


The VOICE of **ŚĀNKA RĀ** śāṅkara-bhāratī



Editor :
R. Balasubramanian

eṣā śaṅkara-bhāratī vijayate
nirvāṇa-sandāyinī

victorious is the voice of Śaṅkara,
leading, as it does, to liberation.

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The VOICE of
ŚĀṆKARĀ

Śaṅkara-bhāratī

Editor

R. Balasubramanian

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HOMAGE TO ŚAṄKARA

[190]

कन्येव रूपगुणशालिनमादरेण
 मर्त्यं प्रमोदभरतः स्वयमेव मुक्तिः ।
 यद्वाक्सुधाप्रणयिनं वृणुते हि स त्वं
 श्रीशङ्करार्यं मम देहि पदावलम्बम् ॥

kanyeva rūpa-guṇa-śālinam-ādareṇa
 martyam-pramodabharataḥ svayameva muktiḥ
 yad-vāk-sudhāpraṇayinaṁ vṛṇute hi sa tvam
 śrīśaṅkarārya mama dehi padāvalambam.

As a person becomes fully interested to drink the nectarine words of Śrī Śaṅkara, the maiden of *mokṣa* comes of her own accord to clasp that person, just as an young girl happily chooses, with great regard, one who is endowed with beauty and all ennobling qualities as her husband. Hence, Oh Śrī Śaṅkara! kindly give shelter at your pair of lotus like feet.

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राजाधिराजपदवीं तरसा प्रयाति
 यत्पादपङ्कजयुगं सकृदेव नत्वा
 दीनाग्रयाय्यपि विना कमपि प्रयत्नं
 श्रीशङ्करार्यं मम देहि पदावलम्बम् ॥

rājādhirājapadavīm tarasā prayāti
 yat-pāda-paṅkajayugaṁ sakṛd-eva natvā
 dīnāgrayāyyapi vinā kamapi prayatnam
 śrī-śaṅkarārya mama dehi padāvalambam.

Even the most poor person, having once prostrated at the pair of lotus like feet of Śrī Śaṅkara, attains immediately, without any effort, the royal throne of the supreme monarch (of the whole world). So, oh Śrī Śaṅkara! may you give me shelter at your lotus like feet.

Jagadguru Śrī Saccidānanda Śivābhinava Nṛsimhabhārati
 in the *Śrīśaṅkarācāryapadāvalambastava*

THUS SPAKE ŚAṄKARA

R. Balasubramanian

Brahman: Beyond Immanence and Transcendence

I

Every object in the world can be viewed from three perspectives. Let us consider the case of an object like pot made of clay. It may be viewed in itself, with reference to its immediate cause, and finally with reference to its ultimate cause.

Suppose I ask a person "What is this object?" by showing a pot which is kept in front of him on the ground. He answers my question by saying that it is a pot. His answer is correct. Trained as he is in the language game, he has correctly identified the form or configuration of the object shown to him and named it as "pot."

Another person to whom the same question has been asked answers it by saying that it is clay. His answer is also correct, but more thoughtful and profound, because, unlike the first person, he has taken note of the material cause out of which it is made and which constitutes its essence. If a person perceives only the external configuration of an object, he perceives it only outwardly;

his is what we generally call a *prima facie* view. That the object shown to him is clay and nothing but clay, can be known only through causal inquiry. Ordinarily, we make a distinction between two kinds of causes, material cause and efficient cause. While clay is the material cause (*upādāna-kāraṇa*) of pot, potter is the efficient cause (*nimitta-kāraṇa*). Since the material cause constitutes the essence of an object which has manifested as its effect, the latter, which originates from it, cannot exist independently of it, and is not *essentially* different from it. In other words, the effect is non-different from its material cause (*kārya-kāraṇayoḥ ananyatvam*), and has no existence of its own, no status of its own, and no nature of its own. Its existence, its appearance, and its attractiveness—all these three which we notice in it as its characteristic features are derived from its material cause which is its substratum (*adhiṣṭhāna*). Only name (*nāma*) and form (*rūpa*) are its own; that is why we call it a particular object. The form is subject to change, and the name by which it is identified is conventional which one learns through language game. Taking into consideration the causal background of the object, which provides the clue to its essence, on the one hand, and its bare particularity (*nāma-rūpa*) on the other, the Upaniṣad says that cause alone is real while the effect, which is only a modification (*vikāra*) of it, is a mere name dependent on speech.¹ Though a pot which is empirically existent is useful in our transactional world, it is nevertheless characterized as *kalpita*, or *mithyā*. When the Advaitin uses these terms with regard to the objects of our day-to-day experience, it is to highlight the ontological status of these objects, but not to reduce them to the status of a non-entity, an airy nothing, which is totally non-existent (*asat*). By means of the causal inquiry into the ontological status of objects which are related as cause and effect, the Advaitin arrives at the conclusion that the former which is the substratum is the essence of the latter, and so the logic of his metaphysics is enshrined in the principle, "*kalpitasya adhiṣṭhānameva svarūpam.*"

In addition to the two perspectives mentioned above, there is yet one more. While the ordinary mind perceives a pot as a pot, the inquiring mind perceives it as clay. Different from these two is the vision of a seer, or an enlightened person (*jñānī*), who experiences it as Brahman. To him, everything—a pot and a pan, a table and a tree, the sun, the moon, and the stars—is Brahman. It is this vision of the seer that is conveyed by the *Chāndogya* text, "All this, indeed, is Brahman," (*sarvam khalu idam brahma*).² It is well-known that every object requires a cause. If so, the world too, which is a totality of objects, requires a cause. In the case of a single object, or even a group of objects, an ordinary cause may be sufficient to account for them. However, in the case of the totality of objects, we require an extra-ordinary cause which is capable of intelligently planning them and also producing them on its own without seeking the help of anything else. In other words, such an extra-ordinary cause must play dual role, must be two-in-one; i.e. it has to be both the material and the efficient cause rolled into one. Then only it can be the sole as well as the total cause of the entire world. Following the Upaniṣad, Advaita holds that such an extra-ordinary cause is Brahman or Sat, the primal Being. If the entire manifested world has to be traced to Brahman or Sat, then what kind of metaphysical entity should it be? Without leaving us to guess as to what it is, as it is beyond our imagination, the Upaniṣad itself says that the primal Being, the cause and ground of the world, is "one only without a second" (*ekam eva advitīyam*).³ While it is possible for us to have the intellectual conviction that the whole manifested world is Brahman, it is only the man of wisdom who has that peak-experience, which is elevating and transcendental, which is also called mystical-flight. The lesson that we learn from these three perspectives is that it is not only necessary, but also possible for us to achieve the transcendence from the ordinary to the transcendental vision. It may be pointed out in this connection that Sage Śāṅḍilya, who teaches meditation on Brahman as that from which the world has

originated, as that in which the world is dissolved, and as that which supports the activities of all beings during their existence, emphasizes the importance of shaping one's conviction through meditation.

II

The celebrated "*śāṅḍilya-vidyā*" of the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, 3.14, formulates the theory of immanence of Brahman for the purpose of teaching meditation on the latter. Śāṅḍilya commences his instruction by saying "All this, indeed, is Brahman" (*sarvam khalu idam brahma*). The text reads:

All this, indeed, is Brahman. This (world) is born from, dissolves in, and exists in That. Therefore, one should meditate by becoming calm. Because a person is identified with his conviction, (therefore) just as the conviction a man has in this world, so does he become after departing from here. Therefore, he should shape his conviction.⁴

Śaṅkara in his commentary first of all says that the text quoted above enjoins meditation on Brahman as possessed of special qualities and powers. He then explains the meaning of "*tajjalān*" which occurs in the text. To quote Śaṅkara:

This world consisting of names and forms and which is the object of direct perception, etc. has Brahman as its origin. The word "Brahman" derivatively means that which is the oldest. How can all this world be Brahman? In order to answer this question, the text says: "*tajjalān*". Since all (creation), through a succession of fire, water, food, and so on, is born from that Brahman, it is said to be *tajja*; it is said to be *talla* since it gets merged in that very Brahman, that is to say, it is wholly identified with that; and it is said to be *tadana* since it continues to live, to function in that very Brahman during the state of its existence. Thus, the

entire world is non-different from Brahman in all the three states, since it is not perceived apart from Brahman. So, this world is undoubtedly that Brahman itself. And in the sixth chapter (of this Upaniṣad) we shall explain how this world is that Brahman alone, "one only without a second."

What is the benefit that accrues to one, one may ask, who shapes the conviction that way? Or, one may ask: how is that conviction to be shaped? Śaṅkara answers these questions in his commentary. "The shaping of the conviction," declares Śaṅkara, "is a means to the attainment of the desired result. It is well-known that a person is identified with the kind of conviction that he entertains (*kratumayah*). Consequently, *yathākratuḥ puruṣaḥ bhavati*, i.e. just as the sort of conviction he entertains in this world while living, even so does he become, after departing from here, from the body... Since the result that accrues accords with the conviction, therefore that conviction has to be shaped." In order to explain how the conviction is to be shaped, the Upaniṣadic text sets forth the characteristics of Brahman for the purpose of meditation on it. Here is a description of the attributes of Brahman, which has become a classic.

He appears like the mind, has *prāṇa* as the body, has the form of consciousness, is of true resolve, is of the nature like space, is the performer of all actions, has all good desires, good smells, good essences, pervades all this, is devoid of speech, is free from hankering.⁵

The Self gets identified with *manas*, *prāṇa*, *bhā*, and so on; and it has to be meditated upon as characterized by these attributes. The Self which is conditioned by the mind-sense-body complex appears to be finite and limited. But it is essentially no other than the infinite and immutable Brahman. Śāṅḍilya conveys the idea that the Self which is extremely subtle is identical with Brahman

in the sequel. First of all, he says that this Self within the heart is smaller than paddy, or barley, and so on and that it is greater than all the worlds that we can think of.⁶ Then he straight away declares that it is Brahman itself⁷ and concludes that a person who meditates on the Self in the way it has been described attains it, i.e. becomes one with it, after departing from the body. A person continues to live so long as the past actions, which have started producing results in this life, are not exhausted; and he has the true conviction that he will attain Brahman, i.e. realize his true nature, after death in accordance with his conviction. "Verily, he who believes this will have no more doubts," assures the Sage.

The teaching of the *sāṅdilya-vidyā* may be summarized as follows: (1) Brahman-Ātman which is the cause of the entire manifested world is immanent in it. (2) The effect which is dependent on the cause for its being, manifestation, and functioning is not real. (3) Our next life depends on what we do in this life. (4) We can overcome finitude through meditation as prescribed in scripture. (5) The goal of man is union with Brahman-Ātman. It is necessary to point out in this connection that the logic of the clay-pot illustration mentioned at the outset to bring out the illusoriness of the effect vis-à-vis the cause which is real is equally true of the rope-snake example, which is often cited by the Advaitin in his explanation of Brahman-world relation. The Advaitin makes use of only one principle in his explanation of the cause-effect relation. The principle, "*kalpitasya adhiṣṭhānameva svarūpam*," holds good both in the case of clay-pot and rope-snake examples. Though it is true that in the former case the manifestation of pot is through actual transformation (*pariṇāma*) undergone by clay, while in the latter the appearance of snake is through *apparent change* or transfiguration (*vivarta*) in rope, this difference, the Advaitin holds, does not alter the nature, or the ontological status, of the effect. The effect in both the cases is dependent on the cause for its origination, existence, manifestation, and functioning. It is, therefore, *kalpita*, while its cause, the substratum (*adhiṣṭhāna*), is

real (*satyam*). It does not matter whether we assign empirical reality (*vyāvahārika-sattā*) to clay-pot and phenomenal reality (*prātibhāsika-sattā*) to rope-snake, because both are *kalpita* as ontological entities. What is true of these two illustrations is equally true of the illustrated; that is to say, while Brahman is real, the world is *kalpita*; and hence the Advaita thesis, viz. "*Brahma-satyam, jagan-mithyā*," is perfectly justified.

III

Brahman is not only immanent in the world, but is also transcendent to it. If the focus of the *śāṅḍilya-vidyā* is on the immanence of Brahman, the Yājñavalkya-Gārgī dialogue in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, 3.8, elucidates its transcendence. Though Brahman and Ātman are identical, it will be helpful if the contextual usage of these two terms is kept in mind for the sake of conceptual clarity. Again, Advaita makes the distinction between Brahman-in-itself and Brahman-in-the-world. The former is called Nirguṇa-Brahman and the latter, Saguṇa-Brahman or Īśvara. It must be noted that the distinction between Nirguṇa-Brahman and Saguṇa-Brahman is not absolute, but contextual. Nor does it support the existence of two Brahmanas as the critics of Advaita hold. Such a distinction is made to highlight the difference between acosmic and cosmic points of view, what the Upaniṣads call *niṣprapañca* and *saprapañca* points of view, respectively. In the words of S. Radhakrishnan:

The distinction between Brahman-in-itself and Brahman-in-the-universe, the transcendent beyond manifestation and the transcendent in manifestation, the indeterminate and the determinate, *nirguṇo guṇī*, is not exclusive. The two are like two sides of one reality. The Real is at the same time being realized.⁸

Getting permission from the Brāhmaṇas assembled in the court, Gārgī once again asked Yājñavalkya two questions.

Gārgī: "By what, O Yājñavalkya, is that pervaded which is above the heaven and below the earth, which is this heaven and earth as well as between them, and which they say was, is, and will be?"⁹ Śaṅkara in his commentary on the text points out that, following the earlier discussion relating to the Sūtra, the inner most and subtle entity unifying the entire universe, Yājñavalkya replied that "the manifested universe consisting of the Sūtra exists in the unmanifested ether, like earth in water, in the past, present, and future, in its origin, existence, and dissolution."

Gārgī, repeating the earlier part of the previous question, further asked: "By what is the unmanifested ether pervaded?"¹⁰

Śaṅkara's commentary on this is illuminating. Śaṅkara observes:

[Gārgī] considered the question unanswerable, for the unmanifested ether itself, being beyond time, past, present, and future, was difficult to explain; much more so was the Immutable (Brahman) by which the unmanifested ether was pervaded; hence it could not be explained. Now, if Yājñavalkya did not explain it for this reason, he is liable to the charge of non-comprehension; if, on the other hand, he tried to explain it, notwithstanding the fact that it was a thing that could not be explained, he would be guilty of contradiction; for the attempt to explain what cannot be explained is a case of contradiction.

Yājñavalkya: "O Gārgī, the knowers of Brahman say that this Immutable (Brahman) is that. It is neither gross nor minute, neither short nor long, neither red colour nor oiliness... without eyes or ears, without the vocal organ or mind... without interior or exterior. . ."¹¹

Here also, as usual, Śaṅkara's commentary is helpful to understand the full significance of Yājñavalkya's answer. Śaṅkara writes:

By referring to the opinion of the knowers of Brahman, [Yājñavalkya] sets aside both the charges by suggesting that he

will say nothing objectionable, nor that he has failed to comprehend the question. When he thus answered her question, Gārgī must have rejoined, "Tell me, what is that Immutable which the knowers of Brahman speak of?" Thus addressed, Yājñavalkya must have replied: It is not gross, i.e. it is other than gross. Then it must be minute. No, not minute. Then is it short? No, it is not short. Then it must be long? No, nor long. By this fourfold negation of size, all the characteristics of a substance are denied of it. In other words, the Immutable is not a substance. Is it then red, which is a quality? No, it is different from that too, for red colour is a quality of fire. Is it then the oiliness of water? No, nor oiliness... Has it then eyes? No, it is without eyes, for it does not have the visual instrument... Similarly, it is without ears... Also, it is without mind... In short, it is devoid of all attributes, for it is one only without a second; if so, what is there to be specified, and through what?

Yājñavalkya goes on to say: "Under the mighty rule of this Immutable, O Gārgī, the sun and the moon are held in their positions... heaven and earth maintain their positions... some rivers flow eastward... others flow westward... still others keep to their respective courses."¹²

Śaṅkara in his commentary brings out the objective of the above passage. He says:

The śruti text, by denying the various attributes of the Immutable, has affirmed its existence. Yet, by anticipating the popular misconception about it, it adduces an inferential evidence in favour of its existence... So the Immutable (Brahman) which has made the sun and the moon exist, and compels them to rise and set, and so on, even though they are powerful. It is this Immutable which is like a boundary wall that preserves the distinctions among things—keeps all things within their limits... heaven and earth obey a fixed order, which would be impossible in the absence of a conscious, transcendent ruler.

Yājñavalkya finally says: "This Immutable, O Gārgī, is never seen, but is the witness. It is never heard, but is the hearer. It is never thought, but is the thinker. It is never known, but is the knower. There is no other witness but this, no other hearer but this, no other thinker but this, no other knower but this. By this Immutable, O Gārgī, is the unmanifested ether pervaded."¹³

IV

It is impossible for us to know Brahman-Ātman, the primal Being, straight away. Accustomed as we are to the things of the world, which are impermanent, insentient, and finite, it is difficult even to imagine what it could be. We can neither define nor describe it by means of empirical categories, because it is totally other than the world even though it is the ground of the world. That there is the world revealing marvellous sequence and magnificent order is a mystery beyond our comprehension. How and when the manifestation of the world took place cannot be explained by means of reasoning. The primal Being, which the Ṛg-vedic seer calls "That One", manifests itself by its own intrinsic power as the world. Just as a rope remains concealed when it appears as a snake, even so the primal Being remains concealed when there is the manifestation of the world therein. It is by negating the manifested world which is superimposed on the primal Being that one can directly experience the latter. Negation paves the way for affirmation. It is for this reason that Brahman-Ātman is said to be free from the world (*niṣprapañca*). Though the Real is not the actual, the actual is a pointer to the Real. We have access to the Real through superimposition and denial. What is superimposed on it due to ignorance must be negated with the help of scripture supported by reasoning. Scripture tells us that the primal Being is the ground of the manifested world. The One becomes the many through its own power of differentiation, called *māyā*. It becomes Īśvara, the Creator-God on the one hand, and the *jīva*

on the other. Both Īśvara and jīva are a complex of being and becoming; they constitute the objective world and the subjective world, respectively. Since our spiritual journey is from the familiar world (*prapañca*) into which we are thrown to its source, which is devoid of it, we characterize the latter as *niṣprapañca*. In the final analysis, we have to withdraw even this characterization which is contextual. The One which is the ground of the many remains unnamed and unspoken. Silence must be our ultimate response to it. When Bāṣkali requested Bādhva to teach him, the latter was silent. When the request was repeated, the teacher said, "I am teaching you, but you do not follow. The Self is silence."¹⁴ The positive characterizations with which we start are followed by the negative ones. It does not follow from this that the primal Being which we speak of is a non-entity, a vacuous emptiness. The reality of which all predications are denied is something positive. The *apavāda* which follows *adhyāropa* is significant negation. That is why Advaita follows the method of *adhyāropa* and *apavāda* in order to establish the existence of the primal Being as the substratum on which the entire world is superimposed. There is no other way to reach it. Śaṅkara's conclusion at the end of the Yājñavalkya-Gārgī dialogue is worth quoting here.

The unconditioned Self [Brahman], being beyond speech and mind, undifferentiated and one, is designated as "not this, not this". When it has the limiting adjuncts of the body and organs due to ignorance, desire, and work, it is called the transmigrating individual self; and when it has the limiting adjunct of the power of eternal and unlimited knowledge (i.e. *māyā*), it is called the Inner Ruler and Īśvara. The same Self, transcendent, alone, and pure, is called the immutable, supreme Self. Similarly, having the limiting adjuncts of the bodies and organs of Hiraṇyagarbha, the Undifferentiated, the gods and the species, the individual men, animals, and spirits, and so on, the Self assumes those particular names and forms. . . The above beings differ only because of

their limiting adjuncts, but not otherwise, for all the Upaniṣads conclude, "only one without a second."

V

Is it, then, correct to characterize Brahman-Ātman as both transcendent and immanent? The answer is both yes and no. We claim that we are rooted in the world, subjective and objective. The mind, the senses, and the body which we possess, we claim, are real; and so is the external world of space, time, and cause. It is but natural for us to think of the cause of the world, which is actually its ground, from the perspective of the world. Our philosophical reflection on the problem is the first attempt to overcome the naïve and natural attitude towards the world, both subjective and objective. If we try to know the truth of the mind-sense-body world through a process of transcendence from one level to another—from the bodily to the vital, from the vital to the sensory, and then to the mental and the intellectual, and finally to the self-conscious—we will discover the Self or Ātman which remains hidden supporting the entire mind-sense-body complex, which is the transcendental *a priori* of all that we do as the subject of knowledge, as the agent of action, and the enjoyer of the consequences of our action. Being of the nature of consciousness, the Self, though immanent in the mind-sense-body complex, is not only different from it, but also transcendent to it. Similarly, if we probe into the external world by subjecting the things therein to a rigorous causal inquiry, then we can *dis-cover* the primal Being, which the Upaniṣads call Brahman or Sat, as not only the final cause of the world, but also its ground. Brahman, as the cause of the world, is immanent in it, and so from the perspective of the world, the theory of the immanence of Brahman is justified. The concept of "*tajjalān*" which we arrive at through the causal inquiry also shows that what really exists is Brahman and that the entire manifested world is *kalpita*. If so, Brahman as real is other than the world,

and is transcendent to it. It means that the concept of the transcendence of Brahman is intelligible only on the presupposition of the existence of the world. Brahman and Ātman are one and the same entity. The two terms "Brahman" and "Ātman" have the same referent. In the absence of the world, there is neither the immanence nor the transcendence of Brahman-Ātman, though for the purpose of instruction (*upadeśa*) the Upaniṣad speaks of it as immanent as well as transcendent. Gauḍapāda's declaration "*upadeśāt ayam vādaḥ*" and "*jñāte dvaitam na vidyate*"¹⁵ is relevant in this context.

NOTES

1. *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, 6.1.4.
2. *Ibid.*, 3.14.1.
3. *Ibid.*, 6.2.1.
4. *Ibid.*, 3.14.
5. *Ibid.*, 3.14.2.
6. *Ibid.*, 3.14.3.
7. *Ibid.*, 3.14.4.
8. S. Radhakrishnan, *The Principal Upaniṣads*, Harper Collins Publishers India, Sixth impression, p. 70.
9. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, 3.8.3.
10. *Ibid.*, 3.8.4.
11. *Ibid.*, 3.8.8.
12. *Ibid.*, 3.8.9.
13. *Ibid.*, 3.8.11.
14. See Śaṅkara's commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra*, 3.2.17.
15. See his *Māṇḍūkya-kārikā*, 1.18.

TRUE GUIDE TO CONDUCT*

Śrī Candrasekharendra Sarasvatī

The *śāstras* are the final authority for deciding what one should do or should not do. It is our duty to understand the *śāstras* and follow the injunctions contained therein.

All religions guide us towards salvation, the ultimate goal of life. In fundamentals like devotion to God, speaking the truth and helping others, there is no difference between one religion and another. The difference between religions is mainly in regard to certain doctrines and practices, which are the outcome of the varying experiences (*anubhava*) of each religious teacher. That is why Hinduism does not advocate conversion. We believe that, if a person faithfully follows the teachings of his religion, he will obtain salvation, which is the goal pointed out by all religions. There is, therefore, no need for extolling one religion or decrying another; wisdom lies in developing the spirit of tolerance (*samarasa*).

The doctrine of equality has begun to invade every aspect of our social behaviour. Modern reformists seek to obliterate all

* Courtesy: *Acharya's Call*, Sri Kamakoti Pitham Sri Sankaracarya Swami Math, Kanchipuram, 1995, Part II, pp. 110–16.

differences between man and man, and, in their zeal, they seek to decry the orthodox practices observed by those who wish to adhere strictly to the injunctions contained in the *śāstras*. In support of their stand, they quote the authority of the following verse from the *Bhagavad-gītā* (5.18):

विद्याविनयसम्पन्ने ब्राह्मणे गवि हस्तिनि ।
शुनि चैव श्वपाके च पण्डिताः समदर्शिनः ॥

The meaning of this verse is that a *paṇḍita* views alike a Brahmin endowed with knowledge and humility, a cow, an elephant, a dog, and a person who eats dog's flesh. This enumeration comprehends all grades of creation. But those who quote this verse for their own purpose conveniently ignore the significance of the two key expressions, *Paṇḍitaḥ* and *samadarśinaḥ*. *Paṇḍitaḥ* are those who have attained *ātma-jñāna*. In their eyes all are one. It is only such realized souls that are able to "see" the one, Brahman which is not affected by *sattva* and other *guṇas* or their effects, in all the creations mentioned in the verse. This position implies that, before one claims to treat all things as equal, one must have realized this *ātma-jñāna*, entitling one to the title of *Paṇḍitaḥ*. It is, therefore, unwarranted to conclude that this verse provides a clue as to how ordinary mortals should act.

