

# THE VOICE OF ŚĀṆKARA

Śāṅkara-bhāratī



Editor:

N. Veezhinathan

एषा शाङ्करभारती विजयते निर्वाणसन्दायिनी

*eṣā śāṅkara-bhāratī vijayate*

*nirvāna-sandāyini*

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leading, as it does, to liberation.

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# THE VOICE OF ŚAṆKARA

## *Śāṅkara-bhāratī*

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N. Veezhinathan



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1

HOMAGE TO ŚAÑKARA

॥ श्रीः ॥

वागंशुभिः द्वैतमहान्धकारं प्रोत्सार्य तत्त्वं समदर्शयत् यः।  
मार्तण्डतुल्योऽपि शशीव कान्तः तं शङ्करं देवनुतं नमामि ॥

I prostrate in homage before Śaṅkara who is adored by the divine beings, who has imparted the knowledge of the Truth of the Upaniṣads by dispelling the abysmal darkness of duality, and who, although intensely blazing like the sun, is pleasantly cool like the moon.

[*Pañcīkaraṇa-Candrikā* of Gaṅgādhara-kavi]

## TEACHINGS OF ŚAṄKARA

The Upaniṣads explain the nature of the jīva as the Self that is reflected in or delimited by the adjuncts, viz. avidyā and its product, the psycho-physical organism of which the mind is the predominant factor.

The text of the *Brahmabindu Upaniṣad*—

*eka eva hi bhūtātmā bhūte bhūte vyavasthitaḥ  
ekadhā bahudhā caiva dr̥śyate jalacandravat.*<sup>1</sup>

[This Self of all beings is verily one. It is immanent in each and every being, and thus it appears to be one (as Īśvara) and many (as the jīvas). This is similar to the moon which, although one, appears to be many in waters contained in various receptacles],

and another śruti text—

*yathā hi ayam jyotirātmā vivasvān  
apo bhinnā bahudhaika'nugacchan  
upādhinā kriyate bhedarūpaḥ  
devaḥ kṣetreṣu ajo'yam ātma.*<sup>2</sup>

[This luminous sun is an unit by itself. But, it appears to be multiple because of its reflection in water present in various receptacles. Similarly, this self-luminous Self appears to be many in different limiting adjuncts (such as avidyā and the like)]

use the analogy of the reflection of the moon and of the sun in the water to describe the nature of the jīva.

The *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* and the *Kaṭha Upaniṣad* in an indential passage –

*rūpam rūpam pratirūpo babhūva*<sup>3</sup>

declares that the Self itself undergoes reflection in each and every limiting adjunct.

The *Vedānta-sūtra*, “*ābhāsa eva ca*”<sup>4</sup> too speaks of the jīva as a reflected image. Śaṅkara in his commentary on this *sūtra* states:

The jīva is only (*eva*) a reflection (*ābhāsa* or *pratibimba*) of the Self, and not the Self itself; nor is it something different from it. And, it is to be understood on the analogy of the sun in the water.

*ābhāsa eva ca eṣa jīvaḥ parasyātmanaḥ, na sa eva sākṣāt, nāpi vastvantaram.*

In regard to the theory of reflection of the Self in the limiting adjuncts, viz. avidyā, etc., on the analogy of the reflection of the sun in the water, Śaṅkara in his commentary on the

*Vedāta-sūtra – ambuvat agrahanāt tu na tathātvam*<sup>5</sup> records the following objection:

Water has a material shape, and it is seen to be different and at the same time far off in space from the sun which too has a material shape. Hence the occurrence of the reflection of the sun in the water is natural. The Self, however, does not have a material shape. It is all-pervasive and is non-different from every object. Hence the limiting adjuncts, viz. avidyā, etc. cannot be viewed as remotely placed or different from it. On this ground the contention that the jīva is the reflection of the Self in the limiting adjuncts on the analogy of reflection of the sun in the water is not appropriate.

