

A HALF-YEARLY JOURNAL OF ADVAITA-VEDĀNTA

# The VOICE of ŚĀṆKARĀ


śaṅkara-bhāratī

*Chairman, Advisory Board*

V. R. Kalyanasundara Sastri

*Editor*

R. Balasubramanian



Vol XXIII No 2

July 1998

esā śaṅkara-bhāratī vijayate  
nirvāṇa-saṁdāyini

victorious is the voice of śaṅkara,  
leading, as it does, to liberation.

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## CONTENTS

	1	Homage to Śaṅkara
<i>Śrī Candrasekharendra Sarasvatī</i>	3	On the Vedas
<i>Kireet Joshi</i>	16	Paramācārya: The Multifaceted Personality
<i>Shashi Prabha Kumar</i>	27	Ecology & Conservation in the <i>Bhūmisūkta</i> of the <i>Atharvaveda</i>
<i>Amiya Chakravarty</i>	42	Śaṅkara – Advaitism and Bhakti
<i>R. Balasubramanian</i>	51	Maṇḍanamiśra
<i>Śrī Śaṅkara Bhagavatpāda</i>	63	Nature of the Witness
<i>Sangam Lal Pandey</i>	68	Vedāntic Social Philosophy
<i>K. Srinivas</i>	91	Advaita as Interpreted by P.T. Raju
<i>N. Gangadharan</i>	106	Advaitic Concepts in the <i>Tirumandiram</i>
<i>J. Krishnan</i>	117	Relation between Pure Consciousness and Mind

## HOMAGE TO ŚAṆKARA

[174]

विनिष्कासितानीश तत्त्वावबोधा-  
 त्रतानां मनोभ्यो ह्यनन्याश्रयाणि ।  
 रजांसि प्रपन्नानि पादाम्बुजातं  
 गुरो रक्तवस्त्रापदेशाद्बिभर्षि ॥

*viniṣkāsitānīśa tattvāvabodhān-  
 natānām manobhyo hyananyāśrayāṇi  
 rajāṁsi prapannāni pādāmbujātaṁ  
 guro raktavastrāpadeśād-bibharṣi.*

O Supreme Master! Śaṅkara! Benign Preceptor! You have, indeed, worn the ochre robe that symbolises the mass of dust (red powders) (ignorance/desires, etc.) which has been warded off by you – through the awakening of the knowledge of Reality – from the minds of the ardent devotees who have bowed down at the pair of your lotus like feet.

[175]

भवाम्भोधिमग्नान् जनान्दुःखयुक्तान्  
 जवादुद्धिधीर्षुर्भवानित्यहोऽहम् ।  
 विदित्वा हि ते कीर्त्तिमन्यादृशाम्भो  
 सुखं निर्विशङ्कः स्वपिम्यस्तयत्नः ॥

*bhavāmbhodhimagnān janān duḥkhayuktān  
 javād-uddidhīrṣur-bhavān-ityaho'ham  
 viditvā hi te kīrttim-anyādrśāṃ bho!  
 sukham nirviśaṅkaḥ svapimyastayatnaḥ.*

Oh Śrī Śaṅkara! You want to lift up hurriedly the miserable people who are immersed in the quagmire of the ocean of *saṃsāra*. O! how much compassionate you are! I am, indeed, wonderstruck as I come to know of your extraordinary fame; hence I fall asleep comfortably, without any anxiety and free from any endeavour at all (to help the mankind).

Śrī Saccidānanda Śivābhinava Nṛsiṃhabhāratī  
 in Śrī Śaṅkarācāryabhujāṅgaprayāta-stotra



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## ON THE VEDAS\*

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Śrī Candrasekharendra Sarasvatī

### 1. *The Age of the Vedas*

The sacred books of Buddhism, Christianity and Islam have definite historical dates assigned to them. The *Tripitakas* are said to have been written about the time of Aśoka, though the Buddha's date, according to some *Purānas*, went further back by several centuries. The *Koran*, which is the word of God conveyed to the prophet, is about 1,200 years old. The New Testament of the Bible is about 2,000 years old. Though no one can assign any definite date to the Vedas, Orientalists are anxious to discover when they were "composed." Some of them say that it was done about 1,500 B.C.; others suggest that it may have been composed about 3,000 B.C. Tilak fixes the date as 6,000 B.C. But modern Orientalists are inclined to bring the date nearer.

If the Buddha was born 2,500 years ago, and if in the Buddha's time it was not known when the Vedas came into existence, then the date of the Vedas should be long anterior

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\* Courtesy: *Ācārya's Call*, Madras Discourses (1957-1960) pt. I, pp. 15-21, pt. II, pp. 7 - 13 published by Śrī Kāmakoti Pīṭham Śrī Śaṅkarācārya Svāmi Maṭha, Kanchipuram - 631 502.

to his time. But the truth of the matter is that the Vedas are *anādi* and *nitya*, without beginning and without end and eternal, like the sound. They manifest themselves after each *pralaya* (deluge). *Pralaya* and *śṛṣṭi* (deluge and creation) alternate. The Old Testament speaks of the creation of the present world. According to Hindu scriptures, there have been many creations before, and also *pralayas*. The period of each *śṛṣṭi* and *pralaya* spreads over aeons, infinitely beyond human calculation. The findings of Geology, which traces the history of the earth to a period long before the time referred to in the *Book of Genesis*, confirm this view of cycles of creation and deluge. In fact, the more and the deeper the researches of modern science, the greater the confirmation for the declarations in our Hindu scriptures. It is futile, as it will be foolish, to discard these declarations at any time, on the ground that they do not accord with the discoveries of science known till then. For, fresh light thrown by later scientific discoveries provide startling confirmation for many of these declarations.

The Orientalists also attempt to fix the date of the Vedas on the basis of certain internal evidence about the relation between the Sun and the stars, etc. The Hindu theory of cycles, however, refers to several creation and so, the same astronomical coincidences and deviations may have occurred during the period of some past *śṛṣṭis* also. We do not know how many such *pralayas* and *śṛṣṭis* have gone before.

Another method adopted for fixing the age of the Vedas is to go by the changes in the style of Hindu scriptures, from the *Ṛk Samhitā* down to the *Kāvya* literature. In the case of spoken languages, it has been computed that gradual mutations took place with the passage of every 200 years. For example, the Tamil language to-day

is different from the Tamil of the Sangam age. It is a far cry from modern English to old English. American English is different from the orthodox English in use in Britain. On this method of appraisal, it has been suggested that the Vedas should have come into existence 1,500 years ago.

It is common knowledge and experience that if a thing is in constant use, it will wear out and bear marks of such use and wear, and that a thing rarely used will remain as fresh as it was when it was first used. The same is true of languages also. English, Tamil and Hindi have changed in form through the centuries and undergone even distortions by usage. But the language of the Vedas remains to-day the same in form and feature as it was at that time out of memory. The reason for this absence of distortion or deterioration is that Vedic chanting has been so carefully guarded, as not to allow any possibility of a lapse from its pristine form. Of the innumerable *Veda Śākhās*, we know now only of one out of the 21 branches of the *R̥g Veda*, three out of the 101 branches of the *Yajur Veda*, two or possibly three out of the 1,000 branches of the *Sāma Veda*, and one only out of the 11 branches of the *Atharva Veda*. It is to be borne in mind that if one desires to become proficient in even one *sākhā* of a Veda, one will have to devote to its learning about eight years, night and day.

There are various methods in *Veda-adhyayana* (memorising the *Veda mantras*) which help to preserve the number and the order of the words and letters of each *Veda mantra*. There are specifications regarding the time interval (*mātrā*) for the utterance of each letter in a word; the part of the body from which each of the sounds in the word should emanate by the exhalation of the breath in an appropriate manner; the affinities between the *svaras* in the Vedas and the *svaras* in *Saṅgīta* (music) and the affinities of both

(*Veda svaras* and *saṅgīta svaras*) to the natural *svaras* in the sounds produced by animals, birds, etc. These methods of memorising the *Veda mantras* are known as *vākya*, *pada*, *krama*, *ghana*, *jaṭā*, *svara*, etc.

The Vedas are not like the sounds of common speech to undergo periodical changes by usage; on the other hand, they have been meticulously preserved as a result of being protected by definite prescription and indices relating to the sound measures, their nature, sequence, manner of utterance, etc., which have been preserved by oral transmission from generation to generation. The injuntions relating to the persons who should do the *adhyayana*, and the *ācāras* such persons should observe, are intended to promote this objective. To approach the study of the Vedas without a clear knowledge of all these ramifications and to adopt rough and ready methods for estimating their age will amount to proceeding on a basis which has no bearing on the subject of the study.

## 2. Study of the Vedas

The state of things in this country for the past 100 years or so is such that the Vedas are being brought to the notice of the people of this country the land of the Vedas, through the published works of Western Orientalists. While we should acknowledge with gratitude the invaluable contributions made by these research scholars of the West in classifying, printing and preserving the Vedas, so far as we in India are concerned, the primary purpose of the Vedas, namely to memorise and recite correctly, with proper accents, or *adhyayana*, cannot be served by these publications. The Vedas printed and preserved in libraries will (in the absence of regular study and recitation) eventually acquire only a museum value, and the future

generations reading these published works may marvel at the wonderful things contained in them.

The Vedas are intended to serve a different purpose. They have to be learnt by heart, understanding the correct way of pronouncing the *mantras* by listening to the rendering of the *mantras* by the *guru* (teacher). The Veda mantras so learnt should become the guide in our daily life, in our *karma-anuṣṭhāna*, *tapas*, *Īśvara ārādhana*, etc. If, in India, the Vedas retain their original vitality even today, it is because the hymns are being continuously repeated by students and teachers of the Vedas and the purity of the sounds and accents of the words are retained in that process. It is only by practising the Vedic injunctions that we can obtain the grace of God, both for our individual welfare and for the welfare of the whole world. That is why the mere preservation of the Vedas in well-bound volumes cannot secure us the benefits for which they are intended.

In fact the Vedas are never intended to be written down and read. *Veda adhyayana* implied hearing from the lips of the teacher and repeating after him. That is why in ancient Tamil classics the Vedas are referred to as *Ezhutākiḷavi* (எழுதாக்கிளவி) unwritten book. *Veda Pāṭhakas*, who learn from books, are included among the six classes of inferior scholars. The other five classes are those who recite the Vedas musically, those who recite very fast, those who shake their heads while reciting, those who do not know the meaning, and those who have a poor voice. This is made clear in the following verse:

गीती शीघ्री शिरःकम्पी तथा लिखितपाठकः ।  
अनर्थज्ञः अल्पकण्ठश्च षडेते पाठकाधमाः ॥

*gītī śīghrī śiraḥkampī tathā likhitapāṭhakaḥ  
anarthajñāḥ alpakaṅṭhaśca śaḍete pāṭhakādhamāḥ.*

The study of the Vedas has been confined in these days to a few professionals (*purohīts*), who are not even accorded a proper status in society. Many of them learn mechanically, without caring to understand the meaning of the Vedic hymns. At this rate, there is a danger of *Veda adhyayana* becoming extinct, in the not so distant a future. To avert such a situation, a private Trust has been formed with land gifts made by some donors for encouraging the study of the Vedas in the traditional manner. About six years ago, statistics were prepared of those who have made a complete *adhyayana* of the Vedas, in each *śākhā* (branch), and presents were given to them. Stipends are being given to qualified students in each *śākhā*, who desired to learn *Veda-bhāṣya* under a competent teacher. Half-yearly examinations are being held in the prescribed *Veda* and *Veda Bhāṣya* portions and *sambhāvanās* are being given to successful candidates.

There are many people who genuinely regret that they have to perform the various rituals prescribed in the *Śāstras* without understanding the meaning of the *mantras* employed therein. Take the instance of the marriage ceremony. The indifference shown by our young men and women for the rituals connected with marriage is due to their ignorance of the meaning of the *mantras* they are asked to repeat. If the meaning of the *mantras* are explained to them beforehand, by a competent person, they will be able to go through the rituals with better understanding and greater devotion. The same procedure can be adopted in respect of *Upanayana* and other *saṁskāras*.

*Veda adhyayana* without knowing the meaning there-

of is like preserving the body without the soul. *Veda mantras* uttered with a knowledge of their meaning will lead to *pāpa-parihāra* (expiation of sins), and *ariṣṭa śānti* (liquidation of evil), and thus pave the way to *Brahma-sākṣātkāra* (God-realisation).

The Vedas are the roots of our religion. All other *paraphernalia*, like feasts and festivals, are like the leaves and fruits of that tree, depending for their sustenance on the Vedic roots. Though imbedded in mud, the internal core of the roots is as fresh and fragrant as the fruits and flowers on the top. It is no use feeling gratified that the Vedas have been written down, printed and published by Western scholars. To us, *Veda adhyayana* and their employment in the sacraments of our daily life are important. For that purpose it is necessary to learn them by heart, understand their meaning, and recite them in the prescribed manner.

### 3. *Preservation of Vedic Lore*

(Speech delivered by His Holiness at a special meeting convened by the Mutt, which was attended by a large and distinguished gathering, including those connected with Veda and Śāstra Pāṭhaśālās in the mofussil.)

It is more than one year since I came to Madras. Compared to others, who came here after me, I have become an 'old' resident of Madras. In one sense I am glad to be here. Even before I came to Madras, the work of renovating the *gopuram* of the Śrī Kapālīśvarar Temple was undertaken and I had the opportunity of having *darshan* of this *gopuram*. After my arrival in Madras, the renovation of the *gopurams* of the Śrī Keśava Perumāl Temple and the Śrī Mādhava Perumāl Temple was undertaken and the work on the former has been completed. Recently the work on the renovation of

the *gopuram* of Śrī Āñjaneya Temple, near the Sanskrit College has started. Such acts of devotion have considerable significance in the life of the people. The atmosphere may be filled with thoughts of hatred; but when a few people engage themselves in such noble deeds, the beneficent effects of their deeds will bring about a climate of peace and harmony.

Madras State is a land of temples and *gopurams*. It is but right that this State should adopt the *gopuram* as its emblem. Our Government has adopted the Upanishadic saying, *Satyameva Jayate* as its motto. I am glad that it finally decided to stick to the Upanishadic form and retained the word, *Jayate* and did not change it into *Jayati*. It is not enough to have a motto; it should be put into practice. I am, however, hopeful that when once a right motto has been chosen, it will come to be practised in due course. It is also significant that the wheel of *Dharma* adorns the centre of the National Flag. It may be asked whether the *Dharma Chakra* is not a Buddhistic emblem. The wheel is a Hindu idea and you will find in the *Gītā* the reference, *evam pravartitam-cakram*. (so functions the wheel). God Nārāyaṇa holds a Cakra, a wheel in His hand. Ancient Tamil literature speaks of the *Aravāzhi* (அறவாழி) or *Dharma cakra*. It is possible that the Buddhists borrowed this idea of the wheel from the *Gītā*. There is no reason to feel that we are imitating Buddhism.

Huge *gopurams* came to be constructed for temples mentioned in the devotional songs of the Śaivite and Vaishnavite saints, namely, the Nāyanmārs and Āzhvārs. When philanthropic members of the Nagarathar community and the Thengalai Chettiars of Madras thought of renovating temples, they selected the temples about which these saints had sung. Most of the temple *gopurams* came into existence



towards the end of the Chola dynasty and the Vijayanagaram dynasty. Most of these were constructed in brick mortar. Achyutadeva Raya, who succeeded the famous Krishnadeva Rāya wanted to construct *gopurams* in granite for 64 temples. Foundations were laid for them and his direction was that all of them should be completed by the time he returned from a pilgrimage to Rameswaram. Two of the temples selected were those at Śrīraṅgam and at Tiruvānaikoil, lying within a distance of one mile from each other. Both the places are in the Śrīraṅgam island, and granite for constructing the towers had to be conveyed across rivers. However, the ambition of Achyutadevaraya could not be fulfilled. The *gopuram* at Śrīraṅgam rose only to the first tier, and even now it is called the "Rāya Gopuram". Huge granite pillars intended for the *gopuram* can be seen standing at Tiruvānaikoil.

There are however, *Vimānas* in granite in a number of temples. *Vimāna* is the roof over the *sanctum sanctorum* of a temple. One such *Vimāna* is at Gangaikonda Chozhapuram. In recent times a philanthropic gentleman completed the construction of a stone *gopuram* for the Śrī Sukhavaneshwarar temple in Salem. Speaking of *gopurams*, four tall *gopurams* in the South come to our mind. They are the *gopurams* of Śrī Virūpākshesvarar temple at Hampi, of the temple at Kalahasti, of the Śrī Ekamresvarar temple at Kanchipuram, and of the Śrī Śārangapāṇi temple at Kumbakonam.

There is an interesting story connected with the *gopuram* of the Śrī Śārangapāṇi temple. The work was undertaken by a bachelor by name Lakshminarayana. He made it his mission in life. When pressed by his relations to marry, so that he may beget a son for performing his obsequies, he is said to have replied that if his devotion was

sincere, God Himself would perform the necessary ceremonies and enable his soul to ascend to Heaven. It is said that on the death of Lakshminarayana, God took the form of a boy and performed his obsequies. This tradition is being maintained to this day, and every year the *śrāddha* of this devotee forms part of the temple rituals. How did the temples come into existence? From what do they derive authority for this sanctity? What is it that invests the minds of millions of devotees who behold the *gopuram* with a sense of reverential awe and piety? The temples derive their authority from the several South Indian *Āgamas*. The deities installed in them are sanctified through *Vedic hymns*. *Vedattin mandirattāl veṇ maṇalum Śivamāhi* (வேதத்தின் மந்திரத்தால் வெண்மணலும் சிவமாகி) the white sands of the river bed raised to the dignity of Godhead by being sanctified by *Veda mantras*. Those who sanctified these deities were persons who strictly adhered to the prescribed observances, like *niyamācāra*, *āhāra* and *dhyāna*. They dedicated and offered the fruits of their rigorous penance to the deity installed in the temple, and thus sanctified the image of God. They did this, not for their individual benefit, but with the object that the deity so sanctified may bestow grace on the worshipping public. Thus the Vedas, the spiritual life that they ordain, and the holy men who exemplified that ideal in their lives, constitute the very basis of the temple, not merely as a structure in brick and mortar, but as a religious institution making for the spiritual education of the people. The Archaeological Department spends time and money to study and explain the architectural and other external features of temples. But hardly any thought is bestowed on the ultimate basis of the temple institution, namely, the Vedas.

The Vedas are the roots of all *Dharmas* – *Vedo'khilo dharma mūlam* (वेदोऽखिलो धर्ममूलम्). If the roots of a tree

are exposed, the tree withers and dies. The Vedas are the hidden source of strength for everything. But, what are we doing to preserve this source? In South India, Kerala ranks first in the matter of Vedic studies. This is because the *upanayanam* of a Namboodiri Brahmin is performed in his seventh year, and within the next five or six years, he is made to master his branch of the Veda. During this period the Namboodiri boys lead a life of rigorous discipline wearing only a loin cloth and sleeping on a deer skin. The present Chief Minister of Kerala, Śrī Śaṅkaran Nambudiri-pad, is said to have undergone such a course of study. The next place in the matter of Vedic studies goes to the Telugu region. The encouragement for Vedic studies was provided by annual examination and Vidvat Sadas, held at Vijayawada during *Navarātri*. Scholars were honoured with cash presentations on this occasion and also given certificates testifying to their scholarship. These scholars used to return to their homes on foot, and en route, *grhasthas*, to whom they showed these certificates, also gave them generous gifts. At every marriage an amount was earmarked for making presents to Vedic scholars. Tamilnadu ranks third in Vedic studies. Now-a-days not many among us are devoted to *Veda-adhyaana*. We are exchanging landed properties for university diplomas.

All the Vedas centre on God. The Lord says in the *Gītā*: *Vedaiśca sarvairahameva vedyah*. (वेदैश्च सर्वैरहमेव वेद्यः) This is an echo of a well-known passage in the *Kaṭhapaniṣad*. There is only one God and He is the Paramātman. He is the author of creation, preservation and destruction. A tree springs to life from the earth; it is nourished by the earth; and becomes part of the earth when it dies by decay. Similarly the entire universe derives its being from God, is sustained by Him and finally merges into Him.

The only unchanging and indestructible Being in the universe is God. Other religions also proclaim the existence of only one God, but known by a different name. It is said that if this view is accepted, the bond of religions would become loose and the chances of conversion to other religion would increase. But that is not true. If an adherent of one religion comes to believe that the God proclaimed by his religion and the God proclaimed by another religion are the same, he will not change his religion; for, such an action will be tantamount to denying the God of the religion he professes, who is the same as the God of the religion which he proposes to embrace. He will thus be a traitor both to his former religion and to his new religion.

The Vedic religion is anterior to all religions which adopt this definition of God. Any person who thinks of forsaking the Vedas becomes untrue not only to God, but to his own self. If, in any two religions, God is defined in common as the Creator, Preserver, Destroyer, Forgiver and Liberator, for one belonging to either religion to give it up for the other is the greatest act of blasphemy and is, therefore, the grossest sin. The Vedas contain the immutable rules by which the universe functions for all times, the past, the present and the future. They determine the entire range of human relationship and activity. The Vedic injunctions govern our entire life from birth to death – *niṣekādi śmaśānāntam*. (निषेकादि श्मशानान्तं) We are now at a stage when we follow the Vedic injunctions by habit, without understanding their meaning or significance. If this attitude is allowed to continue, there is the danger of our losing the Vedic traditions, a loss not only to this country, but to the whole world. It is our duty to produce in sufficient numbers persons who make the Vedas their life-study and who are able to explain the Vedic *mantras*. According to the statistics

available, the number of students learning the Vedas either privately or in Pāṭhaśālās is very small. More could be induced to take to Vedic studies by introducing a system of awarding cash prizes for every completed *pañcādi*. To produce persons understanding the meaning of the Vedas, a series of ten half-yearly tests have been introduced. The sixth test in the series was held recently and 50 scholars appeared for it. A sufficient cash present has to be given to keep these scholars going for the next six months, so that they can continue their studies. This scheme of examinations has been introduced and is in vogue under the auspices of the Math. With sufficient inducement, more scholars may come forward to make a life-study of Veda Bhāṣya. The Vedas have to be studied from the mouth of a teacher. If their purity and efficacy are to be maintained, a dedicated and strictly disciplined life is necessary. That is the significance of the verse:

शिखां पुण्ड्रञ्च सूत्रञ्च समयाचारमेव च ।  
पूर्वैराचरितं कुर्यात् अन्यथा पतितो भवेत् ॥

*śikhāṃ puṇḍraṃ ca sūtraṅca samayācārameva ca  
pūrvairācaritaṃ kuryāt anyathā patito bhavet.*

It is distressing to find that most of the Veda-*Paṭhaśālā* have now become defunct due to scarcity of students. It is the duty of the public to give a fillip to the Vedic studies, and help in their revival by providing livelihood for the Vedic students and the possibility of future prospects. They should be given a respectable status in society, and the sense of frustration under which they suffer should be removed from their minds. Āstikas, all over India should create organisations suited to their own regional conditions to arrest the decline in Vedic study and knowledge and bring about their rejuvenation.

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## PARAMĀCĀRYA THE MULTIFACETED PERSONALITY\*

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Kireet Joshi\*\*

It is a great privilege to be associated with this symposium which has been organised to pay tributes to Pūjyaśrī Candrasekharendra Sarasvatī Svāmī, who has been hailed as the Master of masters. During his fullness of one hundred years, he brought to our country the message of the Veda and the *Upaniṣads* and show their relevance and practicability even in the critical times through which we are passing today.

The Vedas and the *Upaniṣads* declare that the highest realization has to be achieved here itself in this very body. The *Kenopaniṣad* (2.5) declares:

इह चेद्वेदीदथ सत्यमस्ति न चेदिहावेदीन्महती विनष्टिः ।

It means: "If here one comes to that knowledge, then one truly is; if here one comes not to the knowledge, then great is the pordition."

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True to this great teaching, all those who have come into contact with Paramācārya testify that it was *here* that he had come to that knowledge, and therefore, he truly was and is. He has been described as a *jīvanmukta*, liberated in this very life. To remember and to dedicate ourselves to the ideal of *jīvanmukti* is so precious that we feel beholden to all those who have given us this opportunity to understand and reflect upon this great ideal of *jīvanmukti*.

Among countless discourses that Paramācārya has given and which are published in a number of books – the latest being *Hindu Dharma* published by Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan in 1996 –, the most important themes that predominate are those of the Vedas and Dharma. On both these subjects, Paramācārya has thrown authoritative light and inspired people belonging to different religions and no religion to pursue the life of Dharma.