Samadarśana comes in naturally to an *ātma-jñānī*. What is possible for him will not be possible for others. He may eat anything; he may take a plunge in a drain with as much unconcern or reverence as when he takes a plunge in the Ganges; he may drink a cup of molten lead with as much ease as when he drinks a cup of water. Others cannot do the same. Therefore, a *Paṇḍitaḥ*, or the perfect one, alone can have *samadarśana*, and not the ordinary mortal. What is applicable to a *Paṇḍitaḥ* cannot obviously apply to an ordinary person.

It is also significant that the word used in this verse in question is *samadarśinaḥ* and not *samakāriṇaḥ*. The *samatva* or *advaita*

(non-difference) referred to in the verse pertains to attitude and not to activity. The verse speaks of looking at all with an equal eye; not acting equally or identically in all cases. If the reformist's interpretation of *samadarsana*, *advaita* or non-difference in action also, is pursued to its extreme, absurd consequences will follow. We can have the same feeling of tenderness towards the mother, the wife and the daughter, but we cannot treat them identically. The advocacy of equality on the wrong interpretation of the *Gītā* verse in point will result in inconsistency, to say the least. That is why it has been laid down, and very properly too, that *Bhāvādvaitam sadā kuryāt, kriyādvaitam na karhicit*. In our attitude, we should develop *advaita-bhāva*; but behaviour patterns should differ according to difference in objects. In fact, the adoption of *kriyādvaita* will make difficult the development of *bhāvādvaita*, which is most vital. There must be distinction in *kārya*, even as there must be no distinction in *bhāva*.

So long as we are caught up in the whirl of *saṁsāra* and are subject to feelings like *kāma*, *krodha* and *dveṣa* and are afflicted by pain and sorrow, we cannot venture to adopt Advaita in action. Such a course will only lead us to grief. But this differentiation will get automatically extinguished and *bhāvādvaita* will develop, as we acquire *jñāna*, by refraining from evil thoughts and deeds, and by thinking of and practising only good deeds. When we become truly *ātma-jñānīs*, both our outlook and conduct in regard to all men and things in all the three worlds will become advaitic in content and character (*advaitam triṣu lokeṣu*). But there is one exception, and that is, *na-advaitam guruṇā saha* (Do not practise Advaita towards your guru). That will take away the very foundation of *upadeśa* and *anugraha*.

The next question is how to determine what to do and what not to do. Some people say, "let your intelligence be your guide" in this respect. As no two people hold the same view, and as the views of the same person change from time to time, we cannot adopt the shifting criterion of *buddhi* (intelligence) in such a vital

matter. That is why Lord Krishna says later on in the *Bhagavad-gītā* (16.24):

तस्माच्छास्त्रं प्रमाणं ते कार्याकार्यव्यवस्थितौ ।
ज्ञात्वा शास्त्रविधानोक्तं कर्म कर्तुमिहार्हसि ॥

Our *śāstras* are without beginning. They are the final authority in respect of human conduct. They embody the *anubhava* of humanity and are firmly established in verified human experience. They have survived the onslaughts of hostile criticism and the vicissitudes of doubt and defection. The mark of prudence is to rely on the inviolate injunctions of established *śāstra*, than on the inconstant intimations of our little minds. If we lead our lives with this faith in *śāstra*, we shall not come to grief.

Some people advance the argument that, though there are some good things in our *śāstras*, they are encumbered by weeds, which should be removed. This process of removing weeds is a dangerous one. No two persons are agreed on what is weed and what is crop. What is crop to one may be weed to another. So, in the name of removing weeds, there will be indiscriminate uprooting of everything, and there may be nothing left which we can call religion.

And so, in the craze for a false equality, let us not obliterate every difference. Do not twist scripture to suit your views. Understand it properly and act accordingly, with faith and devotion. Do the duties prescribed by *śāstra*, not to the extent possible, but "wholly". If inevitable, you may do so gradually. "To the extent possible" is a dangerous concession to the faltering and the faithless. It will lead, in their cases, to "nothing". Even if you apparently come to grief by allegiance to *śāstra*, it does not matter. For, you can be sure of one thing, namely, that you have not done anything wrong. The practice of the *śāstraic* injunctions will remove our sins and cleanse our hearts. In the heart so kept clean, God will manifest himself and guide us to the higher realms of realization, when all differences will automatically drop off.

Way to Get Rid of Evil

There has been no dearth of good and pious people in this holy land of ours. Some of these great men, whose names come to our mind effortlessly, are Samartha Ramdas, Tulsidas, Tayumanavar, Pattinathar, Appayya Dikshitar, Appar, Tirugnanasambandar and Ramalingaswamigal. These saints and devotees of God devoted all their time to doing good deeds only. They have left behind a wealth of devotional and metaphysical literature which is a perennial source of inspiration to us.

These good personages were incessantly engaged only with goodness in thought, word, and deed. Nothing evil came anywhere near them. The only way to avoid evil is to engage our minds fully and always in good things, without giving thought to evil, even in a negative way. If a person takes a resolve not to think of, speak, or do evil (which is thinking of evil in a negative way), he is likely to lapse into evil immediately and powerfully, as he will be reminded of evil, by the very fact of his resolve not to think of evil. An old *sannyāsin* was once asked how he overcame the promptings of *kāma* (desire). His reply was that when *kāma* knocked at his mind's door, it found his mind so busy that it withdrew of its own accord. A vacant mind provides opportunities for evil thought, temptation to gossip, etc. to enter it. When once an evil like *kāma* enters the mind, it will establish its sway there. But, if the mind is filled with good thoughts always and we are also consequently engaged actively in doing good deeds all the time, evil influences dare not come anywhere near us. The sure way of getting rid of *dus-saṅgam* (bad company) is *sat-saṅgam* (good company).

Mere meditation and *japa* may not fully help us to avoid evil. By habit they may tend to become automatic, resulting in the consciousness being enticed away by evil. Therefore, one has also to engage oneself continuously in good things. One way of keeping the body and mind engaged in the right way is to follow the stories

about, and the teachings of great saints and devotees. The more one engages one's mind in good direction, the less will be the opportunity for evil to enter it. Singing of Śrī Varadarāja of Kanchipuram, Appayya Dīkṣita says:

मन्ये सृजन्त्यभिनुतिं कविपुङ्गवास्ते
 तेभ्यो रमारमण मादृश एव धन्यः ।
 त्वद्वर्णने धृतरसा कवितातिमान्घात्
 यत्तत्त्वदङ्ग-चिरचिन्तन-भाग्यमेति ॥

The meaning of this verse is: "O! Lord, there may be other poets who can compose verses in Thy praise quickly. I am slow. But my good fortune is greater than theirs; for, while I struggle to put thy praise in verse, my mind lingers longer on thy resplendent features."

In the very process of doing good, evil automatically vanishes from one's consciousness. That is the lesson the lives and examples of the great sages of our land teach us. Therefore, the way to keep ourselves free from evil is not by merely saying "evil must go," but by always thinking of good, speaking about good deeds, and keeping the company of the good.

AMALĀNANDA*

Rajesvara Sastri Dravid

Śrī Appayya Dīkṣita, the most noteworthy and versatile Advaita scholar, in the beginning of his work *Siddhānta-leśa-saṅgraha* observes:

Victorious is the auspicious birth-destroying discourse (the *sūtra-bhāṣya*), which issue forth from the blessed lotus face of the Bhagavatpāda, has for its sole purport the non-dual Brahman, and is diversified a thousand-fold on reaching the (numerous) ancient preceptors (who expounded it), in the same way as the river (Gaṅgā), which issuing from the feet of Viṣṇu, is diversified on reaching different lands.

Ancient preceptors of Advaita who wrote commentaries and treatises on the *Sūtra-bhāṣya* of Śaṅkara with a view to determine its import were keen on establishing the unity of the self. And, in

* Courtesy: *Preceptors of Advaita*, pp. 157–164, Sri Kanchi Kamakoti Sankara Mandir, Secunderabad, 1968. Mahāmahopādhyāya R.S. Dravid was the Head of the Department of Ancient Politics and Economics, Sanskrit University, Varanasi.

order to establish this, they advocated several theories which differ among themselves. All these differing theories, however, pertain only to the empirical stage, and hence they do not in any way stultify the non-dual nature of the self. Sureśvara, well-known as the author of the *Vārtikas*, states that by whichever theory one attains to the knowledge of Brahman that theory must be taken to be the best; and there are many theories within the fold of Advaita.

Among the manifold theories explored and expounded by the ancient preceptors, the theories advocated by Vācaspatimiśra in his commentary, *Bhāmatī*, on the *Sūtra-bhāṣya* of Śaṅkara are prominent. His work is traditionally known as the *Bhāmatī-prasthāna*. He wrote treatises on the six orthodox *darśanas*, and was well-versed in Nyāya, Mīmāṃsā and Vyākaraṇa. The word *prasthāna* etymologically derived means a work by which is determined (*sthīyate - nirṇīyate*) beyond all uncertainty (*prakarṣeṇa*) the import of the *Sūtra-bhāṣya* of Śaṅkara. The work *Bhāmatī* determines beyond all uncertainty the import of the *Sūtra-bhāṣya* of Śaṅkara and hence it is called a *prasthāna*.

The views set forth in the *Bhāmatī* are difficult to understand and, in order to favour the earnest students of Advaita, Amalānanda wrote a commentary on it by name *Vedānta-kalpataru*. Appayya Dīkṣita in his *Parimala* on the *Vedānta-kalpataru* says that the latter gives room, like the aerial car of Pushpaka, to the manifold theories set forth by wise men. We shall now set forth briefly some unique features of the *Kalpataru* in the interpretation of the *Bhāmatī* on the *Catussūtrī* portion of the *Sūtra-bhāṣya*.

Śaṅkara in his *Adhyāsa-bhāṣya* states, "After imposing on each the nature and the attributes of the other through non-discrimination of each from the other in the case of attributes absolutely distinct among themselves as also of the substrates absolutely distinct among themselves, there is this natural empirical usage like, "I am this", and "this is mine", *coupling the true with the untrue*, with its cause in the illusory cognition."¹

The *Bhāmatī* on this passage is as follows: The true is the intelligent self; the untrue are the intellect, the sense-organs, the body, etc.; *coupling* (*mithunīkṛtya*) these two substrates; *coupling* means *yoking* (*yugalīkṛtya*).²

Although the word *mithunīkṛtya* is interpreted in the sense of *yugalīkṛtya*, yet the intended sense is not clear. A doubt naturally arises whether this *yugalīkaraṇa* means the relations of contact, etc. or a unique kind of relation.

Amalānanda in the *Kalpataru* explains the word "*yugalīkaraṇa*" thus: The manifestation of the substrate and the object superimposed is *yugalīkaraṇa*.

*yugalīkaraṇam nāma adhiṣṭhānāropyayoḥ
svarūpeṇa buddhau bhānam.*

This definition has one difficulty. *Yugalīkaraṇa* is the cause of superimposition. And, it is interpreted to mean the manifestation of substrate and the object superimposed. The latter, therefore, necessarily precedes superimposition. But, before the first superimposition of mind on the self, when one gets back to waking state from deep sleep or at the time of first creation when the cosmic dissolution is over, the manifestation of the substrate and the object superimposed, that is, mind, is not possible. For, it is admitted that at the time of dissolution or deep sleep, mind merges in its cause, that is, *avidyā*. Hence it must be held that the latent impressions arising out of the manifestation of the substrate and the object superimposed (mind) before the dissolution or deep sleep is the cause of the superimposition of mind on the self when one gets back to waking state from deep sleep or at the time of the first creation when the cosmic dissolution is over. *Yugalīkaraṇa* thus comes to mean the latent impressions arising out of manifestation of the substrate and the object superimposed. The manifestation of the substrate and the object superimposed is superimposition. Hence *yugalīkaraṇa* means the latent impression of the earlier superimposition.

Yugalīkaraṇa, therefore, means the latent impressions of the earlier superimposition which has for its content the substrate and the object superimposed and whose form is identical with the form of the succeeding superimposition.

*Adhyāsa-samānākāraḥ adhishṭhānāropyaviśayakaḥ
pūrvabhramasamskāraḥ yugalīkaraṇamityarthaḥ.*

It has been said that *yugalīkaraṇa* means manifestation of the substratum and the object superimposed. From this it should not be understood that there is the manifestation of the substrate and the superimposed object as distinct entities. According to Advaita, error is not admitted without a substratum. What is superimposed is unreal. And it has no existence independent of the substratum. Substratum is the limit of sublation. And by its knowledge, the knowledge of the superimposed object is sublated or at least taken to be not valid. So, when it is said that there is manifestation of the substratum and the object superimposed, it must be understood that the two are manifest as a blend or a unified whole.

Now it might be objected thus. The manifestation of substratum and the object superimposed as a unified whole is error or superimposition. It is the cause of later superimposition. The knowledge of the substratum is independently the cause of the knowledge of the substratum of the later superimposition. Similarly, the knowledge of the superimposed object is independently the cause of the knowledge of the superimposed object of the later superimposition. One need not hold that the form of the earlier superimposition or its latent impression *as such* is the cause of the later superimposition and must correspond to the form of the later superimposition.

This objection is not valid. One does not have the erroneous cognition in the form of 'I am the body' (*aham dehaḥ*) although there exists the knowledge of '*aham*' and '*dehaḥ*' separately. The reason is that there is no such previous knowledge and so, no

such latent impression which could lead to the superimposition in the form of 'I am the body'. On the other hand, there is the superimposition in the form of 'I am a man', and this is caused by the previous superimposition or its latent impression in the form of 'I am a man'. Hence the form of the later superimposition corresponds to the form of the earlier superimposition or its latent impression. And, the earlier superimposition or its latent impression by having a form similar to that of the later superimposition is the cause of the later superimposition. Hence *yugalīkaraṇa* means earlier superimposition or its latent impression.

In the *Adhyāsa-bhāṣya* Śaṅkara says: "There is this natural empirical usage like 'I am this', and 'This is mine'." The *Bhāmātī* on this passage is as follows: "When there is cognition of what is superimposed, there is the superimposition of what was formerly seen, while that cognition itself is conditioned by superimposition; thus, (the defect of) reciprocal dependence seems difficult to avoid. To this he says: "natural". This empirical usage is natural, beginningless. Through the beginninglessness of the usage, there is declared the beginninglessness of its cause—superimposition. Hence, of the intellect, organs, body, etc. appearing in every prior illusory cognition, there is use in every subsequent instance of superimposition. This (process) being beginningless, like (the succession of) the seed and the sprout, 'there is no reciprocal dependence; this is the meaning'."

From this it is clear that the empirical usage, its cause, that is, superimposition, and its cause, earlier superimpositions or the latent impressions—all these are beginningless like a stream. Amalānanda explains the concept of beginninglessness in the following verse:

tadākr̥tyuparaktānām
vyaktīnāmekadhā vinā
anādikālāvṛttiḥ yā
sā kāryānāditā matā.

Earlier superimpositions or their latent impressions are beginningless in this sense that there always exists the relation of time to either of these. In the same way, *adhyāsa* or superimposition is beginningless in the sense that superimposition or its subtle form is always related to time. Similarly, empirical usage is beginningless in this that empirical usage or its subtle form is always related to time.

Some hold that this series of superimpositions or their latent impressions is *avidyā*. And they cite the following texts from the *Sūtra-bhāṣya* to substantiate their contention. One text is: "Wise men consider the superimposition of this nature to be *avidyā*";³ and the other text is: "It is for the removal of this cause of evil, for the attainment of the knowledge of the oneness of the self, that all the Vedāntas are commenced."⁴ On the basis of these texts, some conclude that the *Bhāmatī* which speaks of two kinds of nescience in the invocatory verse is not true to the view of the *Brahma-sūtra-bhāṣya*.

In order to remove this misapprehension, the *Kalpataru* states that one kind of nescience which is beginningless and positive in character is explained in the *devatādhikaraṇa*; and the other kind is the series of latent impressions arising from previous erroneous cognitions. Between these two kinds of nescience, the one that is explained in the *devatādhikaraṇa* is well-known in the Advaita literature to be the *mūlāvidyā*, primal nescience.

Now two questions arise, one as to the nature of nescience and another as to its primal nature. Nescience is that which has undifferentiated consciousness alone as its content (*viśaya*). And it is *avidyā* in the sense that it is removable by the intuitive knowledge of Brahman. Or, we may say that it is *avidyā* in the sense that it has the characteristic of veiling the true nature of Brahman. And this characteristic of veiling the true nature of Brahman is present **both in the *mūlāvidyā* and the *tūlāvidyā***. It is a *jāti-viśeṣa*; and it **gives rise** to the empirical usage 'I do not know'. Its primal nature **consists in this that it is the material cause of the superimposition**

of the body, the senses, etc. by veiling the true nature of the substratum. The phrase "material cause of erroneous cognition (*bramopādāna*)" occurring in a *Kalpataru* passage conveys the sense that *mūlāvidyā* is the material cause of superimposition which veils the true nature of the substratum.

Now an objection may be raised. The superimposition of the body, sense, etc. is like a continuous stream and so the earlier superimposition is the cause of the succeeding one. When such is the case there is no necessity to resort to primal nescience as the cause of superimposition.

This objection does not hold good. Primal nescience serves a two-fold purpose. One is that it conceals the specific nature of the substratum of superimposition. There arises the superimposition of silver in the nacre only when the specific nature of the substratum, i.e. the consciousness delimited by nacre is not manifest. It is an invariable rule that non-manifestation of the specific nature of the substratum is the most important cause of superimposition. The phrases like *vivekāgraha*, and *asamsargāgraha* refer only to the non-manifestation of the specific nature of the substratum. When there is the manifestation of the specific nature of the substratum, there does not arise superimposition. The chief reason for this is that there is the absence of the cause of the superimposition, i.e. non-manifestation of the specific nature of the substratum. Thus, only when there is the non-manifestation of the specific nature of the undifferentiated consciousness, could the superimposition of mind, etc. on the self arise. And, the non-manifestation of the specific nature of Ātman is caused only by *mūlāvidyā*. In this sense, it is the cause of the superimposition of mind, etc. on the self and the relation of the self on the mind, etc.

Another purpose is served by *mūlāvidyā*. It is the transformative material cause of the superimposition of the body, senses, etc. It is thus: The superimposition of the body, sense, etc. has a transformative material cause, because it is an existent effect, like pot, etc. Thus there is assumed only one transformative material cause

with reference to all superimpositions. It is similar to the Naiyāyika position that only one omniscient being, that is, God, is inferred to be the efficient cause of the entire universe. The Upaniṣadic text '*māyām tu prakṛtiṃ vidyāt māyinaṃ tu maheśvaram*' affirms avidyā to be the primal cause of the universe.

Although both Madhusūdanasarasvatī and Brahmānandasarasvatī established the validity of the Advaitic truth by adopting the Navya-nyāya method, yet it must be noted that they adopt the line of arguments of the *Kalpataru* and other commentaries. And this is evident from this that both the writers often refer to the views of the *Kalpataru* in their works.

There is a *bhāṣya* text which is as follows: "There is begun respectful inquiry into the Vedānta texts whose auxiliary is reasoning not inconsistent therewith and whose purpose is liberation."⁵ The *Bhāmatī* on this passage is as follows:

The inquiry into the Vedānta is itself reasoning; other reasoning which does not conflict therewith such as is mentioned in the *Pūrva-mīmāṃsā-sūtras* and the *Nyāya-sūtras* in discussing the authoritativeness of the Veda, of perception, etc. serves as auxiliary.⁶

The *Kalpataru* on the above passage comments that the *Nyāya-śāstra*, *Smṛitis*, etc. are said to be 'reasoning' (*tarkāḥ*) in this that they are auxiliaries to the understanding of the import of scripture.

Thus the *Navya-nyāya* terminology also must be taken to be '*tarka*' and it is part and parcel of the *Vedānta-mīmāṃsā*. And the later Advaitic writers adopted the *Navya-nyāya* method in their works in order to achieve logical precision.

Amalānanda at the end of the *Kalpataru* says that he wrote the work under the Yādava king of Devagiri (the present Doulatabad) — Krishna and his brother Mahādeva (A.D. 1247–1260). Hence Amalānanda flourished in the middle of the 13th century.

In the beginning of the *Kalpataru* on the third chapter of the *Brahma-sūtra*, Amalānanda gives his name as Vyāsāśrama.

śrīmad vyāsāśramasya prativadanamadāt karṇayugmam viriñciḥ.

In the beginning of the *Kalpataru*, Amalānanda says that he is the disciple of Anubhavānanda.

yathārthānubhavānanda-pada-gītaṃ gurum̐ numah.

He further states that Ātmānanda-yati is his grand-preceptor.

ātmānandayatīśvaram̐ tam-anīśam̐ vande gurūṇām̐ gurum.

And his *vidyāguru* is Sukhaprakāśa, the disciple of Citsukha.

*prodyat-tāraka-divya-dīpti-paramām̐ vyomāpi nīrājyate,
gobhīrasya sukhaparakāśa-śaśinam̐ tam̐ naumi vidyāgurum.*

Amalānanda lived in Nasik-trayambaka-kshetra. In the *Saman-vayādhikaraṇa* there occurs the following verse in the *Kalpataru*:

*asti kila brahmagirir nāma girivarah
trayambaka-jaṭājūtakalanāya vinirmitā
pāṇḍureva paṭī bhāti yatra godāvarī nadī.*

While commenting on this, Appayya Dīkṣita states that our author who lived in Nasik (Trayambaka-kshetra) composed his works. Apart from the *Kalpataru* on the *Bhāmātī*, Amalānanda wrote *Śāstradarpaṇa*, an exposition on the *Brahma-sūtra*.

NOTES

1. *Tathāpi anyonyasmin anyonyātmakatām anyonyadharmāmśca adhyasya itaretarāvivekena atyantaviviktayoḥ dharmadharminoḥ mithyājñāna-nimittāḥ satyānṛte mithunīkṛtya ahamidaṁ mamedamiti naisargiko'yaṁ lokavyavahāraḥ.*
2. *Satyaṁ cidātmā, anṛtam buddhīndriyadehādi, te dve dharmiṇī mithunīkṛtya yugalīkṛtya ityārthaḥ.*
3. *Tametam-evamlakṣaṇam-adhyāsam-panḍitāḥ avidyete manyante.*
4. *Asya anarthahetoḥ prahāṇāya ātmaikatva-vidyāpratipattaye sarve vedāntāḥ ārabhyante.*
5. *Vedānta-vākyamīmāṁsā tadavirodhi-tarkopakaraṇā niḥśreyasaprayojanā prastūyate (Śaṅkara's commentary on BS. 1.1.1).*
6. *Vedānta-mīmāṁsā tāvat-tarka eva, tad-avirodhinaśca ye anyepi tarkāḥ adhvaramīmāṁsāyām nyāye ca vedapratyakṣādiprāmāṇya-pariśodhanādiśūktāḥ te upakaraṇaṁ yasyāḥ sā tathoktā.*

THE HINDU IDEA OF GOD*

S. Radhakrishnan

Religion as a human institution is a living organism. It possesses the same kind of unity and self-identity which organic things have, the unity of a continuously changing life as against that of an unchanging creed. Its spirit is to be found not in what it was in a past stage, nor even in what it is now. Religion requires to be interpreted "according to its meaning and not according to its lisp- ing expression," even as Empedocles was expounded by Aristotle (*Metaphysics* I, 985 a 3). If we survey the successive stages of the history of a religion, we get an idea of something deep and funda- mental, which is ever expressing itself anew, though never finding perfect expression. This growing ideal, this operative principle, which is inadequately expressed in any specific stage, is the real spirit, the meaning or the idea which informs the whole historical movement.

If we ask for the spirit of the Hindu religion, it is to be found in its insistence on the reality of spiritual experience. We are at grips

* Courtesy: G.A. Natesan & Co., Madras. This article originally published in *The Spectator*, May 30, 1931, was republished along with other articles under the title, *The Heart of Hinduism*, 1936, by G.A. Natesan & Co.

with reality in the inner depths of the soul. This insistence on the inwardness of religion, its subjective or experimental character is maintained throughout the history of Hinduism. When the Hindus look back to the Vedic period as the epoch of their founders, it means that the Rishis were the pioneer spirits, the first researchers in the realm of spirit. The Sanskrit word *Rishi* is from the root "*dr̥ś*" to see. Religion is sight, vision, experience. Thus truths announced by the Rishis are evolved not as the result of logical reasoning or systematic philosophy, but are the products of spiritual intuition, *dr̥ṣṭi*, vision. The Rishis are not so much the authors of the truths registered in the Vedas as the seers who were able to discern the eternal truths by raising their life-spirit to the plane of universal spirit. Their utterances are based not on transient vision but on continuous experience of resident life and power. *Sadā paśyanti sūrayaḥ*. If the Vedas are regarded as the highest authority, it is because the most exacting of all authorities is the authority of facts. God is not the ideal we cherish, but the Real we apprehend. Spiritual experience is not a species of imaginative thinking, but is the closest communion with Reality.

