

The VOICE of ŚĀṆKARĀ

śaṅkara-bhāratī



Editor :

S. Ramaratnam

eṣā śaṅkara-bhāratī vijayate
nirvāṇa-sandāyinī

victorious is the voice of Śaṅkara,
leading, as it does, to liberation.

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The VOICE of
ŚĀṆKARĀ

Śaṅkara-bharātī

Editor

S. Ramaratnam

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THUS SPAKE ŚAṄKARA

S. Ramaratnam

The *Śataślokī* is one of the important '*Prakaraṇa granthas*' of Śaṅkara. All aspects of Advaita philosophy are dealt with in this work in a systematic fashion. Having first brought out the efficacy of a '*guru*' in a beautiful verse (*dr̥ṣṭānto naiva dr̥ṣṭaḥ...*) the author proceeds to expound the nature of the Ātman and the universe. According to Advaita, the universe is '*mithyā*'. The word *mithyā* is roughly translated as 'illusion' but it does not bring out the full significance of the term. What Advaita says is that the universe is neither ever-existent like Brahman nor completely non-existent like a flower sprung from the sky. It is '*sad-asad-vilakṣaṇam*'. The opponents of

1

HOMAGE TO ŚAṄKARA

॥ श्रीः ॥

अनाद्यविद्याशमनं प्रपद्ये ।
नाम्ना महिम्नापि च शङ्करं त्वाम् ॥

I take refuge under you who put an end to the beginningless *avidyā* and who are great by name and fame as Śaṅkara.

[*Śrīmacchandraśekharendra Sarasvatī Bhagavat pūjyapādāḥ*]

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Advaita have failed to grasp the significance of this concept and have embarked on a scathing attack on Advaita by stating that according to Advaita everything connected with the world including the scriptures are useless since they are illusory. But Śaṅkara is a firm believer in tradition and in the authority of the scriptural texts. According to him, the scriptures are important means to the realization of Ātman. After the realization only, they may become redundant. Until then one cannot dispense with them. Śaṅkara brings out this point effectively in verse 8 of the *Śataślokī* thus.

स्वं बालं रोदमानं चिरतरसमयं शान्तिमानेतुमग्रे
 द्राक्षा-खर्जूर-आम्र-सुकदळमथवा योजयत्यम्बिकाऽस्य ।
 तद्वत् चेतोऽतिमूढं बहुजनभवात् मौढ्यसंस्कारयोगात्
 बोधोपायैरनेकैरवशमुपनिषद् बोधयामास सम्यक् ॥

“Just as a mother would provide grapes, dates, mango or plantain to pacify her child for long, so the *Upaniṣads* expound the knowledge of the Self to men who are not in control of themselves due to ignorance and latent impressions carried through successive births”.

It is a matter of common experience that children become restless when they are overcome with sleep. They will start crying and become uncontrollable. Mothers know that they cannot be put to sleep immediately. Their crying must be controlled first. For the sake of this they give them chocolates and biscuits to stop them from crying. When they calm down a bit, they can be put to sleep. Likewise men

cannot be led to the state of realization all of a sudden since they are not yet ready for it. They must be made to get rid of the '*vāsanās*' or the latent impressions or erroneous conceptions of the universe and Brahman. People are prone to identify themselves with the body. The concept that 'I', that is, the soul, is different from the body is not easy to accept. Similarly it is difficult to consider the world that we see as an illusion, though that is the ultimate truth. The erroneous belief that the world is real is rooted strongly in the mind, since such an impression is carried through several births. These wrong impressions have to be removed first before imparting the knowledge of Brahman. This is what the Upaniṣads do. They first help us to get rid of the '*vāsanās*'. They adopt the method of going from the known to the unknown. They impart true knowledge in a sugar-coated form through stories and interesting anecdotes. The disciple wants to know about Brahman, the most important thing in the world. The teacher asks him to think for himself and come out with an answer. The student comes back and says that it is 'food'. The beings in the world are born out of food, are sustained by food and finally submerge in food. The teacher asks him to go back and meditate again. Then he comes back with the idea that '*prāṇa*' or the life-force is 'Brahman'. Creatures are born out of *prāṇa*, sustained by *prāṇa* and get dissolved in *prāṇa*. Likewise the successive stages of '*manas*' and '*vijñāna*' are set forth. The

final stage is, of course, the Highest Realisation where there is nothing but supreme joy.

The study of the scriptural texts has been recommended by Śaṅkara in his other *granthas* also. In the *Upadeśapañcakam*, he says: “वेदो नित्यमधीयताम्” Śaṅkara reverts the Upaniṣads to a great extent and quotes profusely from them in his commentaries on the ‘*Prasthānatraya*’. In fact he identifies the Upaniṣads with the knowledge of the Brahman. In his commentary on the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, he says: “सैयं ब्रह्मविद्या उपनिषच्छब्दवाच्या तत्पराणां सहेतोः संसारस्य अत्यन्तावसादनात् उपनिपूर्वस्य सदेस्तदर्थत्वात् तादर्थ्यात्ग्रन्थोऽप्युपनिषदुच्यते”। The knowledge of Brahman is called ‘*Upaniṣad*’ because it entirely removes the relative world together with its cause from those who betake themselves to this study, for the root ‘*sad*’ prefixed by ‘*upa*’ and ‘*ni*’ means that the texts containing that knowledge are also called *Upaniṣad* as they have the same end in view’.*

*Sri V.R. Kalyanasundra Sastrigal, ‘*Gītā and Upaniṣads*’, Ādi Śaṅkara Advaita Research Centre, May, 1990.

ON ADVAITA*

**JAGADGURU ŚRĪMACCHANDRAŚEKHARENDRA
SARASVATĪ BHAGAVT PŪJYAPĀDAḤ**

At first, Śrīmad Ācārya (i.e. Śrī Śaṅkara) established Advaita-siddhānta. Among the texts that teach Advaita-siddhānta, the principle ones are the commentaries on the three *prasthānas*, viz. the *Upaniṣads*, the *Bhagavad-gītā*, and the *Brahma-sūtra*. These three are the basic authoritative texts for Advaita-siddhānta. Besides these, the Ācārya has written several manuals (*prakaraṇas*). The *Vivekacūḍāmaṇi*, etc., are the most important among them. And, in addition, he has composed many a hymn—Śiva-stotras, Viṣṇu-stotras, Āmbikā-stotras, etc. He has also written a text on mantra-śāstra bearing the title '*Prapañcasāra*'.

*Courtesy: Preceptors of Advaita, pp.549-559. Sri Kanchi Kamakoti Sankara Mandir, Seconderabad, 1968.

Many great learned preceptors have written commentaries on the works of the Ācārya. Of the works of Ācārya, the most important is the *Brahma-sūtra-bhāṣya*. This is a commentary of the *Brahma-sūtra* of the sage Vyāsa. In the *Brahma-sūtra* are to be found topics that are taught in the ten principal Upaniṣads. The essence of these teachings is given in the *Brahma-sūtra* in aphoristic form. The *bhāṣya* explains in an extensive way how the *Brahma-sūtra* refers to the topics dealt with in the ten *Upaniṣads*. Many preceptors, down to the present day, have written commentaries on the *bhāṣya*.

Padmapāda, one of the chief disciples of the Ācārya, wrote a commentary by name *Pañcapādikā*. For this, there is a commentary by Prakaśātman : it is called *Vivaraṇa*. Akhaṇḍānanda wrote his commentary *Tattvadīpana* on the *Vivaraṇa*, Vidyāraṇya and Rāmānanda have summarized the teachings of the *Vivaraṇa* in their works, *Vivaraṇa-prameya-saṅgraha* and *Vivaraṇa-Upanyāsa* respectively. This branch of commentaries is known as the *Vivaraṇa* school.

There is another commentary called *Bhāmatī* for the Ācārya's *bhāṣya*, written by Vācaspatimiśra who lived in North India. Amalānanda wrote a commentary *Kalpataru* on it. Appayya Dīkṣita wrote a gloss *Parimala* on the *Kalpataru*. There is another gloss on the *Kalpataru* by Koṭṭaiyūr Lakṣmīnṛsiṃha Vājapeya : this is called *Ābhoga*. This is the second Advaita tradition known as the *Bhāmatī* school.

For the *Sūtra-bhāṣya*, there is a commentary, *Ratnaprabhā*, by one Rāmānanda; there is also a commentary on the *Ratnaprabhā*.

For the same *Sūtra-bhāṣya*, Ānandagiri, a disciple of the Ācārya, wrote a commentary : this is called *Ānandagirīya*. About one hundred-and-fifty years ago one Tryāmbaka Bhaṭṭācārya wrote a commentary on the *bhāṣya* known as *Bhāṣyabhānuprabhā*. One Raghunātha-sūri of Mahārāṣṭra wrote a commentary for one section (*pāda*) of the *sūtra-bhāṣya*. This bears the name '*Śāṅkara-pāda-bhūṣaṇa*'. These are the commentaries on the *bhāṣya* known to us.

Thus, for a single *bhāṣya* there are so many commentaries.

Of the ten principal Upaniṣads, the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* and the *Taittirīya* have *Vārttikas* by Sureśvarācārya. Hence, this preceptor is also known as the *Vārttika-kāra*.

On the Ācārya's commentary on the *Bhagavad-gītā* there are ten commentaries. All these are texts which expound Advaita-siddhānta.

Similarly, there is Dvaita-siddhānta. For the aforesaid *Brahma-sūtra*, Madhvācārya who appeared on the West-coast wrote a *bhāṣya* after the Dvaita-siddhānta. Many scholars have written commentaries on this *bhāṣya*. In those commentaries, they have opposed the doctrine of Advaita-siddhānta. About four-hundred years ago, a work called *Nyāyāmṛta* was written criticising Advaita-siddhānta. Criticising this,

Madhusūdana Sarasvatī wrote a work by name *Advaita-siddhi*. On behalf of Dvaita, a work bearing the title *Taraṅgiṇī*, was written criticising the *Advaita-siddhi*. Criticising the *Taraṅgiṇī*, a great preceptor by name Brahmānanda who lived in Gauḍa-deśa wrote his *Candrikā*. This work is also known as '*Gauḍa-brahmānandīya*'. Criticising this from the standpoint of Dvaita, one Vanamālāmiśra wrote '*Vanamālāmiśrīya*'. Trayāmbaka Bhaṭṭa, the author of the *Bhāṣyabhānuprabhā*, wrote the *Siddhāntavaijyantī* in which he criticised Vanamālāmiśra's work.

More than sixty years ago, Anantālvār wrote a work called '*Nyāya-bhāskara*' criticising the *Gauḍa-brahmānandīya* from the standpoint of Viśiṣṭādvaita. Criticising the *Nyāyabhāskara*, Rāju Śāstrin who came in the lineage of Appayya Dīkṣita wrote the *Nyāyendu-śekhara*. Thus, we have the *Siddhānta-Vaijyantī* as the last critique of the Dvaita standpoint and the *Nyāyendu-śekhara* as the last critique of the Viśiṣṭādvaita standpoint. The series of critical works so far stops with these two works. But it may be extended hereafter. Any critique, by whomsoever written, must be studied by all.

A study of such works will lead to clarity. It is only when differences of view arise that doctrines gain clarity. In our country, any scholar who is well-versed in the literature of his own philosophical school usually has close acquaintance with the literature of other schools. This is our tradition.

There are so many works relating to our tradition. We do not read them. We know more about the books written in other countries. Which book is our authority, we do not know. Bundles upon bundles of books which have no relevance to our tradition, we know. We do not know our texts. If we become aware at least of their titles, we may begin to take some interest. If scholars who are versed in these texts volunteer to expound them, we do not lend an ear to them; we disregard them. Our country is in a very low state now. The people of other countries praise our Ātma-vidyā. If we should gain esteem in the world, we should augment that culture of our country which has been the object of true esteem. What is the greatness of our country? It consists in the fact that here countless sages have realised the Bliss that is the Self. If we do not come to be aware of the grounds of that greatness, we shall be demeaning ourselves.

So far I have mentioned the series of the important works on Advaita-siddhānta. What is Advaita? What shall we gain from it? Do we know it, or do not know? Could we gain its fruit, or not? Or, do all these belong to the region of mere imagination? Will Advaita become fruitful in experience? We shall consider these questions.

What does 'Advaita' mean? Its meaning is 'without a second'. That there is no second does not appear to us to be true. There are thousands of things. If there is no second, what do we gain? Is this not clear? It is only because there is

no second, that for which we strive will get fulfilled. What for do we strive? We strive for the removal of all the miseries that afflict us. The removal of miseries will be accomplished through the realisation of that which is without a second (i.e. non-duality). We strive for removing poverty, hunger, dishonour, disease, empirical usage (*vyavahāra*), mental pain, etc. Is there any place where these miseries are absent? No. Yet, we continue to strive for the removal of miseries. Through our empirical endeavours, there is only temporary appeasement. If through medical treatment one disease is cured, another disease comes. The means for the absolute removal of all miseries is Advaita. Through it, hunger, disease, death, dishonour, empirical usage, anger, poverty, etc. will not recur. Why do we have misery? It will be good if hunger, etc., do not afflict us. But, why do they afflict us? Let us see through which course they come. They will come as long as the body lasts. But, if this body goes, another takes its place. For that body also, hunger, thirst, disease, etc., will come. So, if we could do without body, then these miseries will disappear. We take many births. What is the cause of those births? On account of what do we take a body? We have to reap the consequences of the good and bad deeds done in the previous births. The self cannot reap them. Fire cannot burn the self; nor the application of sandal paste make it cool. Therefore, a body is needed. As the result of the good and bad deeds done by us, God endows us with a body, and punishes us by making us imagine that the body is "I". If a boy

commits a mistake, he is beaten for that. By his side there is a doctor. If the boy swoons not being able to bear the pain, he is revived and again beaten. He is given food, and again beaten. For the sins we have committed, God gives us a body and thus punishes. If this is not enough, He endows us with another body and punishes. Thus, the sins that we commit are the cause for the body. If we do not commit anymore sins, we shall not be endowed with a body hereafter. Constantly we should remember that we should not commit sin.

What is the cause of merit and demerit? There is the desire to eliminate them by refraining from the deeds that give rise to them; but we are not able to avoid those deeds. If a tree is to be prevented from growing, it is not enough to cut off the branches; the root-trunk must be removed. Similarly, we must discern the cause of sin, and destroy that cause. Why do we perform evil deeds? We desire to possess an object. We device short-cuts to obtain it. That is sinful. The cause for our performing sinful deeds is desire. If an object is beautiful, there arises desire to possess it. The knowledge that a thing is good produces desire. In order to fulfil that desire, we perform actions. Knowing through the senses that a thing is beautiful is the cause of desire. Through effort, we can produce desire, or change it. Knowledge cannot be produced, nor changed.

The punishment for the sins we do is the body. Therefore, if we remove desire which is the cause of sin, there will

be destruction of misery. How to remove desire? The way to remove misery is not taught in the other sacred texts.

Vedānta does not omit this teaching. Vedānta which is the peak of the Vedas teaches the way for the removal of sorrow.

Hatred and desire arise only in respect of objects other than us. There arises neither desire nor hatred in regard to ourselves. Since desire arises in regard to objects other than us, that desire will not arise if those objects are rendered identical with us. If all become identical with us, and if there is nothing other than us, then desire will not arise. If there is no desire, there will be no effort. If this be so, there will be no sin. When there is no sin, there will be no body. When that is not there, there will be no misery. It is for the destruction of misery that we put forth several efforts.

If there is something as a second to us, and if that thing is more powerful than us, there arises fear. If there is something beautiful, there arises desire; and the mind is disturbed. If there is no second, there is no desire, no hatred, no fear. Scorpions and snakes cause fear in us. If we ourselves remain as scorpions and snakes, how then could there be fear? Would we be afraid of ourselves? As long as there is something other as a second, there will be fear. Therefore, what Advaita accomplishes is the bringing about of secondlessness. The Upaniṣad declares that there is no fear when there is no second thing.

Are there not in the world many people? How can all of them become one? How to accomplish secondlessness? Vedānta teaches that what we see in this world as many are illusory. It declares that all are of the nature of Īśvara. We do not see thus. If it is true that Īśvara is all, then what we see must be illusory. If what we see is true, then the declaration that Īśvara is all must be false. If what appears to us is true, then there should be no misery for us. But misery does come to us. Therefore, what Vedānta teaches must be true. If that be so, that all are of the nature of Īśvara should be regarded firmly as the truth. What appears to us is illusory. The real is not this. Our eyes see what are illusory. Advaita teaches that there is a Reality as the basis of the entire world. What appear to us to exist are all illusory; the true existence that is one is alone real.

If all is Īśvara, are we alone different? We should dissolve ourselves too as that Īśvara. Then, there will be no second entity. Now we see things as different. But the true seeing is seeing all as Īśvara. If we too get dissolved without leaving a second, then good will result. Even in the empirical world if two minds become one, there is no strife. Similarly, if all become one as Īśvara, we shall become all; then there will be no desire in regard to ourselves. In the absence of desire, there will be no sin; and if there is no sin, there will be no body; and if there is no body, there will be no misery at all. For the destruction of misery, Advaita is the medicine. Advaita is that which accomplishes secondlessness. Seeing

all as Īśvara is Advaita. Seeing what is real is Advaita. It is this that is taught in the books mentioned above.

Many objections are raised against this position. Some of them are logical; the others are unreasonable. The sacred texts reply to those objections. They outline the disciplines that lead to Advaita. The manuals written by the Ācārya impart the same teaching.

We go to sleep. From sleep we wake up. Sometimes we sleep well. Sometimes we experience dreams. The waking state is *jāgrad-avasthā*. Experiencing dreams is *svapna-avastha*. Deep sleep is *susupti-avasthā*. Thus there are three states of experiences. Our waking is for doing work. Deep sleep is for getting rid of tiredness that results from work. These two seem to be enough! Why should there be dream experience? I reflected on this. Īśvara is everywhere. He is the non-dual Brahman. All is of the nature of Ātman. In order to prove this truth, it appears, He has projected the dream-world as an example. There is no other purpose. The apparent plurality of the empirical world is similar to that of dreams. In dream there occur multifarious difficulties and pleasures. But at the termination of the dream there is nothing left. Even the body which appeared when the dream was experienced is not there. Only he who realizes that such dream was seen is left as the residue. All else that appeared to exist in dream disappears. When we wake up from this empirical world which is a dream, only consciousness will remain. That is the true reality. It is that which is called Advaita. We are all

Advaitins; we are in Dvaita-experience. But, those of us who have faith in Advaita see the Dvaita-dream in the empirical state. In this dream, we go through disease and misery. But we are those who believe that there will be a state in which there will be no disease. By what is Dvaita made known? It is given in immediate experience, now, through the sense of sight, etc. Advaita is made known only by Vedānta. Advaita is that which is made known by the sacred texts; Dvaita is that which is evidenced by the sense of sight, etc. Science tells us that the sun is very big; but our eyes tell us that the sun's diameter is just a span in length. With the palm the sun could be covered. Therefore, the sun appears small. But, what is the truth? If what we see is alone true, there is no need for the texts. It is only what we do not know that should be revealed by the sacred texts. In the Upaniṣads, at certain places, Dvaita is mentioned; at some other places, Advaita. In what context is Advaita mentioned? It is mentioned in the context where the nature of supreme Brahman is taught. In the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad*, for instance, when the significance of Praṇava is taught, it is declared that all is of the nature of Advaita, that Om is all; here the expression 'Advaita' occurs. The term 'Dvaita' occurs in an Upaniṣad. The context there is this: "Remaining as different, how can one perceive an object that is different? If all is of the nature of Ātman, who can experience what as different"? In this context occur the words "Where, indeed, there is Dvaita (duality) as it were". The meaning is: In the state where duality appears to be, there would be that differentiated experience:

*yatra hi dvaitam iva bhavati, taditaraḥ itaram paśyati; yatra
tvasya sarvam ātmaivābhūt, tatkena kaṁ paśyati.—
Bṛhadaranyaka.*

Where, however, all has become the Ātman, there, it is declared, there is duality *as it were*. In the context of the expression *as it were (iva)*, duality is mentioned; and in the context of the statement 'where, however, all has become the Ātman', non-duality is taught. There is also the word '*tu*' (however) mentioned in the context where Advaita is declared. If after a statement, the word *tu* (however) or the word '*atha*' (then) occurs, it means that the final position is set forth thereafter. After the words '*yatra tu*' (where, however), it is declared 'all has become the Ātman'. Thus, from the expression '*tu*' (however) we have to understand the conclusive truth that all is of the nature of Ātman. The expression '*iva*' (as it were) indicates appearance and not reality. The expression 'like him' means 'not he himself'. Hence, when it is said 'duality, as it were', it means that there is no duality—this is the siddhānta. To our senses, duality is presented. That is mere appearance. What is understood with the help of sacred texts is Advaita. That alone is the siddhānta. That all is Self (Ātman) alone is the truth.

Here, the expression '*Ātman*' occurs; should not the expression be '*Paramātman*' (supreme Self)? Thus it may be asked. If there is '*Paramātman*', there would be '*alpātman*' (little self) as different from it. There is no *Paramātman* too. It is only in the state of duality that there is the distinction of

'*Paramātman*' and '*jīvātman*'. When the state of Advaita is realised, there is only the Self (*Ātman*).

The *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* declares: *dvitīyād-vai bhayaṁ bhavati*. It is from duality that fear, misery, strifes, etc., arise. Only if there are two different entities, there would arise desire, fear, misery, etc.

If some one that is dear to us dies, there arises misery. If he passes away before our eyes, we feel distressed. We think that there would be no distress if we pass away. If we pass away, there would be no misery for us. Therefore, if all are ourselves, then there will be no misery whatsoever. When there occurs misery, there is the thought of difference. What is it that occasions desire? It is only when there is consciousness of duality that there arise desire and misery. If the other becomes us, then there is no misery at all. How to effect this identity? If all becomes the paramātman, there would be the one Self alone.

Hence, Vedānta declares: There need not be duality; non-duality alone is the truth. This truth our Ācārya has expounded as a glowing lamp, and has asked us not to forget. His commentary is called '*bhāṣya-dīpa*'. Simply because the expression '*Dvaita*' occurs in Vedānta, people begin to say "*Dvaita*", "*Dvaita*". They do not inquire as to where, what for, and before which concluding statement, the expression occurs. This is like the conclusion that there was the preva-

lence of drinking toddy among the Vedic circles, which some scholars arrive at, on the ground of the Vedic statement, 'Do not drink toddy'.

We are now in the state of dream. If we wake up from this state, that is the state of Advaita. If this siddhānta is retained in memory, at least one in a hundred-thousand will endeavour to attain the state. It is with this end in view that the great preceptors have written their works. It is not enough if we know that there is the Gaṅgā at Kāśī; we must buy the necessary ticket, travel by the appropriate train, cross the railway junctions *enroute*, and without oversleeping arrive at Kāśī and actually bathe in the Gaṅgā.

The Veda declares that Advaita-experience is that whence words, speech and mind return, not being able to reach it:

yato vāco nivartante aprāpya manasā saha.—

Taittirīyopaniṣad

If it cannot be thought by the mind, how to know it? What is the meaning of this Vedic declaration? What is the meaning of the statement that the status of the Self cannot be thought by the mind? If it be that the supreme Self could be known, it would become an object of knowledge. The knower would then be different. In the *Kena Upaniṣad*, it is said: "He by whom it is not contemplated, by him it is contemplated. He by whom it is contemplated knows it not".

yasyāmataiḥ tasya mataiḥ mataiḥ yasya na veda saḥ.

What is the meaning of the statement that the Self is not known? The meaning is that it is not an object of knowledge. There is no meaning in bringing in another lamp to show a lamp. It is only for illuminating what is non-luminous that a lamp is required. To see a lamp nothing else is needed. Consciousness is self-luminous. Īśvara is the nature of that very consciousness. In many places in the Tamil hymns, such as *Tevāram*, *Tiruvācakam*, and the songs of Tāyumānavar, it is declared that Īśvara is 'consciousness alone', that He is 'of the form of consciousness'.

By the mind, the Self is not thought; the mind thinks by it. All that the mind thinks is false; that by which it thinks is true.

yan-manasā na manute, yenāhur-mano matam –

(Kena Upaniṣad)

All that is seen in dream is false. The seeing consciousness alone is real. It is this self that appeared in dream as all the object seen. When the dream terminates, it will be realised that the one consciousness alone remains. If there be one that speaks and one that knows, they would be different. If there is no difference, there will be neither speech nor knowing. It is this not-duality that is declared in the Upaniṣads; and in the aforesaid sacred texts.

On the tree that is the Veda, there are the flowers, the Upaniṣads. The *Brahma-sūtra* serves as the thread which helps in making a garland out of them, fit to be worn round the neck: (*vedāntavākya-kusuma-grathnārthatvāt sūtrāṇām*).

If the maker of the thread (*sūtra*) was Vyāsa, the one who made the garland was the Ācārya. Those who wear the garland are we. That garland should adorn our neck.

What we have conclusively understood, is this: “The truth is only one; all is of the nature of Īśvara”. On account of past impressions, things appear as different. But all must be made into one. Even what is referred to as ‘we’ must be dissolved. For that, the appropriate sacred texts should be studied. The means to this are the Veda, the Smṛtis, the Purāṇas, the sight of temples, pūjā, etc. We sacrifice so much for the sake of the objects of the world. We can do anything for gaining the bliss that is stable. The royal sage Janaka has said: “I have given away entire Videha kingdom; I have given away myself too”.

videhān dadāmi mām cāpi saha dāsyāya.

To reach this state, the easy path is meditation on Śrī Candramaulīśvara. Thus Appayya Dīkṣita has said. Following this way, all should gain Advaita-siddhi.

īśvarānugrahād-eva puṁsām advaitavāsanā,

mahadbhayaparitrāṇā dvitrāṇām upajāyate.

Narāyaṇasmṛtiḥ

THE PLACE OF ADVAITA
IN
INDIAN AND WORLD-PHILOSOPHY*

K.S. RAMASWAMI SASTRI

Śaṅkara's *bhāṣya* on the *Vedānta-sūtras* was the earliest in point of time. Bhartṛprapañca who appeared before Śaṅkara wrote a *bhāṣya* on the *Bṛhadāranyaka Upaniṣad* and propounded his *Dvaitādvaitavāda* and gave the analogy of the 'Sun' and his rays and the 'Sea' and its waves. He affirmed the *pariṇāmavāda* as opposed to the *vivartavāda* of Śaṅkara. He taught also *jñāna-karma-samuccaya*. Later came Bhāskara, in ninth century A.D. to establish his

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bhedābedhavāda — the doctrine of identity-cum-difference. He severely criticised Śaṅkara's Advaita and the *māyā* doctrine also and Buddhist Nihilism. He must have lived in the early part of the ninth century A.D. as Vācaspati who lived about 841 A.D. refers to him. He says that there are both identity and difference in the inter-relation of Brahman and *cetana* and *acetana*; that the inter-relation of Brahman and *acetana* is both different and non-different and that however, in the inter-relation of Brahman and *jīva*, difference is adventitious and non-difference is essential. He affirms that Brahman has got attributes and is not *nirguṇa*. He says that God evolves into the world (*parināmvāda*). He says also that liberation (*mukti*) is got by the co-ordination of both knowledge and action (*jñāna-karma-samuccaya*) and can be had only after death (*videhamukti*). Such *samuccaya* is a *kramasamuccaya* i.e. first *karma* and then *jñāna*, one after another, *jñāna* being the cause of liberation. Thus, according to him, the absolute is both conditioned and unconditioned and differentiates itself into the diversity of souls and things. He thinks that when the condition is removed, the finite merges in the infinite. He advocated a *tridaṇḍi* order of *sannyāsins*, who had daily, rituals and sacred thread. This tradition was followed by Rāmānuja.

Thus Bhāskara, differs in many particulars from Śaṅkara. His *bhedābheda* doctrine was in its turn subjected to severe criticism by the Advaitin Vācaspati Miśra, who wrote a great commentary called *Bhāmatī* on Śaṅkara's *bhāṣya*

and also by Rāmānuja who wrote the *bhāṣya* and promulgated the *Viśiṣṭādvaita* system of philosophy. The main criticism is that identity (*abheda*) and difference (*bheda*) cannot co-exist as the two concepts are contradictory and mutually destructive. Rāmānuja attacks Bhāskara's view in his *Śrī Bhāṣya* and *Vedārtha-Saṅgraha*. Vedānta Deśka attacks it in his *Paramatabhaṅga*.

After Bhāskara and about the time of Rāmānuja came Śrīkaṅṭha. Appayya Dīkṣita says that Rāmānuja's *bhāṣya* follows in the wake of Śrīkaṅṭha (*tadanukṛtisaraṅgī*). Śrīkaṅṭha wrote a *bhāṣya* on the *Vedānta-sūtras* and sought to make out that God Śiva was the supreme divine principle. His doctrine is *Śivaviśiṣṭādvaita*. Appayya Dīkṣita's *Śivārkaṃaṇi-dīpikā* is a commentary on Śrīkaṅṭha's '*bhāṣya*'. Yādavaprakāśa lived at Kañcipuram in the 11th century A.D. and was the guru of Rāmānuja who eventually revolted against his teachings. He also taught a type of *bhedābheda*. His *bhāṣya* on the *Vedānta-sūtras* is not extant. Sudarśana Bhaṭṭa who wrote a gloss called *Śrutaparakāśikā* on Rāmānuja's *Śrī Bhāṣya*, says that Yādava followed and formulated the view of *Āśmarathya* in the *Vedānta-sūtra* I,4.20. Like Bhāskara, Yādavaprakāśa attacks the concept of *nirguṇa brahman* and *māyā*. Bhāskara says that the psycho-physical complex is a limiting adjunct (*upadhi*), that the *upadhi* is real (*satyopādhi*) and not fictitious (*mithyopādhi*) and that the *jīva* is the *ghaṭākāśa* (ether in a pot). Yādavaprakāśa says that Brahman by its immanent *śakti* is transformed into the world that *cit* and *acit* are modes

(*prakāras*) of Brahmānanda as ripples in the ocean of Brahman and that Brahman continues to be itself though it is transformed into the pluralistic universe, while Bhāskara says that by breaking the *upādhi*, the soul merges in Brahman (*ekībhāva*). Yādavaprakāśa thinks that *mukti* is the experience of *bhedābheda* (identity-in-difference), while Bhāskara teaches that the unity of soul and Oversoul is the ultimate truth. Yādavaprakāśa teaches that unity-in-diversity is the ultimate fact and it can never be negated. According to Bhāskara the soul in bondage is different from Brahman but becomes one (*ananya*) with Brahman in *mukti* (liberation). But Yādavaprakāśa thinks that in *mukti* the soul realises itself as a portion of the infinite but is not extinguished in the infinite. But both deny *jīvanmukti*.

Rāmānuja (1017 to 1137 A.D) differed from and criticised his teacher's (Yādavaprakāśa's) views. He based his teachings on the Vedas and *Pāñcarātra Āgamas* and Tamil Prabandhas (4,000 hymns by the Āḷvārs). His *bhāṣya* on the *Vedānta-sūtra* is called *Śrī bhāṣya*. According to him Brahman is Nārāyaṇa with infinite auspicious qualities (*ananta-kalyāṇa-guṇanidhi*). The word *nirguṇa* in the Vedas means only that God is devoid of inauspicious qualities (*heyaguṇarahita*). By knowing and loving God we can attain *mukti* in *vaikuṇṭha* which is Nārāyaṇa's eternal blissful abode made of pure *sattva* (*suddha-sattva*). What is needed is *tattva* (Reality), *hita* (means i.e. *Bhakti*) and *Puruṣārtha* (goal of *mukti*). God is the basis of the universe (*adhiṣṭhāna* or

ādhāra); He is the supporter of the universe (*vidhāta* or *sthitikartā*); and He is the Ruler (*niyāmaka* and *antaryāmi*) and the final master and Goal (*śeṣa*). The *jīva* is the *niyamya* (ruled) and the servant (*śeṣa*). According to him the inter-relations between God on the one hand and *cit* (souls) and *acit* (universe) on the other hand is that of soul and body (*śarīri-śarīra*). The soul is *aṇu* (atomic) and has got inherent consciousness (*dharma-bhūta jñāna*) by whose radiance it pervades and cognises the body. The universe is a reality (*satkhyāti*) and is not an illusion. Rāmānuja postulates the *pariṇāma-vāda* (evolution by modification) and attacks the *vivarta-vāda*. In *pralaya* the souls and the universe are in a quiescent and subtle state respectively and God has this subtle body (*sūkṣma cidacitviśiṣṭa*). After creative evolution, the souls get bodies according to their *karmas* and the subtle universe (*prakṛti*) evolves into the gross visible universe and God has both *cit* (embodied souls) and *acit* (manifested universe) as His universal body. But He is one and the same. The doctrine of Viśiṣṭādvaita implies this identity of the *sūkṣma-cidacitviśiṣṭa* and the *sthūla-cidacitviśiṣṭa* (the identity of the Oversoul of *cit* and *acit* in the subtle state and the Oversoul of *cit* and *acit* in the state of developed manifestation). The Viśiṣṭādvaita teaches also the doctrine of *Pañca-vyūhās* (five self-manifestations of God) viz., *para*, *vyūha*, *vibhava*, *antaryāmi* and *arcā*. *Para* is the transcendental reality; *Vyūha* is the same Lord presiding over the emergent forces and factors in evolutionary self-manifestation as *Vāsudeva*,

Saṅkarṣaṇa, *Pradyumna*, and *Aniruddha*; *Vibhava* consists consists of the incarnation like the *daśāvatāra* including the specially important incarnations as Narasiṁha and Rāma and Kṛṣṇa, the tenth or Kalki-avatāra being the *avatāra* at the end of the Kaliyuga; *antaryāmi* is the immanent deity in every heart; and *arcā*, the images of God. According to Rāmānuja, God is the efficient cause and the material cause of the universe (*abhinnanimittopādāna*). According to Rāmānuja, *karma* and *jñāna* lead to *bhakti* which is the means of *mukti*. Even easier that *Bhakti* is *prapatti* (self surrender) which is open to all persons and to both sexes. Śrī-Mahālakṣmī is the mediator and intercessor (*puruṣakāra*) and secures *mukti* for the jīva from Nārāyaṇa. In release, the jīva has equal bliss with God never merges in God and remains in a state of blissful *kaiṅkarya*. Rāmānuja denies *jīvanmukti*. He has in his commentary on I,1,4, of the *Vedānta-sūtras* embarked upon a minor criticism and a major criticism (*laghu-pūrvapakṣa* and *mahā-pūrvapakṣa* followed by a brief exposition and a detailed exposition (*lagu-siddhānta* and *mahā-siddhānta*) of his own system. Vedānta Deśika who was the leader of the Vaḍakalai sects of Śrī Vaiṣṇavas elaborately expounded Rāmānuja's system and attacked Śaṅkara in *Paramatabhaṅga* and *Śatadūṣaṇī*. The Tenkalai sects which emphasised the Prabandhas was led by Pillailokācārya and Maṇavaḷamahāmuni. Nimbārka who wrote a *bhāṣya* on the *Vedānta-sūtras*, lived some time after Rāmānuja in the 11th century A.D. It is called *Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha*. His philosophy is called the

Dvaitādvaita-vāda or the *Bhedābheda-vāda*. He follows Auḍulomi and Bhāskara and Yādava in some respects. Thibaut calls Audulomi's view as *satyabheda-vāda* (see *Vedānta-sūtras*, I. 4. 21). The jīva according to him is different from Brahman and is *aṇu* (atomic) but merges in and becomes one with Brahman in *mukti* and is omniscient and has the bliss of Brahman. But Nimbārka thinks that the difference between Brahman and jīva persists even in *mukti*, though the jīva feels itself to be one with Brahman as *aṁśa*. Brahman is the efficient cause (*nimitta kāraṇa*) and the material cause (*upādāna kāraṇa*) of the universe, and yet transcends it. The universe is not an illusory projection of *māyā*, but is a self-projection (*pariṇāma*) of Brahman by his immanent *śakti*, like the web from the spider. In *mukti*, the jīva loses his finitude but does not become one with Brahman, *Avibhāga* is not *samyoga* (union) or *ekībhāva* (identity) or *laya*, (merger). Like Rāmānuja, Nimbārka recognises three kinds of jīvas – *nitya*, *mukta* and *baddha* (i.e. ever-free, liberated and bound souls). He recognises also *suddha-sattva acit*. While Bhāskara insists on the essential unity of the jīva and Brahman and Yādava calls *Īśvara* and jīva as two modes of Brahman, Nimbārka says that each is a distinct entity dependent on Brahman. Thus Nimbārka's system is largely akin to Rāmānuja's system.