In an important discourse on the "Western Vedic Research," Paramācārya paid tributes to those Western scholars who took great pains to discover ancient Indian texts and publish volume after volume incorporating their findings. He, however, pointed out that while some good was done, "this good was not unmixed and had undesirable elements." He explained that "the intention of many of those who call themselves orientalist or indologists was not above reproach. They wanted to resurrect the history of India on the basis of the study of the Veda, and in course of this, they connected the Aryan-Dravidian theory of races and sowed the seeds of hatred among the people. Purporting to be rationalists, they wrongly interpreted, in an allegorical manner, what cannot be comprehended by our senses. In commenting on the Vedas, they took the view that the sages were primitive men." These views were expressed by

Paramācārya, not in the spirit of polemics but in the spirit of his impartial search for the Truth. And, indeed, they invite us to undertake fresh efforts to revisit the Veda. Are the Vedas, we may ask, compositions of primitive people? It is argued that these compositions are obscure and barbarous. How is it, we may ask, that they have had the most splendid good fortune to be the reputed source not only of some of the world's richest and profoundest religions, but also some of the subtlest metaphysical philosophies? Can obscurity and primitiveness ever come to be revered not only as the origin but even the standard of all that has been universally acknowledged to contain profound and illumined thoughts, and of systems of subtle and elaborate psychology? We must consider and evaluate properly how and why the Vedas have been revered as the source and criterion of Truth for all that can be held as authoritative and true in the *Brāhmaṇas* and the *Upaniṣads*, in the Tantras and the *Purāṇas*, in the doctrines of great philosophical schools and in the teachings of famous saints and sages. The only name that was borne by these compositions was Veda, the knowledge, – the received name for the highest spiritual truth of which the human mind is capable. Surely, this great tradition starting from the Ṛṣis of the Vedas and the *Upaniṣads* like Vasiṣṭha and Yājñavalkya, and continuing even till today through modern Ṛṣis like Sri Aurobindo, could not have been sustained, if the Vedas were merely what the Western scholarship wants us to believe it to be, namely, collections of sacrificial compositions of the primitive and still barbarous race written around a system of ceremonial and propitiatory rites addressed to powers of Nature and replete with a confused mass of half-power myth and crude astronomical allegories yet in the making.

Paramācārya has rightly pointed out that the great Vedic declaration, "*ekam sad viprā bahudhā vadanti*" (That



reality is one but it is formulated variously by wise men) can only be a summit of luminous human thought and spiritual experience. For our immediate purpose, we may refer to a brief but powerfully pregnant *Rk* of the famous *Sūkta* (170 of the first *Maṇḍala*) where Indra makes a statement about the nature of the ultimate Reality:

न नृगस्ति नो श्वः कस्तद्वेद यदद्भुतम् ।  
अन्यस्य चित्तमभि संचरेण्यमुताधीतं वि नश्यति ॥

It is not now, nor is It tommorrow; who knoweth that which is Supreme and Wonderful? It has motion and action in the consciousness of another, but when it is approached by the thought, it vanishes.

Commenting on this *Rk*, Sri Aurobindo points out that Indra here speaks of the unknowable source of things, which can come to be thought of, or striven after, only when the highest summits of thought are reached and transcended. It is then that the wonder and strangeness of oneness of Reality come to be glimpsed, and one begins to perceive something which is beyond Space and Time. In effect, Indra says, "That is not to be found in Time. It does not exist in the actualities of the present, nor in the eventualities of the future. It neither is now nor becomes hereafter. Its being is beyond Space and Time and therefore in Itself cannot be known by that which is in Space and Time. It manifests Itself by Its form and activities in the consciousness of that which is not Itself and through those activities it is meant that It should be realized. But if one tries to approach It and study It in itself, It disappears from the thought that would seize It and is as if It were not."

We are at once reminded of the famous verses of the *Keṇopaniṣad* (1.3-4):

न तत्र चक्षुर्गच्छति न वाग् गच्छति नो मनो  
 न विद्वो न विजानीमो यथैतदनुशिष्यति ॥  
 अन्यदेव तद्विदितादथो अविदितादधि ।  
 इति शुश्रुम पूर्वेषां ये नस्तद्व्याचक्षिरे ॥

There sight travels not, nor speech, nor the mind. We know It, we know It not, nor can we distinguish how one should teach of It. For It is other than the known; It is therefore, above the unknown. It is so we have heard from men of old who declared That to our understanding.

Again, Paramācārya has rightly declared that the entire theory which aims at promoting the division between Aryans and Dravidians is a concoction. The latest research has now provided ample evidence to show that the whole story of Aryan invasion through Punjab is a myth of philologists. In this connection, let me present the following quotation from Sri Aurobindo describing his experience when he came from Bengal to say in Southern India and who had held at that time the second-hand belief in the racial division between Northern Aryans and Southern Dravidians. He writes in *The Secret of the Veda*:

I could not, however, be long in Southern India without being impressed by the general recurrence of northern or "Aryan" types in the Tamil race. Whenever I turned, I seemed to recognise with a startling distinctness, not only among the Brahmins but in all castes and classes, the old familiar faces, features, figures of my friends of Maharashtra, Gujarat, Hindustan, even though this similarity was less widely spread, of my own province Bengal. The impression I received was as if an army of all the

tribes of the North had descended on the South and submerged any previous populations that may have occupied it. A general impression of a Southern type survived, but it was impossible to fix it rigidly while studying the physiognomy; of individuals. And in the end I could not but perceive that whatever admixtures might have taken place, whatever regional differences might have been evolved, there remains, behind all variations, a unity of physical as well as of cultural type throughout India.

He was, however, still aware of the differences of language to support the theory of the division between Aryan and Dravidian races. But even here, he found that Sanskrit and Tamil appeared to have been both derived from the one lost primitive tongue. He has stated:

For on examining the vocables of the Tamil language, in appearance so foreign to the Sanskritic form and character, I yet found myself continually guided by words or by families of words supposed to be pure Tamil in establishing new relations between Sanskrit and its distant sister, Latin, and occasionally, between the Greek and the Sanskrit. Sometimes the Tamil vocable not only suggested the connection, but proved the missing link in a family of connected words. And it was through this Dravidian language that I came first to perceive what seems to me now the true law, origins and, as it were, the embryology of the Aryan tongues. I was unable to pursue my examination far enough to establish any definite conclusion, but it certainly seems to me that the original connection between the Dravidians and Aryan tongues was far closer and more extensive than is usually supposed and the possibility suggests itself

that they may even have been two divergent families derived from one lost primitive tongue.

We must be grateful to Paramācārya for having taught us that there is no ground to divide India on any racial or linguistic basis and that India is one united nation with varieties of differences that do not amount to division.

Commenting on Dharma, he refers to the great sayings:

वेदोऽखिलो धर्ममूलम् ।

धर्मो रक्षति रक्षितः ।

Paramācārya traces the root of Dharma in the Veda, in doing so, he points out that the most difficult thing in life is the knowledge of life and application of that knowledge to day-to-day management and conduct of life. In regard to both these things, he explains how the Veda is the science of life as well as art of life. It may be mentioned that no science is as difficult to establish and systematise as the science of life. For, that would require the knowledge of both the beginning of life and the end of life, which are, to our ordinary consciousness, perpetual mysteries. Again, these two mysteries become intricately complex when we realize that life is endlessly multiple and that it exhibits characteristics of what may be called apparent chance, a play of multiple probabilities and possibilities, and also of the iron grip of blind or intelligent inevitabilities. And yet, the Veda happens to manifest such a mastery of knowledge of life, death and immortality, and such definitive assurance of what life can deliver to man at the highest levels of explorations that one cannot but acknowledge the depth of and heights of the Vedic science. It is no ordinary thing when Parashara describes the realization of Angirasas in the following words:

वीळू विद्दळ्हा पितरो न उक्थैरद्रिं रुजन्नङ्गिरसो रवेण ।  
चक्रुर्दिवा बृहतो गातुमस्मै अहः स्वर्विविदुः केतुमुग्राः ॥

(*Rgveda*, 1.71.2)

Our fathers broke open the firm and strong places by their words. Yea, Angirasas broke open the hill by their cry: they made in us the path to the great heaven; they found the day and swar and vision and the luminous cows.

Or let us refer to Vāmadeva who declared:

नेशत्तमो दुधितं रोचत द्यौरुद्देव्या उषसो भानुरर्त ।  
आ सूर्यो बृहतस्तिष्ठद्वक्त्रां ऋजु मर्तेषु वृजिना च पश्यन् ॥

(*Rgveda*, 4.1.17)

Vanished the darkness, shaken in its foundation; Heaven shone out; upward rose the light of the divine dawn; the sun entered the vast fields upholding the straight and crooked in mortals... let there be the truth for our thought, O master of harmony, O master of vastness.

The entire Veda, *vedo'khila*, is the statement of exploration of the vastness in which life is spread out, and it gives us definitive guidelines that will help every explorer in regard to the geography of the domains of life and insights into the interaction of forces which create history of life. The Veda also gives us the secret of how one can overcome what seems inevitable so as to actualise even the most difficult, but most desirable probabilities. How to conquer the inevitability of death and attain the most difficult nectars of immortality, this is the climax of the Vedic science and Vedic art of life.

It is clear that the Vedic Ṛṣis had discovered what can be called the eternal rhythms which govern the creation and maintenance of the universe and human life. As the *Ṛgveda* (3.3.1) declares :

अग्निर्हि देवाँ अमृतो दुवस्यत्था

धर्माणि सनता न दूदुषत् ।

Immortal mystic fire of aspiration adores cosmic powers and beings so that the eternal principles of Dharma may not be violated.

These great words of Viśvāmitra give us a glimpse of the concept of Sanātana Dharma of which Paramācārya has given extensive exposition in his discourses and writings.

Sanātana Dharma is to be distinguished from what is called religion or rather sectarian religion or religionism. The word "Dharma" has nothing to do with dogma and outer aspects of sectarianism. Dharma is the scientific law that sustains the rhythms of life and rhythms of the growth of life. Again, Sanātana Dharma is so called because the Vedic Ṛṣis discovered that the fundamental rhythms of life are constant, and that if they are violated, they cannot but inflict a blow to the sustenance and growth of life. These eternal principles of Dharma are again to be worked out in detail in respect of the age, country, group, and individual and that in each case there are discernible principles of variations. We have therefore, the concept of *Yuga-dharma*, *Rāṣṭra-dharma*, *Varṇa-dharma* and *Sva-dharma*. All the flexibility that the human society requires in maintaining and developing interrelationship between individual and collectivity is provided for in the concept of Sanātana Dharma.

Paramācārya insisted that it is by observing Dharma, it is by protecting Dharma that we expect Dharma to protect us. In the numerous discourses, Paramācārya has expounded

how Dharma can be practised and how human beings are distinguishable from animals only when they conduct their life in accordance with Dharma. The famous statement quoted by Ādi Śaṅkarācārya tells us:

आहारनिद्राभयमैथुनं च सामान्यमेतत् पशुभिर्नराणाम् ।

धर्मो हि तेषामधिको विशेषः धर्मेण हीनाःपशुभिःसमानाः ॥

The human beings and animals have the same urges. They eat and sleep and copulate and besides, the feeling of fear are common to both. What, then, is the difference between the two? It is adherence to Dharma that distinguishes human beings from animals. Without Dharma to guide him, man would be no better than an animal.

Expounding the idea of Dharma, Paramācārya states: "There is a law governing the behaviour of everything in this universe. All must submit to it for the world to function properly. Otherwise, things will go awry and end up in chaos... if there is a law that applies to trees, there must be one that applies to us also... what is called Dharma is this law, the law of governing the conduct of man." (*Hindu Dharma*, Part I, p.2).

Within this broad context of the concept of Dharma, Paramācārya has expounded, with his mastery over *śāstras*, various institutions of *varṇāśrama*. In regard to various details, one could raise points for discussion, provided we have the time for the same. But one feels confident that Paramācārya had wide catholicity and the very fact that he exhorted adherents of different religions differ widely in regard to many matters of importance, he would only prescribe persuasion rather than arbitrary imposition.

To study Paramācārya is to study a vast ocean. He has not only dealt with Vedas, *Brāhamaṇas*, *Āraṇyakas*, and

*Upaniṣads*, he has given insights also into Vedāᅅgas. He has thrown light on different systems of philosophy. He has explained the *Purānas*, Tantras, history of Indian religion and spirituality. He has dwelt upon the contributions made by Buddhism and Jainism. He was widely awake in respect of varieties of doctrines and their conflicts, and he had shown the way of reconciliation and harmony. He had profound knowledge of literature, art, and architecture. Above all, he had the supreme mastery over Advaita Vedānta and the great Yoga of inward meditation by which oneness of beings can be realised. This is not the occasion to expound even a fraction of what Paramācārya had given to India as his precious heritage. We can only sit before him in humility and admire his greatness.



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## ECOLOGY AND CONSERVATION IN THE BHŪMISŪKTA OF THE ATHARVAVEDA

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The *Vedas* are the oldest source of Indian culture and tradition. They propound the most complete, holistic perspective of the universe. In the present state of ecological imbalance on this earth, it is necessary that we draw upon our fund of ancient Vedic knowledge so that some integral path towards the goal of sustainable growth be prepared. The present paper is a modest attempt in the same direction.

Ecology is the study concerned with the interrelation of living organisms and their environment while *conservation* means management, protection and preservation of earth's natural resources and environment.<sup>1</sup> In the Vedic world-view all life in the cosmos is interrelated and interwoven; the process of transmutation and cyclic degeneration and regeneration of life is an accepted postulate. The man-nature relationship is at the centre of Vedic vision enunciated through sacred incantations and articulated as rituals for repeated reminding of the need to sustain and foster the ecological balance of nature.

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## II

The *Bhūmisūkta* of the *Atharvaveda* is one the oldest and the most important sources of information on the relationship of man to his environment and his duty to preserve it. In the sixty-three verses of this hymn, the seer Atharvan has presented a beautiful picture of Mother Earth which is the basis of our sustenance as also a symbol of the entire environment. The verses reflect the symbolic significance through a sensitive comprehension of ecology and conservation.

Bhūmi, i.e. the earth is invoked here as the personified Mother Goddess; she supports us by her abundant endowments and riches; it is she who nourishes us all like a loving Mother nourishing her children.<sup>2</sup> What could be more intimate depiction of the intrinsic relationship of Man to the Earth. These sentiments clearly denote the bond between the Earth and the human beings and exemplify the true relationship of human beings to other forms of life.

In fact, Earth in the *Bhūmisūkta* does not merely mean the land, she rather represents all that is part of the environment. She symbolises the three principal components of environment: solid, liquid and gaseous. She is described here as born out of the waters of ocean. Surrounded by space, she is the creator and sustainer of the world.

In her solid form, Bhūmi is the land and abode of living and non-living beings as also guardian and protector of all that is born and is to be born.<sup>3</sup> She supports and sustains all, furnishes wealth and is the foundation of the world.<sup>4</sup> Rocks, stone and dust constitute the earth; her soil is brown, black and variegated.<sup>5</sup> The ascents, advances and planes of land belong to the earth.<sup>6</sup>

On the liquid side of the environment, Bhūmi is the sustainer of oceans, rivers and waters;<sup>7</sup> she is the wife of clouds and is enriched by rains.<sup>8</sup> Various resources of water, such as the sea, rivers and waterfalls flow on the earth.<sup>9</sup>

The gaseous aspect of earth is brought out through the observation that the air, "Mātariśvan" blows on the earth and the light of the flame follows the wind which is blowing forward and backward. All the birds and bipeds fly to the earth.<sup>10</sup> She bears whatever lives, breathes and stirs.<sup>11</sup> All the four quarters belong to her.<sup>12</sup>

Bhūmi is called "*agnivāsā*,"<sup>13</sup> having fire as her covering. She also represents the energy or the element of fire in the environment. She bears with her the universal fire which is present in herbs, waters, stones, men and horses.<sup>14</sup> Agni gives heat and shine to the earth. The earth also has rich treasures of gold, gems and metals.<sup>15</sup> She carries along with her the seasons brought by the Sun<sup>16</sup> her companion.

The physical aspect of the earth includes agriculture. Fertility of the earth is symbolised here through the image of the brimming vase, the bowl of plenty. Foliage and lotus emerge from this bowl. Waters flow as the life-giving forces of regeneration. The energy of the sun blossoms as vegetation which is the sap of life. She bears herbs of various varieties. Foodstuffs, such as rice and barley, come into being on the earth.<sup>17</sup> In this way, the earth is a figure of fecundity.

The earth is the source of life. She is the world of living beings. The five races of men belong to her. They are her children. She has people dwelling at places, using different languages and practising diverse customs and manners.<sup>18</sup> The great trembling and stirring vibrations of the earth render the diversity into a close-knit unit. All are born

on the same land and all move on the same land, and she treats them all like a cow her calves, alike.

Not only human beings, ferocious animals also are children of the same Mother Earth. Serpents and scorpions lie hidden in a torpid state. Worm too stirs in the early rainy season in a lively form. Man-eating lion, tiger, jackal, wolf, scorpion and reptile – all are on the earth.<sup>19</sup> The seer, however, wishes that they should not harm or crawl on man, mainly because all of them should live together homogeneously. According to this integral view, nothing in this universe is without its utility; each and every species has to be protected for its own sake so that the equilibrium of nature is not disturbed.

It is against this background that the land, water, air, fire, plants, animals, humans and divine beings come together in various images of the Goddess Bhūmi, Mother Earth. The heaven, the earth, and the atmosphere have given this vastness of vision to the seer while the fire, the sun, the waters, and the gods have given him wisdom.<sup>20</sup> He, therefore, gratefully reveals the sublimity and divinity of Bhūmi, the all-encompassing principle of nature and its resources.

### III

We have taken a long stride since the Vedic age. At the turn of the twentieth century, environmental issues have emerged as a major concern for the survival and welfare of mankind on this planet. Armed with the rapidly advancing technology and the fast growing economic system the modern civilisation is under increasing threat from its own activities causing pollution of air, water and soil.<sup>21</sup> The ozone hole, acid rain, nuclear and other toxic wastes, chemical and pesticide industries, the fear of global

warming, pollution of rivers and oceans, deforestation and the consequent soil erosion, and the loss of bio-diversity are just a few highlights of the developmental model adopted across the globe and causing ecological concerns.

The multiplying demands upon the ecosphere which supports life on this planet are rapidly exhausting the resources. The list of ecological threats is increasing by leaps and bounds. The prevailing world order has linked much of its productive economy to energy-intensive techno-culture which is ecologically destructive. We stand at the verge of an unprecedented environmental disaster faced by man never before. Man indeed has used his power not to transform, but to destroy the environment. As an eminent thinker observes in the context of India: "Even more than population explosion, the imbalance in the environment and ecology is the greatest threat to the continent. We may be able to control the first, but the process of devastation we have begun in the second may bring final doom."<sup>22</sup> "Our land, compared with what it was, is like a skeleton of a body wasted by disease." What Plato said of Attica in the fourth century B.C. could very well apply to India with her increasing arid, semi-arid and dry sub-humid areas totalling about five billion hectares.

#### IV

This brings us to the point where we have to pause and ponder over the ecological imbalance threatening the modern world as well as over the ways and means to cure and curb them. The question is what are the diverse components of the disturbance and what methodologies and strategies were suggested and adopted in the past to sustain the ecological balance. Can we, even at this crucial stage, learn any lessons from our ancient Vedic lore for equipping ourselves suitably to face the human predicaments of today?

First and the foremost is the pollution of the land. Fouling the air and poisoning the water are not our only tresspasses against the elements. Nor were they the earliest. "Man's first onslaught was against the Earth itself."<sup>23</sup> Earth is a unique planet, most beautiful and bountiful. It is the floating ball beneath the most gleaming membrane of bright blue sky. What, however, have we done to it? Arid lands have increased, soil which was venerated by our ancestors has been eroded and infertility, sand and salt have taken over. It is estimated that in this sub-continent alone, a million hectares are being turned into desert each year. Desecration of the bowels of Earth through excessive quarrying has become common. Man's power has asserted its most destructive tendencies and the collective greed of man has hollowed the centre of life. Consequently, Bhūmi, the eternal mother, now stands polluted and desecrated beyond all measurements.

Related to this is the massive, unprecedented deforestation. Consequently, the soil's capacity to absorb and hold water has diminished. The disturbance in the ecological system of the earth, water, vegetation, river and mountain is threatening the existence of all types of life. Man has disturbed the cosmic order, the rhythm of the movement of the earth, water, air, ether and Agni, i.e. the five elements whose interaction and interdependence is the basic rule of nature.

In Vedic view, sustenance of ecological balance is regarded as the first and last duty of man, since only then the moral order of the world, i.e. *Rta* can be sustained. The idea of *Rta* has much to do with the law of ecological balance as envisaged by Vedic seers. The emphasis is both on the notion of cosmic regularity as also on purity and non-pollution. The *Vedas* dedicate many hymns to Varuṇa who is considered the

great superintendent of the moral order. He is the guardian of *Rta*. He sees all that is there between the Earth and the Heaven and even what lies beyond them.<sup>24</sup>

There is another prayer in the *Atharvaveda* which draws our attention once again to the ecological balance and how the Earth, like Varuṇa, is herself the upholder of moral order. Truth and moral order sustain her.<sup>25</sup> She is called the sacred environment, "*Devayajani*".<sup>26</sup> Man has been given the capacities for its conservation and growth which would promote his own development also. The conception of the earth as the Mother in the *Bhūmisūkta* even goes further and prescribes that we should always recount without forgetting the glories of Mother Earth in all assemblages and meetings of the people,<sup>27</sup> since she prefers virtuous men of great abilities to those who obstruct the good.<sup>28</sup>

This is to warn us that we have "only one earth". Our science may increase its bounty and our husbandry make its resources go further but its capacity to support life cannot be indefinitely extended. As such, our generation, as custodians of the present and trustees of the future, must take responsibility to sustain it. If life on the earth is to be sustained, we shall have to take care of it and share to a greater extent the responsibility for its conservation. No longer do we live in a world endowed with infinite amount of ecological resource. We must be conscious of the ecological bottom-line. The time is now ripe to give back to Mother Earth what we have taken from her because whatever comes from nature, must go back to her many times over. This is the message of the *Veda*. This "Good Earth" would not get better tomorrow unless we act today. Now that we are aware of our wrong doings and its consequences, we must change the mode of our response to nature.

## V

The ecological implication of the relationship between man and nature is deep-rooted in the history of mankind, while man's sense of responsibility towards it is tied up with the knot of conservation. The theory of conservation has to be the science of totality which moves from segmental knowledge to the integrative wisdom of our Vedic seers. This means that the earth and its resources have to be protected for their own sake and not merely to preserve their potential for man's development. The concern for conservation or stewardship of natural resources is linked with the notion that man's respect for nature is lost today in the pursuit of material gains. The greatest challenge that confronts the present generation is the sustained development and intelligent management of the planet earth. Fundamental to this sustainable development is the concept of inter-generational equity which is the mainstay of Indian culture; it teaches one to meet the needs of this generation, without compromising the privileges of future generations to meet their own needs. It reminds us that the primary responsibility for our common future on this unique earth is, in a very real sense, in our own hands. As has been remarked very succinctly by Dieter Frisch, Director General of Development Commission of the European Community (Brussels), "We have not inherited the land from our ancestors, we have borrowed it from our children."<sup>29</sup>

The seer Atharvan of the *Bhūmisūkta* has also echoed the same feeling when he prays to the Mother Earth that we and our children may live long and be free from sickness and consumption.<sup>30</sup> For that, he clearly remembers his own obligation and says:

Whatever I dig from thee, O Mother Earth,  
May it have quick growth again! Purifier,



We may not injure thy vitals or thy heart.<sup>31</sup>

This conditional qualification about living according to the eternal law of nature clearly implies that the course of development of human history is open-ended. Man has been given the freedom to make this earth the paradise by aligning himself with the divine design, but there is the clear realisation that man has to carve his future through his conduct today. The *Veda* declares that "for the one who lives according to eternal law, the winds are full of sweetness, the rivers pour sweetness. So may the plants be full of sweetness for us."<sup>32</sup>

Many of us consider that the ecological awareness has developed in man only in the recent past. This notion becomes unfounded, however, when one reads the *Bhūmisūkta* of the *Atharvaveda* alone and not to talk of the whole of the Vedic literature. It is probably the first of its kind of scripture among all living traditions on earth which presents such a wide spectrum of noble ideas on ecology and conservation. It aims at conserving the environment not only on the physical level, but also on the moral, mental, religious, spiritual and above all the cosmic level and that too not merely by checking or controlling the pollution, but also by changing attitudes and perceptions of people towards nature. In this way, the *Bhūmisūkta* creates an attitude of environmental stewardship and eco-spirituality which is scarcely to be found in any other tradition.<sup>33</sup>

The *Bhūmisūkta* envisages that the whole world can get redeemed only by redeeming the character of man. This is possible only if the ecological thinking, instead of being confined to the plane of expediency, delves deep into the philosophical thought as well as the religious sensibility. This has become all the more important today, when the earth is teaching us a moral lesson through the ecological

crisis. The very opening verse of the hymn states that the earth is sustained *by truth, by eternal order, consecration, penance, knowledge and sacrifice*.<sup>34</sup> These are the six qualities which sustain the earth and its firmness. In other words, love of the earth is grounded in certain ethical and religious notions. An austere life of discipline devoted to the pursuit of higher values, such as truth and *Rta*, makes this love of earth really significant and valuable. Truth and *Rta* presuppose Brahman or knowledge and *dīkṣā* which result in *tapas* and *yajña*. These six values are enumerated here as the basic principles of which ecology has to be founded. These factors make us understand that the earth has a certain divinity about her and that we must protect it by means of sacrifice and self-control. Such a spiritually charged and protected earth alone can bestow strength, lustre and authority on the nation.<sup>35</sup> Mother Earth, representing nature as a whole, is presented here not only as a source of sustenance but also as a means to spiritual enlightenment.