The saint who knows God by acquaintance and not simply by hearsay does not want a definition of God. Doubt and disbelief are impossible for him. Nothing can disturb his sense of certainty, strange and simple. But for the sake of ordinary human beings, who are religious at second-hand, who wish to enjoy the consolations of religion without undergoing the labour of being religious, who wish to be guided by myth and ritual in the path of religion, we require imagery to clothe the vision. Besides, the only way to impart our experience to others, elucidate its implications, defend its validity against hostile criticism is by means of logic and language. Hinduism offers us a graduated scale of interpretations from the most impersonal to the crudely personal.

When the individual who has had the insight attempts to interpret his experience in the light of logic and common sense, he adopts an attitude of faith which is urged by its own needs to

posit the transcendent Reality. He knows that the soul has dealings, intimate, direct and luminous, with a plane of being, different from that with which the senses deal, more resplendent but not less real than the conventional one which the understanding presents. Reason, revelation and spiritual experience alike bear witness to the reality of a Being, spiritual in its essence, which is the ground of all that is, "whose shadow is immortality and death". *Yasya chāyāmṛtam, yasya mṛtyuḥ* (*Rg-veda* 10, 121). Ineffability is the most striking feature of spiritual experience. When we seek to define the experienced reality, we are compelled to use forms and conceptions, but the real exceeds the most comprehensive of them. Buddha admits the reality of spiritual experience, but refuses to interpret it as the revelation of anything beyond itself. For him, the view that spiritual experience gives us a direct contact with God is an interpretation and not an immediate datum. Buddha attempts to keep close to the given, and is content with the affirmation that a deeper universe of spirit penetrates the visible and tangible world. Śāṅkara, the great Hindu philosopher and theologian, argues that all forms contain an element of untruth and the Real is beyond all forms. The Upaniṣads, Buddha and Śāṅkara and his followers admit that the pure luminous Spirit, without division or duality, unique, existent beyond, or rather, within the world of multiplicity and change, is an unconditioned existence, beyond all possibility of adequate expression by thought or description by speech. We confess without confession that the glory of God is inexplicable, beyond the reach of speech and mind. "It is other than the known and above the unknown." (*Kena Upaniṣad* 1.3) "The eye goes not thither, nor speech nor mind." (*Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* 3.8.8) There is, however, a danger in this intellectual modesty and spiritual humility. Buddha's reticence on the question of the Absolute exposed him to the charge of atheism. By denying all attributes and relations we seem to be reducing ultimate reality to bare existence, which is absolute vacuity. Śāṅkara urges that only the feeble-minded will confuse the negation of empirical

qualities with the negation of all being. The negative accounts are intended to convey the soul's sense of the transcendent majesty of the Absolute, that it is the "wholly other", of whom nought may be predicated save in negations.

Hinduism is not content with this negative account. The three noteworthy features of spiritual experience are reality, awareness, and freedom. If some parts of our experience come to us with these characteristics, it implies the possibility that all experience is capable of being received in the same manner. The consciousness to which all experience is present in its own immediacy, revealedness, and freedom from anything which is not itself, is the divine consciousness, that which is our ideal. In the divine status, reality is its own immediate witness, its own self-awareness, its own freedom of complete being. There is nothing which is not gathered up in its own being, nothing which is not revealed in it, and there is utter absence of all discord. It is perfect being, perfect consciousness, and perfect freedom, *sat*, *cit* and *ānanda*. Thought and its forms, will and its expressions, love and its harmonies are based on it. These human counterparts involve duality, tension, strain. Hence the inadequacy of the human and finite categories to the perfection of the divine. The Supreme is real, not true—is perfect, not good. Its freedom is its life, its essential spontaneity.

While the fullness of spiritual being transcends our categories, its nature is still akin to the highest kind of being we are aware of in ourselves. If the real were utterly transcendent to the self of man, it would be impossible for us to apprehend even dimly its presence. We would not be able to say that the Supreme is wholly other. There is in the self of man, at the very centre of his being, deeper than his intellect, something which is akin to the Supreme. There is a real ground in man's deepest being for the experience of reality. God's revelation and man's contemplation seem to be two sides of one fact. The con-substantiality of the spirit in man and God is the conviction fundamental to all spiritual wisdom. It is not merely a matter of inference. In the spiritual experience

itself, the barriers between the self and the universal spirit drop away. We belong to the real, and the real is reflected in us. The great text, *Tat tvam asi*, That art thou, is the simple statement of an experienced fact. The Biblical saying: "So God created man in his own image; in the image of God created He him" (Genesis I, 27) asserts that in the soul of man is contained the true revelation of God. "The spirit of man is the candle of the Lord." (Proverbs xx, 27) According to Plato, man is potentially a participator in the eternal mode of being which he can make his own by living in detachment from the fleeting shadows of the earth. "I and My Father are One" is Jesus' way of expressing the same profound truth.

God is the infinite spirit who is both in us and out of us. If God were not in us there would be no sense of need; if God were not out of us, there would be no sense of worship. If we emphasize the transcendence of the Supreme to the human self, our religion becomes devotional. Our highest knowledge of God is only partial. There always remains something which is unknown and unspoken. The specifically religious consciousness insists on the sense of communion with a higher than ourselves with whom it is impossible for the individual to get assimilated. There are many degrees in this personal relationship ranging from the feeling of utter humiliation in the presence of the Divine Majesty to the communion with the Supreme Love on whose grace the worst sinner can count. To compare the Supreme with the highest kind of being we know is nearer the truth than to compare him with anything lower. The religious devotee envisages the supreme reality in the form of a personal God who is the source, guide and destiny of the world. The difference between the Supreme as absolute Spirit and the Supreme as personal God is one of standpoint and not of essence. It is a difference between God as he is and God as he seems to us. Personality is a symbol, and if we ignore its symbolic character, it shuts us out from the truth.

Hinduism is the symbol of India's spiritual vision. It is based on the intuition of the oneness and wholeness of supreme spirit. On the belief that human life everywhere and always is a part and parcel of the divine being, it has cultivated a sort of religious hospitality. It recognizes that more than one reading of the experience is possible. If a number of us watch a sunset in summer, our experiences in the world of thought and feeling may not be identical, and our articulations of them are bound to vary. But this variety of interpretation need not be used as a support for scepticism.

NATIONAL INTEGRATION, SECULARISM AND
ADVAITA PHILOSOPHY OF VALUE*

Bijayananda Kar

National integration is, no wonder, a burning issue today at least in the context of India. India comprises of multi-lingual, multi-racial, multi-religious and multi-ethnic groups of individuals and at the same time those individuals, somehow or other, belong to India as its bonafide citizens. Because of so much diversity, the conflict and disharmony do arise frequently in different sectors and parts of the country and those, of course, stand as grave challenge to the very integrity of India not only as a political unit, but also so far as its national as well as cultural integrity is taken into account.

Here, a question may be raised as to how far the traditional religio-philosophical outlook which this country presents since antiquity is, in any sense, conducive to sustaining the spirit of national integration; or, to put it differently, how far the Advaita

*Courtesy: R. Balasubramanian (co-ed.), *Perspectives of Śankara*, Department of Culture, Ministry of Human Resource Development, Government of India, New Delhi, 1989, pp. 393–403. Professor Bijayananda Kar is at present UGC Emeritus Fellow.

philosophy of value is compatible with the idea of national integration beyond any point of controversy. The issue is so framed that a straightforward answer either in the positive or in the negative sense is not easily possible. But merely, on account of that, one need not avoid the issue and abstain oneself from further conceptual exploration. For, at least, one thing is clear that by such type of conceptual scrutiny many more facts concerning the issue are made explicit and consequently one attains a position to either solve or dissolve the problem.

I

Let us first take up the concept of national integration. It presupposes the point that within the nation itself there are people of various faiths, beliefs and attitudes; but they all, in spite of such differences and diversities, agree to remain under one single political set-up. This political attachment may not be only due to formal or legalistic agreement on a round table conference as it were, but it may have deep-rooted religio-cultural foundation. For instance, such type of emotionally charged expression like 'Bhārat Mātā' is surely intended to bring different people remaining within India to a much closer bond of unity and in many quarters at least such type of emotional appeal does have some pragmatic significance. Several dhārmic as well as purānic literatures obviously display a sense of cultural affinity to one nationality and thereby it serves, at least indirectly, the purpose of national integration.

It should also be noted in this connection that national integration is primarily a political concern. It does have a political root and integration. There is a demand based on non-religious need and requirements. Nations unite and separate largely on political causes. This is not necessarily arbitrary and whimsical. There may be certain justifiable grounds at the social sector for making a move in such a direction. No nation is an absolute reality in the sense that it ever remains as a real entity. In accordance with the

prevailing situation and circumstantial factors, a nation is formed and political support becomes almost a necessary prerequisite. In our own time, India and Pakistan have been created as two independent countries and those are said to have been formed on the basis of the theory of two nations. Again, for some political reasons, it was found in due course that Pakistan faced a challenge for disinte-gration, and consequently Bangladesh has come into existence. Thus there is the birth of another nation. As long as that nation continues to remain, the spirit of nationality is obviously a living phenomenon which again is due to various socio-political factors. So the issue of national integration can never be consistently framed being divested from the political origin.

There has been a tendency in certain quarters to establish a view that political decision to either form a nation or to sustain a nation largely depends upon the religious beliefs and attitudes which the people at large belonging to a particular region commonly share. In this connection, Iran as an Islamic state may be cited. The conflict between Israel and Palestine is largely found to be due to the difference between two distinct religious groups. Pakistan, at one phase, is declared by its political leaders as purely an Islamic nation based upon religious basis. The same point of view is also found to have been supported by the political leaders of Bangladesh. But though religion is used in all such cases for certain political purposes, the distinction between the conceptual frameworks of both politics and religion can easily be noticed even in these countries. For the sake of national stability, there is no reason as to why a particular religion-based state is not to move for a secret pact or alliance with a foreign non-religion-based nation for serving certain political objective. From such a consideration it may seem quite plausible that religious feeling and national interest are not necessarily on the same scale, and there is no justifiable reason as to why they cannot be conceived independent of each other.

Now, the issue may be taken up at the present Indian context. It goes without saying that India, as a nation, is established on secular ideology. A secular nation is said to be neutral to religion. In this context the Indian political leaders very often emphasize that politics and religion are different and as such any kind of infusing the idea of religious fundamentalism in the framework of political decision is ruled out. The Indian nation is not committed to any particular religion. Nobody is here either to be favoured or is to be looked down on the basis of adherence to any particular religious faith. Of course, in this context, it has been advocated by the constitutional experts that Indian secularism is aimed at national integration not by developing an adverse and negative attitude towards religion but by showing equal respect to all religions.

II

Only recently, secularism as a concept has been brought under common usage in the Western intellectual circle. According to the Western formulation, the concept has been introduced with a purpose to eradicate the transcendental supremacy over the empirical plane. Secularism is thus found to be opposed to all forms of religious formulation that is based upon some sort of mystical dehumanized transcendence. In that way "secular" is opposed to "sacred" and is placed within the worldly humanistic framework. Basically secularism is grounded upon the philosophy of humanism and any move for trans-human supernatural form of God-realization is excluded here. The secularist, in this sense, is supposed to be at least non-religious (non-theist), if not irreligious. Any supposition of attaining trans-empirical God's grace or compassion is never entertained in the secularist framework. In the political as well as national sphere, secularism is thus aimed at preserving the interest of a group of people remaining as citizens

in a particular political state. Those interests are worldly and empirical. They do not move beyond the human purpose. Thus secular framework at the national and political background need not necessarily be thought as opposed to the interest of people belonging to other nations and states. Because of the basic commitment for human welfare, it has to accelerate the sense of mutual goodwill and understanding among different nations and countries. So national interest is not thought to be necessarily opposed to international understanding. This is because of the fact that both national and international points of views do have their basis on secular humanistic foundation.

In India, the situation is somehow different. Since antiquity, people belonging to this land are prone to different religious faiths. Particularly the so-called Hindu religious outlook is so deeply rooted in the average Indian mind that it is difficult (if not impossible) to bypass that tendency while trying to make a proper estimation of Indian secularism. To put it differently, the dhārmic background of Indian secularism has got to be accepted as a powerful living phenomenon. Perhaps, in this sense, secularism here cannot be meaningfully operated without dhārmic basis.

However, the problem is: how can this be conceived? If secularism is anti-sacred, anti-theistic, anti-mystical, how can that have a synthesis with the dharmic framework? In recent past, only after independence, secularism as a socio-political ideology is advocated by the national leaders on the ground that this ideology, if properly understood and pursued, is likely to bring people of different faiths and attitudes within one religion as well as among other religions more closely. Consequently, that would strengthen the political and also national stability of the whole country. Gandhi tried to achieve this end by emphasizing the basic unity between different religious beliefs, particularly Hinduism and Islam. Gandhi is, of course, not the first person to boost up this trend of thought. But his appeal for spiritual unity has been intended to achieve a goal at the socio-political level. That all religious

(theistic) beliefs are basically one and that transcendental supernatural God is the same in every religion are some of the cardinal presuppositions of this sort of spiritual secularism (as one may call it). Even after Gandhi, the other prominent Indian political leaders, social workers, nationalists move on more or less in advocating this point of view.

In spite of the great boosting of the above approach, it can be remarked that such an idea of spiritual secularism is not quite effective in establishing the sense of mutual tolerance and harmony among different Indian citizens. Even now people are found to be opposed to each other on grounds of religious faiths. Religious dogmas, fanatic outlook and an overall sense of fundamentalism reign supreme even now after fifty years of independence. This has, no doubt, threatened the very stability of Indian nation and its integrity. I feel, it is primarily due to the fact that the much publicized slogan in this regard that *Īśvara* and Allah are one and the same seems to be neither effectively convincing to the mass so that it, in turn, modifies its religious practices, nor is it doctrinally or theoretically so much non-controversial. It has to be conceded that different religions being so much based upon transcendence have almost lost their ground; and that is at least one of the reasons for which in the advanced age of science and technology the claim of religion seems to be somewhat dim. Religion, in the usual traditional sense, is of course confined to a sectarian closed outlook, and thus it cannot fruitfully contribute towards human welfare. So far as its lexical and popular meanings are concerned, religion always stands for some sort of supernaturalism. Religious craving, in some form or other, stands for the attainment of supernatural, mystical perfection in a world beyond. It is in this sense other-worldly and its concern for the present worldly existence is only provisional and secondary.

Thus religion, being understood in terms of super-normality and transcendence, can obviously have no connection with integration at the socio-empirical level. The socio-political outlook

aspiring for integration is confined to the natural objective sphere. The term 'secular', in this sense, cannot even be understood in the sense of being neutral to religion (*dharma-nirapekṣa*). For even that implies that secularism cannot be understood without acknowledging religion. That is why standard authorities (both in India and abroad) define "secular" not in terms of religion but rather in terms of the present-worldly or empirical existence (*laukika*); for, religion carries a definite sense of transcendence. In this sense, secularism has absolutely no reference to religion. Its object is to safeguard and foster human values. A secular state is one which is to create and encourage opportunity for sustenance of human ideals. And this can be easily pursued without any reference to religious framework. Rather religious sense of divinity and transcendence blocks the easy flow of human welfare at the concrete socio-political level. The objective of national integration being grounded on a secularist framework cannot thus be conceived as having any compromise with religious framework. Religion is not only irrelevant for the cause of national cohesion and solidarity, but also it is virtually a hindrance.

III

It was indicated before that in the Indian context national integration cannot be accomplished without taking into account the religious dimension, because some form of religious sense has been thickly planted in Indian mind and it is thought that an Indian is naturally religious. Hence any attempt of infusing the sense of national integration in him cannot be meaningfully effective without acknowledging the deep-seated religious basis. It is thought that a religion-based social order (as it is thought to be prevalent in India) can be well adapted to national consciousness, provided one carefully emphasizes that the significant feature of all religious inquiries never bypass man's hopes and aspirations here and now. Otherwise the talk of national integration and

communal harmony will always remain no more than a visionary ideal.

It is exactly here that a sharp difference is often noticed between religious conservatives and religious reformists. While one group emphasizes some dogmas and rituals as the very core of religious frame-work, another group wants to view religion through social service at the human context. While to one, religion is social, to the other, it is trans-social. Very often the traditional religious conservatives claim that religion in its fundamental essence can never accommodate any such reformative measures that overlook and bypass the vital institutional framework of religious order. On the other hand, the liberalists claim that the true or real sense of religious conviction can never neglect the human concern at the socio-empirical context.

Now, what is the way out? How does philosophizing become effective in resolving the controversy? Let us take here Śaṅkara's Advaita into the fold of discussion. Does Advaita supply any clue for resolving the conflict between religious and secular ideals? So far as tradition is concerned, Śaṅkara is acknowledged as a great Advaitin. His Advaita *darśana* is regarded as one of the most authentic and convincing expositions of Vedānta or Upaniṣads. As a philosopher, his standpoint is on rigorous rational footing. Again, Śaṅkara is also acknowledged as a great religious advocate. His mission of revitalizing the *sanātana-vaidika-dharma* and in this context his establishing four great Advaita *maṭhas* in four notable religious centres situated in four corners of the country have paved a long way for religio-cultural unification which, in turn, is supposed to have boosted the cause of national integration.

So far as the common use of the term "*dharma*" is concerned, it can be noticed that there are at least two distinct meanings attached to it which have been well accepted in the tradition. *Dharma*, from one point of view, does have conspicuous similarity with religion. It accommodates within its fold priestly activity, prayer, worship, temples of various gods and goddesses. In this

sense *dharma* is not very much far from what is, of course, understood as religion. There is the acceptance of theistic model with all its association of transcendental divine mysticism. Dogmas, rituals, scriptural authenticity and various types of institutionalized cults and denominations are thickly blended with this type of dhārmic use. So far as this meaning is concerned, *dharma* is close to religion, and in this sense it is distinctly on a non-secular footing. Consequently, it cannot consistently be interpreted as a boosting factor for national integration. The value for which this sense of *dharma* is found to have been set is distinctly sacred, other-worldly and supra-social. Here the dhārmic craving stands for the attainment of supernatural perfection in the sense of mystic realization of the identity of *jīvātman* and *Paramātman* (mokṣa). Hence, in this formulation, it seems that the scheme of value presented by Śaṅkara, though of great significance from normal religious or dhārmic standpoint, does not perhaps become effective in accelerating the cause of national integration. It, like any other religious formulation, probably suffers from a closed sectarian, dogmatic and divisive outlook. On the basis of history it is held in certain quarters that there is the presence of bitter hostility among the followers of Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja and Buddha on the religious plane.

But, side by side, there is also distinctly noticed another use of the term "*dharma*" in the Vedic/Vedāntic scriptural writings and which has been well taken up by the present-day philosophical community for developing a point of view which is not very far from a rational humanistic outlook so far as the entire religio-cultural perspective of India is considered.¹ From this angle it is held that *dharma* primarily stands for the socio-moral principle (*ṛta*) which puts the whole mankind on a common bond of unity and solidarity by way of emphasizing such virtuous qualities in human personality like honesty, discipline, truthfulness, etc. which are meant to rationally balance individual needs and desires amidst social demands and requirements. *Dharma*, in this use, is a purely ethical principle at the secular plane. It does not have any such

trans-human, supra-social theistic or even general theological outlook. It has a definite unreserved sense of secular concern. This approach can be said to be clearly philosophical rather than religious. Here singular emphasis has been laid upon human welfare at the socio-empirical setting and not on any mystical, obscurant idea of perfection.

Recently the Vedāntic concept of mokṣa in particular has been also interpreted in a type of secular non-religious setting. Quoting from different passages of Śaṅkara and other prominent Advaitins, G.C. Nayak has made an effort to establish the point that "tolerance in a typical form is inextricably related to the very structure of Advaita" and Hinduism, particularly in its most influential Advaita (monistic) perspective is distinctly "non-religious or secular religion."² The Vedic point of view is held by him as "the natural culmination in the concept of Brahman without a second in the Upaniṣads and the Advaita Vedānta" and the Advaita rendering is regarded by him as "transcendental monism". The value which it aspires is, according to him, placed at the setting of what he terms as "transcendental secularism". He has taken care to point out that in this context secularism is quite proper in so far as it (Advaita point of view) "is not tied to any religious dogma or bias" and again it is transcendental to the popular sense of secularism in so far as it "avoids all 'isms' and is associated with a transcendental variety of monism subscribing to the view of non-duality of existence."³

Now, because of its freshness and novelty, a discussion seems to be warranted on this interpretation of Advaita concept of value. Certain points as to whether this rendering is quite faithful in exposing the Advaita standpoint are to be noted in this context. Further, how far this formulation itself is reasonably sound has to be considered. And also to what extent this point-of-view is acceptable for national integration must be examined.

If value in Advaita is primarily set for sustaining social justice, harmony and solidarity, then obviously it has a great worldly

significance. If the conception of all-pervasiveness of Brahman (*sarva-bhūtāntarātmā*) can be viewed as pointing at the equi-distribution of dhārmic principle everywhere and its proper comprehension (*avagatī*) is the illumination (*puruṣārtha* or *mokṣa*), then of course Advaita is no longer seen to be a metaphysical abstract point of speculation; nor is it the result of dry logic chopping or verbalism; but, on the other hand, it can be viewed as extremely important at the worldly socio-ethical plane. Such Upaniṣadic expressions that Brahman is realized here and now, and that it is not that what people worship, are quite significant in emphasizing the Advaita tone of secular non-theologism. It is, no doubt, the fact that in certain Advaitic writings there are definite supportive implications and in highlighting such implications there is *prima facie* no danger of misrendering.

But when one tries to connect some such highly significant lines from the socio-ethical point of view with other lines of Vedānta where there is found exclusive emphasis on oneness to the extent of complete avoidance of manyness (*neha nānāsti kiñcana*), difficulty seems to be quite normal. There is clear indication that in the Advaita philosophical scheme the highest value (*niḥśreyasa*) is free from all sense of duality and multiplicity. Here there is no synthesis of unity with diversity. But the sole acceptance of oneness or *ekatva* is maintained all through consistently. Diversity is not reconciled; but it seems to have been just relegated from the front to the back, and a distinct note is given to the idea that *ekatva* alone is valuable and that *nānātva* is valueless. Here by way of referring to some lines of the *Pañcadaśī*, it is held that Advaitic illumination does not destroy duality, only the enlightened come to realize that the world of diversity is not real in the sense of the reality of the Self or Brahman.⁴ Now, even if one accepts this concession, what does it amount to? Does it effectively synthesize the one with the many? Does it not reveal that duality is not real in the sense that oneness is real? In that way the Advaita concept of value seems to be radical rather than liberal. What sort

of tolerance can there be possible, when one so uncompromisingly rejects the other point of view?

One thing, of course, is acceptable, viz. that Advaita *darśana* is not propagating any religious doctrine. It is clearly a philosophical point of view. It is not a religious cult. This becomes quite evident from the point that in Advaita, Brahman as the highest value has cautiously been kept distinct from Īśvara which is usually the object of worship and prayer. But how, for that matter alone, does it become a secular value? A word of explanation is advanced in this regard. It is said that it is not secular in the popular sense as it avoids all 'isms'. Hence it is termed transcendental. But what plausibility can there be in such an explanation when it is said that it is that which is transcendental to something, say X? Does not transcendental or beyond something turn out to be obscure and vague? And in what sense is it beyond all 'isms' when it itself is designated as transcendental secularism? An attempt has been made to explain the expression "transcendental secularism" in terms of transcendental monism and that too again in terms of non-duality of existence. Well, what is the clarification achieved thereby? Does this not reveal a mark of abstract vagueness? It is not clear as to what precise meaning is obtained when the Advaita concept of value is depicted as transcendentially secular. If secularism is not here exactly in any of the available socio-ethical planes, but in a peculiar abstract trans-popular metaphysical sense of implying non-duality of existence, then that is surely vague and cannot cater to the need of invigorating the cause of national integration.

More penetrating investigation is perhaps required for arriving at a meeting point between the Advaita concept of value and that of national integration. It is perhaps well acceptable that *dharma* in this tradition has definitely a sanctioned use which is never opposed, but rather is conducive for inculcating an ethical idea that is well designed to keep a balance between individual expectation and social need. *Dharma*, in this sense, has of course a clear

secular leaning. It is obviously ethical rather than theological. This conception of *dharma* seems to have a philosophical support in the Advaita explanation of the concept of mokṣa which is meant as being enlightened about the highest value in the human plane (*puruṣārtha*). From this point of view, Advaita is definitely secular in the usual socio-ethical sense. It thereby strives to point out how an Advaitin is to develop an attitude towards everything on the basis of dispassionate balanced reason (*sama-buddhi*). *Ekatva* is emphasized here not necessarily in the sense of eradicating *dvaita*. But it is perhaps only meant to point to the significance of the idea of oneness, universality, etc. amidst multiplicity. Thus the concept of value as mokṣa or *puruṣārtha* seems to have a profound importance, and in that way it is secular and not sacred. Perhaps, in this sense, it is a form of humanitarian secularism (as I would prefer to describe it) which is never opposed to the idea of national integration, but does supply at least an indirect boosting for it.