Madhva, the propounder of Dvaita system of thought was born in 1199 A.D. (in 1238 A.D. according to some others) and lived for 79 years. He took his stand on theism

and realism and pluralism. He differed from his Advaitic teacher Acyutaprekṣa. He rejected the Advaita doctrines of *nirguṇa Brahman* and *māyā* and identity of soul and God. He rejected also Rāmānuja's doctrine of *śarīra-śarīri* and *apṛthak-siddha* relationship, According to him God is only the efficient cause of the universe, *prakṛti* being the material cause. Hari or Viṣṇu is the omnipresent God. He stressed *pañcabheda*, i.e. the total separateness of God and soul, soul and soul, God and universe, soul and universe, and every object and every other object in the universe. He rejected both *vivarta-vāda* and *pariṇāma-vāda* and traced the origin of the universe to the will of God. God is *svatantra* (ever-free) and soul and universe are *asvatantra*, i.e. dependent on God. The souls are atomic in size and are bound by *karma* until they are full of *bhakti* and are liberated by God. He propounded the doctrine (new to Hinduism and not agreed to by any other religious teacher) of three classes of souls, i.e. *mukti* yogyas (eligible for salvation), *nitya saṁsārins* (eternally bound) and *tamo-yogyas* (damned). He postulated also gradations of bliss (*ānanda-taratamya*) among the liberated souls. His works are *Brahma-sūtra-bhāṣya*, *Gītābhāṣya*, *Tattva-saṅkhyāna*, *Tattva-viveka*, *Mahābhārata-tātparya-nirṇaya*. etc. His views are summed up in a well-known verse—

श्रीमन्मध्वमते हरिः परतरःसत्यं जगत्त्वतो
 भेदो जीवगणाः हरेरनुचराः नीचोच्चभावंगताः ।
 मुक्तिर्नैजसुखानुभूतिरमला भक्तिश्च तत्साधनं
 अक्षादित्रितयं प्रमाणमखिलाम्नायैकवेद्योहरिः ॥

There are many other *bhāṣyas* on the *Vedānta-sūtras* but I do not propose to deal with them here beyond making a mere enumeration as I have dealt with them in *extenso* in my works, “*The Essense of Brahma-Sūtras: A Synoptic view* and “*Integral Hinduism*”. I have already referred above to Bhāskarācārya’s *bhāṣya* which propounds the Bhedābheda philosophy. Later teachers were Keśava, as also Yādavaprakāśa. I have made a reference to them already and to Nimbārka’s *bhāṣya* about 11 to 12 A.D.) which is called *Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha*. His school of philosophy is known as *Dvaitādvaita*. Baladeva’s *bhāṣya* was called *Govinda-bhāṣya*. It follows Caitanya’s (1486 to 1532 A.D.) Acintya-bhedābheda school of philosophy. Vallabha (1479 to 1532 A.D.) wrote *Aṅu-bhāṣya* and *Bṛhad-bhāṣya*, Only a portion of the former is extant. Vijñānabhikṣu’s *bhāṣya* on the *Vedānta-sūtra* was written in the 16th century A.D. *Śrīkara-bhāṣya* by Śrīpatipañḍitarāya is from the Liṅgāyat point of view. Bhāskararāya refers in his *Setu-bandha* to a *bhāṣya* from the point of view of Śaktism (Devi Cult). But it has not been traced as yet.

All the abovesaid commentators are united in attacking Śaṅkara’s interpretation. Some of them even decry him in vulgar language whereas he always maintained a high and dignified level in debate. There have been many replies to their criticism from the Advaitins. Prakāśātman, Vācaspati Miśra, Amalānanda, Vidyāranya and Rāmānanda have replied to and refuted the criticisms of Bhāskara. Kṛṣṇānanda Sarasvatī and others refuted the criticisms of Rāmānuja’s

school. Appayya Dīkṣita, Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, Raghunātha and others refuted the criticisms of Madhva's school.

It will be impossible to go in this work into such voluminous controversial literature. It will be enough to reaffirm what I have already shown viz. that Śaṅkara's doctrine of *Nirguṇa-Brahman* and *Saguṇa-Brahman* and his doctrine of the identity of soul and Over soul and his concept of *mokṣa* in general and *jīvanmukti* in particular have undeniable Vedic origin and support. Nay, the concept of Absolute noumenon beyond all names and forms is also found in Western philosophy. Some world-faiths deny form to God while admitting attributes. We may well leave the controversialist to deal with one another, leaving the *Advaita-vāda* to itself as the solution of the problem of Reality, As Gauḍapāda says in *Māṇḍūkya-kārikā*—

स्वसिद्धान्तव्यवस्थासु द्वैतिनो निश्चिता दृढम् ।
 परस्परं विरुद्ध्यन्ते तैरयं न विरुद्ध्यते ॥
 अद्वैतं परमार्थो हि द्वैतं तद्भेद उच्यते ।
 तेषामुभयथा द्वैतं तेनायं न विरुद्ध्यते ॥

Śaṅkara says in his *bhāṣya* on the *Praśna Upaniṣad* :—

विवदत्स्वेव निक्षिप्य विरोधोद्भवकारणम् ।
 तैः संरक्षितसद्बुद्धिः सुखं निर्वाति वेदवित् ॥

The Advaitins have no quarrels with those who affirm a personal God or the reality of an *Aprakṛta-suddha-sattva* paradise beyond and above the universe formed of the three *Guṇās*

and the five elements. In fact Śaṅkara's all-inclusive line includes them all. He calls them his kinsmen (*asmadīyaśca kecit*). Nay, he calls them his limbs, (अन्योन्यगिरोधिभिः द्वैतिभिरस्मदीयोऽयं वैदिकः सर्वानन्यत्वादात्मैकत्वदर्शनपक्षो न विरुध्यते; यथा स्वहस्तपादादिभिः). Appayya Dīkṣita calls *Viśiṣṭādvaita* and *Dvaita* systems near to us (पदवीरदवीयसीर्नः). But what Śaṅkara affirms by way of supplementing and completing what they say is that in *Nirvikalpa-Samādhi* the reality of the Absolute beyond all names and forms is realised as *Ananta-akhaṇḍa-sampūrṇa-saccidānanda* and the identity of the soul and Over soul is realised equally well. No contentious arguments can negate a fact of consciousness or a well-attested experience. Many Western mystics like Eckhart describe the experience of the Blissful Noumenon beyond all names and forms and of the identity of jīva and Brahman. Even recently Rāmakṛṣṇa Paramahaṁsa and Svāmi Vivekānanda and Ramaṇa Maḥarṣi have borne testimony to such an experience. We may well bear in mind the scriptural text :—

यथा नद्यः स्यन्दमानाः समुद्रे
ह्यस्तं गच्छन्ति नामरूपे विहाय ।
तथा विद्वान्नामरूपाद्विमुक्तः
परात्परं पुरुषमुपैति दिव्यम् ॥

Thus the uniqueness of Śaṅkara's doctrine is as remarkable as its universality and inclusiveness. He stresses *śruti* as the supreme *pramāṇa*. His doctrine of *vyāvahārika* and *pāramārtika-satta* (reality) enables him to reconcile the high-

est philosophy and the highest religion and harmonise into a state of concord the so-called *abheda śrutis* and *bheda śrutis*. Madhusūdana Sarasvavī says in his commentary on the *Samkṣepa-śārīraka*:—

श्री भगवत्पूज्यपादैस्तु व्यावहारिकत्वेन कर्मकाण्डप्रामाण्यप्रवृत्त्यादि
व्यवस्थाप्य वेदान्तानां तात्त्विकशुद्धाद्वैतपरत्वं व्यवस्थापितमिति
स्वार्थसमन्वित्वं कृत्स्नवेदस्य प्रतिपन्नम् ॥

He accepts all the theistic systems within the ambit of his generous embrace. Though other systems are afraid of what is apprehended as loss of individuality and personality in Advaitic bliss, he is bold and fearless and even ecstatic in such identity of Brahman and jīva. As Vidyāraṇya says in his *Pañcadaśī*:—

मग्नस्याब्धौ यथाक्षाणि विह्वलानि तथास्य धीः ।

अखंडैकरसं बुद्ध्वा निःप्रचारा विभेत्यतः ॥ (II, 27)

Śaṅkara's bold affirmation of such identity in *nidhidhyāsana* or *nirvikalpa-samādhi* or mystic intuitive experience and ecstasy is the meeting point of Veda and mystic illumination and experience all over the world at all times and is his highest claim to world's acceptance and admiration.

SOME PRE-ŚAṄKARA ADVAITINS

ĀTREYA BRAHMANANDI AND DRAVIḌĀCĀRYA**POLAGAM ŚRĪ RĀMĀ ŚASTRI***

These two personages who are among the early expounders of the pure Advaitic tradition were born in the beginning of their *yuga*. Of these two, Brahmanandī wrote a work called *Vākya* in *sūtra* form and it was an exposition of the purport of the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*. Draviḍācārya embellished that work by his *bhāṣya* on it. On account of this, these authors came to be known as *Vākyakāra* and *Bhāṣyakāra*, respectively.

*Courtesy: *Preceptors of Advaita*, pp.311-316. Sri Kanchi Kamakoti Mandir, Secunderabad, 1968. Śāstraratnākara Polagam Śrī Rāmā Śastri was Professor of Vedānta at the Madras Sanskrit College.

In the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, from the first to the fifth *adhyāya* the following topics are expounded for the benefit of persons of inferior and not-so-inferior qualifications: three kinds of *upāsanas*, namely, *aṅgāvabaddha upāsanā* which leads to the fruits of *karma*, *svatantrapratīkopāsanā* which bestows material welfare, and *aṅgrahopāsanā* which leads to *krama-mukti*. In the sixth, seventh, and eighth *adhyāyas* are expounded in order *sadvidyā*, *bhūmavidyā*, and *prājāpati-vidyā*. These have their fruition in *sadyomukti* or immediate release. These relate to the realisation of *nirguṇa-Brahman* which is *saccidānanda* and are expounded for persons of superior qualification. In the eighth *adhyāya*, for the benefit of persons of intermediate qualification, *daharavidyā* which relates to *saguṇa-Brahman* is explained again. Thus two kinds of Brahman are treated of in the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, the qualified Brahman to be worshipped and the Brahman free from any qualities which is only to be known and realised.

In his *Vākya-grantha* which is an exposition of the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*. Brahmanandī too clearly brings out, in accord with the *Upaniṣad*, the two-fold character of Brahman. Draviḍācārya also in his *bhāṣya* on the *Vākya*, very clearly expounds the two-fold Brahman and his exposition is in line with the *Upaniṣad* and the *vākya*. Unfortunately, these works are not available.

However, thirty statements of the *vākya* and twenty of the *bhāṣya* are available having been quoted in the works of early writers. Of these, eight statements of *vākya-grantha*

and nine of the *bhāṣya* are found quoted in Advaitic works. Twenty-two of the *vākya-grantha* and eleven of the *bhāṣya* are quoted in the writings of Rāmānuja and others. Thus from both the *vākya* and *bhāṣya* we are now in possession of only fifty statements. They have been set forth in the work entitled *Draviḍātreyadarśanam*.

Śaṅkara and others have quoted in their Advaitic works from the *bhāṣya* of Draviḍācārya in the context of the explanation of the *madhuvidyā* and *saṁvargavidyā* found in the third and the fourth chapters of the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*. Rāmānuja and others quote from the *vākya* and *bhāṣya* passages in the context of the *antarādityavidyā* set forth in the first chapter of the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*.

Though Śaṅkara has not quoted verbatim from the *vākya*, yet in his exposition of the *antarādityavidyā* in his *Chāndogyabhāṣya*, and in the *antastaddharmādhikaraṇa* devoted to an examination of it in the *sūtra-bhāṣya*, he has expressed the same ideas in similar language. Thus, we find that Śaṅkara has given expression in his works to ideas similar in language to passages in the *vākya* and the *bhāṣya* and having the same meaning. Such paralld passages have been indicated in the work *Draviḍātreyadarśanam*. They have also been separately tabulated in that work for purpose of comparison under the heads of *Brahmanandi-Bhagavatpāda-Vākya-Sāmarasyam* and *Draviḍācārya-Bhagavatpāda-Vākya-Sāmarasyam*.

The *vākya-grantha* gives six meanings to the *antarādityavidyā* passage in the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*: *tasya yathā kapyāsam puṇḍarīkaṁ evamakṣiṇī*. In his *Chāndogya Upaniṣad-bhāṣya* Śaṅkara gives the conventional (*rūdhī*) meaning of the word *kapi*. In the work *Dravidātreyadarśanam* it has been shown that this interpretation is not affected by the criticism made against it by others. Rāmānuja and others adopt three other meanings of the word from the etymological (*yaugika*) point of view taking them from the *vākya-grantha*. It has to be emphasised that all meanings, the conventional and the etymological are those stated in the *vākya* itself.

In his *vākya-grantha*, the Vākyakāra observes that for the *anugraha* of the aspirants, the Lord's form which is resplendent (*jyotirmaya*) is imperceivable by the sense of sight, but can be perceived only by those of pure mind who worship concentrating on the form of the sun (*āditya-maṇḍala*). This same meaning accepted by the Vākyakāra is conveyed by Śaṅkara in the exposition of the *antarādityavidyāvivarāṇa* of the *antastaddharmādhikaraṇa* and of the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*. The Vākyakāra says:

*syādrūpam kṛtakam anugrahārtham taccetasām aiśvaryāt;
rūpam ca atīndriyam antaḥkaraṇa-pratyakṣam tannirdeśāt.*

Dravidācārya's *bhāṣya* on this passage is:

*añjasaiva viśvasṛjorūpam tattū na cakṣuṣā manasā tvakaluṣeṇa
sādhanaāntaravatā grhyate.*

Śaṅkara writes in the *antastaddharmādhikaraṇa*:

*syāt parameśvarasyāpi icchāvaśāt māyāmayam rūpam
sādhakānugrahārtham.*

In the *Chāndogya-bhāṣya* he says:

*dṛśyate nivṛtta-cakṣurbhiḥ samāhita-cetobhiḥ brahmacaryādi-
sādhanāpekṣam.*

'It is seen by those whose eyes have been turned inward and whose minds are steadfast by reason of the practice of *brahmacarya*, etc.

It is to be noted that corresponding to the expressions of the Vākyakāra, *taccetasamanugrahārtham*, *aiśvaryāt* and *kṛtakam*, Śaṅkara uses the words *sādhakānugrahārtham*, *māyāmayam* and *icchāvaśāt*. Similarly, where the Vākyakāra says *atīndriyamantaḥ-karaṇapratyakṣam*, the Bhāṣyakāra explains it as *na cakṣuṣā grāhyam manasā tvakaluṣeṇa sādhanāntaravatā grhyate*, and Śaṅkara's expressions for them are respectively *dṛśyate nivṛtta-cakṣurbhiḥ*, *samāhitacetobhiḥ* and *brahmacaryādi-sādhanāpekṣam*.

Thus, while the expressions in the *vākya*, the *bhāṣya*, and Śaṅkara's explanations are in accord, not disposed to agree to this, Rāmānuja and others have altered the words *rūpam cātīndriyam* into *rūpam vā atīndriyam*. They also maintain that the statement *syād rūpam* is the *pūrvapakṣa* and that *rūpam vā atīndriyam* contains the *siddhānta*. They also say that the form of the Lord is not unreally assumed by Him, but that it is His real nature. The Vākyakāra says in the previous sentence that it is assumed for purpose of *anugraha* and he follows it in the succeeding sentence that that form is

supersensuous, but perceivable in the *antaḥkaraṇa*. There is nothing irreconcilable in the Lord's form being the result of an assumption and also supersensuous and cognisable by the pure mind. Where is the distinction of *pūrvapakṣa* and *siddhānta* between two positions which are not contradictory to each other? Dispassionate consideration will show that this has not been taken into account in a partisan view of this matter. That the Lord's form is eternal has nowhere been stated in the *vākya*. All this has been clearly brought out in the work *Dravidātreyadarśanam*.

In his *bhāṣya*, Dravidācārya says that *bhagavadrūpa*, the Lord's form is *yathābhūta*, that is, it is existent, and goes on to observe that form is not spoken of a *devatā* which is formless; for *śāstra* speaks only of what is. It is *yathābhūta-vādī*. It informs us of what has *sattā*. True, there is no instruction of *rūpa* in respect of what is *arūpa*, formless. The meditation on the form of the Lord is not based on *adhyāsa* or supposition as in the meditation of the mind as Brahman, etc., but it is the meditation of the existing *rūpa*. Śaṅkara too following the same text speaks in the same manner. This is what he says: There is no non-validity in respect of the texts which refer to the subject of *upāsanā*. Hence *śāstra* which speaks of *upāsanā* refers only to the actually existing *ātmā*, *Īśvara* and *devatā*, etc. While explaining the third *brāhmaṇa* of the first *adhyāya* of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, he observes, 'As that which is indicated as *paramātmā*. *Īśvara* and *devatā* is non-empirical, it deserves to be spoken of as

actually existing'. Similarly in the *bhāṣya* on the *sūtra-svāpyayasampatyoh anyatarāpekṣamāviṣkṛtam hi*, Śaṅkara says: That where this Īsvara's nature is described, it refers to a different state like *svarga*, etc., and it is the locus of the *saguṇavidyā*.

The empirical reality of the Lord's form subsists till the direct realization of Brahman. It is not transcendental (*pāramārthika*), non-sublatable in all the three periods of time like the qualitless Brahman. This view is based on the passage *laukikam tadvadevedam paramāṇamtvātmaniścyāt*, given at the end of the *bhāṣya* in *samanvayādhikaraṇa*. Rāmānuja and others maintain, however, that the Lord's form is *pāramārthikam*. They rely on the following passage in Bhāskara's *bhāṣya* on the *Brahma-sūtra*:

parameśvarasya sarvaśaktitvāt upāsakānugrahāya rūpopādānasambhavāt, kiṁ māyāmayam rūpam? neti brūmah, pāramārthikamevaitat, yathābhūtajñāpakam hi śāstram.

But that is not correct. Even as the Vākyakāra upholds the theory of *vyāvahārika*, so does the Bhāṣyakāra too. In the context of the explanation of the *sadvidyā*, taking up *Śruti vācārambhaṇam vikāro nāmadheyam mṛttiketyeva satyam*, Vākyakāra discards the theory that a thing should be either *sat* or *asat* only, and establishes on the basis of *śruti* the theory of *vyāvahārika-satya* of the world which is neither exclusively *sat* nor *asat*. *na samvyaavahāramātratvāt*. This conclusion of the Vākyakāra is clearly explained in the *Samkṣepa-śārīrika*, in the commentaries on it and in the *Kalpataru*. It is

pertinent to ask those who proclaim that they are followers of the position of the Vākyakāra, why they rejected the statements establishing the *vyāvahārikatva* of the world quoted in the *Kalpataru* and the *Samkṣepa-śārīrika*.

While explaining the *sadvidyā* the Vākyakāra says *yuktam tadguṇakopāsanāt*. He considers that *antarguṇaka brahmaprāpti* is a proper consequence of *antarguṇakabrahmopāsanā*.

The Bhāṣyakāra too explains this passage as follows:

*antarguṇam pratyakguṇameva bhagavatīm paradevatām
bhajata iti tatra tadguṇaiva devatā prāpyate.*

Here the word *tadguṇakam* in the *vākya* is explained as *antarguṇa*. And, the expression *antarguṇa* in the *bhāṣya* is explained as the *pratyagātman*. *Antah* (inner) is a correlate of *bahih* (outer) i.e. inner as opposed to outer. So we get the equation: *tadguṇakopāsanāt antarguṇakopāsanāt pratyagrūpa-brahmopāsanāt*. By the 'tatkṛatu nyāya' it is proper to say *tadguṇaiva antarguṇaiva pratyagsvarūpaiva*. By this *pratyagsvarūpa* the *paradevatā*, the supreme deity which is *parabrahma-rūpa* is attained. This reasoned conclusion of the Vākyakāra and the Bhāṣyakāra is established beyond doubt. That the consciousness of the non-difference of the *pratyagātman* and Brahman arises from the knowledge of the identity of the two which is the purport of the *mahāvākya tattvamasī* is expounded by both of them.

The same is explained by Śaṅkara in his commentary on the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*. That this is the view of the



bhāṣya of Dravidācārya is clearly stated in the *Samkṣepa-śārīrika* also.

Explaining the *mahāvākya-tattvamasī*, the Vākyakāra puts it in the form of a *sūtra*, *siddhāntu nivartakatvāt*. The Bhāṣyakāra explains it thus: A prince brought up among hunters thinks that he is a hunter. But when he is told on the basis of proper reasons that he is a prince, he realises his true nature. Even so the jīva thinks that he is a *saṁsārī*. But when a guru tells him of his true nature of which he was ignorant so long he realised his true nature upon the removal of that nescience. Thus is established the validity of the declaration *tat tvam asi*. The *vākya* is not to be understood as illumine what is already luminous. Thus this elucidation of Dravidācārya in the form of the story is found in several Advaitic works. The fact that Advaita *sannyāsins* specially worship Dravidācārya at the time of *Vyāsapūjā*, proves his association with the propagation of the Advaita *sampradāya*.

And so, it is concluded with the prayer that every one may derive benefit according to his capacity by the study of the *Advaita-darśana* which is the central teaching of the *Upaniṣad*, proclaimed in the *Jñānavāsiṣṭa* by the great sage Vaśiṣṭa, enunciated by Bādarāyaṇācārya in his *Brahma-sūtra*, clearly explained by Vṛttikāras like *Upavarṣa*, made definite by Gauḍapādācārya in his *Kārikās* on the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad*, established by Śaṅkara Bhagavatpāda who stands for the pure Advaita *sampradāya* in his *bhāṣyas*, etc., annotated on in the *tīkā*, *vārttika*, etc., by *ācāryas* like Padmapāda and

Sureśvara, by the authors of *Samkṣepa-śārīrika* and *Vivarāṇa* and by Vācaspati Miśra, expounded in simple language by Vidyāraṇya and which has been transmitted through a holy and beginningless tradition and which dowers its votaries with supreme joy and eternal peace.

6

**IN ADORATION OF THE
DIVINE FEET
OF
PARAMAŚIVENDRA SARASVATĪ**

[The *Navamaṇimālā* of Sadāśivabrahmendra]

C. Murugan*

Paramaśivendra Sarasvatī was the fifty-seventh head of the Kāñcī-Kāmakoṭi-pīṭha founded by Śaṅkara. Sadāśivabrahmendra, the *jīvanmukta*, was his foremost disciple; and, he has composed the hymn, *Navamaṇimālā* in adoration of him.

[1]

विषयेषु निर्व्यपेक्षं विमलतरङ्गानसंपदध्यक्षम् ।

परमकरुणार्द्रवीक्षं परमशिवाचार्यपादमद्राक्षम् ॥

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With reverence I behold the adorable feet of the preceptor Paramaśivendra who has commendable aloofness from things formed of matter, who preserves the treasure of Self-realization which is free from everything that would obscure its ideal character, and whose glances are expressive of tenderness and mercy towards his fellow-beings.

[2]

निर्जितवादिमृगेन्द्रं भर्जितमदमानकामवैरीन्द्रम् ।

श्रितचयकुवलयचन्द्रं परमशिवेन्द्रं भजामि निस्तन्द्रम् ॥

Like the moon which makes the blue lotuses bloom, Paramaśivendra has enabled his disciples to attain spiritual illumination; and, like a lion which overthrows the herd of elephants, he has vanquished, in argumentation, his opponents by defending the Advaita position from their attacks. He is pre-eminent by burning (as it were) the (natural) enemies, viz. conceit, self-esteem, and desire (for securing happiness here or elsewhere). Him I adore with silent zeal and entire absorption.

[3]

वेलातीत-भवार्णव-मग्न-जनोद्धरण-चातुरी-धुर्यम् ।

प्रणतहृदम्बुज-सूर्यं परमशिवार्यं प्रणौमि गुरुवर्यम् ॥

I offer my salutations to the distinguished preceptor, Paramaśivārya who has resourcefulness and ability to rescue the people who are submerged in the ocean of transmigration—the ocean which is boundless; and who, like the sun, makes the lotus-like hearts of those who worship him bloom.

[4]

यत्करुणानीरनिधेः निर्मलविद्यामयो मणिलब्धः ।
तं देशिकवरमन्तः परमशिवाचार्यपादमवलम्बे ॥

I meditate in my heart the adorable feet of the pre-eminent preceptor, Paramaśivendra, the ocean of compassion from where the jewel in the form of Self-realization has been attained (by me).

[5]

यस्योपर्याधाय प्रत्यग्वाङ्मौखरीभरं स हरः ।
मौनमधारयदुचितं परमशिवेन्द्रं तमानतोऽस्मि गुरुम् ॥

I prostrate in homage to my preceptor Paramaśivendra. Lord Śiva, having assigned to him, with trust and confidence, the sublime task of expounding the nature of the Self, has solemnly undertaken the vow of silence.

[6]

व्याकुर्वति सति यस्मिन् ईशानः स्वाधिकारशैथिल्यात् ।
प्रापद्बटतरुमूलं परमशिवेन्द्रं तमाभजे सततम् ॥

When Paramaśivendra has begun to expound the import of the Upaniṣads, Lord Śiva, feeling that he is freed from the obligation of performing this task, has reached the foot of the banyan tree (and stays there observing silence). Such is the greatness of my preceptor whom I shall always worship.

[7]

प्रविततजनमोहप्रशमनपदवाक्यप्रबोधितात्मानम् ।

वरकरुणाभरजलधिं परमशिवेन्द्रं धियां निधिं वन्दे ॥

I bow down before Paramaśivendra who is the repository of wisdom, who is the ocean of divine compassion, and who by clarifying the terms (*tat* and *tvam*) and by identifying the logical significance of the great saying (*tat tvam asi*), imparts the knowledge of the Self that puts an end to the pervasive false notion of "I" and "mine" in the case of his disciples.

[8]

शमितान्तरसन्तमसं विरचितविज्ञानकैरबोद्धासम् ।

कलये परमशिवेन्द्रं कमपि सुखाकाशपरिलसच्चन्द्रम् ॥

I meditate upon Paramaśivendra, the incomparable one. He is the moon which shines forth in the sky of unconditioned bliss, removing the nescience present in the inner Self and enabling the blue lotus, viz. Self-realization to bloom.

[9]

यन्निष्क्रियं निरंशं सूक्ष्ममलक्ष्यं च शुद्धपरतत्त्वम् ।

तत्त्वमसि इति वदन्तं परमशिवेन्द्रं भजेऽहमश्रान्तम् ॥

Paramaśivendra instructs his disciples that their true nature is the Self which is transcendental, is actionless, is partless, is beyond the range of senses and is not the primary signification of words. I worship him with constancy and attentiveness.

[10]

नवमणिमालामेतां गुरुचरणारविन्दनुतिरूपाम् ।
 धारयति यस्तु कण्ठे स जयति कैवल्यसाम्राज्ये ॥

He who keeps in mind this hymn entitled *Navamaṇimālā* which is in adoration of the divine feet of the preceptor, Paramaśivendra would shine brilliantly in the kingdom of the Self which is liberation, the ultimate value.

**METAPHYSICS OF ADVAITA IN THE
PHILOSOPHY OF PĀÑCARĀTRA**

J. DEVANATHAN*

The doctrine of Pāñcarātra is rooted in the *Rg Veda* as found in the *Puruṣa Sūkta* portion and *Satāpatha Brāhmaṇa* (XIII.vi.1), which proclaims the supremacy of Lord Nārāyaṇa celebrated as the ultimate ontic Being of highest reality. Pāñcarātra Āgama-s are a set a theological texts significant in portraying the essentials of Viṣṇuism, as Mahabharata informs us in the *Nārāyaṇīya* section of *śānti Parvan*¹, the earliest available record. Andre Padaux argues for the antiquity of Pāñcarātra School which he traces back to a period prior to the Kashmir schools of śaivism. According to Andre Padaux, Vaiṣṇavism² flourished very early in Kashmir, notably in the

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tāntric form of the Pāñcarātra. Pāñcarātra saṁhita-s are originally traced from the northern parts of Aryan land and that the canonical triad of Pāñcarātra, *Sātvata*, *Jayākhyā* and *Paṅskara* (possibly *Ahīrbudhnyā* also) are the earliest literatures of the school extent to our present days. In Kashmir in particular, Andre Padaux, based on the iconographic evidences insists on the historical fact that Pāñcarātra predated the *śaiva* systems³. Pāñcarātra literature is huge and it amounted to probably not less than one million *śloka*-s while its style is usually terse and yet succinct [Schrader; 1995]. The content of Pāñcarātra is generally *tāntric* by nature and it also includes intense philosophical speculations upon the ontological and soteriological domains. The structure of Pāñcarātra is usually with in four divisions vide, *Jñāna pāda*, *Yoga pāda*, *Kriyā pāda* and *Carya pāda*. *Jñāna pāda* as the name reveals, deals with the theoretical foundations exhibiting the complex metaphysical postulations. The *Yoga pāda* mainly focuses on the spiritual practices in the pursuit of trance and the *Kriyā pāda* is that which is connected with temple architecture, rituals and so on. The last division of *Carya pāda* explains the method of initiation, priesthood and praxis [Ramachandra Rao; 2005].

Pāñcarātra Agama is otherwise known as the *Ekayāna Śāstra*, as *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*⁴ indicates is considered to be promulgated by Lord himself, in five nights (*ahorātra*) to selected group of sages like Atri, Bhṛgu, Sanatkumāra, Sanaka and others. *Ekayāna Śāstra* is thus celebrated to be the most

significant authority and is eulogized to be the source of all Vedas. According to *Padma Saṁhita* (5-2,88) *Ekayāna* connotes the *Ekāntika Sāstra* or the *Parama-ekāntika Sāstra* for the reason that it declares solely the supremacy of Nārāyaṇa alone and not any other deity. *Īśvara Saṁhita* regards Pāñcarātra to be the root of all Vedas and that the latter inherited the import from the former and hence known to be the *Vikāra* Vedas [Dasgupta; 2000]. *Ekayāna Sāstra* is commonly classified into three fold, vide, *sāttvika*, *rājasa* and *tāmasa*. These āgama-s are further classified as *Divya*, *Muni* and *Mānuṣa*; *Divya* group of āgama-s are those taught by Nārāyaṇa himself, *Muni prokta* are considered *rājasic* which are taught by preceptors and sages and *Mānuṣa* is traced to human authorship which is regarded to be *tāmasic* by nature. Generally Pāñcarātra āgama-s, the Vaiṣṇava āgama-s are known to be *sadāgama-s* while others are often considered *asadāgama-s*. These Vaiṣṇava āgama-s are usually 108 in number, (particularly according to F.O.Schrader's account). Apart from these classifications the doctrine of Pāñcarātra is categorized into four different forms namely, *āgama siddhānta*, *divya siddhānta*, *tantra siddhānta* and *tantrāntara siddhānta*⁵.

Philosophy of Pāñcarātra is predominantly theistic in character with considerable *tāntric* influences, primarily postulating the ontological position of the Reality, which is delineated to be beginningless, endless, eternal, one and non-dual. Such reality is regarded to be transcendental essentially, and remains beyond the speculations of mundane illusions.

Ahīrbudhnya Saṁhita presents a systematic exposition of multifaceted Pāñcarātra philosophy. Ahīrbudhnya, one among the eleven Rudras imparts the teaching which covers cosmic evolution, mysticism / occultism, soteriology and *tāntric* tenets. Cosmic evolution of this particular saṁhita follows the *Sāṁkhyan* theory of creation and causality⁶. *Prakṛti* is the transformatory cause for the corporeal entities (*payomṛdādivat tatra prakṛti pariṇāmini*). *Kāla*, the time factor is the interface that stimulates association of *prakṛti* and *Puruṣa* for the evolution of the world. This association makes the *Prakṛti* evolve from its state of inertness while the *Mahat tattva* æ the primordial macrocosmic evolute emanates, which subsequently causes sequential creation. The products of evolution are classified into their corresponding to the three fold *guṇās*. The gradational process of cosmic evolution as portrayed in *Sāṁkhyan* accent is found to be in confirmation with the Advaita tenets asserted by the internal evidences available. In Sanjukta Gupta opinion upon studying *Lakṣmī Tantra* records that the general Pāñcarātra accent particularly with regard to the metaphysics is closely akin to that in the Advaita philosophy. She maintains thus:

'The Upaniṣadic unqualified Brahman retains its position as absolute transcendental Being, Consciousness and Bliss. It is one and integral, but the identification of this Brahman with Puruṣa of *Puruṣa Sūkta* is quite obvious. Moreover, the qualified Brahman, styled as Lakṣmī-Nārāyaṇa (Becoming and Being) is by no means lower in existential status, as it

is in the Upaniṣads or rather in Śaṅkarācārya's philosophy.

[cf. ppxxiv / *Lakṣmī Tantra*; Sanjukta gupta; 2003].

The *Ahīrbudhnya saṁhita* issues endorses Advaitic concept of creationism as it refers Prakṛti only as the *Pariṇāmyupādāna kāraṇa* and it attributes the causality to Puruṣa, which according to Advaita refers the *Īśvara*, who is the referred to as *Puruṣa yoni*. This *Puruṣa*, as *Ahīrbudhnya* defines is *Kūṭastha* (also *Sanatkumāra Saṁhita*; *Indra Rātra* / 6th Chapter verse 2, 'Kūṭasthadakṣarāt tasmāt Vāsudevo'kṣaro'janī') or the immutable consciousness, the ultimate reality or the substratum of all apparent beings. Further the proximity of *Prakṛti* unto *Puruṣa* is the cause for the evolution or transformation of the former; for the latter's effulgence is inherited by the *Prakṛti* for its apparent existence⁷. While discerning the nature of *Puruṣa*, *Ahīrbudhnya* clearly indicates the Advaitic postulation that the *Puruṣa* or the *Kūṭastha Caitanya*, the immutable consciousness is essentially attributeless, to say 'Brahman is neither long nor short not gross and not even subtle'⁸. In answering Nārada, *Ahīrbudhnya* instructs upon the nature of ultimate Brahman as consciousness wherein he employs the Upaniṣadic method of negation '*neti neti*' to ascertain the falsity of apparent dualities; for the teacher imparts the fact that 'that ultimate *Puruṣa* (the consciousness) is eternally beyond all dualities and is devoid of all limiting adjuncts⁹. *Ahīrbudhnya* insists on the concept of *Nirguṇa*, as he emphasizes to say that 'though the *Kūṭastha Caitanya* assumes the six great qualities¹⁰, in reality it is *Nirguṇa*' – '*aprākṛtaguṇasparśam nirguṇam parigīyate*'. Nārada

questions the very nature of six-fold qualities of the ultimate realities, to which Ahirbudhnya answers to advocate the Advaita tenet that the very first quality '*Jñāna*' actually refers to '*svarūpa*' or the essential nature postulating the position that it is not an attribute as commonly misconceived by realists. This view is re-iterated by Ahirbudhnya when he reveals the Advaita position to contend that Brahman itself is knowledge and that the latter cannot be considered as a quality or otherwise - '*Jñānameva param rūpam brahmaṇaḥ paramātmanaḥ*' [*Ahirbudhnya Saṁhita*, II.62]. According to Advaita Vedānta, the effulgence of supreme Brahman is concealed by the power of *avidyā* (*tirodāna śakti*) that creates the *jīvan*-hood. *Ahirbudhnya saṁhita* endorses this view and contends thus: 'the power of concealment causes delusion and hence creates the presence of *jīvan*-hood'. Also that '*mahā māyā* is the cause for *avidyā* which is root for delusion; it is the cause for bondage due to knot of ignorance in the heart'¹¹. The knot of ignorance in Advaitic terms is otherwise known as *Viṣṇu granti* or *Hṛdaya granti*, which is the psycho-physical matrix of an individual soul. Mind in association with the effulgence of soul assumes the sense of I'ness - *ahamkāra*, which is misconceived to be the Self due to ignorance, which causes the bondage. Mind is a psychic element constituted with the pair of opposites viz. pleasure-pain, desire-hatred etc, has the tendency to act and enjoy while Soul which is entirely disassociated with the mind is devoid of any agency to act or enjoy (*na kartā na bhoktā*). Ahirbudhnya underlines

this view and holds that 'pleasure, pain etc exists as a result of fructification of earned impressions (*vāsanā-s*) which is due to the concealment of ignorance alone'¹². The soteriological position of Pāñcarātra is clearly reflected in the *Ahīrbudhnya saṁhita* which categorically affiliates itself with the Advaita view on bondage and liberation. Advaita strictly adheres to the Upaniṣadic view that knowledge alone can annihilate ignorance and removal of ignorance accomplishes the state of liberation. Ahīrbudhnya teaches exactly this position while he says 'liberation is the natural consequence of supreme knowledge which accomplishes the ultimate union (*aikya*) – 'sāyujmanyē sa tu mokṣa uktāḥ 14.41; *ugravradharo jñāni Vedānta-jñānaniścalaḥ 14.30*'. Furthermore, *Jayākhyā saṁhita* insists on this view; for it holds that 'the individual consciousness actually becomes one with the supreme Brahman' [Ramachandra Rao; 2005].

The ontological status of the empirical world, according to Advaita Vedānta does not hold absolute reality and is considered to be illusory by nature. Status of existence is regarded as the *prima facie* of reality. The *prima facie* is pondered upon with five characteristic features which aid to discern the objective nature of existence. The five characteristics are *asti* – existence; *bhāti* – manifestation; desirability – *priyam*; name – *nāma* & form – *rūpa*. Experience in empirical level of reality is attributed with all the five characteristic features while the first three constitute the essential nature of Brahman [T.M.P.Mahadevan; 2006]¹³.