According to the modern environmental science, conservation has the three steps, *viz.* Preservation of Natural Resources, Environmentalism and Global Citizenship.

#### (i) *Preservation of Natural Resources*

There are again two views about the preservation of natural resources, *viz.* utilitarian conservation and bio-centric preservation.

##### (a) *Utilitarian Conservation*

According to this idea, the natural resources should be used for "the greatest good, of the greatest number and for the longest time."<sup>36</sup> In this view, man is the focal point of the universe. According to it the purpose of saving forests is

not because they are beautiful or provide shelter for wild animals but because they provide homes and jobs for men.

(b) *Bio-centric Preservation*

It emphasises that nature deserves to exist for its own sake, regardless of its usefulness to humans. In this view, habitat protection is the fundamental right of other species as well as of the humans.

The *Bhūmisūkta* of the *Atharvaveda* combines both these aspects in its implicit concept of conservation. There is interdependence between human beings and other forms of nature, but being dominant, the human beings have destroyed the environment out of their greed and uncontrolled desires. Over-consumption and wasteful habits of man could ultimately be the cause of elimination not only of other species but also of their own race. Unless human beings change their attitudes towards the earth and its resources, damage and destruction will continue. Those who protect the natural resources are showered with divine blessings.<sup>37</sup> But those who pollute the environment and indulge in hatred, violence and selfishness, have got to be regulated. Such control plays an important role in shaping our attitude towards the earth and its resources. This step of conservation has to be taken by one and all.

(ii) *Environmentalism*

It is concerned with the entire environment, created as well as natural and emphasises upon the links between science, technology and society. It aims at promoting a sense of interdependence amongst all the elements of creation. The *Bhūmisūkta* also throws some light on this side of conservation by mentioning that cities should be planned in such a manner that the earth remains full of prosperity and natural beauty fascinating even for gods.<sup>38</sup> Those who

destroy the environment of Mother Earth and prove detrimental to the growth of her flora and fauna are asked to run away; she herself has brushed aside all such persons in the same way as the horse shakes off dust from his body.<sup>39</sup> The robustness of the sense of environmental purity of Seer Atharvan can be judged from the fact that "he provides for punishment to the extent of banishment of the exploiter of the earth."<sup>40</sup>

The prayer for preservation of original fragrance of the earth borne by herbs and waters and shared by all the creatures including men and women, horses, deer and elephants<sup>41</sup> also suggests that we should not exploit the natural resources beyond a certain measure. This fragrance is not the physical odour which is also a specific characteristic of the earth. It signifies the bewitching loveliness of the land, mixed with honey<sup>42</sup> or the nourishing aspect of nature. This has to be shared by all.

### (iii) *Global Citizenship*

The third step of conservation lies in taking care of the systems which support the life of the planet. A key concept in this regard is one of "sustainable development" which is a term introduced in "Our Common Future" and defined in the *Brundtland Commission Report* as "to meet the needs of the present generations to meet their own needs." United Nation's Conferences such as the "Earth Summit" held at Rio de Janeiro in 1992 have been organised to attract the attention of the governments to this vital problem of environmental protection.

The *Bhūmisūkta* of the *Atharvaveda* goes a step further when it propounds that every entity and organism is a part of one large family presided over by the eternal Mother Earth. The Mother has always supported her children and

has been the source of fulfilment of their unending desires. Never has she demanded anything in return. But we, her children, must not exploit her and violate her line of control. These sentiments denote a family bond not only between the Earth and the human beings, but amongst all forms of life. The *Bhūmisūkta* enjoins us to have universal code of conservation so that the case of God's creation is undertaken in right earnest. In fact, the traditional Indian ideal of "*vasudhaiva kuṭumbakam*", i.e. the whole world being one single family is even wider than that of global citizenship. In the cosmic vision of the *Vedas*, all animate beings and inanimate things are operated upon by one and the same principle. This concept has been well enunciated by Karan Singh when he says that "the planet we inhabit and of which we are all citizens, 'Planet Earth' is a single, living and pulsating entity, that the human race, in the final analysis, is an interlocking extended family," *vasudhaiva kutumbakam*" as the *Vedas* have it."<sup>43</sup>

To sum up, it may be said that the *Bhūmisūkta* of the *Atharvaveda* is a lucid expression of the emotions of a true son of the soil. Mother Earth is depicted here as a symbol of natural resources bestowed upon man and it is desired that the same may remain steadfast, gracious, pure and propitious.<sup>44</sup> *Bhūmi* is worthy of homage. Never does she decay. She fulfills all our wishes.<sup>45</sup> The Creator furnishes her with whatever she lacks in.<sup>46</sup> It is the duty of we, human beings, that we should never trouble her whether we are sitting, standing or striding forth, with our right or left feet.<sup>47</sup> May she bless us with all that is good. May God, the Lord of the universe, make Mother Earth of ours pleasant in every quarter.<sup>48</sup> May that Mother Earth, thus prospering, enhance our prosperity.<sup>49</sup> But for that we have to be watchful,

cautious and ready to sacrifice our best for her, the Mother Earth:

"*vayaṁ tubhyaṁ balihṛtaḥ syāma.*"<sup>50</sup>

### NOTES

1. Collins Reference Dictionary, *Environmental Science*, pp.90, 140.
2. *Atharvaveda* (AV), 12.1.10.
3. Ibid. 12.1.1
4. Ibid. 12.1.5.
5. Ibid. 12.1.26
6. Ibid. 12.1.2.
7. Ibid. 12.1.8.
8. Ibid. 12.1.42.
9. Ibid. 12.1.9.
10. Ibid.12.1.51.
11. Ibid.12.1.3.
12. Ibid.12.1.4.
13. Ibid.12.1.21.
14. Ibid.12.1.19.
15. Ibid.12.1.44.
16. Ibid.12.1.48.
17. Ibid.12.1.2,4.
18. Ibid.12.1.45.
19. Ibid.12.1.46.
20. Ibid.12.1.53.
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22. Kapila Vatsyayan, "Ecology and Indian Myth" in *Indigenous Vision*, (Ed. Geeti Sen), Sage Publications, New Delhi, 1992, p.158.
23. Śrīdath Ramphal, *Our Country, The Planet*, Lime Tree, London 1992, p.5.
24. AV, 4.16.5

25. Ibid. 4.16.3
26. *Yajurveda*, 3.5
27. AV. 12.1.56
28. Ibid. 12.1.37
29. Dieter Frisch "Report of Development Commission of the European Community", *The Courier*, No.133, May-June, 1992, Belgium, p.2
30. AV. 12.1.62
31. Ibid. 12.1.35
32. *Yajurveda* 13.27
33. O.P. Dwivedi, in *Environmental Stewardship and Sustainable Development* (Ed. R.B.Jain) Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, New Delhi 1997, p.279
34. AV.12.1.1
35. Ibid. 12.1.8
36. William P. Cunningham, *Understanding Our Environment*, Wm. C. Brown Publishers, Oxford, England, 1994, p.11.
37. AV. 12.1.7.
38. Ibid. 12.1.43.
39. Ibid. 12.1.57.
40. Ibid. 12.1.58.
41. Ibid. 12.1.23-24.
42. Ibid. 12.1.7,16.
43. Karan Singh, *Brief Sojourn*, B.R. Publishing Corporation, Delhi, 1991, p.123.
44. AV. 12.1.17.
45. Ibid. 12.1.61.
46. Ibid. 12.1.61.
47. Ibid. 12.1.28.
48. Ibid. 12.1.43.
49. Ibid. 12.1.13.
50. Ibid. 12.1.62.

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 ŚAṆKARA – ADVAITISM AND BHAKTI\*
 

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Amiya Chakravarty\*\*

Devotion springs from man's feelings, from his yearning to rise above his limited condition towards the fullness of the Supreme. Devotion is born from the realization of our smallness, fanned into the fire of the desire to transcend this smallness and reach into the greater unity of love and light as embodied in the Divine. It takes the form of single-minded attention towards the brilliance of the aspired goal, renouncing all desire to continue working and living for our narrow -minded selves. Devotion brings out strongly the distinction between what is high and what is low and the quest to rise upward. With this a link is formed between the different levels of being. "Among things conducive to liberation, devotion (*bhakti*) alone holds the supreme place. The seeking after one's real nature is designated as devotion."<sup>1</sup> In the last sentence is found the emphasis of Śaṅkara: to seek our real nature which in some inexplicable way has become, lost to ourselves. To bring this out, Śaṅkara took two approaches, one non-theistic and the other theistic.

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\* Courtesy: *Śaṅkara and Śaṅmata* – Souvenir published in connection with the conference on "*Śaṅkara and Śaṅmata*" held in Madras from June 1 to June 9, 1969.

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When Śaṅkara asks us to search within to find that part of our nature which is true, permanent, and ever-lasting he takes the non-theistic approach, where through psychological analysis he brings to bear on the mind the different sides of our being. But Śaṅkara also asks that we reach outward to the ground and source of the Universe. Here the theistic side gains prominence as a greater harmony with the world about us is brought out.

In the Vedāntic conception of Īśvara as supreme Being or, perfect Person, devotion is seen in a clear light. For Śaṅkara, Īśvara, as the supreme being, is that Person in whom all the limiting factors have been removed so that complete perfection remains. Negatively this means that "Īśvara is ever free from *avidyā*",<sup>2</sup> or ignorance, that the darkness which arises through confusion is totally removed. Those factors of personality causing blindness cease to have the power to influence such a being.

Positively, Īśvara is the embodiment of freedom, joy, and compassion. "He identifies himself with the whole world,"<sup>3</sup> and with his great compassion and loving heart witnesses all about Him. Īśvara is mysteriously and inexpressibly bound to the world in which He rules and expresses His power, yet He is ever free. The idea of Advaita morality "is gradually to replace the narrow view held by the Jīva (individual soul) by one like that of the cosmicself, whose interests coincide with those of the universe."<sup>4</sup>

In contrast to Īśvara, Śaṅkara brings out the limited nature of the Jīva bounded by *avidyā*. Through confusion and blindness the individual has alienated himself from his true nature. As a person he is bounded by his ego, sunken under the veil of his own misunderstanding. It is this condition which disturbed Śaṅkara, and towards which he offered his great philosophical system. He wished to free

man from wrong views and attitudes so that he could regain contact with his essential reality. To bring mankind to the realization of the limitlessness of his true nature became Śaṅkara's goal. Here conflict is reconciled, for the different sides of man's nature are seen not as being in conflict, but rather as belonging to different levels of the same being, grounded in the depths of Brahman. Similarly, Śaṅkara gave back to India the harmony of contending views by showing that different systems of thought were also brought out from different levels and likewise needed to be seen in the light of the indeterminate. By asking of mankind that he search for the deepest roots of his being, of the immanent in himself, and also to search for the ground of the Universe, the transcendental, Śaṅkara sought to give room to all levels of thought and temperament within and without. He did not ask that views and ideas be given up as worthless, as being blind. Rather, he asked of the aspirant that he only look farther to behold the truly permanent and unchanging reality lying in the midst of all that is.

To bring out the undivided essence of man's nature, Śaṅkara emphasized the need of seeing the different levels of man's being in order to gain a truer understanding of himself. If this were done, it would be found that man was not divided from Īśvara, that his essential nature was bound up with the entire world as was Īśvara's. Here Śaṅkara sought to remove the imagined distance between oneself and Īśvara. "The Jīva and Īśvara are one, or more strictly, are not different."<sup>5</sup>

So long as man is bound up with the world, Īśvara is his highest aim, the Perfect Person acting out of love and compassion completely devoid of the passions of lust and greed. To Īśvara "the whole of existence is related as an object."<sup>6</sup> while the Jīva finds himself wrongly bound to his narrow personality. In contrasting these two, Īśvara and the

individual. Śaṅkara seeks to give man a fuller and more complete realization of his true self so that he grows into the larger world and acts through greater service and devotion. The aim is the reaching of perfection, where the limitations are completely overcome.

Human personality is seen by Śaṅkara to be an organismic whole composed of many levels and standing upon a deeper ground. In the confusion of the many levels of man's being, ignorance causes small-mindedness and narrow outlooks. To bring this out Śaṅkara takes great pains to show the distinction between the mind and the world. Here two levels of being meet, and in the encounter, as it were, our greatest perplexity arises. For the older Sāṅkhya system, consciousness and the world were completely cut asunder, each being given an independent reality. The world was as real as consciousness, both everlasting. Śaṅkara saw consciousness and the world as undivided, but each on a different level. Mind cannot explain matter, as matter cannot explain mind. They are different orders of being. Therefore it follows that the intellect's understanding of the world cannot be but its own abstractions and gleanings gathered from the world presented to it. Between the two there is the undivided involvement which the mind cuts asunder to bring forth its new creation. How this happens is a mystery, it is *māyā*. But this is not *avidyā*, or ignorance. Ignorance is there when we deny this meeting of levels at a deeper synthesis, thinking the partial to be absolute. Right understanding removes *avidyā*, but the mystery ever remains. We cannot meet this difficulty with an explanation, for it would be completely onesided-presupposing that mind is "above" matter. This Śaṅkara would not have us do. Rather, see the two levels, know they are not totally distinct from each other, and understand that one does not explain the other. "It is a matter not requiring any proof that the object and the subject whose respective

spheres are the notion of the 'Thou' (the Non-Ego) and the 'Ego' which are opposed to each other as much as darkness and light are, cannot be identified."<sup>7</sup> The abstractions created through the intellect, although directly related to the world, cannot explain it. And here is the ignorance: that man superimposes upon the world a scheme for understanding it. "There is no ignorance outside the mind."<sup>8</sup>

Śaṅkara is insistent as to the place of knowledge in man's search for the real. For him, we have somehow and inexplicably fallen into a confusion as to our true nature. He sees that limited views have caused blunderings and factions. Therefore the remedy is to see better so that one can walk better. The insistence on a better set of intellectual tools is to give greater clarity to the whole of life. Śaṅkara has very clearly shown that we have superimposed a false view of things upon what is. We have called the rope a snake and therefore stand in fear where fear need not arise. The confusion of misunderstanding has caused us to live a life not in correspondence with the truth of things. It is only when the superimposed view is seen as the mind's addition to the presented, that the error is removed.

For Śaṅkara, the whole of creation is misjudged. Through ceaseless habit we have come to identify the whole of life by things around us, and do not see the truth that lies at the root of all this. Here Śaṅkara asks for deeper and more comprehensive view of things, and to understand the limits of our set ways. He asks us not to stop with any of the limited and partial views, but constantly to press on to the more and more comprehensive, until finally the transcendental is forced upon us.

The personal approach to reality as brought forth by Śaṅkara has a negative as well as a positive side. Negatively,

there are the limiting factors to be overcome, the tendencies which cause conflict ; suffering must be removed so that joy, bliss and knowledge shine forth. "With the cessation of selfish action the brooding on the sense objects is stopped, which is followed by the destruction of desires. The destruction of desires is Liberation, and this is considered as Liberation-in-Life."<sup>9</sup>

The positive realization is clearly brought out again and again by Śaṅkara. "The whole universe, being the effort of the real Brahman, is in reality nothing but Brahman."<sup>10</sup> "Brahman is existence, knowledge, infinity, pure, supreme, self-existent, eternal, and indivisible Bliss, not different from the individual soul and devoid of interior and exterior."<sup>11</sup> In speaking on one who has realized his true nature Śaṅkara says that such a person "with his mind steeped in the ocean of Existence and Bliss Absolute, roamed, verily purifying the whole world."<sup>12</sup> The *Vivekacūḍāmaṇi*<sup>13</sup> ends with this *śloka*: "For those who are afflicted, in the way of the world, by the burning pain due to the (scorching) sunshine of threefold misery, and who through delusion wander about in a desert in search of water- for them here is the triumphant message of Śaṅkara pointing out, within easy reach, the soothing ocean of nectar, Brahman, the one without a second- to lead them on to Liberation!"

But the later followers of Śaṅkara took a greater interest in the negative side of personal realization, giving greater emphasis to the factors of personal life which have to be overcome and burned out. As a result the tendency arose to turn away from the world, which when wrongly seen feeds desires and passions. They had neglected the attitude of final realization where freedom and spontaneity become the natural way of being.

Because of the tendency to turn away from the world brought out by later Advaitins, Rāmānuja and other interpreters of the Vedānta brought forth new views to attempt to correct this one-sidedness and give greater clarity to man's vision. This was not a deviation but an enhancement of Śaṅkara's basic position: the emphasis was turned towards the richness of the world of the many. Spiritually this meant the realization of the feeling of identity between oneself and God. Within each individual soul is to be found that part which is the same as the supreme Soul (Īśvara). Affection and yearning growing into love and devotion towards the Divine as the all-encompassing gains a prominent place. The distinction between things is held although all experiences based on objective and subjective factors are fused in the transcendental experience of divine Union. By maintaining an accent on some forms of distinction so long as the transcendent experience does not take over, action and service gain a more conspicuous place. Śaṅkara's philosophy allows this, in fact it fully supports ethical action as leading to the supreme identity. Rāmānuja's *bhakti-mārga* followed and affirmed Śaṅkara's emphasis. "Action in the form of divine service develops into a steady and continuous loving devotion of the Supreme and as such in all stages of life action is of great ethical value."<sup>14</sup>

### NOTES

1. Śaṅkara, *Vivekacūḍāmaṇi*, trans. Swami Madhavananda (Calcutta, 1966), p. 11.
2. S. Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, II (London, 1962), p. 609.
3. M. Hiriyanna, *Outlines of Indian Philosophy*, (London, 1964), p. 366.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 366.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 364.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 363.

7. *The Vedānta Sūtras of Bādarāyaṇa with the Commentary of Śaṅkara*, trans. George Thibaut (New York, 1962), p. 3.
8. Śaṅkara, *Vivekacūḍāmani*, p. 67
9. Ibid., p. 124.
10. Ibid., p. 91.
11. Ibid., p. 89.
12. Ibid., p. 222.
13. Ibid., p. 223.
14. Anima Sen Gupta, *A Critical Study of the Philosophy of Rāmānuja* (Varanasi, 1967), p.xxxii.

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 MAṄḌANAMIŚRA\*
 

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R. Balasubramanian

Maṅḍanamīśra, the author of the *Brahmasiddhi*, is one of the best known figures in the literature of Advaita Vedānta, and one of the few teachers of great renown who have left the characteristic hallmark of their thought on the stupendous structure of Advaita. In addition to the *Brahmasiddhi*<sup>1</sup> which is considered to be one of the major classical treatises on Advaita he wrote three works on Mīmāṃsā – the *Mīmāṃsānukramaṇikā*,<sup>2</sup> the *Bhāvanāviveka*<sup>3</sup> and the *Vidhiviveka*,<sup>4</sup> one work on the philosophy of language – the *Sphoṭasiddhi*<sup>5</sup> and one work on the theories of error, viz., the *Vibhramaviveka*<sup>6</sup>.

It is not difficult for us to fix the upper and the lower limits of the period when Maṅḍana must have lived. Maṅḍana quotes a passage from Bhartṛhari's *Vākyapadīya*,<sup>7</sup> and also a verse from Gauḍapāda's *Māṅḍūkya-kārikā* in the *Brahmasiddhi*.<sup>8</sup> He cites the authority of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa's *Ślokavārtika* either for approval or criticism many a time.<sup>9</sup> There are evidences to show that he was a younger

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\* Courtesy: *Preceptors of Advaita*, Sri Kanchi Kamakoti Śaṅkara Mandir, Secunderabad, 1968



contemporary of Prabhākara, for while he is critical of Prabhākara's *Bṛhatī*,<sup>10</sup> Prabhākara himself does not presuppose Maṇḍana's works. Śālikanātha, a disciple of Prabhākara, quotes extracts from Maṇḍana's *Brahmasiddhi* and criticises them in his *Prakaraṇapañcikā*.<sup>11</sup> So Maṇḍana was later than Bhartṛhari and Gauḍapāda and earlier than Śālikanātha, and must have been a younger contemporary of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa and Prabhākara. Though Maṇḍana does not quote or refer to any passage from Śaṅkara's works, there are internal evidences to show that he is quite conversant with Śaṅkara's standpoint, particularly with regard to *karma* and *jñāna*.<sup>12</sup> A careful study of the *Brahmasiddhi* will prove that Maṇḍana expounds the philosophy of Advaita drawing his inspiration from the *Upaniṣads*, the *Bhagavadgītā*, and the *Brahmasūtra*. In all probability he was an elder contemporary of Śaṅkara. If the view of modern scholars who assign Śaṅkara to 788-820 A.D. (?) is accepted, then Maṇḍana as a contemporary of Śaṅkara must have lived in the second half of the eighth century and the beginning of the ninth century A.D. Though we find it difficult to determine the date of Maṇḍana, we can confidently assign him to the period later than Gauḍapāda and Bhartṛhari and earlier than Śālikanātha.

Maṇḍana's aim in writing the *Brahmasiddhi* is to vindicate the authority of the *Upaniṣads* which intimate the non-dual, ever-existent Brahman. The main purpose of this work as indicated by its title is to ascertain the real nature of Brahman which is the ultimate reality by means of a searching enquiry and critical investigation. The work is divided into four chapters: (1) the *Brahma-kāṇḍa*, (2) the *Tarka-kāṇḍa*, (3) the *Niyoga-kāṇḍa* and (4) the *Siddhi-kāṇḍa*. Of these, the third chapter is the biggest occupying nearly half of the work and the last one the smallest.

Almost the entire first chapter which is devoted to elucidate the substance of the first verse through the authority of Scripture and reasoning is concerned with the main theme of the work, viz., the ascertainment of the true nature of Brahman. Towards the end of this chapter there is a discussion about the place of *karma* and knowledge in the scheme of discipline leading to liberation. In the *Tarka-kāᅇᅇa* there is elaborate discussion about the superiority of the scriptural testimony *vis-a-vis* perception and other means of knowledge in respect of our knowledge of the trans-empirical reality; and this is followed by a critical examination of the nature of difference and the views of the Vaišeᅇikas, the Bhāᅇᅇas, and the Bauddhas thereon. The central theme of the third chapter is that Brahman-realisation does not fall within the scope of injunction. The explanation of the Advaita view of liberation and the refutation of the Prābhākara theory of akhyāti are also to be found in this chapter. In the last chapter the question how the *Upaniᅇads* convey the sense of Brahman, not already known, through words whose meanings are known in the sphere of ordinary thought is discussed.

Maᅇᅇana has made valuable contribution to the Advaita ontology. His arguments to show that bliss which is Brahman is not absence of misery or absence of desire, but a positive state of happiness are elaborate and exhaustive. He argues that the transcendental bliss, of which the empirical pleasure is only a fragment, should be conceived positively and not negatively; for only a positive category admits of specification and determination. The more and the less are possible only in the case of a positive category. Brahman or the Self is bliss, because it is the seat of supreme love. There is not only the authority of Scripture but also the evidence of experience to show that the Self is of the nature of bliss. For all the creatures including the smallest worms, the self is

dear. The love of one's self, says Maṇḍana, is nowhere more evident and better expressed than in the desire of every creature, "Let me not go out of existence; let me live for ever." This love of the Self is consistent only if it be of the nature of bliss.<sup>13</sup>

Maṇḍana's argument to establish the self-luminosity of Brahman or the Self serves as a model of philosophical reasoning. Brahman, argues Maṇḍana, is never an object in relation to a knowing subject. It cannot be known in the way in which other things are known. The Self which is pure consciousness lights up all our experiences and reveals all the objects of the world, which being insentient are incapable of revealing themselves. While everything else is presented to the Self as an object, the Self is not presented to anything not even to itself. It follows, therefore, that the ordinary categories like cause and effect, substance and attribute, whole and parts, etc., do not apply to it. It is not an object in relation to a subject; and so it is not in space and time. It is not a cause in relation to an effect, not a substance in relation to attributes, not a whole in relation to its parts, not an identity in the midst of diversity. In short, it is supra-relational and so supra-rational. It is for these reasons that Maṇḍana says that the self-luminosity of the Self which is the knower is its cognizability. It is not cognizable in the usual sense of the term. If we say that the Self is cognizable, it is because it is self-luminous. Its self-luminosity is what is meant when it is treated as cognizable.