NOTES

1. Here special mention may be made to two modern writers, Pandit Nilakantha Das (Vide his book, *Śrīmad Bhagavad-gītā* (in Oriya), third edition, New Students Store, Cuttack-2, 1968), and Dr Ganeswar Misra (Vide his book, *Vaidika Dharma Cetanā: Eka Dārshanika Vicāra* (in Oriya), Santosh Publications, Cuttack, 1985).
2. G.C. Nayak, *Philosophical Reflections*, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1987, pp. 66–68
3. *Ibid.*, pp. 69–71.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 76.

WORLD PERSPECTIVE OF INDIAN
PHILOSOPHY*

V.A. Devasenapathy

This is the second time since its inception that the Indian Philosophical Congress is holding its annual session in Kerala. I had the privilege of attending the session at Trivandrum in December 1945. I am grateful to the authorities of the Indian Philosophical Congress for the honour they have conferred on me by inviting me to be the General President of the fifty-first session here in Alwaye. This gives me an opportunity to place before you something of what I have been able to gather during a period of nearly four and a half decades of apprenticeship to philosophy.

It appears to me that in the long history of philosophy, whether in the West or in our country, there have been three major patterns of thought which may be characterized broadly as Absolutism, Theism and Humanism. No doubt this suggestion may be regarded as an over-simplification of the various rich trends discernible in

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philosophy. It may also be argued that these need not be exclusive trends and that it is possible to go from one of these to another or that any one of these may contain the other two. One may argue that starting from human existence as given in our own experience, we may go on to discover God as the spirit that sustains human existence as well as the world and find the consummation of our search in the recognition of the Absolute which, while accounting for everything, is beyond them all and in the final analysis, is the non-dual Reality. It is interesting to note that one may proceed in the opposite direction also. That is, one may start with an impersonal absolute—the total or over-all Reality. One proceeds thence to the concept of a personal God, who is responsive to the cry of one's heart, as more appealing than the Absolute. The culmination of this process is in the identification or recognition of God in human beings. God is not a spirit other than the various living beings but is the in-dweller in each of them and is nothing apart from them. This is, in a way, to substitute human beings for the Absolute and for God. Humanism could also totally repudiate God and the Absolute. In its contemporary phase humanism may be characterized as scientific naturalism, seeking on its practical side, to give the benefits of science and technology to mankind.

My submission is that each of these patterns sometimes assumes such a dominant and aggressive role as to deny the insights in the other two patterns of thought. The corrective for this would be the adoption of the *spirit* of the dialectical method in Western philosophy. This enables one to realize that while one's own standpoint is the most satisfactory for oneself, one stands to gain and definitely not to lose, by trying to incorporate the insights behind other views, into one's own standpoint. It may be this spirit that actuates contemporary efforts to organize religious dialogue. It is rewarding to observe how earnestly the participants in a religious dialogue strive to learn from one another so as to enlarge and enrich their own standpoints and experience. I venture to think that there is a similar spirit that actuates the procedure

followed in the Indian *darśanas* of stating and examining the *pūrva-pakṣa* first before setting forth the *siddhānta*; one incidentally passes in review other standpoints to determine their adequacy. Indeed the word *darśana* which is taken to mean a vision of reality, may be understood to include in its scope, enlargement of the original vision.

This brings us to the question of the role of philosophy. Is its role confined to the promotion of mere theoretical understanding of reality? Or does it call for interpretation of reality? Is its role to be enlarged further to include the changing of Reality or at any rate, of the world around us? I do not see any exclusiveness in these roles. Indeed even as the *jñāna*, *kriyā* and *icchā* aspects are combined harmoniously in a healthy personality, these roles may be effectively united. "Philosophers have hither attempted to explain the world, the real task is to change it"—this is a familiar remark. But to change the world, we have to understand or interpret it first. The understanding and interpretation will differ according to the standpoint of the persons concerned. Of late, conceptual and linguistic clarity have come for greater emphasis in interpretation. This is necessary, no doubt. But linguistic clarity may not be uniform for all branches of knowledge. Clarity characteristic of mathematics and the experimental sciences cannot be obtained in the fine arts, for example. Cognitive awareness is often promoted by suggestions, similes, etc. Hence in understanding and interpreting the world of reality, other forms may be used besides those employed by mathematics and the experimental sciences.

When we move on from understanding and interpreting the world to changing it, we often find that two approaches which have to be combined are set in opposition. These are (a) changing the individual and (b) changing the environment or the world. This is like setting heredity and environment in opposition, whereas the growth of the individual requires both of them. Even in combining these approaches, I believe that priority has to be given to the former, viz., changing the individual. No doubt

environmental improvement is necessary. But it is the individual who has to use his potential taking into consideration the opportunities of resistance offered by the environment to react to it suitably.

It is necessary for the individual to equip himself not only intellectually but also morally to understand reality before he attempts to change it. "None but the pure in heart can see God"—, or reality, or what you will. Even as a scientist requires discipline for careful observation and correct interpretation of the data relating to his field overcoming his personal likes and dislikes, similarly a student of philosophy has to subject himself to discipline very early in life. In this connection, I have difficulties in understanding the following oft-quoted remark of Hegel: "Philosophy comes too late to teach the world what it should be. . . The owl of Minerva begins its flight when the evening shadows have already fallen." Philosophy seems to be taken here for thinking after the event—hindsight rather than foresight, as wisdom after the event. Even granting that wisdom may come later in life the search for it need not be postponed to the declining period of one's life or of a nation's. The search for wisdom is in itself worthy of man's best effort. There is also the possibility that, even as the dawn comes as a surprise after intense darkness, wisdom may lie in wait for us. We may recall Bradley's remark made in another context. "Even in the cold world of Philosophy, some fortunes go by favour. One never knows until one tries." The spirit of adventure, natural to youth can certainly be encouraged to address itself to the adventure of ideas. Those embarking on this adventure will do all the better if they undergo normal and spiritual discipline. We must also reckon with philosophy as foresight, as "seeing life steadily and seeing it whole."

I have been using the word reality loosely so far. It may be said that Reality, with a capital R, is an obsession from the past that we need to get rid of. Whatever needs to be known can be dealt with by the various sciences. The task of philosophy is only

to interpret and clarify the findings of the various sciences. The operation of reason cannot be extended beyond the sphere of mathematics and the experimental sciences. Attempts of reason to go beyond these spheres have given us conflicting and contradictory systems. Such criticism notwithstanding, it is not idle to suggest that reason is not mere ratiocination. It need not be restricted to clarification of the findings of the sciences. When we say that these findings need clarification, is it not implied that they are not meaningful in and by themselves and that they require a frame of reference? Who is to determine the frame of reference? Again, in going beyond the findings in order to discover their implications, the 'seers'—those who have a vision or *darśana* seem to make a leap not only across analysis but also beyond a formal synthesis of putting together what has been pulled asunder, to a state of synoptic vision, and thus become "spectators of all time and existence". Beholding with the 'eye of Grace', they find everything transparent. If instead of this, we use demonstrative reason, we find that the very small focal point lit up thereby is covered by an overwhelming periphery of total darkness. It is observed that "Whitehead has escaped from the stage of thinking that the great philosophers were all wrong into the stage of seeing that they were again and again right, though not always in the way their followers thought they were" (John Lewis, *History of Philosophy*, p. 171). Is it not interesting to note, for example, that Berkeley, an empiricist, finds the need for God to maintain some kind of an independent and external world? Again, what is it that makes J.S. Mill, protesting that it was impossible to believe in the existence of God, go on to say that he was prepared to discuss the *possibility* of a Being who is limited in his power? "The cultivation of an imaginative hope is quite compatible with reserve as to positive belief, and whatever helps to keep before the ideal of a perfect being is of unspeakable value to human nature," says Mill. I offer the following comments on this statement of Mill for your consideration. Man as an imperfect being need not be. God as a

Perfect Being cannot but be. He cannot be the end product of the cultivation of a mere imaginative hope, but must be. For that, after all, is the thrust of the ontological argument that God, conceived as a Perfect Being, must exist, if perfection carries its full meaning. Yet, here is the paradox of a being who need not be, discussing the possibility of a Being, who as perfect, must be. The reality of our contingent existence becomes meaningful only because of the necessary existence of God as a Perfect Being. *Sat* or the reality, as in our existence, is meaningful only because *sat* or existence as such is meaningful. We *are*, because God *must* be. Instead of deriving the necessary existence of God from our contingent existence, we may derive and understand our contingent existence from his necessary existence. What inspires the confidence in Mill despite his reserve as to positive belief to make him say "whatever helps to keep before the ideal of a perfect being is of unspeakable value to human nature"? If this ideal were no more than an imaginative hope, could he say that it is of unspeakable value to human nature? Does anything of unspeakable value stem from an unfounded imaginative hope?

Nearer our times, we have Bertrand Russell saying that ever since men became capable of free speculation, their actions in innumerable important respects have depended upon their theories regarding the world and human life. Is it not puzzling that some contemporary philosophers give up the age-long philosophic quest of looking for the meaning of human life and existence as beyond the powers of the human intellect and yet feel that these questions are of profound importance to mankind? May we not, in the same spirit that makes us attempt the clarification of the findings of the various sciences, continue the age-long tradition of maintaining contact with religion, and attempt clarification (and reconciliation) of the findings of the various religions? If the followers of each religion have come to feel with all their personal commitment to their own religion, that there are valuable truths in other religions which may not be ignored, philosophy will be needlessly impo-

verishing itself by confining its attention only to the physical sciences.

Philosophy has to take into consideration facts relating to all aspects of life or at least such facts as have a bearing on life. The emergence of ecology as a new branch of science is not without its significance for philosophy. Is our environment limited to the physical, chemical, biological, geological and astronomical surroundings alone? In a subtle, but no less powerful and pervasive way, it seem to include the moral and spiritual aspects as well. In our ancient thought, *ṛta*, meaning 'course', stood not only for cosmic order but also for moral order. The physical order is sustained by the moral one. *Varuṇa* is "the real trustee of the *ṛta*". It is said that ceasing to be current in late literature, *ṛta*, however, plays an important part under the name of *dharma*. *Dharma* is "what holds together", and hence is the basis of all order. Ecology may yet help us to realize that it is not fanciful to attribute seasonal rains and prosperity to individual and social morality and spirituality. I should like to call to your attention the following lines paraphrased from a Tamil Bauddha classic called *Maṇimekhalai*:

If the sceptre swerves, the planets swerve,
If the planets swerve, the rains fail,
If the rains fail, settled life ceases,
All souls lose their status
As the life of the ruler of the world.

Two points are worth noting here. One is that people are the soul, while the state or the king is the bodys. The other is that a righteous state sustains and is sustained by righteous people. Righteousness is required not only for order in society but also for regularity in nature. There is a subtle extension of this principle to the universe as a whole, which is conceived as an organism with its physical, biological, moral and spiritual parts interacting delicately.

In the light of the foregoing, we have to ask whether the philosopher is to restrict his interpretation only to physical and biological findings? Modesty may forbid the contemporary philosopher to play the role of a seer or "spectator of all time and existence". But, if he does not wish to add self-denying austerity to his modesty, he need not preclude the inclusion of the insights of religion and thus deny himself and his subject these riches. If it is not a gratuitous task to seek to clarify the finding of the sciences, it need not be so in regard to the material offered by religion. Verily, "All is grist to the philosopher's mill."

It may be argued that religious consciousness is not universal and that therefore it does not merit philosophical consideration. We may note two attitudes to religion. One is to call for positive proof for the existence of God, soul, immortality, etc., before assent is given. Understanding has to precede belief. There is the other attitude where belief precedes understanding. "I believe so that I may understand." I feel that this attitude is not unscientific. Do we not provisionally assume an hypothesis to be true so as to verify the consequences drawn therefrom with facts? Such a procedure need not be ruled out for religion. We may recall the Indian tradition of *śruti*, *yukti* and *anubhava*. *Śruti* may be the authentic experience of a reliable person or revelation from God. But for a given individual, it may be mere hearsay, to start with. He may proceed to test it by reason (*yukti*), to see if it is intelligible. It is worthwhile remembering that there is no need for the declarations of *śruti*, where perceptual experience or reason will suffice. We have also to bear in mind the need for a procedure which is different from what is required for understanding the data given by sensory experience. The biological sciences require a procedure different from the one required for the physical sciences; likewise the categories used also differ from group to group of the various sciences, the category of purpose being distinctive of psychology; we may also note incidentally that for psychology, a more comprehensive study is necessary than is usual

in most academic circles. The study of super-conscious states may give us important clues to understand Reality. The emphasis on experience is salutary but the scope of experience need not be restricted to the sensory level. The insistence on *anubhava* shows that just as in science, experiments are conducted to verify for oneself conclusions reached by others, personal experience confirms what is obtained through *śruti* and *yukti*. Appearing to be purely subjective in character, it provides for consilience of results.

It is interesting to note that the passage may be in the reverse direction. One may have, without any previous study or mental preparation, *anubhava* or an overwhelming experience, 'a fire baptism', to borrow Thomas Carlyle's vivid phrase. This experience seems to bring about an awareness that is total. The experiences become capable of knowing everything, empirical or trans-empirical, if he wants to. The authenticity of what is thus given in his experience is vouched for by reason and by the scriptures. The biographical accounts of Ramana Maharshi who lived in recent times make it clear that he found confirmation of his experience in the scriptures. He was able to elucidate the scriptural passages referred to him, even though he came across these for the first time. There seems to be total clarity in such experiences, containing and going beyond linguistic and conceptual clarity. In this way, the transition could be from unpremeditated personal experience (*anubhava*), to a rational examination thereof (*yukti*) and confirmation by the scripture (*śruti*). Whichever the direction travelled, there is rich material for philosophy, not only in the empirical sciences but also in religious experience.

What has gone into the Indian philosophers' mill in the present century? Abraham Kaplan has an interesting chapter on Indian philosophy in his book, *The New World of Philosophy*. He makes an introductory remark in this chapter as follows: ". . . I shall be speaking about Indian philosophies and not about philosophies in India; because India today is a part of the world community of nations and is very much more European than is often supposed—

this especially is true in the realm of ideas. In my opinion, Nehru, for instance, is better understood if we think of him as a product of British higher education than if we try to trace his ideas to their roots in Indian antiquity. A great deal of philosophy in India today is essentially Western. Indeed, this seems to me to be true throughout Asia, and unfortunately many Asians confuse the task of the modernization of their cultures with the very different enterprise of Westernizing them. Students of philosophy in India, Japan, and Free China—to say nothing of Communist China—are often more conversant with the Western philosophical tradition than with their own cultural heritage."

I should like to make two observations on Kaplan's remark just quoted: (a) if some Indian philosophers feel interested in typically Western philosophy, ancient or contemporary, we may be happy in the thought that their interest will also bring credit to us as exemplifying Indian capacity for philosophical thinking on lines other than indigenous ones. (b) From Vedic times India has welcomed all thought irrespective of whichever side it may come from. "Let noble thoughts come to us from every side" says the *R̥g-veda*. The *Tirukkural*, a great Tamil classic, says: "To discern truth in everything by whomsoever spoken is wisdom."

This classic poses a question. "To the learned, any town or country is like his own town or country. Why then does a person not strive to learn till his last breath?" In the manner in which fruitful comparisons have been made between types of Western and Indian Absolutism or Western and Indian Theism, there is likely to be an assimilation of existentialism (especially in its theistic aspect) and analytical philosophy, while Marxism acts as a powerful stimulus on the practical side. It was a happy idea of the Government of India to bring out two volumes on *Philosophy Eastern and Western*. Surely the Vedic Spirit may continue to inspire our philosophical thinking whether its content be Western or India. It is my wish and prayer that the Indian philosopher should see things in a world-perspective and strive to serve mankind in his own way.

THE IDEA OF SPIRITUAL VALUE*

S.L. Pandey

Since the rise of science and scientific outlook in the seventeenth century, there has been taking place a continuous erosion of religious values in the West. Nietzsche's dictum that God is dead has virtually declared the death of religion. With the idea of God as dropped from the explanation of the external world, social order and human personality, most of the philosophers, let alone scientists, argue that there is no spiritual value at all, and that all values are materialistic and relative to social, economic, political and psychological conditions of the human beings who seek them in the normal course of their life. They equate the spiritual value with the religious value and therefore their condemnation of religion is tantamount to the condemnation, or even elimination, of the spiritual value. This spiritual crisis is the logical nemesis of the contemporary Western *Weltanschauung* that has become the most dominant fashion among the intellectuals of the whole world today.

*Courtesy: *Perspectives of Śāṅkara*, New Delhi, 1989, pp. 307–316. Dr S.L. Pandey was formerly Professor and Head, Department of Philosophy, University of Allahabad.

But the religions of the East that are not God-centred are not affected by this crisis. For example, Buddhism and Jainism are religions without God. They refute the equation of spiritual value with religious value and argue that spiritual value is to be sharply distinguished from faith in God, devotion to God and God-realization. Their impact on the Western *Weltanschauung* is, therefore, compelling it to redefine the spiritual value or spirituality which is other than the materialistic life related to the social milieu of its seekers. However, despite their emphasis on spiritual value as distinct from religious value, Buddhism and Jainism have landed into another sort of confusion, for they do not make a neat distinction between spiritual value and moral value. They are rightly regarded and interpreted as ethical religions, and as such they are undoubtedly successful in establishing the verve and power of moral values over all other values. Nonetheless, moral values are multiple in nature. They are also characterized by prohibitive asceticism and denial. Hence these religions give rise to moral pluralism or nihilism that becomes harmful to social solidarity and personal integrity which need, *inter alia*, a commitment to one supreme value that is life-affirming. The Vedānta of Śaṅkara fulfils this need. It also removes the afore-mentioned double confusion about the identification of spiritual value, since it declares unequivocally that there is only one spiritual value that is distinct from both religious value and moral value, and that it is to be identified with self-realization. There is no value that is greater or higher than it. No gain or achievement is higher than self-attainment ("*ātmalābhāt paro nānyo lābhaḥ kaścana vidyate*" — *Upadeśasāhasrī*, 2.17.4).

But there is a paradox about self-attainment, for the self, in fact, is not attainable as it is ever attained. Here Śaṅkara shares a sort of scepticism and pleads that moral and religious values are not ultimate, for in his estimate they are subject to change, modification and annihilation. Moreover, they are attributes or merits which are acquired *ab extra* (*upādeya*). The spiritual value, on

the contrary, is free from these characteristics. It is not destructible, modifiable and producible. It is ingrained inherently in the nature of consciousness that is called the self in Advaita Vedānta. Its attainment is virtually the attainment or recognition of what is eternally attained (*nitya-prāptasya prāptiḥ*). When the edifice of error is demolished completely by the bulldozer of knowledge, the self-effulgent consciousness bursts forth over all objects of knowledge spontaneously, and the intellect that was confined to the body (*dehātmadhīḥ*) immediately becomes the intellect encompassing the whole universe of infinity (*brahmātmadhīḥ*).

So if there is no self-realization, then all other values become disvalues, because they are concerned with the glorification of the not-self only. Whatever is valuable is valuable only because it is for the sake of self-realization. No self-realization, no value. If value, then self-realization. Such are the aphoristic formulations of the Vedāntic concept of value that is found in the work of Śaṅkara.

This concept of value is, for example, clearly formulated in a small tract entitled *Anātmaśrīvigarhaṇam* (The Censure of Materialistic Values) that is attributed to Śaṅkara. Here he explains how self-realization is the only spiritual value and how it is sharply distinguished from religious, moral, political, economic and social values. Some of his observations may be cited here to illustrate the unique characteristic of spiritual value.

Distinguishing spiritual value from moral value, Śaṅkara says: "Even if you have conquered sex, anger, greed, envy, egoism and delusion, what is the worth of this conquest if you have no self-realization?" This exhortation of Śaṅkara clearly makes a sharp distinction between the spiritual value of self-realization and the moral value of the victory over the six enemies of human nature. The moral values themselves are not the end of human life. They are just the means of self-realization that is the only end of human life. Furthermore, he says in the same context: "Even if you have become a king, a respectable social leader or a religious divine,

what is the worth of this achievement if you have no self-realization?"

Thus the great Ācārya distinguishes between the spiritual value and the social, political and religious values. Again, he asks: "You have defeated your enemies in a battle, got good friends in society and achieved miraculous powers (*siddhis*) through Yoga, what is the worth of these achievements if you have no self-realization?" Similarly he argues that profound scholarship, charity, meditation, luxurious living and honourable status in society are all worthless if there is no self-realization. Thus according to Śaṅkara, self-realization is the only spiritual value which at the same time is the pervasive feature of all other values.

Now this distinction between the spiritual value and the religious value may be pursued a little further to articulate the nature of either of them. It is well-known that Śaṅkara founded not only the Advaita Vedānta order, but also gave his approval to the six sects of Hinduism, viz. Śaivism, Vaiṣṇavism, Śāktism, Gāṇāpatyam, Sauram and Kaumāram. These sects are the different ways of achieving the same religious values, such as charity, meditation, penance, faith in a deity, devotion to the deity, social solidarity, holiness and the like. But these values are only extrinsic and so they are only means for self-realization. The value of self-realization, i.e. the spiritual value, however, is perfectly compatible with the religious values of every sect. That is also the *sine qua non* of the unity of all religions or sects, as fundamentally it is the touchstone of the value of a religion.

The Advaitic dictum that *bhakti* is cultivated for the sake of wisdom (*bhaktir-jñānāya kalpate*) gives a principle of synthesis that accommodates religion with philosophy, theism with absolutism, and the way of faith with the way of knowledge. In the parlance of Advaita Vedānta, the religious values are objective, action-oriented, phenomenal and personal, whereas the spiritual value is subjective, knowledge-based, transcendental and impersonal. The former is a mental construct or *kalpita*, while the latter

is the genuine recognition of all that is real (*vastu*). It is true that Śaṅkara takes Buddhism, Jainism and Kāpālika sect as *pūrvapakṣa* only for the development of his philosophy of value, and hence does not accord them the same status that he gives to the six sects of Hinduism mentioned above. But this is largely due to the fact that these religions themselves deserved this sort of treatment since very vainly they did not accept the validity of the Vedas and tried to oppose the Vedic way of life tooth and nail. If they, however, make amends, Śaṅkara is prepared to have an accord with them. He may give them the status of a religion vis-à-vis philosophy provided they also respond to his spirit of accommodation. He is undoubtedly for a multi-religious and open society as it is evident from his acquiescence to six sects of Hinduism. But he is against nihilism, fanaticism, bigotry, racism, ritualism, fundamentalism, rigorism and formalism which mislead the common people from their goal of self-realization and create tensions and conflicts in their society. Anything that takes man away from his final goal of self-realization is positively harmful to him and his society.

If Śaṅkarācārya's formulation of the synthesis of religious value and spiritual value is accepted as it should, then all religions, let alone Buddhism, Jainism and Kāpālika, sects can be perfectly adjusted to Advaita Vedānta. This is what Sureśvara, one of the four great disciples of the Ācārya has attempted in his *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-bhāṣya-vārtika*. In modern times the advocates of Advaita Vedānta including the present author have worked out this sort of synthesis all over again. Advaita Vedānta has thus become the philosophy of the essential unity of all religions. It is the only religion of mental worship (*mānasī pūjā*). Śaṅkara explicitly states that the self is God, intellect is his spouse, vital airs are his companions, the body is the temple, all that is enjoyed is his worship, sleep is the state of *samādhi*, walking is the circumambulation of the temple, all speech or utterance is the prayer to God, all that is done by a person is nothing but worship of the Lord (*Parā Pūjā*, 10). Can there be a better way of sublimating

the normal activities of a human being and directing them to the divine life? It is the discipline of mental worship that has made Advaita Vedānta the universal philosophy of all religions or the only religion of philosophy. The gap that is created by a religious sect between religion and philosophy has been fully filled in by the Vedānta of Śaṅkarācārya which can hardly be replaced by any of its rivals at its enviably pristine position.