The last two characters, ie, name and form are the products of *māyā* and are those elemental which speculates upon the spatio-temporal conditions. World, as a medley of name and form is thus regarded as a mere appearance which is potential to operate only in the transactional plane of existence that is transient and not eternal, This corporeal existence of world as mere appearance is often illustrated with an analogy of a rope that is falsely seen as snake. Ironically it is a widespread view that Pāñcarātra thinkers attribute reality to the world and thus they are often called realists in common terms. Such an articulation is lamented to be a misconception, as eminent scholar T.M.P.Mahadevan remarks,

'The realism of Pāñcarātra thinkers is not real but only apparent. They are firm in emphasizing the transcendental nature of the Supreme Being, and in showing that the changing world is incompatible therewith..... Although there are non-Advaitic elements in the Pāñcarātra teaching, the predominance of the Advaitic tendency is unmistakable'¹⁴

Jayākhya Saṁhita, Parama Saṁhita and the *Nārada Pāñcarātra*¹⁵ unanimously contend the (pseudo-realistic) view on the ontological position of the world as they seem to regard that the reality of the world is only phenomenal and not absolute. Such a distinct opinion on the apparent reality of the world synchronizes with the essentials of Advaita stand on the metaphysics [S.R.Bhatt; 1980].

As Andre Pataux articulates, the Pāñcarātra āgama-s were predominantly non-dualistic in their natural content while

it assumed more of a realistic tone through ages. 'Brahman is comprehended in two aspects (*Saguṇa and Nirguṇa*) while it remains one without the second, the non-dual which is eternally existent', says *Sanatkumāra Saṁhita* (6th adhyāya/verse41) – '*tau dvimūrtikṛtau jñeyau dvaitākhyam tad dvayam viduḥ | advaitam tu param brahma ekamūrtim taducyate ||*'. This *ekamūrti* is Vāsudeva, the supreme Being, which is non-dual and immutable and attributeless as according to Advaita Vedānta. Pāñcarātra āgama-s strongly advocates the theory of divine emanation or the *vyūha* doctrine in which Para-Vāsudeva is distinguished to be the transcendental state of Being (*Vaiṣṇavam paramam padam*). *Vihagendra Saṁhita* deliberates on the essential nature of para-Vāsudeva that it is a state that is 'devoid of aspects, formless, impartite and absolute (*niṣkala-nirākāra-niranga-aspada*) [Ramachandra Rao; 2005]. *Īśvara*, according to Advaita Vedānta is the ultimate Being as Śaṅkara in the Gita Bhasya, describes him as '*param brahma Vāsudevākhyam sarvasya sarvagataḥ 'stithi nāśa laya bhoga lakṣaṇam vikriyā rūpam avagatha..... paramārtha tattvāḥ*' – 'Supreme Brahman styled Vāsudeva, the source or origin of the entire world; from whom the course of existence, destruction and experience of fruits of works proceed. *Īśvara* is hence the *para tattva* – a higher place of existence which alone surpasses the other transactions at the apparent and empirical states of existence as defined by the terms *nitya-śuddha-buddha-mukta-sarvagata*. Śaṅkara further comments on the nature of Supreme *Īśvara* to say '*loka*

maheśvaram lokānām mahabūtam Īsvaram – turīyam ajñāna tatkāryavarjitam – Lord of the worlds—the Fourth or the transcendent devoid of nescience and its effects'¹⁶. Pāñcarātra philosophy constructs its cosmogony personifying creative dynamism representing the hypostatizations of theological abstractions in the theory of divine emanation. According to this theory, the transcendental Para-Vāsudeva, which is immutable and distinct Being, manifests itself animating with the six divine attributes in four dynamic aspects. This manifestation ascends from the supreme Vāsudeva as the *vyūha*'s head the creation. The differentiation in contradistinction proceeds in the form of divine aspects namely, Saṅkarśana, Pradyumna and Aniruddha. They represent gradual transition from the transcendence to phenomenal appearances [cf. pp226-227, Sanjukta Gupta; 1997]. Alluding to *Mahā Sanatkumāra Samhita*, Schrader says 'Vāsudeva creates from His mind the white goddess *śānti* and together with her Saṅkarśana or Śiva; then from the left of the latter is born the red goddess Śrī, whose son is Pradyumna or Brahman; the latter, again creates the yellow Sarasvati and together with Aniruddha or Puruṣottama, whose Śakti becomes black Rati'. Saṅkarśana, the first divine emanation superintends all souls, Pradyumna controls the mind and Aniruddha protects the world. [cf. pp37-38 volIII, Dasgupta; 2000]. Guy.L.Beck aptly portrays the Pāñcarātra – Advaita equation concerning metaphysics wherein we find compelling parallels between the two regarding the emanation theory.

In Advaitic accent, the Pāñcarātra theory of emanation in *Lakshmi Tantra* corresponds each of the “four parts of *Pranava (OM)* including *Nāda* and *Bindu* counted as the fourth, to the four *vyūhas* or emanations of Viṣṇu. *A’kāra* stands for Aniruddha, the final emanation in the world of senses, *U’kāra* stands from Pradyumna, *M’kāra* signifies Sañkarśana, and the fourth (*Turīya*) represents the original state of para-Vāsudeva”¹⁷. Advaita posits the concept of *Pranava* in the *Māñḍūkya Upaniṣad* where each of the three syllables of *OM*, corresponds to three levels of phenomenal experiences, viz, *jāgrat*, *svapna* and *susupti*. *Sesa Saṁhita* presents a blend of Pāñcarātra and Advaita positions on the conceptualization of *vyūha* and *Pranava* mapping both theories on a single analytical plane.

In the *Brahma Sūtra, Tarka khāṇḍa* of *Avirodādhyāya* deals with the Pāñcarātra view particularly treating the *vyūha* theory. In commenting to the *Sūtra*-s 42-45, Śaṅkara critically evaluates the Pāñcarātra school and maintains the following view on the cosmogony and four-fold cosmic emanations. Śaṅkara observes thus

‘Concerning this system we remark that we do not intend to controvert the doctrine that Nārāyaṇa, who is higher than the undeveloped, who is the highest Self, and the Self of all, reveals himself by dividing himself in multiple ways; for various scriptural passages such as ‘He is one, he is three-fold’ *Ch.Up* VII.26.2, teach us that the highest Self appears in manifold forms. Nor do we object to the inculcation of unceasing concentration of mind on the highest Being

which appears in the Bhagavata doctrine (Pāñcarātra) under the forms of reverential approach, etc.,.... We, however, must take exception to the doctrine that Saṅkarśana springs from Vāsudeva, Pradyumna from Saṅkarśana, Aniruddha from Pradyumna' [pp441]¹⁸

The above note gives a clear picture on Śaṅkara's stand on the Pāñcarātra school, that he subscribes almost to the majority of its tenets while he slightly differs in his perception regarding the doctrine of *vyūha* as interpreted by the so-called Bhagavatas in conceiving the import of Pāñcarātra. Śaṅkara is only against the Bhāgavata claim that *jīva*-s are *de novo* from Vāsudeva which he proves to be untenable. Śaṅkara strictly opposes the Bhāgavata attempt to restrict the *vyūha* theory to just the three divine aspects in the name of Saṅkarśana, Pradyumna and Aniruddha; for he extends the same doctrine of *vyūha* to all beings from Brahma to blade of grass, as he says '*Brahmādistambaparyantasya samastasyaiva jagato bhagavatvyūhatvāvagamāt*¹⁹'. While Śaṅkara insists on the point that *vyūhas* as instruments as assumed by Bhāgavatas cannot be the cause for another instrument; for Saṅkarśana as an instrument of Vāsudeva cannot give rise to Pradyumna which again is an instrument viz, *aḥamkāra* and so on. This position of Bhāgavatas is untenable, advocates Śaṅkara. Śaṅkara thus laments the mis-interpretations of Pāñcarātra doctrine attempted by the Bhāgavatas while he clearly admits the same quite openly. Amalānanda [13th C.E], the author of *Kalpataru* clarifies Śaṅkara's stand regarding the *vyūha* doctrine, to say that '*jīva-utpatti*, origination of individual

souls (and four-fold cosmic manifestation) is taken only in a figurative sense and that the doctrine *per-se* is not fallacious'²⁰. B.N.K.Sharma, however is keen to portray the above fact as apparent contradiction; for he issues a sweeping merit to Rāmānuja and Madhva for their mutually contradictory opinions on the issue. It is indeed ironical that B.N.K.Sharma advocates Madhva's interpretation in treating *Śākta* view to this portion of *Tarka khāṇḍa* in *Brahma Sūtra* and appraises Rāmānuja for attesting Pāñcarātra for entirely a different reason; all for the sake of criticizing Śaṅkara's stand. It may be argued at last that Pāñcarātra cannot share its metaphysical tenets with Advaita Vedānta; for Śaṅkara himself leaves a strong remark on the validity of the former for the reason that it casts slur to the Vedas. Śaṅkara remarks thus: 'Moreover we meet with passages contradictory of the Veda, for instance, blames the Veda, 'Not having found the highest bliss in the Vedas Sāṅḍilya studies this (Pāñcarātra) *Śāstra* ', therefore it is concluded that this assumption is illogical' [B.S. II.ii.45 *Śaṅkara Bhāṣya*]. It is important here to remember that Pāñcarātra, as pointed out earlier, is classified into three viz, *Deva prokta* which is *sāttvic*; *Muni prokta*, *rājasic* and *Manusya prokta* to be *tāmasic*. Vedānta Deśika, a prominent Viśiṣṭādvaitin, himself agrees to this in his work *Pāñcarātra Rakṣa*, as he insists on the supremacy of *Divya-prokta* over *Muni-proktas* '*Munivākyam parityajya divyamārgeṇa pūjayet*' also '*rājasena tu pūjādyam vartate yatra nityasaḥ | tatrāpi sātvikenaiva pūjādyam subhadam sadā*' [*Pāñcarātra Rakṣa*;

1st *Adhikāra*]. *Deva Prokta* being *sāttvic* is considered to be most authentic and it holds utmost validity over the other two for obvious reasons. It is pivotal to note the point that Śaṅkara in his commentary cites only the *Muni bhāṣita* portion (as held by Sāṅḍilya) which he sees to be hostile to Vedic tradition and hence criticizes it. We ought to keep in mind that Śaṅkara clearly endorses the concept of Vāsudeva as Supreme Being, which is commonly held to be promulgated by the Lord himself is considered to be purely *sāttvic*. *Sāṅḍilya Saṁhita* which allegedly contains the hostile remarks of Sāṅḍilya on Vedas is considered as a *rājasic* text while it is *tāmasic* according to different sources. Amalānanda comments on the validity of Pāñcarātra to state “They are works of Nārāyaṇa himself. (i) His omniscience is established by the Vedas themselves (ii) He is not like Kapila or Patanjali – a mere individual Self (but God himself) (iii) His teachings have not been treated in the *Purāṇa*-s as having been intended to delude the undeserving like those of the Buddha-*Avatār*”²¹. Amalānanda vehemently advocates for the validity of Pancartra āgama as he strongly believes and argues that the āgama-s being authored none by *Īśvara* himself cannot proclaim a theory contradictory to Vedas; for the *Deva-proktas* are not prone to flaws at all²². Amalānanda in his other work *Śāstra Darpaṇa* categorically posits self-validity to Pāñcarātra āgama-s; for the very reason that they are composed by Lord-himself and hence cannot go against Vedas. He further adds to state that ‘all that is said on the *Jīva*’s originations remains to be figurative for sure since

Īśvara's being omniscient cannot utter words contradicting the Vedas – ‘*buddhipurvakṛtistatram brāhmaniḥśvasitam śṛuti | tenajīvajānistatra siddhā gauṇī niyamyate || yāvadyekadeśe vedāvirodhādīśvarabuddhervedamūlatvam vedātvā sarva- viśayatvam pratiyate tāvadeva svataḥpramāṇavedājīvā- nutpatti pramitau tādṛśabuddhipūrvakeśvaravacanāna jīvotpattiravagantum śakyate |*’ [*Śāstra Darpaṇa* II.ii.45 / pp138, Srirangam Vani Vilas Press; 1913] Thus clearly, Amalānanda’s main concern here was to explicate and defend Śaṅkara’s stand with proper justification. Lakṣmīṅśimha, author of *Ābhoga*, a commentary on *Kalpataru* argues along the lines of Amalānanda over the issue in favour of validity to Pāñcarātra clarifying Śaṅkara’s stand. Interestingly Vidyāraṇya in his *Jīvanmuktiviveka* quotes *Nārada Pāñcarātra* [pp64, Advaita Ashrama Press; 2006], which itself is an added evidence that Pāñcarātra doctrines are not alien to Advaita Vedānta. It is not surprising that B.N.K.Sharma is completely silent about articulating the above views and it is apparent that he sees Amalānanda adopting ‘a more deferential and conciliatory attitude than Śaṅkara and Vācaspati’ towards the philosophy of Pāñcarātra. On the other hand, Amalānanda puts forth a pellucid approach in appraising Pāñcarātra particularly portraying the implied import of Śaṅkara’s stand in accepting the same in tune with the metaphysics of Advaita Vedānta.

NOTES:

1. see (358-62, 63) & also 66th *adhyāya* of *Bhīṣma parvan* that hints at a reference to Pāñcarātra school. Cf. pp17, Schrader, '*Introduction to the Pāñcarātra*', Adyar library and research centre, Chennai, 1995.
2. Vaiṣṇavism must not be confused with the Viśiṣṭādvaita school of Rāmānuja. Vaiṣṇavism is more a common usage denoting the Viṣṇu cult; it may be distinctly called Viṣṇuism too. Academic research reveals that early Advaita is purely placed on a Vaiṣṇava environment; for Gauḍapāda, ādi Seṣa and Śaṅkara and his direct disciples reflect strong affiliation to Viṣṇuism (by Sanjukta gupta, Jacqueline Hirst, Mayeda, Shuon Hino, Paul Hacker unanimously ascertain that Śaṅkara was basically a Vaiṣṇava). For more details refer pp77, Devanathan.J, *Voice of Śaṅkara*, Vol 33, No1, 2008. Also cf. pp130, Jacqueline Suthren Hirst, '*Śaṅkara's Advaita Vedānta*', New York, 2005.
3. cf.pp 67, Andre Padaux, '*Vāc*', Translated by Jacques Gontier, Satguru Publications, Delhi, 1990. The author records that many Śaiva doctrines based upon Śiva Sūtras, whose authors, in fact sometimes refer to Pāñcarātra Saṁhitas citing Vaiṣṇava authors. One of the earliest references of this type is cited from the *Spandapradīpika* of Utpala Vaiṣṇava who is little earlier to Abhinava gupta. Utpala Vaiṣṇava copiously quotes from *Ahīrbudhnya Saṁhita*, as Padaux records in his book '*Vāc*', revealing the fact that all

doctrinal adaptations developed in Kashmir systemized along the Trika thought, through an earlier text *Adhārakārika* of Seṣamuni is ascertained to be a work of Vaiṣṇava bent.

4. Ch.Up VII.i.2, '..... *daivam nidhim vākovākyam ekayānam brahmavidyam ...*'
5. cf. ppxliii, Melpakkam Duraiswamy Ayyengar, '*Sri Pāñcarātra Rakṣa*', Adyar library and research centre, Chennai, 1996; the author here remarks on the *Ekayāna śāstra* and comments on it to say that it is root material for all Vedas. The author cites a quote from *Nyāya-pariśuddhi* in support of this claim.
6. See pp61, '*anyūnānatiriktam yad guṇasāmyam tamomayam | tat sāmkyair jagato mūlam Prakṛtisceti kathyate*\\' *Ahīrbudhnya Saṁhita*, chp VII/ Verse 1.
7. *Ahīrbudhnya Saṁhita* Chp VII/ Verse 6a
8. '*nādigham naiva ca hrasvam na sthūlam naiva cāpyaṇu*' *Ahīrbudhnya Saṁhita*, Chapter III/ Verse 49.
9. *Ibid.*, verse 53.
10. The six great qualities of the Lord are *viz*, a. *Jñāna* b. *Śakti* c. *Aiśvarya* d. *Bala* e. *Vīrya* f. *Tejas*. Ramachandra Rao quoting *Sāttvata saṁhita* 1.26-27 groups the above mentioned qualities into two functional planes æ one as the *bhūti Śakti* and the other as the *Kriyā Śakti*. By order of pairs these qualities operate in distinct modes corresponding to the cosmic configurations cf. The *āgamic* encyclopedia, pp102; See also *Ahīrbudhnya Saṁhita* III.28.

11. cf. pp122, *Ahīrbudhnya Saṁhita* Chapter 14/ Verse 17.
12. cf. pp124, *Ahīrbudhnya Saṁhita* Chapter 14/ Verse 25.
13. *Dr̥g-Dr̥śya viveka* Verse XX. 'asti bhāti priyam rūpam nāma cetyamśapancakam | ādhyatrayam brahmarūpam jagatrūpam tato dvayam ||'
14. cf. ppxi, TM,P.Mahadevan, Opinion 1, 'The Philosophy of Pāñcarātra', Delhi, 1980.
15. *Jayākhya* IV.85; *Parama Saṁhita* I.80; *Nārada Pāñcarātra* II.ii.100.
cf. pp69, S.R.Bhatt, 'The Philosophy of Pāñcarātra', Delhi 1980.
16. Refer, Śāṅkara's *Gītā Bhāṣya* X.8; X.3.
17. Guy.L.Beck, pp178-179, 'Sonic theology', MLBD, Delhi, 1995.
18. George Thibaut, 'Vedānta Sūtras', SBE vol34, MLDB, Delhi, 1998.
19. *Brahma Sūtra* II.ii.44 *Śāṅkara Bhāṣya*.
20. Amalānanda consolidates the Pāñcarātra view in the following manner; '*Buddhīpūrvakṛtiḥ Pāñcarātram niṣvasitam śṛutiḥ | tena jīvanistatra siddhā gauṇī niyamyate ||*', *ataḥ pramaṇāpahṛtaviṣaye gauṇam tadvacanam; na tu bhrāntam*' – B.N.K Sharma in his book, '*Brahma Sūtras and their Principal commentaries*' mentions the above verse as the *Sangrahaśloka* of *Kalpataru* as cited by Vyāsātīrtha in his *Tātparyacandrika*. [pp109].
21. pp108, B.N.K.Sharma, '*Brahma Sūtras and their principal commentaries*', Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Bombay, 1974.
22. *Kalpataru* II.ii.42

S. BHUVANESHWARI[#]

Introduction

Upadeśasāra is a 'minor' work composed by Bhagavān Śrī Ramaṇa Maharṣi. This work deals with both *Karma yoga* and *Jñāna yoga* and hence presents the Vedic teaching in a nutshell. *Upadeśasāra* is said to be written by Ramaṇa on the request of one of his devotees. A devotee of Ramaṇa, named Muruganār, who was a great Tamil scholar, once happened to have composed a Tamil composition on the sports of Lord Śiva based on the Purāṇas. In this work, an incident occurs, where Śiva descends as a guru in the form of a sage and expounds the role of *karma* and *jñāna*. This is popularly known as *Dārukāvana-upadeśa*. Muruganār, who composed

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the incidental story in Tamil, seems to have requested Ramaṇa to compose the *upadeśa* portion. Thus, Ramaṇa composed *Śiva-dārukāvana-upadeśasāra* or popularly as '*Upadeśasāra*', is an essence of Veda. This work which was originally composed in Tamil has been translated into Sanskrit, Telugu and Malayālam by Ramaṇa himself. *Upadeśasāra* consisting of thirty verses, firstly (verses 1 to 13) explicates *karma* as a *sādhanā* or means to the attainment of knowledge and secondly (verses 14 to 30), the work deals with *jñāna*, the direct means to liberation.

I

Karma Yoga

Ramaṇa refutes the contention of Pūrvamīmāṃsā¹, who holds on to the view that *karma phalam* is not bestowed by *Īśvara* and performance of *karma* gives eternal liberation in the form of *svarga*. *Karma* disassociated from *Īśvara* is cause of bondage². But *karma* is moulded into *karma phalam* by *Īśvara*³. This transformation, from *karma* to *karma phalam*, has to take place based on infinite laws, which can be co-ordinated by the omniscient *Īśvara* alone. Ramaṇa points out that the omniscient *Īśvara* is the bestower of results, *karma* being inert by itself cannot disseminate appropriate results. The second contention of Pūrvamīmāṃsā is also refuted, wherein Ramaṇa says, *karma* is the cause for the fall into the ocean of sorrow and hence the result of action is non-eternal. Ramaṇa then presents the purpose and role of *karma* in the spiritual journey. He suggests the conversion of *karma* into

*karma yoga*⁴. *Karma* should be performed as an offering to the Lord and without a desire for material benefit⁵. Then, *karma* serves as the purifier of the mind and becomes an indirect means to liberation. There are three kinds of *karma*, viz, physical, verbal and mental and Ramaṇa emphasizes the suitable action for purification of mind as performance of rituals, utterance of Lord's name and meditation. *Īśvara* is to be visualised in the form of *Virāt*⁶ and whatever one performs is the offering to the Lord⁷. Lord is endowed with eight aspects, viz, the five elements, sun, moon and all beings. Ramaṇa considers worship of all-pervasive *Īśvara* as the highest mode of worship. He then mentions the highest form of verbal mode of worship as *nāma japa*, which is of three kinds, viz., *uccha*, *manda* and *cittajam*. Of these, Ramaṇa declares that *cittaja japa* is of superior kind since it is a mental activity, equated to meditation. Silence is emphasized as an important spiritual practice⁸. The next step of *karma yoga* described is *mānasa karma* or *dhyāna*. While *kāyika* and *vācika karma* are presented as *karma yoga*, the *mānasa karma* is said to be *bhakti yoga*. In meditation, Ramaṇa states that there should be undisturbed flow of thoughts centered on *Īśvara*, like the flow of ghee into a container or river flowing into the ocean. These two examples cited by Ramaṇa, signifies the initial deliberate effort to centre the mind on *Īśvara* and later by constant practice there arises a spontaneous effortless thought flow of *Īśvara*. Here, meditation is categorized as *bheda rūpa* and *abheda rūpa*, wherein Ramaṇa says, one

should meditate on *Īśvara* as non-different from Self. Ramaṇa hints that 'I' the *ātmā* is obtained in mind abiding in the heart. Thus, so far, Ramaṇa presented *karma* and *bhakti* as *sahakāri sādhanās* in the spiritual journey. In this series of *sādhanās*, Ramaṇa includes the practice of Patañjali's *aṣṭāṅga yoga*, especially *prāṇāyāma*. All these *sādhanās* culminate in *jñāna*. *Prāṇāyāma*, according to Ramaṇa helps in controlling the *vikṣepa* of the mind, the mind quietens like a bird caught in a net. Hence control of breathe (*vāyu rodhanam*) is the means for control of mind (*mano rodhanam*). Ramaṇa then explains the principle of such a function, that is, in *māyā* foundation there are two branches, viz, mind and vital air. When one branch is pulled the other branch also moves along with the trunk. Thus, regulation of breathe regulates the mind. Now, Ramaṇa introduces *jñāna yoga*⁹. That duality is bondage is revealed through *Śruti*¹⁰, *Yukti*¹¹ and *Anubhava*¹². An objection is raised here, that liberation is attained in *Samādhi*, through the practice of *aṣṭāṅga yoga*, where mind is resolved and duality is absent. Ramaṇa states, there are two ways of controlling the mind, one is *laya* (dormant condition of mind) and the other is *vināśa* ('destruction' of mind). The mind in dormant condition comes back to duality whereas, the 'destroyed' mind never returns. While the practice of *prāṇāyāma* helps to control or weaken the mind temporarily, a committed enquiry into the nature of reality (*ekacintanam*) 'destroys' the mind. Ramaṇa then declares, that one who has 'destroyed' the mind through *jñāna yoga*¹³, is established in Self where nothing remains to be performed.

II

Jñāna Yoga

Ātmā or Self is revealed in the Upaniṣad as all-pervasive consciousness (*sarvagata caitanya*), which is in unmanifest form, and is recognized as 'I' obtained in the mind. Consciousness is mixed with thought (*vṛtti*) of mind. The thought is known as '*dṛśya*' (seen) and Consciousness is '*dṛk*' (seer). Ramaṇa, therefore says that Self is recognized as consciousness when the thoughts of the mind are negated. Ramaṇa presents 'enquiry' (*mārgaṇam*) as the valid methodology to arrive at the Self. The mind cannot be destroyed by any other method as mind by itself is unreal and an unreal entity being non-existent cannot be destroyed. So, the 'destruction' of mind here is the understanding of the unreal nature of the mind. An unreal thing cannot be 'destroyed' by knowing, but here the very attempt to destroy the mind is dissolved. This is known as *bādhā* or *mithyātva niścaya*. In order to enquire into the nature of mind, Ramaṇa firstly defines mind. Mind is a collection of thoughts. Thoughts are basically classified as subjective thought (*aḥam vṛtti*) and objective thought (*iḍam vṛtti*). Since the *iḍam vṛtti* are based on *aḥam vṛtti*, the mind is said to be *aḥam vṛtti* or *aḥamkāra*. Thus enquiry into the nature of mind (*manovicāra*) is nothing but enquiry of *aḥamkāra* (*aḥamkāravicāra*).

'I' Analysis

By questioning 'where is 'I'?', Ramaṇa exclaims, Alas! The *aḥamkāra* falls (*patati aḥam*)¹⁴. This is explained, every

individual is a mixture of Ātmā and Anātmā. By the discriminative knowledge of Ātmā and Anātmā, we know that Ātmā is consciousness, eternal, all-pervasive, unmoving and Anātmā is inert, non-eternal, limited, moving. On enquiry we find that 'I' cannot be said to belong to either Ātmā or Anātmā. 'I' refers to a third pseudo-entity, a false entity which is the result of mixing up of the features of Ātmā and Anātmā¹⁵. When the false *ahamkāra* falls, the 'I' refers to Pure Consciousness, that is Existence, which is complete, that is self-evidently known. Thus, the meaning of the word 'I' is Pure Consciousness alone. Ramaṇa gives the reason, if 'I' refers to *ahamkāra*, then it must be obtained in all states of experiences. But the absence of *ahamkāra* is experienced in deep sleep state, where the Pure Consciousness 'exists' without being dissolved along with *ahamkāra*. Ramaṇa then takes up the Upaniṣadic method of enquiry, viz, *pañcakośa viveka* to arrive at the Self. 'I am not the gross body, vital breathe, mind, intellect or bliss-sheath, but am the non-dual Existent principle'.

Sat-Cit Equation

Ramaṇa establishes the non-difference between '*Sat*' and '*Cit*'. If it is said that an object exists, the question is whether it is sentient or insentient. If insentient, then its existence cannot be proved unless there is a sentient being. Every insentient object depends on sentient being for its 'existence'. It would mean that '*Sat*' is dependent, but '*Sat*' is an independent entity that does not require any sentient being

to prove its existence. 'Sat' is self-evident in every object, being both immanent and transcendental. 'Cit' is unnegatable independent entity. This 'Cit' is non-different from 'Sat'. Ramaṇa therefore interrogates, 'where is a separate 'Cit' to prove 'Sat'?'; 'Cit' does not illumine 'Sat' because, 'Cit' alone is 'Sat'. The 'tvam' padārtha refers to 'Cit' and 'Tat' padārtha refers to 'Sat'; the mahāvākya reveals the non-different nature of 'Cit' and 'Sat' and Ramaṇa points out that the 'Cit' is 'I'. (*sattayā hi cit cittayā hyayam*). This non-dual Existence-Consciousness is seemingly experienced as *Īśvara* and *Jīva* due to the limiting adjunct (*upādhi*), and Ramaṇa uses the word 'veṣa' or 'dress' as it were that gives rise to duality. But from the standpoint of 'Sat' there is only one non-dual entity. By negating the adjuncts, knowing the essential nature of *Īśvara* as non-different from the essential nature of *Jīva*, one should remain established in Self (*ātmaniṣṭhitā*). It is emphasised here that, 'Cit' is neither an object of knowledge or ignorance. It is neither 'known' nor 'unknown'. In the non-dual Self, there is neither a 'known' condition or an 'unknown' condition. Thus, Ramaṇa questions, 'Can there be knowledge in this non-dual Self?' (*asti kim jñātumantaram?*), then what is the nature of Self, is to be arrived at through the method of enquiry (*vicāra*).

Jñāna Phalam

Ramaṇa concludes by enumerating the consequence of Self-knowledge. Self is imperishable, free from births, infinite consciousness bliss and one who 'sees' it is immortal. Then,

one transcends the realm of 'bondage' and 'freedom'. Being established in the Higher 'I' while living is *jīvanmukti* (*vindati iha*). This knowledge can be gained by one who possesses the required qualities¹⁶ (*daivika*). Ramaṇa finally glorifies 'self-enquiry', that illumines the nature of one's own 'Self', as the greatest penance that eliminates *ahamkāra*, (while all other kinds of tapas does not destroy *ahamkāra*). This teaching is the words of Ramaṇa (*Ramaṇa vākyam*), the essence of Vedānta.

REFERENCES

1. *Śāṅkara sūtra Bhāṣya*, 1.1.4.
2. *Bhagavad Gītā*, III.9. (Hereafter *BG*).
3. *BG*, XV.14.
4. *Śāṅkara Gītā Bhāṣya*, II.50.
5. *BG*, II.47 and 48.
6. *BG*, XIII.13.
7. *Soundaryalaharī*, Verse-27.
8. *Vivekacūḍāmaṇi*, verse- 367.
9. *Upadeśasāra*, Verse-13 to 16.
10. *Kāthopaniṣad*, 2.4.10.
11. Hypothetical syllogism: Duality is finitude, finitude is sorrow therefore duality is sorrow.
12. *Ātmabodha*, Verse-23.
13. *Māṇḍūkya Kārikā*, IV.56.
14. Refer *Saddaraśanam*.
15. *Adhyāsa bhāṣya*, *Satyāṅṛte mithunīkṛtya aham idam mamedam iti naisargikoyam loka vyavahārah.*
16. *Sādhana catuṣṭaya sampatti*.

**JĪVA - A BLEND OF PURE CONSCIOUSNESS
AND MIND**

J. KRISHNAN*

GOD (Īśvara), soul (jīva) and the world (jagat) which constitute the subject-matter of many a system of philosophy are admitted by the Advaitin to be the apparent diversifications of a transcendental entity called Brahman. The latter, through *māyā* or *avidyā*, appears as the world which is indeterminable either as real (*sat*) or as an absolute nothing (*asat*) or as both. It is thus: *sattva* which is unsublatability in the three divisions of time cannot pertain to the world which is said to be removed by the knowledge of Brahman. And, *asattva* too which is non-manifestation at any given point of time as existent cannot be predicated of with reference to the

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world which is given in our perception as existent. It cannot be real and an absolute nothing at once; for, that is a discrepant notion. Hence the world is viewed to be false or *mithyā* or *anirvacanīya*.¹

The *jīva* is only the pure consciousness reflected in *avidyā*. *Īśvara* too is pure consciousness which in view of its relation to the revealing medium, namely, *avidyā* and also the reflected image, namely, the *jīva* acquires an adventitious feature, namely, the state of being the original (*bimbatva*). And the consciousness-element when associated with this feature is known as *Īśvara*. Thus we see that according to Advaita *Īśvara* is only the pure consciousness associated with the characteristic of being the original (*bimbatva*) and the *jīva* is the pure consciousness associated with the characteristic of being the reflected image (*pratibimbatva*). And *bimbatva* and *pratibimbatva* are not intrinsic to consciousness, but are extrinsic by being derived from *avidyā*. *Avidyā* is located in pure consciousness, and when it is removed by the direct knowledge of the latter, the world-appearance would vanish and the states of *bimbatva* and *pratibimbatva* too attributed to consciousness by *avidyā* will be removed. What would exist then is only pure consciousness. It would be evident from the above that consciousness is non-dual, as the world given in perception is not real, and the states of being *Īśvara* and of the *jīva* are only illusorily present in it.

The theory that the *jīva* is only a reflected image of consciousness is based upon the text of the *Brahmabindu Upaniṣad* —

एक एव तु भूतात्मा भूते भूते व्यवस्थितः ।
एकधा बहुधा चैव दृश्यते जलचन्द्रवत् ॥²

Advaitānanda in his *Brahmavidyābharana*— a commentary on Śaṅkara's *bhāṣya* on the *Vedānta-sūtra* explains this text thus:³ just as the one moon appears to be manifold in water present in different vessels, in the same way consciousness remains as one in the form of Īśvara and appears to be many in different bodies as jīvas. This text explains the nature of the jīva as a reflected image on the analogy of the reflection of the one moon. The point that is to be noted here is that the moon remains as *mere* moon without any extrinsic feature attached to it; but it acquires the adventitious feature of *bimbatva* or the state of being an original when related to the reflecting media and the reflected images therein. In the same way, consciousness is the Pure Being; but when related to the reflecting medium— *avidyā* and the reflected image therein, it acquires the new characteristic of being the original. And the consciousness associated with this new characteristic is known as Īśvara. This way of explaining the nature of the jīva as a reflected image is known as *pratibimbavāda* or the reflection— theory and Padmapāda, the author of the *Pañcapādikā* and Prakāśātman, the author of the *Vivarana* which is a commentary on the *Pañcapādikā* are advocates of this view.⁴

Vācaspatimiśra, the author of the *Bhāmatī*, does not favour the theory of reflection of consciousness. He is of the view that there could be reflection of only those objects which

have material shape and that too in a revealing medium having a material shape. Neither consciousness which is admitted to be reflected, nor avidyā which is held to be the reflecting medium possesses material shape. On this ground he rejects the theory of reflection of consciousness⁵ and advocates the theory known as *avacchedavāda*. This theory known as the delimitation-theory explains the nature of the jīva on the analogy of the all-pervasive ether defined or conditioned by pot. Just as ether which is one and all-pervasive is conditioned by objects such as pot, and the like, in the same way, consciousness which is all-pervasive is conditioned or delimited by avidyā. The consciousness as defined by avidyā is the jīva and consciousness that transcends avidyā is Īśvara.⁶ This way of explaining the nature of the jīva as Brahman that is delimited has the sanction of the text of the *Brahmabindu Upaniṣad*—

“घटसंवृतमाकाशं नीयमाने घटे यथा
घटो नीयेत नाकाशं तद्वज्जीवो नभोपमः”⁷

This text means: just as when a pot is moved it is only the pot that is moved and not the ether enclosed in the pot, so too is the analogy of the soul with the ether. This text compares the soul to the pot-defined ether.

We have said that the theory of the *avacchedavāda* proceeds on the basis of the criticism of the theory of the *pratibimbavāda* that there could not be the reflection of consciousness in avidyā, as neither consciousness nor avidyā has

any material shape. But the followers of the *Vivaraṇa* school argue that there is reflection of sound in the form of echo in the ether conditioned by the cave. Neither the sound which is reflected, nor the ether conditioned by the cave that reflects the sound has any material shape whatsoever;⁸ yet there is reflection. In the same way, consciousness could be reflected in *avidyā* although both are devoid of any material shape.

The matter that is of importance here is that the Upaniṣads favour both the reflection-theory and the delimitation-theory. That is why Śaṅkara in his commentaries on the Upaniṣads, the *Vedānta-sūtra* and on the *Bhagavad-Gītā* uses the analogy of reflection and of the pot-conditioned ether to explain the nature of the soul.⁹ From the above it follows that according to Advaita, consciousness when reflected in *avidyā* attains to the state of the *jīva*. *Avidyā* undergoes modification into the form of psycho-physical organism. The psychical organism consists of five senses of knowledge, five senses of action, five-fold vital-air and the internal organ in its two fold aspect of mind and intellect.¹⁰ This is known as *liṅga-śarīra* or the subtle body. The physical organism which is the physical body is known as *sthūla-śarīra* or the gross body. *Avidyā* which is the cause of these two is known as *kāraṇa-śarīra* or the causal body.

The *jīva* in the state of waking is associated with *avidyā*, the gross body and the subtle body. In the state of dream, it functions by being associated with the mind alone. In these two states, it distinctly manifests as 'I' or '*aham*'. In the state

of deep sleep where mind too provisionally merges in avidyā, the jīva is not distinctly manifested as 'I' or '*aham*'. From this one is led to conclude that the mind which is the predominant factor in the subtle body is responsible for the distinct manifestation of the jīva as 'I' or '*aham*'. The *aham-padārtha*, therefore, according to the Advaitin, is a blend of consciousness on the one hand and avidyā and the mind on the other. Since avidyā is the cause of the mind and is responsible for the relation of the mind to consciousness, it is usually said that the *aham-padārtha* is a blend of consciousness and mind.¹¹

So far we have set forth the view of the Advaitin that the jīva which is the content of the 'I' -cognition or the *aham-padārtha* is only a blend of consciousness and the mind. Vyāsatīrtha is of the view that the *aham-padārtha* is the jīva as such, and the mind does not form a constituent of it. He raises several objections against the Advaitin's view and Madhusūdana Sarasvatī answers these objections. We shall deal with these now.