Maṇḍana's discussion of the knower-known relation is very interesting. One of the arguments adduced in favour of the reality of difference centres round the knower-known relation. The object which is known implies that there is a knower independent of and external to it. The knower is inferred from the known, and so the knower and the known are different from each other. Though Maṇḍana spares just

twelve lines for the purpose of refuting this view, he is able to show with a remarkable dialectical dexterity that the knower-known relation, far from lending support to reality of difference, undermines it. His contention is that the knower-known relation is intelligible and consistent only when the oneness of reality is accepted. In the course of the discussion Maᅇᅇana points out that, if difference is accepted as real, the Self or the knower and the object which is known cannot be related, since the two are of different nature; the Self or the knower is knowledge pure and absolute, whereas the object which is known is insentient. He rejects the contention that the internal organ (*antaᅇkaraᅇa*) could relate the knower which is consciousness and the object which is its opposite. The explanation that is given in terms of the modification (*vᅇtti*) of the internal organ, which by its proximity to the sentient Self acquires lustre by which it is able to reflect the objects, though the underlying consciousness which is the Self remains unaffected by the modifications of the internal organ does not, declares Maᅇᅇana, serve to show that objects are really seen, and that they are different from the knower. If it be said that the internal organ gets the reflection of the Self, it only means that the internal organ which is insentient *appears* to be sentient. And so this "getting the reflection" of the sentient Self by the internal organ is not real but illusory. We cannot under these circumstances argue by depending upon this acquired power of reflection of the internal organ, which is *mithyā*, that objects are really seen and that they are different from the knower.<sup>14</sup> It may not be out of place to point out here that the line of reasoning which Maᅇᅇana has adopted in the discussion of the knower-known relation has very much influenced Ānandabodha, who himself admits that he has gathered his materials from others.<sup>15</sup> This admission is significant in view of the fact that most of the arguments

which we find in the works of Ānandabodha have been borrowed by the later writers of the Vedānta school.

Being influenced by Bhartṛhari, the noted grammarian-philosopher, Maṅḍana introduces the Śabdādvaita<sup>16</sup> in the course of his interpretation of the significance of the word 'akṣaram' contained in the opening verse of the *Brahmasiddhi*. Brahman, says Maṅḍana, is *akṣaram* or the nature of sound (*śabdātmā*), because the scriptural texts establish the identity of the mystic sound *Om* or *Praṇava* with Brahman. The *Praśna Upaniṣad*, for instance, says: "That which is the sound *Om* is verily the higher and the lower Brahman."<sup>17</sup> The sound *Om* is not indicative of Brahman; on the other hand, *Om*, according to this text, is Brahman. This is on account of the termination '*kāra*' which refers to the preceding letter or word, and which has its purport in the word and not in the object which the word refers to.<sup>18</sup>

Maṅḍana does not deny that *śruti* texts sometimes teach meditation on *Praṇava* as Brahman, since it is difficult to meditate on Brahman which is devoid of attributes without some image or symbol as an aid. Just as a piece of wood or stone taken as the symbol of a deity is worshipped as if it were the deity, so also Brahman is to be meditated upon by means of *Om* since it is the name for Brahman. *Praṇava* is commended for purposes of meditation in *śruti* statements like, "Meditate on *Om* as the Self", etc.<sup>19</sup> But it should not be construed that *Om* is commended for meditation in all places. If a *śruti* text purports to bring out the nature of *Om* without commending it for meditation, it must be interpreted as teaching the identity of *Om* with Brahman. The *Taittirīya Upaniṣad*, for example, declares the identity of *Om* with Brahman when it says: "*Om* is Brahman, *Om* is this all."<sup>20</sup> Again, the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* says: "Just as all leaves are

permeated by the stalk, so is all speech permeated by *Om*. Verily, the syllable *Om* is all this."<sup>21</sup>

Maṇḍana vindicates by means of elaborate arguments that the phenomenal world is only an illusory appearance of *śabda* which is the reality. If the ultimate reality is said to be *śabda*, there is the fear that it may not be identical with the Self or Brahman of the *Upaniṣads*; for *śabda*, it may be thought, is insentient, while the Self is said to be of the nature of knowledge. There is no room for any such fear, for Maṇḍana clearly shows that *śabdatattva* is identical with knowledge which is Brahman. Knowledge manifests objects in a clear and distinguishable way only when it comes to be associated with sound. Sound is identical with knowledge, for it is the potency of sound (*vākśakti*) that illuminates objects.

Maṇḍana's exposition of the nature and locus of *avidyā* contains several striking features peculiar to the Advaitic tradition as embodied in the *Brahmasiddhi*. Maṇḍana does not make any distinction between the two terms *avidyā* and *māyā*. He uses them as synonyms. It is only in the post-Śāṅkara period that the two terms came to be used in different senses. *Avidyā*, says Maṇḍana, is not of the nature of Brahman; nor is it something other than Brahman; it is neither real nor unreal. It is thus known as *māyā*, *mithyāvabhāsa*. Since it is neither real as Brahman nor unreal as the sky-flower, it is said to be *anirvacanīya*. Maṇḍana argues that the *jīva* is the seat or locus of *avidyā* which obscures the true nature of Brahman and thus has Brahman as its object.<sup>22</sup> It may be argued that Maṇḍana's standpoint involves the fallacy of mutual dependence: that is, the *jīva* is the result of *avidyā*, and *avidyā* has to depend upon the *jīva* which is its locus, Maṇḍana refutes the criticism that his explanation involves the fallacy of mutual dependence. First,

*avidyā* does not admit of logical analysis in terms of consistency and cogency. How can we expect *avidyā* to stand to reason? Therefore the objection that *avidyā* which is dependent on the *jīva* for its existence cannot itself be the cause of the *jīva* is meaningless. Second, since both *avidyā* and the *jīva* are beginningless like the sprout-seed series, there is no logical priority as between *jīvatva* and *avidyā*; as for chronological priority, the question does not arise as neither has a beginning in time.

How is *avidyā* to be removed? *Avidyā*, says Maṇḍana, is destroyed by the practice of aids (*sādhana*) like *śravaṇa* or the understanding of the truth from the scriptural texts, *manana* or the investigation of the truth in the light of reason, *dhyānābhyāsa* or repeated contemplation upon the truth as enjoined by Scripture.<sup>23</sup> Repeated contemplation upon the truth preceded by *śravaṇa* and *manana* annuls the multifarious cognitions of diversity (*bheda-darśana*), as it is opposed to it. The knowledge that results from *śravaṇa*, *manana* and *dhyānābhyāsa* is itself one which involved distinctions. *Śravaṇa* implies the distinctions of the teacher, the taught, and the teaching, and so the knowledge which arises therefrom is a form of *avidyā*. For the sake of our understanding, this can be characterised as the good phase of *avidyā*. It serves to remove the multifarious cognitions of difference due to *avidyā*. The latter can be called the bad phase of *avidyā*. Not only does it remove the world of diversity projected by *avidyā* but also removes itself, just as the clearing-nut purifies the turbid water of dirt by removing it and also removes itself, just as poison nullifies another poison and also annihilates itself. When all the illusory differences conjured up by *avidyā* as well as the different aids (*sādhana-bheda*) like *śravaṇa*, *manana*, etc., disappear, the *jīva* shines forth remaining in its natural state, pure and

unperturbed. In support of his account of the removal of ignorance – how the good phase of *avidyā*, viz., the knowledge resulting from *śravaṇa*, *manana* and *dhyānābhyāsa*, removes its bad phase, viz., the appearances of plurality due to nescience – Maṇḍana quotes the authority of the scriptural text which declares: "Knowledge and ignorance, he who knows the two together crosses death through ignorance, and attains immortality through knowledge."<sup>24</sup> The meaning of the text according to Maṇḍana, is this: *avidyā* and *vidyā* must be taken together, as the former is the means to the latter or as the former is dependent on the latter. The bad phase of *avidyā* is '*mṛtyu*' which is removed by the good phase of it consisting of *śravaṇa*, *manana* and *dhyānābhyāsa*, and the knower of truth thus remains what he has always really been, the eternal, free, self-luminous consciousness.

Maṇḍana's contribution to epistemology is as valuable as his contribution to the metaphysics of Advaita. His refutation of the Prābhākara theory of *akhyāti* is thorough and elaborate.<sup>25</sup> Though the theory of *akhyāti* alone is examined in the *Brahmasiddhi*, the other important theories of erroneous cognition are discussed in his *Vibhrama-viveka*. It should be pointed out in this connection that the discussion of the theory of *akhyāti* in the *Vibhramaviveka* and the *Brahmasiddhi* is almost identical. By maintaining the Bhāṭṭa theory of *viparīta-khyāti* which is practically the same as the Nyāya theory of *anyathā-khyāti*, Maṇḍana prepares the way for the *anirvacanīyakhyāti* of Advaita.

According to Maṇḍana, the knowledge which we get from the *Upaniṣads* is indirect and mediate (*parokṣa*) and necessarily involves relation in some manner like any other cognition arising from a valid verbal testimony. Meditation



upon the content of the verbal cognition is necessary in order to transform the indirect and mediate knowledge into direct and immediate experience. So repeated contemplation (*prasaṅkhyāna*) on the import of the principal texts (*Mahāvākyas*) is a 'must' in order to attain the direct intuition of Brahman. Vācaspati who is greatly indebted to Maṅḍana follows him in this respect, as in many others.

Like other Advaitins, Maṅḍana too upholds the doctrine of *jīvanmukti* or liberation in the living state.<sup>26</sup> He contends that at the onset of knowledge ignorance and all *karmas*, the fructified as well as the unfructified, disappear. In support of his contention, he quotes the *Muṇḍaka* text: "The knot of the heart is cut, all doubts are dispelled and his *karmas* terminate, when He is seen, the higher and the lower."<sup>27</sup> If all *karmas* including *prārabdha* cease to exist at the time of Brahman-realisation, a person who attains perfect intuition should become disembodied immediately; and this would go against the *Chāndogya* text<sup>28</sup> which fixes the falling off of the body as the limit for the attainment of final release (*kaivalya*). In order to show that his position does not come into conflict with the *Chāndogya* text, Maṅḍana interprets it in two ways. One interpretation results in the advocacy of *sadyomukti* or complete liberation from embodied existence immediately following Brahman-realisation, while the other involves the acceptance of *jīvanmukti*. Since Maṅḍana refers to both *Sadyomukti*, and *jīvanmukti*, he is compelled to explain the *sthitaprajña* described in the *Gītā*<sup>29</sup> in two ways. From the point of view of *sadyomukti*, the *sthitaprajña* may be taken as a *sādhaka* who has closely approximated to realisation and is awaiting it. According to the second interpretation, the *Gītā* description of *sthitaprajña* may be taken to refer to a *jīvanmukta*. Maṅḍana does not say that in all cases the body

should fall off as soon as Brahman-realisation is attained. Though *prārabdha* ceases to exist like other *karmas* together with *avidyā* at the onset of knowledge resulting in complete liberation from embodied existence, it may be that in certain cases the body persists for a short while even after realisation, because of the impressions of *prārabdha*. There is therefore no justification for the view that Maṇḍana does not advocate *jīvanmuktī*.

Maṇḍana's evaluation of *karma* and its relation to knowledge exhibits certain features peculiar to the tradition of *Advaitā* which he upholds. According to him, *karma* and knowledge are related as means and end.<sup>30</sup> He does not accept the view that *karma* and knowledge, being diametrically opposed to each other, could not be brought into relation. He maintains that both *karma* and meditation play a vital role in bringing about Self-realisation.

The verbal cognition which arises from the *Upaniṣads* should be supplemented by certain aids (*sādhana*) like contemplation in order to attain Brahman-intuition. As a result of repeated contemplation (*abhyāsa*), the impressions of the knowledge of the non-dual Self obtained from the *Upaniṣads* grow and develop in such a way that they are able to remove the impressions of *avidyā* and thereby bring about the final manifestation of the real nature of the Self. Since *karmas* are prescribed by Scripture,<sup>31</sup> they are also useful in this regard. Whereas the usefulness of contemplation is visible, that of the *karmas* is imperceptible. The *karmas* belonging to the *āśramas* are exceptional means (*sādhana-viśeṣa*). Though he readily admits that it is possible for one who observes life-long celibacy to attain Self-realisation exclusively through contemplation in association with the control of the mind, etc., without performing scriptural rites, he says that one who combines the contemplative and the

ritualistic disciplines will be able to reach the goal far more quickly than otherwise. The *āśramakarmas* are helpful to the seeker after truth as a horse is to the wayfarer in reaching the goal quicker. Though the goal may be reached by plodding on without a horse, yet a horse is sought to be employed for gaining time or for avoiding inconvenience. *Karmas* are of as much service to a seeker after truth as a horse is to one who would otherwise have to trudge the whole distance on foot.<sup>32</sup>

Maṇḍana is a firm believer in *āśrama-dharmas*, not as ends in themselves but as very valuable means to the end. By recommending the association of the contemplative discipline with the ritualistic discipline for the purpose of attaining Self-realisation, he has distinguished himself as the foremost among "integrative Advaitins."

A respected authority on Mīmāṃsā and a reputed teacher of Advaita, a doughty champion of the *Upaniṣadic* tradition and a master-mind skilled in dialectical reasoning, Maṇḍana occupies a high pedestal in the imposing edifice of Advaita Vedānta. His contribution to Advaita is of lasting importance. Among the lustrous names that adorn the history of Advaita, Maṇḍana's is a prominent one.

## NOTES

1. Edited with Introduction by Professor S. Kuppaswami Sastri (Madras Government Oriental Manuscripts Series No. 4, Madras 1937). In this paper this work will be referred to as BS.
2. Edited by Ganganatha Jha, Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series.
3. Sarasvati Bhavan Texts, Benares No. 6.
4. The Pandit, Benares.
5. Madras University Sanskrit Series No. 6.
6. Madras Oriental Series No. 1.
7. BS, Part I, p. 26.
8. *Ibid.* p. 150.

9. *Ibid.* pp. 10, 11, 38, 40.
10. Compare BS, Part I, pp. 23-26 with *Brhatī* (Madras University Sanskrit Series No.3), pp. 20, 22.
11. Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series No. 17, pp. 154, 155.
12. BS, Part I, pp. 32-34.
13. *Ibid.* p. 5.
14. *Ibid.* p. 8.
15. *Nyāyamakaranda* (Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series No. 38) p. 359.
16. BS, Part I, pp. 17-19.
17. 5-2.
18. *Vyākaraṇa-vārtika*, 3.3.108.
19. *Mundaka Upaniṣad*, 2.2.6.
20. 1.8.1.
21. 2.23.3.
22. BS, Part I, p. 10.
23. *Ibid.* p. 12.
24. *Īśāvāsya Upaniṣad*, 11.
25. BS, Part I, pp. 136-146.
26. *Ibid.* pp. 129-130.
27. 2.2.8.
28. 6.14.2.
29. 2.54.
30. BS, Part I, p. 32.
31. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, 4.4.22.
32. BS, Part I, pp. 36-37.

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## NATURE OF THE WITNESS\*

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Śrī Śaṅkara Bhagavatpāda

- 1 ईक्षितृत्वं स्वतः सिद्धं जन्तूनां च ततोऽन्यता ।  
अज्ञानादित्यतोऽन्यत्वं सदसीति निवर्त्यते ॥

All beings are, by their innate nature, consciousness itself. Because of ignorance they seem to be different from consciousness. However, such a difference gets annihilated through the instruction, "You are existence itself."

- 2 एतावद्ध्यमृतत्वं न किञ्चिदन्यत्सहायकम् ।  
ज्ञानस्येति ब्रुवच्छास्त्रं सलिङ्गं कर्म बाधते ॥

The Śāstras speak of the futility of action when they point out knowledge alone forming the ultimate cause of immortality, and nothing else apart from knowledge.

- 3 सर्वेषां मनसो वृत्तमविशेषेण पश्यतः ।  
तस्य मे निर्विकारस्य विशेषः स्यात्कथंचन ॥

As I witness the modifications of minds of all

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\* Extract from the *Upadeśasāhasrī* (Padya section, ch. xi). Free rendering in English : Dr. V.K.S.N. Raghavan.

invariably, and am changeless, how can I possess any *viśeṣa* (specific feature)?

4. मनोवृत्तं मनश्चैव स्वप्नवज्जाग्रतीक्षितुः ।  
संप्रसादे द्वयासत्त्वाच्चिन्मात्रः सर्वगोऽव्ययः ॥

There is no change in me at all, for, I am the witness of the mind and its functions in the waking state as in the state of dream. But in the state of deep sleep, while mind and its functions get lost, I shine as mere consciousness that is all pervasive and immutable.

5. स्वप्नः सत्यो यथाबोधाद्देहात्मत्वं तथैव च ।  
प्रत्यक्षादेः प्रमाणत्वं जाग्रत्स्यादात्मवेदनात् ॥

Before the rise of self-knowledge, one consider in the waking state, sense-perception (*pratyakṣa*), etc. as valid and also identifies oneself with the body just as one finds dream-cognition as real in the dream state (before getting up).

6. व्योमवत्सर्वभूतस्थो भूतदोषैर्विवर्जितः ।  
साक्षी चेताऽगुणः शुद्धो ब्रह्मैवास्मि स केवलः ॥

But after the rise of self-knowledge, one realises: I am Brahman, pure consciousness, without qualities, opposed to ignorance, bereft of the three states (waking, dream and sound sleep), all pervasive like ether (*ākāśa*), the witness (*sākṣin*) and am free from all defects.

7. नामरूपक्रियाभ्योऽन्यो नित्यमुक्तस्वरूपवान् ।  
अहमात्मा परं ब्रह्म चिन्मात्रोऽहं सदाद्वयः ॥

Being different from names, forms and actions I am, indeed, (i) of the form of eternally Free, (ii) the Ātman, (iii) the supreme Brahman and (iv) the sole consciousness; and I am always the one without a second.

8. अहं ब्रह्मास्मि कर्ता च भोक्ता चास्मीति ये विदुः ।  
ते नष्टा ज्ञानकर्मभ्यां नास्तिकाः स्युर्न संशयः ॥

If some people consider themselves as Brahman, and at once also as agents and enjoyers of actions, then they are lost in their knowledge and duties. Undoubtedly they are atheists – nonbelievers of the Vedic authority.

9. धर्माधर्मफलैर्योग इष्टोऽदृष्टो यथात्मनः ।  
शास्त्राद्ब्रह्मत्वमप्यस्य मोक्षो ज्ञानात्तथेष्यताम् ॥

With regard to the *Karmakāṇḍa* section of the *Vedas* the wise people accept that when one obeys or disobeys the Vedic injunctions (and prohibitions), one accrues the fruit of merit (*puṇya*) or demerit (*pāpa*) even though it (this fruit) is unseen. Similarly, they have to admit the authority of the *Vedas* (the *Upaniṣads*) for knowing the self as Brahman, and the knowledge of Brahman alone as the means to liberation (*mokṣa*).

10. या माहारजनाद्यास्ता वासनाः स्वप्नदर्शिभिः ।  
अनुभूयन्त एवेह ततोऽन्यः केवलो दृशिः ॥

In dreams, people have the vision of yellow clothes, etc. owing to residual impressions (*vāsanāḥ*) of the mind in the human body. But the Self as mere consciousness is different from the body (which provides such mental impressions, to the self through the mind.

11. कोशादिव विनिष्कृष्टः कार्यकारणवर्जितः ।  
यथासिर्दृश्यते स्वप्ने तद्बुद्धोऽस्वयंप्रभः ॥

Like a sword pulled out of its scabbard is found to be shining by its own nature, the Self, that is self-effulgent, is found in dream to be the knower, on its own accord.

12. आपेषात्प्रतिबुद्धस्य ज्ञस्य स्वाभाविकं पदम् ।  
उक्तं नेत्यादिवाक्येन कल्पितस्यापनेतृणा ॥

The Upaniṣadic text, "Not this, not this" (*neti-neti*) that stultifies all superimpositions (*kalpita*) explains the true nature of the individual soul (*jīva*), after awakening it (the self).

13. महाराजादयो लोका मयि यद्वत्प्रकल्पिताः ।  
स्वप्ने तद्वद्वयं विद्याद्वयं वासनया सह ॥

Similar to the rulership, etc., of the world that are superimposed on me (the self) during the dream state, the two (visible and invisible) forms, along with mental impression (*vāsanāḥ*) are superimposed on me (the self); so they are unreal.

14. देहलिङ्गात्मना कार्या वासनारूपिणा क्रियाः ।  
नेति नेत्यात्मरूपत्वात्त्र मे कार्या क्रिया क्वचित् ॥

When one considers oneself as identical with the gross and subtle body, one performs all actions-being induced by mental impressions. But, as I understand myself as pure consciousness through the text, "Not this, not this," I am thoroughly free from all actions.

15. न ततोऽमृतताशास्ति कर्मणोऽज्ञानहेतुतः ।  
मोक्षस्य ज्ञानहेतुत्वात्त्र तदन्यदपेक्षते ॥

None can even hope to attain immortality through the performance of actions, for the actions have their seed in ignorance (*ajñāna*). Since liberation (*mokṣa*) is based on knowledge, liberation does not depend on any other thing.



16. अमृतं चाभयं नातं नेतीत्यात्मा प्रियो मम ।

विपरीतमतोऽन्यद्यत्त्यजेत्तत्सक्रियं ततः ॥

According to the text, "Not this, not this," the Self is immortal, free from fear, indestructible and most dear to me. Anything opposed to this cannot be thought of the Self; they should be abandoned along with (the agency of) actions.

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## VEDĀNTIC SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY\*

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Sangam Lal Pandey\*\*

### I. ROLE OF PHILOSOPHY IN TECHNOLOGICAL SOCIETY

#### 1. SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY

Until the beginning of the eighteenth century, science was called natural philosophy or philosophy of nature and was regarded as the part and parcel of philosophy. Many ancient and medieval philosophers had made significant contributions to the development of science. This state of affairs prevailed not only in Europe but also in India, China and Arabic-speaking countries. But since the eighteenth century science has progressively separated itself from philosophy and imposed upon itself certain epistemological norms and limitations. It worked on certain axioms and definitions which, unlike philosophy, it did not challenge. The gulf between science and philosophy, therefore, went on widening for the last two hundred and fifty years. Consequently, in the twentieth century science has become

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\* Courtesy: S.L.Pandey, *Vedāntic Social Philosophy*, Allahabad Philosophical Series No.10, Darshana Peeta, Allahabad, 1988, pp. 9-23

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supreme. It is now trying to banish philosophy from the universe of intelligible discourse. But is it possible? Is this matricide of science justified? What are the criteria of the scientific treatment of philosophy?

The criteria of the elimination of philosophy may be examined in this context. They are primarily two: (1) scientific veto and (2) linguistic veto. According to the scientific veto all knowledge is objective and has its origin in sense-experience and reality is to be identified with what is observable. Sometimes this veto goes further and argues that the measurable alone is real. It declares that philosophy which delimits or decries empiricism and objective knowledge and is open to subjective experience and speculative has *ipso facto* no right to treat and describe reality. According to the linguistic veto, again there can be no legitimate or significant talk about supersensible realities that constitute the subject matter of philosophy, and speculative philosophy that deals with them is nonsense. Thus philosophy that deals with the non-natural and non-empirical is banned.

Entangled by these vetoes, philosophy struggled hard for her survival from 1922 to 1939. During this period she accepted the leadership of science, but at the same time reserved her right to exist and carefully carved out a niche for herself in the context of scientific knowledge. It was pointed out to scientists that their reasonings, observations, constructions and reports need to be confirmed and tested by the principles of logic and that the concepts they use need to be clarified and analysed. Moreover if philosophers are not permitted by scientists to do philosophy, the scientists too are not permitted to work under confusions, ambiguities, superstitions and sentiments, for scientists cannot break the rules of logic. So first as logicians and secondly as analysts, philosophers demonstrated their power and usefulness to

scientists. The scientists themselves were compelled to a critical study of their methods which brought them closer to what philosophers were doing in the earlier centuries. Thus two new branches of philosophy were created by the joint efforts of philosophers and scientists in the twenties of this century. They are symbolic logic and philosophy of science. Philosophy ultimately re-established herself in these two forms which are perfectly acceptable to science. But while all this was going on, the philosophy of the nineteenth century, especially absolute idealism succumbed to the attack of science. The absolute idealism of the nineteenth and early twentieth century could not protect itself from the fatal stroke of scientific methods and principles.

But, as the ancients said, all knowledge is one and indivisible. So the scientific method itself reaffirmed the perennial belief that the glimpse of unified knowledge is an attainable possibility, and that the gulf that divides science and philosophy can be bridged. Basically, scientific knowledge and philosophical knowledge are two aspects of one and the same process of knowing. Science, at any rate, cannot be against the assimilation of knowledge which has several complementary parts. In this way the philosophers of the mid-twentieth century came to justify their work. Philosophy is contemporarily more justified than ever before. Philosophy was never so badly needed as it is needed today.

## 2. EFFECTS OF MODERN TECHNOLOGY

There is much talk of technology today. But it is not a brand new thing, for, man has always been living with it from times immemorial. Technology is as old as human civilization since human society was never bereft of technology. Nonetheless what has happened to technology in the twentieth century is something really unique in the history of mankind. In its earlier stages it was an obedient

servant of man, but today it has become the master of man and taken the role of enslaving man. It has posed serious dangers to the perennial philosophy which had been its good neighbour for ages. These dangers are in order.

First, technology has mechanized nearly all processes of consciousness, particularly those of cognition and conation and demonstrated that human body is nothing more than a good machine. It has shown that there are machines that can perform men's functions far better than men themselves. For example, computers can do calculation better than men and X-ray machines and telescopes can detect what the naked human eyes cannot do. The method of mechanization has analysed the cognitive and conative functions of human brain to such an extent that a problem has arisen whether there is consciousness over and above the brain. The efficiency of machines has been established as superior to that of man. So man is developing an inferiority complex in the presence of his own created machines. They have dwarfed him in the true sense of the word. He is terrified and leaving his old gods for the worship of machines which appear to assume the role of the Almighty.