Śaṅkara rejects the objection contained in the foregoing paragraph and explains the appropriateness of the illustrative example thus:

The illustrative example of the reflection of the sun in the water is quite apt inasmuch as it contributes to the understanding of what is to be comprehended. Between an example and the thing exemplified, no one can show likeness in every respect apart from some point of similarity. If likeness in every respect is intended, then the very relation between an example and the thing explained would be lost. Further, the reference to the illustrative example is not based upon the

exercise of one's imagination. It is given in the śruti text and its purpose is to be explicated.

The point of similarity that is intended to be emphasized here is: "The state of sharing the characteristics of expansion and contraction". The reflection of the sun in the water spreads out in every direction when there is the expansion of the water; and it becomes less in extent when the water shrinks. Further, the reflection appears to move to and fro when the surface of the water quivers. It also appears to be many in the water contained in different receptacles. Thus, it partakes of the characteristics of the water while in reality it does not have any of these. In the same way, the Self which in reality is immutable and uniform by nature acquires, owing to its immanence in the limiting adjunct, viz. the mind, the characteristics of the latter. It is to emphasize this fact the reflection of the sun in the water is given as an illustrative example.<sup>6</sup>

The *Aitareya* text, "*sa etameva sīmānam vidārya etayā prāpadyata*",<sup>7</sup> the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* text, "*sa eṣa iha praviṣṭaḥ ānakhāgrebhyah*,"<sup>8</sup> the *Chāndogya* text, "*anena jīvena ātmanā anupraviśya nāmarūpe vyākaravāṇi*",<sup>9</sup> and the *Taittirīya* text, "*tat sṛṣṭvā tadeva anuprāviśat*"<sup>10</sup> speak of the "entrance" (*praveśa*) of the Self in the objects of the world created by it to explain the nature of the jīva. The term "*praveśa*" does not mean actual reflection like the reflection of the sun in the water. Śaṅkara explains the significance of the entrance of the Self thus:

Entrance or *praveśa* of the Self is only its specific manifestation in the mind as one who sees, hears, thinks, and resolves. <sup>11</sup>

What Śaṅkara means is that just as Devadatta and others who have entered a house are noticed to be present there, even so the Self is discerned to be immanent in the mind. It is only the immanence of the Self in the mind that is figuratively spoken of as “entrance”. And, the Self that is immanent in the mind is the *jīva*.

Again while commenting on the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*<sup>12</sup> text, Śaṅkara observes –

Like the reflection of the sun in the water, the entrance of the self means only its being perceived like a reflection in the differentiated universe. Before the manifestation of the latter, the Self is not perceived; but after it is manifested it is perceived within the mind, like the reflection of the sun in the water.....The entrance of the Self into the universe is a metaphorical way of stating that it is perceived in the midst of the latter.

From the above we could gather that the texts which speak of the entrance or the reflection of the Self in the limiting adjuncts signify only its immanence therein.

Another text of the *Brahmabindu Upaniṣad* –  
*ghaṭasamvṛtam ākāśam nīyamāne ghaṭe yathā  
ghaṭo nīyeta na ākāśam tadvat jīvo nabhopamaḥ.*<sup>13</sup>

[As when a pot is moved, the pot alone is moved and not the ether enclosed in it, so too the analogy of the jīva with the ether]

treats the jīva as a delimited entity by describing it as being similar to the pot-defined ether.

The *Vedānta-sūtra*, “*aṁśo nānā vyapadeśāt...*”<sup>14</sup> speaks of the jīva as a part (*aṁśa*) of the Self. Just as the ether conditioned by pot is considered to be a part of the all-pervasive ether, in the same way, the Self as conditioned by the limiting adjuncts such as avidyā is viewed as a part of the omnipresent Self.

Śaṅkara while commenting on this *sūtra* states:

*jīvaḥ īśvarasya aṁśaḥ bhavitum arhati,  
yathā agneḥ visphuliṅgaḥ.  
aṁśa iva aṁśaḥ, na hi niravayavasya  
mukhyaḥ aṁśaḥ sambhavati.*

The Self being partless can have no real part (*aṁśa*). Hence the jīva is a part *as it were* of the Self, just as a spark is a part *as it were* of the fire.

