi*. Maṇḍanamisra, a contemporary of Śaṅkara, wrote the *Brahma-siddhi*. Later on, Vimuktātman (A.D. 1050) wrote the *Iṣṭa-siddhi*. Nearly six centuries later, Madhusūdana Sarasvatī wrote the *Advaita-siddhi*, which is a polemical work, defending Advaita and answering the objections raised by Vyāsatīrtha, a follower of the Dvaita system.

S: What are the other works of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī?

T: I would like to mention only two of his works now. One is the *Gūḍārtha-dīpikā*, a commentary on Śaṅkara's *Gītā-bhāṣya*. The other one is the *Siddhānta-bindu*, a commentary on Śaṅkara's *Daśaślokī*.

S: Is there not any other polemical work in Advaita like the *Advaita-siddhi*?

T: Yes, we have the *Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khāḍya* of Śrīharṣa (A.D. 1100) who refutes the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika categories which seek to establish the reality of the world. Citsukha's *Tattvapradīpikā* is another polemical work defending Advaita and criticising the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika categories.

S: What about independent, expository works on Advaita?

T: Yes, we do have. The *Pañcadaśī* of Vidyāraṇya is a popular text which expounds Advaita in a lucid way. The *Vedānta-sāra* of Sadānanda (A.D. 1550) is an easy and good introduction to Advaita. The *Vedānta-paribhāṣā* of Dharmarāja expounds in a technical way the epistemological and metaphysical dimensions of Advaita.

S: Is there not any book which summarizes the doctrines and their different interpretations by the teachers of Advaita?

T: Yes, we do have a book, the *Siddhānta-leśa-saṅgraha*, written by Appayya Dīkṣita. It is a masterly summary of the differences in the interpretations of the doctrines within the framework of Advaita. I must emphasize three points in this connection. First, all the Advaitins, subscribing to the Vivaraṇa or the Bhāmatī view, or accepting the former in some respects and the latter in some other respects, have derived their inspiration from Śaṅkara. Second, they accept the basic tenets and the supporting doctrines of Advaita, whatever may be their differences on some issues. Any interpretation, Suresvara tells us, can be accepted as valid provided it leads to,

or is in conformity with, the basic position. This is what he says:

यथा यथा भवेत्पुंसां व्युत्पत्तिः प्रत्यगात्मनि ।
सा सैव प्रक्रियेह स्यात् साध्वी सा च अनवस्थिता ॥

It means: "Whatever be the mode of explanation through which people attain the firm knowledge of the inward Self must be treated as valid. But it is in itself not valid." This declaration occurs in his *Brhadaran̄yaka-upaniṣad-bhāṣya-vārtika* (1.4.402). Third, they have not hesitated to write commentaries on commentaries on commentaries. They must have thought of this method as the correct one, as the one which strengthens rather than weakens the system. This method has not prevented them from being original and creative. It means that philosophical development has taken place through the commentarial tradition.

S: You have mentioned quite a few teachers covering both the pre-Śaṅkara and post-Śaṅkara Advaita. I am sure that there must have been some more illustrious teachers.

T: You are absolutely reight. My reference to the teachers and their texts has been selective. It is not possible to refer to all of them now. It will not be difficult for you to find out on your own. Your have to do some home-work.

MAHĀKAVEH KĀLIDĀSASYA
GĪTĀTRAYAM

[in Sanskrit]

by Ātmavidyābhūṣaṇam
V. S. V. Gurusvāmī Śāstrī

with an English translation

by Dr. V. K. S. N. Raghavan

MARSHALL KATHARINE
MAYASTAYAN

(in Sanskrit)

of the University of

the State of New York

with an English translation

by Dr. H. S. S. S. S.

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परिणामोपक्रमेण विवर्तेनावसायिनीम् ।
 सोपानारोहणगतां क्रमविन्यासपद्धतिम् ॥
 वर्णयामास सुश्लिष्टं सगप्रदायविदग्रणीः ।

“प्रस्थाप्यमाने परिणामवादे स्वर्थं समायाति विवर्तवाद्ः” ।

इत्याह सर्वज्ञसुनिः प्रबन्धे संक्षेपशारीरकनामके स्वे ॥

इति सम्प्रतिपन्नार्थं महाकविविवक्षितम् ।

“त्वामामनन्ती”ति पद्यं व्याख्यायाहं प्रकाशये ॥

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सर्वज्ञं चेतनं सन्तमाम्नायास्त्वां वदन्ति हि ।

