

The VOICE of **ŚĀṆKARA** śaṅkara-bhārati



Editor :
R. Balasubramanian

**ṛṣā śaṅkara-bhāratī vijayata
nirvāṇa-saṁdāyini**

**victorious is the voice of śaṅkara,
leading, as it does, to liberation.**

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Śaṅkara-bhāratī

Editor

R. Balasubramanian

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1
HOMAGE TO ŚAṄKARA

[183]

श्रीगुरुं भगवत्पादं शरण्यं भक्तवत्सलम् ।
शिवं शिवकरं शुद्धमप्रमेयं नमाम्यहम् ॥

*śrīgurum-bhagavattpādam
śaraṇyam-bhaktavatsalam
śivam śivakaram śuddham-
aprameyam namāmyaham.*

I salute the revered preceptor—the Bhagavatpāda who protects those who resort to him, who is compassionate towards his devotees, who is auspiciousness and who confers auspiciousness, who is pure and who is incomprehensible.

Gurvaṣṭakam

[184]

यस्येदं सकलामलेन्दुकिरणप्रख्यैर्यशोरश्मिभि-
 ०र्याप्तं यश्च कृपालुतापरवशश्चक्रे हितं दुःखिनाम् ।
 यद्वाणीकुलिशावरुणमतयः पेतुर्दिशस्तार्किकाः
 भक्त्या पूज्यतमं प्रणम्य तमहं तद्भाष्यनीतौ यते ॥

*yasyedaṁ sakalāmalendu-kiraṇa-prakhyair-yaśoraśmibhiḥ
 vyāptam yaśca kṛpālutaaparavaśaśchakre hitam duḥkhinām
 yadvāṇīkulisāvaruṇamatayaḥ peturdiśas-tārkikāḥ
 bhaktyā pūjyatamam praṇamya tamahaṁ tad-bhāṣyanītau yate.*

Saluting with devotion the most revered teacher by whose rays of glory, similar to those of the impeccable full moon, this world is pervaded, who by his grace has done good to the afflicted caught up in bondage, by whose utterance, similar to the thunder-bolt, the Logicians (and others) being struck ran to different directions, I endeavour to write this explanation on his *Bhāṣya* (on the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad*).

Sureśvara's *Taittirīyopaniṣad-bhāṣya-vārtika*

Liberation through Knowledge*

Now let us begin with the knowledge of Brahman with a view to avoid the causes which lead to the performance of karma. Desire must be the source of karma, because it generates action. Those whose desires have been fulfilled have no inclination to action, because they are established in their own Self as a result of the absences of desire; and all desires get fulfilled in the case of those who are devoted to the Self. It must be borne in mind in this connection that the Self, indeed, is Brahman, and the knower of Brahman attains the Highest. So, continuance in one's own Self, as a result of the removal of ignorance, is the same as the attainment of the Highest. This idea is supported by such śruti texts as "When one is fearlessly established in Brahman," "He attains this Self of the nature of bliss," and so on.

Objection: Should we not say that liberation consists in remaining in one's own Self without any special effort for attaining it; that is to say, liberation takes place as a result of (1) the

* From Śaṅkara's commentary on the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad*, 1.1: free rendering of the text by R. Balasubramanian

non-performance of optional and prohibited deeds, (2) the exhaustion through enjoyment of the results of deeds that have commenced, and (3) the absence of sin owing to the performance of obligatory deeds. Or, one may even argue that liberation results from the activities themselves, since karmas produce that unsurpassable happiness, which is called heaven.

Reply: This is untenable, because karmas are many, and so there is the possibility that there are actions done in many previous births and bearing fruits in this life, or remaining in abeyance—which have opposite results. Accordingly, those actions which have not begun to bear fruits in this life cannot be exhausted through enjoyment in this single birth; it means that a fresh body shall be created as a result of the residual fruits of action. There are hundreds of śruti and smṛti texts such as "Those who performed good deeds here will attain good births," "Owing to the residual results, the jīva gets its future birth," etc. which speak about the existence of residual fruits of work.

Objection: The obligatory duties, one may argue, will consume all the good and bad fruits of actions, which are still inoperative.

Reply: This objection does not hold good, because it is stated that the non-performance of obligatory duties results in *pratyavāya*. The word "*pratyavāya*" means evil consequences. It is admitted that the performance of obligatory duties is for the purpose of avoiding evil consequences in the form of future sorrow; it follows that the performance of obligatory duties is not for the purpose of destroying actions that have not begun to bear fruit. Let us grant for the sake of argument that the obligatory duties are capable of removing the actions which are yet inoperative; even then, it is only the impure ones which they can remove,

and not the pure ones; for, there is no contradiction between the pure actions and obligatory duties; that is to say, actions which produce desirable results are pure by nature, and so they cannot be logically opposed to obligatory duties. The pure and the impure alone can be opposed to each other.

Further, desires are the springs of action; and they will not cease unless there is liberation. And so, there is no possibility of the removal of actions as a whole by the performance of obligatory duties. It is admitted that the object of desire is something other than the Self. The reason for this is that, since the Self is ever-realized, it cannot be an object of desire; and the Self, we have already stated, is the supreme Brahman. There is yet another point to be considered in this connection. The non-performance of obligatory duties is something negative (*abāva*); and it is impossible for an evil consequence to arise from something which is negative. So we have to hold the view that the non-performance of obligatory duties is a pointer to the fruition of the evil consequences flowing from the sins accumulated in the past. It follows that the use of the suffix *śatṛ* (-ing) is not unreasonable in the text: "Not performing the obligatory duty (and performing the prohibited ones and getting attached to sense-objects), a man courts his downfall." If this is not accepted, one has to say that something positive arises from what is negative—a view which is untenable. It follows that it is wrong to say that a person can remain rooted in the Self without any positive spiritual effort. The contention that liberation can be attained through action is untenable; for, liberation is a state which is eternal, and what is eternal cannot have a beginning. Also, whatever is produced in this world through karma is impermanent. So liberation which is eternal cannot be achieved through karma.

Objection: Karma in association with meditation (vidyā) can produce a permanent thing.

Reply: No, because it involves a contradiction. It is self-contradictory to say that a thing which is eternal is still produced.

Objection: Why should we not think of liberation like *pradhvaṁsābhāva*, which is eternal, though produced by action? Liberation, though eternal, can be brought into existence in the same way as non-existence in the form of destruction (*pradhvaṁsābhāva*) can be produced by action.

Reply: This argument is untenable, because liberation is a positive state. Further, since it is not possible to distinguish one non-existence from another non-existence, it is just a figment of imagination to say that non-existence in the form of destruction has a beginning, but no end. Non-existence is, in fact, that which is opposed to existence. Though existence is one, it appears to be many when it is qualified by objects such as pot, cloth, and so on, so that we speak of the *existence* of a pot, the *existence* of a cloth, etc. Even though non-existence is devoid of characteristics, it is wrongly associated with characteristics and spoken of as many in the same way as substance, etc. are said to be many through the association of action, quality, etc. Non-existence can never co-exist with a quality in the way a lotus can co-exist with its colour. If it were characterized by a quality, it would be a positive entity.

Objection: Since the agent of meditation and karma is eternal, liberation which results from the continuous flow of meditation and karma will be eternal.

Reply: This argument also is untenable, because the agentship which flows like the current of the Gaṅgā is an evil with the result that liberation will be subject to termination on the

cessation of agentship. So it has to be admitted that liberation consists in abiding in one's own Self when the material cause in the form of ignorance, desire, and action gets removed. The Self *per se* is Brahman. Liberation takes place when ignorance is removed by the knowledge of Brahman. That is why the study of the Upaniṣad is taken up for the acquisition of the knowledge of Brahman.

Śrī Candrasekharendra Sarasvatī

1. Hindu Religious Practices

When we analyse the personal discipline and religious observances (*anuṣṭhānam*) prescribed in the Vedic religion, we find that no other religion contains such rigid regulations. At the same time, apart from the good sense of the people, there is no special sanction for enforcing these religious practices. This paradoxical situation has led people to regulate their life as they liked. When there was a strong village community life, there were elders in society who pointed out if any deviation occurred from the time-honoured practices, and their personal influence and authority helped society to keep itself within bounds. Even if people did not do what should be done, they at least abstained from doing what ought not to be done, for fear of incurring the displeasure of the elders in society. The disintegration of village

**Acharya's Call*, Madras Discourses (1957-1960), Part 2. Published by Sri Kamakoti Peetam, Kanchipuram

life and the migration of people to cities and towns, and even to far off places, have resulted in the gradual disappearance of many wholesome observances. In political life one is bound by party discipline; but in religious life even that amount of discipline has ceased to exist.

As I explained on another occasion, I am of the view that at one time Vedic religion prevailed all over the world and people everywhere observed the same practices. With the rise of Christianity and Islam, religious life came to be understood to consist chiefly in offering prayer to the Supreme Being on a specified day in the week. So far as Buddhism and Jainism are concerned, except in the conception of the ultimate goal, there is not much difference between them and the Hindu religion. But, we, Hindus, are so steeped in religious traditions that we often feel that we should keep up certain observances, though we are not able to give effect to this feeling always, either on account of circumstances beyond our control, or on account of the general laxity that has come to prevail in such matters. In the circumstances, it is worth pondering why our Vedas and *śāstras* prescribed so many strict codes of personal conduct and religious ceremonies.

Let us take the institution of marriage. No other religion has insisted on post-puberty marriage as Hinduism. Even when custom did not insist on post-puberty marriage, there is restriction in the freedom of the movement of unmarried girls, who have attained puberty. There was the practice of women immolating themselves on the funeral pyre of their husbands. Rajput ladies threw themselves into the fire when they found that the fortune of war was favouring the foreign enemies. Sītā preserved her life in captivity; but ordered a fire to be lit for immolating

herself when she found that Śrī Rāma would not accept her as a result of her captivity. Even in the present times, when *sati* has been abolished statutorily, we read in the newspapers stray cases of *sati* occurring in North India. Why should there be all these restrictions and hardships in the name of religion? The answer is that to the extent we make sacrifices in performing acts which we sincerely believe to be good, to that extent will our soul or Ātman get elevated. Even acts done in ignorance, but with faith, will produce spiritual reward. The moment we begin to question why a particular religious practice should be observed, the moment we are beginning to lose faith or bhakti.

In other religions, marriage is a contract by which the contracting parties pledge to be faithful to each other during the period of the contract. Both parties are free to obtain divorce. A widow is also free to marry again. Thus, marriage in such societies is an institution to get over social complications and also to keep sex life within bounds. In Hinduism, on the other hand, marriage is a sacrament intended for the elevation of the soul. So far as men are concerned, marriage is intended to restrict and regulate their physical desires. For their spiritual realisation, man must seek and obtain a preceptor (guru). But so far as women are concerned, marriage is both a regulator of physical desires and a means for spiritual elevation. By the sacred ties of marriage, a woman surrenders herself completely to her husband and in serving him she serves God. In fact, she regards her husband as God. There are numerous stories to illustrate this principle. As novels reflect the spirit of the times, these Pūraṇic stories reflect the ideals behind the social and religious practices of our ancients. A woman who has dedicated her body completely to her husband in the firm faith that he is God finds no use for

it at the death of her husband. That is the principle behind the practice of *sati*. Marriage is the *upākarma*, initiation into spiritual life, for a girl. For widows who cannot sacrifice themselves on the funeral pyre of their husbands, because they have certain duties to discharge, like the care and bringing up of young children, certain codes, known as *Vidhava Dharma*, have been prescribed.

We tie up a cow which is prone to graze in other people's fields. This is done to save the crop of the neighbours and also to save the cow itself from coming to grief by getting beaten for trespassing into fields. Similarly we have also to bind ourselves with certain chords voluntarily, so that we may not go wrong, goaded by passions like *kāma* (desire) and *krodha* (anger), so that our *Ātman* may get elevated higher and higher. A cowherd knows when to untie a cow. Similarly, *Īśvara*, who is called *Paśupati* (literally cowherd), knows when to release us from bondage. When a bale is tightened with iron loops in a press, the rope with which it was tied before it was placed in the press, becomes loose and slips down. Similarly, if we bind ourselves tightly with the loop of *jñāna* (true knowledge), we get rid of the shackles of *kāma* (desire), *krodha* (anger), and other passions, which bind us to earthly pleasures and which are the causes of births and deaths. *Yajña*, *dāna*, *tapas* and *karma* lead to *jñāna*. When we perform with faith the prescribed *karmas* and *anuṣṭhānas*, and dedicate them to God, as taught by the Vedas, we attain *jñāna*, which clears the way for God-realisation. Let us bind ourselves with *punya*, accruing through making sacrifices inherent in the adherence to our *anuṣṭhānas*, so that we may be released from the lesser bond of sins, and thus be enabled to transcend birth and death by realising the supreme Being.

2. Linguistic and Religious Concord

It seems to me that greater troubles and greater conflicts are being caused by the language issue on the one hand, and political ideologies on the other, than by caste and religious differences. Taking the case of Madras State, the language issue seems to have provoked greater opposition than issues based on caste. Fortunately, the language controversy has so far taken only the form of protests, as far as this State is concerned. But in the North, the quarrel over languages has resulted in serious rioting.

In former days the greed of kings to extend their sovereignty led to wars. Now, countries are ranged in opposing camps on the basis of the form of administration or political ideology. All are agreed that the administrative set-up must be democratic; but the dispute is whether the American form of democracy, branded by Russia as capitalistic, or the Russian form of democracy, branded by America as communist, should prevail. The personal ego of former kings has now given place to the ideological ego of party bosses. No doubt, some countries like India are remaining outside both the ideological camps. However, this is a political matter, the solution of which is not my concern.

We require a language or languages to communicate our thoughts to one another. If we take the case of India, we will find that the language of the region changes roughly for every 500 miles. Similarly, the same language underwent drastic changes in the course of every 500 years. This can be verified if we survey the incidence of language from Kanyakumari to the Himalayas and from the remote past to modern times. Languages serve a very useful purpose, and no one will subscribe to the

proposition that because languages gave room for controversy, there shall be no languages at all. Languages have come into existence, not for the purpose of creating linguistic quarrels, but for serving mankind. Therefore, a rational mind will try to probe into the causes which give rise to linguistic controversies and tackle those causes with a view to eliminating them.

The genius of Tamil is its hospitality for other languages. People from the South have gone to the Telugu and Maharashtra areas long ago and settled there. In the Telugu country they are known as Dravidas; but they know not a word of Tamil now. Similarly, there are Dravids in Maharashtra, who have adopted Marathi as their mother tongue. But in Tamil Nadu, there are people from Andhra, Gujarat, Maharashtra and other places. Though they are here for generations, they continue to talk among themselves in their respective mother tongue. They are also proficient in Tamil. In fact, several non-Tamilians have composed Tamil works. Tamilians have also the capacity to pick up the language of their surroundings in a short time. Tamil Nadu can be compared to a refrigerator, capable of preserving all the languages existing in its midst, whereas in other areas alien languages have disappeared with the passage of time. Therefore, over this language issue, Tamilians have a great responsibility of maintaining their praiseworthy tradition of hospitality. We should not approach the language problem with the notion that one language is superior to another. A spirit of *camaraderie* and a liberal outlook in adopting the noble ideas contained in one language by the other languages, will result in the enrichment of all languages and in the development of mutual respect and regard among the people speaking different tongues. That is the way to abolish linguistic fanaticism.

If a thing is good basically, but for some cause evil resulted from it, the sane view is to retain the thing for its good and to eliminate the root cause of the evil result. This principle is applicable in the case of religion and caste also. If we take caste into consideration, we will find that the system was devised for the smooth functioning of society and not for the exploitation of one caste by another. It is a functional division, each doing his allotted duty, and all together contributing to the general welfare of the community. According to the nature of the function, the nature of food, the form of daily *anuṣṭhānas*, and the way of life, were adopted. *Aśramas* (stages of life) have also been prescribed for a similar purpose. There is no justification for one caste regarding itself as superior to another. Restrictions that were imposed pertain to marriage and personal observances, and not to social life. Such restrictions prevail everywhere. The origin of the trouble can be ultimately traced to egoism and selfishness, one caste regarding itself superior to another. Each of us must develop an outlook that will make us regard the troubles, sorrows, and difficulties of others as our own. If a member of another caste is in difficulties, our duty is to go to his aid first, before attending to our own needs. If we develop this broad outlook, which is both correct and *śāstraic*, there will be proper understanding among the castes and a harmonious and integrated social life. *Sarve janāḥ sukhino bhavantu*—the happiness of all should be our guiding principle.

As for religious concord, we should first of all stop criticising and finding fault with other religions and religious sects. We should examine ourselves first and see if we have lived up to the requirements of our religion, before we proceed to criticise the other man's religion. Religion is intended to elevate man

spiritually and to bring him nearer and nearer to God. Before we begin to advise others, we should conquer *kāma* (desires), *krodha* (anger), and *dveṣa* (hatred). We should approach all religions in a spirit of humility and appreciate the good points in all religions. Such a friendly approach will remove the edge of all controversies, and religion will become a source of strength and inspiration, instead of degenerating into a bone of contention.

Take an illustration. Here is a bundle of faggots. There are a number of individual faggots in it; but all of them are tied together with one string. If I remove one faggot from the bundle, the bond will immediately become loose, and the other faggots will slip out automatically. Supposing the faggots are first tied into four or five smaller bundles, and then all these four or five smaller bundles are tied together with a common bond, then even if one faggot gets loose, the bundle as a whole will remain unaffected. Similarly, members of society are tied together in a number of cohesive bundles called castes, and all these bundles are tied together with the common bond called religion. Caste and religion are meant to keep society together in a strong bond of *camaraderie* so that all the component members will strive for the general welfare of the community as a whole, in an atmosphere of mutual respect and co-operation, and not meant to create hatred and conflicts. We should strive to lead a sinless life, uphold human brotherhood, and earn the grace of *Īśvara*.

3. The Roots of Religions

Prince Gautama, who came to be known as the Buddha, was born in Kapilavastu, about 2,500 years ago. His life of sacrifice and renunciation profoundly influenced the mind of every

structed only with the aid of inscriptions, images and other archaeological materials, there may not be any reference either to Śrī Śaṅkara or to Advaita.

It is to be noted that the founder of each religion criticised the religion that was in vogue in his time and which he sought to replace by his own religion. Buddhism criticised the Vedic religion, Jainism criticised Buddhism and so on. Each of these religions, including Vaiṣṇavism of Śrī Rāmānuja and Śaivism of Śaiva Siddhānta, has a distinct feature of its own. There are also points of differences between one religion and another. Even in a matter like idol worship, on which both Vaiṣṇavism and Śaivism agree, the former insists on *Mūrti Upāsana*, or, worship of the form in which God is conceived, while the latter is satisfied with the worship of a symbol like the *Liṅga*. Christianity and Islam inveigh against idol worship, as also the Arya Samajists. While Hinduism is based on the Vedas, both Buddhism and Jainism revolted against the Vedas. Each of these religious teachers, in his time, gathered around him a huge following.

When we survey the position of religions at the present time, we find that nearly half the world's population professes Christianity and almost an equal number professes Buddhism. The population not covered by these two religions follow the other religions. Several religions have risen and fallen in this world, and some of them have practically disappeared. How did they rise and why did they fall? These are interesting questions. Each religion, as it arose, claimed the monopoly of truth and proclaimed that it alone had the last word in true religion. Truth is only one; there cannot be two truths. Yet, each religious leader was able to attract to himself a very large following. Is truth to be judged from the number of people claiming allegiance to a

particular religious system? If so, how did it come about that a number of religions claiming monopoly for truth, and which in their time commanded a large following, ceased to be popular?

This gives rise to a number of other questions. Is a religion popular because it is true, or is it true because it is popular? Did people embrace a religion because it is true, or did a religion disappear because it was not true? When we ponder over these questions, it becomes apparent that the endurance of a movement, or the validity of the views on which that movement is based cannot be judged by the number of its adherents. In our own life time we have seen how Gandhism appealed to thousands of people who were prepared to fast, court imprisonment or die at his direction. There were also people who rejected Gandhiji's religious philosophy and were indifferent when he undertook his fasts. We are also seeing that the votaries of Gandhism are now gradually dwindling in number.

A consideration of all these factors leads one to the inevitable conclusion that a religion does not flourish merely on account of the truth it proclaims. The key to the growth of a religion lies in the cause for its subsequent decay. In a farce (*prahasana*) known as *Mattavilāsa*, written by King Mahendra Varma, who is responsible for the rock-cut temples at Mahabalipuram and other places, there is a reference to the licentious habits of the Buddhist bhikkus of his day, and to their swerving from the high code of personal conduct laid down for them. The Buddha himself, when admitting women to his order to bhikkus, foresaw the inherent danger of having both men and women in the order. The decline of Buddhism was, therefore, due to the failure of its adherents, particularly those who have to set an example for others, to rigorously adhere to the

precepts of that religion. Conversely, a religion will continue to flourish, if it can continuously claim among its adherents, particularly those who, by their personal example, are charged with the propagation and preservation of that religion, men of high spiritual attainments, with a large heart and without any blemish in their character.

While the initial impetus to any religion is given by its high-souled founder, its subsequent strength and popularity depend on the fervour, devotion, discipline and purity of succeeding religious heads, and the fidelity and character of its followers. Common people are drawn to a religion by the personality of the teacher rather than by a firm conviction of the truth it teaches. The truth or otherwise of a religion is a matter of academic discussion, confined to the intelligent few. The reason why some religions, though they had a long history, gradually and inevitably lost their hold on the people, and eventually disappeared, can be traced to the decline in the standards of the teachers. In his own life time, Gandhiji had to close down the Sabarmati Āśram when he found that its inmates deviated from the strict rectitude he had imposed on them.

Therefore, if a religion is to be popular and powerful, its followers should observe its tenets faithfully and well. It is not in numbers or in demonstrations that the vitality of a religion lies. For that matter, Sāṅkhya and Advaita are the least demonstrative of all religions. That, in spite of the numerous and trying vicissitudes, the Vedic religion, the date of whose origin is still undetermined, survives to-day, and has such a large following, is due to the fact that in it were born, from time to time, great souls, unselfish, pure and godly, who had deep devotion and earnest fervour, and who unswervingly adhered to the ordinances of its

practices. And so, if we desire, as we must, that our religion should continue to influence humanity for all times, we, its followers, must be good and pious, pure in character, and continuously affirm its tenets in our thought and action.

 ĀNANDĀNUBHAVA

V.R. Kalyanasundara Sastri*

Ānandānubhava has written three valuable treatises on Advaita Vedānta. The *Iṣṭa-siddhi-vivarāṇa*, as the name indicates, is a commentary on the *Iṣṭa-siddhi* of Vimuktātman. The *Nyāyaratna-dīpāvali* and the *Padārtha-tattva-nirṇaya* are his independent works. In addition to these Advaita works, he has also written a commentary on the *Nyāyasāra* of Bhāsarvajña. Ānandagiri has written a commentary, *Vedānta-viveka*, on the *Nyāyaratna-dīpāvali*. The *Padārtha-tattva-nirṇaya* has been commented upon by Ānandagiri and Ātmasvarūpabhagavān.

In the colophon of the *Nyāyaratna-dīpāvali*, Ānandānubhava is described as a pupil of Narāyaṇajyotiḥ. We come across in this work references to Kumārila, Prabhākara, Viśvarūpa, Maṇḍana, Vācaspati, Sucaritamiśra, Ānandabodha, and others. Ānandabodha, a celebrated teacher of Advaita, has written the

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Nyāya-makaranda, the *Nyāya-dīpāvalī* and the *Pramāṇamālā*. It is believed that Ānandabodha must have lived about A.D. 1100. Ānandānubhava has written a commentary on the *Iṣṭa-siddhi* of Vimuktātman. The latter is assigned to the period between A.D. 850 and A.D. 1050. From these it is clear that Ānandānubhava must have lived after Vimuktātman and Ānandabodha. Citsukha in his *Tattvapradīpikā* refers to Ānandānubhava. The date of Citsukha is said to be A.D. 1220. And so, Ānandānubhava could not have been later than Citsukha. Most probably, he must have lived in the second half of the twelfth century A.D.