Vyāsatīrtha argues that the *aham-padārtha* is considered to be a blend of consciousness and mind by the Advaitin on the following ground: one does not have the cognition, 'I' in the state of deep sleep. This shows that the *aham-padārtha* is not manifested therein. And the non-manifestation of the *aham-padārtha* in the state of deep sleep could be explained only by admitting that *aham-padārtha* consists of two factors — the mind and consciousness. Since the mind provisionally

merges in avidyā in the state of deep sleep one has only the experience of the consciousness-element identical with the bliss-element along with avidyā and not the experience of the *aham-padārtha*. The *aham-padārtha*, that is, the jīva is, therefore, a blend of consciousness and mind.

This view of the Advaitin is wrong on the following ground: one who comes back to the waking state from that of deep sleep has the recollection of the form 'I slept happily and I did not know anything when I was asleep'. Here the experience and the corresponding expression 'I' stand for the jīva. It too is the object of recollection. Since there could not be recollection of an object that is not experienced earlier, and since there is the recollection of 'I' or the *aham-padārtha* at the state of waking, it must be held that the *aham-padārtha* also is experienced at the state of deep sleep. Otherwise one cannot explain the fact of the *aham-padārtha* being recollected at the moment when one comes back to the waking state from that of deep sleep.¹²

Madhusūdana Sarasvatī refutes the objection of Vyāsātīrtha thus: the Advaitin and the Dvaitin accept that the *aham-padārtha* is experienced only as associated with qualities like desire, etc. In the state of deep sleep, however, desire, etc., are not present. So there is no possibility of the experience of the *aham-padārtha* in the state of deep sleep.¹³

It might be contended that the Dvaitin does not subscribe to the view that the *aham-padārtha* is always experienced as associated with qualities like desire, etc. So

there is nothing wrong in the experience of *aham-padārtha* as divested of its relation to qualities like desire, etc., in the state of deep sleep.¹⁴

Madhusūdana Sarasvatī points out that the experience or the perceptual cognition of an entity which is possessed of qualities is invariably based upon the perceptual cognition of qualities. If this position is not admitted, then a pot may become the object of perceptual cognition even when it is devoid of qualities like colour, etc. From this it is known that in order that an entity having qualities may be perceptually known, what is necessary is the perceptual knowledge of the qualities. Here the *aham-padārtha* is associated with the qualities like desire, etc. And in the state of deep sleep the latter are not present. Hence there is no possibility of the manifestation of the *aham-padārtha* in the state of deep sleep.¹⁵

It might be argued that one cannot raise the objection that pot will become the object of perceptual cognition even when it is devoid of qualities, if the rule that an entity having qualities could be comprehended only along with those qualities is not accepted. It is because if pot is devoid of qualities, then it is non-existent. It is the non-existence of pot, and not the non-manifestation of the qualities of pot that accounts for the non-manifestation of pot.¹⁶

Madhusūdana Sarasvatī rejects this contention by stating that it is wrong to argue that pot must be viewed as non-existent, if it is devoid of qualities. It is because pot is admitted to be existent at the first moment of its origination

without any quality whatsoever. It is also admitted to be existent without any quality at the moment in between the moment of the destruction of its earlier colour and the moment of the origination of a subsequent colour. Hence there cannot be the perceptual cognition of pot if it is devoid of qualities. In the same way, there could not be the cognition of *aham-padārtha* in the state of deep sleep wherein desire, etc., which are the qualities of *aham-padārtha* do not exist. It must, therefore, be accepted that what is experienced in the state of deep sleep is consciousness free from any quality. The *aham-padārtha* is not at all experienced then. Hence it must be held that *aham-padārtha* is different from consciousness which is experienced as the substratum of avidyā in the state of deep sleep.¹⁷

Vyāsātīrtha raises two objections in regard to the view of the Advaitin that the *aham-padārtha* is not experienced in the state of deep sleep. The first objection is: if the *aham-padārtha* is not experienced in the state of deep sleep, and if consciousness alone is experienced then, then there would arise recollection of the form 'The consciousness slept'. The second objection is: if the *aham-padārtha* is not experienced in the state of deep sleep, then one cannot account for the rise of the recollection 'I slept' which involves reference to the *aham-padārtha*.¹⁸

Madhusūdana Sarasvatī answers these two objections by stating that the Advaitin does not admit the state of recollection in so far as the element of *aham-padārtha* is concerned.

For, in the state of deep sleep there is the experience of the bliss-element identical with the consciousness-element, of deep sleep and of avidyā. This experience is only the mode of avidyā—the mode which is inspired by the recollection of consciousness in it. The consciousness-element is real and the mode of avidyā is non-real. There is the destruction of the mode of avidyā inspired by the reflection of consciousness in it at the moment when one comes back to the waking state. It leaves latent impression which leads to recollection of the bliss-element identical with the consciousness-element, the state of deep sleep and avidyā. The consciousness-element which is recollected is conditioned by the mind at the time of waking state resulting in the cognition 'I'. Hence the cognition of the form 'I slept happily' is of the nature of recollection in respect of the bliss-element identical with the consciousness-element, the state of deep sleep and avidyā. There is recollection in respect of the consciousness-element and experience in respect of mind-element.¹⁹ Since consciousness-element is related to the mind at the time of the waking state, there is no possibility of recollection of the form 'The consciousness slept'.²⁰

Vyāsatīrtha raises another objection in regard to the view that the *aham-padārtha* is not experienced in the state of deep sleep. If the *aham-padārtha* is not experienced in the state of deep sleep, and as a result if it is not recollected, then there is the unwelcome position of the rise of the doubt of the form 'The one who has slept so far is myself or somebody

else', and there is no possibility of the ascertainment of the form 'I alone slept'.²¹

Madhusūdana Sarasvatī points out that, as set forth earlier, consciousness which is experienced in the state of deep sleep becomes associated with the mind which is its revealing medium. The nature of a revealing medium is to reveal an object as if it is present in itself. A mirror, for example, reveals the face on one's shoulders, and while doing so it reveals it as if it is present in itself. Cow which is a particular (vyakti) reveals the universal—cowness and while doing so it reveals it as if it is present in itself. In the same way, the mind when it reveals the consciousness reveals it as if it is present in itself. And the blend of consciousness and the mind is the *aham-padārtha*. Since consciousness experienced at the state of deep sleep attains to the state of the *aham-padārtha* when associated with the mind at the beginning of the waking state, there could only be the cognition of the form 'I slept' and there is no possibility of the rise of the doubt in the form 'one who slept was myself or somebody else'.²²

Vyāsatīrtha suggests that the cognitions 'So long I have been seeing the dream' and 'So long I have been awake' are causes of recollection. And the 'I' -element or the *aham-padārtha* too is an object of recollection. In the same way, the cognition 'I slept happily' which is a recollection must have the 'I' or the *aham-padārtha* too as its object. Since the *aham-padārth* is thus an object of recollection, it must have been experienced in the state of deep sleep. The *aham-padārtha*,

therefore, is the *jīva* as such and it does not involve any reference to the mind.²³

Madhusūdana Sarasvatī points out that in the case of the cognition 'So long I have been seeing the dream' which one has after coming back to the waking state from the state of dream, the *aham-padārtha* itself was experienced in the state of dream. And it is recollected at the time of the waking state. In regard to the cognition of the form 'So long I have been awake' too which is a case of recollection in the waking state itself, the *aham-padārtha* or 'I' as such is recollected. But in regard to the cognition 'I slept happily' which one has after coming back to the waking state from that of deep sleep and which is a case of recollection one cannot say that 'I' or *aham-padārtha* also is the object of recollection. It is because in order that it may be recollected it must have been experienced in the state of deep sleep. We have earlier pointed out that *aham-padārtha* is not manifest in the state of deep sleep and as such it cannot be the object of recollection too. Yet it is involved in the recollection of the form 'I slept happily'. And this could be explained only by admitting that consciousness which is experienced in the state of deep sleep is recollected at the time of waking state wherein the mind becomes associated with it, resulting in the blend of consciousness and mind which is the *aham-padārtha*. Hence there is only recollection in so far as the consciousness-element of the *aham-padārtha* is concerned. In the case of the inert-element of mind which is an object of experience and which

has formed a blend with pure consciousness that has resulted in the *aham-padārtha* there is only the false notion that the latter too is the object of recollection.²⁴

The Advaitin argues that the *aham-padārtha* is not manifested in the state of deep sleep is confirmed by the *Chāndogya* text —

“नाहं खलु अयमेवं संप्रति आत्मानं जानाति अयमहमस्मिति”²⁵

according to which one cognizes neither himself as ‘I am’ nor the other being in the deep sleep state.

Vyāsatīrtha points out that the above text is identical in content with the text of the *Māṇḍūkya-kārikā*—

“नात्मानां न परांश्चैव न सत्यं नापि चानृतम्
प्राज्ञाः किञ्चन संवेत्ति तुरीयः सर्वदृक् सदा”²⁶

This text does not speak of the absence of the experience of the *aham-padārtha* as such. It refers only to the absence of the experience of the *aham-padārtha* as distinct from the other objects. In the same way, the *Chāndogya* text cited above does not speak of the absence of the experience of the *aham-padārtha* as distinct from other objects. There is, however, the manifestation of the *aham-padārtha* in the state of deep sleep.²⁷

Madhusūdana Sarasvatī rejects the above contention by stating that if the *Chāndogya* text cited above is interpreted to mean that in the state of deep sleep, there is only the absence of the experience of the *aham-padārtha* as distinct from other objects, and there is the experience of the *aham-*

padārtha as such, then it will be in direct conflict with the import of the other text of the same Upaniṣad, viz.,

“एवमेव इमाः प्रजाः अहरहर्गच्छन्त्यः एतं ब्रह्मलोकं न विदन्ति,
अनृतेन हि प्रत्यूढाः”²⁸

This text states that in the state of deep sleep the *jīva* or the *aham-padārtha* as such becomes one with Brahman, but it does not realize this fact owing to the veil of *avidyā*. This text thus denies the experience of *aham-padārtha* in the state of deep sleep.²⁹

Vyāsatīrtha further states that it is only the *aham-padārtha* that recollects at the waking state the state of deep sleep and the consciousness-element identical with the bliss-aspect of it. Hence it is but proper to hold that the latter is the experient in the state of deep sleep. The causal relation among recollection, latent impression and experience would hold good only when they are related to one and the same substratum. It comes to this that the *aham-padārtha* who recollects at the waking state the deep sleep state, etc., must be admitted to be the experient of the deep sleep state, etc. This means that there is manifestation of the *aham-padārtha* in the state of deep sleep.³⁰

Madhusūdana Sarasvatī answers the above objection by stating that the consciousness conditioned by *avidyā* is the experient of the deep sleep, etc., and the consciousness conditioned by *avidyā* and mind is the one who recollects at the time of waking.³¹

Vyāsatīrtha anticipates the above answer and argues that since the limiting conditions of consciousness, namely, avidyā and mind are distinct, what is conditioned by the former must be different from the one that is conditioned by the latter. As such the substratum of recollection, namely, the *aham-padārtha* which is consciousness conditioned by avidyā and mind must be different from the substratum of experience which is consciousness conditioned by avidyā alone. The rule that there could be causal relation among recollection, latent to one and the same substratum thus stands contradicted.³²

Madhusūdana Sarasvatī states that when two limiting conditions are located in one and the same place, the factor that is conditioned by the two is one and the same. For example, a room and a pot are the limiting conditions of space. If the pot is placed inside the room, the space conditioned by the two is one and the same. In the same way, here what is conditioned by avidyā is further conditioned by mind. Avidyā is located in the pure consciousness associated with avidyā. Thus avidyā and mind — the two limiting conditions of consciousness are located in one and the same consciousness. In the state of deep sleep, mind remains in a latent form in avidyā and so the consciousness conditioned by avidyā alone is the experient. In the state of waking, mind remains in its gross form and the consciousness conditioned by avidyā is further conditioned by mind; and, it is the *aham-padārtha* and is the one who recollects. Thus since there is no difference between the consciousness conditioned by avidyā — the

experient and the consciousness conditioned by avidyā and mind — the one which recollects, there is no contradiction to the rule that recollection, latent impression and experience in order to have causal relation among themselves must be related to one and the same substratum.³³

Vyāsatīrtha again argues that the *Chāndogya* text—

“गृहीतं चक्षुः गृहीतं श्रोत्रं गृहीतं मनः”³⁴

referring to the state of deep sleep states that senses of sight and hearing and mind—these alone are reduced to their latent forms. This text does not state that the *aham-padārtha* is not manifest then.³⁵

Madhusūdana Sarasvatī points out that the *aham-padārtha* is only a blend of mind and pure consciousness. And, when mind provisionally merges in avidyā, it goes without saying that the *aham-padārtha* as such ceases to manifest.³⁶

Vyāsatīrtha further argues that the contention of the Advaitin that since the *aham-padārtha* is the content of ‘I’ -cognition like body, etc., it is not the essential nature of the soul and so it is not-Self or *anātman* is wrong. It is because the consciousness-element too involved in the *aham-padārtha* comes within the range of the ‘I’ -cognition and so it must also to be treated as *anātman* which, however, is not the case.³⁷

Madhusūdana Sarasvatī states that the essential nature of the jīva which is consciousness never becomes the content of the ‘I’ -cognition. What becomes the content of the ‘I’ -

cognition is the blend of mind and the pure consciousness and this blend is definitely *anātman* or the not-Self.³⁸

Vyāsatīrtha further raises objections in regard to the contention that the *aham-padārtha* is not the true nature of the soul and it is not-Self or *anātman*. The objections are as follows:

- i. in the first place, the experience 'I am fair-complexioned' shows that the *aham-padārtha* or 'I' is the substratum of the erroneous cognition of fair-complexion which is not-Self. And the fact of *aham-padārtha* being the substratum of the erroneous cognition of not-Self would hold good only when the *aham-padārtha* is the self of Ātman for, according to Advaita only Ātman - the pure consciousness could serve as the substratum of erroneous cognition and not *anātman*;
- ii. in the second place, the experience of unbounded love toward the *aham-padārtha* of the form 'Let me exist always' shows that the *aham-padārtha* is the jīva as such and is not *anātman* as there could not be unbounded love toward the not-Self; and,
- iii. in the third place, the absence of any doubt or contrary notion in regard to the existence of *aham-padārtha* shows that the latter is self-luminous. And, that which is self-luminous should invariably be Ātman.

It comes to this: the contention of the Advaitin that the *aham-padārtha* is not-Self is wrong.³⁹

Madhusūdana Sarasvatī answers the above objections thus:

- i. the first objection is not sound. It is because the feature that is present in a delimited entity will be figuratively referred to as being present in the delimiting adjunct. For example, the illusory silver is present in the consciousness delimited by the this-element of the shell. The latter is the delimiting adjunct. And, the silver is figuratively spoken of as present in the this-element of shell. In the same way, the feature - fair-complexion is present in the body related to the consciousness conditioned by mind. And it is figuratively spoken of as being present in the delimiting adjunct—mind which, being inspired by the reflection of consciousness in it, is the *aham-padārtha*,⁴⁰
- ii. the second objection raised by Vyāsatīrtha too is not valid. The *aham-padārtha* is viewed to be the abode of unbounded love on the ground that it is falsely identified with the consciousness-element which is bliss by nature;⁴¹ and,
- iii. the third objection too raised by Vyāsatīrtha is not sound on the ground that the absence of doubt or contrary notion in regard to the *aham-padārtha* is due to its identification with the pure consciousness.⁴²

To sum up: The jīva is only a blend of pure consciousness and the mind.

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THE ĀTMAVIDYĀ - VILĀSA

[A Spiritual Autobiography of
Sadāśiva-Brahmendra-Sarasvatī]

TEXT WITH TRANSLATION*

C.MURUGAN*

[23]

अगृहीताघकलङ्कः प्रशमितसङ्कल्पविभ्रमः प्राज्ञः ।

न्यकृतकार्यकलापः तिष्ठति आपूर्णसीमनि कापि ॥

The one who has realized the Self, who is not sullied by sin, who is free from bafflement and mental confusion, who has discarded the group of action (sacred or secular) as of no value remains steadfast in the seamless whole.

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*Continued from the previous issue.

[24]

चपलं मनःकुरङ्गं चारु गृहीत्वा विमर्शवागुरया ।
निगमारण्यविहारश्रान्तः शेते स्वधाम्नि कोऽप्येकः ॥

Having brought under control the mind which is as restless as a deer by capturing it in the net of profound reflection, and having become tired of wanderings in the woods, viz. the *Upaniṣads*, some one reposes in his own Self.

Notes:

Vimarśa or *vicāra* is one of the means to make the mind free from relation to external objects. It is of the form that the Self is the only reality and everything else is superimposed upon it, and hence unreal. Madhusūdana Sarasvatī observes that the followers of the *Upaniṣads* pursue this means; and the followers of the yoga school adopt the other means, viz. practice of *samprajñāta-samādhi*. *Gūḍārtha-dīpikā*, 6,29.

[25]

दारुणचित्तव्याघ्रं धीरमनः खड्गधारया हत्वा ।
अभयारण्ये कोऽपि स्वैरविहारी जयत्येकः ॥

Having felled the mind which undergoes modification in the form of external objects and which is like a fierce tiger, with the finely tempered sword blade, that is, the mind which is rid of any modification, the incomparable one wanders at will in the forest of fearlessness (i.e. the Self which is free from the characteristics of being an agent, an experient, and a knower).

[26]

सज्जनहृदयसरोजोन्मीलनकरधीकरप्रसरः ।

एकः यतिवरपूषा निर्दोषः चरति चिद्रगने ॥

The peerless and flawless ascetic, traversing unimpeded the sky of the form of consciousness all alone like the sun, sends forth rays in the form of the knowledge of the Self which causes the lotus-like hearts of those who pursue the path to perfection.

[27]

कुवलयविकासकारणमज्ञानध्वान्तकौमुदीप्रज्ञः ।

शुद्धो मुनीन्द्रचन्द्रः सुरसेव्ये लसति विष्णुपदे ॥

The distinguished sage is like the moon. He is free from everything that is foreign to his true nature; and, he is the cause of delight to the entire world. The Self-realization which he has attained dispels, like the moonlight, the darkness of avidyā. He shines with marvellous radiance as the Self—the essential nature of Lord Viṣṇu — which is adored by the Gods.

[28]

स्वानन्दामृतसेकैः आन्तरसन्तापसन्ततिं शमयन् ।

चित्रम्, अचञ्चलवृत्तिः चिद्बोम्नि भाति योगिवर्यघनः ॥

The great sage shines like an unmoving cloud in the ethereal region of consciousness, sprinkling the nectar-like bliss—his true nature on his fellow-beings, thereby quenching the series of their mental afflictions. This indeed excites astonishment (by its greatness and perfection).

[29]

सुमनः सौरभमञ्जुल-संचारनिवारिताखिलश्रान्तिः ।
संयमिचारुसमीरः विहरति आनन्दसंविदाराभे ॥

The ascetic, like the fair breeze, gracefully roams in the pleasure-garden, i.e. the Self which is consciousness and bliss by carrying along with him the sweet fragrance of flowers; and thereby he removes the weariness of his fellow-beings — the weariness caused by their undergoing the series of cycle of births and deaths.

Notes:

¹ It is said in the *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad* (2.13) that strange fragrance will spread all around from a realized soul.

[30]

निःश्रेयस सरसफले निर्मलविज्ञानपल्लवमनोज्ञे ।
वीतभये विपिनतले यतिशितिकण्ठो विभाति कोऽप्येकः ॥

The matchless ascetic shines brightly all alone like a peacock in the woodland, i.e. the Self which is free from fear (in the form of transmigratory existence), is lovely with the tender leaves of the form of knowledge which is free from everything that would obscure its essence, and which is the fruit with fullness of flavour and ripe juiciness, i.e. liberation.

[31]

निःसाररभुवनमरुतलम् उत्सार्यानन्दसाररसपूर्णं ।
वरसरसि चिन्मयेऽस्मिन् परहंसः कोऽपि दीव्यति स्वैरम् ॥

The transcendent swan, viz. the ascetic, abandoning the world with the deep conviction that it is a desert having no intrinsic value, sports at will in the surpassing reservoir, viz. the Self which is brimming with water in the form of bliss and consciousness.

[32]

निखिलागमपल्लविते निगमशिरस्तन्त्रशीतलोद्याने ।

मधुरतरमञ्जुवाचः कूजन्नास्ते यतीन्द्रकलकण्ठः ॥

In the tranquil garden, viz. the Self which is the import of the Upaniṣads and which is spread over by all the Vedas, the supreme ascetic, like a cuckoo, recounts his mystic experiences in soft sweet words.

[33]

दारितमोहमदेभः दूरीकृतसकलदुरितशार्दूलः ।

त्रिबुधोत्तमसिंहवरः विहरत्यानन्दविततकान्तारे ॥

This peerless lion, viz. the ascetic who is eminently wise is sporting in the expansive forest of bliss, viz. the Self, after having torn asunder the wild elephant, i.e. avidyā and driven away the tigers of the form of demerits.

[34]

अज्ञानमृगवरोज्झितविज्ञानोत्तुङ्गशृङ्गशिखरितले ।

मतिसलिलशीतलाङ्गः यतिमदकलभः विराजते विहरन् ॥

This wild young elephant, viz. the ascetic shines by sporting in the high regions of the lofty peak of supreme knowl-

edge which is beyond the reach of the lion, i.e. ignorance with his body permeated by the waters in the form of profound meditation upon the Self.

[35]

नासाञ्चलनिहिताक्षः नामादिभ्यः निवर्तितस्वान्तः ।
तटनीतटेषु तत्त्वं ध्यायन्नास्ते यतिः कोऽपि ॥

The illustrious ascetic — is meditating on the truth of Vedānta on the banks of a river, with his eyes fixed on the tip of his nose and with his mind completely withdrawn from things which consist of names and forms and which are apparent to the senses.

[36]

आशावसानो मौनी नैराश्यालङ्कृतः शान्तः ।
करतलभिक्षापात्रः तरुतलनिलयो मुनिर्जयति ॥

Without any appropriate covering or clothing over his body, having his palms as alms-dish, centering his mind upon the Self, and embellished by absolute detachment from material things, the sage shines supreme by residing under a tree without any mental agitation or excitement.

[37]

विजननदीकुञ्जगृहे मञ्जुलपुलिनैकमञ्जुतरतल्पे ।
शेते कोऽपि यतीन्द्रः समरससुखबोधवस्तुनिस्तन्द्रः ॥

The ineffable sage, the prince among ascetics who has realized his identity with his true nature which is immutable consciousness and bliss, and who is, therefore, freed from

any affliction that pertains to transmigratory existence, reposes on the lovely bed of smooth sands under a leafy bower on a river-bank free from any passer-by.

[38]

भूतलमृदुतरशय्यः शीतलवातैकचामरः शान्तः ।
राकाहिमकरदीपः राजति यतिराजशेखरः कोऽपि ॥

The ineffable ascetic sovereign shines with outstanding brilliance by resting serenely on the soft bed of bare ground, with cool breeze as his *cāmara* and with the full moon as the lamp.

[39]

विपुलशिलातलफलके विमलसरिद्धापरिवृतोदारे ।
मन्दं मलयपवने वाति प्रस्विपति कोऽपि यतिराजः ॥

The foremost among the ascetics sleeps soundly on a broad slab of rock which is lovely as it is surrounded by pellucid waters of a stream, while the southern breeze blows gently.

[40]

आन्तरमेकं किञ्चित् सन्ततमनुसन्दधन् महातौनी ।
करपुटभिक्षामश्नन् अटति हि वीथ्यां जडाकृतिः कोऽपि ॥

Ever meditating upon the ineffable one (i.e. the Self) which is immanent in his heart, highly reserved in speech, and taking the food by receiving it in his palms, some one is roaming through the streets in an artless fashion (i.e. with indifference to or unawareness of the impressions he is producing on others).

[To be continued]

THEORIES OF CAUSATION

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An analysis of the nature of the world given in perception during the waking state has led the Advaitin to conclude that the objects of the world are mere appearances and they have no substance in them. Pot, for example, which may be taken as standing for the entire world, is noticed in ordinary experience to be the effect of a lump of clay. When subject to investigation whether it exists in its cause prior to its production or not, or whether it is different from its cause or identical with it, one does not have any irrefutable argument so convincing as to compel certitude regarding its precise nature.

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To begin with, the Nyāya school argues that the effect, the pot cannot be considered to be present in the cause, the clay prior to its coming into existence. If it were present, then the causal operation of the efficient cause (*nimittakāraṇa*), the potter would not be needed. Not only this. There would be the contingency of the manifestation of the pot in the clay even prior to the causal operation of the potter. It follows that the pot prior to coming into existence from the clay does not exist therein. In other words, there is the antecedent non-existence (*prāgabhāva*) of the pot in its cause – the clay prior to its production. By the causal operation of the potter, it comes into existence over and above the clay. It is a *de novo* creation. This theory is known as *asat-kārya-vāda* or *ārambhavāda*.

The Sāṅkhya school is of the view that the effect, pot must be admitted to be existing in its cause, the clay even prior to its production on the following grounds:

(i) if there is the non-existence of pot prior to its production, then it is similar to a square circle (*asat*) and there is no possibility of its being produced at any point of time;

(ii) in the experience 'The pot is originated' (*ghaṭaḥ utpadyate*), the meaning of the verbal root is the function known as origination. And, it must have a substratum which is technically termed *kartā* [*dhātvarthavyāpāraśrayaḥ kartā*]. If the pot were not existent prior to the moment of the origination,

then it cannot be viewed as the substratum of origination; and, so the experience 'The pot is originated' would be contradicted. Further at the moment of its origination, the pot cannot have any relation to its cause. For, relation is always possible between two entities that are already existing. If not, even the square circle could be viewed to have relation to some cause; and,

(iii) if the effect — pot is non-existent in its cause prior to its production, then it means that it comes into existence from prior non-existence. In that case the non-existence of pot is present in every other factor besides clay and so there is every possibility of the origination of the pot from any other source. But it is not so.

On these grounds the Sāṅkhya school argues that the view that the effect is not present in its cause prior to its production must be given up and it must be held that it exists in its cause prior to its production. If this position is held, the Sāṅkhya school points out, the difficulties outlined above would be avoided. This view that the effect exists in its cause prior to its origination is known as *sat-kārya-vāda* or *pariṇāma-vāda*.

The Nyāya school at this stage points out one difficulty with regard to the view of the Sāṅkhya that the effect exists in its cause prior to its production. If the effect pre-exists in its cause, then as it is already existent, there is no need for causal operation of the potter to bring it into existence. The Sāṅkhya school would reply that the effect exists in a latent

form in the cause and the causal operation is necessary to bring it into a gross form. Origination means only the manifestation of what is latent into a gross form.

The Nyāya school would argue that manifestation of what is latent into a gross form consists in adding certain essential elements and in removing certain non-essential elements. Since according to the basic position of the Sāṅkhya everything is existent, the essential elements as well as the non-essential ones are existent and so they can neither be added nor be removed. Hence the causal operation becomes futile even according to the view that the effect pre-exists in its cause. Thus the concept of manifestation by which is meant origination is a *pseudo* one.

Gauḍapāda while reviewing the points of the Sāṅkhya and the Nyāya school in regard to the theory of origination states that the arguments put forward by each of the two schools against the other seem to be quite convincing. The rejection of each of the two views by the other leads us to conclude that there can be no real origination of any object whatsoever.¹

The Nyāya school which holds that the effect is a *de novo* creation maintains that the cause and the effect are totally distinct and not identical with each other. If the effect, the pot were viewed as identical with the cause, the clay, then the causal relation which involves the difference between the cause and the effect in the form 'This one is the cause', and 'This one is the effect' cannot be maintained. This is as it should be;

for, one and the same thing cannot be maintained as the cause and the effect at the same time. Further if the cause and the effect are identical, then there would arise the unwelcome position of the absence of any difference in so far as their adaptability to practical needs of life is concerned. The pot is effective as the means to bring water while the clay is not so. Nor does the effect have the efficacy of the clay in bringing into existence the pot. Moreover, when the clay is in the lump form it must be perceived as pot if the clay, the cause and the pot, the effect are identical. This, however, is not the case. From this it follows that the pot and the clay — the effect and the cause are not identical with but different from one another.

The Sāṅkhya school argues that the pot is only a specific configuration of the lump of clay and as such there is no difference between the clay, the cause and the pot, the effect. This is analogous to the cloth which is not different from its cause, the threads that are conjoined in a specific manner. Further, the causal relation that a particular factor is the cause and another, the effect can be had even if we admit the identity between the two. The one which has the effect in its latent form is the cause and the same in a gross form with a specific configuration is the effect. In the same way, the difference in the practical efficiency noticed in the case of the cause and of the effect can be maintained even when the two are identical. The clay in its lump form is suited for some specific purpose

while the same clay in its form as pot is adapted to a different need. Thus the effect being present in the cause prior to its production is identical with the cause.

We are now faced with two alternatives: the Sāṅkhya school holds that the cause and the effect are identical, while the Nyāya school maintains that they are different. Both the views are wrong. We have the experience and the corresponding expression of the form *mṛdghaṭaḥ* (the clay-pot). The two words, *mṛd* and *ghaṭaḥ* have the same case-ending and are juxtaposed to each other. The relation between the two words is known as *sāmānādhikarāṇya*. This cannot be had if the meanings of the two words- *mṛd* and *ghaṭaḥ* are different. Never do we have such a relation between the words *aśvaḥ* and *paṭaḥ* in the form *aśvaḥ paṭaḥ*, as the meanings of the two words are different from one another. In the same way, we do not have such a relation between the two words *gauḥ* and *gauḥ* in the form *gauḥ gauḥ* as the meanings of the two words are one and the same. It emerges from the two words are one and the same. It emerges from this that the *sāmānādhikarāṇya* relation between two words cannot be had if the meanings of the words are identical with one another or different from one another. We do now have such a relation between the two words *mṛd* and *ghaṭaḥ* in the expression *mṛdghaṭaḥ*. As explained above, the meanings of the two words can neither be identical with nor different from one another. The Advaitin, therefore, concludes that there is no actual or real difference or identity between the cause, the

clay and the effect, the pot. It must, therefore, be held that the pot is only an appearance of the consciousness, that is, Brahman conditioned by *mṛd* through *avidyā*. There is a superimposed identity between the consciousness-element conditioned by the *mṛt* and the pot. This identity involves an amount of difference also. But both identity and difference are not real. The pot too is not real.

It is with the above in view Vidyāraṇya in his *Pañcadaśī* states:

स घटो न मृदो भिन्नः वियोगे सति अनीक्षणात् ।
नाप्यभिन्नः पुरा पिण्डदशायां अनवेक्षणात् ॥

This verse means: 'When examined on the basis of reasoning pot is not identified to be different from clay. Nor is it identical with clay, as when the latter is in a lump form the shape of pot is not noticed therein'.

From the above it emerges that the effect, pot cannot be considered to be existent or non-existent in its cause- the clay prior to its production. Nor could it be identified as either identical with or different from its cause. The natural corollary of this view is that the effect, pot is a false appearance; it has a semblance of reality. The causal element, the clay exists prior to the origination of the effect, at the time of the existence of the effect and after the destruction of the effect and so it is real.

When it is said that the clay is real it must be noted that it is referred to be so only in relation to its effect, the pot. It is not absolutely real; that is, it is not unsublatable in the

three divisions of time—past, present and future. It is because the absolute reality of every object apart from Brahman is negated by the *śruti* text-

अतोऽन्यत् आर्तम्³

The unsublatability at all time in respect of Brahman is accepted as the latter is free from sublation. It is with this in view the *śruti* text gives the reality of the clay -the cause and the non-reality of the pot-the effect as illustrative examples of the reality of Brahman- the cause and the non-reality of the world-the effect respectively.

So it has been said in the *Pañcadaśī*.

एवं मायामयत्वेन विकारस्यानृतात्मताम् ।
विकाराधारमृद्भस्तु सत्यत्वं च अभ्रवीत् श्रुतिः⁴ ॥

This text means: 'The *śruti* text (by way example) refers to the effect which is the projection of avidyā as non-real and to the cause, the clay which is the substratum of the effect as real'. When compared with Brahman, the ultimate cause, the clay is an effect and is, therefore, non-real.

The *śruti* text referred to here is:

वाचारम्भणं विकारो नामधेयं मृत्तिकेत्येव सत्यम्⁵ ॥

This text may be explained as follows: the word *vikāra* in the text stands for the objects such as pot, dish, etc. These merely come within the range of verbal usages such as 'The pot exists', 'The dish exists' and the like (*vācārambhaṇam*). The question arises as to how are we to account for the verbal usage of the form 'Pot, etc., have come into existence from clay' which involves reference to the causal relation to pot, etc., and the

clay. The *śruti* text answers it by stating that it is *nāmadheya* which means that it pertains to words only and it is devoid of any intrinsic nature. It may be asked as to what then is real? The *śruti* states that the causal entity in form of clay alone (*eva*) which persists in the effects, the pot, the dish and the like is real. The particle *eva* which means 'alone' emphasizes the fact that the causal element alone is real and it excludes the effects from the purview of real entities.

That Brahman is the cause of the world is known from the *śruti* text-

‘यतो वा इमानि भूतानि जायन्ते, येन जातानि जीवन्ति,
यत्प्रयन्त्यभिसंविशन्ति, तद्विजिज्ञासस्व, तद्ब्रह्मेति’ ।⁶

This text means: ‘That from which these beings arise, That from which these derive their existence and manifestation and That into which they lapse back at the dissolution, seek to know That; That is Brahman’. This text thus conveys that Brahman is the cause of the world.

Other texts of the Upaniṣads such as-

i) विज्ञानम् आनन्दं ब्रह्म,⁷

ii) निष्कलं निष्क्रियं शान्तम्,⁸

and the like speak of Brahman as of the nature of consciousness and bliss and also free from parts and activity.

Now the question arises as to how Brahman of this nature could be viewed as the cause of the world, as in ordinary experience we notice that that which is composed of

parts serves as the cause of an effect. In order to resolve this apparent contradiction, the *śruti* text-

ते ध्यानयोगानुगता अपश्यन् देवात्मशक्तिं स्वगुणैः निगूढाम्⁹ ।

states that the sages absorbed in meditation discovered the *creative power* which is present in Brahman, the self-luminous one and which consists of the three strands of the *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* and thus introduces the principle of *māyā* identical with *avidyā*. Another text of the same *Upaniṣad*-

मायां तु प्रकृतिं विद्यात् मायिनं तु महेश्वरम्¹⁰ ।

speaks of *māyā* as the primal cause of the world and maheśvara or Brahman as its substratum.

Now the doubt arises as to whether we should take Brahman as the cause of the world or *māyā-avidyā* to be so as there are *śruti* texts in favour of both the views. This doubt is resolved by introducing the concepts of *pariṇāma* and *vivarta*. *Pariṇāma* signifies diversification of one thing into another; and the thing that undergoes diversification and the effect of such a diversification would belong to the same level of reality. *Vivarta*, on the other hand, is apparent diversification of one thing as another. Here the thing that undergoes apparent diversification and the resultant effect of such a diversification would belong to different levels of reality. When viewed in this light, since *avidyā* and the world are known to be removable by the knowledge of Brahman, they belong to the same level of reality known as empirical reality. And, *avidyā* is admitted to be the transformative material cause (*pariṇāmyupādāna*)

of the world. And, the world is admitted to be the *pariṇāma* of *avidyā*. Brahman, on the other hand, serves as the substratum of *avidyā* whose transformation is the world. It acquires an appearance of the world which is other than its essential nature. Brahman and the world which is other than its essential nature. Brahman and the world, therefore, belong to two different levels of reality – the former being absolute and the latter, empirical. This means that Brahman is unsublatable at all time, while the world is unsublatable till there arises the knowledge of Brahman. Brahman is admitted to be the transfigurative material cause (*vivartopādāna*) of the world. The latter is the *vivarta* of Brahman.

It may be added here that in the case of shell-silver illusion, the silver is the transformation (*pariṇāma*) of the *tūlāvidyā*, a derivative of the primal nescience (*avidyā* or *mūlāvidyā*) located in the consciousness conditioned by the shell. And it is the transfiguration (*vivarta*) of the latter. Absence of sublatability at all time constitutes the essential nature of Brahman. It is, therefore, referred to as absolutely real (*pāramārthika-satya*). The world being the transformation of *avidyā* is unsublatable till there takes place the removal of *avidyā* by the knowledge of Brahman. Hence it is characterised as empirically real (*vyāvahārika-satya*). The silver that appears in a shell is the transformation of *tūlāvidyā* aided by defects such as defective eye-sight, etc. It is, therefore, removed by

the knowledge other than the knowledge of Brahman, namely, the knowledge of the true nature of its substratum, the shell. Accordingly it is said that shell-silver is apparently real (*prātibhāsika-satya*).

We have said that Brahman is the cause of the world, The world 'cause' is a general one and is applicable to both the material and the efficient cause. It is clear from the *Taittirīya* text referred to above which states that Brahman is that into which the world lapses back at the time of dissolution that Brahman is the material cause of the world. It is because an effect when it is destroyed will lapse back into its material cause only. Brahman is the efficient cause of the world too.