There are, however, two distinct ways of life. The first is the life before self-realization and the second, the life after self-realization. Whatever is done before self-realization is again of two sorts. First, all that is done to gain self-realization directly or indirectly is valuable and hence commendable and good. Secondly, all work that is done for anything else is just an exercise in futility, a sheer wastage of the present human life as it further increases its suffering and bondage. It is, therefore, evil. These two types of life, one good and the other evil, are described by Śaṅkara very clearly in his *Mohamudgara-stotra* (In Praise of the Hammer to Infatuation), viz. "Day and night, evening and morning, winter and spring, come again and again. Time is rolling on. Age is declining. But the life of desire is not coming to an end." This type of life is obviously not praiseworthy. Śaṅkara exhorts us to give up this mode of life and attain freedom from desire. He says: "Oh deluded person, give up your zest for wealth, acquire right understanding and achieve freedom from desire. Enjoy every moment of your life with whatever you earn with your labour. Lead a life of contentment." This is, in short, the needed precept for leading a moral life that culminates into the spiritual life. In his *Brahma-sūtra-bhāṣya*, Śaṅkara discusses the prerequisites of the spiritual life and calls them the four means (*sādhana-catuṣṭaya*) which are regarded as the *sine qua non* of moral preparation for receiving spiritual wisdom. Out of them *mumukṣutva* is the most important means. It is the burning desire for freedom, liberation, self-rule, perfect peace or summum bonum. It can also be described as the strong sense of spiritual value.

Similarly the life after self-realization is also of two types. First, a self-realized man may do nothing and go on enjoying the state of his self-realization within himself. This type of life is elaborately described in the *Siddhānta-bindu*. This is the life of non-action. It is also called the life of pure Reason, the same pure reason that was analyzed by the German philosopher Immanuel Kant. It is to be noted in this context that Vācaspati Miśra, a commentator on Śaṅkara's *Brahma-sūtra-bhāṣya*, has called the great Advaita Ācārya as the personification of pure reason (Cp. *natvā viśuddha-vijñānam Śaṅkaram karuṇākaram, Bhāmatī*, benedictory verse 6) Śaṅkara himself described this type of his life in a short monograph titled *Svātma-prakāśikā* (Exposition of my own Self) which appears to be a sort of his spiritual autobiography. Therein he says:

Only consciousness is his body,
 Only consciousness is his universe,
 Only consciousness is his world of objects,
 Only consciousness is his system of sense organs,
 Only consciousness is his agency and personality,
 Only consciousness is his inner sense,
 Only consciousness is his ultimate reality,
 The ultimate truth and the ultimate value.

Furthermore, the *Bhagavad-gītā* says that the life of non-action is, in fact, a life of all action, for the self-realized man identifies himself with everything that is in the universe. He is behind every event that is happening there. But how does such a self-realized person perform all actions is a mystery to those who have no taste of self-realization. Neither Śaṅkara nor the *Bhagavad-gītā* recommends this type of life to everybody. On the other hand, they recommend the second type of life that is led by a self-realized person like King Janaka and Śrī Kṛṣṇa, or for that matter, like Śaṅkarācārya himself, to some extent. This type of life is an active

life of social service without any desire for its fruits. It is a life of non-attachment as well as the performance of duties. In short, it is the life of dedication to the cause of social solidarity (*loka-saᅅgraha*) and lends its support to a sort of altruism or ideal utilitarianism.

But how is it possible? How can an ideal utilitarianism be combined with the life of non-attachment? Here the answer is the philosophy of the *Bhagavad-gītā* that has been included by Śāᅅkarācārya in the triple sources of Vedānta. The philosophy of the *Bhagavad-gītā* as explained by him has epitomized the quintessence of social philosophy of Advaita Vedānta. During the last several hundred years or so, it has preserved the value of self-realization and maintained that *svadharma* and *varᅅa-dharma*, or spiritual value and the performance of one's duties according to one's station and status in society may be combined together and ought to be accomplished simultaneously. Before issuing any precepts to somebody, everybody ought to practise them strictly. Those who do not follow this Vedāntic rule are unauthentic persons and do immense harm to society and their own self. They are called *ātmahā*, i.e. those who kill themselves. The greatest evil is the omission of self-realization, for it defies the very purpose of human life.

If we compare the life after self-realization with the one which was before it, we may notice an apocalyptic change. Self-realization brings about a radical transformation of personality. A self-realized man does not run after the objects of the external world; his sense-organs are inverted and reoriented to the inner world. His sense-perception undergoes a total change and becomes one with what is known in Western epistemology as intellectual intuition. He becomes a *samadarśin*, i.e. one who sees the presence of his own self in each and every thing of the world, a *svarāt*, i.e. a master of himself in the true sense of self-rule, a *samrāt*, i.e. a monarch or sovereign wielding far greater power than any ruler or king of the world. For him there is no difference, no inequality, no disharmony, no otherness. In short, nothing is *viᅅama* (disharmony)

for him. There is no bondage for him and there is no ruler over him. He sees himself in everything, and everything in himself. This inverted perception animated with an absorbing sense of participation shows that self-realization is cognitive in its nature. Consequently the spiritual value that is identified with it, is absolutely cognitive.

The self-realized man is the realized being of consciousness. He does not feel any emotion or sentiment like love (*rāga*) or anguish (*śoka*). As a matter of fact, all his emotions and desires are burnt up through his penances (*tapas*) and are attuned to his self-luminous being that is pure consciousness. He witnesses the disappearance of his own mind (*manonāśa*) and the annihilation of all his desire (*vāsanākṣaya*). Thus he becomes pure consciousness and does not deviate even for a moment from it. Śaṅkara describes this life in the following words: "Consciousness is his body. Consciousness is his society. Consciousness is his world. Consciousness is his sense-organs and motor organs. Consciousness is his agency. Consciousness is his inner sense. Consciousness is the absolute value." Such a man is called *jīvan-mukta* (a liberated in life), *sthita-prajña* (a man of settled intellect), *Siddha*, *Brahmavit* (knower of Brahman) or *Ātmavit* (knower of Self). He is not only free and peaceful, but he is freedom itself and he is peace itself. His freedom is freedom from all desires and emotions, from all conation and affection, on the one hand, and from all dualities of the knower and the known on the other hand. It has neither name nor form. It is existence, consciousness, or bliss. Śaṅkara aptly states that among the five characteristics of reality, existence (it is), consciousness (it appears), bliss (it gives pleasures), name (it is described) and form (it occupies space and time), the first three characteristics constitute the nature of the self and the last two are attributed to the world. Finally, on further and deeper analysis it is discovered that the worldly life is known as a disvalue, and the self, as the only value. What is disvalue is unreal and what is value is real. So the self, being the only value, is also at the same time the only reality.

The life of existence, consciousness or bliss, or in short, the life of *saccidānanda* as it is called in Vedānta is totally different from the course of ordinary human life that is based on sense-experience and animal sensibility. Those who lead a life of animal sensibility or passions can hardly imagine the type and the pleasures of the life of *saccidānanda*. Our poets and visionaries, however, have tried to give a picture of this life in their works. That picture is very sublime and stimulating. But it is not the life of *saccidānanda*. It is only a faint image, copy of the picture of that life which can be illustrated by a *jīvan-mukta* alone. This picture is drawn from a distance and lacks the power and peace that accompany self-realization. On a deeper analysis, it is further discovered that the life of a *jīvan-mukta* cannot be described, but only discerned, cannot be shown but only shared, cannot be loved but only lived, for it is participation in consciousness or existence (*satsaṅga*) and not predication about consciousness or existence (*sat-prakāratā*).

It has been, however, argued that a *jīvan-mukta* behaves like an ordinary person in the course of his daily activities. But he is not what he appears to be. Apparently he may look like an ordinary person. But in reality he is Brahman, the infinite, the being, the existence, the primal source of all that is there. It is the power that rules the universe. This authentic life of the *jīvan-mukta* can be apperceived or intuited only by those who have a sense of spiritual value. It is really free from *samādhi* and *vikṣepa*, from silence and projection which are like the waves in the ocean of consciousness. Advaita Vedānta is very particular in its espousal that consciousness *qua* numerical unity of existence is indivisible (*akhaṇḍa*) and seamless (*ekarasa*).

At this juncture we may take Arjuna of the *Bhagavad-gītā* as the ideal man, for he got a vision of the Self and lived up to it. Before receiving it, he lost his previous senses and personality and was granted new senses and new personality. It caused the death of his animal sensibility and turned over a new leaf in his

life. He got self-realization as a gift of God's grace. That was his new birth in consciousness, as different from his old birth with consciousness. The man who was endowed with new senses and new personality during self-realization was, however, not a man of animal sensibility. But Arjuna was not prepared to give up his animal sensibility. So he voluntarily opted for it and returned to it with a changed perspective. He became the same Arjuna of pre-realization stage and recovered his old memories and personal identity. Yet his rationality was transformed. A revolutionary change overtook him and he started to discharge his obligations and duties aright with a new idea of consciousness and a new conviction. This changed Arjuna is the ideal of all persons who engage themselves in the performance of duties *a la* self-realization. So the synthesis of *svadharma* and *varṇadharmā* is fully illustrated in the life of Arjuna. We need simply to analyze his conduct in the war of the *Mahābhārata* to understand the relevance of the realization of spiritual value for the present life.

Every man is really in the role of Arjuna. His life situation is the *Mahābhārata* for him. His own sense of spiritual value is Śrī Kṛṣṇa, the friend, philosopher and guide. So the message of the *Bhagavad-gītā* is always relevant to him. So long as man remains a serious seeker of values, the spiritual value can never be out of date or surpassed, because it is the value-making spirit of man. Those who have eliminated the spiritual value while retaining all other values have committed a fallacy, for they see a colour but deny the existence of light or vision. The idea of spiritual value, though closely related to the idea of self, is different from the idea of the embodied self, and is unlike everything that is an item of objective knowledge. It is beyond the purview of ordinary perception. But it is accessible to those who make an inquiry into its nature and utility. The moment it is understood, the knower becomes a *jīvan-mukta* and the secrets of the whole universe are disclosed to him immediately. He accomplishes all that is worth accomplishing and nothing remains for him to accomplish further.

That is why he is called a *siddha* (an Accomplished person). He has achieved freedom with peace and power and knowledge with the good of the ought (*kr̥ta-kr̥tyatā*).

As a common man realizes that his idea of self is modelled on his embodied self, so a *jīvan-mukta* realizes that his idea of self is patterned on the absolute reality. His self is not confined to his body alone. As a matter of fact, it transcends his body and encompasses the whole universe, for it is identical with the very soul of the universe, the creative principle of all that is there, with *Tat* (That) appearing before him. the more he intensifies his identification with the absolute through constant reflection, discussion and contemplation, the more perceptive, powerful and peaceful he becomes. Indeed, when he has realized his self, all of his obligations are thereby fulfilled, for there is nothing more for him to accomplish. His life becomes the life of value itself. One who knows Brahman becomes Brahman—*brahma veda brahmaiva bhavati* (*Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad*, 2, 2, 9). The people may or may not regard him as God incarnate, but he is not God. For deification of man in his perception is a dangerous fallacy which is to be avoided for understanding the state of his self-realization which is called *Brāhmī-sthiti*, the state of being in itself relative to anything else.

JĪVA IS BRAHMAN ITSELF, NOT DIFFERENT FROM IT

V.R. Kalyanasundara Sastri

Śrī Śaṅkara Bhagavatpāda holds the view that the text of the *Bhagavad-gītā*, "You also know me as *kṣetrajña* in all *kṣetras*, Oh Bhārata,"¹ clearly establishes the same idea of the identity of the jīva and Brahman. The substance of the view of Śrī Śaṅkara is as follows: As in the case of the principal texts such as "*Tattvamasi*,"² here also the identity of jīva and Paramātman is ascertained through grammatical coordination between the two words, '*kṣetrajñam*' and '*mām*'. On account of this identity, there is no scope for the supreme Self becoming a *saṁsārin*; nor is there scope for the absence of bondage; also there is no scope for scripture which speaks about bondage and liberation becoming useless. Since Īśvara is himself *kṣetrajña*, he appears as if he is a *saṁsārin* owing to the distinction in the *upādhi* caused by avidyā; but not really a *saṁsārin*, in the same way as the individual self appears (due to avidyā) to be identical with the physical body. The instruction about the identity is for the purpose of removing the false difference. Just as the illusion of snake is removed through the utterance of the trustworthy person, "This is a rope, and not a

snake," even so the individual self is freed from the illusion of bondage through the instruction of the Lord, the most trustworthy person. That is why there is the traditional statement, "Brahman itself is in bondage through its avidyā; also it gets liberated through its vidyā." Also, it is declared in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, "This (Self) was indeed Brahman in the beginning. It knew only itself as 'I am Brahman.' Therefore it became all. And whoever among the gods knew it also became That; and the same with sage and men."³

Those who do not accept the identity of *kṣetrajñā* and the supreme Self and who do not understand the substance of this view restate the standpoint of Śaṅkara differently and then criticize it. This criticism has been refuted by great scholars of yore. With a view to bring out the refutation of the criticism, I endeavour to set forth this exposition.

The restatement (of the Advaita position), according to some, is as follows: Since there is grammatical coordination between the words, '*kṣetrajñam*' and '*mām*' in the text, "*kṣetrajñam cāpī mām viddhi*," Īśvara himself, due to ajñāna, appears as *kṣetrajñā*, and so with a view to remove (this illusion) there is the instruction of identity; just as the utterance of a trustworthy person, "This is a rope, and not a serpent," removes the illusion of snake, even so by the instruction of the Lord, the most trustworthy person, the illusion of *kṣetrajñā* gets removed. It is also commented by the opponents in the following way: "There is the contradiction that Īśvara who is omniscient has the illusion of being a *kṣetrajñā* due to ajñāna, and that the same Īśvara gives instruction to *kṣetrajñā*."

The Advaita standpoint requires proper consideration. The Advaitins do not say that Īśvara himself appears to be *kṣetrajñā* due to ignorance. What then? He holds that Īśvara who is *kṣetrajñā* appears to be a *saṃsārin* due to ignorance. So Īśvara has no illusion of being a *kṣetrajñā*. On the contrary, to hold that Īśvara is *kṣetrajñā* is a valid cognition, because Īśvara himself is *kṣetrajñā* and he is not a *saṃsārin*. Indeed, cognition of something as some-

thing else is illusion. One and the same Reality which is *sat*, *cit* and *ānanda* is spoken of by the two expressions, "Īśvara" and "kṣetrajñā" to convey the meaning of one who controls and one who has the knowledge of *kṣetra* respectively. Therefore, just as *Īśvaratva* (the state of being Īśvara) of Īśvara is not illusory, even so *kṣetrajñatva* (the state of being *kṣetrajñā*) of Īśvara is not illusory. That Īśvara is *sākṣin* is also declared in the *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad*, "It is consciousness, witness..."⁴ The derivative meaning of *sākṣin* is one who directly sees everything; and so, one who is *kṣetrajñā* is, indeed, *sākṣin*; for everything which is known is *kṣetra*. It is, indeed, well-known in the world that a witness is one who, being impartial, is a knower; it follows that Īśvara who is the knower is not subject to change by virtue of his being impartial. Unlike the disputants, a witness is not subject to the change of pleasure, pain, etc. that is why he is said to be impartial. In the same way, Īśvara is not a *samsārin* by virtue of his immutability, for the modifications of pleasure, pain, etc. constitute bondage. So, the Advaitins hold that Īśvara alone who is not a *samsārin* is *kṣetrajñā*. This view is true and not an erroneous one, like the rope-serpent illusion, for the Advaitins do not hold that, just as a snake is illusory superimposed on the rope, *kṣetrajñā* is illusorily superimposed on Īśvara.

Such being the standpoint of Advaita, those who think that the Advaitins hold the view that Īśvara himself has the illusion of being a *kṣetrajñā* are themselves erroneous, but neither Īśvara nor the Advaitins. Only the opponents are subject to illusion since they have ignorance, the cause of illusion. That is why, due to ignorance they have the illusion that Īśvara is different from *kṣetrajñā* and that *kṣetrajñā* is *jīva* who is a *samsārin*. Also, they wrongly interpret the text "*kṣetrajñam cāpi...*"

If it be asked how, the reply is as follows. The opponents interpret the text to mean that one should know *kṣetrajñā* and 'mām' i.e. its indwelling self; further, because of the use of the word 'api', it means that one should know the *kṣetra* also as its indwel-

ling self. The first defect in this interpretation is that it is detrimental to the principal grammatical coordination between the two words, '*kṣetrajñam*' and '*mām*'. Another defect is that it construes the word '*mām*' which is a single word as '*madātmakam*' which is a compound word. If it be said that the word '*ātmā*' (in '*madātmakam*') is used in the sense of essential nature, then it amounts to the abandonment of their view. It may be said that, just as the jīva is the self of the body by virtue of being its *śarīrin*, even so Īśvara, by virtue of its being the *śarīrin*, is the self of the jīva who is the body; and so, the word '*ātmā*' is used in the sense of *śarīrin*. If so, to use the word '*śarīra*', which means that which perishes, to the jīva which is eternal is wrong. If it be said, with a view to avoid this defect, that the jīva is not eternal, it will be opposed to the text of the *Bhagavad-gītā* which says that the jīva is "unborn and eternal."⁵

If '*ātmā*' is interpreted as '*śeṣin*', then it will result in the defect of making the jīva, a dependent entity on Īśvara, whereas the jīva is well-known to be not only not dependent on anything, but also independent of everything. Just as the body is inseparably related to the jīva, even so, it may be said, the jīva is inseparably related to Īśvara, and so it has Īśvara as its self; but this cannot be accepted as there is untenability both in the illustration and the illustrated. For, inseparable relation does not hold good between the body and the jīva as they are separately cognized as the object known in the form, "This is mine," and as "I", the knower respectively. If the jīva is not accepted as something different from the body, then it will lead to the acceptance of the standpoint of Buddhism, for the Bauddhas hold the view that the body itself is the Self. If a body separate from the jīva is not accepted, then the body must be said to be deathless, for death is spoken of in respect of the body separated from the jīva; but, according to the opponents, the body is always inseparably related to the jīva. In the same way, if it is not accepted that Īśvara is different from jīva, then the former will be subject to bondage. If it be said that the jīva and Īśvara are

identical, then it will be acceptance of the Advaita view and the abandonment of one's own position. If Īśvara is always associated with jīva, then he will be subject to bondage in the same way as a piece of iron becomes hot because of the association of fire with it; consequently it will be detrimental to the relation of the controller and the controlled, etc. between Īśvara and jīva respectively. If the jīva is not accepted as different from Īśvara, then it will result in the non-existence of the jīva, the *samsārin*; also, it will result in the absence of bondage. It is also wrong to say that it is the very nature of the jīva to be controlled by Īśvara, for there is no controller-controlled relation between Īśvara and jīva in the state of deep sleep. Indeed, the jīva is not controlled by anyone in deep sleep. Never does the essential nature of a thing go away.

Further, if the jīva is the self of the body due to some reason other than superimposition (*adhyāsa*), then through this example we will be compelled to say that the jīva has Īśvara as its self and that Īśvara has the jīva as its self. This, however, is not true. No wise man considers himself as the self of one body or the body as his self. On the contrary, he knows the body as different from himself, and vice versa. He who looks upon himself as a man is not wise. How can the omniscient Lord know himself as jīva, or know jīva as himself? If that were the case, he should have said that the jīva has the Lord as its self. Therefore, the reason for the use of the grammatical coordination between the body and the self, or between the jīva and Īśvara, is not the former being the inseparable attribute of the latter in each case, but ignorance alone. There is, indeed, grammatical coordination between jīva and Īśvara in the text "*kṣetrajñam cāpi mām viddhi*," however, ignorance which is the cause (for the use of grammatical coordination) cannot be thought of in Īśvara; and so the interpretation of the opponents is untenable. According to the interpretation of the opponents, no discerning person, in spite of knowing the body as the inseparable attribute, says, "Know this body as myself;" if that were the case, the omniscient Lord would have said, "Know the jīva as my self."

In the case of a person who says, "Know me to be divine," the sense of false-identification with his body is not absent, because being divine, being human, etc. are the characteristics of the body and not those of the *jīva*. If it be said that the sense of false-identification with the *jīva* is not absent even in the case of *Īśvara*, then *Īśvara* will have to be treated as parviscient. If, on the contrary, it be said that it (i.e. the false-identification) is absent, then the instruction "Know me as the *jīva*" is untenable. As for the *kṣetra*, it has *Īśvara* as its self, because it is what is superimposed on *Īśvara*; and so, it has the latter as its *svarūpa*; indeed, what is superimposed is of the nature of its substratum. Since *Īśvara* is the indwelling self of the *kṣetras*, he is the controller of the *kṣetra*. However, this meaning is not intended implicitly by the use of the word 'api'. That *Īśvara* is the indwelling self of all *kṣetras* is explicitly stated by the word, '*sarva-kṣetreṣu*' (which occurs in the text). Indeed, one who abides in all *kṣetras* is the indwelling self thereof. It is not your view that *kṣetra* is of the nature of *Īśvara* on account of its being superimposed on *Īśvara*. It cannot be said that this is what is intended by the opponents, for in that case, it will amount to the abandonment of one's own position and the acceptance of the opposite view.

In the same way, the opponent's view that the word '*kṣetrajñam*' in the expression, "*sarva-kṣetreṣu kṣetrajñam*" is used in the singular as a collective noun is also untenable; for it will be detrimental to an excellent idea which is sought to be conveyed by the use of the plural number in '*sarva kṣetreṣu*'. Further, there is no authority for construing it as a collective noun in the singular number. If that were the intention, Sage Bādarāyaṇa should have said, "*kṣetrajñāncāpi mām viddhi*" (also know me as *kṣetrajñas*). Moreover, there is no class-feature (*jāti*) in respect of *kṣetrajña* which is of the nature of *sat*, *cit* and *ānanda*. Also, only if there is difference among individual members (*vyakti*), is it possible to say that there is no difference in class-feature; however, there is no difference among individual members, for *kṣetrajña* which is



eternal cannot be described with the differentiating features. There is, indeed, no scope for difference among individual members in respect of air as well as ether, which are both formless (*nirākāra*); if that were the case, it should be possible in respect of jīva which is formless. Hence it is untenable to speak of a plurality of *kṣetrajñas*. There is no scope for the mixing up of the experience of pleasure, pain, etc. (among the jīvas), for pleasure, pain, etc. are the characteristics of the internal organ; and the internal organs are many. Nor is it possible for *kṣetrajña* which is all-pervasive to become many, like the internal organs which are limited. It cannot be said that *kṣetrajña*, too, is limited. If that were the case, it will become impermanent. If so, what is the difference, we ask, between Īśvara and jīva who is the knower, who is eternal, and who is all-pervasive? Just as the body is differentiated from the self on account of its being impermanent, limited and an object of knowledge, the jīva cannot be differentiated from Īśvara, for the latter is real, (eternal, all-pervasive, etc.). It is no argument to say that difference (between jīva and Īśvara) arises due to omniscience and other features, for they are the characteristics of māyā and not of Īśvara: and also because of the fact that the power of revealing everything which is the essential nature of omniscience is also present in the jīva. Therefore, there is no difference between jīva and Īśvara; nor is there a plurality of jīvas. This kind of knowledge (of the difference between jīva and Īśvara, etc.), being the cause of bondage, is not right knowledge.

NOTES

1. *Bhagavad-gītā*, 13.2.
2. *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, 6.8.7.
3. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, 1.4.10.
4. *Svetāśvatara Upaniṣad*, 6.11.
5. *Bhagavad-gītā*, 2.20.

ADVAITA, CAUSALITY AND
HUMAN FREEDOM*

S.S. Suryanarayana Sastri

It will be the aim of this paper to treat in some detail the notion of causality as set out in and criticized by the Advaita Vedānta, consider its affinities if any with the conception of cause in modern science and discuss the bearing of these views on the problem of human freedom. In the course of the discussion I shall specifically refer to two books—Stebbing's *Philosophy and the Physicists*¹ and Brahma's *Causality and Modern Science*.² I have neither the time nor the ability to discuss the former in full; I shall content myself with a consideration of the tenth chapter on 'Human Freedom and Responsibility'. The second book presents more a point of view than a detailed exposition; and with this, though in agreement to a large extent, I have to express dissatisfaction in some measure.

The Advaitin's ontological position has been often stated and requires little repetition. Reality is non-dual; it is consciousness or

* First published in *The Indian Historical Quarterly*, 1940, it was reprinted in the *Collected Papers of Professor S.S. Suryanarayana Sastri*, University of Madras, 1961. Professor Sastri was the Head of Philosophy Department, University of Madras, from 1927 to 1942.

experience, self-luminous by nature; it is eternal and free. On this are superimposed as appearances duality, inertness, cognisability in dependence on another, dependence, impermanence, and so on. The superimposition is the work of nescience. This is not real as then there could not even be the realization of it as nescience, leading to its sublation; it is not unreal, since duality and dependence are facts of immediate experience in no wise comparable to the impossible barren woman's son or even to the barely possible, but not actual, hare's horn; it is therefore considered indeterminable, not characterisable as real or as unreal, *anirvācya*. All limitations, and all relations among the limited, fall within the realm of this nescience, which is neither coeval with reality nor falls outside of it. Finitude and plurality being phenomenal, the relations among the diverse, such as time, space and cause are also phenomenal. They cannot claim to hold good absolutely, whether for all or everywhere.