The *Padārtha-tattva-nirṇaya* seeks to refute the categories of the Vaiśeṣika system and also the views of the Bauddhas, the Sāṅkhyas, the Mīmāṃsakas and others. The work is divided into two chapters. The *prima facie* view (*pūrva-pakṣa*) is cogently explained in the first chapter, while the final view (*siddhānta*) is established in the second chapter. Ānandānubhava vindicates the Advaita view that Brahman alone is real and that the phenomenal world of diversity is just an appearance.

The *Nyāyaratna-dīpāvalī* is one of the authoritative, polemical treatises on Advaita Vedānta. Ānandānubhava establishes the fundamental standpoint of Advaita not only on the authority of the Upaniṣads but also by reasoning. According to Advaita, Brahman or the Self which is the ultimate reality is one only without a second (*ekameva ādvitīyam*). The real nature of the non-dual Brahman is missed due to the beginningless avidyā. Coming under the spell of avidyā, we look upon the pluralistic world as real; and we are deeply attached to it. Bondage is our attachment to the non-real. If the ignorance of the real is responsible for our bondage, it can be removed only by the knowledge of the real. In other words, liberation can be attained only

by the knowledge of Brahman. It is wrong to think that Advaita Vedānta which maintains that mokṣa can be attained by the right knowledge of the Self belittles the importance of karma and upāsana. Karma purifies the mind and the knowledge of the Self is manifested in such a pure mind. It cannot directly lead to mokṣa. The function of karma is restricted to the *preparatory stage*. Control of intellect, external senses, etc. (*śamadamādi*), have to be practised, as they are also useful to the attainment of the knowledge of Brahman. While the help of karma is indirect, that of practices like control of intellect, external senses, etc. are direct to the attainment of the knowledge of Brahman.

Following the arrangement of chapters in the *Brahma-sūtra* of Bādarāyaṇa, Ānandānubhava has divided the *Nyāyaratna-dīpāvali* into four chapters. The first chapter begins with the discussion about the validity of the Vedic testimony. By means of elaborate discussion, Ānandānubhava establishes the view that the Vedas, which are *apauruṣeya*, are a source of valid knowledge. This is followed by a discussion about the validity of knowledge. After refuting the views held in other systems, Ānandānubhava establishes the Advaita view that (i) truth is intrinsic, and that error is extrinsic and that (ii) the validity of knowledge is due to conditions which are intrinsic to knowledge itself. In the course of the discussion of the causality of the universe, Ānandānubhava maintains the view that the blend of pure Brahman and māyā (*māyā-śabalita-brahman*) is the material cause. By elaborate arguments, he proves that the Self is of the nature of existence (*sat*), knowledge (*cit*) and bliss (*ānanda*).

On the model of the second chapter known as *avirodhādhyāya* of the *Brahma-sūtra*, Ānandānubhava shows in the second chapter of the *Nyāyaratna-dīpāvali* that the so-called scrip-

tural contradictions do not exist with regard to the Vedāntic view and that all other views are incorrect. There is an elaborate discussion of the different theories of error. After refuting the views of others, he establishes the soundness of the *anirvacanīya-khyāti* of Advaita. His discussion of the *paṛamāṇuvāda* of the Vaiśeṣikas is important as well as interesting, for he proves in the course of the discussion that atoms must have parts.

The third chapter of the *Nyāyaratna-dīpāvali* is mainly concerned with the means to the realisation of Brahman. He argues that karma is not directly conducive to the attainment of liberation and that the combination of knowledge and action (*jñāna-karma-samuccaya*) is untenable. In this chapter, the scriptural sanction with regard to *sannyāsa* of the *ekadaṇḍin* type and of the *tridaṇḍin* type is also discussed. Ānandānubhava points out that śruti and smṛti texts lend support to the *sannyāsa* of the *ekadaṇḍin* type followed by Śaṅkara.

Ānandānubhava discusses in the fourth chapter the nature of liberation, the removal of avidyā and *jīvan-mukti*. Though like other Advaitins he admits *jīvan-mukti*, he points out that from the ultimate point of view even *jīvan-mukti* must be considered to be māyā. Brahman which is non-dual can never be said to be born or destroyed. In the absence of creation and destruction, there is no bondage; and in the absence of bondage, there is no seeker after liberation, and there is none liberated from bondage. In support of his stand he quotes from Gauḍapāda's *Māṇḍūkya-kārikā* (2.32):

na nirodho na cotpattir-
na baddho na ca sādhaḥ,
na mumukṣur na vai muktaḥ
ityeṣā paramārthatā.

In the remaining part of this paper let us consider in detail Ānandānubhava's explanation of the locus of avidyā (*avidyāśraya*) and of the removal of avidyā (*avidyā-nivṛtti*).

The post-Śaṅkara Advaitins take sides in answering the question regarding the locus of avidyā. While Prakāśātman holds the view that Brahman, the pure impartite consciousness, is the locus of avidyā, Vacāspati argues that the jīva is the locus. Ānandānubhava follows the standpoint of Prakāśātman, which has come to be known as the Vivaraṇa view.

The four possible alternatives that one might think of with regard to this question are: (i) that Brahman is the locus of avidyā, (ii) that Īśvara who is omniscient, etc. is the locus of avidyā, (iii) that an insentient object is the locus of avidyā, and (iv) that the jīva is the locus of avidyā. By showing the untenability of the last three alternatives, Ānandānubhava maintains the view that Brahman, the pure consciousness alone, is the locus of avidyā.

Īśvara who is omniscient cannot serve as the locus of avidyā, for Īśvara himself comes into being as a result of the association of avidyā with the self-luminous consciousness. Since avidyā is posited even prior to Īśvara, the latter cannot be the locus of the former.

It may be argued that Brahman or the Self cannot be the locus of avidyā, as the two are diametrically opposed to each other. Brahman is of the nature of knowledge; and avidyā is just the opposite of it. If so, how can Brahman be the locus of avidyā? Ānandānubhava answers this objection by pointing out that there is no opposition between the self-luminous Brahman and avidyā. It is only the knowledge which arises from *pramāṇa* (*pramāṇa-jñānam*) which, being opposed to ignorance (avidyā), removes it. The Self which is self-luminous consciousness is not only not

opposed to it, but reveals it, as a lamp reveals the existence of an insentient object, say, pot. Ānandānubhava cites the case of deep-sleep to show how avidyā can co-exist with the self-luminous consciousness (*svarūpa-jñāna*.)

The view that an insentient object can serve as the locus of avidyā is untenable. For one thing, there is no *pramāṇa* which reveals the existence of avidyā in an insentient object; nor is it made known through *sākṣin*, as there is no relation between consciousness and the insentient. Secondly, the positing of avidyā in an insentient object does not serve any purpose. The twofold work of avidyā is concealment and projection; that is to say, avidyā conceals the true and projects the false. What is by its very nature insentient and therefore does not reveal itself need not be concealed. So it is impossible to think of an insentient object as being the seat of avidyā.

Let us now consider the view that the *jīva* is the locus of avidyā. There are two reasons which contribute to the plausibility of this view. First, the *jīva* is sentient, and so while an insentient object cannot be the seat of avidyā, the *jīva* can. Second, the experience of 'I am ignorant' shows that the *jīva* is the seat of avidyā. Ānandānubhava argues that this view, too, is not acceptable. The *jīva* is what it is because of the association of the internal organ (*antaḥkaraṇa*) which is itself a product of avidyā. How can the *jīva*, being dependent on a product of avidyā which is therefore earlier, be the locus of avidyā? Further, those who uphold the view that the *jīva* is the locus of avidyā must clearly specify whether the *jīva* as qualified by the internal organ (*ahāṅkāraḍi-viśiṣṭa-jīva*) is the locus, or the *jīva* as indicated by the internal organ (*ahāṅkāraḍi-upalakṣita-jīva*) is the locus. The *jīva* is a complex of consciousness and internal organ. The former

view considers the relation between the two as that of the qualified and the qualifier, similar to the relation between rose and the red colour. The latter view takes the internal organ as a mark (*upalakṣaṇa*) indicating consciousness in the same way as a crow serves to indicate the house on the top of which it is perched. Ānandānubhava argues that the former view is untenable, for it seeks to rest avidyā on the internal organ too, which qualifies consciousness, and this amounts to maintaining that the cause, viz. avidyā, is seated on its own effect, viz. the internal organ.

It may be argued that avidyā and its product, viz. the internal organ, form a series in such a way that the one is preceded by the other alternatively constituting a continuous chain backwards like the seed-sprout series; and so the difficulty of the cause (avidyā) resting on its own effect (internal organ) does not arise. And also the objection of infinite regress is not possible, since the series is *anādi*. This argument, according to Ānandānubhava, overlooks an important point of difference between the two. In the case of seed-sprout series, there are individual differences (*vyakti-bheda*) with regard to seeds and sprouts. But this is not possible in the case of avidyā. It is true that erroneous cognitions and their impressions are many; but all of them are the product of avidyā which is one and the same.

Ānandānubhava brings out the difficulty involved in this view in another way also. If it be said that the jīva qualified by the gross body (*sthūla-śarīra-viśiṣṭaḥ*) is the locus of avidyā, then the gross body differs from birth to birth, and so it will result in different centres of consciousness. Such a consequence is undesirable, for there will not be any continuity, between one life and another life; and in the absence of continuity one will not reap the consequences of the deeds done in the previous birth and one

may get certain good or bad results, without being the merit of the earlier deeds. If, on the other hand, it be said that the jīva qualified by the subtle body (*sūkṣma-śarīra-viśiṣṭaḥ*) is the locus of avidyā, the destruction of the subtle body in the state of liberation will also involve the destruction of consciousness of the individual. If it is argued that the subtle body is not destroyed in the state of liberation, then there is no difference between liberation and bondage. For all these reasons, the view that the jīva qualified by the internal organ is the locus of avidyā is untenable. The view which considers the internal organ as a mark (*upalakṣaṇa*) will lead to Ānandānubhava's standpoint; for the internal organ as a mark is separated from consciousness which it serves to indicate, and so avidyā is seated only in consciousness.

After refuting the explanation of the nature of liberation given by the Naiyāyikas, the Sāṅkhyas and others, Ānandānubhava sets forth the Advaita view that the removal of avidyā (*avidyā-nivṛtti*) is liberation. He states the possible objections against the view, criticises them and finally establishes the soundness of the Advaita view of liberation.

The critics are interested in proving the untenability of the very conception. They argue that *avidyā-nivṛtti* cannot be said to be real (*sat*), or unreal (*asat*), or both (*sadasat*), or indeterminable (*anirvacanīya*). If it be said to be real, is it other than Brahman or identical with Brahman? If it is other than Brahman, it will give rise to dualism which is not acceptable to the Advaitin. The other alternative, so the critics argue, fares no better. In what sense can it be said to be identical with Brahman? There are two possible alternatives here: either *avidyā-nivṛtti* gets itself merged in Brahman, or Brahman gets itself merged in *avidyā-nivṛtti*. If the former, then it is eternal in as much as Brahman is eternal,

and so knowledge (jñāna) is not required; if the latter, Brahman has to be treated as a negative entity in as much as *avidyā-nivṛtti* is negative. Can it be said to be unreal (*asat*)? Even this possibility is ruled out by the critics. If it is unreal like the sky-flower, there arises again the futility of knowledge. If it is unreal, it cannot be brought into being. If it be argued that it can be brought into being, then sky-flower, etc., which are unreal, can also be brought into being; and this is absurd. It cannot be both real and unreal at the same time, as it goes against the law of contradiction. Since *avidyā* is said to be *anirvacanīya*, *avidyā-nivṛtti* too cannot be *anirvacanīya*.

The critics further point out that it is not possible to explain *avidyā-nivṛtti* as a fifth mode (*pañcāma-prakāra*) as other than the four possibilities mentioned above. First, there is no *pramāṇa* which would justify it. For the sake of argument let us suppose, so the critics argue, that there is *avidyā-nivṛtti* which is a fifth mode. It is incumbent upon the Advaitin to say whether it is removable or not. It cannot be removed by jñāna; the latter can remove only ajñāna; and there is no other means available to the Advaitin to bring about its disappearance. There is also another difficulty here. The disappearance of *avidyā-nivṛtti* will mean the re-emergence of *avidyā*, which is not desirable. The other alternative, viz. that it is not removable, may now be considered. The question that arises here is whether it is knowable or not. If it be said that *avidyā-nivṛtti* which is not removable (i.e. which is eternal) is knowable, the Advaita view that "whatever is perceived is illusory" has to be given up. If *avidyā-nivṛtti* is said to be eternal and also is knowable, the world also which is knowable may be said to be eternal. It is not open to the Advaitin to formulate the *vyāpti* as "whatever is perceived other than *avidyā-nivṛtti* is

illusory". To the Advaitin there is no real other than *avidyā-nivṛtti*. If it be said that it is not knowable, then no efforts need be taken for attaining it. The critics, therefore, argue that it is impossible for the Advaitin to show that the conception of *avidyā-nivṛtti* is intelligible and tenable. The untenability of the conception of *avidyā-nivṛtti* will, according to the critics, undermine the central thesis of Advaita, viz. that the Self is non-dual and that the world which is a product of *avidyā* is illusory.

Ānandānubhava argues that the explanation of *avidyā-nivṛtti* as a fifth mode (*pañcāma-prakāra*) is quite sound and that the critics have not really shown the conception to be unintelligible and untenable. Since *avidyā* is indeterminable, its removal has to be explained only as a fifth mode. It cannot be real, for in that case *avidyā* too will become real. Since it has *avidyā* as its *pratiyogī* and also since it is brought into being, it cannot be unreal like the sky-flower. Nor can it be both real and unreal as it amounts to breaking the law of contradiction. It cannot be indeterminable (*anirvacanīya*), since *avidyā* is indeterminable. So it has to be explained as a fifth mode, as something other than all the four mentioned above.

It is true, says Ānandānubhava, that *avidyā-nivṛtti* is different from real and unreal in the same way as *avidyā* is different from real and unreal. But that is no reason for characterising it as *anirvacanīya*. If *avidyā* is said to be *anirvacanīya*, it is not because of its being different from real and unreal (*sadasat-vilakṣaṇa*), but because it is removable by knowledge. In other words, *anirvacanīya*, according to Ānandānubhava, is to be explained in terms of removability by knowledge (*jñāna-nivartyatva*). *Avidyā* is *anirvacanīya*, because it is removable. But *avidyā-nivṛtti* is not removable by knowledge. On the con-

trary, it is brought into being by knowledge. It is knowable in as much as it falls within the scope of experience. It is wrong to think that it is not removable. Only if it is maintained that it is not removable, it will be prejudicial to the inference by which the Advaitin proves the illusoriness of the world. Ānandānubhava cites the authority of Scripture to show that *avidyā-nivṛtti* too is removable. The *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* text says: "In it there is no diversity." The purport of this text is to show that there is nothing else, either positive or negative, other than Brahman; and in this total denial *avidyā-nivṛtti* is also included. Ānandānubhava takes pains to show that his standpoint is quite consistent with the view of Vimuktātman, the author of the *Iṣṭa-siddhi*. The explanation of *avidyā-nivṛtti* as a fifth mode (*pañcama-prakāra*) is acceptable to Vimuktātman, as he himself adopts this mode of interpretation in the *Iṣṭa-siddhi*. It is true that he equates *avidyā-nivṛtti* with the non-dual Self subsequently in the same work. Ānandānubhava's elucidation of Vimuktātman's position makes it clear that any suggestion that Vimuktātman is vacillating between these two explanations and that he is not consistent is unwarranted. Since there is nothing else, either positive or negative, other than the Self, *avidyā-nivṛtti* cannot be given a permanent standing as a negative something coeval with the Self. If Vimuktātman seeks to equate *avidyā-nivṛtti* with the Self, it is to show that the Self, indicated by *avidyā-nivṛtti*, is bereft of everything, positive as well as negative.

THE VEDA AND THE DEVELOPMENT
OF HINDUISM
Significant Stages of the History of Hinduism

Kireet Joshi*

I

To understand the significance of the development of Hinduism, it is necessary to go back to the Veda, which can be regarded as the luminous seed of the huge *banyan* tree of what in course of time came to be known as Hinduism. (It may be noted that the ancient Indian religion that was developed from the Veda was known as *Sanātana Dharma* or *Ārya Dharma*. The word "Hinduism" came to be used at a later stage when foreigners referred to the religion practised by the people of India.

In the eyes of the R̥ṣis, who composed the Veda, the physical and the psychical worlds were a manifestation, twofold and diverse, and yet connected and similar figures of cosmic

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godheads. The inner and outer life of man was a divine commerce with the gods, and behind it was the one Spirit or Being of which the gods were various names and personalities and powers, *ekam sat viprā bahudhā vadanti*.¹ These godheads were not only masters of the physical Nature, but were at the same time inward divine powers. Simultaneously, they were states and energies born in our psychic being. Godheads, devas, are declared to be the guardians of truth and immortality, the children of the Infinite.

In the Vedic vision, the life of man was a thing of mixed truth and falsehood, a movement from mortality to immortality, from mixed light and darkness to the splendour of a divine Truth whose home is above in the Infinite, but which can be built up here in man's soul and life.

This building up the home of Truth here implies a getting of treasure, of the wealth, the booty given by the gods to the human warrior, and a journey and a sacrifice. The Vedic poets spoke of these things in a fixed system of images taken from Nature and from the surrounding life of the warlike, pastoral and agricultural Aryan peoples. And these images centred round the cult of Fire and the worship of the powers of living Nature and the institution of sacrifice. The Vedic poets used for their expression also a glowing web of myth and parable, which expressed to the initiates a certain order of psychic experience and inner realities.

II

Yāska has spoken of several schools of interpretation of the Vedas. He has declared that there is a triple knowledge and therefore a triple meaning of the Vedic hymns—a sacrificial or ritualistic knowledge, a knowledge of the gods, and finally a

spiritual knowledge. He has also said that the last one is the true sense, and when one gets it, the others drop or are cut away. According to him, "the R̥ṣis saw the Truth, the true law of things, directly by an inner vision". He also said that "the true sense of the Vedas can be recovered directly by meditation and *tapasya*". We also find that the Vedic R̥ṣis themselves believed that their hymns contain a secret knowledge and that the words of the Veda could only be known in their true meaning by one who is himself a seer or mystic; from others, the hymns withhold their knowledge. For example, the R̥ṣi describes himself as one illumined, expressing through his thought and speech words of guidance, secret words, wisdoms that utter their inner meaning to the seer.²

It is, however, true that there was an external aspect of the Vedic religion, and this aspect took its foundation on the mind of the physical man and provided means, symbols, rites, figures, which were drawn from the most external things, such as heaven and earth, sun, moon and stars, dawn and day and night and rain, and wind and storm, oceans and rivers and forests, and other circumstances of the vast and mysterious surrounding life. But even on the external side, the Vedic religion spoke of the highest Truth, Right, Law of which the gods were the guardians, of the necessity of a true knowledge and larger inner living according to this Truth and Right, as also of the home of immortality to which the soul of man could ascend by the power of truth. In addition, the Vedic religion provided sufficient ground to draw even the common people in their ethical nature and to turn them towards some initial developments of their psychic being, and to conceive the idea of a knowledge and truth other than that of the physical life and to admit even a first conception of some greater spiritual reality.

But the deeper and esoteric meaning of the Veda was reserved for the initiates, for those who were ready to understand and practise the inner sense. It was the inner meaning, and the highest psychic and spiritual truth concealed by the outer sense, that gave to the Vedic hymns the name by which they are still known, the Veda, the Book of knowledge. Only in the light of this esoteric sense can we understand the full flowering of the Vedic religion in the Upaniṣads and in the long later development of Indian spiritual seeking and experience.

The inner Vedic religion attributes psychic significance to the godheads in the cosmos. It conceives of a hierarchical order of worlds, and an ascending stair of planes of being in the universe, *bhūr*, *bhuvah*, and *sva*. Truth and Right (*satyam* and *ṛtam*), which have their home in the highest world of *sva*, sustain and govern all the levels of Nature. They are one in essence, but they take different forms in different levels of existence. For instance, there is in the Veda a series of outer physical light, another series of higher and inner light, which is a vehicle of the mental, vital and psychic consciousness. Besides these, there is the highest inmost light of spiritual illumination. Sūrya, the Sun-god, was the lord of the physical Sun, but he is at the same time giver of the rays of knowledge which illumines the mind. He is also the soul of energy and the body of spiritual illumination.

All Vedic godheads have an outer, as also an inner and inmost foundation, their known as well as secret names. All of them are different powers of the one highest reality, *ekam sat, tat satyam, tad ekam*. Each of these gods is in himself a complete and separate cosmic personality of the one Existence. In their combination of powers, they form the complete universal power,

the cosmic whole. Each again, apart from his special function, is one godhead with others. Each holds in himself the universal divinity, each god is all the other gods. This complex aspect of the Vedic teaching and worship has been given by European scholars the title "henotheism". Beyond, there is, according to the Vedas, the triple infinite, and in this infinite, the godheads put on their highest nature and are names of the one nameless ineffable.

This teaching was applied to the inner life of man, and the application may be regarded as its greatest power. Consciousness of the godheads can be built, according to the Vedic teaching, within man, and affirmation of these powers leads to the conversion of human nature into the universality of divine nature. Gods are the guardians and increasers of the truth, the powers of the immortal, the sons of the infinite mother, Aditi. Man arrives at immortality by calling the gods into himself by means of a connecting sacrifice, by surrender. This leads to the breaking of the limitations not only of his physical self, but also of his mental and ordinary psychic nature.

The Veda describes various experiences which indicate a profound psychological and psychic discipline leading to the highest spiritual realisation of divine status. This discipline contains the nucleus of the later Indian yoga, the fundamental idea of which was that of the journey from the unreal to the real, from darkness to light, from death to immortality. The Vedic sages speak of this as *ṛtasya panthāḥ*, the path of the truth. In one of the vivid descriptions of the spiritual realisation, Vâmadeva records: "Vanished the darkness, shaken in its foundation; heaven shone out; upward rose the light of the divine Dawn; the sun entered the vast fields beholding the straight things and the crooked in mortals. Thereafter, indeed they awoke and saw

utterly; then indeed they held in them a bliss that is enjoyed in heaven. Let all the gods be in all our humans, let there be the truth of our thought, O Mitra, O Varuṇa."³

This is similar to another experience described by Parāśara who declares: "Our fathers broke open the firm and strong places by their words, yea, the Angirasas broke open the hill by their cry; they made in us the path to the great heaven; they found the Day and Svar and vision and the Luminous Cows."⁴ He declares again: "They who enter into all things that bear right fruit formed a path towards immortality; earth stood wide for them by the greatness and by the Great Ones, the Mother Aditi, with her sons, came for the upholding."⁵

These and other statements give us the clue to what the Vedic sages meant by immortality. When the physical being is visited by the greatness of the infinite planes above, and by the power of the great godheads, who reign on those planes, breaks its limits, opens out to the light and is upheld in its new wideness by the infinite consciousness, Mother Aditi and her sons, the divine powers of the supreme Deva—then one realises immortality.

Again, the Veda makes a distinction between the state of knowledge and the state of ignorance, and discovers the means by which ignorance can be overcome. Upholding the thought of the truth in all the principles of our being, the diffusion of truth in all parts of our being, and the birth of activity of all the godheads—this is the quintessence of the means of attaining knowledge, which results in immortality.⁶

We find the most characteristic ideas of Indian spirituality in their seed in the Veda, though not in their full expansion. There is, first, the idea of the one existence, supra-cosmic, be-

yond the individual and the universe. There is also the idea of one God who presents to us various forms, names, powers, personalities of his godhead. There is, thirdly, the distinction between knowledge and ignorance, the greater truth of an immortal life opposed to the much falsehood and mortal existence. Fourthly, there is the idea of the discipline of an inward growth of man from the physical through the psychic to the spiritual existence. Finally, there is the idea and experience of the conquest of death, the secret of immortality. Throughout its long and uninterrupted history of the Vedic tradition, these ideas have remained constant up to the present day.

III

The Vedic beginning was a high beginning, and it was secured in its results by a larger sublime efflorescence. This is what we find in the Upaniṣads, which have always been recognised in India as Vedānta, the crown and end of the Veda. While the Brāhmaṇas concentrated on Vedic rituals, the Upaniṣads renewed the Vedic truth by extricating it from its cryptic symbols and casting it into the highest and the most direct and powerful language of intuition and experience. Indeed, this language was not the thing of the intellect, but still the intellect could take hold of its form, translate into its own more abstract terms and convert into the starting-point for an ever-widening and deepening philosophic speculation and the reason's long search after the truth.