प्रकृतिं सर्वजगतः परिणामि च कारणम् ॥

त्वामेव पुरुषं न्यायवेदिनो ब्रह्मवित्तामाः ।

विकारवत्याः प्रकृतेर्विजानन्त्यपि साक्षिणम् ॥

परिणामे भवेद्द्रव्यं सविकारं विनश्वरम् ।

दधिभावं गतं क्षीरं विकृतञ्च विनश्यति ॥

ब्रह्मणः परिणामित्वे विकारित्वमनित्यता ।

भवेतां, ब्रह्म नित्यं च निर्विकारं श्रुतिर्जगौ ॥

कारणस्य स्वरूपं तु यद्विकृत्य प्रजायते ।

कार्यं तत्परिणामि स्याद्दध्याद्यत्र निदर्शनम् ॥

प्रपञ्चभानकालेऽपि ब्रह्म नित्यञ्च निष्क्रियम् ।

निर्विकारं साक्षिमात्रमिति वेदान्तनिश्चयः ॥

लोकदृष्ट्यनुरोधेन ब्रह्मणः परिणामिता ।
 शास्त्रदृष्ट्यनुसारेण वर्णिता च विवर्तता ॥
 प्रकृत्यपरपर्यायमायासंबन्धमात्रतः ।
 परिणामिकारणत्वं ब्रह्मणो ह्युपचर्यते ॥
 विवर्तकारणत्वं च मायाश्रयतयोच्यते ।
 मायान्वयानन्वयाभ्यां ब्रह्म द्वेषा निगद्यते ॥
 शास्त्रार्थचर्चाभीरूणां बालानामेव तुष्टये ।
 व्याकरोन्मल्लिनाथस्तु पद्यं सांख्यमतानुगम् ॥
 व्याख्यानं मल्लिनाथीयं सर्वथा नोपपद्यते ।
 प्रधानपुरुषैक्यं तु सांख्यानां नैव सम्मतम् ॥
 पद्येऽस्मिन् त्रिदशैः सर्वैरेकस्यैव हि वेधसः ।
 प्रकृतित्वं पूरुषत्वमुक्तं पूर्वोत्तरार्धयोः ॥
 अत्यन्तभेदोपगमात् प्रकृतेः पुरुषस्य च ।
 सांख्यानां खलु सिद्धान्ते नैवेदमुपपद्यते ॥
 सर्घज्ञश्चेतनो ब्रह्माचेतना प्रकृतिर्जडा ।
 इति नेयं स्तुतिः किन्तु निन्दा स्यात् सुरकल्पिता ॥
 प्रकृत्यभेदमारोप्य पुरुषे सांख्यकल्पिता ।
 स्तुतिर्भ्रमात्मिकेत्येवं कल्पनापि सुबाधिता ॥
 अख्यातिवादिनः सांख्याः भ्रमकल्पत्यसहिष्णवः ।
 स्वप्नेऽपि ते भ्रमकथां न कुर्वीरन्कथञ्चन ॥

(अनुवर्तते)

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Being the foremost among the knowers of the *sampradāya* (the Advaitic tradition), the great poet Kālidāsa has described in unambiguous terms the reality of Brahman using the order of climbing step by step, viz. commencing the description with *pariṇamavāda* and concluding it through *vivartavāda*.

Even Sarvajñātmamuni in his *Saṅkṣepaśārīraka* (II.61) contends that when one endeavours to explain things with *pariṇamavāda*, automatically one has to end up with *vivartavāda* (the theory of transformation leading to the theory of projection finally). Hence, let me explain the purport of the *śloka*, “*tvāmāmananti...*” based on the essential/subtle meaning intended by the great poet.

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Indeed, the *Vedas* proclaim that the Lord is omniscient, eternally sentient, and real forever. The essence of the whole world lies in the Lord; and the Lord is also the cause — the transformative effect being the whole world. Even the great Brahma-jñānins (Knowers of Brahman) well-versed in Vedānta dialectics consider You (the supreme Lord) as Puruṣa, and as the supermost witness Self that is at the core of *prakṛti* which is ever-changing. When a substance undergoes modifications, at once it gets transformed and hence merely temporary, just as when milk gets curdled, the state of milk gets fully terminated.

Therefore, if Brahman is spoken of as the cause of transformation then the changing nature and non-

eternity will be the attributes of Brahman; whereas the *śruti* states that Brahman is eternal and unchanging.