Though such a position is not attractive or convincing on the face of it, a little consideration would seem to make it acceptable in the case of space and time. Analysis of these reveals two sets of difficulties. We seem unable to set limits to space and time though, obviously, spatial and temporal characteristics belong only to the finite. What is bounded in space, and what has a beginning or end, these are certainly finite. Space itself, however, cannot be bounded; what lies outside space? If it is more space, it means we have not so far come to the limits of space; if it is non-space, we have to admit that the spatial finitude of our experience derives from something determined, if at all, in the last resort by something which is not space; and this, in effect, will not differ from conceding the phenomenality of space. One may contend that space is infinite though spaces are finite. This again will be the admission of Advaita in another way—the admission of the possibility of finitude being an appearance of the infinite, limitation an appearance of the limitless, the many an appearance of the one. It may still be argued that, while the Advaitin considers the many and the finite to be

appearances, the opponent treats them as real just as much as the one and the infinite. To maintain in the same breath the reality of opposed qualities like infinitude and finitude is to fly in the face of the law of contradiction and refuse to think. Justification based on the category of identity-in-difference will prove but a broken reed, as will be seen presently. It may be said that an infinite cause may have finite effects; with this contention we shall have to deal in the consideration of causality. This possibility excepted, there seems no way of avoiding the phenomenality of space. So also of time.

The other set of considerations mentioned relates to experiences like dreams. The contents of these experiences are actual enough and enjoy spatial and temporal properties very much at variance with the setting of the dreamer in what we call actual, i.e. waking, life. While the dreamer's body lies in Madras, the dream relates to Benares or to the battle-front. While the dream occupies what corresponds to a few minutes of our waking time, the dreamer often grows up, gets married, achieves success and even dies within that period. There would thus seem to be different and conflicting spatial and temporal systems within our experience. Even within waking experience, consider the phenomenon of reverie. In the course of a few minutes we run through a course of events which occupied a considerably longer interval of time. Is the latter contained in the former? If so, how can this be unless the interval which seems so variable is also negligible as ultimate reality, unless time is phenomenal?

Similar considerations may be raised in regard to causality too. It has been argued that causal efficiency is no proof of reality; the dream food satisfies dream hunger though not waking hunger. But these arguments are not quite conclusive in regard to causality being phenomenal. The causal efficiency of the dream content has indeed been used in the reverse way by realists like the Mādhvas to establish the reality of that content. Further, though he who dreams of Māhiṣmatī does not wake up there, he who

dreams of a snake wakes up often with actual trembling; the victim of a nightmare actually cries out; and the physiological consequences of an erotic dream belong to the waking order of experience. It was also noticed that an appeal may be made to causality in order to exhibit the reconcilability of one and many, finite and infinite. The notion of cause, therefore, seems to stand on a slightly better footing than space and time, from the point of view of the anti-phenomenalist; and it deserves a fuller consideration.

The Advaitin, like the follower of the Sāṅkhya, holds to *satkāryavāda*, the doctrine that the effect is not a creation *de novo*, but is prefigured in the cause. The Sāṅkhya arguments for the position are well known. Either there is or there is not a time interval between cause and effect. If there is, does the cause wholly cease to exist, before the effect comes into being? In that case, the immediate antecedent of the product would be a non-existence; and though we may in speech distinguish non-existence of X from non-existence of Y, there is in reality no way of distinguishing one non-existence from another. Thus, so far as the immediate antecedent goes, we have no explanation why X is the effect, not Y; theoretically any effect may follow from any cause; sand may produce oil, and water, curds; for between the alleged cause and sought effect, there is interposed a non-existence, whose character can be but homogeneous. Yet, in practice we do not get curds out of water; we treat the effect as derivable only from a potent cause. What can this potency be except the pre-existence of the effect in the cause, in a latent form? If, however, no time-interval be admitted between cause and effect, we have to take them as either identical or as wholly different; in neither case is the cause-effect relation possible; cow is not the cause of itself; nor is it the cause of a horse; co-existent differentials are no more cause and effect than the two horns of a bull.

With this line of Sāṅkhya criticism of the Vaiśeṣika creationist position, the Advaitin has great sympathy. He will not, however, subscribe to the ultimacy of the causal concept; for if the Sāṅkhya

criticism is pressed to its limits, the concept has to be abandoned. The critic of the creationist view can admit the pre-existence of the effect only in a latent form; the causal operation serves to make it patent or manifest. The questions raised about the effect may be raised about its manifestation too. Is that pre-existent or not? If pre-existent, it could be only as manifest, since it is absurd to say there is manifestation, but as non-manifest; and if manifestation is pre-existent, it amounts to the admission of the effect as fully pre-existent, not merely as a potentiality; and such an effect needs no explanation in terms of causal operation. On the other alternative of manifestation being produced *de novo* by the operation, what is the special virtue of this effect, that it alone is susceptible of creation, not the effects which become manifest? It seems legitimate to conclude that the Sāṅkhya, while envisaging a difficulty, has, instead of solving it, only pushed it back one stage. And the difficulty seems insoluble so long as we stick to the distinctness of cause and effect. We seem nearer a solution, if we deny the distinctness treating cause and effect as appearances of the same reality. This is in effect what the Advaitin does. The non-distinctness is asserted not as between finite causes and effects in the world, but as between the world and its cause, Brahman. The causal relationship is to be understood as between the substrate and the superimposed, the rope and the snake; but for the rope there would be no snake-delusion there; it is present only so long as the rope is there and disappears into the rope, when the latter is truly known as such. The effect, the delusion, is nothing other than the cause, though it appears to be different. The causal relation is based on this delusive difference. It is, so to speak, subjective; and this subjectivity will, one may expect, infect all derivative finite causal relations too. The Advaitin, however, maintains the relative objectivity of finite causal relationships. Causality is no doubt a product of nescience; but so long as we live in a world of nescience, without rising above it to that which is neither cause nor effect, we have no right to impugn causality; it is as objective

as the world is; even for the transcendence of nescience we depend on this concept, since we have to depend on means like instruction, reflection, contemplation, etc. If these were not well-settled causes, they could not be depended on by us in our laudable endeavour to realize ourselves; and yet when we do realize, the very means which furthered our endeavours appear delusive. The needs of science and metaphysics seem to be equally satisfied by the invocation of two worlds. Whether causal rigidity in the empirical world is consistent with denial of causality in the transcendental world is a problem which we shall have to pose in the course of this paper. The orthodox Advaita position would seem to admit of some improvement.

We have to note in the meantime that the cause would seem to find no logical resting place short of Brahman; and in Brahman it seems to annul itself along with the effect. This is how. The concept in question is an attempt to understand change. It attempts to explain what is fleeting and limited in time, what was not, but is and may cease to be, what in other words is occasional and impermanent. The presumption in any such explanation is that the permanent and the unchanging is self-explanatory; by being related thereto the transient may be made intelligible. A mere relation of one thing to another does not satisfy *per se*. It will no doubt be said that explanation consists in relating the unknown to the known, not the fleeting to the permanent; even in this way of conceiving explanation it must be remembered that the known implies a relatively unified and relatively permanent system; and the permanence of the knowing self at least is in most cases assumed. Without the relation to something more permanent or fundamental, no phenomenon finds explanation. The goal of explanation would seem to be, therefore, the exhibition of the relation of the changing to that which is above change. Hence it is that *pradhāna* and primal atoms alike are conceived as unborn and eternal. Where the world is declared to arise out of a First Cause, such cause is itself not a product and is conceived as above space and time.

This indeed is the merit of the causal concept, that, however inconsistently, it rises above the very limitations and diversities which lead to its invocation and seeks to reach infinitude and unity. The relating of one phenomenon to another may give some temporary or practical satisfaction; but we cannot logically stop short of the noumenon above the phenomena.

And when we do get to the noumenon, whether by reasoning or testimony or both, we still seem to be no better off logically. The noumenon, Brahman, the supreme and sole reality, is the cause. The effect cannot be spoken of as such unless there is some difference from the cause. Hence the world, though differing from Brahman in respect of finitude, inertness etc., may well because of this very difference be the effect of Brahman. The world is not eternal and constant; else it would not be an effect; nor would it require explanation, as the eternal is self-explanatory. It is not real in the way that Brahman is real. Nor is it unreal, as in that case it would have nothing at all in common with Brahman and could not be its product. The effect shares with the cause the negation of unreality; it differs from the cause in falling short of reality by which we understand what is always and for ever. The phenomenon, in other words, is indeterminable as real or as unreal; hence its relation to the noumenon can have no better status; that too, must be but indeterminable or phenomenal. The Advaitin does assert the non-otherness of effect from cause; he does not however assert their identity in such wise as to deduce for the effect the reality of the cause; the negation of otherness amounts only to this—that the effect has no reality other than that of the cause.³ Hence, it is that the promissory statements of śruti can be justified as to the knowledge of all (effects) through knowledge of the one (cause).

It is worth while sparing some attention here to the notion of identity-in-difference as connected with the causal concept. Identity and difference may appear *prima facie* irreconcilable contraries; but their co-existence, one may contend, is both pos-

sible and actual, as will be seen if we look at the many transformations of a single cause. Hail and snow are different; so are bracelet and ear-ring; yet these differences co-exist with the fundamental identity of each pair, in the causal aspect, i.e. as water and as gold. As cause, there is identity; as effect, there is difference. One has to ask what the relationship is between the cause and the effects. Is it identity or difference? If identity, then, what holds good in the causal aspect should equally hold good in the effect-aspect too, so that there is no propriety in restricting the identity of hail and snow only to their casual aspect; they must be identical even as products, a conclusion commendable neither to common-sense nor to the opponent. Suppose, however, there is difference between cause and effects; then between hail which is different from water and snow also different from water, how can there be identity in the causal, i.e. water-aspect? We shall have to resort here again to identity-in-difference, a procedure tainted with the charge of self-dependence or infinite regress. Further, when, because of identity-in-difference, there is intermixture between the causal and effect-aspects, how can there be the restriction of identity to one of these aspects? We are again faced with the violation of common-sense.

The real is the cause; the effect may not be identical therewith nor different therefrom; nor is difference *cum* non-difference intelligible; the effect is neither real nor unreal; one term of the causal relation being thus indeterminable, the relation itself is indeterminable.

This conclusion may be due to our illegitimate attempt to extend the causal concept beyond the phenomenal realm, where alone it can be legitimately invoked. Phenomenal causality knows nothing of these transcendental difficulties. The relation between one phenomenon and another can be so refined as to be invariable and unconditional; and with this all reasonable ambitions of causal explanation will have been satisfied. In answer to such an objection, let us undertake a still closer investigation of the causal concept.

The Advaitin's examination of cause as conceived by the realists of the time is very instructive and can perhaps be hardly improved upon. The cause is usually conceived as an antecedent in time. Of course, not any antecedent will do, e.g. a donkey standing by the potter's shed is not a cause in respect of the production of a pot. We refine the notion by the qualification of invariability; we know that the donkey is not an invariable antecedent. But our difficulties seem to be just beginning. Those who enumerate causes admit causal efficacy not merely for distinct events in time, but also for certain common conditions like time, space, Īśvara, etc. Īśvara is above time, hence not an antecedent in time. Time itself is not in time and hence cannot be treated as such an antecedent. An ingenious attempt will claim that, though there are no temporal distinctions for time, they may be understood through adjuncts, just as the Advaitin claims that, because of adjuncts, distinctions are introduced in the distinctionless. Priority and posteriority for time would be due to the priority and posteriority of the adjuncts. But how are the adjuncts distinguished as prior or posterior? Because of time; and because of the adjuncts so determined, time itself is to be characterized as prior or posterior; a clear case of self-dependence. If time were not the determinant of sequence among adjuncts, all of them would be simultaneous, making all empirical usage impossible. This very impossibility would be a ground for treating time and cause as phenomenal, not for admitting sequence among adjuncts and claiming at the same time that it is not temporally determined. This is only to recognize under another name, time as a distinct adjunct determinative of sequence; and one of the two postulates, either this adjunct or time, is clearly superfluous. Even were differentiation by adjuncts possible, it could not be said that time qualified by one of these exists in another time differently qualified, since in any case time cannot exist *in* itself. We do not indeed say that Devadatta who wears glasses exists *in* Devadatta who wears a suit.

This kind of difficulty may not appeal to those who refuse to recognize general causes. Even these will realize that invariable antecedence in time is over-pervasive of symptoms and co-effects, which are not causes. Day is not the cause of night. A persistent low temperature symptomatic of tuberculosis is not the cause of the patient's subsequent decline. We have to introduce further refinements in our understanding of invariable antecedence; and we seem nowhere near success in doing this. We may thus seek to dismiss symptoms and co-effects on the ground of their being *anyathā-siddha*, like the donkey or like the all-pervasive ether. The donkey's presence where the pot is made is due to other causes. Neither its presence nor the cognition of its presence is linked up *as a cause* with the cognition of the pot. Given its own causes, the presence of the donkey would be fully accounted for, without any reference to the production of pot. So too in the case of ether, its presence is inevitable because of its pervasiveness, not because it accounts for the pot-production. Similarly, the day is the effect of the rotation of the earth round the sun; it may be invariably associated in our minds with night, but its presence and cognition are adequately accounted for by its own cause without reference to night; so also the low persistent fever is accounted for by the tubercle bacillus without a necessary reference to the subsequent decline. Thus co-effects and symptoms may be ruled out.

But, we ask, do you mean to rule out all conditions that are accounted for by their own causes or are inevitable? In that case you would be ruling out most if not all accepted causes. The pervasive ether is admitted to be the cause of sound, and the pervasive self, of happiness, etc. It may be you are not prepared to admit their pervasiveness and *anyathā-siddhatva*. The difficulty, however, persists in the case of admitted causes. The clay and the wheel and the staff are undoubted causes of the pot. Are not these causal conditions sufficiently accounted for in their turn by their

own antecedents? Perhaps, you think, they are not fully accounted for without reference to their purpose, the production of the pot, their final cause. There are at least two difficulties in such a view. You as a conscious being may consider the lack of final purpose to be a defect and may be inclined to read it in whatever you cognize; but that of itself will be no justification for reading this purpose into inert objects and determining their causality or non-causality thereby. Further this purpose is not an antecedent in time, but what is to be fulfilled in time, while what we seek to do here is to clear up the notion of an invariable antecedent. Again, what is it that we try to understand? Is it not the causality of clay, wheel, etc. in relation to pot? The notion of pot as the final cause of the wheel, etc. how does that help us in this? In any case, it is difficult to maintain that clay is not understandable except with reference to a pot to be produced. It may be where it is by accident or design; and the design may relate to pots or dolls or a nature-cure plaster. The antecedents of its presence can be definite, not the purposes which it may serve; and because of the definiteness of the former, it does not cease to be a cause of pot, etc. Of course, clay present in a potter's house is different from clay in Mahatma Gandhi's. In the former case, its causality of pot or basin is exceedingly likely; but it is only likely; the probability approximates to certainty when you see it in the potter's hands; even then there is an element of uncertainty; he may change his mind and throw it away or fashion something else; the certainty is greater when a rough shape has been given, and you watch it on the wheel; it is greatest when the pot has been finished; you can then say the clay of the pot is the cause of the pot, a proposition perilously near tautology. Again, in the case of earth, water, light, and seed, each of which is accounted for by its own causes and is known without a necessary reference to the growth of crops, can the causality in respect of crops be denied? The notion of *ananyathā-siddhatva* turns out to be a frail reed incapable of sustaining the causal concept.

You may now demand of the alleged cause that it should be helpful in producing the effect. But wherein lies helpfulness? And what degree of it is required? In any particular case of pot, the donkey may be helpful; from contemplating its utility, the potter may have derived extra cheerfulness and succeeded in finishing off a better pot than usual. This extra psychical stimulus may be provided by different causes for different pots; the potter may dream of his wife or his gains; though, because of variability, no one of these can be the cause of pot in general, causality in respect of each particular pot seems difficult, if not impossible, to deny.

Assuming for a moment all such objections to be fanciful, let us see whether there is any definite way of understanding the helpfulness of the cause. It is not that the effect is invariably present where the cause is; or the presence of seed is not invariably attended by the shoot. Of course, it will be said, seed alone is not the cause, but seed together with accessories. But it is in determining these accessories that we have all the trouble just noted; the donkey and the potter's wife are clamant in their demand for inclusion, though with a show of logic we insist on excluding them. The only legitimate ground for their exclusion is that, though present, they are not present as causal. Our difficulty however is just what constitutes causal presence and it is no help to refer to accessories with a need for excluding what are not causal.

In any case, it is clear that the semi-popular usage of 'cause' has to be abandoned; for this can produce the effect only in dependence on auxiliaries; and those auxiliaries do, properly speaking, enter into the very cause of the effect in question. We cannot legitimately separate the alleged cause from the auxiliaries; and any attempt to include them seems to end only when we come right down to the effect itself.

It may be said that nothing can be simpler than to determine the true auxiliaries, on the ground of co-presence and co-absence, *anvaya* and *vyatireka*. Whatever has this generic quality is a cause, not any other. There are some merely technical objections to such

a view; e.g. a genus, since it cannot possess another genus, can never be a cause. Since clay which is co-present and co-absent with pot has the genus "substanceness" and this is shared by donkey, etc. these too would be causes. If this genus be considered too wide and remote and a narrower more proximate genus insisted on, e.g. clayness, or earthiness then such non-distinctive causes as ether, time, space, etc. would be wholly excluded from the causal category, whereas time and space are always conceded to be causes. This is also the reason for our failure to understand *anvaya* and *vyatireka*. Is the co-presence in time, or space, or both? In the first case, time cannot be a cause since it is not present in time; in the second case, space cannot be a cause since it is not present in space, and since neither is present in *both* space and time, neither can be a cause in the third case. Nor is the difficulty merely fanciful or terminological. For no cause is such in the abstract, but only as occurring in certain spatial and temporal conditions; and these cannot be ignored in reckoning causal efficiency; rains at harvest-time cannot be the cause of plenty.

We have still to face the ancient bugbear known as plurality of causes. Fire may be caused by a match-stick, or a burning-glass, or by a steel and tinder. No one of these is the invariable antecedent of fire, yet each is said to cause fire. Our logicians in their wisdom say such usage is due to ignorance and lack of analysis. Where the alleged cause and effect are sufficiently refined by analysis, it will be found the same cause has only the same effect and the same effect has the same cause. Where the fire in the oven has been lit by one of these alternative modes, what, one wonders, will the analysis of the effect lead us to? Our perception does not acquaint us with any difference in the fires. It may be said that if we look at the fires armed with the knowledge of their causes, we are enabled to distinguish the products too. In a class of young boys not old enough to be invested with the sacred thread and all looking more or less alike, we distinguish a Brahmin boy by his parentage from the rest; so too in the case of the fire and other

similar effects alleged to result from a plurality of causes. The illustration is not suitable. For reasons, sound and unsound, we admit the Brahmin parentage of the particular boy and then deduce or admit his Brahminhood. Here, however, which is the cause is the very point at issue; and the matter we say is unsettled, because of the inconstancy of the antecedents of fire at different times. To the reply that the fires too are different, we oppose their practical indistinguishability. It is no answer to this to offer their distinguishability in the light of their distinct causes. Granted their causality, the effect would be distinguishable; granted the distinguishability, the alleged causes would be really such: thus we have flagrant reciprocal dependence.

Nor is this due to the apparent puerility of the instance chosen. Though death, in popular speech, may be due to many causes, any particular instance of death will on analysis prove traceable only to one of such causes. Interference with the respiratory system is not the same as interference with the circulatory system. Drowning interferes with respiration; certain varieties of snake poison clot the blood and arrest the circulation. Both are vital functions. The arrest of one leads to the suspension of the other also, resulting in what we call death. In respect of the final cessation of all functions, is there any difference? None we can discover. In the preliminaries thereto, there are differences: one may get black in the face, or have the wind-pipe or spinal column broken, or the respiratory passage filled with water, or one's blood-vessels choked up with clotted blood; but this is just what we too affirm; in the face of such divergent antecedents, how can we deny plurality of causes or affirm a distinction in the effects, except at the risk of such tautologies, as "Drowning is the cause of death by drowning"? Analysis is a good servant, but a bad master. The man in the street does not analyze and has perhaps little faith in the infallibility of causal relations; the logically trained person analyses, but that does not justify his pathetic faith in the perfect causal relation; if the process of analysis is pressed forward

rigorously instead of being allowed to stop short to contemplate its triumphs, it will find itself under the necessity to transcend the causal concept.

Again, since, where we do not arrive at a non-difference of cause from effect, we have to distinguish between the cause and its auxiliaries, may we not, even on the assumption of effects being distinguishable, attribute the distinctness to the auxiliary rather than to the cause? Drowning and shooting are both causes of death, we may say; there is no doubt of this difference in the effects, that there is water in the respiratory passages in one case and a hole through the heart in the other; but this is due to the mode in which the different causes function to their accessories; it cannot detract from the possibility of different causes to produce the same effect. Not a very sound argument, perhaps, but a plausible one.

Our difficulties, it may be thought, are due to the persistence of the popular notion that the cause is a single condition, whereas it is in truth a complex of conditions. We should not confuse ourselves with the notion of a cause and its auxiliaries, but should always envisage a causal complex, any member of which may figuratively, and for strictly limited purposes, be called a cause. A cause is that which is a member of a causal complex. This does not, however, take us very far, since, as we have already seen, our difficulty is to determine how much to include in this complex and what to exclude. The only answer we get is that we should include all causes and only causes; but this is to go round in a circle. Further, being a member of the complex, is it the very nature (*svarūpa*) of each of the components? Then each should produce the effect. Even if aggregation be not the *svarūpa*, it may be eternal; in such a case the effect should be constant, instead of appearing and disappearing. If, however, the aggregation is adventitious and occasional, how does *that* come about? If it is due to another cause, that will involve another complex, and we shall have an infinite regress; or our notion of the first complex would itself turn out to be defective because of the non-inclusion of this factor

which accounts for its own being. And when this cause of the complex can itself explain the effect, why postulate an intermediate complex? The complex should be accounted for by its own constituents. Is each then distributively the cause? Then, since some one element of it, e.g. space, will be constant, the complex should be constant, and also the effect. If, to avoid this, we say that the factors collectively account for the aggregation, we are in the old round of explaining collectiveness by itself. To postulate another complex or aggregate of course leads to infinite regress.

Why all this difficulty about aggregation? All conditions that are proximate constitute the complex; what is remote does not enter into it. The matter is not so simple, as we have difficulties parallel to those in understanding co-presence and co-absence. If the proximity be in time alone or space alone, time would be excluded in the former case and space in the latter; proximity in both would exclude both from causal conditions. If you mean not such contiguity, but either conjunction or inherence of one condition or set of conditions in the other or others, the conjunction and inherence would not be causes, since for them there is not another conjunction or inherence. That there is a single complex may be determined from the production of a single effect; but this is to beg the question as to what it is that produces the effect.

Our troubles have been due to conceiving cause statically. The factors not merely exist but also function in producing the effect. This functioning (*vyāpāra*) we call aggregation or complication; and the effect results therefrom. We are still in the woods; for is this functioning extrinsic or intrinsic to the factors? If intrinsic, we have to determine whether it belongs to each factor distributively or to all collectively. In the former case, we have the old difficulty that some factors being constant, the operation and the effect would also be constant. To conceive function as intrinsic to the aggregate does not help, since our present efforts are directed only to the understanding of aggregation. If the functioning be extrinsic to the factors, another functioning would have to be

interposed between that and the factors, and there would be infinite regress. If, however, the function of complication can be arrived at without intermediate function, why may not the factors produce the effect itself without the interposition even of complication?

When the conception of functioning fares thus, it is no help to define cause as that which has function. Other difficulties apart, this would exclude the final function from the cause, since that function has not another function. And since function cannot be defined except in terms of generating i.e. causing,⁴ we are again involved in a vicious circle. Further, the possession of function cannot be interpreted as inherence or as generation. The latter involves self-dependence while the former is contrary to what is known. Sacrifice is said to be instrumental to heavenly enjoyment through the function of an unseen potency (*apūrva*); but his *apūrva* is not inherent in the sacrifice; for the sacrifice perishes while the *apūrva* survives and results in the enjoyment hereafter.