The Upaniṣads are records of deepest spiritual experience and documents of revelatory and intuitive philosophy of an inexhaustible light and power. Whether written in verse or cadenced prose, they are spiritual poems of unfailing inspiration,

inevitable in phrase and wonderful in rhythm and expression. They are epic hymns of self-knowledge, world-knowledge and God-knowledge. The imagery of the Upaniṣads is in large part developed from the type of imagery of the Veda. Ordinarily, it prefers unveiled clarity of the directly illuminative image, but it frequently uses the same symbols in a way that is closely akin to the spirit of the older symbolism. The Upaniṣads are not any departure from the Vedic mind, but a continuation and development and, to a certain extent, an enlarging transformation. They bring out into open expression what was held covered in the symbolic language of the Veda as a mystery and a secret. Ajātaśatru's explanation of sleep and dream, passages of the *Praśna Upaniṣad* on the vital being and its motion are some of the examples of Upaniṣadic symbolism.

Along with the Veda, the Upaniṣads rank as śruti, since they embody revelations and intuitions of spiritual experience. The Upaniṣads have been acknowledged as the source of numerous profound philosophies and religions that flowed from them in India. They fertilised the mind and life of the people, and kept India's soul alive through the centuries. Like a fountain of inexhaustible life-giving water, they have never failed to give fresh illumination. It is even being said that Buddhism was only a re-statement of one side of the Upaniṣadic experience, although it represented a new standpoint and provided fresh terms of intellectual definition and reasoning. Even in the thought of Pythagoras and Plato, one could rediscover the ideas of the Upaniṣads. Sufism has been found repeating the teaching of the Upaniṣads in another religious language. Even some of the modern thinkers of the East and the West seem to be absorbing the ideas of the Upaniṣads with living and intense receptiveness.

And it may not be an exaggeration to say that there is hardly any main philosophical idea which cannot find an authority, or seed, or indication in those ancient and antique writings. It has also been claimed that the larger generalisations of science are constantly found to apply to the truth of the physical nature, those formulas which were discovered by the Upaniṣadic sages in their original and largest meaning in the deeper truth of the spirit.

The Upaniṣads are Vedānta, a book of knowledge, but knowledge understood not as a mere thinking but as a seeing with the soul and total living in it with the power of inner being, a spiritual seizing by a kind of identification with the object of knowledge. Through this process of knowledge by identity or intuition, the seers of the Upaniṣads came easily to see that the self in us is one with the universal Self of all things and that this Self again is the same as God and Brahman, the transcendent Being or Existence, and they beheld, felt, lived in the inmost truth of all things in the universe as well as the inmost truth of man's inner and outer existence by the light of this one and unifying vision.

The three great declarations of the ancient Vedānta are: "I am He;"⁷ "Thou art That;"⁸ "All this is Brahman;"⁹ and "This Self is Brahman."¹⁰

The main conceptions of the Upaniṣads remained intact in parts at least in various philosophical systems, and efforts have been made from time to time to recombine them. Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Sāṅkhya, Yoga, Pūrva Mīmāṃsā and Uttara Mīmāṃsā bear the imprint of the Upaniṣadic thought, and the last one, in particular, has as its basic text, *Brahma-sūtra*, which was written by Bādarāyaṇa, and in which the quintessence of the Upaniṣads was expounded aphoristically. The *Brahma-sūtra* came to be

commented upon by various Ācāryas. This gave rise to at least five schools of Vedāntic interpretation, viz. Advaita of Śāᅅkarācārya, Viśiᅅᅅādvaita of Rāmānujācārya, Śuddhādvaita of Vallabhācārya, Dvaitādvaita of Nimbarkācārya, and Dvaita of Madhvācārya. The *Bhagavad-gītā* is also considered to be an exposition of the essence of the Upaniᅅadic teaching. The commentary literature on the Upaniᅅads, the *Brahma-sūtra* and the *Bhagavad-gītā* is continuing to develop even in our own times.

It is true that the Upaniᅅads are concerned mainly with the inner vision and not directly with outward human action; yet, all the highest principles of ethics held out by Buddhism and later Hinduism are products of the very life and significance of the truths to which they give expressive form and force. They even present the supreme ideal of spiritual action founded on the experience and principle of oneness with God as well as all living beings. It is for this reason that, even when the life of the forms of the Vedic cult had passed away, the Upaniᅅads remained alive and creative, and could generate the great devotional religions, and inspire the idea of Dharma embedded in the Indian psyche.

By the time we came to the Upaniᅅads, the original Vedic symbols had begun to lose their significance and to pass into obscurity. The earlier stage of culture represented an old poise between two extremes. On one side, there was the crude or half-trained naturalness of the outer physical man; on the other side, there was an inner and secret psychic and spiritual life of the initiates. But this poise was disturbed because of the necessity of a large-lined advance. In its developing cycle of civilisation, India was called for a more and more generalised intellectual, ethical and aesthetic evolution. This called for a new poise and a new balance. At this juncture, the Upaniᅅads saved the ancient

spiritual knowledge by immense effort, and the spiritual edifice created by the Upaniṣads guided, uplifted and penetrated into the wide and complex intellectual, aesthetic, ethical and social culture that came to be developed during the ages that followed the age of the Vedas and the Upaniṣads.

IV

During the post-Vedic age, which extended right up to the decline of Buddhism, we see the rise of the great philosophies, many-sided epic literature, beginnings of arts and sciences, emergence of vigorous and complex societies, formation of large kingdoms and empires, manifold formative activities of all kinds and great systems of living and thinking. It was the birth time and youth of the seeking intellect, and a number of scientific or systematic bodies of intellectual knowledge came up at an early stage. Actually, Vedāṅgas had begun to develop even before the Upaniṣads. The *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad* mentions six Vedāṅgas: Śikṣā (phonetics); Kalpa (ritualogy); Vyākaraṇa (grammar); Nirukta (etymology); Chandas (metrics); and Jyotiṣa (astronomy and astrology). Each Vedāṅga takes up one aspect of the Veda, and an attempt is made to explain it.

In due course, there developed a vast literature on these Vedāṅgas, expounding various systems of phonetics, rituals of sacrifices and rules of conduct of various kinds such as those described in *Śrauta-sūtras*, *Gṛhya-sūtras* and *Dharma-sūtras*, principles and details of Vedic etymology, grammatical subtleties, various forms, meters and styles of poetry, and several systems of astronomical and astrological knowledge. There developed also considerable literature of Prātiśākhya, which dealt with the subtleties of grammar, meters and pronunciation pertaining

to the Śākhās of the Vedas. Apart from the Vedāᅅgas, there developed four sciences known as Upavedas, viz. Āyurveda, Dhanurveda, Gāndharvaveda and Śāstraśāstra. Here, again, in due course, there developed a vast literature of expositions, commentaries and treatises.

Strong intellectuality of this period was inspired by the wide variety of spiritual experience and the synthetic turn so visible in the Vedas and the Upaniᅅads. There was a conscious perception that spiritual experience is higher than religion and that what religion seeks can really be attained by the inner psychological discipline, which, in due course, came to be developed into a śāstra, the śāstra of Yoga. It allowed intellectuality to become free from the crippling effects of religious dogma, and we find that the intellectual development became multisided. Materialistic atheism, agnosticism, and scepticism also developed. Indeed, this intellectuality was austere and rich, robust and minute, powerful and delicate, massive in principle and curious in detail. The mere mass of the intellectual production during the period from Ashoka well into the Mohammedan epoch is something truly prodigious. This can be seen from the account which recent scholarship gives of it. And while evaluating this account, it must be noted that what has been dealt with so far of this ancient treasure is a fraction of what is still lying extant, and what is extant is only a small percentage of what was once written and known. We also have to note that what was accomplished had for its aid the power of memory and the perishable palm-leaf. The colossal literature extended to various domains—philosophy and theology, religion and yoga, logic and rhetoric, grammar and linguistics, poetry and drama, medicine and astronomy besides the sciences. It dealt also with politics and society, music and dance, architecture and

painting, all the sixty-four accomplishments and various crafts and skills. It may be said that even such subjects as breeding and training of horses and elephants had their own śāstras. Each domain of thought and life had a systematic body of knowledge, its art, its apparatus of technical terms, its copious literature.

During this period, India stood in the first rank in mathematics, astronomy, chemistry, medicine, surgery and all other branches of physical knowledge which were practised in ancient times. In many directions, India had a priority of discovery. It is true that the harmony that was established between philosophical truth and truth of psychology and religion was not extended in the same degree to the truth of physical nature. But from the beginning, starting from the thought of the Veda, the Indian mind has recognised that the same general laws and powers hold in the spiritual, the psychological and the physical existence. Omnipresence of life was discovered, and there was affirmation of the evolution of the soul in nature from the vegetable and the animal to the human form.

The philosophical mind started from the data of the spiritual experience, and it went back always in one form or the other to the profound truth of the Veda and the Upaniṣads which kept their place as the highest authority in these matters. There was a constant admission that spiritual experience is a greater thing and its light a truer, if more incalculable, guide than the clarities of the reasoning intelligence. In the epic literature of the *Māhabhārata* and the *Rāmāyaṇa*, we find a strong and free intellectual and ethical thinking; there is an incessant criticism of life by the intelligence and ethical reason. We find in it a multisided curiosity and desire to fix the norms of truth in all and an implicit or explicit assent to the spiritual truth. In the field of art, there

was insistence upon life and its creativity, but still its highest achievement was always in the field of interpretation of the religio-philosophical mind. The whole tone of art during that period was coloured by the suggestion of the spiritual and the infinite.

The master ideas of the Vedas and the Upaniṣads governed the developing turn of imagination, its creative temperament and its significant forms in which it persistently interpreted its perception of self and things, and life and universe. The sense of the infinite and the cosmic generated by the Vedic hymns is seen in a great part of the literature of the subsequent ages even as we see it in architecture, painting and sculpture. And as in the Veda, even so here, there is a tendency to see and render spiritual experience in images taken from the inner psychic plane, or in physical images transmitted by the stress of a psychic significance and impression. The tendency to image the terrestrial life often magnified, as in the *Māhabhārata* and in the *Rāmāyaṇa*, reflects the Vedic influence.

In the field of collective life, Indian society developed its communal co-ordination of the mundane life of interest and desire, *kāma* and *artha*. But it governed its action always by a reference at every point to the moral and religious law, the *dharma*, and never did it lose sight of spiritual liberation, *mokṣa*, as the highest motive and ultimate aim of the effort of life. At a still later stage, when there came about an immense development of the mundane intelligence and an emphatic stress of aesthetic, sensuous and hedonistic experience, there was a corresponding deepening of the intensities of psycho-religious experience. It may be said that every excess of emphasis on the splendour, richness, power and pleasures of life had its recoil and was balanced by a corresponding stress on spiritual asceticism. And through-

out this development, one can see the inner continuity with the Vedic and Vedāntic origins.

It is true that at one time it seemed that a discontinuity would take place. Buddhism seemed to reject all spiritual continuity with the Vedic religion. It also seemed to be a sharp new beginning. But the ideal of nirvāṇa came to be perceived as a negative and exclusive statement of the highest Vedāntic spiritual experience. The eightfold path also came to be perceived as an austere sublimation of the Vedic notion of the right, truth, and law, which was followed as the way to immortality. The strongest note of Mahāyāna Buddhism which laid stress on universal compassion and fellow-feeling was seen as an ethical application of the spiritual unity which is an essential idea of Vedānta. The Buddhistic theory of karma could have been supported from the utterances of the Brāhmaṇas and the Upaniṣads. Actually, the Vedic tradition absorbed all that could be of Buddhism, but rejected its exclusive positions.

V

We now come to the Purāṇic-Tāntric stage. There was a gradual fading out of the prominent Vedic forms and substitution of others. Symbol, ritual and ceremony were transformed; the lofty heights of the Vedic spiritual experience did not reappear as a predominant tendency, although there was further widening and fathoming of psychic and spiritual experience. The Vedic pantheon gradually faded out altogether under the weight of the increasing importance of the great Trinity, Brahmā-Viṣṇu-Śiva. A new pantheon appeared; its outward symbolic aspect expressed a deeper truth and larger range of experience, feeling and idea. The tradition of the Vedic sacrifice began to break down;

the house of Fire was replaced by the temple. The devotional temple ritual came to replace, to a great extent, the kārmic ritual of sacrifice. More precise conceptual forms of the two great deities, Viṣṇu and Śiva, came to replace the shifting mental images of the Vedic gods. The śaktis of Viṣṇu and Śiva also came to dominate the religious scene. These new concepts became stabilised in physical images, and these images were made the basis for both internal adoration and external worship.

The esoteric teachings of the Vedic hymns which centred on the psychic and spiritual discipline disappeared, although some of its truths reappeared in various new forms. These forms, as we see them in the Purāṇic and Tāntric religion and yoga, were less lofty than the Vedic nucleus of spiritual experience, but they were wider, richer, complex and more suitable to the psycho-spiritual inner life.

The Purāṇic-Tāntric stage was marked by an effort to awaken the inner mind even in the common man, to lay hold on his inner vital and emotional nature, to support all by an awakening of the soul and to lead him through these things towards the highest spiritual truth. This effort required new instruments, new atmosphere and new fields of religious and spiritual experience. While the Vedic godheads were, to the most of their worshippers, divine powers who presided over the workings of the outward life of the physical cosmos, the Purāṇic Trinity had, even for the multitude, a predominant psycho-religious and spiritual significance. But the central spiritual truth remained the same in both the Vedic and the Purāṇic-Tāntric systems, the truth of the One in many aspects. As the Vedic godheads were forms of the Supreme, even so the Purāṇic Trinity was a triple form of the one supreme Godhead and Brahman; even the Śaktis were energies

of the highest divine Being. But this truth was no longer reserved for the initiated few; it was now brought more and more powerfully, widely and intensely home to the general mind and feeling of the people.

The system of the hierarchy of the worlds that we find in the Veda was more intricate than the system found in the Pūraṇas. In the Veda, the highest worlds constitute the triple divine principle; infinity is their scope, bliss is their foundation. These three worlds are supported by the vast region of the truth whence a divine light radiates out towards our mentality in the three heavenly luminous worlds of *sva*, the domain of Indra. Below is the triple system in which we live. This triple system consists of three earths, three heavens, *dyaus*, and the connecting mid-region (*antarikṣa*). In simpler terms, the triple lower world in which we live is the world of matter, life-force and pure mind. According to the Vedic idea, each principle can be modified by the subordinate manifestation of the others within it, and each world is divisible into several provinces. Into this framework, the Vedic sages placed all the complexities of the subtle vision and its fertile imagery. The Purāṇic system is a continuation of the Vedic system, but it is simpler. The Pūraṇa recognises seven principles of existence, and the seven Purāṇic worlds correspond to them with sufficient precision, thus:

<i>Principle</i>	<i>World</i>
1. Pure Existence—Sat	World of the highest truth of being (Satyaloka)
2. Pure Consciousness—Cit	World of infinite will or conscious force (Tapoloka)
3. Pure Bliss—Ānanda	World of creative delight of existence (Janaloka)

4. Knowledge or Truth—Vijñāna	World of the vastness (Maharloka)
5. Mind	World of light (Svar)
6. Life	World of various becomings (Bhuvar)
7. Matter	The material world (Bhūr)

The Vedic interpretation of life as a movement of sacrifice and a battle continued in the Purāṇic-Tāntric tradition also. According to the Veda, the struggle of life is a warring of Gods and Titans, Gods and Giants, Indra and Python, Aryan and the Dasyu. In the Purāṇas and Tantras also, life is conceived as a struggle and battle between Devas and Asuras, Devas and Rākṣasas, armies of Gods and Goddesses and of those Āsuric, Rākṣasic and Paiśācīk adversaries. The Vedic goal of achieving immortality recurs also in the Purāṇas and Tantras, where we have symbolic story of the search after the nectar of immortality.

The Vedic idea of the divinity in man was popularised to an extraordinary extent during the Purāṇic-Tāntric stage; there was the development of the concept of *avatārs*, of the occasional manifestations of the Divine in humanity; there was also the development of the idea of the Divine presence, discoverable in the heart of every creature. New systems of yoga also developed, but the basis was the same, namely, secret of the power of concentration, of the method of concentration, and of the object of concentration. There was, however, a many-sided endeavour which opened the gates of Yoga on various levels and planes of consciousness. Many kinds of psycho-physical, inner vital, inner mental and psycho-spiritual methods came to be developed; but all of them had the common aim of realisation of a greater con-

sciousness and a more or less complete union with the One Divine, or else merger of the individual soul in the Absolute. The Purāṇic-Tāntric system provided a basis of generalised "psycho-religious experience from which man could rise through knowledge, works or love, or through any other fundamental power of his nature to some supreme experience and highest or absolute status.

VI

After the Purāṇic-Tantric stage, came the third stage of development of religion and spirituality in India. The first stage had consisted of the Vedic training of the physically minded man; the second stage took up man's outward life, as also a deeper mental and psychical life, and brought man more directly into contact with the spirit and divinity within him. But now at the third stage, there was an attempt to take up man's whole mental, psychical and physical living so as to arrive at the first beginning of at least a generalised spiritual life. This is what we see in the emergence of great spiritual movement of the saints and Bhaktas after the decline of Buddhism and an increasing resort to various paths of yoga. During this stage, there was also the great problem of receiving Islam, and, as we have said earlier, two great attempts were made to arrive at a new synthesis; one from the side of the Muslims, and the other from the side of the Hindus. The former was exemplified in the attempt of Akbar to create a new religion called Din-I-Ilahi, and the later was exemplified by the life and work of Guru Nanak. The work of Guru Nanak later gave rise to the astonishingly original and novel Sikh Khalsa movement. During this period, there was a tremendous churning of the spirit of India, and a great attempt was made to explore all

aspects of human being and to develop them in such a way that they could all open up to the spiritual light and force. This attempt had not only an individual aspect but also a collective one. This was a remarkable attempt which could have revolutionised the collective life of India. But this was interrupted on account of several factors.

Among these factors was the fact of the exhaustion of the vital force as a result of a long march and effort from the earliest times of Indian history. This exhaustion was also due to the fact that, since the sixth century B.C., there entered a current of culture which negated the meaning and significance of cosmic life. It created confusion and disbalance resulting in excessive asceticism. It impoverished life and led to the neglect of social, economic and political conditions of the country. High ideals began to be exiled from active life, and rigidities of various kinds came to imprison the forms of life of individuals and collectivities. The exhaustion of vital force also coincided with the political instability and the coming of settlers from the West. Finally, the establishment of the British supremacy in India resulted in extreme impoverishment of the Spirit of India.

VII

The third stage of religious and spiritual development of India could not bear its natural fruit although it has done much to prepare a great possibility for the future. The significance of the third stage lies in its message that the spiritualisation of the collective life cannot be achieved if only the physical mind of the common man is trained as in the Vedic Age, or even if a greater effort is made to train the psychic-emotional part of the common man's nature, as was attempted in the Purāṇic-Tāntric age. What

is needed is to turn to spiritual reality the entirety of mental, psychological and physical living of the individual and the collectivity so as to divinise the entire human life and nature.

It is significant, therefore, that there arose from the middle of the nineteenth century a reassertion of the Indian spirit which is marked by three tendencies, namely, reaffirmation of the spiritual ideal, emphasis on dynamism and creative action, and insistence on collective forms of life. The reassertion came through the works of the great personalities like Raja Ram Mohun Roy and Dayananda Saraswati, Sri Ramakrishna and Swami Vivekananda, who filled India with a new vision and power, both for the spiritual awakening and national prosperity. The new nationalist spirit was at once spiritual and social in character, and symbolised a new vibration.

It is significant also that in this awakening, the Veda and the Upaniṣads were rediscovered. The esoteric teaching of the Vedas, which was confined only to initiates during the Vedic period, seems in the new light to be a store from which Hinduism can even now draw illumination and power of regeneration. The new light does not advocate a mere revival or prolongation of the Purāṇic system, but points to something which the Vedic seers saw as the aim of human life and which the Vedāntic sages cast into the clear and immortal forms of the luminous revelation. And yet it is not to the Vedic forms that Hinduism is called upon to return. The great message of modern India, coming through its accomplished Ṛṣi, Sri Aurobindo, calls for the discovery of newer light and development of newer forms. Not to trace or retrace the old, but taking into account the treasures of the past and by liberating or developing new knowledge, even by hewing new paths, the renascent spirituality is called upon to find original solutions

to build up integral consciousness which can manifest divine consciousness potently in all fields of activity—scientific, philosophical, cultural, social, economic, and political.

VIII

Significance of the Veda is not confined merely to the fact that it is the world's first yet extant scripture, but that it is the earliest interpretation of Man and the Divine and the Universe, as also that it is a sublime and powerful poetic creation. The utterances of the greatest seers, Viśvāmitra, Vāmadeva, Dīrghatamas and many others, touch the most extraordinary heights of māntric poetry. At the early stages of the Vedic tradition, the substance of Indian religion and spirituality came to be determined by the varieties of deepest psychic and spiritual experiences shared and expressed by hundreds of the Vedic seers. It can be seen that the post-Vedic and later spirituality of Indian people was contained in the Veda in seed or in first expression.

The great force of intuition and inner experience, so evident in the Veda and the Upaniṣad, gave to the Indian mind the sense and reality of cosmic consciousness and cosmic vision. Perception of the One underlying reality, recognition of the perception of unity, as vidyā, and the necessity of the individual to lift himself from avidyā to vidyā—these are the connecting threads of Indian religion and spirituality, and these we see repeatedly emphasised in the Vedic teachings. At the same time, we have to note that, even while admitting the One without a second, *ekam eva advitīyam*, there was no paralysing exclusion of multiplicity and life in the Veda and the Upaniṣad, and there was a clear admission of the duality of the One and the distinction of the Spirit and Nature; and there was room also for various trinities and a million aspects of That One, *tad ekam*. This has created in

the Indian mind aversion to intolerant and mental exclusions, and even when it concentrates sometimes on single limiting aspect of the Divinity—and seems to see nothing but that—it still keeps instinctively at the back of its consciousness the sense of the All and the idea of the One. Even when it distributes its worship among many objects, it looks at the same time through the object of worship beyond the multitude of Godheads at the unity of the Supreme. What is of special significance is that this synthetic turn is not limited to mystics or philosophic thinkers, but extends even to the popular mind, which has been permeated by the force of thoughts, images, traditions and cultural symbols not only of the Veda and Vedānta, but also of the Purāṇa and Tantra. There is in the Indian mind a pervasive synthetic monism, many-sided unitarianism, and large cosmic universalism.

This is not to deny the fact that there have emerged in the long course of Indian history tendencies, thoughts and even religious movements characterised by exclusivism. There have been exclusive claims and counter-claims, and even quarrels and intolerance. But the efforts at synthesis have tended to prevail. Even in the field of philosophy, while trenchant positions are not absent, synthetic turn eventually predominates. In the field of Yoga, too, there have been specialisations and exclusive claims and counter-claims; claims of the path of knowledge have opposed the claims of the path of action and devotion and vice-versa, but there have also been powerful systems of synthesis, such as those of the esoteric Veda, Upaniṣads, Gītā and Tantra. Even in later times, in the movements of saints and bhaktas there is a marked turn towards synthesis, and even in our own times, in the yogic life of Sri Aurobindo and his integral yoga we have the latest effort and statement of the synthesis of yogic disciplines.

Catholicity of the Veda and the Upaniṣads has permitted remarkable changes in the forms of Indian religion and spiritual culture, even while maintaining the persistence of their spirit. And if we examine the changes that have occurred, we shall find in them a meaningful process of evolution and a certain kind of logic. Right from the Vedic times, there has been a tendency in the Indian religion to provide suitable means for the individual and collective life to develop by graded steps, and reach and experience truths of higher and spiritual existence. It was recognised that at the beginning not many could safely and successfully reach the heights, but the pioneering leaders did not accept the theory that many must necessarily remain for ever on the lower rungs of life and that only a few could climb into the free air and light, but were moved by the spirit to regenerate all and the totality of physical life on the earth. It is true that this spirit was not, at all times and in all its parts, consciously aware of its own total significance. But the total drift of the manifold sides and rich variations of the forms, teachings and disciplines of Indian religion and spirituality indicate that the aim pursued was not only to raise to inaccessible heights the few elect, but to draw all human beings and all life and all the parts and planes of the human personality upward, to spiritualise life and in the end to divinise the human nature.