Secondly, technology has dehumanised man and taken him far away from faith and love which have been sustaining him for ages. It has undermined his personal identity and shown that man is nothing but a configuration or mechanism. The transplantation of heart and the change of sexes, among others, are the technological achievements that have created a doubt about the personality, character and destiny of man as a bearer of an inviolate identity.

Thirdly, technology has disturbed the social order in the twentieth century. It has eliminated the division of labour upon which the traditional class society was based and thrown over board the sets or traditional rights and duties. In

fact it has undermined the traditional concept of society and defined society as nothing but tension management. Under its impact all the institutions are undergoing through a process of deinstitutionalization. These onslaughts would have been welcome, had technology led itself to the creation and establishment of a just social order. But no new social order is in sight and only chaos is spreading everywhere. The democrats and socialists of the century, despite their professions to the contrary, are however working under the influence of modern technology and are for the establishment of a social order that is totalitarian and autocratic in nature. Technology has for the present ruled out all ideological differences between them and leading them to totalitarianism. Praxiology has replaced all ideologies.

Fourthly, technology is rendering thousands of people unemployed. What they were doing with their hands in earlier centuries is now being done by one man with the help of machines. This man is called technocrat and is becoming more powerful than any sovereign of history. His power to destroy the world is unlimited. The arsenals that he is producing are sufficient to ruin the whole world within a few minutes. So human civilization is facing today the danger of its own extinction. Besides, the technocrat is establishing automation that is stifling the working capacity of man, impoverishing him and making him lazy for ever. If disuse or unuse is the cause of decay, then the working capacity of man is likely to decay on a large scale. Thus mechanization that goes with technology is tending to its own ruin since if there is left no working capacity of man, who will make, handle and control machines? The time is coming fast when nobody will be able to handle them at all.

Fifthly, technology is utilizing all the resources of land which had been in reserve for ages. It is exploiting its wealth and making the soil barren for all times to come.

Similarly it is now proceeding to exploit the wealth of oceans and depleting them of their future utility.

Finally, technology with its massive effluents is poisoning the atmosphere of the whole world. The nature is being filled with huge heaps of dirt and filth. Noise pollution is encroaching upon the privacy of personal life, and creating anxiety and insanity in an abnormal proportion. Similar are the cases of air pollution with exhausts like smoke and gas, and of water pollution of the sacred rivers, wells, tanks and other reservoirs. Think of the days when water that man drinks is poisonous, air that he breathes is fatal and the vegetables that he eats are carrying the germs of diseases. Luckily such days have not yet come. But if technology is given a free rein in the future as it has been done in recent past, those days will not be far off. Such is the danger from technology. There may be many more dangers than what have been narrated here, for, our list is not exhaustive. But it is certainly representative and compulsive enough to necessitate a review of modern technology today.

Now the question is how to prevent these dangers. The first answer that is seriously considered is that technology itself can do so, and there is no need of any external preventive or curative. Technology is value-neutral. It is neither good nor bad in itself. If it is used wisely, properly and cautiously, it will go on serving man in the best possible way. But the question is what will make men to use technology wisely. In all likelihood there is nothing in technology itself to prevent or deflect it from its onward march. It is not value-neutral as it is generally claimed, for, it is based on the principle of augmentation and efficiency of sensory powers. This principle falls within the objects of moral judgement. Technology, if unfettered, will go on increasing its arsenals unless it is restructured, restrained and reoriented by some agency other than itself. Technology

needs discipline which can be laid down only by a philosophy of values.

It may be argued that ecology is an effective agency or discipline that can control and contain technology, and ecology is nothing but a science that is developed from technology itself. So the development of ecology may be taken as an example of the internal control of technology. But what is ecology? Is it possible without ethics, aesthetics and religion? If these questions are analysed properly, it will be evident that ecology is a graft from without rather than a growth from within technology. It is these and similar other philosophical considerations that have given rise to ecology. What is the good for man? What is good for today may be bad for tomorrow. What is good for the present generation may be very bad for all future generations. These and similar other ethical considerations are at the heart of ecology today. So ethics has come as a safety valve against technology. If ethics is thrown overboard, technology will play havoc like a drunken demon. Moreover, it is true that both scientists and technologists had been, by and large, indifferent to philosophy for the last fifty years and their knowledge was awefully lopsided. That is why they misunderstood the problem of metaphysics and theory of knowledge and tried to undermine personal identity and the sense of social and political obligation. But the philosophical discipline that is especially victimized by their tirades against philosophy is not the theory of knowledge but ethics upon which are based the superstructures of religion and social political order. Fundamentally speaking, ethics is the basic discipline which has been ignored by technologists so far. The awareness of its problems is now forcing them to think of ecology. As a matter of fact the basic problem for technological society is to develop its ethics and aesthetics. Should it adopt the traditional ethics that is based on religion? Should it accept



utilitarian ethics that is the basis of modern democracy? Or, should it follow the communist ethics that has been advanced by Marx and Lenin and is based on collective life? There are at present many moral philosophers who are advocating this or that type of ethics. But all these types are ethics of violence and tension management. Technological problems have, however, thrown a bigger challenge that cannot be faced and solved by these types of ethics. There is an urgent need, therefore, to formulate the ethics of non-violence and practise it firmly. Mahatma Gandhi has already supplied it. It is his ethics that is the needed corrective to modern technology. Significantly, there are other moral philosophers who have also taken up the challenge of modern technology. They are analysing the moral concepts neatly and defining them afresh to suit technological society.

Pacifism, existentialism, humanism, socialism and moralism have put forward the well thought out models for a new social order. They are directed to two goals, (i) to expose the shortcomings and bad effects of modern technology and (ii) to raise up man above technological achievements. Their impact is far reaching. They mean that technology is for man and man is not for technology. So man has to re-establish himself as the end of all technology which has to be used for the benefits of man and man alone. On the basis of these considerations mankind is contemporarily being united socially and politically to exercise a veto on the destructive uses of modern technology. Another important way to contain the evil effects of modern technology is to develop the scope of subjective knowledge and to show that all knowledge is not objective or objective knowledge is not enough. However, so far very little has been done in the field of subjective knowledge in comparison to massive technological development. The realm of subjectivity is, therefore, to be explored *de novo* by philosophers of different

persuasion. They may consolidate their efforts and impose moral and social constraints upon the detrimental uses of technology. At any rate, the need of philosophy is greater today than what it was at any time in the past when there was crude technology. The sophisticated technology of today need a sophisticated philosophy, particularly, sophisticated ethics and social philosophy as an effective regulator and controller. The Upaniṣadic doctrine can here be utilized quite relevantly. It advocates the control of mind over the refractory sense-organs. It pictures the mind as a charioteer and the sense-organs as horses. Today the powers of sense-organs have been excessively augmented by technological tools and equipment. The control of mind should, therefore, be increased in the same proportion. Thus there is an imperative need for the control of mind over the sense-organs and also over the machines which are nothing but extended sense-organs and motor organs of human beings.

### 3. RETURN TO IDEALISM

But what is this mind? Where is this mind? Over these questions contemporary philosophers and scientists appear to have arrived at a conclusion which states that there is no individual mind to bring about this effective control. But they believe that there are certain agencies that can do so. These agencies are public opinion, the community of enlightened scholars and scientists, organisations like United Nations Organisation, enlightened statesmen, saints and religious leaders. They can establish a firm control over technology and avoid destructive uses. These agencies were referred by or put under one blanket term 'The Absolute' by the philosophers of the nineteenth century and also by those of the first two decades of the twentieth century. Vedānta calls these agencies the manifestations of Brahman which is a synonym of the Absolute of Western Idealism. The Absolute is Thought, that is reflected into the above-mentioned agen-

cies. Today the term 'The Absolute' is in disrepute. But we think that there is no escape from it. A return to absolutism is, therefore, the only way to save the world from the hazards of modern technology. All talks about ecology and humanism become meaningless and baseless if they do not lead to understanding of Absolute Idealism. All sorts of ethics that are being recommended for technological society directly or indirectly refer to the 'Absolute Thought, which can be called universal mind. So slowly and gradually, the Absolute is now making its inroad into the precincts of modern technology. Its greater function is to save the world from a catastrophe or from the destructive uses of technology. According to Indian mythology, technology is a demon and the Absolute Thought is God who incarnates Himself to kill this demon. This is a pure thought clothed in mythology. It establishes an idealism which can boost up the personality of man against the demon of technology.

Further the mind that controls should not be understood in the Cartesian sense. It is not merely a thinking entity, for it transcends all thinking entities. There is no likeness of mind in the realm of objects in as much as it is the presupposition of all that is objective. It can be felt but not formulated, it can be thought but not presented or represented, it can be experienced but not experimented upon. In short, it can be seen but not shown. So there is an experience which is beyond observation and experiment, the two guides of the scientific method. All experiments and observations presuppose it. Unless this view of mind is accepted, there is no principle upon which ethics of technological society can be based. So all ethical considerations are leading to the acceptance of the universal mind.

But it must be noted here that both science and philosophy of science are still highly critical of Absolute Idealism. It is they which banished it from the philosophical

world. Nevertheless, their child, that is modern technology cannot maintain itself without the careful supervision of Absolute Idealism which is its only guardian. Thus as in worldly affairs the shrewd son of a father befriends the sworn enemy of his family, so in scientific affairs technology has no option but to befriend Absolute Idealism that is the arch enemy of its parent, i.e., empirical science. Modern technology, thus, is going beyond science and making a reapproachment between science and philosophy. Dialectically speaking, there is a sense in which science is the thesis, technology is the anti-thesis and the philosophy of Absolute Idealism can no longer remain in exile. The requirements of technology, in all likelihood, are restoring it to its glorious status and role. Idealism is the only remedy for corruption and the Absolute Idealism is the only remedy for absolute corruption. The age of modernity is now over and giving place to post-modernity. Modernity was based on the separation of economic and moral values and the sole realization of economic values. So it has created unsolvable problems. Now post-modernity is restoring moral values to their proper place and establishing their full control over economic values. Vedānta does this function *par excellence*. Hence post-modernity means return to Vedānta.

## II. THE METHOD OF PHILOSOPHICAL RECONSTRUCTION

### 1. THE IDEA OF SANDARŚANA

The time has come when philosophy should be defined afresh, especially in India where East and West are meeting to generate a new culture. It cannot be identified now with revealed knowledge (*śruti*) or traditional lore (*smṛti*). Nor is it *purāṇa* (mythical or historical account). It is not an *upaniṣad* (secret or mythical doctrine) either. Ancient Indian philosophers have called it *darśana*. But there are sound arguments why it should rather be called *Sandarśana*.

First, the word, *Darśana* is ambiguous. It means faith, intuition or sense-perception. So it cannot be equated with *Darśanaśāstra* or philosophy which is more than *Darśana*. It also includes knowledge (*jñāna*) and conduct (*caritra*). The Jainas have called *darśana*, *jñāna* and *caritra* as the way of *mokṣa*. This implies that they include *darśana*, *jñāna* and *caritra* into their notion of philosophy. Similarly all Vedāntins include in *Darśanaśāstra* *darśana*, (perception) *manana* (reasoning), *nididhyāsana* (meditation) and *sākṣātkāra* (encounter with Reality). The Buddhists also understand by their term "Abhidharma" something more than right faith or *samyag darśana*. So if we go deeper and thoroughly probe the meaning of *Darśanaśāstra*, we find that it should be called *Sandarśana* rather than *darśana*. The Sanskrit prefix '*sam*' stands for all corrective and supplementary measures that transform *darśana* into *Darśanaśāstra* or philosophy.

Secondly, it can be argued that Sāṅkhya, Mīmāṃsā, Nyāya, Ānvīkṣikī, Vedānta and Abhidharma are the different definitions of philosophy. Each of these definitions stresses a particular perspective on philosophy and surveys the whole field of philosophy from its own point of view. Those who are satisfied with any of these perspectives may continue it and restate it in modern moulds of current language and thought. But their activity will be critical and reconstructive. As far as they refute the perspectives of their opponents they are critical and as far as they restate their own point of view they are reconstructive. Both these activities are included in the concept of *Sandarśana* which means constant review. So philosophy is not a view of any thing, fact or proposition; it is rather a review of that. So even a modern restatement of Sāṅkhya, Nyāya, Mīmāṃsā, Ānvīkṣikī, Vedānta, Abhidharma etc. is nothing but *Sandarśana*. It is a new

philosophic activity. Only its source of inspiration, i.e., insight, is the recapturing of a classical insight.

But if some people are not satisfied with any of the above-mentioned definition they may formulate their own review of the problems that have been discussed by the various philosophers of the world. But *Sandarśana* is neither criticism nor reconstruction. Criticism without reconstruction is as unphilosophical as reconstruction without criticism. Both are equally useless abstractions. They get their *tour de force* from a true insight that is *Sandarśana*.

Thirdly, the various philosophical systems of Western philosophy can also be justified in the light of the definition of *Sandarśana*, for, each of them performs the triple function of insight attainment, criticism and reconstruction. Philosophy spans from curiosity or wonder (*jijñāsā*) to the object of wonder (*jijñāsyā*) through the objects of knowledge (*jñeya*). All the three moments of philosophy are fully preserved in the definition of *Sandarśana*.

Fourthly, the term '*darśana*' is used in the sense of a philosophical system. It is said that there are many *darśanas* (*Darśanāni*) and there is not single *darśanaśāstra* as such. Similarly the term 'philosophy' is now being used in the sense of a system only. That is why Professor Harre says that there are philosophies of science and not the philosophy; there are only philosophers and there is none who is the philosopher. The age when Aristotle was called the philosopher is long over, it is rather dead. Now no person can be called the philosopher. But this miscellany of philosophies and *darśanas* indicate that there is the possibility of a new discipline that deals with the fundamental insight, intuition or perspective. That discipline may be called *Sandarśana*. It is *darśana* or philosophy in the collective sense and cannot be plural as such. The search for

it can never be given up. Nor is it a wild goose chase. The various *darśanas* are simply approximations to it. It is the universal science that was the dream of Descartes and Leibnitz which could not be materialized to this day. Plurality of *darśanas* or philosophies, far from being a defect of the *Sandarśana* is the sine qua non of its operation and functioning.

Lastly, philosophy has always been pursued for an all-comprehensive insight which is its be-all and end-all. That is why in India it has been identified with *darśanaśāstra*, i.e., a system of insight. But *darśana* can also be attained and pursued by some people who are not philosophers. For example, even poets, novelists, scientists and historians have some insight. But their insight is not philosophical. To distinguish the insight of philosophers from that of other scholars, artists and scientists, the prefix 'sam' is added to the word "*darśana*". So the word "*Sandarśana*" defines philosophical activity far better than any other word in Indian languages. Those who coined the word *darśanaśāstra* did not mean that every flash or glimpse is entitled to *darśana*. For them only those flashes of truth were *darśana* which were formative of the whole outlook of the person having them. Hence there is need to redefine philosophy as *Sandarśana*.

A few illustrations of *Sandarśana* activity can make the idea of *Sandarśana* clear. When the Positivists stated that the truth of a proposition consists in its verification by sense-experience, they got an all-comprehensive insight. They applied it to refute all other theories of truth on the one hand and to explain the truth of all scientific propositions and theories on the other hand. In this way they performed the triple functions having an insight into a theory, criticizing other theories and developing their own theory. Analogously,

when Existentialists held that existence precedes essence, they performed all the three functions of *Sandarśana* apropos the theory of existence. So we can preserve all our philosophies – eastern or western – if we accept *Sandarśana* as the redefinition of philosophy. But *Sandarśana* is neither Positivism nor Existentialism. It is neither rationalism nor empiricism either. It is, on the contrary, an all-out intuitionism. According to it, even rationalists and empiricists, positivists and existentialists have an intuition of their fundamental theory. To say, for example, that all knowledge begins from experience is not the result of an empirical observation but an insight into the fundamentals of empiricism. So insight which is basic to *Sandarśana* is intuitive knowledge. But this knowledge is not to be identified with instinct or inspiration. It is neither given nor innate. Nor is it imparted from without, from a *guru* or a scripture. It is, on the contrary, acquired or won by a philosopher himself. The study of philosophical works or doctrines may help it grow. So a teacher may also help, but unless an effort is made by the philosopher himself he cannot have an insight that is the *sine qua non* of his pursuit. That is why the path of *jñāna* has been distinguished from that of *bhakti* because in the former an individual effort is needed, while in the latter it is no longer necessary. Similarly when Wittgenstein said that philosophising is like swimming, he indicated that philosophy requires some struggle or effort which must be intellectual. Furthermore *Sandarśana* as I view it, is not the development of each and every intuition that philosophers had down the ages, but intuitive knowledge itself. In this way it resembles the phenomenology and is least interested in showing the existence of the object that it studies. Its subject-matter is only intuition which is the matrix of all truths. So first of all it makes a distinction between true intuition and false intuition and has a theory of truth. This is done by the



criterion of truth. Truth is the self-evidencing intuition itself that is called *svaparakāśa* in Indian philosophy. Even Descartes, Kant and Husserl got an insight into its nature. But Descartes immediately applied it to investigating the nature and existence of its object and so he deflected it on the side of objects. Kant tried to analyse it but he applied the structures of objects to it and hence committed the fallacy of *adhyāsa*. He confused it with understanding and failed to work out the distinction that he himself had made between 'I think' and 'I know'. He has totally left out the description of 'I think'. Husserl bracketed all existence and tried to probe into its own nature. So far he definitely went beyond Descartes and Kant. But he searched it into essences which are *bhāvas*. The intuitive knowledge itself was not investigated by him either. That is pure consciousness. He simply believed that all consciousness is intentional. But every act of consciousness is intentional—this consciousness of intentionality itself is not intentional. It is consciousness itself; this insight, therefore, does not exhaust all possibilities of intuitive knowledge and falls down into the side of objectivity. Husserl failed to distinguish *sat* (being) from *bhāva* or existence from essence and spread the former into a network of the latter. *Sandarśana* tries to give a complete account of intuitive knowledge. It puts intuitive knowledge at the centre from which it goes on reviewing the seer and all that is seen.

Again, Indian philosophers, especially the Advaita philosophers and Idealist Buddhists have indicated several pathways to the attainment of philosophic insight and made profound investigations into the nature of *svaparakāśa* or self-evidencing intuition. *Sandarśana* endeavours to consolidate them and strip them off from their all -metaphysical linkages. It aims at seeing them through and under the perspective of

truth alone. Thus far it is pure epistemology which reviews all other kinds of knowledge and demonstrates that the truth which is found in each of them is directly or indirectly established on the authority of *svaparakāśa*. Unless a proposition is confirmed by *svaparakāśa* it is an unassimilated abstract and hence false. *Svaparakāśa* is, therefore, the acid test of both reconstruction and criticism that are better known functions of philosophy than intuition that is the alpha and omega of all philosophy.

Thus the idea of *Sandarśana* is fraught with immense possibility. It can restore pure philosophy to its pristine glory and at the same time give it a new orientation. It can review each scientific theory and find out its truth and relevance in the context of its own basic point of view. It can successfully compete with the contemporary schools of phenomenology, existentialism, dialectical materialism and analytical philosophy and point out their shortcomings. If young philosophers accept the idea of *Sandarśana* and develop it in the direction of their own choice they can do much philosophy that is relevant to the needs of modern society and thought. *Sandarśana* is more significant than *indriya-pratyakṣa* (sense-experience).

## 2. APPLICATION OF SANDARŚANA

One of the applications of *Sandarśana* is in the field of social theory. The theory of society which is formulated as *Sandarśana* is called Lokāyana social philosophy. It is conceived and named so in sharp contrast to Lokāyata which is the social philosophy of the materialist schools. Lokāyana philosophy is a form of humanism that is *ipso facto* opposed to materialism.

In Lokāyana philosophy society is taken as an organization of individuals who are bound by language, culture and customs. The ancient Lokāyata philosophy and

modern utilitarians treat it as a mere mechanism attaching more importance to individuals than to their natural or structural organizations. The modern Lokāyatas, especially Communists, however are laying more stress on the structural organization that is called Soviet state than on the individuals that constitute it. They have taken in the wood and left out the trees; they have comprehended the order, strengthened it massively and ignored the individuals. So both the schools of Lokāyata philosophy have gone astray. They have not tried to see the fact that is society. Society is an order of individuals; it is a kinship of persons and hence it implies a set of rules and organisations, customs and festivals, rituals and plays, language and thought patterns.

The order is not less primary and significant than the individuals who belong to it. It is called in our language as *loka* which is translated in English as community or people in the collective sense. It is scarcely perceptible at the microcosmic level but most clearly visible at its macrocosmic level which is state or *rājya*. There are, undoubtedly, a number of intermediate organizations between *loka* and *rājya* and their presence is absolutely necessary for the well-being of the society. The order that envelopes the individuals like an aura is revealed in them in concrete reliefs. In fact it touches all the organizations of individuals. Its touch at the lower strata of these organizations is personal and existential and at their higher strata it is humanistic though impersonal. All social organizations are, thus, the development of *loka* from personal stage to impersonal one or from an existential state to a humanistic stage. Society that is called *samāja* in Indian language, is Lokāyana, i.e. the transformation of an amorphous, though existential, order into a concrete whole of form and reality. When it is rigorously rearranged, it breaks down and hence negates itself. The Soviet state has in all likelihood reached this point. But the capitalist state is not

lagging behind and is fast approximating the same breaking point. To counter-attack the Soviet state it is imitating its *modus operandi* completely.

Lokāyana theory, as a school of social philosophy insists on the preservation of the balance or eco-system that obtains between the individuals and social order. It safeguards individual freedom as well as the freedom of small social groups that constitute the living cells of the body-politic of society. If all individuals are computerised numbers, they are simply prisoners and their society is reduced to prison house. Similarly if all social groupings are identified, registered and controlled by a government of the people, they are nothing but the cells of a prison house. So Lokāyana theory argues that both individuals and their small groups must have equal freedom for their smooth growth and development. For, freedom does not mean only the freedom of an individual from state control to do what he thinks as right, it also means the freedom of his groups. He must have freedom to form organizations and his groups must have freedom from state control to function without let or hindrance. If all persons are not free, if small social groups are not free, then the freedom of an individual is not only meaningless but dangerous also, for, it may sooner or later turn homicidal and genocidal.

The Vedic myth of Indra is relevant to the contemporary state of affairs. Indra is called Purandara because he destroyed a big *puram* or city that posed a threat to the existence of village organizations. In modern terms he stood for micro-organizations and their development and uprooted macro-organizations and their development. His stand is valid today on the criterion of mass participation and immediacy of the people in the social functions. The people have no participation and immediacy in the formation and functioning of the macro-organization which are, therefore,

anti-people, demoniac in the end. Solidarity of individuals in a cohesive group is more vitally needed than the so-called individual development or state functioning and its development. Those who consider the welfare of the individuals and the state only and ignore the well-beings of a host of micro-organizations and social institutions are in fact anti-people. Society is more than individuals and the state.

But our foregoing analysis does not mean that there is the existence of a social mind. It firmly holds, on the contrary, that only individuals have a mind. Their mind, however, is not bound by the conditions of their body alone. It is inalienably related to its social milieu as well as to the universal biosphere and local mental culture.

Furthermore, society is the fullest development of Loka. There is no social organization over and above society. It is not only a field of actions and interactions of individuals, but also an arena for the interplay of their groupings and power games, a Bible of their voices, a spectrum of their visions and a keyboard of their all growth and development. Individuals and their groups may go on regrouping and realigning themselves in the way they desire, provided the two conditions of their development are fulfilled. First, regrouping must not be disproportionately massive, else it will be harmful to the existence of small groups. Secondly, no group should take the place and role of the whole society or impose itself as the supreme commando upon society. Under these conditions all regroupings are beneficial to the life and growth of society. It can also be argued that if they are ever stopped, society will be dead or closed and moribund and its fundamental functions will become inoperative. An open society, therefore, is not only an ideal but also a test of all societies. A society that is not open sooner or later dies out.

But in modern times a great danger is posed by the side of state to the very existence of society. In some countries state has replaced society. In other countries this replacement is afoot under the name of nationalization, centralization, federalism and integralism. So the state which was cut to its size throughout the history of mankind is now outgrowing society. Lokāyana theory is against this colossal development of state. For state is not the whole of society and politics is not the whole of life. State is simply a segment of societal reality and as such it plays a role in the wellbeing of society. But when it devours society and becomes a colossus, then it needs an Indra for its destruction and re-organization. Anyway, Lokāyana theory envisions a global struggle that is going on in the present century between state and society on the one hand and between state and individuals on the other, and aims at strengthening the position of society and the individual vis-a-vis state.

But Lokāyana theory is not a brick and mortar conception of society. It goes deeper and insists on recognition of the fact that the light of *svaprakāśa* that is reflected in every individual and order is the self-same light that is reflected in me as an individual. The individuals are not bricks and society is not mortar. The individuals are persons, i.e., subjects reflecting consciousness and society is a group of persons and their consciousness is not only personal but also inter-personal. Hence it comprehends not only the individuals but also their social order in itself. Society is thus an identity of their interest and purposes, the source of their pathos and ethos. It is, in short, a reality that conserves and consumes every activity of individuals and sets up the ideals of *svarājya* for itself as well as for them.