Enough of this juggling, you may say; it may be that I cannot define cause; but you cannot disprove it. For, living as we do in a world of finite particulars that come and go, the recognition of cause is inevitable; else there would be but constancy, neither appearance nor disappearance; what is uncaused is eternal, like ether or the self. The average realist who urges this is not quite aware of his own presuppositions. The Indian logician, for instance, holds that the non-existence of an effect prior to its production is uncaused; but it is not eternal, terminable as it is by the coming into being of the effect. Again, a barren woman's son is not caused; nor is he eternal. Even if you protest against this reference to non-entities, what are the positive instances on which you base your pervasion? Neither the existence nor the eternality of ether and the self is universally admitted. The rejection alike of eternality and of the absence of causation cannot avail as the ground of pervasion; for the materialist who admits all things to be transient yet denies the validity of inference or causation. One who delights in the bare bones of logic may attempt the following inference.

What is in dispute is caused, since it has prior non-existence; what is uncaused has no prior non-existence, like the self; since the uncaused self is admitted by the Vedāntins, and the present argument is addressed to them alone, the example is unquestionable. But there is a more fundamental defect; the *probandum* must be something known; it must not be a wholly unknown predicate or one whose nature is in doubt; it must not be *aprasiddha-viśeṣaṇa*. Since the causal concept is just that which is in dispute, it serves no purpose to set up an inference like the above to prove that something is caused.


Does the Advaitin then deny causality altogether? No; he does deny its intelligibility and ultimate reality. Viewing ourselves and our environment as finite and changing, there is only one way of rising above our limitations; that is to grasp the identity in the differences, the permanent in the changing. The causal concept is an eminently successful attempt at such apprehension. In the nature of things, however, it cannot claim to be more real than what it seeks to comprehend. The phenomenal world is illusory; the causal concept applicable thereto is also illusory. The causal relation is not ultimately real, because nothing we call cause is ultimately real. What causal explanation seeks is such identity of character between cause and effect as will secure rigid and predictable sequence; the reality of either is for it an irrelevant question. And logically there is no reason for us to insist that any cause or all causes alike should be real. In the first place, all causal factors are not alike; the potter's staff is little like the clay and less like the potter; why should such divergent conditions agree in a claim to reality? True, we call them all causes, just as we apply the notion of similarity to a variety of cases; but the similarity of cow to ox is not the same as that of a cow to the she-buffalo; much less has it in common with the similarity of brother and sister. Why insist on reality being common to such widely divergent factors? Further, by him who says the cause is real, reality is presumably conceived as qualifying the cause. If the cause in every case is that which

has reality for its qualification, then the substrate (*viśeṣya*), the cause, itself is not real; if, on the contrary, the cause does not have reality for its qualification, then too it is not real. Nor can this dialectical skill be turned against the Advaitin. It may not be said for instance that if Brahman be qualified by reality, the substrate of the world would be unreal, and that the same consequence follows, only more so, if Brahman be not qualified by reality. For the Advaitin holds Brahman to be reality itself, above all distinctions of substrate and attribute. Brahman is co-eval with *sattva*, not *antarbhāvita-sattva*; and such a claim may intelligibly be made only for what is one, infinite, above space and time, not for the multiple and the limited.

It would follow from this that explanations of the finite as finite would achieve but limited success where they do not wholly fail. For the finite is grounded in the infinite and the latter alone can explain itself or another. Scientific explanations could take us beyond the particular phenomena sought to be known, but not very far; since our particular interests are limited, they may and do offer help to satisfy those interests; but if we pressed forward, either because of irrepressible theoretical or satiated and novelty-seeking practical quests, we would find our explanations melting into thin air or doubling back to the starting point. Such an expectation on the part of the Advaitin is justified in a measure by what some modern scientists have to say. The name of Eddington is notorious in this connection. And in spite of the disagreement even of some professors of philosophy, it is worth while taking note of his conclusions.

"The determination of the physical laws," says Eddington "reflects the determinism of the method of inference."⁵ And the mode of inference he exhibits as strictly cyclic, maintaining its rigidity by cutting away what inconveniently refuses to fit into the scheme. Thus Einstein in his statement of the law of gravitation makes use of the concept of *potentials* which are said to "obey certain lengthy differential equations." *Potentials* are quantities

derivable from fundamental quantities called *intervals*. *Intervals* are relations between events measurable by a *scale* or *clock*. A *scale* is a graduated strip of *matter*. Keeping to the world of mechanics, matter may be defined in terms of *mass*, *momentum* and *stress*. To the question what these three are, Einstein's theory is claimed to have given an exact answer. "They are formidable looking expressions containing the potentials and their first and second derivatives with respect to the coordinates."⁶ And thus we have gone round full circle, or as Eddington diagrammatically represents it, round the pentagon.



The only way to avoid this going round is to stop short somewhere with what you know or what you seem to know. Most people would imagine they know what matter is and would not question further. For them, scientific explanation would appear very sound, simplifying and inter-connecting concepts, making the whole world more intelligible. But the knower, who is he? What is

Mr. X? Surely till that is answered, the explanation is not complete. It is because of ignoring this question that systems are maintained and certainty achieved. But neither the metaphysician nor even the scientist has the right to ignore this question.

The cyclic nature of physical inference is illustrated by the children's rhyme of the house that Jack built; only at a certain stage we retrace our steps instead of going on, so that we repeat ourselves indefinitely.⁷ And the fact of empirical validity of what we infer cannot guarantee the objective reality of the starting point of the inference. "When from an observation of pink rats we infer the presence of alcohol, the validity of the inference lies in the fact that what we infer originates a process which ends in the mental construction of pink rats. . . . But it is not presupposed that the pink rats are objectively real."⁸

Eddington holds that, with the advent of quantum physics, the decline of determinism has also set in. The strict reign of causality (the belief in rigid reversible causal relations, as distinguished from the belief in *causation* that any consequent is due to its antecedent or complex of antecedents) is no longer found valid in the domain of physics where it had been supposed to hold undisputed sway. Not all modern physicists are willing to sacrifice determinism. But causality is a positive idea, the burden of proof of which lies on those who advance it; and physicists like Einstein and Max Planck, though they would like to re-establish determinism, see no present means of doing it. Their present failure does not involve failure for all time. Strict causality has not been disproved. But this can give no satisfaction to the physicist whose task it is to prove it, if he can. And despite Planck's emphatic assertion that "natural phenomena invariably occur according to the rigid sequence of cause and effect. This is the indispensable postulate of all scientific research,"⁹ we have Eddington's assurance that "Present day physics is simply indifferent to it. We might believe in it today and disbelieve in it tomorrow; not a symbol in the modern text-books of physics would be altered."¹⁰

If the reaction to determinism among modern physicists is not uniform, the welcome among philosophers has not been all that one might expect. Stebbing, reacting violently against the idealism as well as the loose language of Eddington, will concede only that "the discovery of uncertainty relations does involve a considerable change in our attitude to determinism. But I doubt whether it is quite the change that either Jeans or Eddington supposes."¹¹ "The dominance of universal causation is felt to be a nightmare. Heisenberg's principle has some part to play in revealing to us what it is we thought we were accepting."¹² A very limited concession! Radhakrishnan holds that "Even freedom of man is not helped in any way by the freaks within the atom. To suggest that electrons possess free will is to degrade freedom itself."¹³ "If in order to be satisfied of the truth of freedom," says Brahma, "we want it to be proved at the level of mechanism, if instead of rising up to the level of freedom we desire that it may exist at the lower level of mechanism, we are demanding what is nothing short of the impossible. Freedom is not determinism and it can never hold good of determinism."¹⁴ The meaning of this last statement is far from clear, especially in view of what he says later. "The freedom that cannot find any place for necessity and causation but always opposes itself to the latter cannot be ultimate category."¹⁵ Should we not conclude from this that "real" freedom does not oppose itself to determinism and, to that extent, does hold good of determinism? Brahma is quite content with the indeterminism or non-determination of Brahman; at the level of the phenomenal or empirical, causation may have full sway. But this is just what we as humble logicians in quest of the truth fail to understand. Quite irrespective of what may be true of a transcendent or noumenal background, we found it difficult to grasp the notion of cause or effect in any intelligible or consistent fashion even at the empirical level. We found that, try as we might, we were landed in self-dependence or infinite regress, defects which strangely enough seemed to find a parallel in physical laws as

expounded by Eddington. The cyclic nature of physical law exhibits the self-dependence we have detected in the causal notion. And the scientist today recognizes, instead of rejecting, the plurality of causes. "We may think," says Eddington "we have an intuition that the same cause cannot have two alternative effects; but we do not claim any intuition that the same effect may not spring from two alternative causes."¹⁶ And the following quotation from Davidson will serve as a commentary on this: "The scientific world is full of examples of the same effect proceeding from different causes. An instance from chemistry may be taken. It is well known that formic acid can be obtained from nettles, ants, and other living organisms. It can also be obtained from its elements by simple methods; for instance, potassium format can be produced from carbon monoxide and caustic potash, and formic acid can be produced from the compound by distilling with dilute sulphuric acid."¹⁷ The measure of agreement makes us suspect that there may be more to the matter than is conceded by Stebbing or other philosophers, realist or idealist.

Let us consider for a moment the measure of indeterminism now claimed to the credit of the sciences. Each atom is supposed to comprise a nucleus of positive electricity with one or more electrons revolving round it. The nucleus may consist of a single proton or a number of protons and electrons closely packed together, with a preponderance of protons over electrons so that there is a balance of positive electricity. The electron revolving in its orbit should naturally tend to draw ever closer to the nucleus and the process would be normally presumed to be continuous. It has been found, however, that what occurs is a change by jumps, not a continuous change. We have to assume a succession of orbits; from each of these the electron may jump to a higher or a lower, either absorbing energy or radiating it; it may jump to the next lower or to the next but two; when the electron will jump and how much it will jump we do not know and have no means of

knowing; all that we do know for certain is that, between the energy levels of the various orbits, the relation is constant, being expressible in terms of h (Max Planck's constant, equivalent to 6.55×10^{-27} erg. seconds) or some integral multiple of h , such as $2h$, $3h$, etc. There is thus an uncertainty within the atom, what Radhakrishnan calls a freak, as to when and how its mobile components, the electrons will change; the time, the quantity and direction of change are all uncertain.

This much can afford little basis for the scientific determinist or indeterminist philosopher. The measurements required may appear present impossibilities but may be future achievements, even like the bombing and disintegration of atoms. To this extent one may sympathize with Brahma when he says: "If future experiments reveal to us that the indeterminism supposed to exist in the movements of the electron is really non-existent, philosophy would find itself helpless to prove its position if it now accepts the argument of Eddington."¹⁸ But the arguments of Eddington and Schrodinger go a little further than this. They maintain not merely that the movement of the electron is uncertain in the present state of our knowledge, but *can never be certain*, so that scientific prediction such as we used to believe in, is impossible. In order to foretell the motion of the electron you must know both its position and its velocity; but in the nature of things, you can never approach accuracy in regard to the one without receding from accuracy in regard to the other. In order to know the position of the electron you have to look at it or illuminate it with light rays of a smaller wave-length; not even the shortest of ordinary light rays, the violet rays, is short enough for the purpose. We have to use what are called gamma-rays from radio-active substances. When such rays are used, at least one quantum of energy will be involved and this is sufficient to disturb the electron, in an unpredictable manner. We would have very nearly fixed the position but would have disturbed the velocity. If we used lights of long wave-length but

little energy, the velocity would be undisturbed, but the position would be uncertain. Accurate prediction requires knowledge of both position and velocity. "But these two factors are so connected that the more accurately we know the one, the less accurately we know the other."¹⁹ To put it in terms of Schrodinger's wave-theory, an electron may be taken to be associated with a wave-packet so as to correspond to it in some way. Wave-packets may comprise waves of great or small length. In the former case, their velocity will be less than in the latter. The velocity of the electron in the large wave will be not quite determinate, as it may be either in the forward moving or backward moving part of the wave; but since the velocity of the wave itself is low, the indeterminacy will be low compared with the indeterminacy of position due to the length of the wave; the latter indeterminacy is reduced in the case of waves of shorter wave-length; but because of their greater frequency the difference in velocity between the forward and backward parts will be much greater; hence the indeterminacy of velocity is much higher in this case. "We pay for precision in position by uncertainty in velocity and *vice versa*."²⁰ The difficulty, to repeat, is not one of present inability, but the impossibility of prediction, given present conceptions.

It may be urged that these conceptions may give place to others, in the light of which prediction may appear possible. The wave theory gave way to the particle theory; now there is a tendency to combine the two and speak of a wavicle; we may in time arrive at some more intelligible synthesis which will do justice to the phenomena and preserve determinism. As against this, we have to remember that Eddington and those of his persuasion do not claim to have established indeterminism scientifically. They do claim to have disestablished scientific determinism. Strict causality as understood in the past is neither possible nor necessary for science. We have so far only probability based on statistical laws. These statistical laws are not and need not be grounded on a rigid reversible causal relation.

We may assume for the moment that the principle of indeterminacy (strictly speaking it is uncertainty, and is expressive of the inability of the observer, not of the nature of things) has been established. Even thus, it holds of microscopic bodies, not of macroscopic entities like ourselves or our bodies. Granted the electron is free, what follows for us, endowed with organisms composed of large masses of electrons? The governing law may be statistical in its nature, not a relation of rigid necessity. This, however, means little in practice. By extensive observation we may compute the average longevity of the members of a country, community, profession or the like. It will not be possible on the basis of this average to judge the longevity of any particular member of that group; any particular member's length of life may hover about the mean or be far in excess or defect. Despite such uncertainties and aberrations, the average will continue to hold good for the whole as such. Similarly, whatever may be the indeterminacy of the individual electron, the general law of causality will continue to hold good of us who are wholes of electrons. Microscopic uncertainties cannot detract from macroscopic certainty. The supposed freakishness within the atom is no guarantee of my freedom.

The argument thus advanced seems irrefutable. And the Advaitin, who is interested not in the empirical, but in the transcendental, ideality of the concept, may well be disposed to accept the argument at its face value. He cannot, however, afford to forget that his own dialectic has convicted the causal concept of self-dependence, reciprocal dependence and so on. The cloven hoof (ideality) would seem to be manifest, however, dimly, even at the empirical stage. The philosophic advocate of non-difference cannot afford to recognize water-tight planes or compartments, such that causality is wholly real in one plane and wholly unreal in another. It is in truth neither real nor unreal; this indeterminability (*anirvācyatva*) is manifest in varying degrees in various planes. The Advaitin cannot, therefore, countenance scientific determinism as either actual or possible.

It seems likely that the insurance company analogy is responsible for a confusion. The promoter of such a company, if he accepts reliable statistical figures about longevity, gets the advice of a good actuary, and permits no swindling by himself or by others, is exceedingly likely to prosper in his business despite the uncertainty of any individual's death or survival. In such a case, however, the group or class has no individuality of its own. It is loosely knit; if some die early, others die late and there is a balancing which preserves the average age intact. Suppose we consider instead something like the behaviour of a crowd and the behaviour of a company of soldiers. In the latter case, we can predict for the whole, not in spite of uncertainty about the parts, but because there is no uncertainty about them. In the former case, we may be certain about the parts but uncertain about the whole; while each member of a crowd may be inoffensive, whether because of timidity or a genuine law-abiding nature, the crowd as a whole will often override both tendencies and behave in a thoroughly disgraceful manner. The difference between the insurance statistician and the collective psychologist is that the former studies happenings, while the latter studies behaviour. "Collective security" is possible in the former case in a manner and to an extent impossible in the latter. This is because in *behaviour* as contrasted with *event*, we have to deal not merely with particulars, but with units or individuals; and each unit or individual seems to exhibit distressing symptoms of uncertainty.²¹ This is of course most so in the case of the units called individual selves, as is evident from our deliberation as to what we shall do, our regrets for what we did or failed to do and so on. This, however, is to anticipate the question of human freedom.

To return to scientific determinism, it may be argued that with the possible exception of psychology, science is interested in happenings as such, not behaviour, and that if statistical laws can make predictions in those fields, the needs of determinism will be satisfied therewith. This sounds reasonable enough. But let

us examine the nature of statistical law. It is based on a number of observations presumably accurate and formulated in such a way as to hold good of the whole constituted of the individuals observed. The proposition "Early marriages produce weaklings" based on observation of A, B, C. . . . Z, who are all progeny of early marriage, is an instance of such a law; again, the proposition "South Indians generally die at 50," based on numerous observations as to the incidence of mortality in a large number of South Indians in all walks of life, is a statistical law. In neither case has a necessary connection been established between cause and effect, or antecedent and consequent. But the observations, so far as they went, were accurate. There was no doubt of A-Z having been children of parents married early or their being weaklings; the individual South Indians observed did die at the various ages noted by the observer. There is some basis of accuracy to go upon. If similar accuracy were attainable in the case of at least some of these microscopic electrons, we might formulate a statistical law holding good of the macroscopic body, though not of any individual microscopic component. This possibility, however, is just what is denied by the Principle of Indeterminacy which says that position and velocity cannot both be accurately determined. And though from a large number of non-accurate observations one may make a guess to a future event, the prediction can never on this basis achieve any better status than that of a guess, more or less lucky.

We may be faced now with the proposition that what is statistically aimed at is a law that applied to microscopic bodies, not to macroscopic ones; with regard to these, there is neither doubt nor failure of the application of the causal law as ordinarily understood. Even on this position there are certain difficulties. What we know as statistical law is such not because its basis is inaccurate, but because, though accurate as far as it goes, it does not make room for analysis and the establishment of a rigid connection; with the microscopic bodies, however, we find, if Heisenberg is not mis-

taken, that our observations are and necessarily must remain inaccurate. Statistics deal with inadequate data while here we are faced with inaccurate data. The difference, we grant, is one of degree; this, however, is as little ground for ignoring it, as the tiny size of the baby for ignoring its illegitimacy (in Marryat's story). Secondly, we have to ask whether these microscopic entities occupy a region of their own, or are constitutive of the macroscopic bodies supposed to be governed by rigid causality. If they are constitutive, what is the guarantee that the uncertainty of microscopic behaviour will not affect the macroscopic too?²² It would be ridiculous of course to argue that the larger the whole, the greater is the indeterminacy; for the uncertainties may cancel out one another. But is the cancelling out more than a probability? Strictly speaking, should we not say that we cannot be certain as to whether the microscopic uncertainties accumulate or are annulled? And whatever we may judge of *events* as such, should not this uncertainty be our most legitimate conclusion with regard to *behaviour*?

All this seems much at variance with common sense. In looking back on what we know of occurrences or behaviour, we fail to see how any event could have occurred or failed to occur otherwise than as it did. In retrospect at least there seems to be no uncertainty. But this is no problem of the advocate of indeterminacy. In stating the principle, this is how Eddington envisages and answers the difficulty: "There is no limit to the accuracy with which we may know the position, provided that we do not want to know the velocity also. Very well; let us make a highly accurate determination of position now, and after waiting a moment make another highly accurate determination of position. Comparing the two accurate positions we compute the accurate velocity—and snap our fingers against at the principle of indeterminacy. This velocity, however, is of no use for prediction, because in making the second accurate determination of position we have rough handled the particle so much that it no longer has the velocity we calculated.

It is a purely retrospective velocity."²³ "Nature thus provides that knowledge of one half of the world will ensure ignorance of the other half, ignorance, which, as we have seen, may be remedied later when the same part of the world is contemplated retrospectively."²⁴ "It is easy to prophesy after the event."²⁵

Between the Eddington picture of the indeterminacy in the atom and our average picture of human indeterminacy, there is a close parallel. Most of us feel that, after we have acted, the speculation if we could have done otherwise is idle; but before acting we do feel that there is a choice to be made and that much hangs on this choice. Retrospectively we do admit determinism, but not prospectively. And if a serious-minded scientist finds a parallel for this in intra-atomic behaviour, there is little need for us to look with scorn at "freaks within the atom." Any such parallel is bound to be interesting and illuminating, though, of course, never conclusive. And it is not the claim of the Eddington group to have proved human freedom; rather do they maintain that the supposed obstacle of the exact sciences is no longer there.

It may be thought that the claim to exactitude of certain sciences was never a bar to human freedom. The determinism of external events cannot affect the fact of human responsibility. Stebbing makes a distinction between responsibility *for* and responsibility *to*. I am responsible *for* my acts *to* some authority, God or the king or my neighbours. When a question of accountability or responsibility *to* some one arises, it may be legitimate to plead determinism as an excuse. But so long as I do not ignore the fact that whatever is done it is *I* that do it, my responsibility *for* the act persists and cannot be got rid of. The notion of responsibility *to* is irrelevant; what matters is responsibility *for* and this does not stand in need of scientific indeterminism. What matters is that *I* act; and our interest should lie in making precise the *I*, not in making the act indeterminate.

One may sympathize with this clever line of reasoning without, however, being convinced by it. The question of responsibility to

God may be irrelevant, but that of responsibility to society and the state is very important. If a person's acts are the result not of choice, but of prior states and those of still prior states and so on, are we justified in intervening at some stage awarding praise or blame, reward or punishment? On such an extremely determinist view even our approbation and reprobation would appear determined; so the question of justification may not arise. But even in regard to responsibility *for*, surely there is a difference between a primary and a secondary sense thereof. I am responsible for my fall, physical or moral, in a way in which the stone is not responsible for falling. If my responsibility consists in this, that it is *I* who act, the stone should be responsible in precisely a similar manner in that it is the *stone* which falls. This however is not what we mean. With regard to this very falling of the stone, both I and the stone may be responsible, I by the fact of displacing it and the stone by the act of falling, but in very different senses. The stone acts as it is acted on. I act because of the forces which act on me and as I choose among these forces. An abstract external calculation of forces, such as is possible, or as is assumed to be possible, in the case of the stone, is not possible in my case. That is why I am responsible in a sense in which the stone is not. To square this fact of responsibility with scientific determinism we have either to deny that fact or abrogate determinism. The former is what earlier scientists and the materialists did; the latter is what the Eddington group of scientists do.

A third course is perhaps not impossible. One such way would admit determinism in a limited sphere. Determinism is all right in the world of matter, but will not apply to spirit. We are concerned, however, not with the freedom of spirit in the abstract, but with the freedom of human beings, apparently bound in and reacting to a material environment, and embodied in psycho-physical frames. If those frames and the environment are strictly determined, there is no sense in claiming freedom for me; my responsibility is no better than that of the falling stone. Am I different

from the frame and the mechanism? If not, the determinism of the latter applies to me also. If I am different, in what relation am I to the mechanism, and how is it determined? If there is a relation and that is undetermined, we leave the door wide open for the influx of the demons of primitive faith; calculation and determinism, even within a limited sphere, become impossible since this sphere is liable to be disrupted at any time from without. If the relation is determined, it cannot obviously be so unless the other relatum, the *I*, is also determined, and no determinate relation is conceivable where one relatum is undetermined and undeterminable. The only relation, if it can be called that, is one of superposition of the mechanical on the non-mechanical, of matter on spirit. This is the Advaita notion which we shall examine presently. But short of this, there seems no way of avoiding the extremes of denying human responsibility or scientific determinism. To claim a mysterious sphere for the *I* is only to do violence to science without any corresponding advantage in metaphysics.

Why not then adopt the Advaita doctrine of super-position? The mechanical, the material, the determined is a superimposition on the conscious, the spiritual, the ever-free. So long as we are in the sphere of the superimposed, we gladly concede determinism. We recognize, however, that it is only a phenomenal plane, the plane of the analytical intellect. When, by a deeper intuition, we rise to the higher plane *of* spirit, there is no determinism. The Real, the Absolute is neither free nor not-free; the appearance is never free. The fetterless spirit appears as fettered in its own laws; the non-relational appears as the harmoniously related; the uncaused and uncausing appears as a system of rigidly interlinked causes and effects. "The Absolute," says Brahma, "expresses itself differently at different stages and this infinite variety of expressions also in a way proves the infinitude of the Absolute. It is our limitation which is responsible for the belief that what is causally connected cannot be freely conceived. But if we attempt to reach the deepest levels of our experience and to be directly cognisant

of the inexhaustible, autonomous spring that underlies and supports the ever-changing playful states of consciousness, we can realize that what is freely conceived is expressed through harmony, law and system, and that there is no opposition between perfect freedom and spontaneity on the one hand and law and system, causality and determinism on the other."²⁶

This passage, I confess, has puzzled me greatly. In some ways its contention seems as patent as it is acceptable. How can the infinite appear finite, the self-luminous as other-illuminated, the undetermined as determined? To this our answer must frankly be that as finite consciousness we do not know, and to deny the reconciliation is really to presume an omniscience we do not possess. The reconciliation *may be* for aught we know; it *must be* if we are to conserve the intelligibility of the finite in some measure; therefore it *is*. The adoption of this Bradleian reasoning, however, presupposes a *must be*: a stage which we cannot postulate if the finite causal system were a closed system, if determinism, causality, law, system were intelligible instead of being riddled with contradictions as shown in the Bradleian and Advaita dialectic. We may admit that the ever-free can and does express itself as if bound; but if the freedom is real, the bondage can be nowhere near perfect.