Indian spirituality, as seen in the Veda, recognised both the spiritual and physical poles of existence, and sought the experience and realisation of higher planes of the spirit even in the physical consciousness (*pṛthivī*). The legend of the Angiras Ṛṣis indicates the effort to discover the lost sun and herds of light in the caves of darkness, symbolising physical inconscience. It may even be said that the Yoga of the Veda seems to suggest that

the discovery of the light in Sūrya Sāvitrī is followed and completed by the discovery and uncovering of the light in the very depths of darkness of the Inconscient, *tamas*. Not the rejection of matter and material life, but the realisation that matter too is spirit and that material life too can bear and manifest the spiritual light and bliss—this seems to be the basis of the Vedic teaching.

It is this unitive perception that could explain the drift of Indian religion and spirituality towards a wide and many-sided culture. It is true that on its more solitary summits, at least in its later periods, Indian spirituality tended to a spiritual exclusiveness, which was, whatever its loftiness, quite excessive. Actually, this exclusiveness imposed on Indian culture a certain impotence to deal effectively with the problems of human existence; consequently, there came about a general decline in science, philosophy, and all other domains of life. On the other hand, the previous training provided under the Vedic religion to the physical mind and under the post-Vedic and Purāṇic-Tāntric religion to the inner faculties had created favourable conditions for the growth and development of multisided religious and spiritual movements. These movements attempted to synthesise conflicting tendencies and to invite larger and larger sections of the society to possibilities of the multisided spiritual training and development. Even though there was a general arrest of these new developments, the Indian Renaissance has now provided fresh conditions, and the most conscious and potent expression of the new spirituality has declared the aim not of individual salvation, but of collective salvation. It has rejected the exclusive solution of the problems of human life in the attainment of world-negating spirit; it has rather affirmed the possibility of the highest spiritualising of life on the earth.

The earliest preoccupation of India, as expressed in the Veda, was the exploration of the Spirit in matter and of matter in Spirit; the intermediate preoccupation was with the seeking and experiment in a thousand ways of the soul's outermost and innermost experience marked by various conflicts and even exclusive affirmations and denials under an overarching tendency towards multisided development of the spiritual, ethical, intellectual, aesthetic, vital and physical parts of the being and some kind of synthesis. The latest trend takes up the burden and treasure of the gains of the past and looks towards the future with some kind of basis of effective realisation where tasks of the establishment of the divine life on the earth for full participation by the entire human race could be undertaken. While outlining these tasks, particularly, of the nascent India, Sri Aurobindo states:

The recovery of the old spiritual knowledge and experience in all its splendour, depth and fullness is its first, most essential work; the flowing of this spirituality into new forms of philosophy, literature, art, science and critical knowledge is the second; an original dealing with modern problems in the light of Indian spirit and the endeavour to formulate a greater synthesis of a spiritualised society is the third and most difficult. Its success on these three lines will be the measure of its help to the future of humanity.¹¹

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ŚAṄKARA'S FORMULATION OF VEDĀNTA

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In discussions regarding Śaṅkara's formulation of Vedānta, which I propose to take up here for consideration, the first and the foremost task is to see how exactly Śaṅkara's thought stands in relation to the vast body of Vedāntic texts and literature of which he claims to be a faithful commentator (*bhāṣyakāra*). It is well-known that all along his work, while propounding his own philosophy, Śaṅkara gives profuse reference of the Vedāntic passages and although at places he refers to his own position in such terms as "*asmat pakṣa*" (our side) or "*asmākam darśanam*" (our philosophy), he also speaks of the invincibility of the Upaniṣadic philosophy (*aupaniṣadam darśanam*) which, according to him, is evidently none other than the philosophy which he himself advocates. This brings out to the fore the special status which Vedānta texts enjoy in the philosophy of the Ācārya; at the same time it is also interesting to note what Śaṅkara, the

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philosopher, does with these texts and the manner in which he deals with them for propounding his thesis.

Śaṅkara wanted to point out that the Vedāntic literature refers to an existing reality in Brahman and that the passages like 'tattvamasi' are meant to refer to this existing reality, not to any injunctions or prohibitions. So Brahman can be realised only by concentrating on such passages from Vedānta. That the whole of Vedānta literature (śruti) is meant to highlight this existing reality which is non-dual, being identical with the very self of the enquirer, is evident from his commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra*, 1.1.4, *tattu samanvayāt*. A word here regarding the recent-day interpretation of śruti as logical analysis of meaning and śabda as linguistic analysis. Śruti or śabda cannot, I am afraid, be interpreted as mere linguistic analysis, for in the appropriate context Śaṅkara refers to different passages belonging to the entire body of Vedānta literature and also grades them for his purpose. So some of the passages which are regarded as śabda or śruti no less than others are relegated to a secondary status as either not being conducive to illumination or possessing only figurative significance as, for example, the passages speaking of creation. Moreover, Śaṅkara explicitly speaks in *Brahma-sūtra*, 4.1.3, of the *abhāva* of śruti when true knowledge (*prabodha*) dawns, by referring to a passage from the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, viz. "Vedā avedāḥ". All this will be inconsistent with the interpretation of śruti as mere logical analysis of language. Are we supposed to understand that logical analysis of linguistic forms ceases to function after enlightenment? So the entire body of Vedānta literature was under consideration of Śaṅkara when he was speaking of śruti or śabda as a *pramāṇa*. When he was talking of *vākyārthavicāraṇa* or the analysis of the meaning of a sentence,

in his commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra*, 1.1.2, he was advocating the theory that an analysis of the meaning of the Vedānta passages found in the body of Vedānta literature which has come down to us as śruti or śabda needs to be carried out for the comprehension of Brahman (*brahmāvagati*). And the entire context of his remark is not to be lost sight of in this connection. The idea was to refute the Mīmāṃsakas who interpreted the entire śruti as a body of injunctions (*vidhi*) and prohibitions (*niṣedha*). Certainly, one cannot say that illumination in the form of comprehension of Brahman (*brahmāvagati*), according to Śāṅkara, would follow from an analysis by itself of the meaning of any referring expression or any identity statement vis-à-vis descriptive or prescriptive statements. Even an analysis of secular statements like "Thou art the Tenth" (*daśamastvam asi*) or "This is that Devadatta" (*so'yaṁ devadattaḥ*) can lead to illumination provided they are considered along side "Tattvamasi", etc. found in Vedāntic literature, which alone are regarded as *mahāvākyas*. When we get rid of the multiple forms created by avidyā through an analysis of the meaning of the *mahāvākyas* like *Tattvamasi*, we come to realise Brahman or non-duality which is the ultimate reality according to Śāṅkara.

Śāṅkara's conception of reality is derived from the criterion of unchangeability. Whatever is permanently of one and the same nature is real, and knowledge about it is regarded as right knowledge. Śāṅkara's point is that there cannot be any controversy in matters of knowledge. There cannot be any difference of opinion regarding the fire being hot. And the knowledge of fire being hot, therefore, is right knowledge (*samyag-jñāna*) according to Śāṅkara. Taking this clue from our ordinary linguistic usage (*loke*), he builds an ontology of Brahman, the ultimate real-

ity, which never changes. And *Brahma-jñāna* is the realisation of such unchanging reality. All those distinctions that we see, being subject to change, can only be regarded as fabrications of avidyā or ignorance. When ignorance vanishes through analysis, what remains is the unchanging, non-dual reality. Analysis is a method by which ignorance can be removed and *Brahma-jñāna* arrived at provided it is accompanied by all other paraphernalia such as *śama, dama, titikṣā, uparati*, etc. along with *nididhyāsana* or constant concentration on the truth which of course is not a mere linguistic one. On the other hand, it should also be borne in mind that *nididhyāsana* is not concentration on some ontological entity called Brahman, because that would imply a distinction between the subject and the object, which is not acceptable in the context of *Brahma-jñāna*. That is why it is properly understood as *brahmānubhava* or *brahmāvagati* as distinguished from knowledge in ordinary discourse. This *brahmāvagati* alone is the final end (*puruṣārtha*) to be achieved through analysis of the meaning of the Vedānta passages (*vākyārtha-vicāraṇa*), according to Śaṅkara, and mokṣa or liberation is nothing other than that either (*brahmabhāvaśca mokṣaḥ*).

In this way one can have a proper understanding of Śaṅkara's philosophy as a comprehensive system which has been lost sight of in the maze of piecemeal linguistic analysis imposed on Śaṅkara by some recent interpreters. The impression that is given by these interpreters is that Śaṅkara was concerned only with an analysis of a sort and that too the linguistic analysis of various types of discourses. They even go to the extent of asserting that the Advaitin is talking of various structures of language and that his aim is to reveal the depth structure which is the eternal structure in contrast with the surface structure. "*Brahma*

satyam jagan mithyā," these well-known expressions ascribed to Śaṅkara are interpreted to mean that the logical subject is eternal and incorrigible whereas the logical predicate is corrigible. Moreover, the well-known criterion of Reality put forward by Śaṅkara in the *Gītā-bhāṣya*, viz. "*yad-viṣayā buddhiḥ na vyabhicarati tat sat*", is taken to refer to an idea, not to the reality, the interpretation given being "that idea in our discourse which is not capable of change is the eternal or Sat". But in fact Śaṅkara here is speaking of the criterion of *reality* (*N.B.*, *yad viṣayā buddhiḥ*), *not* of mere *idea* in our discourse, nor is there any justification for reducing the distinction between Brahman and *jagat* to a distinction of the logical subject and the logical predicate. Certainly, Brahman of Śaṅkara was not meant to be identified with a mere logical subject. Logical subject has only a specific and restricted use in its tradition. My point is that there is a peculiar ontic reference in Śaṅkara which cannot be eliminated, and this ontic reference cannot be brought out by pointing out the role of logical subject in language. Such exclusive talk of logical subject–logical predicate distinction in Advaita not only involves the fallacy of reductionism, but it also amounts to a sort of philosophical anachronism. Śaṅkara does advocate enlightenment through analysis, no doubt, but analysis here is to be taken as the analysis of *akhaṇḍārthaka vākyas* in so far as it is conducive to the eradication of avidyā resulting in enlightenment with regard to the nature of ultimate reality. Ignorance or avidyā is pervasive and deep-rooted, and as language reflects this ignorance, analysis of language becomes necessary for eradication of ignorance. But what is important is that ignorance about the nature of reality to be eradicated and illumination regarding the nature of the same to be obtained—not illumination about linguistic form

alone— which would constitute mokṣa or liberation according to Śaṅkara.

Avidyā or adhyāsa, according to Śaṅkara, is to have the idea of something in something else (*atasmin tadbuddhiḥ*). In this particular context it would signify the idea of the Self being confused with that of the object and the idea of the object being confused with that of the Self. For Śaṅkara the *lokavyavahāra* or our normal day-to-day transactions are based on *adhyāsa* and are expressed in ordinary language such as "I am this," (*aham idam*) and "This is mine," (*mama idam*). The issue, thus, is ontological, not merely linguistic. It is the all-pervasive and deep-rooted ignorance of the non-dual reality in Śāṅkara Vedānta which is at the basis of our ordinary transactions expressed in the form of linguistic expressions, "I am this" and "This is mine." The confusion expressed in the form of our ordinary language is based on a deep-rooted ignorance which is regarded as *anādi* (beginningless), *ananta* (endless), and *naisargika* (natural). Confusion such as a man considering himself hale and hearty or the contrary so long as his wife and children, etc. are hale and hearty, or a man taking himself to be stout, lean, fair, mute, deaf or blind, etc. are all expressions of a deep-rooted ignorance or avidyā in Śāṅkara Vedānta. Not only this, the entire transactions of man as an agent or an enjoyer are based on this ignorance. It is true that ordinary language reflects this ignorance, but this is only in the case of those who take ordinary language to be revealing the nature of ultimate reality, that is to say, so far, as ordinary language is taken to be something more than *vyāvahārika*. A philosophically enlightened person may use the same language knowing fully well that this is of mere practical value, and all the while he is not misled by the distinctions expressed in the form of ordinary

language. Language, therefore, does not necessarily create the illusion of which Śaṅkara speaks, nor is it a fact that the confusion here is merely verbal.

Ignorance consists in seeing distinctions where, in reality, there is no distinction. Ignorance of non-dual reality is all-pervasive and affects one and all, and this deep-rooted character and universality of ignorance are emphasised by the term 'māyā' in Śaṅkara Vedānta. Māyā is not to be regarded as a mysterious explanatory principle by means of which the origin of the multiple universe from non-dual Brahman is somehow explained by Śaṅkara, for Śaṅkara as a philosopher was not at all concerned with, or interested in advancing, any such speculative hypothesis about the process of creation. The fact that every one sees multiplicity where there is distinctionless non-dual reality and is deceived by varieties of linguistic forms is simply designated here as māyā. Distinctionless non-dual reality has an ontic status in Advaita Vedānta, and the error is therefore an ontological one expressed in the form of our behaviour, normal transactions, and in ordinary language. In this context it would be worthwhile to remember that vidyā, for Śaṅkara, is "*vastu-svarūpāvadhāraṇa*" or the ascertainment of the nature of Reality, not mere linguistic illumination.

Analysis no doubt is a means to eradicate error, but it has to be an analysis of the Vedānta type; unless the *advaita* nature is realised through such analysis, mere linguistic clarification will not do. It is, therefore, essential to make a distinction between mere understanding of the linguistic form through analysis on the one hand, and the eradication of ignorance and consequent realisation of *advaita* which is effected through analysis on the other. What exactly is the difference between the understanding

of different forms of language and the understanding that eradicates avidyā through analysis? This will be clear from the word "adhyavasāna" which is used by Śaṅkara immediately following the words "vākyārtha-vicāraṇa". Vācaspati Miśra in his *Bhāmātī* has very rightly explained "adhyavasāna" as "savāsanā-avidyā-dvayoccheda", i.e. the eradication of two types of ignorance along with their tendencies. Ignorance manifests in the ordinary language and in our normal transactions when we regard a person as ignorant in the usual sense (*tūlāvidyā*) as well as ignorance in the sense of having deep-rooted ignorance (*mūlāvidyā*) which is no less reflected in ordinary language to be eradicated, and then only there will be *Brahmāvagati* which of course is *puruṣārtha*. If this point is lost sight of, as it has been in the case of those who regard linguistic illumination to be the be-all and end-all in Śaṅkara Vedānta, how is one going to explain Śaṅkara's condemnation in the *Viveka-cūḍāmaṇi* of the *vidvān*, one who is learned in Vedānta (*vedāntanayāntadarśī*) as Śaṅkara calls him? The same word 'vidvān', however, has been used in Śaṅkara Vedānta also to refer to a *brahmajñānī* whose ignorance has been removed, for example, when Śaṅkara speaks of *viduṣaḥ sarva pravṛtṭy-asambandhaḥ* in his commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra*, 1.1.4. To my mind it is very important to draw a distinction between these two types of "vidvān" as envisaged in Śaṅkara's literature. The point which I want to make is that mere understanding of the logic of language in the sense of clarifying the distinctions between subject and predicate, or distinguishing between the various types of discourses like prescriptive, descriptive or referring, is not the same as *brahma-jñāna*. Knowledge of these distinctions may be necessary, but my point is that it is not sufficient. Śaṅkara explicitly points out that even if one is intelligent, schol-

arly, clever and full of insight into the most subtle meanings of the *śāstras*, still on being enveloped by *tamas* one regards the unreal to be the reality. Here again the implication is that knowledge of subtle distinctions of meaning is not enough. Moreover, one fails to understand how, on the radically linguistic version of Advaita Vedānta, one would explain Śaṅkara's statement that the knower of the six systems of philosophy including Vedānta is not fit for liberation whereas one who is free from the bondage of attachment towards objects alone is fit for liberation.

A word of clarification here concerning *brahmānubhava* or *brahmāvagati*. I fail to understand how it can be construed as intuitive experience of Brahman when Brahman is not an object of any experience whatsoever and when analysis is supposed to lead to enlightenment consisting in *Brahmānubhava*. I would rather construe *Brahmānubhava* or *Brahmāvagati* as realisation, comprehension or understanding of the nature of ultimate Reality consequent upon the analysis of the meaning of the Vedānta passages. There is little support to be found in Śaṅkara's writings for intuition being regarded as a means of enlightenment. In any case, *brahma-jñāna* is certainly not a matter of having an intuitive flash, and therefore it is definitely misleading to suggest that *brahmānubhava* is a sort of intuitive experience.

"Can the Analytic Approach 'save' Śaṅkara as a philosopher?"—this is the subtitle of a learned article included in the Volume, *Perspectives on Vedānta* recently published in 1988, its main title being "Analytic Philosophy and Advaita". The subtitle is indeed thought-provoking and is, to say the least, suggestive in an interesting way. From the subtitle itself one gets the impression that Śaṅkara as a philosopher is perhaps in urgent need of being saved and that some attempt has already been made

to save him by a sort of *ad hoc* approach; viz. the analytic approach. The author of the learned article, Klive, now raises the question whether such an approach can "save" Śaṅkara as a philosopher. It should be noted in this connection that the learned professor, while referring to those who have tried to interpret in some sense or the other Śāṅkara Vedānta from the perspective of analytic philosophy, has put them all in one basket as it were. This may be a convenient device, practically speaking, but it is, to say the least, a misleading distortion of fact, as will be evident to those who belong to analytic philosophy itself in some sense or the other. Here I will devote myself only to some of the points which are specifically raised by Klive in connection with my approach to Śaṅkara, with a view to reassess my own position vis-à-vis his observations, specially because this discussion is expected to throw further light on the topic under consideration, viz. "Śaṅkara's Formulation of Vedānta."

First of all, I should clarify that my approach to Śāṅkara Vedānta has all along been that of an enquirer (*jijñāsu*) wanting to understand what it is all about. Throughout my career, since the days when I was a student of philosophy at Allahabad, I have been trying to understand the Ācārya in his own terms as far as possible without trying to impose any methodology or idea of my own. And this is how it should be when we are confronted with the work not only of an Ācārya of the stature of Śaṅkara, but also with any work for that matter. It is of course another matter if I have subsequently been equipped with the technique of present-day linguistic analysis, and have tried to see how far, if at all, Śaṅkara could be understood in this light. But as far as my knowledge goes, it has all along been an attempt on my part to understand Śaṅkara's own formulation; I have never tried to impose an

alien method or technique on an indigenous soil, nor have I tried to "save" Śaṅkara as a philosopher through an analytic approach. For me, Śaṅkara, being a philosopher in his own right, does not stand in need of being saved by any approach, but what is important to note at the same time is that the exact nature of Śaṅkara's philosophical illumination needs to be brought out, rather rediscovered, from time to time so as to be intelligible in the conceptual framework of the age to which one belongs. And this is all that I have done in my discussions on Śaṅkara; my task, all along, has been to see what, if any, is the nature of philosophical illumination imparted by the Ācārya. Is it illumination through intuition, or illumination through analysis? What is the status of śruti in this connection, according to Śāṅkara Vedānta? What exactly is avidyā or adhyāsa? Is it mere linguistic confusion? What exactly is the nature and status of māyā in Śaṅkara? These are only some of the questions which have kept me occupied from time to time, and my approach, even if analytic in some sense of the term, has never been meant to run parallel to, or independent of, Śaṅkara's own writings with a view to "save" him as a philosopher, but has been meant to appreciate his position as a philosopher with the help of the conceptual tools available to us without doing any sacrilege to the Ācārya's own writings.

In trying to understand, one of course runs the risk of misunderstanding, and I do not rule out the possibility that I might have misunderstood Śaṅkara at least in a certain context. Regarding this I can say that I should be really glad to improve my knowledge through learned criticism. As a matter of fact, a part of the thesis advocated by me in *Essays in Analytical Philosophy* which mainly provides material for criticism at the hands of Klive has already been superseded somewhat by my later understand-

ing of Śaṅkara incorporated in my article included in that very Volume, *Perspectives on Vedānta*, although at the same time I must point out that the general spirit of my approach throughout, including that of the present paper, remains somewhat uniform.

Now I will concentrate on three different points raised by Klive in connection with my approach to Śaṅkara. The first one is regarding the question whether Śaṅkara was a mere commentator (*Bhāṣyakāra*), or an independent, "free" thinker. Klive seems to suggest that Śaṅkara was a scriptural commentator, not an analytic philosopher. "What if," asks Klive, "Śaṅkara did not want to be a 'free thinker' in Nayak's sense of the word? What if he had other goals and interests in mind (e.g. religious goals)?... May be Śaṅkara wanted to be and remained authoritarian. ... The last point, however, does not need to be taken negatively, for we know that 'authoritarian' thinkers often make many, if not more, contributions to the development of cultural life (and even philosophy) as 'free thinkers'." Now I fully agree with Klive that "authoritarian" thinkers have also made significant contributions to the cultural life and even to philosophy. But the question is whether Śaṅkara was "authoritarian" in the sense in which Klive wants to make him appear. It is well-known that Śaṅkara was a commentator on the *Brahma-sūtra*, the Upaniṣads and the *Gītā*, and that he is popularly referred to as Bhagavān Bhāṣyakāra. But this is not the point at issue. The question is whether this stands in the way of Śaṅkara being an analytic philosopher or a free thinker, not in a trivial but in some significant sense. Śaṅkara advocated enlightenment through analysis of a sort of the Vedāntic statements and he freely chose those Vedāntic statements, e.g. *Tattvamasī*, from within the context of the whole of śruti which alone, according to him, is conducive to enlightenment through

analysis. And as enlightenment in respect of the nature of ultimate reality was the goal to be achieved by him, he even took resort to analysis of secular statements whenever it suited his purpose. Analysis thus plays a significant, and even at times the central, role in achieving illumination in Śāṅkara Vedānta, but it is also true at the same time that everything in Śāṅkara Vedānta cannot be reduced simply to linguistic illumination through linguistic analysis, for the comprehension of non-duality (*brahmāvagati*) is the final end (*puruṣārtha*) to be realised through analysis. If the author of *Essays in Analytic Philosophy* (i.e. I myself in my earlier version) had given any such impression that for Śāṅkara the highest end lies in obtaining a mere linguistic illumination through linguistic analysis, it certainly stands in need of correction, but at the same time it must be pointed out that Śāṅkara does not for that very reason cease to be a free thinker or an analytic philosopher and become "authoritarian".

The second point which Klive raises is that Śāṅkara's interpretation of the *Mahāvākyas* in my terms does not retain any meaning whatsoever. The function of *Tattvamasi*, according to me, is to point at, or gesture towards, the fact without giving any information about it. Klive points out that the *Mahāvākya* in that case will be reduced to sheer meaninglessness, for "we simply would not be able to recognize such a gesture as a gesture of some significance." "Quite on the contrary, *Tat tvam asi*," says Klive, "finds its meaning within some previously given context. This context is informative and specific. Otherwise, Śvetaketu remains at a loss as to what is being said or pointed at." There is no reason why I should disagree with this. The context in the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* is well-known and how *Tattvamasi* features at the end of the dialogue between the father and the son,

Āruṇi and Śvetaketu, is also known to any student of Vedānta. There is no question of denying the context in which *Tattvamasi* becomes meaningful, for I also fail to see how the analysis of *Tattvamasi* (*vākyārthavicāraṇa*) can be carried out at all in a vacuum without any context whatsoever. It is, according to me, uninformative no doubt, but what I mean by this is that it is factually not informative, in the empirical sense of course. *Tattvamasi*, when analysed appropriately within the context (*vākyārtha-vicāraṇa*) does give us *brahma-jñāna* or *brahmā-vagati*, and this certainly is not information regarding an empirical object, or even a non-empirical one for that matter to be achieved through certain means. I fail to see how or why Klive has, because of this, taken me to be unaware of the context in which *Tattvamasi* becomes meaningful and also of the fact that this context itself is informative and specific. It seems that in philosophic discussions, in spite of the best of intentions, we sometimes inadvertently talk at cross purposes on account of over-enthusiasm to make our own point.