The *Chāndogya* text-

तदैक्षत बहुस्यां प्रजायेयेति तत् तेजो असृजत¹¹ ॥

states that Brahman resolves to become many and it created the fire. And the *Taittirīya* text-

तदात्मानं स्वयं अकुरुत¹² ॥

states that Brahman manifested *itself* into the form of the world. From this too it is known that Brahman is the efficient cause of the world.

Efficient causality consists in the possession of knowledge of the objects to be created, desire to act and volition as is favourable to the production of the effect.¹³ All these are only the modes of *avidyā* (*avidyā-vṛtti*) which is present in Brahman and which is inspired by the reflection of Brahman in it. And Brahman which is the substratum of the

above modes of *avidyā* is the efficient cause of the world.¹⁴ It must be noted here that in the case of the *jīva*, knowledge, desire and volition are the modes of the mind (*buddhi-vṛtti*), while in the case of Brahman they are the modes of *avidyā* (*avidyā-vṛtti*).

From the above it emerges that Brahman, the non-dual consciousness is viewed to be the material cause of the world by being the substratum of *avidyā* whose transformation is the world. It is viewed as the efficient cause of the world by being endowed with the modes of *avidyā* in the form of knowledge, etc.

We have said that Brahman is the transfigurative material cause of the world. This means that the world is an appearance of Brahman and is superimposed upon it. Brahman is of the nature of *sat* as is known from the *śruti* text-

सदेव सौम्य इदं अग्रे आसीत्¹⁵ ॥

Since there is a superimposed relation of identity between Brahman, the substratal reality and the world, we have the experience and corresponding expression, 'The pot is real' (*san ghataḥ*), for example. The world does not have any independent reality and manifestation apart from Brahman.

So far it has been said that Brahman is the cause and the world is the effect. It has also been said that there is the relation of the superimposed identity between Brahman and the world. The world is not real and this fact has been explained on the basis of the *śruti* text-

वाचारंभणं विकारो नामधेयम्¹⁶ ॥

earlier. That there is the relation of identity, a superimposed one between Brahman and the world is emphasised by the *śruti* text-

आत्मैव इदं सर्वम्¹⁷ ॥

which conveys that Brahman is the essence of everything in the world, the effect. If the effect, the world were different from its cause, Brahman, then the *śruti* text that speaks of Brahman as the essence of the world would become unintelligible.

That the world thus superimposed upon Brahman is non-real is known from the *śruti* texts such as -

- i) नेह नानास्ति किञ्चन¹⁸
- ii) अथात आदेशो नेति नेति,¹⁹

and the like. The first text which states that in Brahman (*iha*) there is no (*na*) duality (*nānā*) whatsoever (*kiñcana*) specifically negates the existence of the world in Brahman.

The second text is the complement of the text-

द्वे वा व ब्रह्मणो रूपे मूर्तम् च अमूर्तमेव च²⁰ ॥

This text first ascribes two forms to Brahman, corporeal and non-corporeal. Earth, water and fire fall under the first category, while air and space, under the second category. Having thus ascribed the entire world to Brahman, the *śruti* proceeds to state-

अथात आदेशो नेति नेति।

This text refers to the two forms mentioned above and negates them by stating 'not this', not this'. From this it is known that

Brahman is free from the world characterized by duality.

It may be asked as to why the *śruti* text first ascribes the world to Brahman, and negates it therein. It is answered that if the *śruti* text simply negates the existence of the world in Brahman, then there may arise a doubt that it could be present elsewhere. And the presence of the world elsewhere will impair the non-dual nature of Brahman. To obviate this unwelcome position, the *śruti* text first states that the world exists in Brahman only and then negates its existence therein thus precluding the possibility of doubting the presence of the world elsewhere even after its negation in Brahman. Thus it is solely with the view to emphasize the non-dual nature of Brahman, the *śruti* text ascribes the world to Brahman and then negates it therein.²¹ From this it follows that if the world which has Brahman as its material cause were real, then its negation in Brahman would be unintelligible.

To sum up: the theory of causation according to the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* school is known as *asat-kārya-vāda* or *āraṁbha-vāda*; according to the Sāṅkhya school, it is known as *sat-kārya-vāda* or *pariṇāma-vāda*; and according to Advaita, it is known as *vivarta-vāda*.

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INTUITION OF REALITY

S. REVATHY*

The third and the fourth chapter of the sixth section of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* called *Vaiśva Brāhmaṇa* relates to Yājñavalkya, a great sage who decided to renounce all his wealth and pomp of mundane life to retire into solitude. Emperor Janaka of Videha who was greatly renowned for his interest in Vedānta, performed a sacrifice in which he proposed to give one thousand cows decked with gold of five *pāda*-s on each of the horns. Yājñavalkya won this covetable prize set apart for the best knower of Brahman in a contest of debate organized by King Janaka. The sage had two wives Maitreyi and Kātyāyani. Yājñavalkya chose to enter the order of Paramahansa Parivrājakas as he felt that contemplation on the Absolute Reality in solitude was worth more than all

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the wealth and comfort that worldly life could promise. The *Maitreyi Brāhmaṇa* depicts the episode and the dialogue between this great seer and his wife Maitreyi.

The introductory part of the narrative is significant and quite in fitting with the seriousness of the subject-matter discussed in the *Brāhmaṇa*. The sage decides to arrange for a partition of property between his elder wife Maitreyi and her co-heiress Kātyāyani before going to homelessness. But that worthy spouse asked him whether she could hope to become immortal even if the whole earth filled with its wealth came to her lot. Yājñavalkya's answer was in the negative. He assured her of the comfortable life she could enjoy like any other person commanding all the accessories, but cautioned her of the impossibility of immortality through acquisition of wealth. Maitreyi, an aspirant of the highest order expressed her dislike for wealth which cannot bestow her immortality and requested the sage to instruct her that wisdom in which the sage was well-versed. Yājñavalkya was immensely pleased with this reply and said that she has become dearer than ever to him by offering such an agreeably surprising reply and proceeded to explain her the nature of Reality.

If we analyze the purpose of this narrative at the very commencement, it would become clear that there is only one thing worth knowing whose worth is more than all the wealth stored up in this world. Wealth acquired in this world can at best give us a comfortable life and lead us to heaven by virtue of sacrifices performed with the help of wealth. But immortality

could be attained only by knowing the Supreme Reality or intuitively experiencing It. Yājñavalkya is ready to give up his wealth for attaining knowledge of the Reality. Again he emphasizes that it is only by renunciation of the idea of possession that the highest goal of life may be achieved. Maitreyi rightly discards her portion of wealth and prefers the knowledge of the Self. That Yājñavalkya imparts that wisdom to a woman who is not qualified to perform any karma itself is an indication that renunciation and dispassion both qualify a person to look inward and intuitively experience the Self.

At the outset Yājñavalkya very skillfully begins with the topic of conjugal affection which is most familiar to the beings in the world. He deftly leads his wife to an analysis of the notion of the individual self which all human beings instinctively love most of all. The *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* text-

'Verily the husband is dear to the wife not for the sake of the husband, my dear, but it is for her own sake that he is dear. Verily the wife is dear to her husband not for the sake of the wife, my dear, but it is for his own sake that she is dear. Verily sons are dear to parents not for the sake of sons but it is for the sake of parents that they are dear.....
.....When only the Self, my dear, is realized by being heard of , reflected on and meditated upon, all this is known''.

Shows how one's own self is naturally dearer than anything else. It is a matter of common experience that a wife is ready to sacrifice everything else for the sake of her husband whom

she naturally calls her dearest. But yet the sage calls Maitreyi's attention to the fact that the husband is dear to the wife not because she loves him most but only because he happens to be *her* husband and she loves her own self more than even her husband whom she usually styles her 'dearest' The husband in turn calls his wife his most beloved, and this is so only because she happens to be *his* wife; and he loves her only next to himself. The wife of course cannot be dearer to him than himself. Yājñavalkya adds to this list children, wealth, cattle, etc. all of which become dear not for their sake but only for the sake of one's own self. Thus it may be seen that everything one holds dear, counting from the most distantly related down to the nearest kith and kin is dear not for its sake but for one's own sake. From the above account it would become clear that man has totally forgotten and neglected his own self while he is engrossed in the thought of external objects.

Having drawn Maitreyi's attention to the most lovable nature of the self, Yājñavalkya exhorts her to make an earnest effort to realize her own all important self. He says:

*'ātmā vā are draṣṭavyaḥ śrotavyaḥ mantavyaḥ
nididhyāsitavyaḥ maitreyi ātmani khalu are dṛṣṭe śrute
mate vignāte idaṁ sarvaṁ viditam'*² .

The true import of this advice has to be correctly understood for otherwise the subsequent arguments cannot be followed. In the first place what exactly is meant by the statement

“Ātman alone is to be seen (*draṣṭavyaḥ*) And which is that ātman that is exhorted to be seen? Yājñavalkya having declared at the very beginning that the self has to be known in order to attain immortality maintains that by the knowledge of this self the whole objective sphere of knowledge becomes known. This seems to be puzzling. It is because how is it possible to attain immortality by knowing himself? Moreover, how can the knowledge of the knower, the subjective knowing self help one to know all that is objective as well?

In the first place the self as understood by the common man can never lead one to achieve either of the above mentioned results. It is true that the common man has a vague idea of the self. He has the notion that he exists and has something he calls his self, but he has never bestowed any thought of objective phenomena with which he identifies himself from moment to moment except for the temporary state of deep sleep. It is obvious that Yājñavalkya never meant this fancied self when he said that by the knowledge of the self everything else would become known. However, it seems plausible that he might have meant the Vedic transmigratory Self. The individual self could very well be meant here because it is well known in common life that everything else is dearer to us for the sake of one's own self. The statement that everything becomes known by the knowledge of the self may be considered as figurative, since the objective world may be said to be known by the knowledge of their experiences to

whom they are subservient. This view, however, does not hold good because nowhere do we find it stated that by the knowledge of the individual self immortality can be attained. It is not possible to say in the primary sense of the expression that by knowing the individual self everything becomes known. Further it is not proper to take the words in a figurative sense when the primary sense is available. In fact the *śruti* texts and the *smṛti* texts proclaim that immortality could be attained only through the knowledge of the supreme Reality. That the knowledge of the Supreme Reality alone is meant by Yājñavalkya is known from the following *khāṇḍika* of the same Upaniṣad.

The Brāhmaṇa rejects him who knows the brahmana to be different from the self. The Kṣatriya rejects him who knows the Kṣatriya to be different from the self. Worlds reject him who knows the worlds to be different from the self. The gods reject him who knows the gods to be different from the self. The Vedas reject him who knows the Vedas to be different from the self. Beings reject him who knows all to be different from the self. This Brahmaṇa, this Kṣatriya, these worlds, these gods, these Vedas, these beings and this all are only the Self³.

This text of the Upaniṣad clearly states that what is commonly thought to be other than the self is really the self alone. It is this Self whose knowledge according to Yājñavalkya results in the knowledge of the reality underlying everything.

The question that remains to be answered is regarding the possibility of *ātma darśana* (vision of the Self). The word 'ātmā' stands for one's own self. In that case how is it possible for any one to see, hear about, reflect upon and ascertain the true nature of one's own self? Indeed the subjective self cannot be its own object. This doctrine of non-duality of the subject and object seems to be an apparent contradiction that Vedāntins of the other schools say that it is absurd to think Brahman has itself to attain the highest, and therefore maintain that the Upaniṣads do teach some sort of dualism wherein the individual soul has to know Brahman and earnestly meditate upon God who is distinct from the devotee to attain liberation.

The Advaitic preceptors who believe in the perfect identity of the inner self with the supreme self propounded the doctrine of direct vision or *sākṣātkāra* teaching the identity of the inner self with the supreme self. Even prior to Śaṅkara we find this idea echoed in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*. Bhartṛprapañca whose doctrines are frequently criticized seems to favour this doctrine. While explaining the possible meaning of the passage "May fearlessness come to you, O, Yājñavalkya, to you revered one, who have taught us fearlessness"⁴ he poses the question as to how Janaka could pray for the attainment of fearlessness by his teacher, who have already attained it in as much as Yājñavalkya has himself bestowed that on the king. Bhartṛprapañca solves this by the remark "Fearlessness has indeed been attained by Yājñavalkya, it is not unattained, but it has not been directly perceived"⁵.

Śaṅkara in his commentary on the aphorism *Yāvadvikāram tu vibhāgo lokavat*⁶ while answering the objection whether the self being different from space etc, also is not a product like pot etc, gives an account of the nature of the Self. He states that the Self is not an adventitious effect of any cause, it being self-established. On the basis of the texts "The all pervading Self is self-effulgent"⁷ and "By his light all this is lighted variously"⁸, the Self of anyone does not require to be revealed to any one with the help of any other mean. Indeed, means of knowledge such as perception etc, that are admitted to prove the existence of other objects that remain unknown, belong to this very Self. This Self stands there as a postulate even prior to the use of those means. And it is not possible to deny such a Self; for it is an adventitious thing alone that can be repudiated but not so one's own nature. The Self constitutes the very nature of the man who would deny It. It remains unchanged in the three divisions of time past, present and future. Śaṅkara has thus concluded therein that due to the fact that the Self is of the nature of being undeniable it is not a product. The followers of Śaṅkara also maintain the view that it is not enough to know the meaning of the Upaniṣadic text but it is also necessary to have the direct experience of that identity. Padmapāda in his *Pañcapādikā* states:

*avagatiriti sākṣādanubhava ucyate || jñānam tu
parokṣenubhavanārūḍhe'pi sambhavati | sannihite'pyasam
bhāvitāviṣaye anavasitarūpam ityuktam purastāt.*

Here by the word '*avagati*' in the *bhāṣya* is meant direct experience; but mere knowledge is also possible in the case of what is remote and not within the range of direct experience. Even in the case of what is proximate when the object is regarded as improbable, we have already remarked that judgment as inconclusive⁹.

Vācaspati Miśra in his *Bhāmati* writes:

Not mere knowledge alone is desired but that which leads to *avagati* or *sākṣātkāra* (direct vision). That which culminates in *avagati* is the object of the desire denoted by the suffix '*sañ*'. Some preceptors of Advaita are of the view that the knowledge of the self arrived at from the Upaniṣadic texts is only mediate and that it cannot be final until it is raised to the level of what is known as realization¹⁰.

This is the explanation of Śaṅkara's statement.

*avagatiparyantam jñānam sanvācyāyaḥ iccāyāḥ
karma*¹¹

Now how are we to interpret the śruti texts which teach that ātman is to be seen, reflected upon, etc. How can there be a subject-object relation within an entity which has no conceivable parts whatever? We find an answer for this question in Śaṅkara's commentary on the aphorism *Bhedavyapadeśācca*¹². Though the Self ever retains Its true nature of being the Self yet, in the case of ordinary people it is noticed that there is a false identification with the body etc, which are not-self. For the Self who has thus become identified with body and other not selves assertions such as It is unattained and has to be

attained. It is unheard of and has to be heard of and so on. But from the ultimate standpoint a seer or hearer other than the omniscient Supreme Lord is negated in texts like 'There is no seer besides this'. The Supreme Lord is different from the one imagined through ignorance to be embodied, the agent, the experiencer, and known as the self conditioned by the intellect. This difference is similar to the one that exists between the all-pervading unlimited space and the space delimited by pot etc.

Śaṅkara totally dispenses with the distinction of jīva and Brahman and maintains it as only present in the empirical sphere projected by avidyā. In his celebrated work *Upadeśa Sāhasrī* referring to the direct intuition of the Self Śaṅkara states: the perceiving of Self could be intuited by itself as it is of the nature of intuition. The birth of the modification of the mind with its semblance is called anubhava (intuition of the Self). Empirically speaking, the modification of the mind which makes its appearance when one says "I have now known my real Self" is metaphorically called "intuition" by Vedāntins¹³. Further he states that no direct experience of the Self other than this is possible. For, the *Śruti* says "It is unknown to those who know it (objectively)", "By what my dear should one know the knower"¹⁴. These two texts declare that the Self can never be objectified by knowledge, hence intuition of the Self means to know that we are the unobjectifiable Self whose changelss essence of consciousness sheds light to everything else. Śaṅkara affirms saying that any understanding

through a faculty of the intellect can be only that of the not-self; and it can never be that of the real Self. To intuit one's self as the witness of understanding is the only intuition worth the name. The Yogin who thinks that he has realised the Self in a particular modification of the mind, does not know the Truth. The fact that the knower as well as the known, is a semblance of the Self in the modification of the mind. Both are superimpositions on the witness, and are essentially that witness and nothing else¹⁵. The Self which answers to the notion of the I and is the knower of objects, is not the real Self at all. He is the real knower who knows that the Self is neither a knower nor an agent of any action¹⁶.

To sum up: (i) immortality cannot be attained with all the wealth which one can possibly acquire in this world. (ii) everything that one loves in this world is dear for the sake of ātman, one's own self. So, the Self is the dearest to all. (iii) ātman, cannot be known by any one of the faculties of mind or directly visualized. It is of the very essence of consciousness which is not in need of any other light to be seen. To intuit this, is to see ātman.

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2. *ibid.*,
3. *ibid.*, 4.5.7.
4. *ibid.*, 4.2.4.

5. *prāptamabhayaṃ yājñavalkyena nāprāptaṃ na tu sākṣātkṛtam*, This is one of the excerpts from Bharṭṛ prapañca interspersed in Ānandagiri's *tīkā* on the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Vārttikā*.
6. Śaṅkara's C. on *Vedāntasūtra* (VS), 2.3.7.
7. *BU*, 4.3.9.
8. *Kaṭha Upaniṣad*, 2.2.15.
9. Cf. pp.260-261, *Pañcapādikā*, Ed. By Polagam Sri Rama Sastri & Sri S.R.Krishnamurti Sastri, Government Oriental Manuscripts Library, Madras,1958.
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12. *ibid.*, 1.1.17.
13. Revathy.S, '*Upadeśa Sāhasrī*', (US) 18.205. Edited with the Commentary *Padayojanika* by Ramatirtha, Adi Sankara Advaita Research Centre, Chennai, 2005.
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THE CONCEPT OF *JĪVANMUKTI*

N.VEEZHINATHAN

Śaṅkara holds before us two ideals of liberation (*mukti*), *jīvan-mukti* and *videha-mukti*. The former is release from worldly bonds while one is still alive; and the latter is release when he becomes dissociated from the psycho-physical organism after the falling off of his body. We shall explain this in some detail. The state of the person who has attained Self-realization is described in the following text of the *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad* :

भिद्यते हृदयग्रन्थिः छिद्यन्ते सर्वसंशयाः ।

क्षीयन्ते च अस्य कर्माणि तस्मिन् दृष्टे परावरे । ॥

When a person realizes the Self compared with which even Īsvara (*para*) is ontologically lower in status (*avara*), the *āvaraṇa*-phase of *avidyā* — the tie that has bound the Self with the mind and other factors — is removed. All

forms of disbelief concerning the nature of the jīva, of the Self, and also of liberation and the means thereto are dispelled. Further, the *sañcita-karma* comprising the merits and demerits which the person has accumulated in his previous lives and also in this life prior to attaining Self-realization, and which have not yet fructified are dissolved.²

Compare the following texts too:

- i. Just as the upper part of a reed thrown into fire is completely destroyed, even so all his demerits (which have not yet fructified) are destroyed (i.e. they are rendered ineffectual by the opposing power or force of knowledge).³
- ii. The one who has attained Self-realization overcomes both merit and demerit (that have not yet fructified).⁴

Further, there is no possibility of any merit or demerit being attached to him in future. For, merit or demerit would arise only when one performs prescribed deeds and commits interdicted actions with the sense of agency of the form, "I am the agent of this action" But the enlightened one, being free from the *āvaraṇa* phase of avidyā that veiled his true nature which is the Self, is fully cognizant of the fact that he is not an agent, nor an experient. As such, he cannot engage himself in any activity with the sense of agency. Consequently, no merit or demerit would accrue to him. Śaṅkara's rhapsodic account of this state of the enlightened one is worth recording. He says:

Owing to the disquieting influence of avidyā, the aspirant, prior to attaining Self-realization, entertained the false notion that he was an agent of action and an experient of its fruits. When avidyā is removed by Self-realization, the *sañcita-karma* becomes inoperative. This is the significance of the term, “*vināśa*” in the sūtra.⁵ Contrary to the earlier notion that the Self is an agent and an experient, the realized soul has the feeling of certainty of the form, “I am the Self which is free from the characteristics of being an agent and an experient in the three divisions of time; even earlier I was never an agent and an experient, nor am I so at present, nor shall I be so in future.” From this point of view alone can liberation be justified. If the stream of merits and demerits flowing down from time immemorial continues unimpeded in its course, liberation will be a forlorn hope.⁶

It follows that the realized soul cannot engage himself in any activity with the sense of agency of the form, “I am the agent of this action.” Consequently, no merit or demerit would taint him in the least. This is stated in the following text of the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* :

Just as water does not stick to a lotus-leaf, even so sin does not pertain to one who has realized the Self.⁷

The word “sin” in the text, Śaṅkara says, stands for “merit” also; for, the fruit of merit, like that of the sin, is inferior to the fruit of the direct experience of the Self.⁸

One important point needs to be noted in this connection. The power or force of Self-realization would render ineffective only the *sañcita-karma* comprising the accumulated merits and demerits that have not yet fructified, but not the portion of it which has fructified, and begun to bear fruit and which is known as *prārabdha-karma*. This is as it should be; for, it is the *prārabdha-karma* that has given rise to the present body by abiding in which the *jīva* has attained Self-realization. It is thus obvious that Self-realization is fully dependent for its rise upon the *prārabdha-karma* which is a live force. When such is the case, its acquired momentum, like that of a wheel of a potter, or of a discharged arrow must exhaust itself out, as nothing could prevent it from functioning in the intervening period. Śaṅkara observes:

1. न तावत् अनाश्रित्य कर्माशयं ज्ञानोत्पत्तिः उपपद्यते। आश्रिते च तस्मिन्, कुलालचक्रवत् प्रवृत्तवेगस्य अन्तराले प्रतिबन्धा-संभवात् भवति वेगक्षय-प्रतिपालनम्।⁹

2. प्रवृत्तफलस्य तु कर्माशयस्य मुक्तेशोः इव वेगक्षयात् निवृत्तिः।¹⁰

Such a one who is free from the *sañcita-karma* that has not yet fructified, and who is living out only his *prārabdha-karma* which has fructified is called a *jīvanmukta* — one who is liberated and yet alive. He would continue to live in the body by the *prārabdha-karma*, the force of which is of varying strength. It may come to an end with the falling off of the present body to which it has given rise to, and by abiding in which the *jīva* has attained Self-realization. Or, it may give

rise to a number of corporeal forms as in the case of the realized souls like Apāntaratamas, Vasiṣṭha, and others before it is exhausted.¹¹ This fact that a person of Self-realization shall continue to live in the body for some time is in consonance with the teaching of the *Chāndogya* text, "He who has a preceptor knows; for him there is delay only so long as he is freed (from the body), and then he becomes one (with the Self)."¹² Śaṅkara observes that this text sets down the fall of the body as the term to the attainment of final release (*videha-mukti*). He adds that if the entire karma — both *sañcita* and *prārabdha* were dissolved by Self-realization, final release (*videha-mukti*) would instantaneously follow, and so the continuance of the body would be out of the question. And, this would be against the spirit of the text that teaches that one has to wait for the fall of the body (to attain final release).¹³ From this we gather that the realized soul would continue to live in the body caused by the *prārabdha-karma*.

We shall now inquire into the factor that sustains the *prārabdha-karma* in the case of the realized soul. Commenting on the sūtra, "*anārabdha-kārye eva pūrve tadavadheḥ*,"¹⁴ Śaṅkara says:

अकर्त्रात्मबोधोऽपि हि मिथ्याज्ञानबाधनेन कर्माणि उच्छिनत्ति।
बाधितमपि तु मिथ्याज्ञानं द्विचन्द्रज्ञानवत् संस्कारवशात् कश्चित्
कालम् अनुवर्तते एव।

The direct knowledge that the Self is free from the characteristic of being an agent sublates *avidyā* and thereby

makes the *sañcita-karma* incapable of producing results. Avidyā, although sublated, would endure for sometime on account of *sañskāra*. In this respect, it resembles the persistence of the cognition of the moon which, though discerned to be one, appears as having a second owing to the impression left over by the illusion even after it has been sublated.

The word, "*sañskāra*", in the text cited above is taken in the sense of the *vikṣepa*-phase of avidyā by Rāmānanda¹⁵ and Advaitānanda.¹⁶ According to these two preceptors, it is the *vikṣepa*-phase of avidyā that sustains the *prārabdha-karma* and its fruits.

Madhusūdana in his *Advaita-siddhi* sets forth three views concerning this. The first view is that it is a residuum of avidyā after the latter has been removed by Self-realization that sustains the *prārabdha-karma*. This he clarifies by using the concrete example of the fragrance of flowers. The latter persists in a vessel even after the flowers have been taken away. In the same way, the residuum of avidyā (*sañskāra*) would persist even after its removal. He adds that *sañskāra* is an effect; yet, like annihilative negation (*dhvañsa*) which too is an effect, it is not dependent upon a material cause; it is capable of existing in the Self without avidyā.¹⁷

The other view is: of the two phases of avidyā, viz. *āvaraṇa* and *vikṣepa*, the *āvaraṇa*-phase is wholly removed by the direct experience of the Self. The *vikṣepa*-phase has

three powers; each one of these is respectively capable of giving rise to the notion that the world is absolutely real, empirically real, and apparently real. Of these, the first one is removed by *nididhyāsana*, i.e. the stream of cognition of the form, "I am the Self", and the second one, by the direct experience of the Self. The third one sustains the *prārabdha-karma* which, in turn, accounts for the embodied existence of the one who has attained Self-realization. It is termed *avidyā-leśa* and is removed when the *prārabdha-karma* comes to an end after yielding forth its results.

This view concerning the three powers of the *vikṣepa*-phase of *avidyā* and their removal, Madhusūdana points out, is based on the following. śruti text:

तस्य अभिध्यानात् योजनात् तत्त्वभावात्।
भूयश्चान्ते विश्वमायानिवृत्तिः।¹⁸

By means of *nididhyāsana* (*abhidhyānāt*) of the form "I am the Self", the power that gives rise to the notion that the world is absolutely real is removed. By the direct experience of the Self (*yojanāt*), the power that presents the world as empirically real is obliterated. Again (*bhūyah*), in the end, i.e. when the *prārabdha-karma* is exhausted (*ante*), the direct experience of the Self removes the *vikṣepa*-phase of *avidyā* without any remnant (*viśva-māyā-nivṛtīḥ*).

The assertion that the *vikṣepa*-phase of *avidyā* is removed without any remnant when the *prārabdha-karma* is exhausted implies that prior to the exhaustion of the *prārabdha-karma*

there has been the removal of *vikṣepa*-phase of *avidyā* only in certain of its aspects.¹⁹

The third view is: it is the subtle form of *avidyā*, after the removal of both of its phases of *āvaraṇa* and *vikṣepa* by Self-realization, which is known as *avidyā-leśa*, that is the sustaining factor of the *prārabdha-karma*.²⁰

It would have become clear from the above account that the person of Self-realization is free from the *āvaraṇa*-phase of *avidyā* and continues to live in the body on account of the *prārabdha-karma* which is sustained by the residuum of *avidyā*, or an aspect of the *vikṣepa*-phase of *avidyā*, or the subtle form of *avidyā*. Since he is free from the *āvaraṇa*-phase of *avidyā*, he is ever aware of his identity with the Self which is non-dual bliss. The world of duality projected by the sustaining factor of the *prārabdha-karma* appears to him. But, since he has realized its falsity, he no more takes it to be real, and is not deluded by it. He is the *jīvan-mukta*, one who is liberated while living in the body.

The critics of Advaita contend that liberation is inconsistent with embodied existence. They are of the view that embodied existence is bondage, and liberation is the very opposite of it, and so the two cannot co-exist. They hold that liberation could be attained only after physical death. Based on this eschatological view of liberation, they argue that the concept of *jīvan-mukti*, i.e. liberation while living, cannot be deemed as a genuine one.

This criticism is rooted on the view the critics take of the nature of the *jīva* and of its relation to the psycho-physical organism. According to them, the *jīva* is different from, and yet dependent upon the Self, i.e. Brahman which is identified as *Īsvara*, and its relation to the psycho-physical organism is real. But, according to Advaita, the *jīva* does not really differ from the Self. Its apparent difference is due to its temporal relation to the physical body, etc. which, being the result of *avidyā*, is non-real. Bondage, therefore, is not mere association with the body, etc. On the contrary, it is the sense of identification of the Self with them through *avidyā*. Śaṅkara explains the association of the Self with the body in the following terms:

Of what kind is the relation of the Self to the body (etc.)? (It is answered that) it is the rise of the false cognition concerning the Self of the form, "This aggregate of the body, etc. is but myself." This false notion is discernible in all living beings in such forms as "I go," "I come back," "I am blind," "I am not blind," "I am deluded," "I am not deluded." This cannot be removed by anything other than the knowledge of the true nature of the Self. Before the dawn of the latter, it is pervasively present in every case of living being.²¹

Prabhākara, however, holds a different view of the relation of the Self to the body, etc. Śaṅkara takes it up for consideration and presents it as follows:

अत्र आहुः – देहादिव्यतिरिक्तस्य आत्मनः आत्मीये देहादौ अहम्
अभिमानः गौणः, न मिथ्या इति ।²²

The phrase, “*atra āhuḥ*” is a suggestive one. It makes, Rāmānanda says, an indirect reference to the followers of the Prābhākara school. Acyutakṛṣṇānanda takes the words “*abhimāna*” and “*mithyā*” in the text in the senses of “cognition” (*pratyaya*) and “erroneous cognition” (*bhrānti*) respectively.²³ The text means:

The cognition of “I” (*abhimāna*) about the body, etc. which are different from the Self, i.e. the jīva is not erroneous (*mithyā*). On the other hand, it is *gauṇa*, i.e. it is derived by the application of the word, “I” in a figurative manner to the body, etc.

The question arises as to how could the word “I” which is significative of the jīva, the sentient being, be employed to convey the sense of the body, etc. which are insentient. The Prābhākara school answers by saying that it is on the basis of the identification of a common feature present in both the senses. The common feature is “the state of being the means of experiencing pleasure and pain” (*bhoga-sādhanatva*). The jīva possesses this feature by being the inherent cause (*samavāyi-kāraṇa*), the physical body, by being the limiting adjunct (*avacchedaka*) of the jīva, and the group of the senses, the vital airs, and the mind, by being the auxiliary cause (*upakaraṇa*).²⁴ It is the recognition of this feature in both the senses, viz. the jīva and the body, etc. that accounts for the application of the word “I” in reference to the body, etc.

Śaṅkara rejects this contention of Prabhākara. To begin with, he explains the rationale for the figurative use of words on the basis of some common characteristic features by choosing the well-known expression, "This person is a lion." Here, the word "lion" is used to refer to a person on the ground that both the animal, lion and the person possess in common the features such as resolute courage, illustrious bravery and the like. The word, "lion" first secondarily signifies these features, and then the person concerned in whom they are present. The point that must be noted in this connection is that the one who uses the word "lion" in reference to a person is fully cognizant of the difference between the two.

From this we may deduce the following rule: A person could use a word in a sense that is different from its primary one on the basis of the identification of some common feature in both the senses, provided he has a clear knowledge of the difference between the two. But, in the present case, the distinction between the Self and the aggregate of the body, etc. is not at all discernible. It is precisely on this ground, Śaṅkara argues, the word "I" which is significative of the Self or the *jīva* cannot be used figuratively to refer to the aggregate of the body, etc. The linguistic usage of the word "I" and the corresponding experience cannot but be illusory.²⁵

It may be said that those who have the knowledge of the distinction between the Self and the body, etc. through Vedāntic study and reflection use the word "I", and have the

corresponding experience in respect of the body , etc. Hence, these two, viz. the usage of the word "I" and the corresponding experience may be regarded as figurative in their case.

Śaṅkara points out that the knowledge they have is only mediate and not immediate which alone could put an end to the confusion between the Self and the body, etc. Hence, their usage of the word "I" and the corresponding experience in respect of the body, etc. proceed from lack of immediate knowledge of the distinction between the Self and the body, etc., as in the case of those herding the flock of male and female sheep. They are, therefore, illusory. Compare his text:

आत्मानात्मविवेकिनामपि पण्डितानाम् अजविपालानामिव अविबक्तौ
शब्दप्रत्ययौ भवतः।³⁶

This is a re-assertion of what he has earlier said in the *Adhyāsa-bhāṣya*, viz. "Men's actions in general or on a particular occasion do not differ in anyway from those of animals" (*paśvādibhiśca aviśeṣāt*). In this connection, it is worthwhile recording the following observation of Ruskin:

Most men are not intended to be any wiser than their cocks and bulls — duly scientific of their yard and pasture, peacefully nescient of all beyond.

The expression, "Most men," we may take as referring to those who have the mediate knowledge that the Self is different from the body, etc.

The view that the usage of the word "I" and the experience conforming to it in regard to the body, etc. are only erroneous and not figurative implies that the relation between the Self and the body, etc. is illusory and not real. Śaṅkara says that this is the view of the Upaniṣads and he cites the following text of the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* as authority:

मघवन् मर्त्यं वा इदं शरीरम्, आत्तं मृत्युना; तत् अस्य अमृतस्य
अशरीरस्य आत्मनः अधिष्ठानम्।²⁶

O Indra, this body is indeed perishable; it is always in the grip of death. It is the seat of this Self which is immortal and bodiless.

This text predicates the absence of relation between the Self and the body by the word "*aśarīra*" in the expression "*aśarīrasya*". In the same breath, it declares the relation between the two by the expression "*ātmanaḥ adhiṣṭhānam*". This means that even at the time of the presence of the Self in the body, the relation between the two is negated; and there will be harmony between these two assertions only if we hold that, in the case of the Self, bodiless-ness (*aśarīratva*) is intrinsic (*svābhāvika*) and its relation to the body (*sa-śarīratva*) is accidental (*aupādhika*). The latter, therefore, is non-real. The usage of the word "I" and the corresponding notion in respect of the body are also illusory.

The text that is complementary to the one cited above is:

न ह वै सशरीरस्य सतः प्रियाप्रिययोः अपहृतिः अस्ति। अशरीरं वाव सन्तं
न प्रियाप्रिये स्पृशतः।

The one who is embodied (sa-śarīra) will never become free from pleasure and pain (resulting from the interaction of the mind with objects). Never indeed would pleasure or pain appertain to the one who is unembodied (a-śarīra).

Since unembodiedness constitutes the essential nature of the Self and embodiedness is extrinsic to it, the expressions “*the one who is embodied*,” and “*the one who is unembodied*” in the text must be taken to refer respectively to the one who has the false notion of “I” and “mine” with reference to the body and to the one who is free from any such false notion even while living in the body. Śaṅkara says that *a-śarīratva* in this sense is liberation here and now:

1. मिथ्याप्रत्ययनिमित्तत्वात् सशरीरत्वस्य सिद्धं जीवतोऽपि विदुषः
अशरीरत्वम्।
2.मोक्षाख्यम् अशरीरत्वं नित्यम् इति सिद्धम्।²⁷

Commenting on the *Chāndogya* text referred to above, Śaṅkara states that the word “*śarīra*” therein stands for the senses and also the mind associated with it. It follows from this that it is not only the gross body (*sthūla-śarīra*), but also the subtle body (*sūkṣma-śarīra*) comprising the senses of action and of knowledge, the vital airs, and the mind that are denied of the Self. In this context, Śaṅkara refers to three *śruti* texts which are as follows:

1. अशरीरं शरीरेषु अनवस्थेषु अवस्थितम्
महान्तं विभुमात्मानं मत्वा धीरो न शोचति।²⁸

The Self is bodiless and immutable; it is present in the bodies which are impermanent. It is free from limitation by time, space, and objects and is the substratal principle of everything. Realizing the Self (to be of this nature), a wise man grieves not.

This text denies of the Self the gross body. Here too, the Self is said to be bodiless even when it is present in the body. This suggests that bodilessness is the inherent nature of the Self.

2. अप्राणोहि अमनाः शुभ्रः।²⁹

The Self is free from vital airs and the mind. The group of vital airs is endowed with the power of action (*kriyā-śakti*) and the mind, with the power of knowledge (*jñāna-śakti*). When these two are negated of the Self, it must be understood that the senses of action and the senses of knowledge which are dependent upon them are also negated. This text, therefore, predicates the absence of the subtle body in the Self.

3. असङ्गो हि अयं पुरुषः।³⁰

The Self certainly is supra-relational.

This text speaks of the self as free from any relation to the gross and the subtle body.

Acyutakṛṣṇānanda points out that the Self comes to have false relation to the gross and the subtle body because of its false relation to avidyā, the causal body. Hence, when the *śruti* texts reveal that the Self is free of relation to the gross

and the subtle body, it is implied that it is free of relation to the causal body too.³¹ The text of the *Nṛsiṃhottaratāpinī Upaniṣad*, “असत्त्वम्-अरजस्कम्-अतमस्कम्-अमायम्।”³² specifically declares that the Self is free from relation to avidyā or māyā which consists of the three strands of sattva, rajas, and tamas.