In order to understand the significance of the term “part” (*aṁśa*), it is essential to consider the import of the *Bhagavad-Gītā* text –

*mamaiva aṁśaḥ jīvaloke jīvabhūtaḥ sanātanaḥ*<sup>15</sup>

This text constitutes the subject-matter of the *Vedānta-sūtra*, “*api ca smaryate*’;”<sup>16</sup> and, it means that what is well-known in the realm of phenomenal existence as an agent and an experient and what is eternal is only *My part*. Śaṅkara while commenting on this text of the *Bhagavad-Gītā* states:

*yathā jalasūryakaḥ sūryāmśaḥ jalamittāpāye sūryameva gatvā tenaiva ātmanā gacchati evameva, yathā vā ghaṭādyupādhiparicchinnāḥ ghaṭādyākāśaḥ ākāśāmśaḥ san ghaṭādinittāpāye ākāśam prāpya na nivartate ityevam ataḥ upapannam uktam “yad gatvā na nivartante iti”<sup>17</sup>*

Just as the part, i.e. the reflected image of the sun becomes one with the sun when the revealing medium is taken away, and just as the part, i.e. the pot-conditioned ether becomes one with the ether when the limiting adjunct, viz. the pot is destroyed, in the same way, the jīva becomes one with the Self when the limiting adjuncts cease to exist.

Śaṅkara thus interprets the term “*aṃśa*” or “part” in the sense of the reflected image and as a delimited entity. We may, therefore, take that the *sūtra- aṃśo nānāvyapadeśāt*, etc. which states that the jīva is a part *as it were* of the Self treats the jīva as a reflected image or as a conditioned entity. It must be noted here that even according to the view that the jīva is a delimited entity delimitation means only immanence in the limiting adjuncts.

Śaṅkara in his commentary on the *Vedānta-sūtra*<sup>18</sup> states:

There is no entity known as jīva apart from the Self. The latter itself is figuratively spoken of as the jīva because of its association with the limiting adjuncts.





## REFERENCES

1. *BBU*, 12.
2. Cited in *ŚB* on *VS*, 3.2.18.
3. *BU*, 2.15.9; *KU*, 2.2.9.
4. *VS*, 3.2.50.
5. *Ibid.*, 3.2.19. See also *ŚB* on this and also on *TU*, 2.6. and on *BU*, 1.4.7.
6. *ŚB* on *VS*, 3.2.20.
7. *AU*, 1.3.12.
8. *BU*, 1.4.7.
9. *CU*, 6.3.2.
10. *TU*, 2.6.
11. *ŚB* on the above.
12. *ŚB* on *BU*, 1.4.7.
13. *BBU*, 13.
14. *VS*, 2.3.43.
15. *Bh.G.*, 15.7.
16. *VS*, 2.3.45.
17. *ŚB* on *Bh.G.*, 15.7.
18. *ŚB* on *VS*, 3.2.9.

## ABBREVIATIONS

|              |   |                               |
|--------------|---|-------------------------------|
| <i>AU</i>    | — | <i>Aitareya Upaniṣad</i>      |
| <i>BBU</i>   | — | <i>Brahmabindu Upaniṣad</i>   |
| <i>Bh.G.</i> | — | <i>Ghagavad-Gītā</i>          |
| <i>BU</i>    | — | <i>Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad</i> |
| <i>CU</i>    | — | <i>Chāndogya Upaniṣad</i>     |
| <i>KU</i>    | — | <i>Kaṭha Upaniṣad</i>         |
| <i>ŚB</i>    | — | <i>Śāṅkara-bhāṣya</i>         |
| <i>TU</i>    | — | <i>Taittirīa Upaniṣad</i>     |
| <i>VS</i>    | — | <i>Vedānta-sūtra</i>          |



## THE RELIGION OF THE WORLD

By

JAGADGURU ŚRĪMACCHANDRAŚEKHARENDRA SARASVATĪ  
BHAGAVATPŪJYAPĀDĀḤ

There are ever so many religions in this world. Each has a separate name of its own to distinguish it from the others. All these names are personal and are derived from the founders of the respective faiths. Thus Buddhism takes its name from its founder, Lord Buddha, Jainism from Jina, Muhammadanism from its prophet, Muhammad, Christianity from Jesus Christ, Zoroastrianism (the religion of the Parsees) from its founder Zoroaster, and the Chinese religion, Confucianism, from its propounder, Confucius. No doubt all these founders of new religions have been great men possessing the power to attract many men to their way of thinking. Thus every religion other than ours has a distinctive name of its own. But if you ask a youngster belonging to our religion what religion he professes, he would, if he