The third point raised by Klive is whether *māyā* is an explanatory principle in Śāṅkara Vedānta. *Māyā*, according to me, is not an explanatory principle, for Śāṅkara as a philosopher was not at all interested in giving explanation of how this world of ours has come into being. The universality of ignorance is simply pointed out by Śāṅkara through the terminology of *māyā*. According to Klive, however, "*māyā* seems to remain an explanatory principle, regardless of whether it is taken to be the śakti of the Lord, or the descriptive use of language. Our language and its uses—defective or misleading as they may be—belong to the world, and to offer statements about linguistic uses is to make explanations. They may be different kinds of explanations, but

nevertheless they are explanations." Here again, my purpose is served if Klive admits that *māyā* is not a theory of explanation in the sense of explaining how the world is created out of Brahman. It is certainly not a mystifying theory, nor is *māyā* an "indefinable mysterious stuff," as Dasgupta would like to call it. My purpose has been to show, and it is served only if it is seen, that *māyā* in Śāṅkara Vedānta is not a causal theory mysteriously explaining somehow the origin of the universe from Brahman. The talk of *māyā* or magical power of God in Śāṅkara Vedānta is only an indirect way of saying that everyone is numbed and dumbfounded as it were by the compelling ignorance which, being manifest in and through our ordinary descriptive language, creates multiplicity where there is non-dual reality. And if this is also a way of explaining the nature of how things are, I have no objection to the use of the word "explanation" so long as it is borne in mind that here there is no explanation in terms of a causal theory. Once it is admitted that there is no causal explanation given by the Ācārya in terms of *māyā*, the further point of *māyā* being an explanation in terms of elucidation of the nature of how things are, can be conceded to without any difficulty or controversy and, though informative, appears to my mind to be somewhat trivial in the present context.

Finally, I would like to submit that I have tried to *understand* Śāṅkara in his own terms; my aim all along has been neither to interpret or reinterpret him so as to "save" him at any cost. The problem of enormous complexity in matters of understanding philosophy in general and Śāṅkara's philosophy in particular—a point admirably highlighted by K. Satchidananda Murty in one of his recent treatises—is no doubt there, but there seems to be no way out other than discussion, and more of vigorous discus-

sion, with a view not only to make oneself understood, but also to have a better understanding, rather an advancement in understanding, of the philosophy and the philosopher as well as of the position of one another concerned.

 OBLIGATION AND INCLINATION

S.L. Pandey*

1. The Conflict of Two Forces

There is a conflict, almost a tug of war, between obligation and inclination in the life of everyman. Obligation, or rather the sense of obligation, prompts him to do what his duty is regardless of its consequences. For example, he ought to pay his debt, even if this payment causes him great sufferings, he ought to obey his parents and so on and so forth. Again, it is self-evident that the performance of an obligation involves a constraint. It is called *vidhi* or injunction. It is charged with a peculiar prompting force which is of the nature of causation. Further, it is moral prompting and is different from physical or psychological compulsion. It is called the relation of the command to the agent commanded (*praiṣya-praiṣa-sambandha*) which is the *prius* of the relation of the act to the willing agent. S.K. Maitra rightly says that it is "determination or impulsion without com-

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pulsion or mechanical constraint on the freedom of the will". It is moral determination or the self-determination of the will itself. Compared to it, the force of inclination is psycho-physical determination that amounts to a mechanical constraint upon the freedom of will. For, inclinations mechanically drive men towards those objects that attract or please them, and take them away from those objects that are painful.

So inclinations are the springs of action. They can all be traced to *karma* or desiring which manifests itself in *rāga*, (attraction or love), *dveṣa* (hate) and *moha* (delusion). Further, from different combinations of these three inclinations a number of passions, impulses and emotions are produced. All of them drive men to their objects. Their impulsion is compulsion. It does not need or require the free choice of the agent. The moment an agent is under the influence of an impulse, he is willy-nilly driven to its object. There is no voluntary or rational activity on his part from this impulsion. That is why it is called a mechanical force. Now it is obvious that the conflict between obligation and inclination is a conflict between moral determination and psycho-physical determination. The moral determination relates a man to other men; psycho-physical determination relates him to objects. Both obligation and inclination are, thus, relations. Further, both of them produce dispositions that lead men to actions. The former promotes social ends and is altruistic in nature, whereas the latter advances individual pleasures and egoism. The conflict between them is a struggle between the power of will and the power of instincts or natural drives. It takes several forms, such as the struggle between altruism and egoism, between socialism and individualism, between prescriptivism and emotivism.

The cause of the conflict between obligation and inclination is, by and large, the dual nature of man. Man *qua* animal is a bearer of inclinations. He does his actions instinctively. But man is more than an animal. He is rational, and as rational he has an idea of duty or *dharma*. The idea comes into conflict with his animal nature that gives rise to the values of *kāma* and *artha*. Both these values can be called *kāma* alone inasmuch as *kāma* is the general term for all instinctive pleasures. So the conflict between the rational or higher nature of man and his instinctive or lower nature gives rise to the conflict between *dharma* and *kāma*. We know *dharma*, but are not prompted to do it; we know *adharma*, but are not prompted to desist from it. Why is it so? The *Bhagavad-gītā* rightly says that it is entirely due to *kāma*. It is our own naïve desiring or inclination that takes us away from *dharma*. Unless our inclinations are trimmed, curbed, controlled or refined, our sense of obligation is impotent. It becomes powerful only when our sense of higher values is awakened in us through the training of impulses and passions. The conflict between obligation and inclination begins with the knowledge of obligation and the realization of the compulsion of inclinations. *Dharma* satisfies the needs of the higher nature and *kāma*, those of the lower nature. If there is no balance between them, there arises a conflict that may threaten the very unity or integral personality of a man. But if there is a balance between them, there does not arise any conflict at all.

But the question is how to establish the balance between the two natures of man. Moreover, is balance the only way to resolve the conflict between them? Are there not other ways of resolving this conflict? Before answering these questions, let us make an ethical appraisal of inclinations, for that will help us in finding out proper answers to our questions.

2. The Ethical Appraisal of Inclinations

The world of passions, impulses and emotions is highly variegated and coloured. It has certain important features for ethical consideration. At first, all of its inhabitants are not of one and the same worth. They are undoubtedly judged, appreciated and condemned. The standard by which they are judged is not empirical. It does not belong to their own order either. When judged by this standard, some of the impulses are found to be good, some to be bad and others to be indifferent. Secondly, whatever is good must be pleasant, and whatever is pleasant is the object of sensuous attraction (*rāga*). Thirdly, a life based purely upon inclinations is mechanical and highly divided into different parts having no bond of union among them. Such a life is disorderly and chaotic and is called split personality. Fourthly, inclinations give rise to desires that are never satisfied completely. The more they are satisfied, the more they grow. Consequently, the satisfaction of desires increases the thirst of the desiring man and thereby gives him more pains than pleasures. Fifthly, inclinations are ordered, controlled and refined. This process of control and refinement is called self-control whose result is self-purification (*sattva-suddhi*). Self-control enhances the value of impulses and passions. But it does not belong to the order of impulses and passions. It is regulation that is exercised upon them from outside. In other words, it is the control of the higher nature of man over his lower nature. Sixthly, among impulses and passions there are some which are the first principles of social, moral and divine life. Sympathy, faith, love and wonder are the examples of such impulses and emotions. Upon them is based the higher life of man. There is nothing in human life which cannot be traced back to the impulses. But it does not mean that the

whole of human life is nothing but an interplay of these impulses. It simply means, on the other hand, that the world of impulses contains the seeds of all that is achieved in human life. The impulses and emotions like faith, love and wonder are generally dominated by stronger impulses like intense desire (*kāma*), anger (*krodha*), greed (*lobha*) and delusion (*moha*). The moral endeavour consists in freeing them from their subordination and servitude and making them the most dominant forces of life. Lastly, there is the state of dispassion (*vairāgya*) which is the goal of self-control. In this state all inclinations are satisfied, and man becomes completely free from their impulsion. It is called the state of well-settled reason (*sthita-prajña*), because it is not at all disturbed by the refractory impulsion of passions.

This appraisal of inclinations indicates that the world of the lower human nature is open like that of the higher human nature, and some of the inhabitants of the latter migrate to the former and settled there to rule. Again, some of the inhabitants of the lower nature are upgraded and uplifted to the higher nature. For example, love is transformed into *bhakti*, wonder into philosophy, and faith into religion. At any rate, impulses and passions are judged by reference to their conduciveness to the life that is trans-empirical or transcendental. Moreover, the pure impulses themselves drive out the impure ones and thus bridge the gulf between the transcendental and empirical worlds. As M. Hiriyanna says, "The lower inclination is to be constantly conquered by the higher. This means that the good that accrues to the agent is moral improvement which, in turn, implies an ideal of life to whose attainment all moral activity has to be adjusted."

The foregoing appraisal of inclinations indicates that they are important for moral life, and the philosophy that condemns

or approves them indiscriminately is not sound. In the light of this appraisal we can now take a survey of the views which seek the resolution of the conflict between obligation and inclination.

3. The Resolution of the Conflict

The conflicts that have been noticed between obligation and inclination are resolved in a variety of ways. Indian philosophers have tried to resolve them as follows.

At first, naturalists like Lokāyatas and some Naiyāyikas uphold that the good is pleasant, and so it is to be discovered in the domain of inclination. They reject the non-natural origin of obligation, and attempt to derive a theory of obligation from the principle that pleasure should be maximized and pain minimized. Secondly, Mīmāṃsakas are the upholders of the non-natural origin of obligations. They are the genuine deontologists in Indian ethics. They condemn all inclinations and advocate the performance of duties regardless of their consequences. *Ānṛṇya* or freedom from indebtedness is the greatest moral excellence according to them. Three obligations or *ṛṇas* have great binding on all cultured men. They are *ṛṣi ṛṇa*, *pitṛ ṛṇa* and *deva ṛṇa*, i.e. obligation to our teachers, parents and gods. Besides, there are *nitya-* and *naimittika-* *karmas* that are always obligatory. These *karmas* indicate our basic commitment not only to humanity, but also to all creatures. Hence emerges our obligation to all creatures, our duty to promote the good of all creatures. It is this obligation which is placed before himself by the Emperor Ashoka in his sixth Rock Edict. He boldly says, "If there is any valour in me, then I should get freedom from our obligation to all creatures." His memorable words, "Bhutan anamnam gaccheyam," (*bhūtānām ānṛṇyam gaccheyam*), i.e. I should acquit my obliga-

tion to all creatures, are the earliest foundation of Indian deontology and will always inspire us to fulfil our basic commitment to all creatures, let alone all human beings.

Now the inclinations which place hurdles in the performance of these obligations must be curbed by the unconditional and repeated performance of the obligations themselves. The constraint which they exercise upon our inclinations should be practised so much that inclinations may become at one with obligations.

Thirdly, perfectionists like Manu believe that the moral authority of inclinations is the lowest and as such it should be subordinated to the authority of men of good conduct. The authority of these people is further subordinated to the authority of traditional law-givers whose authority again is subordinated to the Vedas. Thus the Vedas are the supreme authority as regards the knowledge of obligation. The Veda, *smṛti*, *sadācāra*, and one's own pleasure are the respective sources of dharma. Perfectionists accept the interpretation of Mīmāṃsā insofar as the practical knowledge of obligation and the modes of its performance are concerned.

Again, Mīmāṃsakas analyse the nature of obligation according to the *varṇa*, *aśrama*, status and merit of a man. They believe that this analysis of Vedic mandates is similar to the analysis of secular commands which are always given through words. These secular commands are prescriptive judgments which lay down the ought of every man in this world. The method of interpretation adopted by perfectionists is called *loka-veda-nyāya* or the maxim of interpreting Vedic statements on the analogy of the secular statements. What is important in the view of perfectionists is the fact that they advocate the sublimation of inclinations

or passions. For them, the performance of obligation is the only way of controlling and refining impulses and passions. For this they lay down the doctrine of four stages, *brahmacarya*, *gṛhastha*, *vānaprastha* and *saṁnyāsa*. Each stage enjoins its own duties whose performance is obligatory on the part of the persons of that stage. This doctrine of four stages, spread out through the whole span of human life, envisages to train all the kind of impulses and passions in a successive but progressive order. Fourthly, theists advocate that all inclinations should be oriented towards God and should be transformed by love of God. When such a transformation takes place, the conflict between obligation and inclination blows over inasmuch as the obligation becomes the command of God and inclination, the love of God. Love and command both become one, because the lover feels pleasure in obeying the command of his Beloved. The constraint or bond of obligation becomes the chosen path of the lover.

Fifthly, the advocates of disinterested action preach a sort of dualism inasmuch as according to them all bodily actions can be done without producing any moral evil. If the agent gives up his interest in the fruits of his actions and dissociates himself from them completely, he is not to gain or lose anything morally, and so he does neither good nor evil. Sacrifice of fruits of actions, and not the sacrifice of actions themselves; is thus the goal of moral life. So inclinations are neither good nor bad in themselves; it is our contamination with their consequences that makes them good or bad. If consequences are not aimed at, or desired, while inclinations are pursued, then inclinations are amoral or morally neutral. They are purely psycho-physical phenomena or facts. It is our adoption or practice of assimilating them to the life of our will that confers on them the right of moral

citizenship. The moment we dissociate ourselves from them, we terminate their citizenship and banish them to their original realm of facts. So self-conscious observance of duties is fully compatible with a rich psycho-physical life of inclinations.

Lastly, transcendentalists reject all the above solutions and believe that both inclination and obligation are due to *ajñāna*. When truth dawns on a man, all dharmas and adharma are automatically transcended. This is the philosophy of mokṣa which does not prefer the ethics of obligation to that of inclination or *vice versa*. All actions, whether led by obligation or inclination, culminate into wisdom. The wise man is free and unbound. Whatever he does is just a natural consequence of his being. He is not bound by his actions. His mere being automatically accomplishes everything. Obviously, the transcendentalists have a deeper intuition and resolve the conflict between obligation and inclination at a higher plane of knowing. Really speaking, from the standpoint of theirs, this conflict is not authentic, but based on a mistake. They notice some degree of purposiveness in all drives and inclinations; for, no person, dull or sharp, does anything without some purpose. Moreover, they find that all obligations are endowed with some purpose. The Mīmāṃsaka Maṇḍana has acknowledged this truth and observed most profoundly that the idea of good or purposiveness (*iṣṭa-sādhana*) is the sole motive of all obligations. The purposiveness that is found in drives and inclinations is progressively perfected in the motive force of obligations and other religious acts, and is finally identified with the idea of the self itself.

4. The Vedāntic Solution

Now we have explained the conflict between obligation and inclination and also its possible resolutions that are offered

by our traditions of philosophy. Most importantly, it is found that balancing is not the only way of resolving this conflict. In fact, balancing is the way of only perfectionists. There are other important ways of defusing it. Transcendence of both obligation and inclination, their irrelevance to the right view of good life, the assimilation of the one to the other, the control and sublimation, the rectification of the will and the perpetual struggle between obligation and inclination are some of the significant ways of defusing it. But as a matter of fact, there is no conflict between values and facts, for they belong to two different universes of discourse. Nor is there any conflict between moral prompting and psychological inclination. All such conflicts are only apparent and mistaken. The real or authentic conflict that lies behind this apparent and mistaken conflict is a conflict of values themselves. As we have said earlier, it is a conflict of *dharma* and *karma*, or that of *dharma* and *artha*.

The ancient solution that *dharma* is a higher or an intrinsic value, and *kāma* or *artha* is a lower or instrumental value is fraught with inconsistencies and moral impropriety. For, both *dharma* and *kāma* can be regarded and have been regarded as instrumental values, because they are transcended by the seekers of mokṣa. Moreover, moral experience is so complex and complicated that it is not impossible to demonstrate on its basis that *kāma* is the intrinsic value and that *dharma* is just an instrumental value for it. For, *dharma* is only a way of good life and *kāma* is a necessary, though not sufficient, ingredient of good life. So new attempts must be made to dissolve or defuse this conflict of values. One such attempt may be made by Advaita philosophers, and the ethics of Advaita Vedānta can be modernized to give the most satisfactory solution of this problem. It can be equally

explained in the light of the philosophical progress from Kant to Bradley. Kant tried to give a new solution by making both obligation and inclination as the formal and the material counterparts of the same moral act respectively. But *dharma* is not formal. Nor is it merely regulative. It is also the material part of the moral life. Kant, therefore, failed to perceive the full signification of both *dharma* and *kāma*, particularly the identity of thought and purposiveness that lies between them. His successor, Hegel, was, however, better qualified to solve the conflict between *dharma* and *kāma*, or obligation and inclination, by his discovery of the dialectic. For, *kāma* or instinctive life is just the thesis and *dharma* or the life of righteousness is its antithesis. Their opposition is *aufgehoben*, i.e. preserved and annulled in self-realization which is the only value in the true sense of the word. Other values are partial or mere abstractions from it. So *kāma* and *dharma* taken separately are mere abstractions. Hence the conflict between them. This conflict is defused as and when the moral progress advances from the instinctive life to the rational life, and from that to the intuitive life. But the solution evaded the mind of Hegel inasmuch as his conception of good and ought was defective and did not comprehend the life of an impulse that has its inalienable place in the immediate experience of the truth, the good and the blissful, or in a word, the Absolute. Bradley tried to correct him when he said that "Every flame of passions, chaste or carnal, would still burn in the Absolute unquenched and unbridged, a note absorbed in the harmony of its higher bliss." Advaita Vedānta seeks this very goal when it says that self-realization is the fulfilment of all desires (*āptakāmatā*) and is the very life of bliss (*ānanda*). Existence (*asti*), thought (*bhāti*) and value (*priyam*), all become one in the ideal of self-realization. This ideal

constitutes as well as contains all the rudiments of *dharma* and *kāma*. It is the Self and Self alone for the sake of which everything is desired or done. This can be realized by existentially tracing the development of dialectical thought from Kant to Bradley through Hegel, or by following the discipline of *jñāna-mārga*. Nothing is more pure or valuable than *jñāna*, and all actions meet their perfection in it. This *jñāna* ought to be cultivated for its own sake, for it is the truth of all truths, the value of all values. Its realization is the fulfilment of all desires or inclinations (*āpta-kāmatā*) on the one hand and of all obligations, (*kṛta-kṛtyatā*) on the other. Dispassion (*vairāgya*) and freedom from obligation (*anṛnya*) assume here not only a negative meaning, they are not only the pathway to self-realization, but also the characteristic features of the value realization. *Viṣaya-kāmatā* is transformed here into *āpta-kāmatā* or *ātma-kāmatā* through dispassion, and *ṛna* or obligation to others into *kṛta-kṛtyatā* through the cessation of all duties (*sarva-kartavyatā-hāni*). Such is the significance of Vedāntic *jñāna-mārga*, or epistemic transformation of inclination and obligation into the wisdom of the sages. There is neither delusion (*moha*) nor anguish (*śoka*) in it. There is neither *vidhi* (injunction) nor *niṣedha* (prohibition) in it. Both inclination and obligation have reached their logical nemesis in it.

Sashi Prabha Kumar*

"*Pratibodha-viditam*" is a very subtle and poignant term which occurs in the *Kena Upaniṣad* and has been interpreted as *sākṣi caitanya* by none other than the great Śaṅkara himself after positing and rejecting several other interpretations of the term. It is intended here to analyse the various *pūrvapakṣas* rendered by Śaṅkara in both of his commentaries on the *Kena Upaniṣad* and the nature of *sākṣi caitanya* as advocated by him in the explanation of this term. The present paper has accordingly been divided into two sections: (i) Section I will deal with various views referred to, but repudiated by Śaṅkara regarding the term *pratibodha-viditam*; (ii) Section II will discuss Śaṅkara's own viewpoint wherein the nature of *sākṣī* will be enunciated.

I

The *Kena Upaniṣad* is a small but important text of Vedānta which deals with the nature of Brahman, the supreme

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Reality and the highest consciousness. In the first two sections of this Upaniṣad, the nature of the unqualified Brahman is pointed out, while the last two sections of the text propound the qualified Brahman. Since the term *pratibodha-viditam* appears in the second section of the *Kena*, the present paper is primarily concerned with the first two sections of the text.

The text under discussion is titled "Kena", for it starts with the word *kena* (by whom) itself. The Upaniṣad begins with a query of the disciple: who is the propeller of sense organs, motivator of mind and propagator of vital air, and how can one know it?¹ To this, the preceptor replies that Brahman is the motivating principle of all the sense organs, mind and vital air. In other words, it is the Ear of the ear, Eye of the eye, Mind of the mind.² Brahman is the supreme Reality to be known, but it is not possible to know it like ordinary objects by ordinary means, since the sense organs cannot reach it and the mind cannot comprehend it. In the words of śruti, Brahman is neither *viditam* (known) nor *aviditam*³ (unknown); it has to be understood as *pratibodha-viditam*⁴ (to be known as an underlying principle of all cognitions). It is only after one has realised it in this form that one attains immortality, the highest goal of life.

From this point of view, *pratibodha-viditam* is the key term of the *Kena Upaniṣad* in the sense that it provides a clue for realisation of Brahman within one's own self as an ever-present, all-comprehensive awareness.⁵ To realise that highest truth in this form is the real knowledge according to this scriptural statement which is highlighted by Śaṅkara in two of his commentaries of the *Kena Upaniṣad*, namely *Pada-bhāṣya* and *Vākya-bhāṣya*. He explains the term *pratibodha-viditam* in various ways, but then accepts and interprets it as the realisation of Brahman in

the form of *sākṣi caitanya*. Therefore the term *pratibodha-viditam* signifies a technique for self-realisation. To grasp it in its fullest depth, an enquiry into several meanings ascribed to the term is envisaged here.

Śaṅkara has given the following interpretations of the term *pratibodha-viditam*.

(1) The first explanation of the term treats the compound as an instance of *tritīyā tatpuruṣa* and breaks it as: *pratibodhena viditam* (known by the process of knowing). This interpretation seeks to establish an independent self as the agent of cognition, just as air is a mover of trees, etc.⁶ In this sense, self is an agent in the form of a knower, but is different from knowledge as such. This *pūrvapakṣa* may be formulated as follows: *Bodhakriyā-śaktimān ātmā bodhotpādakatvāt yo vṛkṣaśākhāś cālayati sa vāyuriti tadvat*.

Śaṅkara rejects this view by pointing out that the above argument clearly leads one to the acceptance of an unconscious self because it tends to prove the self on the basis of knowledge, but not in the form of knowledge itself. Moreover, this view is not in accordance with the basic philosophy of the Upaniṣads, for it purports to present the self as transitory, non-eternal and impure. Knowledge, if it is separate from the eternal self and is merely in the form of knowing process, has to be transitory.⁷ Hence, when that knowing process is over, then the self in the form of unqualified substratum would be left. It may be mentioned here that the above view does not seem to belong to any particular philosophical school, it seems reflective of the common-sense view of the self.

(2) Śaṅkara now addresses himself to the task of analysing the second interpretation of the term *pratibodha-viditam*. He

says that, improving upon the first viewpoint, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas may put forth their own conception of Ātman stating that, although it is not of the nature of knowledge or consciousness, yet the self is immutable. For example, the application of heat to a black pot makes it red in colour, but there is no change in essence of the pot. Similarly, knowledge (as a quality) inheres in the Ātman (a substance), but it does not bring about any change, in the essence of its substratum. This view may be put in the form of an argument as follows:

*Ātmani boddhṛtvam na tu vikriyātmaka ātmā
yataḥ ātma-manaḥ-samyogajo bodha ātmani samavaiti
dravyamātrastu bhavati ghaṭa iva rāgasamavāyi.*

To refute this view Śaṅkara has given the following arguments:

- (i) First of all, the proposition that "Ātman, or for that matter, Brahman, is not conscious by nature and consciousness or knowledge is an adventitious quality of it", is not consistent with the scriptures because it contradicts the Upaniṣadic statements like "*Vijñānamānandam brahma*".⁸
- (ii) Secondly, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas postulate that knowledge arises in the self as a result of conjunction between mind and the self. But the self is supposed to be partless even in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas view and so how can there be any conjunction between the self and the mind? Conjunction presupposes some space or scope for a gap, and this is not possible in the case of partless substance, i.e. the self.⁹
- (iii) Moreover, mind is accepted as an eternal self by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, and so there will be a contingency of ever-presence of memory in each and every soul,¹⁰ which would be difficult to resolve.

- (iv) Lastly, Ātman, according to śruti and smṛti, is unqualified, undifferentiated and unique by nature. Therefore, it is quite illogical to hold that it, even though it is *asaṅga* (unattached or unrelated), conjoins with something which is not equal to it (i.e. the mind).¹¹

In this way, Śaṅkara has tried to prove that the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika explanation of the term *pratibodha-viditam* is not acceptable because it does not suit the basic philosophy of the Upaniṣads.