From what has been said so far, it would have become clear that the Self is free from any real relation to the gross, the subtle, and the causal body. But, owing to the indeterminable relation to avidyā, the causal body, the Self attains to the state of the jīva and is embodied, i.e. it entertains the false notion of being related to the other two bodies. In the language of Advaita, it has become *sa-śarīra*. At the emergence of Self-realization, the āvaraṇa-phase of avidyā is removed and the true nature of the jīva is unveiled thereby. The knower of the Self ceases to be a jīva. He does not harbour any more the sense of identification with the body — the physical and the subtle, although he lives therein till his fructified merits and demerits are exhausted. He is an *a-śarīra* now. He bears the body, but has sloughed it off, and remains as the Self here and now. The *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* declares:

यदा सर्वे प्रमुच्यन्ते कामा येऽस्य हृदिश्रिताः। अथ मर्त्योऽमृतो भवति
अत्र ब्रह्म समश्नुते॥³³

When all desires dwelling in the heart (of the knower of the Self before enlightenment) vanish, he who was a mortal (then) becomes deathless (after enlightenment) and remains as the Self (even) here (i.e. in the body).

This text makes a distinct reference to the state of *jīvan-mukti*. And the text that follows this uses a concrete example to make clear the viewpoint that the *jīvan-mukta*, although living, does not bear the notion of "I" or "mine" with reference to the gross and the subtle body and their characteristics as before. In other words, he remains free of wordliness. The text is:

तद्यथा अहिनित्त्वयनी बल्मीके मृता प्रत्यस्ता शयीत, एवमेव इदं शरीरं
शेते; अथ अयम् अशरीरः अमृतः प्राणः ब्रह्मैव तेज एव ।³⁴

The word, "tat" means *tatra*, i.e. in reference to the *jīvan-mukta* and to the body in which he abides. The word, "yathā" means the illustrative example which in the present context is the slough of a snake. The import of this text is: Just as a snake does not have any sense of belonging toward the skin it has sloughed off upon an anthill, even so the *jīvan-mukta* toward the body in which he continues to live for sometime. He is *a-śarīra* and is deathless. He lives in the body and yet remains as the pure Self which is self-luminous consciousness and bliss.

The *jīvan-mukta* is referred to as *sthita-prajña* — the one who has attained the knowledge of the Truth that is efficacious in removing the mutual superimposition between the Self and the not-self,³⁵ as *viṣṇu-bhakta* — the one who is grounded in the Self that is all-pervasive,³⁶ and as *guṇātīta* — the one who has passed beyond avidyā comprising the three strands of sattva, rajas, and tamas.³⁷ His life has two phases:

it is either *samādhi* when he turns inward and loses himself in the Self; or the condition known as *vyutthāna* or reversion to empirical life when he wakes back to variety, though not losing sight of its underlying unity.

Arjuna asks Kṛṣṇa about the nature of a *jīvan-mukta* when he is in the state of *samādhi* and also in the state of *vyutthāna*.³⁸ Kṛṣṇa says that a *jīvan-mukta* in the state of *samādhi* rests unmoved with his true nature; all desires that dwelt in his heart before enlightenment are eliminated. He experiences in the imperial throne of his heart the transcendental majesty of the unconditioned splendour, his own Self. In the state of *vyutthāna*, the *jīvan-mukta* will neither give cheerful expression of approval when he is praised; nor cheerless expression of sorrow when he is criticized. His words will be characterized by mildness, serenity, and mercifulness. He will select a solitary place and will sit down there to withdraw his senses which, owing to his *prārabdha-karma* have come out, and to fix his mind with diligence and assiduity upon the Self, so that he could be in the state of *samādhi*. Finally, pleasure and pain which result from the interaction of the senses with their respective objects are only the states or the modifications of the mind with which the *jīvan-mukta* has ceased to have any sense of identification. So, he will be a mere onlooker or spectator of all pleasure and pain. They will not excite him or set him in motion. He will never heave a sigh that might have been either of regret or relief. He will not be angry with fate, nor will he lament that he is deprived of

something. Impassiveness, a refined and commendable aloofness from that which is mundane or transitory, temperance in speech and self-control — all this constitutes his second nature.³⁹ He will *reveal* these outstanding and transcending intrinsic virtues in order that his fellow-beings may *realize* them. He has overcome the illusion of individuality so that he sets others on the same level of himself. We have in him the man of enlightenment distinct from the man who is so enmeshed in the veil of avidyā that he asserts himself to the exclusion of others. He would impart the knowledge of the Self to his fellow-beings out of love — love not in its ordinary sense which, like compassion involves a sense of duality which he has already transcended, but love born out of his discernment of his Self in every being. "He loves others not *as such* but *as himself*, because he has realized his identity with them." The personality of a *jīvan-mukta* may best be summed up in the following words from Tao Te Ching:

Therefore the Sage relies on actionless activity,
Carries on wordless teaching,
But the myriad creatures are worked upon by him;
he does not disown them,
He rears them; but does not lay claim to them,
Controls them; but does not lean upon them,
Achieves his aim, but does not call attention to
what he does.⁴⁰

When the *prārabdha-karma* is exhausted by giving forth its fruits, the material garment of the *jīvan-mukta* is cast off, and he would remain in his naked purity as pure identity. The appearance of duality even as illusory will no longer be there. He passes beyond all differences and is in the silent desert into which no difference has ever penetrated and which is supreme over all oppositions and divisions. He is the Self identical with liberation which is not valuable, but value itself.

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4. *Bṛhadāranyaka Upaniṣad* (hereafter *BU*), 4.4.22.
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7. *CU*, 4.4.3.
8. *BSB*, 4.1.14.
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10. *Ibid.*, 3.3.32.
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32. *SKB*, p.181.
33. *Nṛsiṃhottara-tāpini-Upaniṣad*, 9.
34. *BU*, 4.4.7.
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36. *Bhagavad-Gītā*, 2.55-58.
37. *Ibid.*, 12.13-20.
38. *Ibid.*, 14.21-25.
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I owe this reference to Prof. Balasubramanian.

HOMAGE TO ŚAṄKARA

[196]

यद्भाष्य-सागरज-युक्तिमणीन् प्रकीर्णान्
प्राप्याधुना कतिपयान् कवयो भवन्ति ।
तस्मै नमो जनमनोब्ज-दिवाकराय
कृत्स्नागमार्थ-निलयाय यतीश्वराय ॥

yad-bhāṣya-sāgaraja-yukti-maṇīn prakīrṇān
prāpyādhunā katipayān kavayo bhavanti
tasmai namo jana-manobja-divākarāya
kṛtsnāgamārtha-nilayāya yātīśvarāya.

Salutations to the pre-eminent Ascetic who is the abode of the import of all the Vedas, who is like the sun to the lotuses in the form of the minds of the souls, and by whose gems of reasonings found in the ocean-like *bhāṣyas*, we have become adept in Śāstras.

Bodhanidhi in his *Upadeśa-sāhasrī-vyākhyā*

[197]

काले शिवः क्रमवशात् कलिदोषदुष्टे
यः सम्प्रदायरहितं तदपेक्ष्य भूयः ।
क्षोण्याम् अवातरदशेष-जगद्धितार्थी
श्रीशङ्कराख्यममलं गुरुमाश्रये तम् ॥

kāle śivaḥ kramavaśāt kali-doṣa-duṣṭe
yaḥ sampradāya-rahitaṁ tad-apekṣya bhūyaḥ
kṣoṇyām-avātarad-aśeṣa-jagaddhitārthī
śrīśaṅkarākhyam-amalam gurum-āśraye tam.

Lord Śiva, who is desirous of the welfare of the entire world, who is keen on maintaining the Advaitic tradition—which has been lost gradually during the age affected by the defects of *kali*, incarnated himself upon the earth as Śrī Śaṅkara. I resort to that preceptor who is pure.

Śrī Nārāyaṇa in his *Prapañcasārārthadīpa*

GREATNESS OF KAÑCĪ AND KĀMAKOṬṬAM

V.A. DEVA SENAPATI*

I

There are seven sacred cities in India which grant salvation. They are:

अयोध्या मथुरा माया काशी काञ्ची अवन्तिका ।
पुरी द्वारवती चैव सप्तैते मोक्षदायिकाः ॥

Vedāntadeśika in his *Aḍaikkalappattu (The Refuge-Decad)* refers to the excellence of Kañcī (Kaccī) as one of the seven sacred cities that grant salvation:

பத்தி முதலாமவற்றில் பதி எனக்குக்கூடாமல்
எத்திசையும் உழன்று ஒடி இளைத்து வீழும் காகம் போல்
முத்தி தரும் எழில் முக்கியமாம் கச்சிதன்னில்
அத்திகிரி அருளாளர்க்கு அடைக்கலம் நான் புகுந்தேனே.

'Like a crow that flies in every direction and falls exhausted,

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I, being unable to obtain the Lord through devotion, etc., have sought as refuge the grace of the Lord of Hastigiri of Kacci which is the most important of the seven cities that give salvation.'

The city of Kañcī (Kacci) has been praised in the following words in *Perumppāṇāṟruppaḍai* which is one among the ancient works in Tamil Saṅgam Literature.

மலர்தலை உலகக்குள்ளும் மலர்தொழ
விறவு மேம்பட்ட பழவிறன்முதலர் (மாண். 410-411)

'The city of Kacci is an ancient one (*mūdūr*) in the world whose excellence is enhanced by festivals celebrated by the followers of various faiths.'

Naccinārkiniyār comments thus on the above:

மலசமயத்தாகும் தொழும்படி எடுத்த விழாக்களிலே
ஏனை நகர்களின் மேலானவற்றிறியினை உடைய மழைய ஊர்.

'Kacci is an ancient city pre-eminent because festivals of various faiths are celebrated there.'

Appar refers to Kañcī as a place of boundless learning in his *Tēvāraṁ* relating to *Tirukkacci-Tirumēṟṟaḷi*.

செல்வியைப் பாகங்கொண்டார் சேந்தனை மகனாகக்கொண்டார்
மல்லிகைக் கண்ணியோடு மாமலர்க் கொன்றை சூழக்
கல்வியைக் கரையிலாத காஞ்சிமாநகர் தன்னுள்ளால்
எல்லியை விளங்க நின்றார் இலங்குமேற்றளியனாரே. (4.43-8)

'He has His beloved (Pārvatī) sharing half His body; He has Śendan (Subrahmaṇya) as His son; the fair-eyed Gaṅgā adorns

His head, and *kondrai* flowers light up His face. He shines in *Tirumēṟṟali* in Kañcī noted for the boundless learning of its scholars in contrast to the surrounding ignorance.

In a reference to Aravaṇa Aḍigaḷ in the *Maṇimekhalai*, the expression *Kaccimānagar* is used:

தவநிறி அறவணன் சாற்றக் கேட்டனன்
ஆங்கவன்றானும் நின்னறத்திற்கேசுப்
பூங்கொடி கச்சி மாநகர் ஆதலின்
மற்றும் மாநகர் மாதவன் பெயர் நான்
பொற்றொடி தாயரும் அப்பதிப் படர்ந்தனர்.

(மணிமேகலை, கச்சிமாநகர் பூக்க காதை, வரிகள் 150-154)

'Kañcī is the appropriate place for your ascetic practice; and, for your sake your mother and Sudhamathi accompanied Aravaṇan to that place.'

Kacci is referred to as Kāñcī in both Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣya*¹ and Harṣa's *Naiṣadha*.²

The meaning of the word Kāñcī in Sanskrit is *Oḍḍiyāṇam* (a belt worn as an ornament around the waist by women). This ornament is worn only around the navel. Kāñcī is so-called because it is navel position of the earth. The *Kāñcīmāhātmya* and the *Kāmākṣi-vilāsa* speak of Kāñcī as the navel of the world.

(a) तपस्थानं बिलं सूक्ष्मं परमं व्योम तत्स्मृतम्। (काञ्चीमाहात्म्यम् -- ३१-७०)

(b) आधिभौतिकमंहोन्नं नाभिस्थानं भुवः परम्। (कामाक्षीविलासम् - ११-६)

(c) जगद्कामकलाकारनाभिस्थानं भुवः परम्। (कामाक्षीविलासम् - १३-७३)

Śivajñāna Munivar in his *Kāñcīpurāṇa* refers to Kāñcī as the navel-region of the Goddess Earth who wears the sea as Her garment and who shines as the Supreme *ākāśa*.

அணையால் பரப்பு நுண் நிலமாகி அருட்பர வெளியாய்த்திகழும்
அணை கடல் உடுக்கை நிலமகக்குந்தி ஸ்தானமாம்.

சீரட்டஹாசம் படலம்-31

Kāñcī whose renown is celebrated thus consists of *Kāmakōṭṭam*, *Rudra-Kōṭṭam*, *Punya-Kōṭṭam* and *Kumara-Kōṭṭam* which are sacred severally for Parāśakti, Śiva, Viṣṇu, and Kumāra. *Kumara-Kōṭṭam* and *Kālikōṭṭam* are comprised in *Kāmakōṭṭam*.

II

Toṇḍaimaṇḍalam (Tuṇḍīra-maṇḍalam) has as its boundaries *Svāmipuṣkariṇī* in Tirupati in the north, the sea in the east, *Tenpeṇṇai* known as *Dākṣiṇapinākinī* in the south, and *Kallāru* in the West. Of these, *Svāmipuṣkariṇī* is to the north-east of Lord Veṅkaṭeśvara's temple at Tirupati. It is said that Lord Veṅkaṭeśvara invoked the river Virajā and named it as *Svāmipuṣkariṇī*. This is the northern boundary.

When Brahmā started performing a sacrifice at Kāñcī, without Sarasvatī, she flowed fast in the form of a river to destroy the sacrifice. Hence this river is known as *Vegavatī*. Mahāviṣṇu saved the sacrifice. Sarasvatī flowed eastwards and merged in the sea. This sea marks the eastern boundary.

When the sage Bhṛgu once lifted the bow of Śiva, known as *Pināka*, it assumed the form of a river. It is this which is known as river *Pinākinī*. *Pinākinī* takes two courses

as *Uttarapinākinī* (*vaḍapeṇṇaiyāru*) and *Dakṣiṇapinākinī* (*tenpeṇṇaiyāru*). These are in the Nellore and the South Arcot district respectively. The *Dakṣiṇapinākinī* is the southern boundary.

When Lakṣmaṇa was struck down by the weapon of *śakti* in the battle between Rāma and Rāvaṇa, Hanūmān, on the suggestion of Jāmbavān brought medicinal herbs from *Oṣadhiparvatā* and those herbs were washed in *Kallāru*. *Kallāru* marks the western boundary.

Once upon a time Devī went to Kāñcī and was performing penance to obtain Śiva. Śiva ordered Gaṅgā to take the form of a river to test her devotion, whereupon Gaṅgā started flowing in the form of river. There was shivering in the body of Devī when she beheld the river in flood. This river came to known as *Kaṁpā* because it caused trembling (*kampāna*) in the body of Devī.

Through Tonḍaimaṇḍalam bounded on four sides in the above manner flow the river *Kaṁpā* and *Vegavatī*.

At the time of Mūkakavi, *Kaṁpā* was flowing in the form of a river; and, it is clear from his verses in the *Āryāśataka*:

कम्पातीरचराणां करुणाकोरकितदृष्टिपातानाम् ।

केलीवनं मनो मे केषाञ्चिद्भवतु चिद्विलासानाम् ॥ १२ ॥

पुण्या कापि पुरन्ध्री पुङ्कितकन्दर्पसंपदा वपुषा ।

पुलिनचरी कम्पायाः पुरमथनं पुलकनिचुलितं कुरुते ॥ २२ ॥

Herein he refers to *Kaṁpā* as a river. *Kaṁpā* is now in the

form of a small tank on the southern side of the (first) outer prakāraṃ of the Ekāmeśvara temple. The river *Vegavatī* is to the south of Kāñcī. *Kāmakōṣṭha* is situated in between these two rivers. And Goddess Kāmākṣī presides over the *Kāmakōṣṭha*.

III

The temple of Kāmākṣī is the centre of importance in Kāñcī. There are many temple in this sacred city dedicated to Viṣṇu and Śiva. It is the custom of Kāñcī for the *utsavar* of any temple therein to be take in procession at the time of *Brahmotsava* through the four main streets around the temple of Kāmākṣī.

All the temples whether Śaivite or Vaiṣṇavite have their main gopurams or entrances facing *Kāmakōṣṭha*. There is yet another feature about Kāñcī. Whereas outside Kāñcī there is a separate *sanctum* of Devī in every Śaivite temple in Tamil Nadu, there is no such *sanctum* for the Devī in the Śaiva temples within the limits of the city of Kāñcī.

It is because of this: Manmatha who was made formless by lord Śiva performed penance, in order to recover form, at Kāñcī invoking Goddess Kāmākṣī. Pleased with his penance, Kāmākṣī gave him a new form by her gracious look.

हरनेत्राग्निसन्दग्धकामसञ्जीवनौषधिः॥

(श्रीललितासहस्रनामस्तोत्रम्- ३४)

He then prayed that he should be empowered to conquer Śiva. Granting his prayer, Kāmākṣī withdrew her *sānnidhya* unto Herself from all the Śiva temples including Kailāsa and

concentrated all of it in the space of a small cave (*bilākāśa*) in the *Kāmakotṭha*. Finding his temples bereft of Her presence, Śiva felt the pangs of separation. It appeared as if that was the moment of Manmatha's triumph over Śiva. Sometime hence Brahmā went to Kailāsa to offer worship to Śiva. After worshipping Him, he went to pay his obeisance to Devī. Devī was not to be found there. He then went to all the Śiva temples; he could not find her in any of them. He then realised that all this was due to the will of Kāmākṣī; and then he performed penance in the *Kāmakotṭha* at Kāncī praying to Her that Her *sānnidhya* should be manifested in all the temples as before. Kāmākṣī appeared before him and in response to his prayer agreed to restore Her *sānnidhya* in all the Śiva temples except those in Kāncī and further said that there is no need for a separate *sanctum* of Her in any of the Śiva temples at Kāncī which is the *Śivajitkṣetra*. Thereafter, Kāmākṣī restored her *sānnidhya* in all those temples except Kāncī. Since Her *sānnidhya* was released from *Kāmakotṭha* at Kāncī, the sanctum of the Goddess in all the Śiva temples in Tamil Nadu are referred to as *Kāmakotṭha*.

पुरा पञ्चशरोऽनङ्गः प्रत्यक्षाङ्गाभिलाषया ॥
 कामकोष्ठं समासाद्य कामाक्षीं संप्रपूज्य च ।
 हृदी ध्यात्वा तु तां कामस्तपस्तेपेऽतिदुष्करम् ॥
 ततस्तत्कामदेवस्य तपसा तुष्टमानसा ।
 कदाचित् तत्र कामाक्षी महात्रिपुरसुन्दरी ॥
 प्रसन्नाथ महशक्तिः स्वकटाक्षनिरीक्षणात् ।
 ददौ कामाय दिव्याङ्गं नृणामानन्ददायकम् ।

* * * * *

तदा सर्वेषु शैवेषु केलासाद्यालयेषु च ।
 यत्र यत्र स्थितास्सर्वा गौरीः स्वांशतया स्थिताः ॥
 समाकृष्यैक्यतो देवी तूष्णीमासीच्छुभानना ॥

* * * * *

कदाचिदथ लोकेशः कैलासाद्यालयेषु च ।
 सेवार्थं परमेशस्य समागत्यालयं तदा ॥
 देवीहीनालयं दृष्ट्वा शिवस्थानेषु सर्वशः ।
 किमर्थमम्बिका नास्ति सर्वशैवालयेषु च ॥

इति चिन्त्य ततो ब्रह्मा कामाक्ष्याश्चित्रमित्यपि ।
 विज्ञाय ज्ञानदृष्ट्या तु कामकोष्ठमहीतले ॥
 कामाक्ष्यास्सन्निधिं प्राप्य ध्यात्वाराध्य महेश्वरीम् ।
 सर्वालयेषु शैवेषु सर्वलोकस्थितेषु च ॥
 यथा शम्भुस्तथा गौरी सदा सान्निध्यकाङ्क्षया ।
 हृदि ध्यात्वा तु कामाक्षीं द्वादशाब्दं तपोऽकरोत् ॥
 ततः प्रसन्ना सा देवी कामाक्षी भक्तिकामदा ।
 तत्र ब्रह्माणमालोक्य वचनं चेदमब्रवीत् ॥

* * * * *

शिवजित्क्षेत्रमित्युक्तमिदं क्षेत्रं विना भुवि ।
 सर्वालयेषु शैवेषु सन्निधत्तां सदाम्बिका ॥

(कामाक्षीविलासम् - १४, ९-१२; ३१; ३२; ६८-७३, ७५.)

IV

KĀMAKOṢṬHA IN ANCIENT TAMIL LITERATURE

Kāmakōṣṭham is referred to as *Kāmakōṭṭam* in ancient Tamil Literature. To begin with, Aḍiyārkkū-Naḷḷār in his

commentary on the *Silappadikāram* (5. 95-98) quotes an ancient Tamil verse which refers to the exploits of the very ancient ruler Karikālan who made a triumphant tour of the north upto Himālayas and planted his flag of victory on the Mount Meru. That verse is as follows:

கச்சி வளைக்கைச்சி காமக்கோட்டங் காவல்
 மெச்சி யினிதிருக்கு மெய்ச்சாத்தன் - கைக்கிசண்டு
 கம்பக் களிற்றுக் கரிகாற் பெருவளத்தான்
 செம்பெயற் கிரிதிரித்த செண்டு

The *Chendu* — the club with which Kaikārperuvaḷattān split the golden mountain is the club of Śāstā who keeps vigil in *Kāmakōṣṭham* of Kāmākṣī referred to as having bangles around Her hands.

This verse brings out the fact that *Kāmakōṣṭham* of Kāmākṣī was famous even at the time of Karikāḷa Coḷan —that is before the time of Tirunāvukkarasar, Śaṁbandar and Sundarar.

The meaning of the expression *vaḷaikkaicchi* which refers to Kāmākṣī is borne out by the account given in the *Kāñcīmāhātmyam* and the *Mūkapañcaśatī*. According both these works, the impress of the bangles of Goddess Kāmākṣī is seen in the body of Lord Śiva.

स्तनाभ्यामपि बाहुभ्यां संपीड्य बलयैरपि ।
 आलिलिङ्गं हृदं लिङ्गं एकचूताह्वयं शिवम् ॥
 तदेकाम्रेशलिङ्गं वै तस्या आलिङ्गनोत्सुकम् ।
 स्तनकङ्कणमुद्राभ्यां मुद्रितं भूतये भुवः ॥

(काञ्चीमाहात्म्यम् - ४५.)

अङ्कितशङ्करदेहां अङ्कुरितोरोजकङ्कणाश्लेषैः ।

अधिकाञ्चि नित्यतरुणी अद्राक्षं काञ्चीदद्भुतां वालाम् ॥

(आर्याशतकम् - ४५)

Tirunāvukkarasār, who flourished in the 7th century A.D., in his *Tiruttāṇḍagam* of Tiruvaḍigai Vīraṭṭāṇam (near Panruṭi) uses the word *Kāmakkōṭṭi* in the following verse:

கொழும்பவளச் செங்கனிவாய்க் காமக் கோட்டி

கொங்கையிணை யமற்பொருது கோலங் கொண்ட

தழும்புளவே வரை மார்பில்.....

(6-ம் திருமுறை, திருவதிகை வீரட்டாணம், அடையாளத் திருத்தாண்டகம், 10)

This means: 'there is on Lord Śiva's body the impress of the embrace of Kāmakkōṭṭi whose lips are red like coral.'

Saṁbandar, who also flourished in the 7th century A.D., in his *Tēvāram* on Tiruvirumpūlai (Ālaṅguḍi) uses the word *Kāmakkōṭṭi*. The *Tēvāram* is as follows:

நச்சித்தொழுவிர்கள் நமக் கிதுசொல்லீர்

கச்சிப்பொலி காமக் கொடியுடன்கூடி

இச்சித்தீரும்புளையிடங் கொண்ட வீசன்

உச்சித்தலையில் பவி கொண்டுழலானே

(இரண்டாம் திருமுறை, திருவிக்கும்புளை, 4)

Here *koṭṭi* appears as *kōṭṭi*. In ancient times, the same symbol was used for the long and short forms of *O*. This is clearly noticed in old stone inscriptions. It was only after the starting of the printing presses that different symbols were used to indicate the long and short forms of *O*.³

Sundaramūrti svāmi in his *Tēvāraṁ* on *Oṇakāntaṇṇali* in Kāñcī uses the expression *Kāmakkōṭṭam*. The *Tēvāraṁ* is as follows:

கச்சி ஶுதார்க் காமக்கோட்டம் உண்டாக
நீர்போய், ஊரிடும் பிச்சைகொள்வதென்னே
ஓண காந்தன்றளியுளரே

(7-ம் திருமுறை. ஓணகாந்தன்றளி. 6)

This passage, according to Aruṇaivaḍivel Mudaliyār,⁴ means: 'when there exists (*uṇḍāha*) Tirukkāmakkōṭṭam in ancient Kāñcī, why should you go about begging for alms from the public'.

The term *uṇḍāha* cannot be taken, as some say, in the sense that it has come into existence only at the time of Sundarar; if that were the case, Tirunāvukkaraśar who flourished much earlier than Sundarar could not have used the term *Kāmakkōṭṭam* at all.

Šekkiḷār in his account of Tirukkuṛipputtonḍanāyanār in the *Periyapurāṇam* hails the greatness of *Kāmakoṭṭam* in the following verse:

புண்ணியத்திரு காமக்கோட்டத்துப்
பொலிய முப்பதோடி ரண்டறம் புரக்கும். (71)

This refers to Goddess Kāmākṣī presiding over the *Kāmakkōṭṭam* fostering the thirty two virtues.

The reference to Šāstā as the guardian deity of the *Kāmakkōṭṭa* by Aḍiyārkkunallār in his commentary on the *Šilappadikāraṁ* confirms the fact that the present Kāmākṣī temple in Kāñcī is the same as the *Kāmakkōṭṭa* of Karikāla of ancient times. Even to this day the shrine of Šāstā is situated

in the first prākāra of the temple.⁵ Śekkilār's *Periyapurāṇam* also corroborates the identity of the Kāmākṣī temple with *Kāmakōṭṭam* by recording the fact that one who enters *Kāmakōṭṭa* fails to locate the four quarters correctly – a unique and special phenomena of the Kāmākṣī temple.

அந்தமீன்றி நல்லறம் புரிந்தளிக்கும்
அம்மை தன் திருக்காமக் கோட்டத்தில்
வந்து சந்திரசூரியர் மீதுவழிக்
கொளாதன் மருங்கு போதலினால்.

சந்தமர திரமயங்கி யெம்மருங்கும்
சாயை மாறிய தன்றிசை மயக்கம்
இந்த மாநிலத் தவரெல்லாம் காண
என்றும் உள்ள தென்றின்றும் அங்குளதால் - 74.

From what has been said so far it would have become clear that *Kāmakōṭṭa* – the abode of Kāmākṣī has been very popular even at the time of the ancient king Karikāla Colan. The reverence with which all the three Nāyanmārs refers to the *Kāmakōṭṭam* reveals the importance of the *Kamakōṭṭam* in the religious life of the people.

STONE INSCRIPTIONS

That the seat of Goddess in the Śiva temples outside the limits of Kāñcī is referred to as *Kāmakōṭṭha* can be seen from the various inscriptions found in Śiva temples in South India. The book entitled *South Indian Temple Inscriptions* published by the Government Oriental Manuscripts Library, Madras contains several such inscriptions which are as follows:

1. சீதம்பரம்: கொவிலுக்கும் திருக்காமக் கொட்டமு (ஐ)டய பெரியனாச்சியாருக்கும் சாத்தியருள.⁶
2. அவினாசி: கொவிலில் திருக்காமக் கொட்டத்துனாச்சியார் பெருங்கருணை.⁷
3. வீஜயமங்கலம்: திருனாகிவர முடையார் திருக்காமக்கொட்டத் தாளு(ஐ)ட(ய) னாச்சியார்க்கு அழகுபடி.⁸
4. திருவெவாத்தியூர்: திருவெவாத்தியருடையனார் கொயிர்த்திருக்காமக் கொட்டமுடைய னாச்சியார்க்கு வெண்டும் நிமந்தங்களுக்கு.⁹
5. திருப்பாலவனம்: திருப்பாலவனமுடைய நாயனார் திருக்காமக் கொட்டம் இயாதிலும் பாபதிநாச்சியார்க்கு.¹⁰
6. திருக்காட்டுப்பள்ளி: திருக்காமக்கொட்டமுடைய நாச்சியார் அழகமர் மங்கையார்க்கு.¹¹
திருக்காமக்கொட்டமுடைய பெரிய நாச்சியார் அழகமர் மங்கையாருக்குக் கற்றளி¹²
7. வல்லம்: இக்கொயில் சி(வ) காமக்கொட்டமுடைய னாச்சியார்க்கும் வெண்டும் நிமத்தத்துக்கு.¹³
8. திருப்பழனம்: இக்கொயிலில் பூஜை நிலைகளும் திருக்காமக் கொட்டமுடைய நாச்சியார் கொயில் பட்டாசாரிய நிலையும்.¹⁴
நான் ஏழுந்தருளிவித்த திருக்காமக்கொட்டமுடையார் திருப்பழனத்துடையார்க்கு.¹⁵
இன்னாயநாள் திருக்காம கொட்டமுடைய பெரியநாச்சியார்.¹⁶
9. கோவிலடி: இக்கொயிலில் நான் ஏழுந்தருளிவித்த திருக்காமக்கொட்டமுடைய அகில நாயகியாற்கு பூஜைக்கும்.¹⁷
10. ஹஸ்திகிரி: ஸ்ரீபுரவராதிகபர காமக்கொட்டி(டி)ம் பிகாலப்தவர பிரஸாத.¹⁸

11. சீதம்பரம்:

देव्या (स्तस्या) शिशुरिदुहितुः कामकोष्ठस्थितायाः
 प्रकारज्यामपिदयितमसौ क्लृप्तवान् मण्डपञ्च ।
 किञ्चित्तस्याः स्वपति नटनास्थनयोग्यप्रकारं
 सत्यं भक्त्या सुकरमकरोत् भूषणं मौलिपूर्वम् ॥¹⁹

पीताम्बरं काञ्चनमेष देव्याः तत् कामकोष्ठस्थितिमास्थितायाः ।
 चकार यद्वैरविलासिनीनां वनाग्निधूमाम्बरतां करोति ॥²⁰

12. மேலூர்: (பொன்னிவர் தாலுக்கா, செங்கல்பட்டு ஜில்லா)
 திருக்காமகொட்டமுடைய திருவிடை நாச்சியாருக்கு.²¹

13. திருச்சத்திமுத்தம்: திருக்காமகொட்டமுடைய நாச்சியார் கீழ் திக
 மடவளாகம்.²²

14. இளையாத்தங்குடி: காமகொட்ட நாச்சியார்²³

It is to be specifically noted here that in the *Tēvāraṁ* relating to Ālaṅguḍi to which reference has been made earlier, Sambandar refers to the Goddess not merely as Kāmakōṭi but as Kāmakoṭi of Kacchi. Thus in unmistakable terms he says that the *sanctum* of Goddess of the local shrine is the seat of the śakti manifested by the Goddess of the *Kāmakoṣṭha* of Kāñcī.

VI

Śilpa texts also speak of the seat of the Goddess of *Kāmakoṣṭha*. For instance, the śilpa text *Mānasāra* states:

कामकोष्ठविधिं वक्ष्ये (६५-१)

The Śaiva-āgamas – the *Sūkṣmāgama* and the *Karuṇāgama* refers to the seat of the Goddess as *Kāmakoṣṭha*.

(i) कामकोष्ठविधिं वक्ष्ये शृणु त्वं तत् प्रभञ्जन ॥

(सूक्ष्मागमे शक्तिप्रतिष्ठाकामकोष्ठविधिपटलः)

(ii) भोगाङ्गमर्चनं कुर्यात् सर्वसंपत्समृद्धिदम् ।

रात्रौ पूजावसाने तु अर्धयामेन कारयेत् ॥

मन्दिरस्योत्तरे भागे कामकोष्ठस्य मध्यमे ॥

(करुणागमे योगाङ्गार्चनभागः)

Further, the *Lalitā-Sahasranāma* refers to the Goddess as *Kāmakotikā* (त्रिकूटा कामकोटिका), the *Lalitā-trīsatī* as *Kāmakotiᅇnilayā* (कामेश्वरी कामकोटिनिलया) and the *Lalitā-aᅣottara* as *Kāmakoti-mahāpadma-pīᅥhasthā* (कामकोटिमहापद्मपीठस्थायै नमो नमः). Thus in the three stotras, the abode of the Goddess is referred to as *Kāmakoti*.

A reference to this *Kāmakotᅥa* is found in an inscription in a Jaina centre Śāttamaᅇgalam which is two and a half miles away from Vandavāᅣi. It is dated in the 14th century of Pallava Nandivarman II and it records an endowment for the feeding of Jain ascetics. This inscription says that one who violates the terms of that endowment would incur the sin of destroying the *Kāmakotᅥa*:

.....இவ்வறமு ரோங்கரம் பேரகமரக; ஓட்டினால்
காமக்கொட்டமழித்த பாவமரக.....

From this it is clear that *Kāmakotᅥa* was held sacred even at the time of Pallva Nandivarman.

We said earlier that there is a cave (*guha*) inside the *sanctum* of Kāmākᅣi temple and Goddess Kāmākᅣi is present there in the form of the *ākāᅣa* (ether) inside the cave (*guhākāᅣa*). This is affirmed by the *Kāñcīpurāᅇa* and the

Kāmākṣī-vilāsa.

सखीभिः तत्र संमन्त्र्य प्राप्य काञ्चीपुरं शुभम् ।
तपस्स्थानं विलं सूक्ष्मं परमं व्योम तत्स्मृतम् ॥

(काञ्चीपुराणे एकत्रिंशोऽध्यायः)

अत तत्र नृपश्रेष्ठ कामकोटिमहीतले ।
सिद्धितीर्थस्य चेशाने तृतीयांशे महाविलम् ॥
तपस्स्थानं विलं सूक्ष्मं परमं व्योम तत्स्मृतम् ।
विलरूपेण वै काञ्च्यां प्रत्यक्षं मोक्षदं परम् ॥

(कामाक्षीविलासे एकदशोऽध्यायः)

To the north-west of the entrance to this cave, Kāmākṣī appears as doing penance, resting one foot on the ground and resting her right hand on her heart. This form is known as *tapaskāmākṣī*. To her left is seen Goddess Kāmākṣī in the sitting posture with a bow of sugarcane in one hand, flower arrows in another, noose in the third, and goad in the fourth.

धनुर्वाणान् पाशं सृणिमपि दधाना करतलैः ।
पुरस्तादास्तां नः पुरमथितुराहोपुरुषिका ॥

(सौन्दर्यलहरी, ७)

कञ्चन काञ्चीनिलयं करधृतकोदण्डवाणसृणिपाशम् ।
कठिनस्तनभरनम्रं कैवल्यानन्दकन्दमवलम्बे ॥

(आर्याशतकम्, २)

There is *Śrīcakra* consecrated by Śaṅkarācārya in front of the Goddess. There are inscriptions which refer to the *Kumbhābhiseka* of the Kāmākṣī temple in recent centuries and to the refixing firmly of the *śrīcakra* – the original pīṭha.²⁴

Thus we see that the same Goddess is present as formless in the ethereal space inside the cave (*bilākāśa*), with a form in the sitting posture and in the form of a *yantra* in the *śrīcakra*. There is a *dharmastambha* or *jayastambha* in a small *maṅṭapa* situated in front of the gopura on the way to inner *prākāra* from the outer one. Śekkiḷār, as we have referred to earlier, says that Goddess Kāmākṣī, by remaining here, fostered the thirty two virtues mentioned in the scriptures.

புண்ணியத்திருக்காமகோட்டத்து ரெயரணிய
முய்யத்தோடிரண்டறம் புரக்கும்.

This explains the significance of the names of the Goddess such as *dharmiṇī dharmavardhani*²⁵ and the like occurring in the *Lalitāsahasranāma*.

When we go around the *gāyatrīmaṅṭapa* at the Kāmākṣī temple, we find Goddess Śyāmalā with a *viṇā* in her hand. This form is described in the *Śyāmalā-daṇḍaka* of Kālidāsa thus:

माणिक्यवीणामुपलालयन्ती
मदालसां मञ्जुलवाग्विलासाम् ।
माहेन्द्रनीलद्युतिकोमलाङ्गी
मातङ्गकन्यां मनसा स्मरामि ॥

To the south of the *sanctum* of the Kāmākṣī temple, there is a shrine which is one of the hundred and eight *divyadeśas* celebrated by the Ālvārs. The presiding deity of this shrine is known as Kalvar. In the list of the one hundred and eight shrines, Kalvar is referred to as Ādivarāhamūrti.