Another idea underlying Brahma's words may perhaps be expressed thus. Brahman is undetermined; it is not a term in a cause-effect series; all the same it is not characterless; the undetermined nature of Brahman does not lead to the possibility of anything being anything else; the absolute freedom of Brahman is consistent with its being determinate, its being character (though not endowed with characteristics), so that what is abstracted therefrom or superposed thereon is such and such, not something else; and between the various superpositions certain definite laws hold good. This is as it should be. A thoughtful Advaitin would repudiate the characterization of Brahman, refuse to predicate characteristics thereof, but not say that it is characterless. It is that which is at the mercy of all outside influences that has no character; not, however, that

which has no inside or outside and is homogenous. If, therefore, it is this reconciliation that is meant by Brahma between law and its transcendence, there is no need to disagree.

But here again it must be remembered that the finite is not a plane or sphere apart from the infinite; it is the infinite itself which expresses itself in finitude; hence even on the empirical view the boundaries of the finite cannot afford to be hard and fast; they must have a certain haziness, though the haziness may be negligible when dealing with large numbers. What I wish to stress is this: what you call finite has or has not a hard crust; if *ex hypothesis* you endow it with such a crust, you will never make it jump out of its skin into the infinite either now or ever; if, on the contrary, it has no such crust, but we treat it as if it had, then law, systems, determinism are not absolute even in the empirical sphere. Surely this is the only legitimate conclusion, if the deeper intuition is not a *deus ex machina*, but the fruition and fulfilment of the disciplined intellect itself. From such a point of view the postulation of indeterminism in science is a conclusion very much to be welcomed. Absolute certainty for the true Advaitin, belongs to Brahman alone, for that alone is both determinate and undetermined. Anywhere short of that, what is claimed to be absolutely certain is only an exercise in tautology more or less successfully camouflaged.

Again, what can be meant by the statement that the "Absolute expresses itself differently at different stages"? Is it that distinctions of space and time have real significance for the Absolute? Does the Absolute really have to pass through various stages? Or is it that in the Absolute, which is one, we distinguish stages? Surely, this last is the position acceptable to the Advaitin. And on such a view, the non-reality of the stages and distinctions has to be admitted, despite their presentation and empirical reality. The admission of this much of reality may be a necessary stage even in the realization of illusoriness. As the ancient Advaitin asks:

गौणमिथ्यात्मनोऽसत्त्वे पुत्रदेहादिबाधनात्
सद्ब्रह्मात्माहमिति एवं बोधि कार्यं कथं भवेत् ?

But what we insist on is only the non-reality, not the unreality (*asattva*) of the empirically real. Even at a level far short of absolute realization, we find that error has been the gateway to truth; this does not prevent the recognition of the error nor shift the realization of the more inclusive truth to a higher plane or to a different sphere. The passage from error to truth may follow the laws of wave mechanics or of quantum mechanics. We may insensibly move towards the truth or jump to it in well-marked stages; and our jumps may not all be in a forward direction; however this may be, it can never be maintained that in one sphere or plane the error was true, but not in another. We thought it true at one stage, but now we do not think so; the germ of our present realization was in it from the outset; it may be a fresh discovery, not a fresh importation; and consistently with this we have to declare not its reality, but its non-reality even in the empirical sphere. The deficiencies of empirical reality are to be made known not elsewhere or at another time in a different order of experience; our finite practical life itself exhibits its self-diremptive character. What is required is not an ecstatic flight to mystic heights but some patient and persistent analysis. The Vedānta says "That thou art", not "That thou wilt become"; oneness with the Absolute is a present experience, not a mere hope of the future; and the imperfections of the phenomenal must be evident to us now, since we are the noumenon even now and do not have to become it hereafter. We cannot admit indeterminism in one plane and system, causality and law in another plane. Indeterminism is not indeterminateness; hence the *possibility of law* to a limited extent; system is relational, and relation, being an unintelligible concept in the last resort, can never be complete; hence the possibility of law *only to a limited*

extent. Freedom can hold good of determinism, despite Brahma's assurance to the contrary; it is because determinism can never be complete; in its attempt at fullness and precision it reaches out indefinitely, or turns round in a tautologous circle. The self is free energizing as it is self-luminous consciousness. This freedom, however, being another name for the fullness of character independent of external conditions, and not equivalent to the indeterminable subjection to influences other than one-self, it is determinate. This determinateness is appreciable by us in our efforts at prediction, which are so successful in regard to the past and achieve a limited measure of success in regard to the future, though our certainty about the future is not and can never be anything more than a high measure of probability. For the ever-free in its appearance can never appear as the merely determined or the merely indeterminable; it must combine both features while rising above both; hence the predictability in retrospect and the probability in prospect. This is one approach to an understanding of reality and for help in this approach, we may be duly thankful to modern scientists, though beyond this we may not go in reliance on their conclusions.

The dismissal of causality does not involve the abolition of all certainty. It is dreary philosophy which can hold out no certainty at least of release. This certainty cannot be taken away by Advaita or by modern science. There is no philosophy possible without the certainty of the philosophising self. This is self-luminous, self-evident, self-guaranteed. And release, according to the Advaitin, is the self's own nature. It is that it is; it can never be gained nor lost, though it may appear to be lost and appear to be regained. For us who appear to be searching, the regaining of our own nature is a certainty; it is indeed the only certainty, and the only measure among the probabilities which are all we have left to us in prospect.

NOTES

1. Methuen, 1937.
2. Allen and Unwin, 1939.
3. Cf.: "na khalv ananyatvam ity abhedam brūmaḥ kim tu bhedaṃ vyāsedhāmaḥ"—*Bhāmatī*, II. i.14.
4. The function is what is generated by the cause and generates the effect produced by the cause.
5. *The Nature of Physical World* (Everyman), p. 262.
6. Op. cit., p. 254.
7. Or, as another interprets it "We are doing what the dictionary compiler did when he defined a violin as a small violoncello and a violoncello as a large violin" (*Limitations of Science*, p. 193, Pelican).
8. *New Pathways in Science*, p. 294.
9. *Where is Science Going?* p. 107.
10. *New Pathways*, p. 302.
11. *Philosophy and the Physicists*, p. 184.
12. Ibid., p. 240.
13. *An Idealist View of Life*, p. 246.
14. *Causality and Science*, p. 20.
15. Ibid., p. 22.
16. *Nature of the Physical World*, p. 286.
17. M. Davidson, *Free-Will or Determinism*, p. 44.
18. Op. cit., p. 20.
19. *Limitations of Science*, p. 92.
20. Ibid., p. 93.
21. After I had completed the paper I came across the following lines in Eddington's latest book: "A study of mob-psychology would be a very unsatisfactory foundation for a theory of the human mind. The molar law, or mob-law, of physics is an equally unsatisfactory introduction to the theory of individual or atomic behaviour." *The Philosophy of Physical Science*, p. 30.

22. Cp. "If, however, the components acted quite capriciously why should there be aggregate constancy?" Laird, *Recent Philosophy*, p. 165.
23. *Nature of the Physical World*, p. 295.
24. *Ibid.*, p. 296.
25. *Ibid.*, p. 296. It will be interesting to consider here what we know of astrology. It is a matter of common experience among those who consult astrologers that any astrologer worth the name shows uncanny ability in predicting the past while his success as to the future is much more restricted. He may succeed in forecasting certain outstanding events; but the minuteness and accuracy characteristic of the prediction of the past are generally lacking in the prediction of the future. This may be due in many cases to the astrologer's lack of competence; in some cases it is due to inaccuracy of data, the required precision being almost unattainable in the nature of things; to some extent again the lack of accuracy is due to the possible modification of the future by the individual himself; he may offer propitiations and avert malign influences; the planets seem to be responsible only for some tendencies, the effectuation or frustration of such tendencies being, to some extent at least, in the hands of the victim. It is indeed urged that the function of astrology is not to satisfy idle curiosity about the future, but to help the individual to forward good tendencies and avert evil ones, by suitable measures. It is also common belief that astrological predictions of the future fail in the case of yogins, because of their intensive self-culture. However this may be, we find that astrology combines precision as regards the past with a haziness more or less negligible as regards the future; and this combination, instead of disentitling it to be a science, seems to bring it into line with other exact science, in its modern developments.
26. *Op. cit.*, p. 22.

 ŚAṆKARA: HIS MESSAGE TO MANKIND*

N. Veezhinathan

Kālidāsa in his *Kumārasambhava* describes a "tīrtha" as that which is sanctified by the presence of the great venerable ones.

*Yad adhyāsitam arhadbhiḥ taddhi tīrtham pracakṣate.*¹

When viewed in this light, Kālaṭi in Kerala is a *tīrtha* which, being the birthplace of Śaṅkara evokes special reverence or veneration having a character apart from that which is material or secular. A realized soul like Vāmadeva of the Upaniṣadic fame, Śaṅkara proclaims that it is only the philosophy of Advaita that is spiritual and at the same time rational and is in harmony with the teachings of the Upaniṣads. He was not an explorer of the philosophy of Advaita. He was only an expounder of it which has been traditionally handed down from God himself. It is not a fabrication of something new by him through the exercise of his imagination, as Bhāskara, his later day critic, has alleged. That the philosophy of Advaita has been handed down by tradition, Śaṅkara respectfully acknowledges in his commentary on the *Taittirīya-Upaniṣads* thus:

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I offer my salutations to the ancient preceptors by whom the Upaniṣads have been expounded on the basis of Mīmāṃsā, Vyākaraṇa, and Nyāya.

He commences his commentary on the *Kaṭha-Upaniṣad* with an offering of salutations to Naciketas and to Lord Yama whom he characterizes as the preceptor imparting the knowledge of the true nature of the jīva. In his Commentary on the *Bhagavad-gītā*, he states that the person who does not know the traditional interpretation of the Vedānta must be shunned, whatever his other academic acquirements may be.² That there has been a perennial and an uninterrupted flow of the philosophy of Advaita till his time is stressed by Śaṅkara in his commentary on the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*. He states: "God imparted the knowledge of Advaita to Kaśyapa, Kaśyapa to Manu, Manu to humanity at large; and, this knowledge handed down by tradition is perceived as present even now in the case of the enlightened ones."³

The sixth *brāhmaṇa* of the second chapter of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* sets forth the line of teachers who transmitted the teachings of the Vedānta from time immemorial. Sureśvara in his *Vārttika* on this section states:

The śruti gives a detailed list of teachers who have imparted the knowledge of the Self, i.e. the true nature of the jīva, with a view to clear the misapprehension that the truths of Vedānta may after all be something brought into being as the result of the intellectual effort of someone.⁴

While offering obeisance to Śaṅkara, he says:

My preceptor, Śaṅkara while commenting upon the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* has explained the import of all the Upaniṣadic texts. He is the one who has attained the knowledge of the teachings from his preceptor by loving devotion towards him.⁵

In the *Sūta-saṁhitā* it is said:

The knowledge of the teachings of the Upaniṣads imparted by one who does not know the traditional interpretation of the Upaniṣads is not knowledge, but is exactly the opposite of it. This is the considered view of the enlightened ones.

Just as the knowledge of one's lineage is essential for one getting married, even so the knowledge of the traditional interpretation is so important as to be indispensable for attaining self-realization.⁶

Śaṅkara got illuminating confirmation of the truth of Advaita from his preceptor, Govinda-bhagavat-pāda who had received it from his *Guru*, Gauḍapāda. He is a realized soul, a *jīvan-mukta*. The state of *jīvan-mukti* is unembodiedness (*aśarīratva*); and it consists in remaining in the body by being free from the delusive cognition of "I" and "mine" with reference to the body and its features. The physical body, by being present in which the *jīva* has attained self-realization, is caused by past merits and demerits that have started yielding forth their fruits. They will be exhausted only by experiencing their fruits. Till that time the *jīva* who has attained self-realization will continue to live in the body which will fall off when the fructified merit and demerits are exhausted. In his commentary on the *Vedānta-sūtras*, Śaṅkara makes an indirect reference to his state of *jīvan-mukti*. He says:

There need be no discussion in order to convince others as to whether the one who has attained self-realization continues to live in the body for sometime or not. For how can one question the truth of another possessing Self-realization—confirmed by his experience—and at the same time his presence in the human body?⁷

Vācaspatimiśra, while commenting on the above, says: "Here Śaṅkara gives expression to his state of *jīvan-mukti* to those who

consider him to be a worthy person." Padmapāda describes Śaṅkara as the pre-eminent among the realized souls. In his work *Pañcapādikā*, he says:

The view of the revered *bhāṣyakāra*, Śaṅkara who is the prince among the realized souls and who has assumed a body solely with the view to impart the knowledge of the Self to mankind must be treated as possessing scriptural validity.⁸

Śaṅkara, being an enlightened soul (*jīvan-mukta*), has the prerogative and privilege to impart the knowledge of the Self, the sole means to liberation to humanity at large. This service which he has rendered is, in the language of M. Hiriyanna, the natural expression of his felt conviction in the oneness of all (*sarvātma-bhāva*). It is love—love not in its ordinary sense which like compassion involves a sense of duality which he had already transcended, but love born out of his discernment of the Self in every being. "he loved others not *as such* but *as himself*, because he had realized his identity with them." Following the Upaniṣads, Śaṅkara makes a clarion call that man's energies must be directed towards bringing to an end the confusing of the ephemeral with the permanent. The *Kaṭha Upaniṣad* declares:

The internal Self abides always in the heart of men. Him they should differentiate with the great attention on it to the exclusion of everything else, as from the reed the stalk which is inside it.⁹

The Self which is the real, according to Advaita, is free from all imperfection because it is original and not something derived; it is whole and impartite; it is not subject to limitations; and it is not dependent upon anything else as it is self-sustaining. It is beyond what appears to ordinary sense-experience, and is non-dual, pure consciousness and simple identity.

In his work, *Vedānta in Hundred Verses (Śataślokī)*, Śaṅkara describes the present state of men thus:

It is well-known that men waste their time by entertaining an euphoric feeling that bodily form, wife, sons, servants, horses, and bulls afford pleasure to them. It is only the result of centering of the attention on flesh. They never inquire into the nature of the Self, the immortal being which is immanent in their hearts, which is the sustaining factor of the life-principle of all the beings, and by the presence of which bodily form, etc. exist, become efficacious to carry out sacred and secular activities, and acquire grandeur and sublimity.¹⁰

In his commentary on the *Kaṭha Upaniṣad*, he earnestly urges men to direct their attention towards inquiry into their true nature in the following words:

Leave out the belief in variety which is based on vicious logic; discard the misconception of nihilism; being free from pride seek the Self, the true nature of the *jīva*, as taught in the Upaniṣads which are a thousand times better well-wishers of man than even his parents.¹¹

The Upaniṣads provide us with the knowledge of the nature of the Self (*Ātman*). In the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*,¹² Sanatkumāra instructs Nārada that the chief aim of one's life is to realize the truth which is identical with bliss, which is unconditioned and therefore unoblittable at all times. Nārada approaches Sanatkumāra with a prayer that he may be blessed with a state wherein one has transcended every form of grief characterizing cyclic existence. He says that he has mastered all sciences, yet has not transcended grief. When Nārada asked Sanatkumāra to impart him the knowledge by which he could overcome his grief, Sanatkumāra asks him to give a list of sciences he has mastered. Nārada says:

I have read the four Vedas; history and mythology; grammar, the rites for the manes, mathematics, the subjects of natural calamities, and mineralogy, logic, ethics, etymology, the texts

on pronunciation (*sikṣā*), prosody, etc., science relating to the elements, science of archery, astrology, science of serpents, subject of fine-arts like perfumery, dancing, music, sculpture, painting, handicrafts, etc.

Having outlined his stock of knowledge, Nārada with a sense of pain and anguish tells Sanatkumāra:

I have learnt only the names or words; I have learnt from venerable sages like your goodself that he who has realized one's true nature (Ātman) transcends grief. I am grief-stricken. Pray, make me transcend grief.

Sanatkumāra confirms that what Nārada has learnt so far is only words. He then instructs him that bliss is to be sought after and describes the nature of bliss thus.

That which indeed is the infinite that is bliss; there is no bliss in the finite. The infinite alone is bliss and it is to be sought after.

Then he explains the nature of the infinite and the finite thus:

The infinite is that where one does not see anything else, does not hear anything else, and does not understand anything else. The finite is that where one sees something else, hears something else, and understands something else. That which indeed is the infinite, is immortal; and, that which is finite is mortal.

Sanatkumāra has thus imparted the knowledge of Ātman, the true nature of the jīva to Nārada whose mind is pure and thereby enabled him to achieve spiritual illumination. From this we could gather that Ātman is the infinite identical with bliss. It is immortal, i.e. not subject to destruction; it is the real or *satya*.

In the section entitled "*Maitreyī-brāhmaṇa*" of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*,¹³ Yājñavalkya who has two wives, Maitreyī and Kātyāyanī, and who has resolved to renounce the world tells Maitreyī that he shall divide his property between her and

Kātyāyanī. Maitreyī asks him whether she would become immortal if the whole of earth with all its riches belongs to her. Yājñavalkya answers her that there is no hope of immortality through riches. Maitreyī then asks: "What shall I do with that whereby I do not become immortal? Teach me rather what you know." Yājñavalkya then tells her:

Verily not for the good of anything is anything dear, but for the good of the Self it is dear. It is the Self that should be realized through Vedāntic study, reflection, and meditation.

It is clear from this dialogue that nothing is loved for its own sake, but is loved for the sake of the Self. The Self is, therefore, the object of ultimate value, the one object of all love.

An analysis of the Janaka-Yājñavalkya episode in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*⁴ presents a clear account of the Self, the true nature of the jīva. Janaka once gave an impressive discourse on *Agnihotra*. Pleased with his explanation, Yājñavalkya offered him that he would grant any boon he desires. Janaka said that he would seek clarification in regard to any doubt he may have. He asks Yājñavalkya: what is the light on the basis of which man, i.e. the jīva with body-mind complex, functions? After suggesting the luminaries, viz. the sun, the moon, the fire and speech as providing light to man, Yājñavalkya identifies Ātman or the Self as the light. Janaka requests him to explain the nature of the Self. Yājñavalkya describes it as self-luminous consciousness, immanent in the heart of man, identified with the mind, and vital airs. And associated with the mind or the intellect, it attains the state of the jīva, falsely considers itself as an agent, experient, and a knower. It performs prescribed deeds, commits interdicted actions, and undergoes transmigration.

It is on the basis of these Upaniṣadic texts, Śaṅkara comes to the conclusion that the soul or the jīva is none other than the Self. Losing sight of its identity with the Self—its original nature—owing to its association with the mind, it experiences phenomenal

existence. As long as the *jīva* is associated with the adjunct (mind), so long only is the *jīva*, a *jīva*. In reality, however, there is nothing like *jīva*-hood apart from what is fancied to be such by reason of this adjunct. This relation of the Self with the mind has but *avidyā* as its source, and this *avidyā* cannot be removed by anything other than the knowledge of the Self. Hence this relation with the mind does not cease so long as the identity of the *jīva* with the Self is not realized.

It follows that the Self, owing to its association with mind, a product of *avidyā*, has illusorily attained the state of the *jīva*. The Self as associated with, but transcending *avidyā*, is *Īśvara*. The world, being the product of *avidyā*, is illusory. In other words, in the Self which is the only reality, the states of being *Īśvara* and the *jīva* and also the world are falsely presented. The world, although false in the ultimate analysis, is taken to be real till there arises Self-realization. So long as Self-realization has not arisen, the entire complex of phenomenal existence is taken as true, even as the phantoms of a dream are taken as true till the sleeper awakes. The ordinary course of secular and sacred activities and also the pursuit of Vedāntic study, reflection, and meditation would go on undisturbed till there arises Self-realization. "*Samsāra* is a succession of spiritual opportunities."

Self-realization results from the great-saying of the Upaniṣads through inquiry into their import (*śravaṇa*), reflection upon it on the basis of reasoning with a view to convince oneself that import is true (*manana*), and concentrating one's mind upon it to the exclusion of everything else in order to overcome the unconscious ressertion of old habits of thought such as "I" and "mine" (*nididhyāsana*). Śaṅkara's view is that it is only loving devotion or *bhakti* towards *Īśvara* that facilitates the rise of Self-realization from the great-sayings of the Upaniṣads. The Self is free from all attributes; is in *nirguṇa*; it is free from any form, *nirākāra*. Yet as associated with *avidyā*, it comes to be endowed with attributes. It is *saguṇa* but without any form. The Upaniṣads prescribe several meditative

exercises upon the Self which is *saguṇa* but *nirākāra*. For most people this kind of meditation is difficult. For their sake the Self as associated with attributes (*saguṇa*) assumes illusory forms. While reviewing the Bhāgavata school, Śaṅkara confirms the view that devotion or *bhakti* towards Īśvara is based upon scriptural and *smṛti* texts. Elsewhere he states that Self-realization which is the sole means to liberation arises through the grace of Īśvara.

Śrī Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭātri, the author of the *Nārāyaṇīya*, is an Advaitin *par excellence*. In the very first verse, he emphasizes the Advaita view that Īśvara is only an apparent variation of the Self. He says:

The Self is of the nature of unconditioned bliss and consciousness; it is like nothing and unlike everything; it transcends spatio-temporal relation; it is ever-free; it is only indirectly referred to by numerous śruti texts; and, it is the ultimate value the moment it is realized as the true nature of the *jīva*; and, such a Self appears, owing to the abundant merits of people, as the Lord of the holy Gurupavanapura.

When the *jīva* realizes its true nature as the Self from the śruti texts through the grace of Īśvara, then *avidyā* will be removed along with the state of being Īśvara and the *jīva* and also the world—the illusory projections of *avidyā*. What would remain then is only the Self as pure consciousness, i.e. liberation. Śaṅkara is not a theist, nor on that ground is he to be viewed as an atheist. He is a supra-theist. This means that the *jīva* at the empirical level, worships Īśvara, earns his grace, attains from the śruti texts the knowledge of its true nature which is liberation. And liberation is the Self free from the notions of Īśvara, *jīva*, and the world. Śaṅkara's message to mankind is that the *jīva* must feel that it is obviously a guest in its body, and it must strive hard to attain in the imperial throne of its heart the experience of the transcendental Majesty of the unconditioned splendour which is its true nature.

Our land is called "*Bhārata-varṣa*". The term, "*bhārata*" etymologically means the enlightened souls (*jīvan-muktas*) who revel in the Self which is self-luminous consciousness (*bhārūpe brahmaṇi ratāḥ bhāratāḥ*). Since our land has been inhabited by realized souls like Śaṅkara and his illustrious successors, it is figuratively called *Bhārata*. We are fortunate in this that we are born in *Bhārata-varṣa* which is sanctified by the enlightened souls like Śaṅkara whose very presence even now in the form of unconditioned consciousness and bliss accelerates the benign tendencies in our nature. May we offer our homage to Śaṅkara "*The Mirror of Grace and Majesty Divine*".

NOTES

1. *Kumārasambhava*, 6.51.
2. *Bhagavad-gītā*, 13.2.
3. *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* (hereafter *CU*), 8.15.1.
4. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad-bhāṣya-vārttika*, 2.6.2.
5. *Ibid.*, 1.1.2.
6. *Sūta-saṃhitā*, 4.35. 19, 22.
7. *Vedānta-sūtra-bhāṣya*, 4.1.15.
8. *Pañcapādikā* with *Vivarana*, Government Oriental Manuscripts Library, Madras, 1958, p. 97.
9. *Kaṭha Upaniṣad* (hereafter *KU*), 2.3.17.
10. *Śataślokī*, 5.
11. *KU*, 2.1.15.
12. *CU*, Adhyāya, 7.
13. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, 4.5.1–6.
14. *Ibid.*, 4.3.1–7.

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संसाराध्वनि तापभानुकिरणप्रोद्भूतदाहव्यथा-
खिन्नानां जलकाङ्क्षया मरुभुवि भ्रान्त्या परिभ्राम्यताम् ।
अत्यासन्नसुधाम्बुधिं सुखकरं ब्रह्माद्वयं दर्शय-
न्त्येषा शङ्करभारती विजयते निर्वाणसन्दायिनी ॥

*saṁsārādhvani tāpabhānukiraṇaprodhūtadāhavyathā-
khinnānām jalakāṅkṣayā marubhuvi bhrāntyā paribhrāmyatām
atyāsannasudhāmbudhiṁ suhakaram brahmādvayaṁ
darśayant-
yeṣā śaṅkarabhārātī vijayate nirvāṇasandāyini.*

To those who are afflicted, in the way of the world, by the burning pain given rise to by the scorching sun-shafts of misery, and who through delusion wander about in the desert (of worldliness) seeking water—showing the felicitous ocean of nectar, which is very near, the non-dual Brahman, this—the Voice of Śaṅkara—is victorious, leading, as it does, to liberation.