(3) The third standpoint alluded to by Śaṅkara, while explaining the term *pratibodha-viditam*, is regarding self-awareness of knowledge, i.e. the self is to be known (*viditam*) by itself (*pratibodha*).¹² Some corresponding śruti statements are also cited in support of this view.¹³ But Śaṅkara clarifies that this explanation is also not correct. Since Brahman or the highest truth is one and unconditioned, there is no possibility of self-awareness at this level. As far as the śrutis quoted above are concerned, he points out that they refer to the empirical level only where Ātman is conceived of as conditioned by *buddhi*, etc. since pure consciousness can never turn to grasp its own nature. In essence the self is one and only one, not different from knowledge; it is in fact in the form of knowledge itself; so it does not require another knowledge just like a light does not require another light to illumine it.¹⁴ In Śaṅkara's words, the highest truth is neither *sva-saṁvedya* nor *para-saṁvedya*, because it is above all such conditions.

(4) Now, it may be argued that the Buddhist *Vijñānavādins* also hold the same view, i.e. *vijñāna* is the only reality; it is self-luminous and self-evident and does not require anything else to illumine it. But there is a basic difference in the Buddhist and the Advaitic views in so far as the former does not subscribe to any

eternal principle of consciousness; for them everything is momentary while in the latter view, Ātman is eternal and indestructible as propounded by the scriptures.¹⁵ Therefore Śaṅkara rejects the above view also by saying that it is in contradiction to various śrutis.

(5-6) The next two interpretations of the term *pratibodha-viditam* mentioned by Śaṅkara are as follows: According to one view, the realisation of happiness during sound sleep where no external factor is available for generating the feeling, is *pratibodha*.¹⁶ Explaining this view, Ānandagiri, in his gloss on Śaṅkara's commentary, has stated that "*asamprajñāta samādhi*", is the real import of the term *pratibodha*.¹⁷ The second meaning of the term referred to here by Śaṅkara is that *pratibodha* is "instantaneous salvation", which is also explained by some scholars as *sakṛd-vijñānam*.¹⁸ It means that the attainment of knowledge causes salvation at that very moment and there is no necessity of a second knowledge.

Śaṅkara has not given any argument in rejection of these two explanations, but has just disposed them of as unacceptable by using the word "*apare*" which is often used as a demarcative of dislike.

(7-8) In his commentary called "*vākyabhāṣya*", Śaṅkara, after giving the first meaning of the term as *sākṣi caitanya* acceptable to him, has cited two more meanings of the term *pratibodha-viditam* as follows: (i) The first one is a conventional, commonsense view which is based on a simile, i.e. *pratibodhavad viditam*.¹⁹ Here, *pratibodha* means awakening; just as a person who awakens after deep sleep is free of all his false impressions in the dream, similarly one who has realised Brahman is free of all the false views at once. (ii) The second one explains *pratibodha*

as instruction of the teacher: "*Gurūpadeśaḥ pratibodhaḥ, tena viditam pratibodha-viditam.*" It means that Brahman is to be known only by the instruction of the teacher.²⁰

After citing both the above meanings, Śaṅkara rejects them without giving any reason whatsoever. He simply states, "*Pūrvam tu yathārtham,*"²¹ i.e. the meaning which was given earlier is correct and acceptable. By *pūrvam*, he intends to say that the first meaning which he has referred to in the beginning, prior to those later explanations which he is citing and refuting now, does actually convey the exact sense of the śruti. And that first interpretation of the term *pratibodha-viditam* put up by Śaṅkara in both of his commentaries on the *Kena Upaniṣad* is verily the Brahman as *sākṣi caitanya*, which forms the second section of this paper.

II

It is worth mentioning here that although Śaṅkara, while explaining the term *pratibodha-viditam*, has not explicitly used the term *sākṣi*, but on analysing all the epithets that he uses therein, it is more than clear that this is precisely his view. It is not without reason then that Ānandagiri says it conclusively in his commentary of Śaṅkara's following words:

(a) *Pratibodha eva hi saḥ.*²²

(b) *Sarvathā api paramātmā pratibodha eva bodham prati bodham prati sākṣitayā bhātīti.*²³

According to Śaṅkara, the term *pratibodha* is to be understood as an *avyayībhāva* in the sense of *yathā*:²⁴ *bodham bodham prati viditam* is a case of *vīpsā* (repetition) and that which is known as *pratibodham* is *pratibodha-viditam*. From this point of view, the word literally means "that which is revealed in all cognitions";

i.e. the seer of all knowledge, "*sarva-pratyaya-darsī*" in Śaṅkara's own words, and technically it may be known as the *sākṣi caitanya*. In fact, this is the meaning which Śaṅkara has subscribed to in both of his commentaries on the *Kena Upaniṣad*. It is also noteworthy that it is only in this explanation that the word *prati* has a special significance; otherwise in all the interpretations quoted and repudiated above, the word *pratibodha* is simply an equivalent to *bodha*. Therefore, Śaṅkara's own view has a linguistic justification too.

In its common import, the word *sākṣī* means 'seeing or experiencing without being agent of the act concerned.'²⁵ It is admitted to be the evidencing consciousness which reveals the object by imparting immediacy to it. This fact is well substantiated by the grammatical formulation of the word *sākṣī* too.²⁶ Accordingly, Śaṅkara has expounded the nature of Ātman as *sākṣī*. Only, this Ātman or Brahman can be truly regarded as self-evident and self-luminous or directly perceptible²⁷ which is the essential feature of *sākṣī*.

In fact, the Upaniṣads declare Brahman as pure Being, pure Consciousness and Infinity;²⁸ these words imply one another, since Being is not essentially different from consciousness. In other words, consciousness is not a contingent quality of Being, Brahman or Ātman. It eternally shines forth in an unabated form.²⁹ It is the light that illumines uniformly and reveals the objects when the veil of nescience is removed from them; this light of consciousness never ceases or wanes. Viewed from this angle, knowledge is self-luminous as also the illuminator of all that is. It is called *sākṣī* because it not only perceives things directly, but also because it remains unchanged and unaffected.³⁰ According to Śaṅkara, nothing other than Brahman is real, and

Brahman is not different from Ātman whose essence consists in consciousness; the *sākṣī* who is certainly self-luminous, is held to be so because it is taken as representing the unity of consciousness, and thus it predates and sustains all representations. Although we do not come across the term "*sva-prakāśa*" in Śaṅkara's writings, yet he explicitly uses the term *sākṣī* in his *Bhāṣya* on the *Brahma-sūtra*.³¹ It is also clear that he treats Ātman or self as *sākṣī* when it enlightens the manifold states of *antaḥkaraṇa*.³² Thus, we may say that for Śaṅkara, *sākṣin* is a kind of enduring, passive and unchanging awareness, which observes and reveals mental cognitions and physical objects as well as witnesses all changes and activities.³³ In other words, *sākṣī* or the self does not really do anything; it can yet reveal, like the sun, which has no illuminating activity, and yet illumines or heats objects, by its mere presence.³⁴

In the light of the above, when we look at Śaṅkara's commentaries on the *Kena Upaniṣad*, the following points emerge with regard to the concept of *sākṣī*: (i) According to the reference of the term *pratibodha-viditam*, it is worth noting that Śaṅkara here is talking of Brahman as the highest innermost consciousness which is ever-present and self-evident in all forms of knowledge.³⁵ It may be taken as a representative of the scriptural epithet "*satyam*" with regard to Brahman. (ii) The word *prati* in the compound "*pratibodha-viditam*" implies each and every cognition; it is a very significant qualificative, since Brahman is not a *sākṣī* in the ordinary sense of the term who might evidence some particular position.³⁶ It is a witness to all cognitions in the sense that all cognitive processes emanate and culminate in this very supreme consciousness. In other words, it is the underlying substratum of all cognitive processes, but it is not different in

identity from knowledge or consciousness.³⁷ In this sense, it may be understood to signify the term "*jñānam*" of the śruti. (iii) This brings us to the acceptance of the eternal, ever-conscious principle which knows everything not through any sort of cognitive activity, but by its being everything. If it is not everlasting, then it ceases to be "*sarva-pratyaya-darśī*" as Śaṅkara himself highlights in his commentary on the *Kena Upanisad*.³⁸ Thus, while consciousness appears in modes as varying and temporarily determined, it is found constant and invariable in its aspect of transcendental evidencing.³⁹ Put in simpler terms, this principle may be expressed as a witness to all agencies, though not an agent itself. This is possible due to its infinity or transcendental unity, which is termed as "*anantam*" by the śruti. Although Brahman is being described here as "seer of all cognitive processes", yet it has to be emphasised that the adjunct of 'seer' is just being used at the empirical level only; at the transcendental level this seer is not different from seeing, in fact it is seeing proper.⁴⁰ (v) That is what Śaṅkara himself has repeatedly clarified in so many terms: *Pratyayairevā pratyayeṣu aviśiṣṭatayā lakṣyate*.⁴¹ It means that there is no difference at the level of pure Consciousness or Brahman; it is itself known as undifferentiated knowledge through knowledge, for knowledge is its own essence. (vi) In other words, Brahman is being described as a witness or an observer in the sense that all our cognitions are pervaded by the innermost eternal consciousness which is in the form of knowledge itself. Just as the sun is self-luminous, but it is termed illuminator only when there is a reference to something else being illuminated, similarly Brahman is pure, one and the supreme Reality which is undifferentiated, but we talk of it as *sākṣī* only with reference to *sākṣya*,⁴² i.e. objects of knowledge. (vii) Brahman is all-pervad-

ing like *ākāśa*, which is to be experienced as present in a pot, cave or mountain, etc.; they are simply said to be the limiting adjuncts of an omnipresent reality, but they cannot in fact limit it. (viii) We can experience its presence in all beings as *pratibodha-viditam*: this is a unique way of self-realization, and Śāṅkara illustrates this in the following manner: Just as the existence of fire can be felt in a piece of hot iron, similarly we can experience Brahman in each one of our cognitions. In the case of hot iron, we cannot separate heat from iron, but at the same time we cannot negate it. In the same way we cannot discriminate the knower from knowledge and the known, but we can't negate it too. This is what is meant by Śāṅkara when he says that Brahman has to be known in the form of *pratyagātma-vijñāna* and not as *viśaya-vijñāna*.⁴³ In other words, there are two ways of looking at a piece of hot iron. (a) It is a piece of iron which is hot. (b) There is heat permeating in the iron which is illuminating it. The first way of looking is known as *viśaya-vijñāna* and is the cause of ignorance and suffering while the latter one is *pratyagātma-vijñāna* and is the means to immortality.⁴⁴ Heat is unchangeable, all-pervasive and illuminating while iron is changeable, delimited and dark. Similarly, Brahman itself in the form of knowledge is eternal, but not the objects which are illusory and transitory. Hence, one who knows it in this form, rises above death and reaches immortality. (ix) It is also noteworthy in this connection that the term in question denotes Brahman or the highest truth only as *sākṣī*; it does not deal with lower or limited forms of consciousness such as *Īśvara*, *jīva*, etc. It envisages the supreme reality in the nature of pure consciousness which is self-luminous; no amount of means or modes can describe it as such. On the contrary, it is ever-effulgent in all our experiences as an un-

derlying witness thereof. (x) It is not the doer (*karṭṛ*), enjoyer (*bhokṭṛ*) or knower (*jñāṭṛ*), but a mere observer (*draṣṭṛ*) in the form of *sākṣī*.⁴⁵ It is termed *sākṣī* because of its being immediately conscious of everything without in any way being affected by them. This witness is absolute consciousness in the form of unchanging intelligence underlying all our experiences. It is the all-evidencing seer, but it remains untouched and unmoved by affections of any kind because of its being only a silent observer;⁴⁶ nescience can keep away everything from view, but not the witnessing consciousness.⁴⁷ Such an underlying principle in the background may be characterised in terms of "knowing by way of immediate evidencing" (*sākṣātkāri-jñānatva*).⁴⁸ The said evidencing principle may prove to be the transcendental precondition in all particular instances of perceiving or experiencing.

To conclude, we may say that, after analysing Śaṅkara's commentaries on the term *pratibodha-viditam* in the *Kena Upaniṣad*, it is quite clear that although he has given several interpretations of the term,⁴⁹ yet he has approved of the view that this term conveys the idea of Brahman as *sākṣi caitanya*. This idea will be more substantiated when we look at his own words in both the commentaries:

- (i) *Sarve pratyayā viṣayībhavanti yasya sa ātmā sarvabodhān pratibudhyate.*⁵⁰
- (ii) *Tasmāt pratibodhāvabhāsa-pratyagātmatayā yad viditaṁ tad brahma tadeva mataṁ jñātam.*⁵¹

Hence, there is no doubt about the fact that *pratibodha-viditam* is the most important and most subtle term of the *Kena Upaniṣad*. If we dwell upon the six traditional factors for interpreting the Vedāntic texts, we might even go to the extent of saying that the verse containing this particular term in the *Kena Upaniṣad*

is the *upasañhāra* (conclusion) for the main text. That is why many scholars opine that the remaining text of the *Kena* is only interpolation.

To sum up, it may be said that according to the Upaniṣads, Brahman is Ātman, or the light which is ever-effulgent in the nature of consciousness in all our cognitions; and this is exactly the meaning of *pratibodha-viditam*, which is explained by Śāṅkara as "*sarva-bodha-boddhṛtvam*" in the following words: *Tasmān nityāluṭṭavijñānasvarūpajyotirātmā brahmety-ayamarthaḥ sarvabodhaboddhṛtve ātmanaḥ siddhyati nānyathā*.⁵²

NOTES

1. *Keneṣitam patati preṣitam manaḥ
kena prāṇaḥ prathamāḥ praiti yuktaḥ
keneṣitām vācam imām vadanti
cakṣuḥ śrotraṁ ka u devo yunakti. Kena Upaniṣad, 1.1 (KU).*
2. *Śrotrasya śrotram manaso mano yad
vāco ha vācam sa u prāṇasya prāṇaḥ
cakṣuṣaś cakṣur atimucya dhīrāḥ
prety āsmallokād amṛtā bhavanti. Ibid., 1.2.*
3. *Anyadeva tad veditād atho aviditād adhi. Ibid., 1.4.*
4. *Pratibodha-viditam matam amṛtatvam hi vindate, Ibid., 2.4.*
5. Sri Aurobindo, *Kenopaniṣad*, p. 85.
6. Śāṅkara Padabhāṣya (SPB), pp. 80-81 (Gita Press edition).
7. Ibid., p. 81.
8. *Asmin pakṣepy-acetanam dravyamātram brahmeti
'Vijñānmānandam brahma', 'Prajñānam brahma' ityādyāḥ
śrutayo bādhitāḥ syuḥ.*
9. Ibid., p. 83.

10. Ibid., pp. 82-83.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid., p. 84.
13. (i) *Ātmanyevātmānam paśyati (Br. Up. 4.4.23).*
(ii) *Svayamevātmanātmānam vettha tvam- puruṣottama (Gītā, 10.15).*
14. Ibid., pp. 84-85.
15. Ibid., p. 85.
16. Ibid.
17. Ānandagiri's *Ṭikā* on the above, pp. 19-20 (Ānandāśrama Edition, vol. VI).
18. *SPB*, p. 85.
19. Śaṅkara in *Vākya Bhāṣya, (SVB)* on *Kena Upaniṣad*, p. 87.
20. Ibid.
21. *SVB*, p. 88.
22. *SPB*, p. 86.
23. Ānandagiri's *Ṭikā* on the above, p. 20.
24. *SVB*, pp. 78-79.
25. *Akartṛtve sati draṣṭṛtvam, Advaitadīpikā*, 1, p. 439.
26. *Sarveṣām- bhūtānām sākṣī, sākṣād draṣṭari samjñāyām, Pāṇini*, 5.2.91.
27. *Śaṅkara and Indian Philosophy* (State University of New York Press, USA, 1993), p. 184.
28. *Satyam jñānāmanantam- brahma, Taittirīyopaniṣad*, 2.1.
29. *Tacchubhrām jyotiṣām jyotiḥ, Muṇḍakopaniṣad*, 2.9.
30. *Sākṣādīkṣaṇāt nirvikāratvācca, Siddhānta-leśa-saṅgraha*, 1.
31. *Brahma-sūtra-bhāṣya* on *Adhyāsa*
32. S.S. Saha, *Svaprakāśatva, Sākṣijñāna and Sākṣin*, in *Perspectives of Śaṅkara*, Ed. R. Balasubramanian (Department of Culture, Ministry of H.R.D, Govt. of India), p. 51.

33. Bina Gupta, *The Disinterested Witness* (North Western University Press, USA, 1998), p. 48.
34. A.K. Chatterjee and R.R. Dravid, *The Concept of Sākṣī in Advaita Vedānta*, (BHU, 1979), p. 20.
35. *SVB*, pp. 79-80.
36. *Nyāyakośa*, pp. 989-90.
37. *Bhāmatī on Brahma-sūtra*, 2.2.28.
38. *SVB*, p. 79.
39. *Pañcadaśī*, 4/24.
40. Sitanath Goswami, *Kenopaniṣad Vivaraṇa*, p. 140.
41. *SPB*, p. 79.
42. *Vivaraṇa on KU*, p. 140.
43. *SVB*, p. 80.
44. *Ibid.*, pp. 80-87.
45. *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad*, 6.11.
46. A.O. Fort, *The Self and Its States*, (MLBD, New Delhi), pp. 117-118.
47. M.N. Sircar, *Vedāntic Thought and Culture*, p. 156.
48. Debabrata Sinha, *The Idealist Standpoint, A Study in the Vedāntic Metaphysic of Experience* (Santiniketan, 1965), p. 75.
49. It is also to be noted in this connection that in his commentary called *Pada-bhāṣya*, Śāṅkara has given some philosophically more significant meanings of the above term; hence it is more useful in discerning the exact meaning of the same. In this way, it justifies the title of the commentary, i.e. *Pada-bhāṣya*.
50. *SPB.*, P.78.
51. *SVB*, p. 80.
52. *SPB*, p. 84.

G.M. Mallica

I. Introduction

The *Śrīmad-bhāgavata* is the greatest among the Purāṇas. It was communicated to the sages at Naimiṣāranya by Ugrasravā, surnamed Sūta, the son of Romaharṣaṇa. But Sūta only repeats what was narrated by Śuka, the son of Vyāsa, to Parīkṣit, the king of Hastināpura and the grandson of Arjuna. Having incurred the imprecation of a hermit by which he was doomed to die of the bite of a venomous snake at the expiration of seven days, the king Parīkṣit, in preparation for this destiny, repaired to the banks of the Gaṅgā. Even the gods and sages assembled there to witness his death. Amongst the latter was Śuka, and it was in reply to Parīkṣit's question as to what a person should do who is about to die that he narrated the *Bhāgavata* as he had heard it from

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Vyāsa; for nothing secures final happiness so certainly as to die whilst the thoughts are wholly engaged in Viṣṇu.

Thus the idea of a personal God and *bhakti* as the easiest means to realize him indeed permeates the work. Several commentaries have been written on the *Bhāgavata* emphasizing this theistic teaching of it. Each of these commentaries has its commitment to a particular variety of theistic Vedānta, namely Viśiṣṭādvaita, Dvaita, Acintya-bhedābheda, Śuddhādvaita, and Bhedābheda of Nimbārka. Strange though it may appear, there is one commentary which interprets the *Bhāgavata* from the standpoint of Advaita. This is the commentary of Śrīdharaśvāmin. The strong point of this interpretation is the existence of several passages in the *Bhāgavata* which are unmistakably of the nature of Advaita in their import—passages which teach, for example, that the Ultimate Reality is non-dual and impersonal, that the world is an illusion, that the *jīva* is non-different from Brahman, and that knowledge is the direct means to release, which can be had even while the body lasts. On the strength of such passages, the commentary claims that the overall teaching of the *Bhāgavata* is Advaita in character. Thus though the *Bhāgavata* richly provides for theistic Vedānta, its teaching actually surpasses the standpoint of theism and culminates in the standpoint of Advaita in regard to each of the basic questions of philosophy—the reality (*tattva*), the goal (*puruṣārtha*), and the way (*hita*).

The advantage of this interpretation over the theistic one is this. Theistic Vedānta necessarily excludes the teaching of Advaita. But Advaita, far from rejecting the standpoint of theistic Vedānta, includes and transcends it. Hence, when it comes to a question of dealing with passages whose primary meaning is Advaita in nature, the theistic interpreter has perforce to strain

himself to interpret them figuratively in favour of theism. To admit that there are passages of an Advaita import would be detrimental to the theistic claim. An identical difficulty does not confront the Advaitin when he deals with passages that directly convey the theistic meaning. The Advaitin could quite afford to take them as part of the edifice of Advaita. His only concern would be to show that these are not the final teaching of the text and that they are complemented and fulfilled by other passages of an Advaita significance. The admission of theism is not inimical to Advaita, but rather prepares the way for it. Thus the commentary of Śrīdhara makes out that the import of the *Bhāgavata* is deeper than it looks. While the immediate aim of the work is to teach about Bhagavān and *bhakti*, the ultimate aim is to utilize these concepts to convey the idea of Nirguṇa-Brahman as the sole reality and of *jñāna* as the final means to liberation.

The present article follows the interpretation of the *Bhāgavata* by Śrīdharasvāmin. It seeks to show that, although theism is an essential part of the *Bhāgavata*, the text does not really stop with theism, but carries this teaching over into the supra-theism of Advaita. While the *Bhāgavata* fully satisfies the thirst of the soul for the charm of a personal God, it consummates its rich and varied fare of theism in the all-comprehensive, universal philosophy of Advaita.

The chief doctrines of Advaita may be summed up as follows. Nirguṇa-Brahman is the reality. By virtue of *māyā*, or *avidyā*, Nirguṇa-Brahman appears as Saguṇa-Brahman, *jīva* and *jagat*. But while *jagat* is nothing but an appearance, Saguṇa-Brahman and *jīva* are essentially Nirguṇa-Brahman though appearing different. Hence when direct knowledge of Nirguṇa-Brahman dawns, while *jagat* disappears completely, Saguṇa-

Brahman and *jīva* reveal themselves in their true nature as Nirguṇa-Brahman. *Mokṣa* consists in the *jīva* realizing its non-difference from Brahman, overcoming *avidyā* by *jñāna*. Other disciplines like *bhakti* and *karma* prepare the way for *jñāna*. In the following pages we shall attempt to show how these doctrines find support in the *Bhāgavata*. But before entering into details, it is worthy of mention that there is a section of the text which indicates in a general way that the final teaching of the *Bhāgavata* is Advaita.

The central teaching of the work is contained in four verses occurring in the second Skandha where Lord Viṣṇu gives instruction to Brahmā (*Bhāgavata*, II, 9, 32-35). This section is known as *catuślokī-bhāgavatam*, and the whole work may be regarded as an elaboration of the teaching of these four verses. The section covers practically all the major concepts of Advaita outlined above.

अहमेवासमेवाग्रे
 नान्यद्यत्सदसत्परम् ।
 प्रश्नादहं यदेतच्च
 योऽवशिष्येत सोऽस्म्यहम् ॥ (II,9,32)

Brahman alone exists prior to the creation of the world, during its subsistence, and after its dissolution. The import of this statement is that Brahman, which is the non-dual reality, transcends the three states of the world—creation, subsistence and dissolution. The world, which is said to come into being, remain over a period, and disappear, is an illusion produced by *māyā* on the basis of Brahman. The term *param* stands for *prakṛti*, or *pradhāna*, which is the material cause of all that is gross and subtle in the world. Śrīdhara identifies *pradhāna* with *māyā/ajñāna*, which, vis-à-vis Brahman, is non-existent. Though *māyā*, or *pradhāna*,

is said to exist in the state of dissolution, it is not active in the *vikṣepa* phase. It is with this in view that it is said to be non-existent.

ऋतेऽर्थं यत्प्रतीयेत
 न प्रतीयेत चात्मनि ।
 तद्विद्यादात्मनो मायां
 यथाऽऽभासो यथा तमः ॥ (II,9,33)

This verse identifies the nature of *māyā*. The realm of duality, which is bereft of any reality (*ṛte-artham*), appears as though real (*pratīyeta*) in the place of Brahman (*ātmani*) just as the moon, though one, appears double to a defective eye. In this process, Brahman is hidden from our knowledge (*na pratīyeta*) just as the planet Rāhu is not seen though the sky is lit by other luminaries. That which makes possible this dual process of projecting the world and obscuring Brahman, though in itself is indeterminable, is to be understood as (Brahman's) *māyā*.