इस दिव्यदेश के आराध्यदेव आदिवराह भगवान् अञ्जलैवल्लि
लक्ष्मीसमेत वामन विमान में पश्चिमाभिमुख खड़े हुए हैं। कामाक्षीदेवी

के मन्दिर में एक और दर्शन दे रहे हैं। इनका साक्षात्कार अश्वत्थनारायण ने और मङ्गलाशासन संत परकाल ने किया है। यह दिव्यदेश और इसकी नित्यपुष्करिणी अब लुप्त है।

When Lakṣmīdevī was complaining about her husband – Viṣṇu to Goddess Kāmākṣī, Viṣṇu overheard this talk and thus came to be known as Kalvar. To the north of this *sanctum* there is the *mūrti* of Goddess Lakṣmī as *arūpalakṣmī*. It is customary for devotees to offer the *kumkum* received as *prasāda* of Goddess Kāmākṣī at the feet of *arūpalakṣmī* and then to take it reverently for their use.

X

Thus as Goddess Kāmākṣī has withdrawn her powers into the *bilākāśā* there is no separate *sanctum* for goddess in any of the Śiva temples in Kāñcī. This we know only from *Kāñcī-sthala-purāṇa* and *Kāmākṣī-Vilāsa*. If these two works are not handed down to posterity, one cannot explain the millennium-old temple construction scheme without a *sanctum* for Goddess in any of the Śiva temples within the city limits of Kāñcī. The *Ālaṅguḍi Tēvāraṁ* of Sambandar which refers to the seat of Goddess in the Śiva temple at Ālaṅguḍi as *kacchimūdūr kāmakoṭi* makes it clear that the seats of the Goddess in all the Śiva temples are referred to as *Kāmakoṣṭha* because of *śakti* of the Goddess there has emanated from the *bilākāśa* of the *Kāmakoṣṭha* at Kāñcī.

Those who are not able to have a darśan of this holy Kāmakoṣṭha could daily recite the following verses while taking bath.

तस्मादवश्यं कर्तव्यं कामकोष्ठस्य दर्शनम् ।
 न चेन्नित्यं स्नानकाले श्लोकानेतान् पठेन्नरः ॥
 स्वामिपुष्करिणीतार्थं पूर्वसिन्धुः पिनाकिनी ।
 शिलाहृदश्चतुर्मध्यं यावत्तुण्डीरमण्डलम् ॥
 मध्ये तुण्डीरभूवृतं कम्पा वेगवती द्वयोः ।
 तयोर्मध्ये कामकोष्ठं कामाक्षी²⁷ तत्र वर्तते ॥
 स एव विग्रहो देव्याः मूलभूतोऽद्रिराङ् भुवः ।
 नान्योऽस्ति विग्रहो देव्याः काञ्च्यां तन्मूलविग्रहः ॥
 जगत्कामकलाकारं नाभिस्थानं भुवः परम् ।
 पादपद्मस्य कामाक्ष्याः महीपीठं उपास्महे ॥
 कामकोटिस्मृतस्सोयं कारणादेव चिन्नभः ।
 यत्र कामकृतो धर्मो जन्तुना येन केन वा ॥
 सकृद्वापि सुधर्माणां फलं फलति कोटिशः ।
 यो जपेत् कामकोष्ठेऽस्मिन् मन्त्रमिष्टार्थदैवतम् ॥
 कोटिवर्णफलेनैव मुक्तिलोकं स गच्छति ।
 यो जपेत् कामकोष्ठेऽस्मिन् क्षणार्धं वा तदर्धकम् ॥
 मुच्यते सर्वपापेभ्यः साक्षात् देवी नराकृतिः ।
 गायत्रीमण्डपाधारं भूनाभिस्थानमुत्तमम् ॥
 पुरुषार्थप्रदं शम्भोः विलाभं तन्नामाम्यहम् ।
 यः कुर्यात् कामकोष्ठस्य विलाभस्य प्रदक्षिणम् ॥
 पदसंख्याक्रमेणैव गोगर्भजननं लभेत् ।
 विश्वकारणनेत्राढ्यां श्रीमत्त्रिपुरसुन्दरीम् ॥
 भण्डकासुरसंहर्त्री कामाक्षीं तामहं भजे ।
 पराजन्मदिने काञ्च्यां महाभ्यन्तरमार्गतः ॥

योऽर्चयेत् तत्र कामाक्षीं कोटिपूजाफलं लभेत् ।
 तत्फलोत्पन्नकैवल्यं सकृत्कामाक्षिसेवया ॥
 त्रिस्थाननिलयं देवं त्रिविधाकारमच्युतम् ।
 प्रतिलिङ्गाग्रसंयुक्तं भूतबन्धं तमाश्रये ॥

REFERENCES

1. The *Mahābhāṣya*, IV, ii, 140.
2. The *Naiṣadha-kāvya*, 12, 33.
3. It is said that the Devī in Kāñcī is called by Saṁbandar as कामकोटि (Kāmakoṭi). But this is not correct. In Sanskrit there are two different letters *ta* and *ḍa*. In Tamil, however, there is only one letter *ta* which is pronounced as *ḍa* also as in the case of *koṭi*. But the word कामकोटि in Saṁbandar's *Tēvāraṁ* cannot be pronounced as *koṭi* and should be pronounced as *kōṭi* for the following reasons:

In the *Kāmākṣī-vilāsa* we find words *Kāmakōṭi* and *Kāmakōṣṭam* used interchangeably in the verses —

- (i) *kāmakōṭi smṛtaḥ so'yaṁ*
- (ii) *tasmāt avaśyaṁ kartavyaṁ kāmakoṣṭasya
 darśanaṁ*

The copper-plate grant of Vijayagaṇḍagopāla refers to the goddess as *Kāñcī-Kāmakōṭi*. Mūka-kavi in his *Mūkapañcaśati* refers to the goddess as *Kāmakōṭi*.

- (i) कामपरिपन्थि कामिनी कामेश्वरी कामपीठमध्यगते ।
कामदुधा भव कमले कामकले कामकोटि कामाक्षी ॥
- (ii) समरविजयकोटि साधकानन्दधाटी मृदुगुणपरिपाटि मुख्यकादंबवाटि ।
मुनिनुतपरिपाटि मोहिताजाण्डकोटि परमशिववधूटि पातु मां कामकोटि ॥

Tirunāvukkarāṣar in his *Tiruttāṇḍagarṇ* of *Tiruvadigai Vīraṭṭāṇaṁ* and Sundaramūrti Nāyanār in his *Onakāntanṇaḷi Tēvāraṁ* in Kāñcī referred to above use the words *Kāmakōṭṭi* and *Kāmalōṭṭam* respectively. The second letter *ṭ* in *kōṭṭi* and in *kōṭṭam* followed by the letter *ṭ* cannot be pronounced as *ḍ*. Nor are the words pronounced as *koḍḍi*. Instead they are pronounced as *kōṭṭi* and *kōṭṭam*. In the same manner, the word *காமகோட்டி* in Saṁbandar's *Tēvāraṁ* must be pronounced as *Kāmakōṭṭi* and not as *Kāmakōḍḍi*.

It should be noted further that the letter “o” in *Kāmakōṭṭi* or *Kāmakōṭṭam* is the long form of “o” although only the symbol for short o (ௌ) was used in *Tēvāraṁ* and stone inscriptions. Spoken Tamil has both short and long forms of e (ஏ). But written Tamil did not have the long form and only the short form served the purpose of both the short and long forms. Consequently the symbol for e when used before a consonant was a hook with a tiny circle at the bottom (ௌ). Constanzo Giuseppe Beschi in the first part of the 18th Century introduced the symbol for long form e (ஔ). And the symbol for long e when used before a consonant was a hook with tiny circles one at the bottom and another at the top. (ஔ).

In the same way written Tamil did have only the short form of *o* (ஓ) And Beschi introduced the symbol for long form of *O* (ஔ). And the symbol for short form of *o* when used before a consonant, say, *ka* followed by the sign 'ஈ' is கொ and the symbol for long *O* is கோ.

(See the article: தமிழ் ஏழுத்துகள் அன்றுமுதல் இன்றுவரை: By சா.கணேசன் (கையேடு கலைக்காட்சி குழு, இரண்டாவது உலகத்தமிழ் கருத்தரங்கு மகாநாடு, சென்னை, 1968.)

Thus till 18th century both short and long forms of *O* were written with the symbol for short form only although the words were pronounced with short *O* or long *O* as the case might have been. From this it follows that the words காமகோட்டி, காமகோட்டம் and காமகோடி should have to be written as காமகொட்டி, காமகொட்டம், காமகொடி in works before 18th century.

4. *Tēvāraṁ* of Sundaramūri, Dharmapuram Edition, 1964, p.50.
5. The worship of Śāstā or Śāttān, or Āryan or Aiyanār is prevalent in South India. In fact many of the villages as Śāttanūr, Śāttamaṅgalam, Śāttappāḍi, Villupuram-Sāttanūr and the like are named after Śāstā or Śāttān. These villages have, besides the temples of Śiva and Viṣṇu, temples dedicated to Śāstā. In Villupuram – Śāttanūr, there are temples and pūjāsthalas dedicated to Śāstā in eight directions. In Tirunelveli district,

the worship of Śāstā is known as Śāstā-prīti and it is performed with Vedic mantras. The place of Āryaṅkāvu wherein Śāstā or Āryan is worshipped predominantly is named after Śāstā or Āryan. Śaṅkara in his *Śivapādādikeśāntastotra* offers salutations to Śāstā. It follows from the above that the idol of Śāstā in the temple of Kāmākṣī is that of a God well known in the Hindu pantheon and worshipped by the Hindus.

6. South Indian Temple Inscription (Govt. Oriental Manuscripts Library, Madras) Part I, No.14,p. 22.
7. *Ibid.*, No. 197, p. 190.
8. *Ibid.*, No. 267, p. 248.
9. *Ibid.*, No. 530, p. 517.
10. *Ibid.*, No. 539, p. 528.
11. *Ibid.*, Part II, No. 597, p.586.
12. *Ibid.*, No. 598, p. 586.
13. *Ibid.*, No. 635, p. 613.
14. *Ibid.*, No. 1042, p. 975.
15. *Ibid.*, No. 1048, p. 980.
16. *Ibid.*, No. 1049, p. 981.
17. *Ibid.*, Pt.III, Sect. I, No. 1175, p.1152.
18. *Ibid.*, Pt.III, Sect. I, No. 1209, p.1220.
19. *Ibid.*, Pt.II, Sect. II, No. 1271-73, pp.1321-23.

20. *Ibid.*, The work *Rājarājan Ulā* speaks of Chidambaram as '*tirukkāmakōṭṭamun̄ surrumāligaiyuth̄.*'
21. A.R. No. 139 of 1916.
22. A.R. No. 487 of 1908.
23. Kailāsanātha Temple, Ilayāttaguḍi.
24. vide: Dattamāñci Narasimhādhvārī's Inscriptions:
 i. पीठीमाद्यां अभेद्यां अकृतकृतमतिः श्रीनृसिंहाध्वरीन्द्रः, No. 350.
 ii. नरसिंहाध्वरी पीठी अजीघटत् No. 349. Annual Report of Epigraphy, 1954-55.
25. *Lalitā-sahasranāma*, verse, 176.
26. vide: *Tīrthāṅk*, Annual Number of *Kalyan* for the year 1957, p.92
27. It is contended that the idol of Kāmākṣī was originally of the form of Buddhist Tārā Devī and that it was fashioned after the *dhyāna-sloka*s of *Śri-Vidyā*. It is also contended that the *Śvarṇa-Kāmākṣī* may be the Goddess of Jain faith – Dharmadevī. These contentions, however, cannot be upheld; for, neither Goddess Tārā of Buddhist faith nor the Dharmadevī of Jaina faith has *ikṣukodaṇḍa puṣpabāṇa*, *pāśa* and *aṅkuśa*. It cannot be said that all these weapons are rechistelled out of the idols of the Goddess of the Buddhist or Jaina faith; for, a new *mūrti* could easily be sculptured instead rechistelling the idols of Goddess of Bhuddhist or Jaina faith into that of Kāmākṣī. Even admitting for the sake of argument that the idol of Kāmākṣī is the rechistelled from of Tārā, yet it should be noted that Tārā is the Goddess referred to in the *Śrīvidyāmnāya*.

ON THE NATURE OF BRAHMAN

C.L. RAMAKRISHNAN*

This paper seeks to present the nature of Brahman as elucidated in the commentary of Sāyaṇa known as *Vedārtha-prakāśa* on the *Prapāṭakas* 7-9 of the *Taittirīyāranyaka*.

In the famous dialogue between Yājñavalkya and Maitreyī set forth in the *Bṛhadāranyaka Upaniṣad*, Yājñavalkya instructs Maitreyī thus:

न वा अरे पत्युः कामाय पतिः प्रियो भवति ।
 आत्मनस्तु कामाय सर्वं प्रियं भवति ॥

 न वा अरे सर्वस्य कामाय सर्वं प्रियं भवति ।
 आत्मनस्तु कामाय सर्वं प्रियं भवति ॥¹

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This means: 'Verily, not for the good of the husband is a husband dear, but for the good of the self is he dear....verily, not for the good of anything is anything dear, but for the good of the self is it dear'.

The Upaniṣad concludes by saying –

आत्मा वा अरे द्रष्टव्यः श्रोतव्यो मन्तव्यो निदिध्यासितव्यः²

'It is the self that is fit to be realized; and for realizing it one must pursue vedāntic study, reflection and meditation'.

From the above it is understood that the objects of the world are not loved for their own sake, but for the sake of the Self. If a thing is good for something else, then that something constitutes the true end. The passages cited above state that everything in the world gets its worth in reference to the Self. We must, therefore, conclude that the self constitutes the Ultimate Value.

Now the question arises as to the exact nature of the Self. In the celebrated dialogue between Janaka and Yājñavalkya recorded in the section known as *Jyotirbrāhmaṇa* in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, Janaka raises the question as to what may be the light on the basis of which the person with body-mind-complex acts.

याज्ञवल्क्य! किं ज्योतिरेव अयं पुरुष इति? ³

Yājñavalkya initially suggests the luminaries like the Sun, the moon, the fire and the speech and finally affirms that it is the Self that serves as the light for the person to act.

आत्मैव अस्य ज्योतिर्भवति इति । आत्मनैव अयं ज्योतिषा
आस्ते पल्यते कर्म कुरुते विपल्येति।⁴

To the question as to what is the nature of the Self, Yājñavalkya replies –

यो अयं विज्ञानमयः प्राणेषु हृद्यन्तर्ज्योतिः पुरुषः। स समानः
सन् उभौ लोकौ अनुसञ्चरति ध्यायति इव लेलायति इव।⁵

'It is the self-luminous consciousness immanent in the heart, distinct from the vital airs and identified with the intellect. And being identified with the intellect it moves between the two worlds; it thinks *as it were*, moves *as it were*'.

Yājñavalkya proceeds to say that this self which is pure consciousness, by being falsely identified with the internal organ experiences the three states of waking, dream and deep sleep. He explains this on the basis of the analogy of a large fish and a falcon thus:

तद् यथा महामत्स्यः उभे कुले अनुसञ्चरति पूर्वं च अपरं च
एवमेव अयं पुरुष एतावुभावन्तावनुसञ्चरति स्वप्नान्तं च
बुद्धान्तम् च।⁶

तद्यथा अस्मिन्नाकाशे श्येनो वा सुपर्णो वा विपरिपत्य
श्रान्तः संहत्य पक्षौ संलयायैव ध्रियते एवमेव अयं पुरुषः
एतस्मा अन्ताय धावति यत्र सुप्तो न कञ्चन कामं कामयते
न कञ्चन स्वप्नं पश्यति।⁷

These two texts mean:

'Just as a large fish swims alternately to both the banks of a river, so does this self move to both the states of dream and waking';

'Just as a hawk or falcon roaming in the sky becomes tired, folds its wings and hastens to its nest so does this self hastens for the state of deep sleep where falling asleep he cherishes no more desires and has no more dreams'.

It may be added here that the self is pure consciousness. When associated with māyā or avidyā, the subtle body consisting of the five organs of knowledge, the five organs of action, the five-fold vital-air and the internal organ in its two-fold aspect of intellect and mind and the gross body is the experient of the waking state. When associated with māyā and the subtle body, it is the experient of the dream state. And, when associated with māyā alone, it is the experient of the deep sleep state. It comes to this that the blend of the consciousness and the body-mind complex constitutes the soul. The consciousness-element in the soul is constant in and also the witness of the three states.

Yājñavalkya further states that the self-luminous consciousness is supra-relational as it is unattached.

स यत् तत्र किञ्चित् पश्यति अनन्वागतः तेन भवति;
असङ्गोऽह्ययं पुरुषः।⁸

This is as it should be; for, the world of dream and that of waking are not present in the state of deep sleep. The world of dream is not present in the waking state and the objects of the waking state are not present in the state of dream. All these three appear alternately and so they are not real. The self-luminous consciousness which serves as the underlying

principle of the three states which are not real is never affected by them. This is the significance of the teaching of Yājñavalkya referred to above.

It should be noted here that the self-luminous consciousness is the true nature of the soul, as the soul is only a blend of the self-luminous consciousness and the body-mind complex. The blend is caused by *māyā* which is identical with *avidyā*.

The Upaniṣadic text —

अयं आत्मा ब्रह्म।⁹

identifies the self-luminous consciousness known as *Ātman* as Brahman. Brahman is described in the *Taittirīya* text —

सत्यं ज्ञानम् अनन्तं ब्रह्म।¹⁰

as real, of the nature of consciousness and infinite. The three terms— *satya*, *jñāna* and *ananta* are in syntactic equation to one another. A syntactic equation is two-fold as primary and secondary. The primary one is that where the terms convey an unitary entity involving no relation; while the secondary one is that where the words convey the sense of relation. In statements such as 'This is that Devadatta', the words are said to be in primary syntactic equation as they convey the person — Devadatta-in-himself. And in the statement such as 'The lotus lying in water is blue, fragrant and big', the words are said to be in secondary syntactic equation as they signify the object, lotus with different characteristics.

A characteristic is two-fold as *viśeṣaṇa* and *lakṣaṇa*. The former one is that which distinguishes the object to be defined from the objects of its own kind. The second one is that which distinguishes the object from everything that is different from it. The term— *satya*, *jñāna* and *ananta* serve as *lakṣaṇa* in the sense that they distinguish Brahman from the non-real, insentient and limited entities. When it is said that space is an expanse extending in all directions (*avakāśa*), this characteristic does not exclude space from an object of its kind, as space is one only. Yet, this characteristic distinguishes the space from objects which are dissimilar to it. In the same way, the terms— *satya*, etc., distinguish Brahman from objects dissimilar to it.¹¹

Of these, the term — *satya* signifies that which does not leave out its true nature like the rope which serves as the substratum of the snake-illusion. An object is non-real, if it leaves out its form at some point of time. For example, the snake that appears in the rope. When viewed in this light, Brahman which is the underlying principle of everything remains to be the same even during the state of liberation. Hence it is *satya* or real. The world, on the other hand, is sublated at the dawn of right knowledge and as it ceases to exist during the state of liberation, it is non-real. The text—

मायामात्रमिदं द्वैतम् अद्वैतं परमार्थतः।¹²

states that the world characterised by duality is illusory and Brahman — the substratum of the absence of duality is real.

The *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* provides the illustrative example of pot, etc., which are the effects, and the lump of clay, etc., which constitute the cause to prove that the world which is the effect is non-real and Brahman the cause is real.¹³

When it is said in the *Chāndogya* text that Brahman is real on the analogy of the lump of clay which is said to be real, a doubt may arise that Brahman may be insentient in nature. It is thus: Brahman is insentient; it is because it is real, like the lump of clay. In order to dispel this doubt, the *Upaniṣad* states that Brahman is *jñāna*. The lump of clay which is only provisionally real till there arises the knowledge of Brahman is insentient. Brahman, on the other hand, is absolutely real in the sense that it does not undergo any change at any point of time.

When it is said that Brahman is of the nature of knowledge, there may arise the doubt that it is limited. The basis for this doubt is: 'Brahman is limited; it is because it is the significance of the term — *jñāna*, like the knowledge of pot'. In ordinary experience the significance of the term — *jñāna* is the specific kind of mental state that brings in a relation between pot and its manifestation. Such a sense is arrived at on the basis of the etymological derivation of the word of the form 'that by which pot, etc., are known' (*jñāyate sphoryate ghaṭādīkam anena iti*). In order to dispel this doubt, the word *ananta* is given in the text. It is because of the presence of the term — *ananta*, the word *jñāna* is taken in the

sense of knowledge-in-itself (*jñaptih, jñānam*). Unlike the knowledge of pot, for example, which is a kind of mental state and which is, therefore, limited the significance of the term *jñāna* is not a mental state and so it is not subject to limitation.

The word *ananta* signifies that which is free from limitations. There are three kinds of limitations; and, they are: limitation by time, limitation by space, and limitation by objects. Limitation by time consists in an object being existent at one point of time and non-existent at another point of time. Limitation by space consists in an object being present at one place and not present at another place. Limitation by objects consist in an object being existent in its own form and non-existent in the form of another object.

Our author states that the Śruti text—

आकाशवत् सर्वगतश्च नित्यः

affirms that Brahman is eternal and omnipresent like space. It is eternal in the sense that it is related to all points of time. It is omnipresent in the sense that it is present everywhere. Further, the Upaniṣadic text —

ब्रह्मैवेदम् अमृतं पुरस्तात् पश्चात् ब्रह्म दक्षिणतश्च उत्तरेण।

अधश्चोर्ध्वं च प्रसृतं ब्रह्मैवेदं विश्वमिदं वरिष्ठम् ¹⁴

states that Brahman is of the form of every object and is immortal. From this it is known that since there is no object apart from Brahman there is no question of Brahman being limited or conditioned by other objects. Thus that which is

distinguished from entities which are non-real, insentient and limited is Brahman.

An objection suggests itself at this stage: the terms — *satya*, *jñāna* and *ananta* are stated to be intent upon eliminating or excluding that which is not real, which is not of the nature of consciousness and which is not all-pervasive. In that case, since the sense of the term — Brahman is not well known in ordinary experience, the text consisting of these words as a whole cannot refer to anything.

Our author answers this objection by saying that the word — Brahman in the text—

सत्यं ज्ञानम् अनन्तं ब्रह्म

etymologically means that which is all-pervasive.¹⁵ He further cites the following passage from Śaṅkara's commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra*—

सर्वस्य आत्मत्वाच्च ब्रह्मास्तित्वप्रसिद्धिः सर्वो ह्यात्मास्तित्वं
प्रत्येति¹⁶

This passage means that the existence of Brahman is well-known as the self of every being. And every being experiences the existence of one's own self. That Brahman is the true nature of the individual soul is proclaimed by the Upaniṣadic text—

अयं आत्मा ब्रह्म¹⁷

Since the sense of the term — Brahman is well-known, the

term — *satya*, *jñāna* and *ananta* could serve as the *lakṣaṇa* of Brahman.¹⁸

Our author further states that the terms — *satya*, *jñāna* and *ananta* can be serve as the *viśeṣaṇas* of Brahman too. It is thus: these three terms together convey the true nature of Brahman. And each term has a restrictive force upon the other two. The term — *satya* which signifies absence of sublation conveys the three-fold reality, namely, apparent reality, empirical reality and absolute reality. Shell-silver, etc. possess apparent reality as they are not sublated as long as they are manifested. The world of objects possesses empirical reality as it is not sublated in ordinary experience prior to the rise of the knowledge of Brahman. Brahman has absolute reality as it is not sublated even after the rise of the knowledge of Brahman. The word *satya* conveys these three kinds of real objects. But when restricted by the terms — *jñāna* and *ananta* it signifies Brahman only. It is because neither the apparently real object nor the empirically real one is of the nature of consciousness or is infinite or is all-pervasive. The word *jñāna* too signifies both consciousness and also the mental state inspired by the reflection of consciousness in it. But its significance is restricted by the other two words *satya* and *ananta* and therefore it stands for Brahman only. Never indeed is the mental state unsublatable like Brahman, or is free from the three kinds of limitations. The word *ananta* too conveys the sense of space which is free from the limitations

of the form 'it exists here', 'it does not exist there' and also Brahman which is free from any limitation whatsoever. But its significative power to convey the sense of space is precluded by the term *satya* and *jñāna*. Never indeed does space possess absolute reality and also independent manifestation. Thus these three terms convey Brahman which is immutably real, which is of the nature of consciousness and which is free from any duality. In this connection our author cites the following verse in support of the view set forth above:

कौटस्थ्यमेव सत्यत्वं स्फुरणं ज्ञानमुच्यते ।

आनन्त्यं एकता च एवं बोद्धव्यते ब्रह्म तैः त्रिभिः ॥¹⁹

It must be noted here that the term— *ananta* conveys Brahman as that which is free from the three limitations. The terms *satya* and *jñāna*, however, convey Brahman not only as different from that which is unreal and insentient but also as being of the nature of real and of consciousness.²⁰

It may be asked that if these three words convey one and the same Brahman, then there is the unwelcome position of treating these as synonyms. But this objection is not valid. It is because these three words although convey one and the same entity cannot be treated as synonyms in view of the fact that the processes through which these terms convey Brahman are different from one another. The words *satya*, *jñāna* and *ananata* convey Brahman through the elimination of three

different characteristics, namely, non-reality, insentience and finite nature. Thus Brahman is known to be real, consciousness and infinite by nature. These three constitute the *svarūpa-lakṣaṇa* of Brahman.

The *Taittirīya* text —

यतो वा इमानि भूतानि जायन्ते, येन जातानि जीवन्ति
यत् प्रयन्त्यभिसंविशन्ति, तद्विजिज्ञासस्व²¹

conveys Brahman as the cause of the world. The characteristic of being the cause of the world serves as the *qualification per accidens* (*tatastha-lakṣaṇa*) of Brahman.

To sum up this part of the discussion: the self-luminous consciousness is viewed as the soul which is the experient of the states of waking, dream and deep sleep; it is identical with Brahman which is real, consciousness and infinite by nature and it acquires the characteristic of being the cause of the world; and, as associated with this characteristic it is viewed as God. It is enough for our present purpose to refer to one important point, viz., that in the text — *tat tvam asi* the primary meaning of the word- *tvam* is the soul and its secondary meaning is the pure consciousness. In the same way, Brahman as possessing the characteristic of the world is the primary meaning of the word — *tat* and Brahman as real, consciousness and infinite by nature is its secondary sense.

Now we have to discuss the question as to whether Brahman could be known from the means of knowledge other

that the śruti-text. To begin with, Brahman identical with Ātman cannot be known through external sense-organs.

The *Kena Upaniṣad*—

न तत्र चक्षुर्गच्छति न वाग्गच्छति नो मनः²²

states that Brahman transcends the sense of sight, sense of speech and mind. The reason as to why Brahman transcends the sense of sight is set forth in the text of the *Kaṭha Upaniṣad*.

न सन्दृशे तिष्ठति रूपस्य न चक्षुषा पश्यति कश्चन एनम्²³

This text means: there is no colour or material shape in Brahman which would enable one to perceive it through the sense of sight. Just as Brahman transcends the sense of sight in view of the fact that it does not possess colour, in the same way it transcends the sense of hearing, the sense of touch, the sense of taste and the sense of smell in view of the fact that it is free from sound, touch, taste, and smell. This is stated in the following *Kaṭha Upaniṣadic* text

अशब्दं अस्पर्शं अरूपं अव्ययम् तथा अरसं नित्यं अगन्धवच्च
यत्²⁴

It comes to this that Brahman could not be comprehended by the sense -organs.

Brahman cannot be known through inference too. It is because in order that a factor may be established on the basis of inference what is required is the ground of inference. Brahman being the supra-relational entity cannot have any

relation to any ground of inference. On this ground it is ascertained that Brahman cannot be known through inference. The *Chāndogya* text—

सदेव सौम्य इदमग्र आसीत् एकमेव अद्वितीयम्²⁵

states that Brahman is free from any duality whatsoever. On this ground we cannot have any analogy on the basis of which we can identify Brahman. Hence Brahman cannot be known through inference.

It might be said that Brahman can be known through the following inferential arguments

'Earth, etc., is produced by an agent; it is because they are effects; like a pot'.

This contention is not correct. It is because from this inferential argument what could be known is that there is an agent and it could not be known that that agent is real, consciousness and infinite in nature.

Further Brahman is like nothing and unlike everything. Hence it cannot be known through comparison too.

It might be said Brahman could be known through the ritualistic section of the Veda. The latter provides us with the knowledge that a particular sacrifice is the means to a desired end, viz., heaven. The physical body perishes here and so it cannot experience the fruit in a hereafter. There must, therefore, be an enduring principle different from the physical body as the experient of the fruit of heaven, etc. And that

experient is the self. Thus it may be argued that the self which is said to be identical with Brahman is known from the ritualistic section of the Veda itself.

Our author states that this argument does not hold good. No doubt the ritualistic section of the Veda implies that there is the self different from the physical body. Yet it is not known thereby that that self is of the nature of pure consciousness, real and infinite.

Śaṅkara in his *adhyāsa-bhāṣya* states—

शास्त्रीये तु व्यवहारे यद्यपि बुद्धिपूर्वकारी न अविदित्वा आत्मनः
परलोकसंबन्धम् अधिक्रियते, तथापि न वेदान्तवेद्यम् अशनायाद्यतीतम्
अपेतब्रह्मक्षत्रादिभेदम् असंसारि आत्मतत्त्वम् अधिकारे अपेक्ष्यते
अनुपयोगात् अधिकारिविरोधाच्च।²⁶

Our author refers to the following verse from the *Brahmasiddhi* of Maṇḍana—

सर्वप्रत्ययवेद्ये च ब्रह्मरूपे व्यवस्थिते ।
प्रपञ्चस्य प्रविलयः शब्देन प्रतिपाद्यते ॥

This text means: every object that is known through the means of knowledge is known as *sat*. And *sat* is Brahman. It might be argued that Brahman is known through all means of knowledge. But it is not correct. It is because what is known through means of knowledge is not Brahman, the pure Being, but only Brahman as associated with the objects of the world. In other words, what is known through the means of knowledge

is Brahman which is cosmic in nature. The supreme human end, viz., liberation would result from the knowledge of Brahman which is acosmic in nature. And Brahman of this nature could be known only through the Upaniṣads.

Maṇḍana confirms the above view in the passage—

प्रविलीनप्रपञ्चेन तद्रूपेण न गोचरः ।

मानान्तरस्य इति मतम् आम्लायैकनिबन्धनम् ॥²⁸

This text means: Brahman free from its relation to the world never comes within the range of any means of knowledge excepting the *Upaniṣads*.

Our author while re-confirming the above view states that it is with this in view the author of the *Brahma-sūtra* in the aphorism.

शास्त्रयोनित्वात्²⁹

states that scripture or the śruti is the means of knowing Brahman. The ritualistic section of the Veda prescribes several ritual-acts the performance of which without any attachment toward their fruits will purify one's heart and make one eligible to pursue vedāntic study, etc., with a view to attain the knowledge of Brahman. The meditative exercises prescribed in the Upaniṣadic-section of the Veda when pursued with earnestness would give forth concentration of thought. And the major-texts of the Upaniṣads such as *tat tvam asi* and the like would give forth the direct knowledge of Brahman. It is with this in view the author of the *Brahma-*

sūtra has said that the scripture is the means of knowing Brahman.

Our author in support of the above view cites the relevant passages from the *Vaiyāsakīya-nyāyamālā* which are as follows:

अस्त्यन्यमेयताप्यस्य किं वा वेदैकमेयता ।
 घटवत् सिद्धवस्तुत्वात् ब्रह्मान्येनापि मीयते ॥
 रूपलिङ्गादिराहित्यात् नास्य मान्तरयोग्यता ।
 तं तु औपनिषदेत्यादौ प्रोक्ता वेदैकमेयता ॥³⁰

From the above it follows that the Upaniṣads constitute the means of knowing Brahman. But the *Taittirīya* text

यतो वाचो निवर्तन्ते अप्राप्य मनसा सह³¹

states that words cannot convey Brahman. Our author in this connection cites a passage from the *Naīskarmya-siddhi* of Sureśvara which sets forth the reason for the words not conveying Brahman. And that verse is:

षष्ठीगुणक्रियाजातिरूढयः शब्दहेतवः ।
 नात्मन्यन्यतमोमीषां तेनात्मा नाभिधीयते ॥³²

This text means: the primary signification is that power which is present in a word and which enables the latter to convey a sense through one of the following media, namely, a relation, a quality, an activity, a class-characteristic and customary or traditional usage. For example, the word 'one who has stick' signifies the person having a stick through the medium, the

relation of contact between stick and the man. The word – ‘white’ in the expression – ‘white cloth’ conveys the sense of cloth through the medium – the quality of whiteness. The word ‘sacrificer’ signifies a person who perform sacrifices through the medium – the act of performing sacrifices. The word ‘cow’ signifies the object, cow through the medium cownes which is a class-characteristic. The word ‘cloud’ conveys the sense of cloud through customary or traditional usage. None of these media is possible in the case of Brahman. The first four, namely, relation, quality, action and class-characteristic, in order that they may be viewed as existing in a particular object must be related to that object. And the relation through which they are related to the object is known as inherence. It comes to this that if the above four factors are to be viewed as present in Brahman, it must be admitted that they are related to Brahman through the relation of inherence.

The concept of relation as such does not stand logical scrutiny. It is becuse the relation, contact (*samyaga*) rests in two relata, namely, pot and the cloth. The relation known as contact in order that it may serve as a relation must be related to the relata. Thus we arrive at two more relations each one of them must be related to its respective relata. And so on *ad infinitum*. Further the Upaniṣadic text

असङ्गोऽह्ययं पुरुषः³³

states that Brahman is supra-relational. Hence none of the

above four factor is present in Brahman; and, so the words of the Upaniṣads cannot convey Brahman through primary signification.

In the same way, customary usage also cannot serve as the medium for the words of the Upaniṣads to convey Brahman through primary signification. For, it holds good only in those cases where the sense that is conveyed by a word could be comprehended by perception or proofs other than verbal testimony. The object 'cloud' is the conventional sense of the word, 'cloud'. In this case, the object cloud is known through perception and the significative relation between the word, cloud and the object, cloud is known from the usage of the elders. If Brahman should be conveyed in the above manner by the words of the *Upaniṣads*, then it must come within the range of perception and the significative relation between the words of the *Upaniṣads* and Brahman should be comprehended. And Brahman in order that it may come within the range of perception must first come within the range of mind. The *Taittirīya* text cited above, however, states that mind does not function in respect of Brahman. This is because Brahman is that which manifests the mind and other factors and so it is not reasonable to hold that what is manifested, namely, the mind could comprehend its manifesting reality, namely, Brahman. It follows from this that the mind does not function in respect of Brahman and hence the latter does not come within the range of perception. And in view of this, the significative relation between

the words of the Upaniṣads and Brahman could not be comprehended. Hence the former cannot convey through customary usage.³⁴ Thus the absence of the media through which words convey Brahman through primary signification suggests that Brahman cannot be conveyed through primary signification. This is the import of *Taittirīya* text—

यतो वाचो निवर्तन्ते

Now the aphorism—

शास्त्रयोनित्वात्³⁵

and the Upaniṣadic text—

तं तु औपनिषदं पुरुषं पृच्छामि³⁶

which convey that Brahman could be known only through the Upaniṣads must be understood in the sense that Brahman is secondarily conveyed by the words of the Upaniṣads. And this requires a discussion regarding the nature of the secondary signification.

The secondary signification is the power that is present in a word through which the latter conveys a sense which is different but invariably connected with its primary sense.

The above is of three kinds:

- i. *jahallakṣaṇā* or exclusive secondary signification;
- ii. *a-jahallakṣaṇā* or non-exclusive secondary signification; and,

iii. *jahad-ajahallakṣaṇā* or exclusive-cum-non-exclusive secondary signification.

These three may be defined and illustrated as follows:

Jahallakṣaṇā is that power through which a word completely leaves out its primary sense and signifies some other sense that is invariably connected with its primary sense. This kind is noticed in the case of the sentence 'The hamlet is on the Ganges'. The literal meaning of the text is the presence of the hamlet on the current of the river Ganges; and, it is opposed to perception. The word 'Ganges', therefore, leaves out its primary sense and conveys the sense of bank which is invariably connected with the current of the Ganges – the primary sense.

Ajahallakṣaṇā is that power through which a word retains its primary sense and further conveys some other sense connected with its primary sense. This kind is noticed in the case of the sentence, 'The red (horse) runs'. The literal meaning of the latter is 'The quality of redness runs'. This is opposed to perception and hence the word 'red' retains its primary sense of redness and conveys the sense of horse to which redness belongs.