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Courtesy: *Sankara And Shanmata*, The Samskrita Academy,  
Chennai - 2010.

happens to have received a little English education, at once reply that he belongs to the Hindu Religion. On the other hand if we ask our peasants about the name of our religion, they would be at a loss to give a common name to it. If we put the same query to those employed in writing negotiable documents in the South of India, they would describe themselves as they do at the top of these documents, as belonging to the Saivite or the Vaishnavite cult. These are really subdivisions in our faith and cannot be taken as representing the whole of it: but even these names are not derived from those of any historic personages but merely follow the names of the respective divine forms selected for personal worship. If Hinduism is really the name of our religion, it should have been known and described as such even during the period of our remote forefathers. But it would appear that to our ancestors of even a few centuries back, the name "Hinduism" would have been a strange and meaningless term. It is so because ours is a religion without a name.

No doubt the subdivisions in our faith go by certain specific names. These again take their names only after the various forms of the one Almighty selected for *upāsanā* and not after human beings. For the general faith however it would be difficult to find a common name. Of late a name has been much in use, viz., Sanātana Dharma, but even this cannot be said to be the strictly traditional name of our religion, for in that case it should be known as such to the poor peasant and to the humble widow, as in the case of the followers of other man-made religions. But such is not the case.

The term Hinduism is really a name somebody has presented us with. We can find in History a clue as to how this term came to be coined. Our forefathers were once the inhabitants of the region watered by the river Sindhu (the modern Indus) which, to some foreigners who came into contact with us was known as Indus. From this they christened the land in which this river flowed as the Indu Desa or "the land of the Indus". Naturally and in course of time they applied this name to the entire Bharatavarsha of which the part watered by Sindhu formed but a slice. Are we not familiar with the saying that "beyond Hyde Park all is desert"?

Again, every religion has some distinguishing symbol which at once marks it off from the others. The Cross of the Christians is one such example. The Hindus on the other hand, have no apparent symbol to point to as being common to all of them. As we are without a name, even so we are without a common symbolising badge. Ours, therefore, appears to be a religion without a name and a distinguishing mark! For instance, some of us wear the sacred ash, while others wear the "Viṣṇupāda" on their foreheads. Some among us are "Vīra Vaiṣṇavas" and an equal number, the "Liṅgāyats" and similar others are "Vīra Śaivas". All these, however, have the consciousness that they are the adherents of one common religion.

The real grandeur of our faith consists in its being nameless. The need for names for an article arises only when there are many of that type so that each could, in some way, be distinguished from the others. But if there is one and one only of that article, why need a name for it? To take a concrete instance, if there are, say, four Ramasvamis

in a village we must give them different initials or personal names to tell the one from the other or otherwise distinguish between them by calling one of them, Ramasvami, the dark, another of them, Ramasvami, the fair, and so forth. If there be only one Ramasvami, there is hardly any further naming required.

Even so, with our religion. What is religion? It is that which shows us the way out of this miserable cycle of births and deaths or in other words sins and sorrows. It was pointed out at the outset that other religions are known by the names of their respective founders. These religions therefore did not exist before the rise of these great personages. Specific dates are assigned to every such religion. It naturally follows that ours is a religion which existed before all these other faiths were born. Thus it should have existed at a time when it was the only religion in the world, administering to the spiritual needs of humanity as a whole. This then explains our religion not having had a specific original name, as there was no second religion from which this name should distinguish it. It was merely the Dharma—a word synonymous with Religion.

It would appear then that its having no specific name is itself a distinctive symbol. Although the religion has no distinguishing name of its own there is in it a common basis—viz., the faith in the final authority of the Vedas, i.e., *Veda Prāmāṇyam*, in spiritual matters. This is also implied in the saying current in some of our mother-tongues that makes the Vedas a simile for authoritativeness!