यथा महान्ति भूतानि
 भूतेषूच्चावचेष्वनु ।
 प्रविष्टान्यप्रविष्टानि
 तथा तेषु न तेष्वहम् ॥ (II,9,34)

This verse states the relation between the *jīva* and Brahman. A relation can be spoken of only where there is a distinction. So long as the *jīva* (in its ignorance) regards itself as an embodied being distinct from Brahman, it may look upon Brahman as its indwelling spirit. But when it realizes that Brahman is the sole reality and that it (the *jīva*), in its true nature, is non-different from Brahman, there is no room for speaking of Brahman as the indweller of the *jīva*. This point is brought out through the analogy of the relation between the gross elements and the bodies of

all living beings, big and small. As the effect, the gross elements are present in those bodies after creation (*praviṣṭāni*). But as the cause of those bodies, which existed before creation, the gross elements cannot be said to be present in those bodies (*na praviṣṭāni*) which are yet to come.

एतावदेव जिज्ञास्यं
 तत्त्वजिज्ञासुनाऽऽत्मनः ।
 अन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां
 यत्स्यात् सर्वत्र सर्वदा (II,9,35)

This verse briefly sets forth the need for *jñāna* (as the means to release) and the method of attaining it. Whether one inquires into the nature of Brahman by the method of negating everything other than Brahman as "not that," "not this," or inquires into it by the method of affirming everything as Brahman, it becomes established that Brahman alone exists everywhere and at all times (i.e. as the sole reality). It is verily this that is to be known by one who desires to know the truth of Brahman.

2. Nirguṇa-Brahman

Though Brahman is not an object of knowledge, the mind can apprehend it through two kinds of indications (*lakṣaṇa*). Being the cause and so on of the world are adventitious indications (*taṭastha-lakṣaṇa*) of Brahman. They do not belong to the essential nature of Brahman. They are simply accidental marks brought about by *māyā/avidyā*. At the initial stage of inquiry they help to draw the pupil's attention to Brahman. It is like pointing out a house among others by reference to a crow which happens to be sitting on it at the time. On the contrary, existence, consciousness and bliss (*sat, cit* and *ānanda*) are said to be essential indications

(*svarūpa-lakṣaṇa*) of Brahman. However, the expression *svarūpa-lakṣaṇa* is not used in any positive sense to show the essential nature of Brahman. Strictly speaking, the nature of Brahman cannot be indicated in any positive way, Brahman being beyond thought and speech. The real purpose of resorting to *svarūpa-lakṣaṇa* is to indicate the nature of Brahman in a negative way by contrasting it with the not-self. Hence what the three expressions seek to convey is that Brahman is other than and unlike whatever is non-existent, insentient, and subject to misery.

Let us first see how the *Bhāgavata* defines Brahman by resorting to *taṭastha-lakṣaṇa*. Vedānta in general speaks of Brahman as the reality from which the world evolves, by which it is sustained, and into which the world is resolved. The example given by the Upaniṣads to explain this is that of the spider weaving its web out of its own body. The process of origination involves change (*pariṇāma*). To attribute the change to Brahman is against the spirit of the Upaniṣads, which speak of Brahman as immutable. So the change is said to belong to unmanifested matter (*prakṛtilmāyā*), which is regarded as an inseparable aspect of Brahman. This view is called *pariṇāma-vāda*. All those schools of Vedānta which regard the world as real subscribe to this. This view has its own difficulties. For example, the exact relation of *prakṛti* to Brahman has to be explained without compromising the immutability of Brahman. Advaita does not reject *pariṇāma-vāda* outright, but utilizes it to prepare the ground for introducing its own explanation, namely *vivarta-vāda*. The world is an illusion, and there is no question of its being evolved and so on. The world merely appears to be real where there is really only Brahman. *Māyā* is said to be responsible for this illusion. But *māyā*, which others regard as an entity, is taken by the Advaitin

in a special sense as an inexplicable non-entity. There are enough passages in the *Bhāgavata* which present *pariṇāma-vāda*, not for its own sake, but to prepare the ground for *vivarta-vāda*.

Here is a passage which suggests that the world, which is said to be created by Brahman, appears to be real only because Brahman is reflected in it after being created by him.

एतन्नानाविधं विश्वं
आत्मसृष्टमधोक्षज ।
आत्मनानुप्रविश्यात्मन्
प्राणो जीवो विभर्ष्यजः ॥ (X,85,5)

When Brahman is spoken of as the first cause and ultimate refuge of everything, it must be understood that it is only due to *māyā* that Brahman appears to be so, and, therefore, Brahman, as pure consciousness, remains unaffected.

यस्मिन्निदं सदसदात्मतया विभाति
मायाविवेकविधुति सजि वाहिबुद्धिः ।
तं नित्यमुक्तपरिशुद्धविबुद्धतत्त्वं
प्रत्यूढकर्मकलिलप्रकृतिं प्रपद्ये ॥ (IV,22,38)

Again, it is said that Brahman, which is pure consciousness, and which transcends both speech and mind, undergoes an unreal change in the form of the world and its manifestation on account of its association with *māyā*.

तन्मायाफलरूपेण
केवलं निर्विकल्पितम् ।
बाङ्मनोऽगोचरं सत्यं
द्विधासमभवद् बृहत् ॥ (XI,24,3)

The same idea is expressed in another passage thus: "Just as the clouds, which have a beginning and an end, are presented

in etheric space, so also the world, which has a beginning and an end, appears in Brahman due to *māyā*."

यथा जलधरा व्योम्नि
भवन्ति न भवन्ति च ।
ब्रह्मणीदं तथा विश्वं
अवयव्युदयाप्ययात् ॥ (XII,4,26)

We now come to passages which directly bear on *vivarta-vāda*.

स एष आद्यः पुरुषः
कल्पे कल्पे सृजत्यजः ।
आत्माऽऽत्मन्यात्मनाऽऽत्मानं
संयच्छति च पाति च ॥ (II,6,38)

This passage primarily conveys the idea that Brahman is both the efficient and the material cause of the world. The term *ātmā* conveys the idea that Brahman is the efficient cause, and the term *ātmani* that it is itself the material cause. The term *ātmanā* shows that the will to create comes from Brahman himself and not from any other source. *Ātmānam* reiterates that there is no material cause other than Brahman himself. Now, it is inconceivable that one and the same entity could be both the efficient and the material cause unless it is made of parts and is subject to change. But the Upaniṣads declare that Brahman is partless and changeless. Hence the real meaning that is secondarily conveyed by these expressions is that the creation of the world is only apparent and not real.

Vivarta-vāda implies that the very idea of relation between Brahman and the so-called effects is only a case of superimposition (*adhyāsa*) of the "not-self" (*anātman*) on the Self (*Ātman/Brahman*). Brahman is thus the substratum (*adhiṣṭhāna*)

of the superimposition. Again, when direct knowledge of Brahman dawns, the whole world of superimposition is spontaneously negated. Thus Brahman is also the substratum of the negation of superimposition. The idea that Brahman is the substratum of both the manifestation and the negation of the world illusion is represented in the following verses.

व्यतिरेकान्वयो यस्य
जाग्रत्स्वप्नसुषुप्तिषु ।
मायामयेषु तद् ब्रह्म
जीववृत्तिष्वपाश्रयः ॥
पदार्थेषु यथा द्रव्यं
सन्मात्रं रूपनामसु ।
बीजादिपञ्चतान्तासु
ह्यवस्थासु युतायुतम् ॥ (XII, 7,19 and 20)

Here the word *apāśrayaḥ* stands for Brahman. Brahman is present in all the three states undergone by a *jīva*, viz. waking, dream and deep sleep, as well as in all substances which are products of *māyā*. At the same time, Brahman is distinct from them also, just as the bare existence underlying the names and forms of objects is distinct from those name-form objects.

Again, in the following, Brahman is described as the substratum (*āśraya*) of the entire world, because it is by Brahman that the creation (*ābhāsa*) and the destruction (*nirodha*) of the world happen.

आभासश्च निरोधश्च
यतश्च अध्यवसीयते ।
स आश्रयः परं ब्रह्म
परमात्मेति शब्द्यते ॥ (II, 10,7)

We now turn to the definition of Brahman by *svarūpa-*

lakṣaṇa. Brahman is defined in the Upaniṣads as existence, consciousness and bliss (*sat, cit, ānanda*). Vedānta schools other than Advaita tend to regard existence, consciousness and bliss as attributes of Brahman. But to Advaita they are not attributes, but constitute the very essence of Brahman. They are not what Brahman *has*, but what Brahman *is*. But, as we have already said, this is not a positive definition, which asserts that Brahman is such and such. The real intention of this definition is to indicate in a negative way that Brahman is quite unlike all that is devoid of existence, consciousness and pure bliss.

In the *Bhāgavata* the nature of Brahman as *sat* is brought out in the words of sages and gods where they glorify Lord Viṣṇu thus:

सत्यव्रतं सत्यपरं त्रिसत्यं
 सत्यस्ययोनिं निहितं च सत्ये ।
 सत्यस्यसत्यं ऋतसत्यनेत्रं
 सत्यात्मकं त्वां शरणं प्रपन्नाः ॥ (X,2,26)

The word *satyavratam* means *satyasankalpam*, one whose desires are always fulfilled. And the word *satyaparam* means that he is the supreme goal. He is *trisyam*, i.e. the reality who exists before creation, during sustentation, and after dissolution. In the phrase *satyasya yonim* the word *satya* combines *sat* and *tyat*. *Sat* stands for earth, water and fire, and *tyat* for air and space. So *satya* constitutes the five elements which make the world. And the word *yoni* stands for Brahman who is the cause of the five elements and, as such, exists prior to creation. The expression *nihitam ca satye* gives us to understand that Brahman exists during the existence of the world as its inner ruler. The phrase *satyasya satyam* refers to Brahman who exists even after the dissolution of the world. The expression *ṛtasatya netramin*

means that it is Brahman who gives rise to good speech and the vision that all are equal (as they are based on Brahman). Finally, *satyātmakam* means that Brahman is nothing but real.

In the following verse Nirguṇa-Brahman is described as both existence (*satya*) and consciousness (*jñāna*).

विशुद्धं केवलं ज्ञानं
प्रत्यक्सम्यगवस्थितम् ।
सत्यं पूर्णं अनाद्यन्तं
निर्गुणं नित्यमद्वयम् ॥ (II, 6,39)

It is *viśuddham* in the sense that it is devoid of any form of objects (*viśayākāra-sūnyah*). Thus Brahman is not an existent, but existence *per se*. It is inward (*pratyak*); therefore its existence is free from any doubt (*samyag-avasthitam=sandehādi-rahitam avasthitam*). It is infinite (*pūrṇam*), i.e. without beginning or end (*anādyantam*); it is above all qualities (*nirguṇam*); it is the ever-existing (*nityam*), non-dual (*advayam*) reality (*satyam*).

The following verse states that the knowers of truth declare the true nature of Brahman to be consciousness undivided, though they name it as Brahman, the Supreme Self, Bhagavān, and so on.

वदन्ति तत्तत्त्वविदः
तत्त्वं यज्ज्ञानमद्वयम् ।
ब्रह्मेति परमात्मेति
भगवानिति शब्दते ॥ (I,2,11)

Describing the true nature of Lord Viṣṇu, the following half-verse says that he is the non-dual Brahman who is nothing but consciousness (*prabodha-mātram*).

शश्वत्प्रशान्तमभयं प्रतिबोधमात्रं

शुद्धं समं सदसतः परमात्मतत्त्वम् । (first half, II,7,47)

Again, it is said in the following that at the time of the dissolution of the world there exists only the Supreme Self without any other comprehending factor or object to be comprehended. It then exists as pure consciousness (*sañjñāna-mātram*), without being manifested by any mental state, as if in the state of deep sleep.

अहमेवासमेवाग्रे
नान्यत् किञ्चान्तरं बहिः ।
संज्ञानमात्रमयत्तं
प्रसुप्तमिव विश्वतः ॥ (VI,4,47)

The consciousness which is the essential nature of Brahman should not be confounded with ordinary empirical cognition. The latter is only the reflection of pure consciousness in the mental state (*vṛtti*), which is a product of *avidyā*. It belongs to someone as the subject and it is about something or other. It is thus limited and varied. But the consciousness spoken of with reference to Brahman is consciousness as such. It is pure, absolute, undifferentiated, and immutable. It is free from any real relation to *avidyā*. It is inward (*pratyak*), i.e. lies at the base of the varying states of cognition. Such is the nature of the One whom poets describe as Vāsudeva. This is the import of the following verse.

ज्ञानं विशुद्धं परमार्थमेकं
अनन्तरं त्वबहिर्ब्रह्म सत्यम् ।
प्रत्यक् प्रशान्तं भगवच्छब्दसंज्ञं
यद्वासुदेवं कवयो वदन्ति ॥ (V,12,11)

Following the Upaniṣads, the *Bhāgavata* avers that

Brahman, which is consciousness, is of the nature of bliss too.

अण्डेषु पेशिषु तरुष्वविनिश्चितेषु
 प्राणो हि जीवमुपधावति तत्र तत्र ।
 सन्ने यदिन्द्रियगणेऽहमि च प्रसुप्ते
 कूटस्थ आशयमृते तदनुस्मृतिर्नः ॥ (XI,3,39)

Prāṇa follows everywhere the *jīva*, whether born of eggs, womb or sweat or sprung out of the soil, and yet itself remains unchanged in the different bodies. Even so the *Ātman* remains unaffected in the state of deep sleep, when the senses are not operative and when the ego is dormant, i.e. when the subtle body has become functionless. The presence of the self in deep sleep is vouched for by the reminiscent experience which expresses itself as "I slept happily; I did not know anything then." The words *tat anusmṛtiḥ naḥ* conveys this idea. Now, the reminiscent experience would not have been possible if the person had not actually experienced bliss during sleep. So the self which persists as pure consciousness in sleep is also of the nature of pure bliss. And pure bliss, which is identical with the self, is different from the bliss of ordinary life, which is caused by cognition of objects and, therefore, not unmixed.

N. Veezhinathan

The occasion which has brought us together inspires us with the most solemn thoughts. We are here in connection with the celebration of the 108th birthday anniversary of the Sage of Kāñcī, the greatest saint and the mystic of the 20th century, whose very presence compelled admiration, awe and conviction about the truths of the Upaniṣads. He exercised a supreme influence over all who came into contact with him, and he exemplified to us in his simple and lofty life the essential worth of our great religion. Installed at a tender age of 13 as the 68th pontiff in the hallowed line of succession from Ādi Śaṅkara in the great Kāmakoti-pīṭha at Kāñcī, his holiness assumed the ascetic name, Śrī Candrasekharendra Sarasvatī Bhagavatpūjya-pāda.

One of the noteworthy features of the Śāṅkarite Institution at Kāñcī is that it has been presided over by preceptors who were realized souls or *jīvan-muktas*. Śaṅkara himself occupied the headship of the Institution. And he nominated Sureśvara as his successor. Śaṅkara, in the words of his direct disciple

Padmapāda, is the pre-eminent among the realized souls. In his commentary, *Pañcapādikā*, he says:

The view of the revered commentator, Śaṅkara who is the prince among the realized souls and who assumed a body with the chief view to impart the knowledge of Brahman to mankind must be treated as valid as the scripture.

In an oblique reference to his state of *jīvan-mukti*, Śaṅkara in his commentary on the *Vedānta-sūtra* says:

It is not a matter of dispute at all whether the body of one who has realized Brahman continues to exist for sometime or not. For how can one question the fact of another possessing the knowledge of Brahman—vouched for by his heart's conviction—and at the same time continuing to have bodily existence.

Vācaspatimiśra, while commenting on this passage, says:

Here Śaṅkara gives expression to his state of *jīvan-mukti* to those who consider him to be a trustworthy person.

Śaṅkara's disciple, Sureśvara, in one of his works affirms:

The Self is attributeless; and I shall swear thrice.

And this he states on the basis of his experience of the non-dual Self. His disciple, Sarvajñātman, in his *Samkṣepa-sārīraka* states:

The state of liberation while embodied is admitted because it is experienced. The appearance of duality also is admitted, because it too is experienced. And, to account for the appearance of duality, the trace of avidyā also is accepted. All this is based upon one's experience.

It is heartening to see that Sarvajñātman has been followed by a galaxy of preceptors in the great Institution of Ādi Śaṅkara at Kāñcī.

His Holiness Śrī Candrasekharendra Sarasvatī Bhagavatpūjyapāda, the sixty-eighth in the hallowed line of succession from Ādi Śaṅkara, was a realized soul and a channel for spiritual forces. The Sanskrit expression of our motherland is *bhāratavarṣa*. The term *bhārata* etymologically means men of spiritual enlightenment, the *jīvan-muktas*, that is, those who revel in the ultimate reality which is their true nature.

bhārūpe brahmaṇi ratāḥ bhāratāḥ

And this term is metaphorically applied to our land which abounds with *jīvan-muktas* like our Holiness, the Sage of Kāñcī. We are fortunate in having his holiness as our preceptor; He taught us that spiritual enlightenment is the highest goal and absolute detachment from selfish concerns is a pre-requisite to it. He instructed us to regulate our possessions and passion by righteousness and orient them towards spiritual enlightenment. He exhorted us to seek the good things of the mind first with an assurance that the rest will either be supplied or their loss will not be felt. He advised us to seek elegance rather than luxury and refinement rather than fashion. He emphasized the need to overcome the deadly sins such as desire, rage, lust and the like and cultivate ethical excellences by centered human effort. The distinguishing characteristic of our Holiness was that he taught what he practised. *Ācāra* existed in him before *pracāra* came. He made us realize by precept and practice that our land is not so much a particular country or a geographical entity but an idea—the idea that the world matters not, but the spirit in man does.

A *jīvan-mukta*'s life has two phases: *samādhi* or mystic trance where he is one with the ultimate reality; and *vyutthāna* or reversion to empirical life. Arjuna asks Lord Kṛṣṇa to set forth a clear definition of a *jīvan-mukta* when he is in the state of *samādhi*.

Kṛṣṇa says that a *jīvan-mukta* in the state of *samādhi* is firmly rooted in Brahman. And in his case there is the elimination of all desires.

A *jīvan-mukta* in the state of *samādhi* can have no direct relation towards his fellow-beings, although profound peace would pervade all around from the mere presence of such a benignant spirit. We had the experience of a luminous serenity and a limpid clearness in the presence of our Holiness. And we have it here and now as he remains as the all-pervasive spirit.

A *jīvan-mukta* in the state of reversion to empirical life alone could have relation towards his fellow-beings. Three questions are put forth by Arjuna as regards the *jīvan-mukta* in this state; and, they are:

1. how he speaks to others;
2. why he sits down at a solitary place; and
3. how he experiences the objects of the world presented to him by his fructified deeds.

Kṛṣṇa says that a *jīvan-mukta* when he is praised or extolled will not give enthusiastic expression of approval. When he is criticized, he will not give expression of sorrow. His words will be characterized by mildness, serenity and mercifulness. And this he does in order to impart to his disciples the quality of temperance in speech. Secondly, a *jīvan-mukta* selects a solitary place and sits down in order to withdraw his senses, which owing to his fructified deeds have come out, and to fix his mind on the ultimate reality and thereby to be in the state of *samādhi*. Thirdly,

having controlled his mind and sense organs, a *jīvan-mukta* experiences the worldly objects without any sense of attachment. These three characteristics, viz. temperance in speech, self-control and a sense of detachment constitute the second nature of the Sage of Kāñcī. He revealed them in order that his disciples may realize them to achieve perfection.

His Holiness was no escapist retiring into a cell seeking after his own salvation. Dissociating himself from that which is mundane, material and transitory and realizing that which is beyond the range of the perceptive and ratiocinative powers coupled with holiness of life, detachment from material concerns and ecstatic contemplation or spiritual rapture, His Holiness in the clear beam of his purified vision beheld and understood the sorrows and struggles of his fellow-beings. Children in famine, victims tortured by oppressors, refugees who have been forced to leave their native soil seeking shelter and protection from danger especially from religious persecution, poverty, delusive hopes and irrational convictions entertained by ordinary men relying upon the words of the uncultivated mind—the words which are inane, devoid of sense, significance or point, tiresome and purposeless, all these pierced his heart. He had dedicated all the actions of his life to the one end, i.e. removal of the sufferings of the mankind. This his Holiness did out of love—love not in its ordinary sense which like compassion involves a sense of duality which he had already transcended, but love born out of his discernment of his Self in every being. "He loved others not *as such* but as *himself*, because he had realized his identity with them." His service to others was spontaneous—the natural and necessary expression of the universal love which is the result of complete knowledge he possessed. His whole

life was governed by three noble ideals: he lived truly with reference to himself, righteously with reference to his fellow-beings and piously with God.

Her Royal Highness Princess Irene of Greece, after having had the *darśan* of his Holiness for the first time at Kālahasti on the 5th and the 6th of December, 1966 along with her devout mother, Her Royal Highness Queen Frederica, wrote about his Holiness to the late Dr. Mahadevan thus:

His Holiness is obviously a guest in his frail body.

It is a true presentation of the personality of his Holiness from the standpoint of the śruti text:

aśarīram vā va santam na priyāpriye spṛśataḥ

Adopting her phraseology, I would like to state that his Holiness, obviously a guest in his frail body, was experiencing all throughout his life in the imperial throne of his heart the transcendental Majesty of the unconditioned splendour, his own Self. His Holiness was so elevated and exalted that the mind in contemplating him cannot reach full comprehension of him, but in part at least could feel and imagine the vastness of his spiritual glory, nobility and the like. His personality was majestic without severity, impressive without showiness and it revealed outstanding or transcendently intrinsic virtues. The late Kulapati Balakrishna Joshi once said:

It requires tremendous misfortune to escape the
grace of his Holiness.

His Holiness remains here and now in the form of unconditioned consciousness and bliss. May we offer our homage to his Holiness, *The Mirror of Grace and Majesty Divine*.

11

THE ANUBHAVAVILĀSA
of
Hariharāśrama Paramahaṃsa

G. Mishra

The *Anubhavavilāsa*¹ (*The Glory of Self-Knowledge*) is a metrical *Prakarāṇa* text authored by Hariharāśrama Paramahaṃsa (fl. AD. 1890). In this, the author describes his own experience of the realization of the supreme Brahman. Harihara was the disciple of Śivarāmāśrama, who was the disciple of Viśveśvarāśrama. Śivarāma was said to be a resident of Tiruchi and was the author of the *Bhāvājñāna-prakāśikā* and a commentary entitled *Ādarśa* on the *Anubhūtiprakāśa* of Vidyāraṇya. Viśveśvara was a disciple of Svayaṃprakāśa and Hayagrīva, and was the author of the *Ātmānātma-viveka* and *Vākyaṃṛta*.

त्रिधामसुन्दरानन्दचिन्मयी स्वात्मदेवता ।
जगच्चित्रमहादर्शमयी विजयते सदा ॥१॥

1. The text of the *Anubhavavilāsa* is edited here for the first time from a single manuscript (No R.3763) deposited at Government Oriental Manuscript Library, Chennai. The emendations are made in the text wherever necessary.