That effect is said to be the transformation (of a cause), when it results from a thorough change of the essential nature of the cause. Here the illustrations are curd, etc.

According to the principal doctrine of Vedānta, even when the world appears, Brahman is eternal, action-less, unchanging, and the mere witness Self. Taking into account the world view, Brahman is described as the cause of the world-transformation; but as the scriptures point out, Brahman is just an unchanging cause and the world is merely a projection.

Being the transformative cause of the world is ascribed to Brahman only in an *aupacārika* (secondary) way, as a consequence of the mere connection of *māyā* that is otherwise known as *prakṛti*. Brahman is also referred to as the cause of projection (*vivartakāraṇa*) of the world, because of its being the locus of *māyā*.

Hence Brahman is described in a twofold manner on the ground that it (Brahman) has either connection or no connection at all with *māyā*.

To satisfy the minds of the beginners (in the study of the *śāstras*) who are afraid of arguments in the *śāstraic* lore, the wellknown commentator Mallinātha has explained the 13th *śloka* of the second *sarga* of the *Kumārasambhava* in the light of the Sāṅkhya system of thought.

However, the explanation of Mallinātha does not hold good here, for the Sāṅkhyas do not accept the unity of *Pradhāna* (primordial matter or *prakṛti*) and *Puruṣa*.

In the *Kumārasambhava* (II, 13) all the gods (*devas*) praise the creator-god Brahmā as endowed with (i) the nature of *prakṛti* and (ii) the nature of the essential Being respectively in the first half and the second half of the *śloka*.

However, the Sāṅkhyas hold that *prakṛti* and *Puruṣa* are invariably different from each other; so, the view held by the great poet cannot be tenable in the case of the Sāṅkhyas.

If the omniscient and sentient Brahman is spoken of as the insentient and inert *Prakṛti*, then it would be only a censure (*nīndā*) rather than a praise of Brahmā spoken by gods. If it is argued that it is illusory kind of *stuti* (praise) — *bhramātmika*, i.e. ascribing non-difference of *prakṛti* with *Puruṣa*, and as fancied by the Sāṅkhyas, such a contention is also untenable.

Since the Sāṅkhyas are Akhyātivādins, they do not at all accept illusory cognition. Even in the state of dream they would never speak of illusion.

(to be continued)

AVIDYĀ — ILLUSION

आच्छाद्य विक्षिपन्नि संस्फुरदात्मरूपं
जीवेश्वरत्वजगदाकृतिभिर्मृ वैव ।
अज्ञानमावरणविभ्रमशक्तियोगा-
दात्मत्वमात्रविषयाश्रयताबलेन ॥

“*Avidyā*, owing to the strength of having pure consciousness as its locus and content, acquires a veiling and a transfiguring faculty. It veils the ever-luminous consciousness, and then projects it illusorily in the form of embodied souls, God, and the world.”

Sarvajñātman in the *Śaṅkṣepaśūtrika*

ABOUT THE PUBLISHERS

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- (1) to undertake the carrying on a scientific research for the extension of knowledge in the fields of Natural and Applied Sciences generally, and in particular in the fields of Physics and Metaphysics.
- (2) to undertake and carry on scientific study and analysis of the Advaita system of thought as expounded by Ādi Śaṅkara and to conduct research as regards the relevance of his teaching in solving present day ills of mankind.
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संसाराध्वनि तापभानुकिरणप्रोद्भूतदाहव्यथा-

स्विन्नानां जलकाङ्क्षया मरुभुवि भ्रान्त्या परिभ्राम्यताम् ।

अत्यासन्नसुधाम्बुधिं सुखकरं ब्रह्माद्वयं दर्शय-

त्येषा शङ्करभारती विजयते निर्वाणसन्दायिनी ॥

saṁsārādhvani tōpabhānukiraṇaprodhbhūtadāhavyathā-
khinnānām jalakāṅkṣayā marubhuvi bhrāntyā

paribhrāmyatām

atyāsannasudhāmbudhiṁ sukhakaram brahmādvayam

darśayaty-

eṣā śaṅkarabhārati vijayate nirvāṇasandāyini.

To those who are afflicted, in the way of the world, by the burning pain given rise to by the scorching sun-shafts of misery, and who through delusion wander about in the desert (of worldliness) seeking water — showing the felicitous ocean of nectar, which is very near, the non-dual *Brahman*, this — the Voice of Śaṅkara — is victorious, leading, as it does, to liberation.