The question then arises that, if ours was the only

religion prevalent at the time, were our religious principles observed by all the inhabitants of the world? We can now give plenty of instances to show that the reply to this question is in the affirmative.

For instance, one of the charges against Jesus which made the Jews crucify him was that Jesus drank water from a well intended for the lower classes. Does this not imply the existence of a caste system before Jesus' time?

Again an inscription unearthed in Egypt, dated 1280 B.C. contains the terms of a treaty between Rameses II and the Hittites. In this treaty the vedic deity, "*Maitrāvaruṇa*," has curiously enough been cited as the witness! (See H. R. Hall's "*Ancient History of the Near East*"—pp. 364 *et seq.*) Besides, in the ancient Egyptian Chronology, we find a series of kings bearing the name of Rama as for example, Rameses I, Rameses II, Rameses III, etc.

In the island of Madagascar off the Eastern coast of South Africa, as many as seventy-five percent of the names of places happen to be Samskrit names. Most of them are akin to the name of the hero of the *Rāmāyaṇa*, Rama.

We are all aware of the Great Sahara Desert in Northern Africa, There is a theory that all deserts once formed the beds of the seas or, in Samskrit, Sagaras. Is the suggestion far-fetched, that the modern name, Sahara, is a corruption of the Samskrit "Sagara"? It is said that while the Sahara was under water there was a thick population around its banks and that the names of those people were mostly Samskrit and were even related to the name of Rama. (See Encyclopaedia Britannica, Vol. XXIII, Title—Sahara.).

Evidences such as these are not wanting in the opposite part of the Globe. In distant Mexico a festival is being celebrated at about the same time as the Indian “*Navarātri*” or “*Dusserah*” and it is known as “*Rāmasīta*” (See p. 56 of the Text and Plate 24 in T.W.F. Gann’s *The Maya Indians of Southern Yucaton, North and British Honduras*.) Further, the excavations made in that country have resulted in an abundance of the idols of Lord Gaṇeśa being unearthed (Baron Humboldt quoted in Har Bilas Sarda’s *Hindu Superiority*, p. 151). The ancient inhabitants of those parts were “*Astikas*” (i.e., those who believed in *Veda Prāmānyam* or the authoritativeness of the Vedas) a term which still lingers in the modern name “*Aztecs*” which is now given to this group!

In Peru, a country in the West of South America, the inhabitants were sun worshippers. Their principal festivals of the year fell on the solstices. (See *Asiatic Researches*, Vol. I, p. 426.) They were known as the “*Incas*,” a name derived from one of the names of the Sun, “*Ina*”.

While speculating in this strain, it is tempting to make another observation on the remarkable similarity between a series of names of places in California and several *purāṇic* names. We have all heard of the well-known story of the sixty thousand sons of King Sāgara being burnt to ashes by the sage Kapila, to save whose souls their descendant Bhagīrata, is said to have brought down the Gaṅga to the earth. The story goes that the horse sought for by the sons of Sāgara was found in the netherlands (*Patala Loka*). America being roughly India’s antipodes on the globe, is this description of that land in the *Purāṇas* as the netherland to

be laughed at? Is it not very suggestive that *California* might be a corruption for "*Kapila Aranya*" (Kapila's forest), and that the two islands nearby, viz., "*The Horse Island*" and "*The Ash Island*," might represent the places where the horse of King Sāgara was kept and where King Sagara's sixty thousand sons were burnt to ashes?

Figs. 128 and 129 in page 621 of *The Native Tribes of Central Australia*, by Spencer and Gillen (Macmillan, 1899) depict a kind of dance said to be current among the wild native tribes of Australia. This dance is described in the book as *The Śiva Dance*. On closer examination, the dancers appear to have painted on their forehead a third eye, a fact suggestive of the possibility that the people of even such distant lands as Australia were once well-versed in Vedic lore.

Nearer home in the Eastern Archipelago evidences of the prevalance of the Hindu Faith are abundant. Java bristles with relics of Hindu cult and worship. In Borneo there is a forest which the Westerners were for a long time describing as a virgin forest, *i.e.*, not having been penetrated by man (Wallace—*The Malay Archipelago*, pp. 44-45). A party of explorers, after they had gone a few hundreds of miles, discovered a stone which contained an inscription commemorating in detail the performance of some specified *Yāgās* and *Yajñās* (Vedic sacrifices) by a certain king (Yūpa inscriptions of Mūlavarman of Koeti, Borneo).