Significantly, the idea of *svarājya* was first mooted in the circles of the Vedic sages who used it in the sense of spiritual freedom or mental equipoise. Only those who

attained to self-knowledge could establish their personal rule over themselves, could be *svarāj*. But later this concept was applied to self-control, economic independence and political independence in its progressive developments and inflated significance. Gandhi tried to harmonize all these meanings in his book, *Hind Svarāj*. Professor. K.C. Bhattacharya was also impressed by the Vedāntic ideal of *svarājya* and was stimulated to achieve it in the realm of thought. The Lokāyana theory accepts all these formulations of *svarājya*, but it adds to them the full *svarājya* of not only the individuals, the full or complete *svarājya* of not only state, but the complete *svarājya* of *loka* or small social groups called micro-organizations. The *Grāmasvarājya* of Gandhiji, the village republics of ancient India and city republics of ancient Greece are as essential for Lokāyana theory as the modern republics of France, Germany, U.S.A. and India. But the latter are not the models of societal reality. The former alone will remain its model, for, they are the nurseries of everything that is socially good. No macro-organization can be the nursery of good since it is parasitic.

Another threat to Lokāyana is thrown out from the side of colossal economic organizations and the concentration of money power into the hands of a few individuals and groups. Contemporarily they are making tremendous development in the name of industrialization and mechanization. Modern science and technology are helping them grow by leaps and bounds. Consequently the vertical growth of a few individuals and companies is out of all proportions to the horizontal expansion of poverty on the social plane. The fast rising skyscrapers beside ever expanding huts represents a scenario of economic inequality that may burst forth into a volcano and spell the doom of contemporary civilization. Hence Lokāyana theory is against

these lopsided developments and treats them as the bane of society. It stands for an egalitarian order and espouses all measures that reduce economic inequality, curb the growth of capitalism and exercise legitimate control over incomes and expenditures of both individuals and their companies.

But unfortunately there is a secret marriage of state power and economic power in modern times. Both powers are either integrated or united. In capitalism they are integrated and in communism they are united. Unless this marriage is broken, there is no ray of hope for the *svarājya* of society. Lokāyana theory has, therefore, to find out a way of this predicament and argue for the exercise of social control over state power and money power. This is a programme of Lokāyana praxis that develops socialization of state power and money power against unationalization and multinationalization.



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**ADVAITA AS INTERPRETED BY P.T. RAJU**

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K. Srinivas\*

*Introduction*

Raju has been regarded as one of the most influential contemporary representatives of Indian philosophy in general and Advaita in particular. His sound grounding in Sanskrit and his association with the past masters like Radhakrishnan enabled him to penetrate into the structural depths of Indian thought. According to Raju, every philosophical system in India aimed at presenting a philosophy of life. Thus there are many philosophies of life. Of course, one cannot subscribe to every philosophy of life without self-examination. A true philosophy of life is one that recognizes the essentially spiritual nature of man. Such a view goes akin to the grand *Upaniṣadic* tradition, and Raju swears by it.

Raju openly declares that he is committed to the philosophy of Advaita. He firmly believes that, of all the orthodox schools of Vedānta, it is only Advaita which has reached the metaphysical heights by interpreting the logic of the *Upaniṣads*. The monistic and absolute tendencies found

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in the *Upaniṣads* were given a logical form by Śaṅkara and his followers without any sectarian attitude.<sup>1</sup> Raju's commitment to Advaita is not a blind one. The arguments of Advaita are convincing as it takes experience as its basis and the logic that it advances is realistic. In other words, the philosophy of Advaita leads us gradually from the phenomenal to the noumenal realm. To quote Raju in this context:

Our special interest in Advaita lies in its philosophical positions, in the way it marshals the arguments to prove that Brahman is the only reality, and in the status it gives to the empirical world.<sup>2</sup>

In this paper, an attempt has been made to highlight the way in which Raju interpreted the basic doctrines of Advaita. With this end in view, this paper is divided into three major sections epistemology, metaphysics, and axiology.

### *Epistemology*

The metaphysical presuppositions of any system determine its epistemological considerations. Like Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā, Advaita accepts six *Pramāṇas* as valid source of knowledge. According to Raju, Advaita epistemology is realistic in so far as it is concerned with the world of objects and action. Being the measures of reality, *Pramāṇas* can only measure what is measurable. The objects of empirical reality have definite and determinate existence; therefore, they are measurable. In this context Raju makes a distinction between "knowledge by Being something" and "knowledge by cognizing some object". This distinction has its vital bearing on the epistemological doctrines of Advaita. "Knowledge by Being something" cannot be imparted to others, and cannot be obtained by any *Pramāṇa*. In other words, it is the knowledge of Brahman/Ātman. Here the expression "knowledge

of" should not be interpreted as if Brahman/Ātman were the object of knowledge. In this context "to know" means "to be" or "to become". Such a state can be attained only by realizing the true nature of one's own Self intuitively. The individual self, Jīva in its essential nature is identical with Brahman/Ātman, by realising which all the polarities between subject and object, enjoyer and enjoyed, worshipper and worshipped, etc. disappear.

On the contrary, "knowledge by cognizing some object" is not direct and immediate. It is only mediate knowledge which can be obtained through *Pramāṇas*. This knowledge by mediation is the knowledge of object of the empirical reality. Such a knowledge presupposes subject-object polarity without which a knowledge situation cannot be accounted for. The apparent polarity between subject and object is due to *avidyā*. This point will be discussed in due course. As such, every knowledge situation presupposes three important components. They are: (1) cognizer, (2) cognition, and (3) the cognized. These three components are technically called *tripuṭī* and the knowledge obtained by involving these three components is called *tripuṭī-jñāna*. Epistemology in general is concerned with this kind of knowledge and is restricted to empirical reality. Therefore, one should distinguish the account of knowledge given from the ultimate point of view from that given from the relative point of view. Unless one bears this distinction in mind, which runs through all the basic doctrines of Advaita, it is difficult to grasp the epistemology of Advaita.

Proceeding further, Raju points out that knowledge obtained by means of intuition cannot be communicated, for there is no subject to communicate it, whereas the knowledge obtained by means of *tripuṭī* can be communicated, for there is a subject to communicate it, and our language is so

designed for this purpose. Our knowledge at this level is relational; it is also the case with our language which expresses such knowledge. But intuition is the consciousness which experiences the whole as a whole, and is the integration of our discursive intellect. Thus, intuition is an immediate experience, *aparokṣānubhūti*. It alone can lead to *Brahma-jñāna*. In other words, it exposes the limitations of the intellect.<sup>3</sup>

Though the epistemological doctrines of Mīmāṃsā are acceptable, yet Raju holds that the mechanism of perception (*pratyakṣa*) is something unique in Advaita. The internal organ (*antahkaraṇa*) plays a vital role in the perceptual activity. It is spoken of in four ways according to the function it performs. They are: *manas*, *buddhi*, *citta* and *aḥkāra*. These functions or modifications of the internal organ are technically called *vṛttis*. The knowledge obtained by means of *vṛttis* is called *vṛtti-jñāna*. However, it is a form of *tripuṭi-jñāna*. The internal organ becomes conscious because of its proximity to the Self (Ātman). Left to itself it does not have any reality.

After perception, presumption or presupposition (*arthāpatti*) finds an important place in the epistemology of Advaita. According to Raju, the Naiyāyikas could not distinguish between *arthāpatti* and *anumāna*. It is unfortunate, laments Raju, that *anumāna* is wrongly translated as inference. This leads to the main source of confusion for the Naiyāyikas. As a matter of fact, any form of reflective thought can be called inference. In that sense, both *arthāpatti* and *anumāna* involve reflective thinking; therefore, they are inferences. However, Raju maintains that there is a major difference between these two forms of reflective activity. *Anumāna* as a form of reflective thinking requires *vyāpti* to

establish a given fact, while *arthāpatti* presupposes something to complete a given unit of cognition. The former is syllogistic, while the latter is not. Hence, *arthāpatti* cannot be reduced to *anumāna*. Raju prefers the English translation "syllogism" as an equivalent of *anumāna*, and he is right in saying so. The inferences of syllogistic type are different from those of presuppositional type. According to Raju, "*arthāpatti* is a spontaneous cognitive process of mind."<sup>4</sup>

Raju expresses the view that the presuppositional logic employed by Advaita in resolving the apparent conflict between the one and the many is something unique in Indian philosophy. Though Śaṅkara made use of it in a very effective manner, yet he did not make it explicit the way in which Kant did. Raju tries to show that the presuppositional method used by Śaṅkara can be compared with the transcendental method of Kant. According to the latter, certain categories of experience have to be presupposed in order to obtain any knowledge of empirical reality. In a way, it is an *a priori* precondition. Similarly, the presuppositional method of Śaṅkara accepts pure Existence (*sat*) as an *a priori* precondition for doing any epistemology. Such a presupposition is the result of our understanding of *śruti*. Thus *arthāpatti* as a presuppositional method is considered to be one of the most important means of knowledge. Not only that, Śaṅkara made use of it as a method of postulation to resolve the conflict between the one and the many.<sup>5</sup> It is unfortunate, as rightly pointed out by Raju, that the Naiyāyikas could not recognise its importance.

Coming to the question of the validity of knowledge, Advaita subscribes to self-validity of knowledge (*svataḥ-prāmāṇya-vāda*). According to this theory, truth is self-evident while falsity is revealed by some other *pramaṇa*. It is in this context Raju holds that truth is always known first in

so far as the knowledge of the objects of empirical reality is concerned. In fact, Advaitins accepted such a theory of validity of knowledge on the ground that truth, like light, need not be revealed by anything other than itself. Otherwise such a process leads to *ad infinitum* (*anavasthā*). Therefore, self-validity of knowledge is the only criterion of truth. This amounts to saying that truth is something which cannot be contradicted or sublated. For example, Raju holds that when a rope is perceived as a snake, the cognition of the snake is taken for granted until and unless it is contradicted by the subsequent cognition. Thus, falsity is established by some other cognition. Therefore, truth is always self-validated. Such a view dismisses unwarranted scepticism in philosophy. It is true that we do doubt certain judgements about the nature of the objects of empirical reality. But our doubt is only restricted to only those judgements which in the ultimate analysis, turn out to be false. However, Raju warns us that self-validity should not be interpreted as coherence. One cognition may cohere with another, if both of them are true, but such a coherence is only a corollary of self-validity.<sup>6</sup>

Advaita does not treat inherence (*samavāya*) as an independent category. In support of this view Raju argues that it is due to the loose correlation of our language we project as if inherence were a kind of relation of inseparable type. This is the mistake committed by the Naiyāyikas. When someone says, "Rose is red", he is neither cognizing the rose apart from its red colour, nor the colour of the rose apart from the rose to which it is attributed as a property. To say that inherence is an inseparable relation between substance and its qualities is to admit another factor, namely, relation, and it requires another relation to be related to relata. Thus it leads to infinite regress. What Raju argues is that the limitations of our language are somehow imposed on the

objects. As the Mīmāṃsakas say, the relation between the rose and its colour is *tādātmya*. Such a relation is inexpressible in our language. Raju holds that this standpoint of Advaita is profound and logical.

Advaita accords special status to *śruti* as a *pramāṇa* since it has a distinct role to play. In fact, it does not come into clash with other *pramāṇas*. All other *pramāṇas* as measures reveal to us the nature of the objects of empirical reality, whereas *śruti* provides us with an indirect knowledge of Brahman, the supreme Reality. However, it is not the case that, whatever is admitted by *śruti* must be accepted by us blindly. As a matter of fact, the tradition of *śruti* is amply supported by proper reasoning (*yukti/tarka*); otherwise, how can anyone convince those who do not attach any importance to it? To quote Raju in this context:

Though the teachings of the scriptures are accepted as infalliable with regard to the nature of ultimate reality, those teachings are supported by elaborate reasonings of their own, which are not always to be found in the *Upaniṣads*.<sup>7</sup>

This is the reason why Raju supports the view that *śruti* should be given a special status over the other *pramāṇas*. The latter as measures reveal the determinate nature of the objects of the empirical reality, but cannot give us any knowledge of or clue about, the trans-empirical reality. Thus Raju makes a distinction between relational knowledge and absolute knowledge. The former is obtained by means of *pramāṇas* while the latter is known through *śruti*.

### *Metaphysics*

The Upaniṣadic tradition is represented by all the Vedāntic systems in general, and Advaita in particular. Raju

states that Śaṅkara and his followers literally interpreted the tradition of *śruti* without any sectarian attitude. Such an interpretation of the *Upaniṣads* resolved the apparent contradiction between the one and the many. The Mahāvākyas clearly state that Brahman is the only reality, and that it is not different from Ātman. Raju holds that Śaṅkara's interpretation of these Mahāvākyas has its significance in one's own life. One can realise the contradictory nature of the world of objects. To a great extent reason helps us in realising this fact even though it is not a sufficient condition for Brahman-realisation. Brahman is one and infinite, trans-empirical and indeterminate, and inexpressible for its trans-relational. If Brahman alone is the reality, how is it that we perceive the world of plurality? Where does this plurality spring from? Such questions plagued the interpreters of the *Brahma-sūtra*. In order to clear these puzzles, Śaṅkara introduced *Māyā* as an explanatory concept. In fact, Raju writes that, "the doctrine of *māyā* is neither a fabrication of Śaṅkara, nor merely the outcome of Buddhist nihilism, nor found full-fledged in the *Upaniṣads*."<sup>8</sup>

By introducing the concept of *Māyā*, Śaṅkara gives a novel interpretation of the doctrine of causation. According to him, if Brahman is the only reality, then it must be the cause of the world of plurality. But how would anyone explain such a phenomenon? Śaṅkara resolves this riddle by bringing in the notion of Īśvara or Saguṇa Brahman. Īśvara is Brahman associated with *Māyā*. As a *śakti*, *Māyā* has two important characteristics. They are the power of concealment (*āvaraṇa śakti*) and the power of projection (*vikṣepa śakti*). *Māyā* conceals the real nature of Brahman and projects it as something other than what it is. The empirical reality is *māyā*'s projection of Brahman. Raju substantiates this explanation of Śaṅkara with suitable examples. According to Raju,



Īśvara is like the sun covered by the dark clouds. The sun is not at all affected by the clouds in any way. Likewise, Brahman appears as Īśvara when it is associated with *Māyā*. Unlike the Sunya of the Buddhists, *māyā* is a positive entity (*bhāvapadārtha*). But unlike Brahman, it is not real (*sat*). Raju distinguishes the nature of *māyā* from that of *Sūnya*. To put it in his words:

*Sūnya* is both a conclusion from contradictoriness and a synonym for it. But *Māyā* is not a conclusion from contradictoriness, but is only its synonym. Hence a conclusion has to be drawn, that there is truth behind *māyā*, and that is Brahman.<sup>9</sup>

Once this point is made clear, then it is easy to grasp the Advaitic doctrine of causation. There is another important aspect to be kept in mind, i.e. *Māyā* is inexplicable (*anirvacanīya*). It is inexplicable in the sense that it is neither real nor unreal. If it is real, then there is another reality apart from Brahman. Such a view goes against the tradition of *śruti*. At the same time, *Māyā* cannot be unreal for it is experienced by us. This point is well examined by Raju through the rope-snake analogy. In fact, the rope appears as a snake so long as the experience of the snake is not contradicted by the subsequent cognition. We treat the experience of the snake as real. But, once it is contradicted, we no longer treat that experience as real. At the same time, if it is unreal, we would not have experienced it. Similarly, if it is real, it would not have been contradicted by the subsequent cognition. Therefore, it is neither real nor unreal but different from both the real and the unreal (*sadasad-vilakṣaṇa*). In this sense the nature of the snake is inexplicable. The same logic is extended to *māyā* also.

Coming to the question of causation, Brahman is both the material and efficient cause of the world.<sup>10</sup> It is the

material cause in the sense that it is the ground of everything. At the same time, it is the efficient cause in the sense that it is the intelligent principle capable of desiring, willing, and producing the objects through the medium of *Māyā*. Just as the burning power of fire cannot exist independent of fire, *Māyā* as a Śakti of Brahman cannot exist independent of it. However, Brahman is unaffected in the process of causation. Its transformation into the world is only apparent, but not real. Strictly speaking, it is only a kind of transfiguration. Such a theory of causation is known as *vivarta-vāda*. In other words, according to Advaita the effect cannot have any independent existence apart from the cause. According to Raju, it is a unique theory of causation advocated by Advaita. Such a theory exposes the transient nature of the empirical reality.

Raju argues that the levels of reality are often branded as the degrees of truth. Strictly speaking, there are only two levels of existence. They are; absolute existence (*pāramārthika-sattā*) and relative or empirical existence (*vyāvahārikasattā*). Brahman alone is characterised as absolute existence. All other forms of existence are merely relative in their nature. In fact, the objects of the world borrow their existence from Brahman. Independent of Brahman they do not have any existence. The relative existence is further classified into: apparent existence (*prātibhāṣika-sattā*) and insignificant existence (*tucca-sattā*). Here the objects of dream are supposed to have apparent being or existence, which lasts so long as the dream in which they appear lasts. There are mere imaginary objects. They have some sort of existence. Their existence is purely imaginary (*prātibhāṣika*). Raju should not have emphasised on insignificant existence, for it is not considered existence at all. Perhaps, under the influence of the German thinkers like Meionong, Raju might

have thought that this category. However, Raju's classification of the various levels of existence clearly show the nature of existence and its correlate reality at each level. Such an analysis makes us to commit to the view that existence is pure existence, but not an empty existence. The main purpose behind this classification is to show that what is considered to be true or real at the lower level of existence cannot be so at the higher level of existence.

Similarly, Raju's arguments against the view that difference and negation have existence are worth consideration. What is conceptually thought of is attributed to the reality. Neither difference nor negation can ever be perceived. They are only concepts used to explain non-existence of certain entities. But they are not percepts; otherwise they could be perceived. One can perceive a quality called red, but non-red as a quality can never be perceived. One can perceive a chair and a table, but not the difference between them. Thus negation and difference are arrived at conceptually. They can never be experienced. It is evident from the above analysis that Raju is committed to the monistic metaphysics advocated by the *Upaniṣadic* tradition according to which Brahman is the only reality and that it is not different from Ātman.

### *Axiology*

As regards values, Raju classifies values into ethical and spiritual. Ethical values are those that promote material good in the society. Every individual as an empirical being is part and parcel of this world of action. Such a world requires an ethical code to distinguish right actions from the wrong ones, in which individuals act as moral agents. *Mīmāṃsā* as a philosophy of activism provides us with such an ethical code. Its ethical code, as Raju puts it, is derived from the Vedic injunctions by following which an individual can attain what

ever is desired by him. But Raju makes it clear that ethical values do not provide us with the ultimate good, which alone can be considered to be *summum bonum*. To quote Raju:

In one sense, every human activity is spiritual, when performed with the realisation of its relation to the inner spirit. Otherwise it becomes mere selfish activity. Thus, ethical activity also becomes spiritual activity, when performed with this orientation. But ethics as such, as a science of the socially directed activity of the individual, need not be spiritual.<sup>11</sup>

In order to attain the ultimate good, one has to cultivate spiritual values. These values are directed towards the realisation of one's own Self which is nothing but Ātman. Unlike ethical values, which can be attained through the external means, spiritual values can be cultivated by the individual by means of inwardness. Thus the transition from the ethical to the spiritual state is very important in one's life. The very purpose of human life is the realisation of Brahman/Ātman which resides in every individual. An individual attain his freedom in its truest and purest sense only when he is liberated from the patterned world of action. In other words, what Raju tries to say is that one has to transcend the ethical realm so as to enjoy absolute freedom.

The idea or the goal of life, says Raju is Self-realisation. Since bondage is due to *avidyā*, it can only be removed by means of *jñāna*. Under the influence of *avidyā* the individual forgets his own Self, which is none other than Brahman/Ātman. The realisation of one's own Self means the realisation of Brahman/Ātman which alone can free an individual from the fetters of bondage. The realisation of Brahman/Ātman is the highest knowledge (*parā-vidyā*); it

alone can dispel *avidyā* which the root cause of bondage. This is the reason why Raju claims that knowledge is the only means to liberation (*mukti*). However, he recognises the importance of action (*karma*) and devotion (*bhakti*) in so far as they serve as the means to the way of knowledge (*jñāna-mārga*). The way of an action may help an individual to purify his mind (*citta-śuddhi*). Such a state of mind makes one non-egoistic. But every individual must transcend this stage. Similarly, the way of devotion helps an individual to surrender everything to God, but he cannot become one with God. Thus there is still duality between the individual as a spiritual aspirant and God. Therefore, as rightly assessed by Raju, it is only the way of knowledge which leads the individual to liberation. The realised soul becomes one with the Absolute, i.e. remains as the Absolute.

The classification of liberation while one is alive (*jīvan-mukti*) and liberation after death (*videha-mukti*) is an important one. It does not mean that they are two kinds of liberation. It is one and the same liberation in two different states. The greatest contribution of Advaita to the concept of liberation is that one need not wait for liberation until one's death as if it were something other worldly. It can be attained here in this world, right now. Such a concept of liberation makes men more spiritually oriented since the fruits of their spiritual pursuits can be realised without waiting for another birth.

### *Conclusion*

To sum up: it is the firm conviction of Raju that Advaita is the true way of life which goes in accordance with the spirit of the *Upaniṣadic* tradition handed down to us. It is neither anti-theistic nor anti-ethical, rather trans-theistic and trans-ethical. It does not ignore the normal human

experiences that are undergone by us as empirical beings. Instead, it tries to show that out of our own experiences we feel that there is still something higher than this world of objects and action to be attained. Thus, as aptly pointed out by Raju, Advaita suggests a rigorous inquiry into the world of experience. In other words, the source of both external and internal experiences is the same. It is none other than Brahman/Ātman. But under the influence of *Avidyā*, we wrongly identify this source as something other than the Self. The realisation of the Self is possible only by means of a regressive inquiry which aims at transcending every lower stage of life so as to reach the higher stage of life. Thus, Advaita does not separate its theoretical formulations from the practical consequences. Its plan of action is oriented towards spirituality; which is amply aided by certain ethical considerations. A realised person is one who, according to Advait, does not have the sense of "I" and "mine". He is the ideal teacher. Hence, the importance of Jīvanmuktas.

### NOTES

1. P.T.Raju, "Identity in Difference in Some Vedāntic Systems," *New Indian Antiquary*, Vol. 2, 1939, p. 331.
2. "The Empirical and Noumenal Truths in Śaṅkara's Philosophy", *Proceedings of the All India Oriental Conference*, Vol. 9, p. 579.
3. *Thought and Reality: Hegelianism and Advaita*, pp. 215-16. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1937.
4. *Structural Depths of Indian Thought*, p. 44. New Delhi: South Asian Publishers, 1985.
5. *Thought and Reality: Hegelianism and Advaita*, pp. 237-40.
6. *Ibid.*, pp. 137-43.
7. P.T.Raju, *Idealistic Thought of India*, p. 124. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1953.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 96.

9. Ibid., p. 110

10. Ibid., pp. 105-6.

11. P.T. Raju, "The Concept of Spiritual in Indian Thought" in his *Spirit, Being and Self*, p. 32. New Delhi: South Asian Publishers, 1982.

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ADVAITIC CONCEPTS IN  
THE TIRUMANDIRAM \*

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N. Gangadharan \*\*

The *Tirumandiram* ascribed to Saint Tirumūlar (500 A.D.) is a metrical work in Tamil containing 3000 verses divided into nine sections called *Tandiram*. Although the work is mainly concerned with the Śaiva Siddhānta giving the quintessence of the *Āgamas*, principles of Yoga and Tantra, herein references to some of the concepts of the Advaita Vedānta are found. I shall deal with them in this paper.

We know very little about the author of the work. He is traditionally considered to be a Śiva-yogi hailing from the North and settled down in the south of *Tiruvāvaduturai*, Tamilnadu. In many verses of the *Tirumandiram*, Advaita is generally referred to as Vedānta. Since the author makes a specific reference to Vaiṣṇavism elsewhere, the reference to Advaita is implied in the reference to Vedānta. In one verse it is referred to by the two names Vedānta and Māyāvāda. This verse refers to the *tattvas* which are counted differently

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by the various schools of thought. Tirumūlar states that there are overall ninety-six *tattvas* accepted by all the schools of thought. There are thirty-six *tattvas* for the Śaivas, twenty-eight for Vedāntins, twenty-four for Vaiṣṇavas and twenty-five for Māyāvādins. The reference to the school as Vedānta is based on the tradition of the *Upaniṣads* being held as the concluding portion of the *Vedas*.<sup>1</sup> The usage of both the expressions Vedānta and Māyāvāda in the same verse could be taken as denoting either two sub-schools of one system or different phases of a system laying emphasis on a particular concept in two angles.