Jahad-ajahallakṣaṇā is that power through which a word leaves out a part of its primary sense and conveys another part. This kind is operative in the case of sentences such as 'This is that Brahmin'. The word 'this' conveys primarily a

Brahmin related to present time and a particular place. The sentence as a whole should convey the identity between the meanings of the two words constituting it. Here the meanings of the two words are opposed to each other and hence the identity between the two is impossible. Hence the two words leave out a part of their primary sense, namely, the spatial and temporal relation and convey another part, viz., the person-in-himself.³⁷

We shall now consider the process through which the words of the text —

सत्यं ज्ञानं अनन्तं ब्रह्म।

convey Brahman. We have said that a word could secondarily signify only that sense which is associated with its primary sense. So we must first discuss the primary sense of the words *satyam*, *jñānam* and *anantam*. The phenomenal entities are empirically real; Brahman is absolutely real and the blend of the space, etc., which are empirically real and Brahman which is absolutely real has a third mode of reality. The word *satya* primarily conveys the blend of space, etc., and Brahman.³⁸ In the same way, according to Advaita the modification of the mind which is known as *vṛtti* reveals the consciousness conditioned by the object that is cognized. It is the mental state inspired by the reflection of consciousness in it that is figuratively spoken of as knowledge. The true nature of the soul is self-luminous knowledge which is absolutely real. And in the blend of the two there is the state of being knowledge. The

word *jñāna* primarily conveys the blend of the mental state and the self-luminous consciousness which is Brahman, that is Ātman.³⁹ In the same way, all-pervasiveness is noticed in space and also in Brahman. And in the blend of the two, there is another mode of all-pervasiveness. And the word — *ananta* primarily conveys the blend of the two. The primary senses of the words having been considered, it is now easier to identify the secondary sense. Out of the three kinds of secondary signification mentioned earlier, we have to adopt the third one, namely, exclusive-non-exclusive secondary signification. It is because the primary sense of each of these terms is a complex entity and so the adjectival part must be excluded and the substantive part must be retained. And this is possible only if this kind of secondary signification is adopted. Thus the word *satya* primarily conveys the blend of space and Brahman. Through exclusive-non-exclusive secondary signification, it leaves out the adjectival part, viz., the space which is empirically real and retains the substantive part which is the consciousness-element. And exactly similar consideration applies to the other two words too. Hence the text as a whole conveys Brahman as real, consciousness and infinite. In this process they eliminate their opposites, namely, non-reality, insentience and finitude.

It may be noted that these words do not give us the complete knowledge of the nature of Brahman. The author of the *Brahma-sūtras* in the aphorism.

आनन्दादयः प्रधानस्य⁴⁰

prescribes a method of gathering the unrepeated words that are found in the Upaniṣadic passages that speak of the nature of Brahman. According to the traditional interpretation of Advaita, the words thus gathered amount to ten; and, they are *nitya, śuddha, buddha, mukta, satya, sūkṣma, sat, vibhu, advitīya* and *ānanda*.⁴¹ These words constitute a sentence and they convey the nature of Brahman to be real, consciousness, bliss, etc., and at the same time they eliminate their opposites.

One objection may be raised as to why it is admitted that the word-*satya*, etc., convey one and the same Brahman. It is answered that according to rules of language, if the words constituting the sentence are juxtaposed and have similar case-endings they are intended to convey an unitary sense involving no relation whatsoever. This we have noticed in expressions such as '*rājā aśokaḥ*' wherein the two words having similar case-ending are juxtaposed to each other and they convey the unitary sense of the king, that is, Aśoka.

There are certain other Upaniṣadic text which are negative in nature. The *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* text—

अस्थूलम् अनणु अह्रस्वम् अदीर्घम्.....अवायु अनाकाशम् अरसम्
अगन्धम् अचक्षुष्कम् अश्रोत्रम् अवाक् अमनः। etc.⁴²

states that Brahman is neither gross nor subtle, neither short nor long.....it is neither air nor space, it is unattached; 'it is

without taste or smell, without eyes or ears, without tongue or mind. This text thus speaks of the nature of Brahman as free from any material shape. But the *Chāndogya* text—

तदेतत् चतुष्पात् ब्रह्म ⁴³

refers to Brahman as having the sense of speech, nose, eyes and ears as his four feet. From this a doubt arises as to whether Brahman has a material shape or not. Further the *Chāndogya* text—

एष आत्मा अपहतपाप्मा विजरो विमृत्युः विशोकः विजिघत्सः सत्यकामः
सत्यसङ्कल्पः ⁴⁴

states that Brahman is free from sin, decay, death, grief, hunger and thirst; it has desire and resolve that never go unfulfilled. And the *Śvetāsvatara* text—

निर्गुणः ⁴⁵

speaks of Brahman as free from any attribute. A study of all these text shows that Brahman is attributeless and at the same time endowed with attributes. It has material shape and at the same time free from it. But logically viewed an entity cannot have two mutually contradictory features. Hence the author of the *sūtras* in the *adhikaraṇa* entitled *ubhayaliṅgādhikaraṇa*⁴⁶ states that Brahman is attributeless and formless. Yet, for the purpose of meditation it is referred to as having attributes and forms. These are not real. They are only illusorily projected by *māyā*. Our author in this connection cites the relevant passages from the *Vaiyāsakīya-nyāyamālā* in support of the above view. And the passages are:

ब्रह्म किं रूपि वारूपि भवेन्निरूपमेव वा
 द्विविधश्रुतिसद्भावाद्ब्रह्म स्यादुभयात्मकम् ।
 नीरूपमेव वेदान्तैः प्रतिपाद्यमपूर्वतः
 रूपं त्वनूद्यते ध्यातुमुभयत्वं विरुध्यते ॥⁴⁷

We shall now set forth the logical significance of the text *tat tvam asi*. The word *tat* primarily signifies Brahman which possesses the characteristic of being the cause of the universe, that is God. The word *tvam* primarily signifies the soul who is the experient of the three states – waking, dream and deep sleep. Any identity between the two senses is impossible as God and soul – the primary senses of the words *tat* and *tvam* possess mutually contradictory features such as omniscience and finite knowledge, omnipotence and limited power, etc. God and soul, are complex entities. God is only pure consciousness associated with the adventitious feature of being the original. And the soul is only the pure consciousness associated with the characteristic of being a reflected image. The terms *tat* and *tvam* through exclusive-cum-non-exclusive secondary signification leave out the adjectival features and convey the consciousness element in both the primary senses. The logical significance of the text, therefore, is that Brahman, the true nature of God is non-different from Ātman, the true nature of the soul.

To sum up:

Brahman identical with Ātman is the ultimate Reality; it

is free from any form or attribute; it is of the nature of pure consciousness and bliss; it appears as God, world and the soul through the principle of *māyā* which is identical with *avidyā*.

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13. *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* (CU), 6.1.4.ff.
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15. बृहतेर्धातोः अर्धानुगमेन ब्रह्मशब्दार्थस्य प्रसिद्धत्वात्, VP,p.555.

16. *Śaṅkarā's bhāṣya (ŚB)*, on the *Brahma-sūtra (BS)*, 1.1.1.
17. *BU*, 4.4.5.
18. *VP*, p.555.
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20. तेषु अनन्तशब्दः इतरव्यावृत्तिमुखेनैव ब्रह्म विशिनष्टि। सत्यज्ञानशब्दौ तु स्वार्थरूपं कूटस्थत्वं स्फुरणं च समर्पयन्तौ तद्विपरीतं मिथ्यात्वं जाड्यं च अर्थान्निवारयन्तौ विशेषत्वं प्राप्नुतः। *Ibid.*, p.556.
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**ON THE NATURE OF LIBERATION ACCORDING
TO ADVAITA**

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In the history of Indian Philosophy, there is a great antithesis between Advaita on the one hand, and Viśiṣṭādvaita on the other. The former emphasizes the view that there is one only and not many, while the latter affirms that there is one in many or many in one. Naturally the Philosophy of Advaita involves the doctrine of avidyā which implies that the material world is an illusion, the soul is none other than Brahman and knowledge is the sole means to liberation which could be attained here and now. All this is totally opposed to the Viśiṣṭādvaita position that God, the soul and the world are distinct realities and *bhakti* is the sole means to liberation which is to be attained in a hereafter. Rāmānuja — the ex-

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pounder of the Viśiṣṭādvaita system has challenged the basic tenets of Advaita while building up his system. Thus there is continuity and connection, action and reaction, thesis and antithesis between Advaita and Viśiṣṭādvaita and the latter can never be really understood unless it is seen in the light of its connection with the system of Advaita.

Abhayaṅkara Vāsudeva Śāstri has addressed himself to this task in his work *Advaitāmōda*. Having acquired a firmer and deeper hold on the principles of Advaita and Viśiṣṭādvaita by writing commentaries on some of the important texts of the two systems, he has written the *Advaitāmōda* wherein he has defended Advaita against the criticism of Viśiṣṭādvaita.

This paper seeks to present the nature of liberation according to Advaita on the basis of the study of the *Advaitāmōda*.

According to Advaita, the soul is Brahman with certain characteristics such as agency, etc., superimposed upon it because of its false identity with the mind. This false identity is caused by avidyā. And when avidyā is removed, the relation of mind to Brahman will be removed. The latter will cease to be a soul and will remain as Brahman. And this is liberation.

Avidyā will be removed by the direct knowledge of Brahman. The latter would arise from the texts of the Upaniṣads like *tat tvam asi*, etc. In order that the direct knowledge of Brahman that arises from the Upaniṣad's may

become efficacious in dispelling avidyā, what is required is that the mind of the aspirant must be free from *pramāṇāsambhāvanā*, *prameyāsambhāvanā* and *viparīta-bhāvanā*. These are respectively removed by *śravaṇa*, *manana*, and *nididhyāsana*.

The *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* text—

आत्मा वा अरे द्रष्टव्यः श्रोतव्यः मन्तव्यः निदिध्यासितव्यः¹

prescribes *śravaṇa*, *manana*, and *nididhyāsana* as the [proximate] means of the knowledge of Brahman.

In order that *śravaṇa*, etc., may be pursued what is necessary is purity of heart (*sattvaśuddhi*) which results in *nityānityavastuviveka*, *ihāmūtrarthabhogavirāga*, *śamādisādhanaśampat* and *mumukṣutva* which are characterized as the 'four-fold aid' (*sādhana-catustya*). Of these, the factor *śamādhisādhanaśampat* contains *sannyāsa* or renunciation of all activities.

Sattvaśuddhi results from the performance of *karma* as an offering to God. This is known as *karma-yoga*. Thus the scheme of practical discipline in Advaita is: performance of *karma* results in *cittaśuddhi*; the 'four-fold aid' ensues as a matter of course. *Karma* is to be relinquished at this stage. *Śravaṇa*, etc., which are characterized as *jñāna-yoga* are to be pursued till the mind of the aspirant becomes freed from the *asambhāvanas*. Then the direct knowledge of Brahman which has arisen from the *Upaniṣads*, being free from all impediments, would dispel avidyā.

From the above it follows that the knowledge of Brahman is the sole means to liberation; and, the *Uttaramīmāṃsā-śāstra* which treats of the *jñāna-kāṇḍa* of the Veda is addressed with reference to a specific class of persons possessing the 'four-fold aid'. In other words, the prerequisite for the study of Vedānta or the *Uttaramīmāṃsā-śāstra* is the possession of the 'four-fold aid'. This is the view of Śaṅkara and his followers.

Rāmānuja rejects the view of Advaita that the *Uttaramīmāṃsā-śāstra* is addressed with reference to one who has acquired the four-fold aid. He says that one who has learnt the Veda by rote along with its auxiliaries comes to know in a general way that the *karma-kāṇḍa* speaks of the causal relation between sacrifices and heaven, etc. He then enters into the study of the *Pūrvamīmāṃsā-śāstra* that discusses the import of the *karma-kāṇḍa* with a view to ascertain the exact nature of the ritual-actions and their fruits. He is convinced thereby that the ritual-actions would give forth only ephemeral fruits. Then knowing in a general manner that the *jñāna-kāṇḍa* deals with the knowledge of Brahman whose result is liberation, he enters into the study of the *Uttaramīmāṃsā-śāstra* that treats of the *jñāna-kāṇḍa*.² Thus, according to Rāmānuja, the prerequisite for the study of the *Uttaramīmāṃsā* is the study of the *Pūrvamīmāṃsā*. Rāmānuja thus uphold the view that the two śāstras constitute a single text and are addressed with reference to the same class of persons.

The inquiry into the nature of Brahman requires an antecedent factor. And it is the latter that is conveyed by the word *atha* in the first aphorism of the *Brahma-sūtra- athā'to brahma-jijñāsa*. According to Śaṅkara the antecedent factor is the possession of the 'four-fold aid', while according to Rāmānuja, it is the study of the *Pūrvamīmāṃsā-śāstra*.

The contention of Rāmānuja has already been anticipated and answered in the earlier works on Advaita. Śaṅkara himself in his commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra* states that the antecedent factor must be one in the presence of which the inquiry into the nature of Brahman would invariably result. He points out that even prior to the inquiry into the nature of the ritual-actions and their fruits by the study of the *Pūrvamīmāṃsā*, one would embark upon the study of the *Uttaramīmāṃsā* with a view to ascertain the nature of Brahman, in case one possesses the 'four-fold aid' specified earlier.³ From this it follows that the study of the *Uttaramīmāṃsā* need not invariably be preceded by the *Pūrvamīmāṃsā*, and it is invariably preceded by the possession of the 'four-fold aid'.

Śaṅkara further points out that the *Pūrvamīmāṃsā-śāstra* and the *Uttaramīmāṃsā-śāstra* differ from each other in regard to their fruits as well as their content. Ritual-actions which are known from the study of the *Pūrvamīmāṃsā* must be achieved by physical activity. They are not present at the time when they are known. And the fruit of the ritual-action is only material prosperity which is evanescent. Brahman, on the other hand, which is known from the study of the

Uttaramīmāṃsā need not be achieved as it is ever-existent. And its knowledge gives rise to spiritual felicity which is liberation that is identical with Brahman.⁴

Rāmānuja holds the view that Brahman — the ultimate reality is associated with all attributes; and so, according to him, it is possible that it could come within the range of meditation. Meditation, being a mental activity, is always an object of injunction. Thus, just as the *karma-kāṇḍa* enjoins the performance of sacrifices, etc., as the means to heaven, etc., in the same way, *jñāna-kāṇḍa* prescribes meditation upon Brahman as the means to liberation.⁵ Hence the *Pūrvamīmāṃsā-śāstra* and *Uttaramīmāṃsā-śāstra* which treat of the *karma-kāṇḍa* and the *jñāna-kāṇḍa* constitute a single text.

It may be added here that Śaṅkara too holds the view that Brahman associated with attributes is an object of meditation. The meditative worships (*vidyās*) prescribed in the Upaniṣads are related to the conditioned Brahman, that is, Brahman associated with attributes, and they are intended to achieve concentration of thought which is essential for pursuing *nididhyāsana*, one of the important constituents of *jñāna-yoga*. Further, the meditative worship upon the conditioned Brahman has its own fruit in the form of the union with the deity after the fall of one's body provided one continues the meditation till the end of one's life. Brahman that is free from attributes can only be realized as identical with the true nature of one's soul and cannot be meditated upon.

Some pre-Śaṅkara Vedāntins held the view that the *Upaniṣads*, like the ritualistic section of the Veda, are injunctive in character. The injunction, however, relates to meditation upon Brahman. The *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* text like *ātmetyevopāsītā*⁶ enjoins meditation upon Brahman. The texts of the *Upaniṣads* that speak about the nature of Brahman are subsidiary to the injunctive texts mentioned above. They are subsidiary in the sense that they signify Brahman which is the content of meditation. Thus it is not the knowledge of Brahman that arises from the major texts of the *Upaniṣads* that leads to liberation, but only the meditation upon Brahman.⁷

Rāmānuja's view is more or less similar to the above one. According to him, in the case of *mokṣa*, Brahman, that is, God is the goal to be reached and continued meditation upon its true nature known mediately from the major texts of the *Upaniṣads* will help the aspirant to attain 'firm recollection' and then the direct vision of God during the moment before leaving this life. And after the fall of the body, the soul reaches the world of God.

Śaṅkara does not favour the view of the preceptors that preceded him on the following ground: if Brahman were instructed in the *Upaniṣads* as an object of meditation, and if it is said that liberation is to be achieved by continued meditation upon Brahman, then liberation being the one that is attained will definitely be non-eternal. In other words, lib-

eration like the fruits of ritual-action, will be subject to gradation. But every system of thought that is oriented towards liberation considers the latter to be eternal.⁸ Hence the view that continued meditation upon Brahman is the means to liberation is not sound. This criticism directed against the view of the pre-Śaṅkara Vedāntins is equally applicable to the view of Rāmānuja.

It might be contended: if it is held that liberation would be non-eternal in case it is achieved by meditation which is a mental activity, then it would be non-eternal too even if it is achieved by knowledge as the latter too is a mental activity.

Śaṅkara makes a clear distinction between meditation and knowledge although both are mental modes according to Advaita. Meditation is that which may be performed, may not be performed or performed otherwise. It solely depends upon the will of the person. Hence it is an activity and consequently it can be enjoined. Knowledge, on the other hand, does not depend upon the will of the person. It depends only upon the object concerned. If the conditions for the rise of the perceptual knowledge of an object are satisfactorily present, then knowledge would arise irrespective of the will of the person. Knowledge does not conform to the will of the person. Hence knowledge is not an activity although it is a mode of mind.⁹ Consequently it cannot be enjoined.

Moreover, according to Advaita, liberation is not achieved by knowledge. The latter simply removes avidyā

and its characteristics in Brahman. The latter freed from avidyā and its characteristics manifests of its own accord as non-dual consciousness. And this is liberation. In other words, according to Advaita, liberation consists not in realizing Brahman but in non-realizing the not-self like avidyā.¹⁰ Thus if meditation upon Brahman is held to be the means to liberation, the latter would be non-eternal.

To sum up this part of discussion: the *jñāna-kāṇḍa* does not enjoin meditation upon Brahman. It is not, therefore, injunctive in character. Hence the view that just as the *karma-kāṇḍa* which enjoins sacrifices, etc., is injunctive in character, in the same way, the *jñāna-kāṇḍa* too is injunctive in nature by enjoining meditation upon Brahman, and so the *Pūrvamīmāṃsā-śāstra* and the *Uttaramīmāṃsā-śāstra* which respectively treat of the two constitute a single text is wrong.

According to Rāmānuja knowledge or *vidyā* or *vedanā* is identical with firm recollection (*dhruvā smṛti*) which is only the ripened state of meditation or *nididhyāsana*. On this basis it is argued that the *Pūrvamīmāṃsā-śāstra* and the *Uttaramīmāṃsā-śāstra* constitute a single text. It is thus: the *Īśāvāsya* text¹¹—

अविद्यया मृत्युं तीर्त्वा विद्यया अमृतम् अनुश्नुते —

is interpreted by Rāmānuja in the sense that one having transcended by the performance of *karma* (*avidyayā*) the demerits (*mṛtyum*) (that stand in the way of the rise of the 'firm

recollection') attains Brahman (*amṛtam*) by firm recollection or meditation (*vidyayā*).¹²

The above text speaks of the combination of *jñāna* or *upāsanā* and *karma* as the means to liberation. Since *jñāna* and *karma* respectively fall within the sphere of the *Uttaramīmāṃsā-śāstra* and *Pūrvamīmāṃsā-śāstras*, the two texts constitute a single unit.

We shall presently see that *jñāna* cannot be viewed as identical with meditation or firm recollection. Before that we shall set forth the reason why the Advaitin does not favour the combination of *jñāna* and *karma* as the means to liberation. The word *jñāna*, according to the Advaitin, stands for the knowledge of Brahman which is free from all attributes. We have earlier said that this knowledge is only the mental state which arises from the major texts of the Upaniṣads and which is inspired by the reflection of Brahman in it. By its mere rise it annihilates all knowledge of duality. It has for its content — Brahman which is not an agent and an experient. *Karma* in order that it may be performed requires the knowledge of difference among the deity to whom the offerings are to be made, and the instruments for making the offering. Thus performance of sacrifice requires the valid knowledge of duality. It follows that the nature of *karma* is diametrically opposed to that of *jñāna* and so there cannot be any combination between the two.

Śaṅkara in his commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra* refers to certain Upaniṣadic text which deny any interval between the rise of the knowledge of Brahman and liberation. The texts — ‘The soul has realized its true nature of Brahman in the form ‘I am Brahman’ and it remains as the all-pervasive one’,¹³ and ‘Having realised Brahman, the sage Vāmadeva proclaimed his nature of being Brahman in the words ‘I have become Manu, I have become the sun’¹⁴ which deny any interval between the rise of the knowledge of Brahman and liberation, imply the impossibility of the performance of any *karma* after the rise of the knowledge of Brahman.¹⁵

From the above it follows that the combination of *jñāna* and *karma* is not the means to liberation.

The *Īśāvāsya* text cited earlier does not speak of the combination of *jñāna* and *karma* as the means to liberation. That text simply means the combination of *karma* and *upāsana* on the conditioned Brahman. Such a combination is useful in attaining the world of the particular deity that is being meditated upon.¹⁶ The *upāsaka* after reaching the world of the particular deity will attain liberation along with Hiraṇyagarbha at the end of the cosmic age. This is known as *kramamukti*.¹⁷

It emerges from the above that *jñāna* and *karma* cannot co-exist. This being the case, the contention that *jñāna* and *karma* are the means to liberation and so the *jñāna-*

kāṇḍa and the *karma-kāṇḍa* and consequently the *Uttaramīmāṃsā-śāstra* and the *Pūrvamīmāṃsa-śāstra* constitute a single text is unsound.¹⁸

It will be remembered that Rāmānuja has argued that *jñāna* is identical with 'firm recollection' which is only the supreme state of *nididhyāsana*. He has said that the Upaniṣadic text 'When firm recollection has been attained, accumulated karma, etc., which constitute bondage are removed'¹⁹ prescribes '*firm recollection*' as the means to liberation. And the *Muṇḍaka* text 'When the Supreme person is seen, the bondage consisting of the accumulated *karma*, etc. is removed'²⁰ speaks of the *direct knowledge* as the means to liberation. When these two texts are taken together, it comes to this that *firm recollection* and the *direct knowledge* are identical as the purpose that is said to be served by the two is one and the same. The logical corollary of this view is that 'firm recollection' prescribed in the *jñāna-kāṇḍa* and *karma* prescribed in the *karma-kāṇḍa* can co-exist and so the *Uttaramīmāṃsā* and the *Pūrvamīmāṃsa-śāstras* may be viewed as constituting a single text.

Our author argues that 'firm recollection' is the means to liberation only through the knowledge of Brahman. And this is confirmed by the *Muṇḍaka* text which speaks of the direct knowledge of Brahman as the means to liberation.²¹

Further, Rāmānuja has said that 'firm recollection' has the likeness of an immediate presentation.²² Our author states

that firm recollection is only the cause of the immediate knowledge, and it is not by itself the immediate knowledge. *Nididhyāsanā* is prescribed as the means to the knowledge of Brahman in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* text – आत्मा वा अरे द्रष्टव्यः श्रोतव्यः मन्तव्यः निदिध्यासितव्यः²³. Firm recollection is only an advanced stage of *nididhyāsana* and it it would lead to the direct knowledge of Brahman. When the *Upaniṣad* specifically prescribes *nididhyāsana* or firm recollection as the means to the direct knowledge of Brahman, it is strange that Rāmānuja maintains the view that firm recollection itself has the vividness of an immediate presentation.²⁴

It comes to this: *nididhyāsana* is only the means to the knowledge of Brahman. It itself even in the advanced stage of firm recollection cannot be viewed as knowledge. Hence *jñāna* is different from *nididhyāsana*. We have already said that it cannot co-exist with *karma*. The result of this argument is that *karma-kāṇḍa* and *jñāna-kāṇḍa* are not addressed with reference to the same class of persons. The *Pūrvamīmāṃsā-śāstra* and the *Uttaramīmāṃsā-śāstra* are thus different.

Śaṅkara sums up the entire position by saying that if Brahman which is the subject-matter of the *jñāna-kāṇḍa* were an object of meditation, then it will fall within the purview of injunction and is to be viewed as a form of *dharma* – ‘the effect of *karma*. In that case any inquiry into its nature would be covered by the *Pūrvamīmāṃsā-sūtras* which begin with the aphorism *athā’ to dharma-jijñāsā*. Bādarāyaṇa need not

have commenced the *Uttaramīmāṃsā-śāstra*. Or, he should have commenced it by stating that it is only a supplement to the *Pūrvamīmāṃsā-śāstra*.²⁵

It would have become clear from the above that the *Pūrvamīmāṃsā* and *Uttaramīmāṃsā* are intended for different types of aspirants. Hence the prerequisite for the study of the *Uttaramīmāṃsā-śāstra* is not the study of the *Pūrvamīmāṃsā-śāstra* as Rāmānuja thinks but it is only the possession of the 'four-fold aid'.

One who possesses the 'four-fold aid' and pursues *śravaṇa*, etc., attains the direct knowledge of Brahman from the major texts of the *Upaniṣads*. Avidyā is removed thereby and the so-called soul ceases to be a soul and remains as Brahman which is liberation.

Rāmānuja at this stage argues that the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* text — आत्मा वा अरे द्रष्टव्यः श्रोतव्यः मन्तव्यः निदिध्यासितव्यः²⁶ enjoins *darśana* or knowledge. The latter cannot be the mere knowledge of the sense of the major texts of the *Upaniṣads* like *tat tvam asi* on two grounds: in the first place, such a knowledge could very well arise from the text themselves and as such no injunction is necessary. In the second place, removal of avidyā which is said to be the result of the knowledge of Brahman by the Advaitin is not noticed in the case of one who has such a knowledge. What Rāmānuja means is that one who has the knowledge of the meaning of the sentence *tat tvam asi* continues to experience phenomenal existence.²⁷

Our author meets this objection by saying that it is true that there is no need for any injunction in respect of knowledge. In fact, as has been pointed out earlier, knowledge does not depend upon the will of a person and as such it is not an activity. The result of this argument is that, being not activity, it cannot be an object of injunction. Hence the *tavya* suffix in the word *draṣṭavyaḥ* conveys the sense of fitness and the expression *ātma vā are draṣṭavyaḥ* means that the self is fit to be realised.²⁸

The Advaitin holds that even sentences could give rise to the immediate knowledge of an object provided the latter is perceptual. Brahman, being identical with the true nature of one's soul, is always perceptual and hence the major texts of the Upaniṣads could give rise to the direct or immediate knowledge of Brahman. But the latter, being impeded by the *pramāṇāsambhāvanā*, etc., is not effective in dispelling *avidyā*. It is to remove the *asambhāvanas*, *śravaṇa*, *manana* and *nididhyāsana* are enjoined in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* text referred to above.²⁹

Rāmānuja further states that it is unintelligible to hold that knowledge does not arise in the presence of its causal factor which, according to Advaita, is the major-text of the *Upaniṣad*.³⁰ Our author states that this criticism is not valid. The Advaitin does not say that knowledge does not arise from the major texts. He does maintain that the immediate knowledge of Brahman arises from the latter. But that knowl-

edge, being impeded by the *asambhāvanas*, remains mediate as it were. When the *asambhāvanas* are removed by *śravaṇa*, etc., the immediate knowledge becomes effective in dispelling *avidyā*.³¹

Another criticism of Rāmānuja is this: the Advaitin holds that even after the rise of the knowledge of Brahman, the knowledge of duality based upon latent impression of the annihilated *avidyā* continues to exist thus allowing room for the possibility of the state of *jīvanmukti*. But this cannot be. It is because, according to Advaita, latent impression too which constitutes the cause of the knowledge of duality are indeterminable and hence they are bound to be removed by the knowledge of Brahman. If it is said that the latent impressions which are indeterminable are not removed even after the rise of the knowledge of Brahman, then, there being no other annihilating factor, the latent impressions will never be removed at any time. As a result liberation would be an impossibility.³²

Our author answers the above objection by saying that the latent impressions are nothing but the *vikṣepa*-phase of *avidyā*. The latter is not removed by the knowledge of Brahman. It presents the world of duality. But since the knower of the truth is free from the *āvaraṇa*-phase of *avidyā*, he once for all discerns the falsity of the world which is characterised by duality and which is presented by the *vikṣepa*-phase of *avidyā* and he is not deluded by it. The *vikṣepa*-phase of

avidyā continues to exist even after the rise of the knowledge of Brahman because of the operation of the *prārabdha-karma* which cannot be removed by the knowledge of Brahman. Even Rāmānuja admits that after the rise of the 'firm recollection', the *prārabdha-karma* continues to exist, although the accumulated *karma* is removed. When the *prārabdha-karma* is exhausted by the experience of their fruits, the *vikṣepa*-phase of avidyā will be removed by the continuing knowledge of Brahman. The physical body then falls off and the knower of the truth - the *jīvanmukta* remains as pure Brahman.³³ This is the significance of *Chāndogya* text-

'For the knower of the truth, the delay is so long as he is not dissociated from the body'.³⁴

For the understanding of the concept of *jīvanmukti* it is essential to consider the stages that precede its rise.

1. The first stage is the performance of *karmayoga*. It cleanses one's heart and gives rise to the 'four-fold aid' to the study of *Vedānta*.
2. The second stage is the pursuit of *śravaṇa* and *manana*. These two remove *pramāṇāsambhāvanā* and *prameyā-sambhāvanā* respectively.
3. *Nididhyāsana* marks the third stage. This removes *viparīta-bhāvanā*.
4. The fourth stage is marked by the rise of the direct knowledge of Brahman from the major

texts of the *Upaniṣads*. One who has attained this stage is known as *brahmavit* or *jīvanmukta*. And this stage is known as *jīvanmukti*.

The life of a *jīvanmukta* has two phases: it is either *samādhi* when he turns inward and loses himself in Brahman; or the condition known as *vyutthāna* or reversion to empirical life when he wakes back to variety.

On reversion to empirical life, the world of duality beginning with mind, sense-organs, etc., does appear to the knower of the truth. His self will be reflected in the mind; but remaining in the form of consciousness that transcends the mind, he will perceive the reflection of his self in the mind as a reflection. What is expressed by the reflection of his self will not taint him. Since he has once for all realised the falsity of the mind, etc., he does not identify his self with them. As a result he does not have the sense of agency in the form 'I am an agent'. He would perceive the world beginning with the mind, etc., as one which is superimposed on and so manifested by the self — his true nature which is unattached. He has the knowledge in the form 'I am not an agent'; on the other hand, I am the witness of the mind and other factors which, inspired by the reflection of my self act'.³⁵

On reversion to empirical life, the *jīvanmukta* has a specific duty of maintaining the *lokasaṅgraha*, that is preventing men from swerving into an unrighteous path. He should not unsettle the mind of the ignorant by imparting them the

knowledge of Brahman.³⁶ On the other hand, in order to infuse faith in the ignorant in the performance of ritual-acts - the remote means to the knowledge of Brahman, the *jīvanmukta* has to cause their performance.³⁷ As Śaṅkara points out: the *karmā* performed by a *jīvanmukta* is not a *karma* at all as he does not have the sense of agency and does not desire for its fruits.³⁸ In fact it is from the stand-point of the ignorant only that a *jīvanmukta* is spoken of as doing something; but from his own stand-point, the *jīvanmukta* is a non-agent.³⁹

Our author has summarised the views of Śaṅkara set forth above in the *Advaitāmoda*.⁴⁰

It may be added here that Rāmānuja does not formally accept the ideal of *jīvanmukti*, as according to him, liberation is something that is to be attained in a life beyond. But he admits that an aspirant attains here and now the 'firm recollection'. This may be described as a state of enlightenment, as the life that such an aspirant is said to lead after its attainment exactly corresponds to the life of a *jīvanmukta* as described in Advaita.

Rāmānuja is of the view that the content of the 'I' cognition is the true nature of the soul. The latter is a knower. It is not a false blend of spirit and matter as the Advaitin thinks. Hence in the state of *mokṣa* too, the 'I' cognition persists. If it does not persist, then liberation would be another name for the destruction of the soul.⁴¹

Our author argues that the stage of liberation is characterised by the absence of duality. This is the teaching of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*. Therein, the king Janaka is praised by the sage Yājñavalkya as one who has attained non-transmigration (*abhaya*).⁴² And transmigration (*bhaya*) is caused by the cognition of duality (as real).⁴³ When such is the case, if it is said that the 'I' cognition persists in the state of liberation, it amounts to saying that there is the experience of the form 'I know'. This involves the relation of *dharma-dharmi-bhāva*. And the latter involves an element of difference. As has been said above, the cognition of difference is the cause of transmigration. Hence if the 'I' cognition persists in the state of liberation, then the latter would in no way be different from the state of transmigration.⁴⁴ It must, therefore, be held that the liberated soul remains in the form of pure consciousness which is self-luminous and is identical with bliss. It is self-luminous in the sense that it does not depend upon any other factor for its manifestation.

Rāmānuja states that if the content of 'I' does not persist in the state of liberation, then the latter is another name for the destruction of the soul.⁴⁵ But it is not so. The Advaitin does not hold that liberation is something that is to be achieved by the soul. On the other hand, he holds that liberation is pure Brahman – the essential nature of the soul. The latter non-realises the elements of not-self or *anātmā* falsely presented upon it and thereby remains in its essential nature which is liberation.

The text 'He attains all auspicious qualities along with omniscient God'⁴⁶ refers to the state of becoming God-like by meditation upon the conditioned Brahman. Such a one who has become God-like would attain the direct knowledge of Brahman and become liberated along with Hiraṇyagarbha at the end of the cosmic age. This is known as *kramamukti*.

Rāmānuja has held the view that *śravaṇa* and *manana* give rise to an intellectual conviction regarding the true nature of the soul, of God and of the relation between the two. Then one pursues *nididhyāsana* or *upāsanā*. In its advanced stage it is known as 'firm recollection' and it has the vividness of immediate presentation. And it is *bhakti* or loving devotion. The latter enables one to have the direct vision of God at the time of the falling off of his body. One then reaches the world of Lord Nārāyaṇa. And this is liberation.

It may be added here that Advaita too accords a prominent place to *bhakti* in its scheme of practical discipline. We referred to the three stages that precede the rise of the knowledge of Brahman. The first stage is the performance of *karma* as an offering to God which involves *bhakti* or loving devotion to God. Again one worships God with love when pursuing *jñāna-yoga*, that is, *śravaṇa*, *manana* and *nididhyāsana* with a view to get concentration of thought. Further the grace of God which could be attained only by *bhakti* towards Him is very essential for warding off of all impediments that stand in the way of successful completion of *jñāna-yoga*. But *bhakti* is only a mental state involving the

element of love in the form of God. It is only a means to *jñāna*, that is, the direct knowledge of Brahman. The *Bhagavad-gītā* text 'By *bhakti* one knows My cosmic form; and then knowing My true nature (which is the acosmic form) one becomes identical with Me'⁴⁷ 'States that *bhakti* toward the conditioned Brahman is the cause of the knowledge of the unconditioned reality.

Rāmānuja has said that 'firm recollection' has the vividness of immediate presentation of God and it is *bhakti*.⁴⁸ Our author points out that this is against the teaching of the following *Bhagavad-gīta* text:

भक्त्या तु अनन्यया शक्यः अहं एवंविधोऽर्जुन ।
ज्ञातुम्, द्रष्टुम् च तत्त्वेन, प्रवेष्टुम् च परन्तप ॥⁴⁹

This text means that by *bhakti* alone it is possible to know the cosmic form of the Lord, to realise His true nature which is pure consciousness (*tattvena draṣṭum*) and to remain as Brahman (*praveṣṭum ca*). Herein *bhakti* is said to be the means of the direct knowledge of the true nature of God. But since, according to Rāmānuja, *bhakti* is firm recollection and it itself has the vividness of immediate presentation, it cannot serve as the means to the direct knowledge of the true nature of God.⁵⁰

To sum up: Liberation, according to Rāmānuja, consists in the soul reaching the world of Śrī Nārāyaṇa where its *dharmabhūtajñāna* expands to the maximum and wherein it

retains its individuality. And 'firm recollection' which is *bhakti* is the means to liberation.

Our author has proved that liberation is identical with Brahman and the so-called soul remains as Brahman. Liberation is attained here and now. And the direct knowledge of Brahman is the sole means to liberation. *Bhakti* is only its proximate means.

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संसाराध्वनि तापभानुकिरणप्रोद्धतदाहव्यथा-
 खिन्नानां जलकाङ्क्षया मरुभुवि भ्रान्त्या परिभ्राम्यताम् ।
 अत्यासन्नसुधाम्बुधिं सुखकरं ब्रह्माद्वयं दर्शय-
 न्त्येषा शङ्करभारती विजयते निर्वाणसन्दायिनी ॥

*saṁsārādhvani tāpabhānukiraṇaprodhbhūtadāhavyathā-
 khinnānām jalakāṅkṣayā marubhuvi bhrāntyā pariḥhrāmyatām
 atyāsannasudhāmbudhiṁ sukhakaram brahmādvayaṁ
 darśayant-
 yeṣā śaṅkarabhārātī vijayate nirvāṇasandāyīnī.*

To those who are afflicted, in the way of the world, by the burning pain given rise to by the scorching sun-shafts of misery, and who through delusion wander about in the desert (of worldliness) seeking water—showing the felicitous ocean of nectar, which is very near, the non-dual Brahman, this—the Voice of Śaṅkara—is victorious, leading, as it does, to liberation.