All these evidences only go to prove that our religion which was the only religion the world possessed for a long time, had spread all over the world.



It will not be out of place to examine here some conceptions of Hinduism about the Universe. The common Hindu belief about our terrestrial globe is that it is composed of seven *Dvīpās* or land masses. Adi Śaṅkara Bhagavad-pādācārya refers to this in the following sentence in one of his books: *Sapta Dvīpa ca Medinī*.

Each one of these *Dvīpas* consists of several *Varṣas* each of which in turn consists of several *Khaṇḍas*. Our country India has been described in our scriptures as *Bharata Khaṇḍa*, said to be a part of *Bharata Varṣa*, which in turn is supposed to be situated in *Jambudvīpa*. Mount *Meru* is supposed to be to the north of all the seven *Dvīpas*. There is an ocean belt between every two *Dvīpas*, The sun and the moon are said to move round *Meru*.

Let us now examine in detail the real import of these conceptions. The Westerners teach us in our geography books that the earth is round and we think that this truth was first revealed to us by them. The Samskrit term for "geography" is "*Bhū Gola*" which itself means "*the round earth*." Is not the very existence of this word proof of the fact that our ancients were aware of this fundamental geographical truth about the spherical nature of the Earth? In the ancient Indian mathematical science, words such as "*Khagola*" and "*Bhū Gola*" occur which are further evidences in support of the above. In our *Sankalpa Mantras* we use the word "*Brahmāṇḍa*" while referring to the earth. The term *aṇḍa* in this word really means an egg, i.e., an oval-shaped body!

Let us now imagine the whole earth as a lime fruit

with that part of it containing “*Meru*” (Himalayas) directed towards the north as its apex. Then “*Meru*” becomes the north pole and, hence, the northern most point on the earth. This position, then, will sufficiently explain the saying: *Sarveṣāmapī Varṣāṇām Meruruttarataḥ Sthitāḥ*. The rest of the sphere is all to the south of it. To the eye of a man standing on the apex of it, the sun and the moon would appear to go round it, *i.e.*, the sun would not be exactly overhead at any part of the year, but would always be to a side of it. This is what is meant by the statement in our *Śāstras* that the sun goes round “*Meru*” . There is thus nothing in these conceptions which could be considered as being contradicted by modern geographical discoveries.

All the modern discoveries about the geography of our earth seem, therefore, to have already dawned on our ancient seers. References to these truths are also found in the works of Āryabhaṭṭa, Varāhamihira, and Appayya Dīkṣita.

Thus we come back to the truth which we established at the outset, *viz.*, ours was the only religion extant on the face of the earth for a long time. All the other religions of the world have only taken up and developed some phases of our bigger faith which contains all the aspects of the different religions.

With a little propaganda characterized more by kindness and love than by conceit and arrogance, it might yet be possible for us to convince others of this truth.



4

## ŚAṄKARA AND ECKHART\*

By

T. M. P. MAHADEVAN

Time and territory make no difference to the teachings of the Master minds. The distinction of East and West has no relevance to "perennial philosophy". Great thoughts constitute the legacy of the entire mankind. No matter when a sage or saint lived, or where, his message has universal import. This truth may be exemplified by comparing two of the world's greatest teachers – Ācārya Śaṅkara and Meister Eckhart. Śaṅkara lived in India in or before the eighth century A.D., belonged to the Upaniṣadic tradition, and taught Advaita which, he was convinced, was the culmination of all philosophical thought and spiritual aspiration. Eckhart was born in Germany in the thirteenth century, belonged to the Dominican Order of monks, taught and wrote his sermons and works as a Prior or Provincial of the Catholic Church, and died during the painful discussions concerning the orthodoxy of

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his doctrines in 1329. Although the Indian Ācārya, Śaṅkara, and the German Meister, Eckhart, lived and flourished in different ages and hemispheres, they are “contemporaries” to use Rudolf Otto’s expression; for, as he explains, “contemporaries in the deeper sense are not those who happen to be born in the same decade, but those who stand at corresponding points in the parallel development of their environments”.