In the Advaita Vedānta, *māyā* denotes the illusory appearance of the world characterised by multiplicity on account of the superimposition upon the unitary non-dual reality, namely, Brahman. On account of its indescribable and inexplicable nature it is known as *anirvacanīya* or *avācya*. It is neither real as Brahman, nor unreal as the sky-flower. Hence it is quite probable that during that period Vedānta was widely known as Māyāvādā in the Śaiva Siddhānta tradition. A variety of names and forms constituting the world is an evolution due to *māyā*. Eternal Brahman is concealed by such forms. We find this concept expressed in the *Tirumandiram* with the illustration of "carved elephant concealing the wood and the elephant concealed in the wood." (2251) Similarly the five gross elements concealed Brahman, and again they get concealed in Brahman. In a toy-elephant made of wood the toy-elephant disappears, when the wood is conceived and the wood disappears when the toy-elephant is conceived. Similarly when we think of the five gross elements the supreme Being recedes, and when we think of the supreme One the thought of the gross elements recedes. This explains

the concept that the supreme Being remains concealed in the elements and is not visualised by normal perception.<sup>2</sup>

Now we may deal with some of the important concepts of Advaita in the *Tirumandiram*.

### *The Concept of Tripuṭijñāna*

The term *Tripuṭi* denotes the knower (*jñātr*), the object of knowledge (*jñeya*), and knowledge (*jñāna*). Although the consciousness of the subject (*jñātr*) is present in the waking and dreaming states, cognition of the external as well as the internal objects does not occur in the condition of dreamless consciousness (*susupti*). Tirumūlar has elucidated this unity of the three in nine verses (1579-87/1605-13). In one of the verses, he mentions clearly that if one offers the flower of one's self at the feet of the Lord (That - *avan*), the difference of 'I' and 'He' melts away resulting in the realization of One only. The two categories 'You' and 'He', one should behold them both in 'you' and 'He'. By offering the flower of one's self (you) at the feet of the Lord (He), the difference between the two categories disappears.<sup>4</sup>

One of the important concepts of Advaita is the search for one's self and the realization of the self as identical with the supreme Being. Tirumūlar points out that when one realizes one's own self, one becomes free from destruction. He adds that nothing is left to be known after knowing one's own self. He states that one has not known the Self all these days. When the Self is known, nothing else is known. When the Self is known, the Self does not desert one and stays within him enquiring about his welfare with loving care.<sup>5</sup> The authour laments that he has not known his self all these days; and when he came to know the self, he knew nothing else.

The *Mahāvākyas* or the great statements refer briefly to the important truth. A detailed exposition of the great statement, *tat tvam asi* (*Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, 6.8.7) is found in the *Tirumandiram* in eight verses. One who has been liberated from the three states of 'Tvam', 'Tat' and 'Asi', has become verily the '*Parāpara*' himself. 'Tvam' denotes the one who is subject to birth and death. 'Tat' denotes the supreme Being (Lord Śiva). 'Asi' denotes one becoming that. One has to aim at the state of realization discarding the gross elements and their diversities, the ninety-six instruments of experience and transcend the glorious state of '*Nādānta*' and proceed beyond that. The great enunciation unites that one characterized by 'Tvam' with that supreme One characterized by 'Tat'.<sup>6</sup> In one verse the author renders the Sanskrit term "*Mahāvākya*" into Tamil as '*Pērurai*'. We find several references to this Upaniṣadic and Advaitic concept in other Śaivite hymns in Tamil literature. This great statement is translated into Tamil by Tirumūlar as "*nī adu āṇāy*". In a few verses he has changed the order of the words occurring in the *Mahāvākya*, placing *tvam* first followed by *tat*. He states that if one realizes the underlying principle governing the three words, he becomes the Absolute (*parāparam*). The one becomes conjoined with the other. The sacred concept of "You being I" belongs to the Vedānta and the concept of "I becoming Śiva" is Siddhānta Vedānta.<sup>9</sup> He clearly points out that "*tat tvam asi*" of the Vedānta is the same as *tvam tat asi* of the Siddhānta Vedānta. He has declared in another verse that he and God became one "*kaḍavuḷum nāṇum onṛāṇēṇ*". He states that the birth has ended, fetters are removed and "God and I have become one." There is no more rebirth and I have met the auspicious Śiva.<sup>10</sup> This statement reflects the concept expressed in another *Mahāvākya* – "*ahaṁ brahma asmi*" (*Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, 1.4,10).

One of the important technique employed in the Vedānta is that of the three *lakṣaṇās* – *jahallakṣaṇā*, *ajahal-lakṣaṇā* and *jahadajahallakṣaṇā*. The grammarians hold that a word conveys the primary sense (*mukhyārtha* or *vācyārtha*). It is the direct and literal meaning of the word. In some contexts, the same word connotes an indirect and figurative sense (*lakṣyārtha*). This enables the speaker to bring out the implied sense of the word as intended by him. Tirumūlar renders these three terms as *viṭṭadu*, *viḍādadu* and *viṭṭu viḍādadu*. He states that the individual self reaches the void, *upaśānta* and *nādānta*. We may express it in terms of the grammatical expression of the three *lakṣaṇās* etc. When the self reaches the void it is the total discarding of all the attributes. When the self reaches the second one it is discarding and associating. When the self reaches the next one, it is discarding and non-discarding. The state of the self in its final manifestness (*svarūpa*) transcends the grammatical convention.<sup>11</sup> He employs the third type in order to explain the significance of the *Mahāvākya*. It is to be noted that he mentions the popular example – "so'yaṁ deva-dattaḥ"<sup>12</sup> (He is this Devadatta). Here the word 'He' denotes a person of his youthful days, while Devatatta denotes the same person of the present period, advanced in age. Though the two are not exactly identical, their essence (*rasa*) remains the same, indicating that the two are not entirely different. Similarly in the statement "tat tvam asi" the term 'tat' denoting Brahman (through *vācyārtha*) and 'tvam' denoting the individual self (due to *vācyārtha*) indicate the same unitary sentient entity by means of the concept of "jahad-ajahal-lakṣaṇā." The *svarūpa* of Brahman transcends all these three *lakṣaṇas*.<sup>13</sup> In unambiguous terms, Tirumūlar emphasises that the *Mahāvākya* conveys the fact of the realization by the individual self as becoming Paraśiva:

1... *meyyarivu ākiya jīvan paraśivanā manrē*<sup>14</sup>

2... *ākum uyir paran ... śivamenalākumē*

One has to transcend beyond the states of *jīva*, Para and Śiva, and seek the *Turiya* state beyond the three the state beyond all the states, the (one) Truth.<sup>15</sup>

In one of the verses, Tirumūlar refers to seven adjuncts (*upādhis*) and seven *upādhis* of Īśvara, respectively referred to as the *kāryopādhi* and *kāraṇopādhi*.<sup>16</sup> These two terms may be explained on the basis of the *Kaivalyanavanitam* (Tamil) as follows: The seven *kāraṇopādhis* are omniscience (*sarvajñatva*), instrumentality (*sarvakāraṇatva*), lordship over all the senses (*sarvendriyeśītva*), all-lordship (*sarveśvaratva*), all-creatorship (*sarvasraṣṭṛtva*), all-protectorship (*sarvarakṣakatva*), and all-destroyership (*sarvasaṃhāratva*). The seven *kāryopādhis* are fivefold organs of sense and action – constituting the gross body, the objects, susceptible to the aforesaid organs, mind, intellect, consciousness, ego and fivefold breaths such as *prāṇa* etc.

Having transcended the three states of the individual self such as the waking state, characterised by the *sattva-guṇa*, the dreaming state by *rajas*, and dreamless by *tamas*, one realises the fourth and final state (*turiya*) devoid of any material characteristics and becomes identical with Brahman. In one of the verses, Tirumūlar refers to the Absolute as *śuddha* Brahman (*turiya*) as well as the limitless effulgence embodying *turiya*.<sup>17</sup> In a subsequent verse the author states that the Absolute is *turiyātīta* and *śūnya* (*pāl*). *Turiyātīta* is equated with indescribable *pāl* (*śūnya*).<sup>19</sup> In some other verses he speaks about the attributeless One as the *turiya* state beyond the three states characterised by the three qualities. In that state It defies thought and speech.<sup>20</sup>

Liberation (*Mokṣa*) as conceived by the Advaita system is described in the chapters dealing with Śivasvarūpa-darśana, Muktibheda and Karmanirṇaya (chapters 15, 16 of the ninth *tantra*). The absolute is stated to be *caitanya* (consciousness). He is the individual self. Just as fragrance is the intrinsic characteristic of the flower, even so God is one with the individual self. He is beyond the thought process. Tirumūlar states that the supreme Being is sentience. He is life. He is union as well as separation. He is continuity beyond thought. He stands in the fragrance of flower within.<sup>21</sup> In another verse the approach that He is not separate from 'I' is commended. There is no approach such as I and You. We are inseparable like body and life. We are together like the heavens and the heavenly beings. I do savour that like honey and its sweetness.<sup>22</sup> In another verse he states that Jīva and Śiva are not separate. Jīva does not know 'Śiva' and when Jīva knows Śiva, the former becomes identical with the latter.<sup>23</sup> The effect of good *tapas* performed in the past can be discerned in the present with knowledge. Self-knowledge is true knowledge and the rest is but knowledge demented.<sup>24</sup>

In another verse he asserts that the great souls that realize Śiva, as the self within, will be in search of Śiva in the self; and those who do not reach Śiva in the self will never reach Śiva. God is immanent in all the creations. From the same clay many pots are made. Similarly the single Lord is immanent in all the creations. The eyes see diverse things but the latter do not behold the eyes. Similar is the case with regard to the Lord towards the individual self. The Lord remains within and protects the seven worlds.<sup>26</sup> Essentially there is no difference between Jīva and Śiva. *Turiya* state is the original svarūpa. When oneness of Jīva and Śiva is realized, then the immaculate *nirvāṇa* is born.

The foregoing account enables one to surmise that the ancient exponents of the Saiva Siddhānta were familiar with the Advaita tradition and endorsed the viewpoints in their expositions.

### Annexure

For easy reference, a few important verses from the *Tirumandiram* are cited below:

தானென் றவனென் றிரண்டாகுந் தத்துவந்  
தானென் றவனென் றிரண்டுந் தனிற்கண்டு  
தானென்ற பூவை யவனடி சாத்தினால்  
நானென் றவனென்கை நல்லதொன்றன்றே. **1581**

ஒன்றெனக் கண்டெயும் ஈசன் ஒருவனை  
நன்றென் றடியனை நானவனைத் தொழ  
வென்றைம் புலனு மிகக்கிடந் தின்புற  
அன்றென்றருள் செய்யும் ஆதிப் பிரானே. **1744**

சீவன் எனச் சிவனென்ன வேறில்லை  
சீவனார் சீவனரை யறிகிலர்  
சீவனார் சீவனரை யறிந்தபின்  
சீவனார் சீவனயிட்டிங் கிருப்பாரே. **1979**

ஆகின்ற தொண்ணுள்ளே டாறும் பொதுஎன்பர்  
ஆகின்ற வாடு றருஞ்சைவர் தத்துவம்  
ஆகின்ற நாலேழ் வேதாந்தி வயிணவர்க்  
கூகின்ற நாலாறை யைந்துமாயா வாதிக்கே. **2139**

மரத்தை மறைத்தது மாமத யானே  
மரத்தில் மறைந்தது மாமத யானே  
பரத்தை மறைத்தது பார்முதல் பூதம்  
பரத்தில் மறைந்தது பார்முதல் பூதம். **2251**

முன்னைப் பிறவியில் செய்த முதுதவம்  
 பின்னையப் பிறவியில் பெற்றால் அறியலாம்  
 தன்னை அறிவது அறிவாம் அஃதன்றிப்  
 பின்னை அறிவது பேயறி வாகுமே. 2279

தன்னினில் தன்னை யறியுந் தலைமகள்  
 தன்னினில் தன்னை யறியத் தலைப்படுந்  
 தன்னினில் தன்னையும் சார்கில னுயிதில்  
 தன்னினில் தன்னையுஞ் சார்தற் கரியவே. 2310

ஓம்புகின் றுணுல கேழையும் உள்நின்று  
 கூம்புகின் றூர்குணத் தினனெடுங் கூறுவர்  
 தேம்புகின் றூர்சிவஞ் சிந்தைசெய் யாதவர்  
 கூம்பகில் னார்வந்து கொள்ளலு மாமே. 2312

ஆகிய வச்சோயந் தேவதத் தன்னிடத்  
 தாகியவை விட்டாற் காமம் உபாதானம்  
 ஏகிய தொந்தத் தசியென்ப மெய்யறி  
 வாகிய சீவன் பாசிவ னுமன்றே. 2454

காரியம் ஏழுங் காந்திடு மாயையுள்  
 காரணம் ஏழுங் காக்குங் கடுவேளி  
 காரிய காரண வாதனைப் பற்றறப்  
 பாரண வும்முப சாந்தப் பரிசிதே. 2467

விட்ட விலக்கனை தான்போம் வியோமத்துத்  
 தொட்டு விடாத துயசாந்தத் தேதொகும்  
 விட்டு விடாதது மேவுஞ்சத் தாதியிற்  
 சுட்டு மிலக்கனு தீதஞ் சொகுபமே. 2524



நீயது வானு யெனநின்ற பேருரை  
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சுத்தம் பிரம தூரியந்து தூரியத்துள்  
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தூரிய அதீதஞ் சொல்லறும் பாழாம்  
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பேதமில் அச்சிவம் எய்துந் தூரியமோ  
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## RELATION BETWEEN PURE CONSCIOUSNESS AND MIND

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J. Krishnan\*

The Advaitin is of the view that the soul is only a blend of pure consciousness and mind. We shall in this paper discuss the nature of the relation between pure consciousness and mind.

Śaṅkara in the introductory section of his *Brahma-sūtra-bhāṣya* (*Adhyāsa-bhāṣya*) states:

There cannot be any (*real*) relation between pure consciousness the *viśayin*, and mind-the *viśaya* which are opposed to each other like light and darkness; and so there is no possibility of transference of the qualities or features of the one upon the other. Yet, on account of *avidyā* which is indeterminable, the two are related to each other and hence there arises experiences and corresponding expressions such as "I am this", "This is mine."<sup>1</sup>

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The Advaitin makes a clear distinction between Brahman *as* pure consciousness or knowledge, and knowledge *of* Brahman. The former is the essential nature of the soul and is eternal, while the latter is only the reflection of pure consciousness in the modification of mind, of the form of Brahman. And, knowledge of objects too is only the reflection of pure consciousness which is conditioned by the respective objects, and which is reflected in the modification of mind of the form of objects. Knowledge, according to the Vaiśeṣikas, is the quality of the soul.

If we view knowledge as the quality of the soul – as the Vaiśeṣika thinks, or as the essential nature of the soul as the Advaitin holds, then in either case knowledge cannot manifest mind and other objects without being related to the latter. If it were held that knowledge could manifest objects without being related to them, then there would arise the unwelcome position of the manifestation of all objects which, however, is not the case.<sup>2</sup> Hence it must be admitted that knowledge manifests the objects only by being related to them. And a real relation can never be predicated of between knowledge and objects.

Vyāsatīrtha in his *Nyāyāmṛta* records the arguments of the Advaitin in favour of the view that there can be no real relation between knowledge and objects – *dr̥k* and *dr̥śya* in the section entitled *dr̥gd̥śyasambandhavicāra*. Madhusūdana Sarasvatī too in his *Advaitasiddhi* restates the arguments of the Advaitin as presented by Vyāsatīrtha with some elaboration. Later, in the section entitled *anukūla-tarkavicāra*, Vyāsatīrtha argues that there could be a real relation between cognition and object. Madhusūdana Sarasvatī critically examines Vyāsatīrtha's view and finally rejects his arguments.

We shall now set forth the views of the Advaitin in regard to the relation between knowledge and object – *dr̥k* and *dr̥śya* as recorded by Vyāsatīrtha in his *Nyāyāmṛta* and elaborated by Madhusūdana Sarasvatī in his *Advaitasiddhi*.

I. *Saṁyoga or Samavāya cannot be the relation between knowledge and object*

It might be held that there could be the relation of contact (*saṁyoga*) between knowledge and object, but it could not be. For, if knowledge were viewed as the quality of the soul, then being a quality it cannot be related to objects through the relation of *saṁyoga*, as the latter is admitted only between two substances. If it were held that knowledge is the essential nature of the soul or the reflection of pure consciousness in the modification of mind, then being supra-relational it cannot be related through the relation of contact with the objects. In the same way, there cannot be the relation of inherence (*samavāya*) between knowledge and mind as the relation of *samavāya* is admitted between five pairs of inseparables, viz., component-part and the composite-whole, quality and substance, motion and moving body, universal and the individual having it, and the speciality and the eternal substance having it. Knowledge – either as the quality of the soul, or of the nature of the soul, or as reflection of Consciousness in the modification of mind on the one hand and mind on the other – does not come under anyone of the five pairs and so the relation of *samavāya* between knowledge and mind is not possible.<sup>3</sup>

There must, however, be a relation between knowledge and object; otherwise, as has been said earlier, there would arise the unwelcome position of the manifestation of all objects by knowledge. And that relation could only be a false one (*ādhyāsikasambandha*) projected by *avidyā*.

## II. *Subject-Object relation cannot be had between knowledge and Object*

It might be said that there can be a real relation known as subject-object relation (*viṣayi-viṣaya-bhāva-sambandha*) between knowledge and mind. Knowledge comprehends the *viṣaya*. Hence it is the *viṣayin*. *Viṣaya* is mind as it is comprehended by knowledge and the relation between the two is one of *viṣayi-viṣaya-bhāva*.

The contention set forth in the previous paragraph is wrong on the ground that a relation in order to be so must be related to the relata. For example, in the case of a pot and a cloth which are related to each other through the relation of *samyoga*, the latter exists in the relata by pervading the pot and cloth. Here the state of being a *viṣayi* (*viṣayitva*) exists only in knowledge and not in mind. And the state of being a *viṣaya* (*viṣayatva*) exists only in mind and not in knowledge. Thus since *viṣayitva* and *viṣayatva* do not exist in the relata pervading the latter, *viṣaya-viṣayi-bhāva* cannot be treated as a relation at all.<sup>4</sup>

## III. *Viṣayatva cannot be the relation between knowledge and object*

Further when it is admitted that there is a relation of *viṣaya-viṣayi-bhāva* between object and knowledge, it implies that knowledge is related to the object through the relation known as *viṣayatva* that exists in the object. The concept of *viṣayatva*, however, cannot satisfactorily be explained.

### *First Definition of Viṣayatva*

It might be said that pot (say) is the locus of the fruit that results from knowledge which arises from the contact of sense-organ with the object. And the state of being the locus

of such a fruit is known as *viṣayatva*. Pot is the locus of *viṣayatva* and hence it is a *viṣaya*, an object.

To explain: according to the Bhāṭṭa school, when there arises sense-contact with pot (say), there arises the knowledge of pot which gives rise to *prākāṭya* or *jñātatā* or manifestedness, in the pot. It is, on the basis of manifestedness, one infers the existence of the knowledge of pot. The point that is of importance here is that *jñātatā* is the result of knowledge. It exists in pot. Pot is, therefore, the *viṣaya*. The state of being the locus of *jñātatā* or *prākāṭya* which is the fruit, which results from knowledge and which exists in the pot constitutes what is known as *viṣayatva*.<sup>5</sup>

The definition of *viṣayatva* explained above cannot hold good. Brahmānanda in the *Laghucandrikā* points out that never indeed have we noticed the fruit of knowledge to be something other than the removal of ignorance.<sup>6</sup> Further prior to the rise of *jñātatā* in the object, the existence of the object is essential. In the case of objects which have ceased to exist long back or which will come into existence at a future date, there arises knowledge but that knowledge cannot be admitted to be giving rise to *jñātatā* in the object concerned. For, the object does not exist at the time of the rise of knowledge. Hence it cannot be said that *viṣayatva* is the state of being the locus of the fruit arising from knowledge.<sup>7</sup>

### *Second Definition of Viṣayatva*

*Viṣayatva* may be defined in a different manner as follows: from the knowledge of a serpent, there arises yet another knowledge that serpent must be avoided. Here the serpent is the content of the knowledge that it must be avoided – the knowledge that has arisen from the knowledge "This is a serpent." In the serpent, the state of being the

content of the knowledge that it must be avoided – the knowledge which has arisen from the knowledge, "This is a serpent" exists. And it is this state that exists in the serpent that is known as *viṣayatva*. And the serpent is the *viṣaya*.<sup>8</sup>

The above definition of *viṣayatva* too is wrong as its application would result in admitting that space is not *viṣaya*. It is thus: there arises the knowledge of the form, "This is space." And this knowledge cannot lead to yet another knowledge that the space must be avoided or retained. It is because space being all-pervasive, the question of avoidance or retention is not applicable in its case. Hence the characteristic of being the content of the knowledge that it must be avoided or retained cannot be had in the case of space. The result of the argument is that space cannot be viewed as a *viṣaya* which, however, is not the case.<sup>9</sup>

Further, the perceptual cognition of a serpent merely reveals the form of a serpent. Then he who has ascertained in the case of another serpent earlier that a serpent is the cause of unwelcome result has the inferential cognition that the serpent in front like the one noticed earlier is the means of welcome result. Then there arises the knowledge that it must be avoided. Thus the knowledge that a serpent is to be avoided arises only from the inferential knowledge that a serpent is the means to unwelcome result and not from the perceptual knowledge of a serpent. So the definition is totally inapplicable in the case of well-known object, namely, serpent.

### *Third Definition of Viṣayatva*

According to this definition of *viṣayatva*, that which is the *karma-kāraka* of knowledge is an object. *Kāraka* is a productive factor. The knowledge of the form "This is pot" depends for its rise upon the existence of pot. In other words, pot too, among other factors is responsible for the rise of its



knowledge. It is its productive factor and is technically known as *karma-kāraka*. To be the *karma-kāraka* of knowledge is to be the object of knowledge. And *viśayatva* is only the state of being the *karma-kāraka* of knowledge.<sup>10</sup>

This definition of *viśayatva* is wrong on the ground that it is not applicable in the genuine case of the knowledge which God has. The latter is eternal and so there is no question of its being originated by any productive factor. In the same way, in the case of the knowledge referring to pot which has ceased to exist now or which would come into existence at a future date the factor – pot does not exist at the time of its knowledge. Hence it cannot be viewed as the productive factor of knowledge. If it is maintained that a knowledge is so only when it depends for its rise upon pot, etc., then God's knowledge and the knowledge referring to pot which does not exist now cannot be viewed as knowledge at all. It comes to this: the definition that that which is the *karma-kāraka* of knowledge is the object or *viśaya* of that knowledge and the state of being a *viśaya* exists in the object does not hold good.<sup>11</sup>

#### *Fourth Definition of Viśayatva*

An object is that whose knowledge leads to verbal expression in regard to it. For example, the knowledge of pot leads to the verbal expression "This is a pot" and so pot is the object or *visaya*. *Viśayatva* exists in it; and, it serves as the relation of knowledge to the object.

The above definition too is wrong. It is because the knowledge of pot which a dumb person has does not lead to verbal expression of the form "This is a pot." Thus there would arise the unwelcome position of viewing the pot which is an object as not an object of knowledge.

The above difficulty could be overcome by amending the definition of object thus: an object is that whose knowledge has the *fitness* to give rise to verbal expression. The knowledge of pot which a dumb person has does not give rise to verbal expression; but it definitely has the *fitness* to give rise to verbal expression.<sup>12</sup>

At this stage the concept of *fitness* requires an explanation. Stick, for example, is considered to be an efficient cause of pot. But not all sticks constitute the cause. For example, the stick in a tree does not serve as the cause of a pot. But it does have the *fitness* to serve as the cause of pot. It is thus: when it is said that stick is the cause of pot it must not be understood that stick is the cause under the aspect of its being a *dravya*. If it were considered to be so, then a thread too, on the ground of its being a *dravya* must be viewed as the cause of pot. To get over this difficulty, a stick must be viewed as the cause of pot under the aspect of its being the substratum of stickness (*daṇḍatva*). Thread cannot be viewed as the cause of pot as it does not possess stickness. In other words, stick is viewed as the cause of pot not as a *dravya* but as one possessing the features of stickness. The latter is known as *kāranatāvacchedaka-dharma*. That is, stick is the cause (*kāraṇa*).

The state of being the cause (*kāraṇata*) exists in the stick. The factor that determines the stick possessing the characteristic of being the cause of pot is stickness (*daṇḍatva*). It is this feature which is the *kāranatāvacchedakadharmā* that is known as fitness. This exists in the stick in a tree too. Since the stick in a tree has the fitness, that is, the feature – stickness, it too is viewed as the cause of pot. This is one form of *fitness*.

Another form of *fitness* is: a stick in a tree does not give rise to pot because of the absence of other factors such as potter, lump of clay, etc., that constitute the causal aggregate. It is association with the absence of the effect—pot in the present case, the absence caused by the absence of other factors that form the causal aggregate that constitutes *fitness* of the stick in a tree. In other words, if the other factors of the causal aggregate are present, then the stick in a tree would definitely give rise to the effect, namely, pot. These two forms of fitness are present in the stick found on a tree.