Eternal victory to the Goddess of one's own Self, who is the embodiment of beauty, bliss and consciousness of the three worlds and who is the great reflector of the variegated world. (1)

विश्वेश्वराश्रममहागुरुपादपद्म-
भृङ्गायितस्य शिवरामगुरोः पदाब्जे ।
मूर्ध्नाकलय्य परमाद्वयशासनस्य
सारं गुरोरधिगतं खलु संलिखामि ॥२॥

After placing my head at the lotus feet of my preceptor, Śivarāma, who was like a bee at the lotus feet of his great preceptor, Viśveśvarāśrama, I (Harihara Paramahansa), write the essence of Advaita as understood from my teacher. (2)

हरिहराख्ययतिर्निजहृत्स्थितं
श्रुतिशिरोऽर्थ-सयुक्तिभिरन्वितम् ।
अनुभवस्य विलासममुं मुदा
कलयतीह गुरोरभितुष्टये ॥३॥

The renunciate Harihara puts down here the meaning of the Upaniṣad, which is the crest of śruti, from out of his conviction, supported by good logic. This is the embellishment of self-knowledge which is presented here for the satisfaction of the teacher. (3)

दयया कश्चिदाचार्यो दृष्ट्वा दीनं स्वसेवकम् ।
प्राह बोधयितुं युक्तिश्रुतिसंश्रितवर्त्मना ॥४॥

Out of sheer compassion a certain preceptor, by noticing the ignorant nature of his disciple who is obedient to him, instructed the latter, following the path of logic and scripture. (4)

संजातिमृत्युपरिवर्त्तसुभीमवेग-
संसारसिन्धुपतितस्य विना नृदेहम् ।
नास्त्येव दुःखविलयोऽथ तमाप्य तत्र
यो नोद्यतस्स हि निजात्मरिपुः प्रसिद्धः ॥५॥

A living being, who is in the ocean of *saṁsāra*, overwhelmed by successive strong forces of birth and death, cannot hope for liberation from suffering without getting human birth. Even after getting it, if a person does not strive to get liberation, he is, indeed, his own enemy. (5)

This verse may be compared to the first verse of the *Viveka-cūḍāmaṇi*, where Śaṅkara says that three things are difficult to attain—human birth, longing for liberation, and association with the good.

असंख्यदेहेषु परिक्रमन् क्रमात् ।
सुदुर्लभं प्राप्य नृदेहमुत्तमम् ॥०॥
विमोचयेत् मृत्युभयात् स्वमाशु चेत् ।
पुमान् स स्वतरथा हि विट्क्रिमिः ॥६॥

Gradually traversing through innumerable bodies and gaining the precious human birth, which is difficult to get, if a person quickly gets rid of the fear of death, he alone is worthy of being a human being; otherwise, he is like a worm in the night soil. (6)

दुर्लभं पौरुषं प्राप्य जिह्वोपस्थपरायणः ।
न भवेद् अन्यथामीननागाविव विषीदति ॥७॥

By obtaining the human birth one should not delve into pleasures derived from the senses of taste and touch. Or else, he would suffer like fish and elephant. (7)

The author tries to show that the sensual pleasures are the causes of all sufferings. The examples given are the fish which succumbs to the sense of taste of the bait and the elephant which succumbs to the sense of touch of its mate.

तस्मात् विचारक्षममेतदाप्य
मानुष्यमाशु स्वगतिं विचार्य ।
महाभयान्मृत्युमुखाद्विमुक्ता-
बुपायमाप्तुं सुगुरुं समीयात् ॥८॥

Therefore, after attaining a human life, which has the capacity for discrimination, the person should decide his goal in

life quickly, and in order to get rid of the great fear of death, he should approach a venerable preceptor. (8)

Cf. Mundkōpaniṣad, 1.2.2: "gurumevābhigacchet samitpānih śrotṛiyam brahmaniṣṭham." Here it is said that a student desirous of Brahman-knowledge should go to a capable teacher who is proficient in śāstras and rooted in Brahman.

पश्यात्र किं ते विषयेस्सुखं भवेत्
मृत्योर्निविष्टस्य सुखं भयङ्करम् ।
विस्मृत्य मृत्योर्भयमात्मनि स्थितं
कथं सुखे वैषयिके निमज्जसि ॥९॥

Look (the preceptor says): what is the happiness you derive from the sense objects? For one who is liable to die, "happiness" is really frightening. Since such a fear is in you, how can you forget it and get involved in the sensuous pleasure? (9)

जातस्य मृत्युर्ध्रुवमीक्षितोऽखिलै-
र्मृतस्य जन्मापि हि सर्वथा भवेत् ।
कृतस्य भोगाय न किं निरीक्षितं
दुःखं द्वयोरप्यतिदुस्सहं नृणाम् ॥१०॥

It is universally known that a being that is born is sure to die. Similar is the case with the dead one who is born again to enjoy the fruits of his action. Do you not perceive that the suffering of a man in both birth and death is unbearable? (10)

Cf. Bhagavad-gītā, 2.27.

मध्येऽपि दुःखं विविधं विभावितं
रोगार्थकामादिनिमित्तसम्भवम् ।
तस्माद्यथामृत्युमुखात् प्रमुच्यसे
तथा यतस्वाशु विहाय मूढताम् ॥११॥

Also, in the middle (of birth and death), there are varied miseries, which originate because of disease, wealth, enjoyment, etc. Therefore, abandoning foolishness, you have to strive quickly in such a way that you will be freed from the jaws of death. (11)

मृत्युर्जनिर्वापि हि देहकेषु
 मिथ्याभिमानादविवेकजातात् ।
 विविच्य देहात्परमात्मतत्त्वम्
 विज्ञाय मृत्योः प्रविमोचय स्वम् ॥१२ ॥

In the body associated with birth and death, the false identity (of oneself with the body, etc.) is produced out of ignorance. By differentiating the supreme Self from the body and by knowing that reality, liberate yourself from death. (12)

न कर्मभिर्मृत्युमुखात् प्रमुच्यते
 मृत्युप्रदानीह यतस्तु तानि वै ।
 देहाभिमानं समुपाश्रितो यदा
 तदा हि कर्माणि भवन्ति नान्यथा ॥१३ ॥

By action one cannot get liberation from death, as by action alone one is drawn towards death. Only when one identifies oneself with the body, then alone an action can be performed; not otherwise. (13)

न कर्मणा स्यादमृतं फलं क्वचिद्-
 यत्कर्मजातं तदनित्यमीक्षितम् ।
 नैवाविवेकादुदितं भयादिकं
 निवर्तितं दृष्टचारं हि कर्मभिः ॥१४ ॥

By action, one cannot reap the immortal fruit. Whatever is produced by action is deemed to be ephemeral. The fear of death and the like, generated by non-discrimination, are never known to be eradicated by actions. (14)

तस्माद्ध्यानं धारणा वा समाधिः
 प्राणायामोऽप्यासनं वा यमाद्यम् ।
 मिथ्याज्ञानोद्भावितस्येह मृत्योः
 नाशायालं सद्विचारं विना नो ॥१५ ॥

So, contemplation, steadying the mind, meditative trance, breath control, postures, restraint, etc., are not capable of destroying death which is a product of ignorance, without proper inquiry. (15)

तस्मात्सद्गुरुमुखतः सच्छास्त्रार्थं निशम्य शुद्धधिया ।
मत्वा तत्परचित्ततो ज्ञात्वा तत्त्वं भवाशु कृती ॥१६ ॥

Therefore, you should, with a pure mind, hear the meaning of the authoritative scripture from a competent preceptor. By contemplating on that reality and knowing that, quickly achieve success in your mission. (16)

यद्यपि शास्त्रं विविधं तत्र च सारात्मकं समादेयम् ।
सुविचार्य शुद्धबुद्ध्या शास्त्रं रसात्मकं हेयम् ॥१७ ॥

Even though there are many scriptures, one should resort to the essential ones among them; and by contemplating on them with a pure mind, one should know the quintessence of reality. (17)

Cf. Taittirīyopaniṣad, 2.7: raso vai saḥ.

शास्त्रं परोक्षगमकं तत्र च वेदः प्रमाणमूर्धन्यः ।
स्वातन्त्र्यादभियुक्तैर्व्यासप्रमुखैः समादृतत्वाच्च ॥१८ ॥

Scripture teaches that which cannot be known (by perception, etc.). Of these (sources of knowledge), the Veda is the best among the means of knowledge, for it is independently revealed, and is accepted by great personalities like Vyāsa and others. (18)

तत्तत्तात्पर्यं विविधं जैमिन्याद्यैर्निरूपितं तत्र ।
मुख्यं व्यासप्रोक्तं जैमिन्यादेर्यतो गुरुर्व्यासः ॥१९ ॥

The import of the revealed texts is manifold as established by Jaimini and others. In this regard, the import established by Vyāsa is final as he is the preceptor of Jaimini and others. (19)

सन्दिग्धेऽपि च युक्तं मुख्यपक्षं समाश्रयितुम्
यत्र हि फलं प्रकृष्टं मुख्यं पक्षं तमेव जानीहि ॥२०॥

In case of a doubt, it is proper to accept the central view. Know that alone as the final one which leads to the highest fruit. (20)

प्राजापत्यसुखान्तं फलं प्रदिष्टं क्रियाकाण्डे ।
ज्ञाने ब्रह्मानन्दः प्राजापत्याच्छतोत्तरं हि फलम् ॥२१॥

In *Karma-kāṇḍa*, happiness as available in the *Prajāpati-loka* is declared as ultimate. In *Jñāna-kāṇḍa*, however, one can get Brahman-bliss which is hundred times superior to the happiness attained in the former. (21)

Cf. *Ānandavallī* section of the *Taittirīyopaniṣad*.

ज्ञात्वापि चैतदेवं कर्मसु निष्ठाविमोहेन ।
ये ते हि मन्दभाग्या गङ्गातीरेऽपि कूपकर्तारः ॥२२॥

Even after knowing this, if persons are engaged in actions due to delusion, then they are the unfortunate ones, who want to dig a well (for water) on the banks of the river *Gaṅgā*. (22)

सांख्ये न्यायादावपि पुरुषार्थो यस्समादिष्टः ।
न संपूर्णः पुरुषार्थो द्वैतेनैतत्परिच्छेदात् ॥२३॥

The human end taught in the systems like *Sāṅkhya* and *Nyāya* is not infinite since it is limited by duality. (23)

In *Sāṅkhya*, liberation which is stated to be complete destruction of the threefold suffering is not a state of bliss. For *Nyāya* too, liberation is the negation of pain and the self exists as a pure substance devoid of consciousness.

अल्पं यत्तन्मर्त्यं हीत्युक्तं तत्र पूर्णं स्यात् ।
तस्माद् व्यासाभिमतं सच्छास्त्रं तद्विचारयेन्नान्यत् ॥२४॥

It has been stated that what is limited is perishable, as it is not infinite. Hence the authoritative scripture accepted by Vyāsa should be inquired into, not the other ones. (24)

Cf. *Chāndogyopaniṣad*, 7.24.1: *yadalpam tanmartyam*.

तत्र चाद्वयपरात्मविबोधादीरितं परफलं भवतीति ।
साधनं च कथितं बहुधा यत्तत्र मुख्यतममेतदुपैहि ॥२५॥

It has been stated that by knowing the non-dual Self, one gets the highest fruit. Even though the means has been described differently, know this to be the chief one. (25)

शुद्धेन्द्रियादिर्नियमस्तात्पर्यं चेति तत् त्रयम् ।
गीतं भगवता साक्षादर्जुनाय कृपालुना ॥२६॥

The purification of the senses (*karma-yoga*), control of the mind (*bhakti-yoga*), and the understanding of the import of śruti (*jñāna-yoga*) are the three means spoken of by the Lord (Kṛṣṇa) directly to Arjuna out of grace. (26)

In the *Bhagavad-gītā*, the efficaciousness of the three Yogas is discussed elaborately.

वागुरामूलसूत्रेण यद्वत्सर्वापि सन्नता ।
तथैतैरेव संव्याप्तमन्यत्साधनमण्डलम् ॥२७॥

As the whole of snare is controlled by the main cord, similarly the entire gamut of the means of liberation is controlled by these three means (i.e. Yogas) only. (27)

गुरुशास्त्रवचोनिरूपिते विपरीतप्रतिपत्तिवर्जनम् ।
तदिहाद्यमुदीरितं भवेज्जननी सा परबोधवर्धने ॥२८॥

The teaching of the preceptor and the scriptures is to be ascertained in order to get rid of the opposite ideas. In this context, that which is instrumental to the realization of the supreme Brahman has to be dealt with in the beginning. (28)

श्रद्धाविहीनस्य समीहितेऽर्थे साक्षान्महेशेन निरूपितेऽपि ।
प्रवृत्तिरेव प्रतिबध्यते यत् श्रद्धाधनः स्यारत आदितो वै ॥२९ ॥

The settled conclusion of the Vedānta, even though instructed by Lord Śiva himself, cannot be attained by a person who lacks faith. There would be no activity by him who is without faith; hence, one should at first inculcate faith (in the teachings of Vedānta). (29)

शुद्धं विवर्जयति यः परमाप्तवाक्ये
दुष्टार्थजात-विपरीतदृशा विमूढः ।
तस्येष्टलाभ इह कुत्र कदा कथं स्यात्
अश्रद्धिनो ह्यगदवाचि यथा मुमुर्षोः ॥३० ॥

How, when, and where will one, who avoids the pure Brahman, which is the purport of the trust worthy Vedic text and who is deluded by the defective meaning due to wrong vision, be able to achieve the most desired object? This is like speaking about medicine to a dying person, who has no faith in medicine.(30)

करणसञ्चयतिरेव हि या परा
भवति साखिलसाधनरूपिणी ।
यत इयश्च सकलस्य फलात्मिका
खलु समाक्षिपतीह ततोऽखिलम् ॥३१ ॥

The control of the senses itself becomes (stage by stage) the means for attaining the Supreme. Since it leads to the fruition of everything, it comprehends, indeed, everything to be attained. (31)

विना विरागं विषयेषु सा कुतो
विना च नित्येतरवस्तुनिर्णयम् ।
भवेद्विरागोऽपि कथं मुमुक्षुतां
विना प्रवृत्तिर्हि न तत्र निर्णये ॥३२ ॥

How can one control the senses without detachment and without the discrimination of the eternal from the non-eternal? How can one get the detachment without an intense desire to be liberated? Just a motive cannot be the cause of such knowledge. (32)

कथं करणसंयतिर्भवति रागिणस्सर्वतः
प्रवर्तयति धीन्द्रियं खलु बलात्सरागोऽन्तरः ।
कृशान्धमनिसन्नतानुपरतान्मुनीनप्ययं
निपातयति सत्वरं करणचालनाद्दुःस्थले ॥३३॥

How can there be control of the mind for a person who seeks pleasures of the world? The mind impels the sense organs forcefully to the enjoyment of objects. Even the renunciates who are emaciated with visible veins and who constantly meditate, are made to fall into wrong places because of the activities of the senses. (33)

विविच्य नित्येतरवस्तुजातम्
अनित्यदोषस्य विचिन्तनेन ।
विरज्यतेऽनित्यसुखाद्बुधुशुधो वै
तथेतरस्तत्फलमान एव ॥३४॥

By discriminating the eternal from the non-eternal and by reflecting on the defect of ephemerality, a wise man becomes indifferent to fleeting happiness. But the person who is different from this one would be immersed in the result of such sense objects. (34)

संसारदुःखात्मकबन्धनात्स्वं
मोक्तुं समिच्छन् हि विचारयैतत् ।
संसारबन्धं सुखदं विजानन्
को वा विचारं परमं विदध्यात् ॥३५॥

In order to liberate oneself from the suffering of *samsāra*, one should inquire into this reality. But by thinking of the bondage of *samsāra* as a real source of happiness, who can inquire into the supreme Being? (35)

शमादिकं चापि जितेन्द्रियस्य
भवेदनायासत एव तस्मात् ।
समस्तमेवेन्द्रियसंयमेन-
भवेद् गृहीतं परसाधनं वै ॥३६॥

For a person who has controlled his senses, the ensuing states like the control of the mind etc. follow without any effort. By the control of all the senses, the means to attain the Supreme becomes easy. (36)

विमुक्तिसाधनेष्वेव यत्नोऽनन्यतया हि यः ।
तत्तत्परत्वमेतेन विनान्यैर्न फलं भवेत् ॥३७॥

The person who makes constant efforts by adhering to the means of liberation without any distraction would be able to attain the supreme Being; he would not be able to get it by any other means. (37)

सर्वसाधनसुसाधनं तद्य-
न्महेश्वरपदार्यनं भवेत् ।
तद्धिना न हि भवेत् किमपीह
साधनं फलमथान्यदपीषत् ॥३८॥

The worshipping at the feet of the Lord Śiva is the best among all means. In the absence of that, nothing will take place—neither the means, nor the result, not even any little thing. (38)

तस्मादादौ देवदेवं महेशं
सर्वान्तःस्थं भक्तिभावप्रकर्षात् ।
हित्वा शाठ्यं भोगलोभप्रयुक्तं
सेवेतातस्सर्वमेव प्रसिद्ध्येत् ॥३९॥

Hence, in the beginning one should worship Lord Śiva, who is the God of Gods, who dwells in every being, with intense devotion by giving up one's dishonesty due to enjoyment and greed; and by that everything will be fulfilled. (39)

आराधितो हि भगवानखिलान्तरात्मा
भावानुरूपमभिवाञ्छितमाशु दद्यात् ।
न्यूनञ्च साधनगणः फलवान् यतस्स्यात्
तस्मात्तदीयमभिराधनमेव कुर्यात् ॥४० ॥

God who is the inner soul of all beings should be worshipped so that he quickly bestows the most desired results in accordance with the mental states of the devotees. One should devoutly worship him since even insufficient means becomes fruitful. (40)

अनाराध्य देवं फलार्थं यतेद्यो
खिलं साधनं साधयत्यत्रप्यतन्द्रः ।
न सिद्धिर्भवेत्तस्य दुःखं महत्स्या-
द्यथा दुस्तराब्धिं तित्तीर्षोः करेण ॥४१ ॥

If one tries to get the results by untiringly practising all the means without worshipping the Lord, one will not be able to get the desired results. He may face a lot of hardship in achieving the goal like the one trying to cross the impassable ocean by depending on one's own hands. (41)

निःश्रेयसस्य खलु साधनमुक्तमेव-
मेतत्परेण गुरुशास्त्रवचो विचार्य ।
तच्चापि जीवपरयोः परमाद्वयार्थं
युक्त्या तदर्थमधिगत्य कृती भवाशु ॥४२ ॥

The means to attain the supreme reality has been spoken of in this manner. Thereafter, by inquiring into and comprehend-

ing through reasoning the meaning of, the teachings of the preceptor and the scriptures, and also the absolute non-difference between the jīva and Brahman, you become successful in your endeavour soon. (42)

भेदस्तयोरिह विभाति विवेकहाने-
राकाशयोर्घटमठाश्रययोर्हि यद्वत् ।
तस्माद्विवेचय त्वदीयवपुस्त्वमादौ
तेनाद्वितीयपरमात्ममतिस्तव स्यात् ॥४३॥

Owing to the lack of discrimination, the difference between the two (i.e. the individual self and the supreme Self) appears for a person like the difference between the ether enclosed in a pot and the ether enclosed in a hermitage. So, you must first of all inquire into your physical body and thereby you will attain the notion of the non-dual supreme Self. (43)

अद्वैतमात्मवपुरेव यथा विभिन्नम्
स्वप्नेषु पश्यति विमोहित एव मर्त्यः ।
स्वाविद्यया च परिमोहित एव सर्वो
द्वैतं प्रपश्यति तथाद्वय आत्मनीह ॥४४॥

Just as the body of the non-dual self is different from person to person, even so the jīva perceives it differently in the states of dream, etc. due to delusion. In the same way all perceive duality being deluded by their ignorance concerning the non-dual Ātman. (44)

स्वाज्ञानविभ्रमसमुत्थितमेतदस्मात्
संसार दुःखमपगच्छति तत्प्रबोधात् ।
दण्डाप्रबोधजमहाहिकृताविभीति-
र्यद्वत् प्रशाम्यति हि तत्प्रतिबोधमात्रात् ॥४५॥

This (duality) arises because of the projection of one's own ignorance; and the suffering of *saṁsāra* gets removed when one is awakened to the supreme reality. The fear of a big serpent which is originated by the misperception of the stick gets removed by the mere understanding of that entity. (45)

संसारदुःखमुपगच्छति यस्तु सत्यं
नाज्ञानमूलकमितीह न तस्य मुक्तिः ।
ज्ञानेन सत्यविनिवृत्तिरहो कथं स्यात्
प्राह श्रुतिं स्तरति शोकइमिति स्वबोधात् ॥४६

He who takes the suffering of *saṁsāra* as real and does not understand it to be the product of ignorance would not get liberated. If it be asked, "How can there be the eradication of the real through knowledge?" śruti declares that one crosses the suffering of *saṁsāra* by the realization of one's own self. (46)

Cf. *Chāndogyopaniṣad*, 7.1.3: *tarati śokamātmanvit*.

ध्यानादिविज्ञानत ईश्वरस्य
सारूप्यमेवेह भवेद् विमुक्तिः ।
इत्यादिकं वेदवचोविरुद्धं
तद्द्वैतसत्योपगमे न मुक्तिः ॥४७ ॥

By knowing God through meditation and the like, one attains the *sārūpya* state of liberation. All these are contrary to the teachings of the Vedic texts, because liberation is not possible through the knowledge of difference. (47)

द्वैतावशेषे हि भयावशेष
एतत्समाहाथ भयं भवेदिति ।
दृष्टं भयं जागरिते च सुप्ते
द्वैतावभासेन न चान्यतः खलु ॥४८ ॥

When duality remains, there is fear; and this is clearly stated "Hence there will be fear." During the state of waking and

also in sleep (in the sense of dream), there is fear because of the semblance of duality, and not otherwise. (48)

तस्मादबोधादवभासते भिदा
तद्भासनादेव भयं हि सर्वतः ।
बोधेन भेदप्रलये ततो भयं
कथं भवेत्कारणमन्तरा च तत् ॥४९॥

Therefore, owing to non-apprehension duality appears. Because of that appearance alone, there is fear everywhere. When duality disappears through realization, how can there be fear inasmuch as its cause is not there? (49)

अज्ञानमेतत् न च नास्ति यस्मात्
सर्वानुभूतेरिह तत्सुसिद्धम् ।
अज्ञस्वमात्मानमहं न जाने
देहान्यमेवं सकलप्रतीतिः ॥५०॥

Ignorance is not something that does not exist. It is well-known, because it is experienced by all. The ignorant man claims: "I do not know myself as something different from my body." This is how everyone thinks. (50)

नैतस्य हेत्वन्तरमस्ति किञ्चित्
अनादिरूपं तदिहाभ्युपेयम् ।
आकस्मिकं स्यात्तदितोऽन्यथाचेत्
सकारणं चेदनवस्थितिस्स्यात् ॥५१॥

This (ignorance) does not have any other cause (for its origination). It has to be understood to be beginningless. If it were different from what it is, then it may be accidental. If, on the other hand, it is accepted to be caused, then it would lead to the fallacy of infinite regress. (51)

(To be continued)



ABOUT THE PUBLISHERS

The Ādi Śaṅkara Advaita Research Centre was established in 1975 under the guidance and with the blessings of His Holiness Jagadguru Śrī Śaṅkarācārya of Kāñcī Kāmakōṭi Pīṭha. The main objectives of the Centre, among other things, are:

- (1) to undertake the carrying on a scientific research for the extension of knowledge in the fields of Natural and Applied Sciences generally, and in particular in the fields of Physics and Metaphysics.
- (2) to undertake and carry on scientific study and analysis of the Advaita system of thought as expounded by Ādi Śaṅkara and to conduct research as regards the relevance of his teaching in solving present day ills of mankind.
- (3) to undertake, promote, and encourage the study of ancient philosophical systems of India.
- (4) to undertake research for the purposes of establishing norms necessary for realising the divinity in man through moral, spiritual and cultural infrastructure.

THE VOICE OF ŚAṅKARA (ŚAṅKARA BHĀRATĪ) is the half-yearly journal published by the Centre in pursuance of its main objectives.

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संसाराध्वनि तापभानुकिरणप्रोद्भूतदाहव्यथा-

खिन्नानां जलकाङ्क्षया मरुभुवि भ्रान्त्या परिभ्राम्यताम् ।

अत्यासन्नसुधाम्बुधिं सुखकरं ब्रह्माद्वयं दर्शय-

न्त्येषा शङ्करभारती विजयते निर्वाणसन्दायिनी ॥

*samsārādhvani tāpabhānukiraṇaprodbhūtadāhavyathā-
khinnānām jalakāṅkṣayā marubhuvi bhrāntyā
paribhrāmyatām
atyāsannasudhāmbudhiṃ sukhakaram brahmādvayam
darśayant-
yeṣā śaṅkarabhāratī vijayate nirvāṇasandāyini.*

To those who are afflicted, in the way of the world, by the burning pain given rise to by the scorching sun-shafts of misery, and who through delusion wander about in the desert (of worldliness) seeking water—showing the felicitous ocean of nectar, which is very near, the non-dual *Brahman*, this—the Voice of Śaṅkara—is victorious, leading, as it does, to liberation.