The knowledge of pot which a dumb person has cannot be viewed as the cause of verbal expression of the form "This is a pot," as it does not possess *fitness* in either of the two forms described above. In the first place, we cannot identify fitness or *kāraṇatavacchedaka-dharma* in a knowledge of pot which a dumb person has. It is because in order to identify the fitness of the *kāraṇatavacchedaka-dharma* in a knowledge of pot which a dumb person has, it is necessary to hold that the knowledge of pot is the cause of verbal expression in the case of persons who have the ability to speak. The state of being the cause of verbal expression exists in the knowledge of pot. The feature—that determines that the knowledge of pot has the state of being the cause of verbal expression— is the characteristic of having pot as the object (*ghaṭa-viṣayakatva*). This is the *kāraṇatāvachchedaka-dharma*). But this feature cannot be identified as it involves reference to the feature of *viṣayatva* which cannot be ascertained without the knowledge of the relation between knowledge and pot. And it is precisely this relation that we are discussing.

It may be said that the knowledge of pot which a dumb person has is the cause of verbal expression as it has

the *fitness*, namely, non-production of the effect because of the absence of other factor, namely, the ability to speak. But this too is not sound. It is because stick in a tree, for example, is known to have the *fitness* of the form of the non-production of the effect in the absence of the other causes only when it is ascertained that it has the *kāraṇatā-avacchedaka-dharma*. In the same way, in order to ascertain that the knowledge of pot which a dumb person has the *fitness* of the form of non-production of the effect in the absence of other causes such as ability to speak, etc., what is required is the knowledge that the knowledge of pot which a dumb person has, has the *kāraṇatāvacchedaka-dharma*. The latter, as stated earlier, is the state of having pot as the object (*ghaṭa-viṣayatva*) and this feature involves reference to the feature of *viṣayatva* which cannot be known without the knowledge of the relation between knowledge and pot – the relation which we are discussing.<sup>13</sup>

To sum up: an object cannot be defined as that whose knowledge has the fitness to give rise to verbal expression. Hence *viṣayatva* or the state of being an object also cannot be determined. The result of this argument is that it cannot be said that knowledge exists through the relation of *viṣayatva* in the object.

#### *Fifth definition of Viṣayatva*

According to this definition of *viṣayatva*, an object is that whose knowledge arises because of its coming into contact with an instrument of knowledge.<sup>14</sup> This definition fits in well in the case of pot. It is thus: by the contact of the instrument of knowledge, namely, the sense of sight with pot, there arises the knowledge of pot. And pot is the object of that knowledge. The state of being an object (*viṣayatva*)

exists in the pot. And it may be said that knowledge is related to pot through the relation of *viṣayatva* that exists in the pot.

But this definition too is wrong. According to the present definition, an object could be identified as such only on the basis of its knowledge that arises from the contact of the instrument of knowledge with it. In that case, the objects of the world manifested in the knowledge of God could be identified as objects only if the knowledge of God arises from the contact of the instruments of knowledge with the objects. But God's knowledge of the objects of the world is eternal, and hence there is no question of its being caused by the contact of the instruments of knowledge with the objects. The result of this argument is that since God's knowledge is not caused by the contact of any instrument of knowledge with the objects it may have to be treated as devoid of any object whatsoever which, however, is not the case.<sup>15</sup>

It comes to this: an object cannot be defined as that whose knowledge arises because of its coming into contact with the instrument of knowledge. So *viṣayatva* or the state of being an object cannot satisfactorily be explained. One, therefore, cannot consider a knowledge as being related to the object through the relation known as *viṣayatva*.

#### *Sixth Definition of Viṣayatva*

An object may be defined as that which is manifested or revealed in a knowledge. Pot, for example, is manifested in the knowledge "This is a pot" and hence it is a *viṣaya*. And the state of being a *viṣaya* exists in it. The knowledge is related to it through the relation of *viṣayatva*.<sup>16</sup> This definition is framed by Śālikanātha in his *Prakaraṇapañcikā*.<sup>17</sup>

This definition too is not correct. It is because the concept of manifestation is nothing but the state of being an object of knowledge (*viṣayatva*). Thus the definition of *viṣaya*

involves within itself reference to *viṣayatva*, and hence there is the defect of self-dependence (*ātmāśraya*).

### *Seventh Definition of Viṣayatva*

An object may be defined as that which is the limiting condition of its knowledge. The knowledge of pot is contingent on the pot in the sense that it is incapable of existence apart from the pot. In this sense, the knowledge of pot is limited or qualified by pot. Pot thus is the limiting condition of knowledge, and so it is the object of knowledge (*viṣaya*). And the state of being an object (*viṣayatva*) exists in it. Knowledge is related to pot through the relation known as *viṣayatva*.

This definition is wrong. For the notion of knowledge will never be complete unless it refers to an object it characterizes, and the person in whom it is present. The former is *jñeya* while the latter is *jñātā*. This is evident from verbal usages such as "The knowledge which Yajñadatta has," "The knowledge of pot," and the like. Therefore, the knowledge of pot is contingent upon two factors — the *jñeya* and the *jñātā*. And as such the latter two are the limiting conditions of knowledge. According to the present definition, an object is that which is the limiting condition of knowledge. Just as pot is viewed as the object on the ground of its being the limiting condition of knowledge, in the same way, the *jñātā* or the knower too should be viewed as the object of knowledge on the ground that he too is the limiting condition of knowledge. Hence the present definition of an object is over-applicable in the case of the knower of object. The defect of *ativyāpti* is clear.

To overcome this defect it may be said that an object is that which is the limiting condition of knowledge without depending upon the relation of *samavāya*. In the case of the

knowledge of pot, the knower is no doubt the limiting condition of knowledge; but he is so only through the relation of *samavāya*. According to the Vaiśeṣika school, there is the relation of *samavāya* between the soul which is a substance and knowledge which is a quality. Hence the knower does not come under the purview of the definition of an object. Pot, on the other hand, is the limiting condition of knowledge by not depending upon the relation of *samavāya*, and so it comes under the purview of the definition of an object. Now the definition of an object is: that which serves as the limiting condition of knowledge by not depending upon the relation of *samavāya*.<sup>19</sup>

It might be argued that the above definition is associated with the defect of *ativyāpti* (over-application). It is thus: one has the cognitions such as "The knowledge of colour is present in me through the relation of inherence" (*matsamavetaṁ rūpajñānam*), "The knowledge of colour is desirable to me" (*rūpajñānam-iṣṭam*), "The knowledge of colour is destroyed" (*rūpajñānaṁ dhvastam*), and the like.

According to the present definition, an object is that which serves as the limiting condition of knowledge by not depending upon the relation of inherence. In the cases cited above, the relation of inherence, desire and annihilation serve as the limiting factors of the knowledge of colour without depending upon the relation of inherence and hence they too are to be admitted as the objects of the knowledge of colour.<sup>20</sup> Thus the definition of *viśayatva* becomes applicable in the cases of relation of inherence etc., which, however, are not the objects of knowledge of colour.

Madhusūdana Sarasvatī states that the above defect of *ativyāpti* may be overcome by amending the definition as follows:

An object is that –

1. which serves as the limiting condition of its knowledge by not depending upon the relation of *samavāya*; and,
2. which is not conditioned by that knowledge.<sup>21</sup>

Now the relation of inherence, desire and annihilation in the cognitions "The knowledge of colour exists in me through the relation of inherence" etc., are no doubt the limiting conditions of the knowledge of colour by not depending upon the relation of inherence; but being relative factors they cannot be determined apart from their references to the knowledge of colour. It is thus: inherence being a relative factor must naturally be referred to by the relatum which, in the present case, is the knowledge of colour. In this sense inherence is conditioned by the knowledge of colour. In the same way, desire could be understood only in relation to what is desired which, in the present case, is the knowledge of colour. Hence, desire is conditioned by the knowledge of colour. Annihilation too could be understood only with reference to its counter-positive (*pratiyogī*) which, in the present case, is the knowledge of colour. Hence annihilation too is limited by the knowledge of colour.

According to the present definition, an object is that which is the limiting condition of knowledge without depending upon the relation of inherence and which is not limited by that knowledge. When viewed in this light, since the relation of inherence, desire and annihilation in the cognitions "The knowledge of colour exists in me through the relation of inherence," "The knowledge of colour is desirable to me" and "The knowledge of colour is destroyed" are limited by their respective cognitions, they cannot be viewed as objects of their respective cognitions.<sup>22</sup>



Pot, however, can be considered as the object of knowledge "This is a pot" when viewed in the light of the present definition. It is thus: pot is the limiting condition of the knowledge "This is a pot". A knowledge is comprehended only in relation to some object. But an object when comprehended is comprehended quite independently without any reference to knowledge. Hence an object by nature is not conditioned by knowledge, while knowledge by nature is conditioned by object. In this sense pot serves as the limiting condition of knowledge. At the same time, it is not conditioned by knowledge. Hence it is viewed as the object of knowledge of pot. The state of being a *visaya* (*viṣayatva*) exists in it. And knowledge is related to it through the relation of *viṣayatva*.<sup>23</sup>

Madhusūdana Sarasvatī feels that even the above definition in its amended form is wrong on the following grounds: the knowledge of the form "The knowledge of colour exists in me through the relation of inherence" has for its object the knowledge of colour as well as the relation of inherence present in the soul. The present definition has precluded the possibility of viewing the relation of inherence as the object of the knowledge of colour by involving reference to the feature that that which is not conditioned by the knowledge alone could be viewed as an object. The relation of inherence is present in the knowledge of colour which is its relatum; and, hence it could be understood only in relation to the latter. As such, it is conditioned by the knowledge of colour and it could not be viewed as the object of the knowledge of colour. In this process, the definition has precluded the possibility of viewing the relation of inherence as object of knowledge of the form "The knowledge of colour exists in me through the relation of inherence". This knowledge involves reference to the knowledge of colour and also to the relation of inherence. The relation of inherence being a rela-

tive factor is to be understood only in relation to its relatum, namely, the knowledge of the form "The knowledge of colour exists in me through the relation of inherence." In this sense, it is delimited by the knowledge. According to the present definition, however, a factor can be viewed to be an object only when it is not conditioned by its knowledge. Hence the relation of inherence which actually is in the object of knowledge, "The knowledge of colour exists in me through the relation of inherence" cannot be viewed to be an object and hence the definition is associated with the defect of *avyāpti*.<sup>24</sup>

Further, this definition suffers from the defect of *asambhava* or total inapplicability too. It is thus: just as pot serves as the limiting condition of the knowledge of the form "This is a pot," in the same way, knowledge too serves as the limiting condition of pot in the knowledge "The pot is known to me." Thus pot too is limited by knowledge. According to the present definition a feature can be viewed to be an object only when it is not conditioned by its knowledge and when it serves as the limiting condition of its knowledge. Here in the case of the knowledge "The pot is known to me," pot neither serves as the limiting condition of the knowledge "This is a pot," nor does it remain unconditioned by that knowledge. Thus the entire definition will not be applicable in any of the genuine cases which are well-known to be object. As such the definition of object does not hold good.<sup>25</sup>

To sum up: the definition of an object as that which limits its knowledge and which is not conditioned by that knowledge has been proved to be unsatisfactory. Hence the contention that *viṣayatva* exists in such an object and it serves as a relation of knowledge to the object does not hold good.

*Eighth Definition of Viṣayatva*

Madhusūdana Sarasvatī refers to the definition of *viṣayatva* as given by Udayana in his *Ātmatattvaviveka*. The definition is as follows: *sa ca prakāśasya sataḥ tadīyatā-mātrarūpaḥ svabhāvaviśeṣaḥ*.<sup>26</sup> Brahmānanda in his *Laghucandrikā* explains the significance of this definition as follows:

*yadīyaṃ yajjñānaṃ tat tasya viṣayatā*.<sup>27</sup>

Madhusūdana Sarasvatī points out that this definition in the ultimate analysis would come to this: the relation of a thing to its knowledge is *viṣayatva*. It is precisely the relation between a thing and its knowledge that is the subject of our discussion. Thus the definition of *viṣayatva* involves reference to *viṣayatva* itself and hence there is the fallacy of self-dependence.<sup>28</sup>

*Ninth Definition of Viṣayatva*

Yet another definition of *viṣayatva* is discussed by Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, namely, *jñānakaraṇasannikarṣa-samānādhikaraṇaḥ jñānāvachhedakatva-sākṣādvyaṅgya-dharmo viṣayatvam*.<sup>29</sup> It means: *viṣayatva* is that (1) which exists in one of the relata between the sense-organ and pot (say); and (2) which is less-pervasive than the feature, namely, the characteristic of being the limiting condition of knowledge. And the locus of *viṣayatva* is *viṣaya*. When viewed in the light of this definition in the case of the knowledge of pot, it is potness that constitutes the *viṣayatva*. It is thus: the relation between the sense-organ and pot (say), being a relation, exists in the sense-organ and also in pot. In pot which is a relatum, potness exists. Thus the first criterion, namely, that which exists in one of the relata of the relation between the sense-organ and pot, is present in pot-

ness. The second criterion is also present in potness. Pot is the limiting condition of the knowledge of pot. It is *jñānāvacchedaka*. The characteristic of being the limiting condition of the knowledge of pot (*jñānāvacchedakatā*) exists in pot. The factor that is less-pervasive than this characteristic is potness. This is evident from the invariable relation of the form." Where in there is potness there is the characteristic of being the limiting condition of the knowledge of pot." Potness exists in pot. And in it the characteristic of being the limiting condition of the knowledge of pot exists. Thus potness constitute the *viśayatva*. It exists in pot. And, pot, therefore, is *viśaya*.

Madhusūdana Sarasvatī argues that *viśayatva* as defined now, can be reduced to the feature, namely, *vastutva* or the state of being a category.<sup>30</sup> It is thus: *vastutva* is present in the relatum of the relation between a sense-organ and a factor – pot (say) – the relation which is the instrument of the perceptual knowledge of pot. Hence it is *jñāna-karaṇa-sannikarṣa-samānādhikaraṇa*. Further it is less pervasive than the factor, namely, the state of being the limiting condition of the knowledge of pot. This is evident from the invariable relation of the form, "Wherever there is the state of being a category (*vastutva*), there is the state of being the limiting condition of knowledge." The state of being a category (*vastutva*) exists in pot. We have already pointed out that pot is the limiting condition of its knowledge, and so in it there exists the characteristic of being the limiting condition of knowledge. Thus if *viśayatva* is defined in the above manner, then it is nothing but *vastutva* and *vastutva* exists in every object. If *vastutva*, that is *viśayatva* is admitted to be a relation between knowledge and a thing, then since *vastutva* exists in every factor, any factor may be view-

ed as an object of any knowledge.<sup>31</sup> Hence this definition of *viśayatva* also does not hold good.

To sum up the whole discussion: there cannot be the relation of contact or inherence between knowledge and object. Nor can there be the subject-object relation between the two. There cannot be the relation of *viśayatva* between knowledge and pot as the concept of *viśayatva* cannot be explained satisfactorily. There must, however, be a relation between knowledge and object, as otherwise there would arise the contingency of the manifestation of all objects. And that relation could only be an indeterminable or a false one. In the language of Advaita, it is *ādhyāsika-sambandha*.

### NOTES

1 युक्तस्वरूपयोगो विषयविषयाः तमः प्रकाशवद्विषय-

स्वभावोतिरोभावानुपपत्तिर्हि तद्विषयातिरोभावात्

इतिरोभावोत्पत्तिरित्यत्रोत्पत्तिरित्यत्रोत्पत्तिरिति विद्वान्

प्रत्यक्षयोगोत्पत्तिरिति विषयत्वं तद्विषयातिरोभावात्

विषयत्वोत्पत्तिरिति विषयत्वं तद्विषयातिरोभावात्

तद्विषयातिरोभावोत्पत्तिरिति विषयत्वं तद्विषयातिरोभावात्

विषयत्वोत्पत्तिरिति विषयत्वं तद्विषयातिरोभावात्

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तद्विषयातिरोभावोत्पत्तिरिति विषयत्वं तद्विषयातिरोभावात्

विषयत्वोत्पत्तिरिति विषयत्वं तद्विषयातिरोभावात्

तद्विषयातिरोभावोत्पत्तिरिति विषयत्वं तद्विषयातिरोभावात्

विषयत्वोत्पत्तिरिति विषयत्वं तद्विषयातिरोभावात्

2 न तावदातं तदसंबद्धं (द्रव्यासंबद्धं) प्रकाशकमति प्रसङ्गात्।  
*Nyāyāmīta*, p. 295 (vide Madhusūdana Sarasvatī's *Advaita-*  
*siddhi*, ed. by Swami Yogīndrananda, in two volumes with  
the *Nyāyāmīta* of Vyāsatīrtha, Śāddarsāna Prakāśana  
Pratiśāhanam, Benares, 1977).

*bhāṣya* (*Ādhyāsa-bhāṣya*).

उत्पत्तिः। Introductory section of Śāhīkara's *Brahmasūtra-*

- 3 नापि सम्बद्धकमात्मगुणस्य ज्ञानस्य ज्ञेयेन संयोगसमवा-  
ययोरयोगात् । *ibid.*, pp. 295-96.
- 4 विषयविषयिभावस्यचाद्विष्टत्वेनासम्बद्धत्वात् । *ibid.*, p. 296.  
*Vide*: न च विषयविषयिभावः सः, तस्य विषयत्वविषयित्वरूपस्य  
एकैकमात्रनिष्ठत्वेनद्विष्टसम्बन्धात्मकत्वासम्भवात् । *Advaitasiddhi*,  
p. 296.
- 5 विषयत्वं किं ज्ञानजन्यफलाधारत्वम् । *Nyāyāmṛta*, p. 296.
- 6 अज्ञानस्य प्रामाणिकत्वेन तन्निवृत्तेरेव ज्ञानफलत्वसम्भवेन ज्ञातता  
न स्वीक्रियते । *Brahmānanda's Laghucandrikā*, p. 254, ed. by  
Anantakrishna Sastri, Parimal Publications, Delhi, 1982.
- 7 फलं न तावज्ज्ञाततानङ्गीकारात् अतीतादावसम्भवाच्च ।  
*Nyāyāmṛta*, p. 296.
- 8 (विषयत्वं) ज्ञानजन्यहानादिबुद्धिगोचरत्वं वा । *ibid.*
- 9 नापि हानादिः, गगनादौ तदयोगात् । *ibid.*
- 10 ज्ञानकर्मत्वं वा (विषयत्वम्) । *ibid.* See *Advaitasiddhi*, p.296.
- 11 ईश्वरज्ञानस्य अतीतादिज्ञानस्य च कर्मकारकाजन्यत्वात् ।  
*Nyāyāmṛta*, p. 297.
- 12 ज्ञानजन्यव्यवहारयोग्यत्वं वा (विषयत्वम्) । *Nyāyāmṛta*, p.  
296.
- 13 अवच्छेदकरूपापरिचये योग्यताया एव ग्रहीतुमश-क्यत्वात् ।  
न च ज्ञानविषयत्वं तदवच्छेदकमात्माश्रयात् । *Advaitasiddhi*, p.  
298. *Vide*: ननु यज्ज्ञानं यदभिलषणरूप-व्यवहारकारणं सः तस्य  
विषयः । करणपाटवाद्यभावेन...अवच्छेदकत्वस्य फलनिर्णे-  
यत्वात् । *ibid.* pp. 299-300. *Vide also*: व्यवहारयोग्यत्वं न

व्यवहाररूपफलोपहितत्वं, कुत्रचित् प्रतिरुद्धे व्यवहारेऽव्याप्तेः ।  
नापि तत्स्वरूपयोग्यत्वं विषयत्वादन्यस्य तस्यासम्भवात् । *ibid.*  
p. 301.

14 यत्सन्निकृष्टकरणेन यज्ज्ञानमुत्पद्यते स तस्य विषयः ।  
*Nyāyāmṛta*, p. 296.

15 नित्येश्वरज्ञानस्य निर्विषयत्वपातात् । *Nyāyāmṛta*, p. 298. *Vide:*  
नित्येश्वरज्ञानस्य निर्विषयत्वप्रसङ्गात् । *Advaitasiddhi*, p. 298.

16 यस्यां संविदि योऽर्थोऽवभासते स तस्या विषयः ।  
*Nyāyāmṛta*, p. 298.

17 *Prakaraṇapañcikā:*

अत्र ब्रूमः स एवार्थः यस्यां संविदि भासते ।

वेद्यः स एव नान्यद्वि विद्याद्वेद्यस्य लक्षणम् ॥

18 भासमानताया एवाद्याप्यनिरूपणात् । *Nyāyāmṛta*, p. 298.  
*Vide:* भासमानत्वस्य विषयताघटितत्वेनात्माश्रयात् ॥ *Advaita-*  
*siddhi*, p. 298.

19 सम्बन्धान्तरमन्तरेण यो यज्ज्ञानावच्छेदकः स तस्य विषयः ।  
*Nyāyāmṛta*, p. 298. See also: सम्बन्धान्तरमन्तरा ज्ञानावच्छेद-  
कत्वं वा (विषयत्वम्) । *Advaitasiddhi*, p. 298.


20 यत्समवेतं रूपज्ञानमित्यत्र रूपज्ञानात्मसमवायस्य सम्बन्धान्तरं  
विनैव रूपज्ञानावच्छेदकस्य तद्विषयत्वापातात् । *Nyāyāmṛta*,  
pp. 298-99.

21 यः सम्बन्धान्तरमनपेक्ष्य यज्ज्ञानावच्छेदको यज्ज्ञानानव-  
च्छिन्नस्वभावश्च स तस्य विषयः । *ibid*, pp. 301-302.

- 22 यद्यपि च रूपज्ञानं मत्समवेतं ध्वस्तमिष्टमित्यादौ सम्बन्धेच्छादीनां सम्बन्धीष्यमाणाद्यवच्छिन्नस्वभावत्वादिति नातिव्याप्तिः। *ibid.* p. 302.
- 23 ज्ञानविषयस्तु न ज्ञानावच्छिन्नस्वभावः, ज्ञानस्य घटाद्यवच्छिन्नस्वभावत्ववत् घटादेः ज्ञानावच्छिन्नस्वभावत्वादर्शनात्। *Advaitasiddhi*, pp. 302-303.
- 24 मत्समवेतं रूपज्ञानमित्याकारकज्ञानस्य आत्मसमवायविषयकत्वभावप्रसङ्गात्। आत्मसमवायस्य सम्बन्धत्वेन सम्बन्धिभूतस्वज्ञानावच्छिन्नत्वात्। *ibid.* p. 303.
- 25 घटस्य ज्ञानमिति प्रतीत्या घटावच्छिन्नस्वभावत्वं यथा ज्ञानस्य तथा ज्ञातो घट इति प्रतीत्या घटस्यापि ज्ञानावच्छिन्नस्वभावत्वेन असम्भवान्च। *ibid.*
- 26 स च प्रकाशस्य सतः तदीयतामात्ररूपः स्वभावविशेषः। *Ātmataṭtvaviveka*, p. 508.
- 27 यदीयं यज्ज्ञानं तत् तस्य विषयता। *Laghucandrikā*, p. 456
- 28 यदीयस्वभावमिति तद्धितस्य यद्विषयकत्वार्थकत्वे आत्माश्रयात् अर्थान्तरस्य च निरूपयितुमशक्यत्वात्। *Advaitasiddhi*, p. 304.
- 29 ज्ञानकरणसन्निकर्षसमानाधिकरणो ज्ञानावच्छेदकत्वसाक्षाद्दुष्याप्यधर्मो विषयत्वम्। *ibid.* p. 305.
- 30 वस्तुत्वादिकमेव विषयत्वमित्यापत्तेः। *ibid.*
- 31 तथा च अस्य ज्ञानस्य अयमेव विषयः नान्य इति व्यवहारो न स्यात्। *Laghucandrikā*, p. 457.







## ABOUT THE PUBLISHERS

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(4) to undertake research for the purposes of establishing norms necessary for realising the divinity in man through moral, spiritual and cultural infrastructure.

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संसाराध्वनि तापभानुकिरणप्रोद्धूतदाहव्यथा-

खिन्नानां जलकाङ्क्षया मरुभुवि भ्रान्त्या परिभ्राम्यताम् ।  
अत्यासन्नसुधाम्बुधिं सुखकरं ब्रह्माद्वयं दर्शय-  
न्त्येषा शङ्करभारती विजयते निर्वाणसन्दायिनी ॥

*samsārādhvani tāpabhānukiraṇaprodhūtadāhavyathā-  
khinnānāṃ jalakāṅkṣayā marubhuvi bhrāntyā  
paribhrāmyatām  
atyāsannasudhāmbudhiṃ sukhakaram brahmādvayaṃ  
darśayant-  
yeṣā śaṅkarabhārati vijayate nirvāṇasandāyini.*

To those who are afflicted, in the way of the world, by the burning pain given rise to by the scorching sun-shafts of misery, and who through delusion wander about in the desert (of worldliness) seeking water — showing the felicitous ocean of nectar, which is very near, the non-dual *Brahman*, this — the Voice of Śaṅkara — is victorious, leading, as it does, to liberation.