There is close similarity between the two teachers in their metaphysical teachings. According to both, the ultimate Reality is the non-dual Spirit. Brahman, for the Advaita of Śaṅkara, is one only, without a second, *ekameva advitīyam*; without parts and without multiplicity, without any distinctions and differences, *nirguṇam, nirviśeṣam*. For Eckhart also, the pure “Godhead” is Being through and through and nothing other than Being, without any addition and qualification. Reality, in fact, is beyond the reach of words, for the normal use of words is to distinguish and to differentiate. “Wouldst thou be perfect, do not yelp about, God” says Eckhart. Citing an Upaniṣadic text, Śaṅkara declares, “This Ātman is peaceful, quiet”, *śānto’yam ātma*.

Both the Masters contrast the Godhead with God, Brahman with Īśvara. The supra-personal Godhead is above God and is the ground thereof. In the pure Godhead, there is transcendence of subject and object, knower and known. Referring to the conception of the Godhead, the One, the Absolute, in Eckhart, the American Philosopher, Josiah Royce, says that it is a old conception, much older than the Neo-Platonic. “It is almost identical”, he goes on to observe,

with the conception of the Absolute Self or Ātman of the earliest Hindu speculation. But Eckhart, knowing nothing, of course, of the remoter sources or counterparts of his conception, and himself learning it in the main from Dionysius discovers the everlastingly fresh and convincing verification of it in his own religious life”.

Just as the two Masters agree in their conception of the Godhead, they agree also in regard to the idea of God. Critics of Śaṅkara wrongly make him out to be a non-theist, it not an atheist, even as the Churchmen branded Eckhart as a pantheist. The truth, however, is that both are theists. Simply because, according to Śaṅkara, the knowledge of the personal Īśvara is lower knowledge (*aparā vidyā*), it does not mean that this knowledge belongs to the region of error (*avidyā*). *Saguṇa Brahman* is not a Brahman different from the Nirguṇa. Īśvara is Brāhman as the world ground. He is the efficient as “well as the material cause of the world. Śaṅkara allows of no second beside God as the world cause. As Otto correctly understands, “The *nirguṇa Brahman* is not the exclusive opposite of the *saguṇa Brahman*, but it is superlative and a development of the tendencies which lead to the *saguṇa Brahman* itself”. Only, while Otto uses the term *samucchaya* (summing up) to describe Śaṅkara’s method of relating the *saguṇa* and the *nirguṇa Brahman*, we would prefer the expression *samanvaya* (harmony).

What is true of Śaṅkara’s doctrine of God is true of Eckhart’s also. The view of both is super-theism and not anti – theism. Even when he mounts up high on the towers

of mysticism, the German Dominican monk keeps close to the Christian belief in God. Clinging to God, having intimate communion with Him, according to Eckhart, is the very meaning of the life of man. God, here, is conceived as the power of life, as light and life, as truth, knowledge, essential holiness and justice, rather than as King, Father, Judge – a person in relation to persons. What Eckhart is not in favour of is the external view of God. God is not to be looked upon as an “objectum”. To possess God is to live God, or rather “to be lived by God”. The meaning of Eckhart’s statement that man must get rid of God is that man must get rid of the conceived and apprehended God. What man should realize is that God is the inward power and the health of his spiritual life. In Eckhart’s “alks of Instruction” the following occurs:

“Man should not have merely a God intellectually conceived. For when thought passes them God (intellectually conceived) also passes. Rather, man must have an essential God, who is high above the thoughts of men (because He is inwardly possessed and lived). This God does not pass away unless man turns from Him of his own free will. Whoever has God thus in his being conceives Him divinely. For him God shines in all things. In him God has His eyes open at all times. In him there is a quiet turning from outward things and a penetrating into the beloved, ever-present God”.

It is surprising that even for the concept of *māyā* there is a parallel provided by Eckhart’s conception of the “creature”.

In so far as creature is regarded by the German Mystic as what God is not, as vain, unreal and non-essential, his thought comes very close to the Advaita view of the world of *māyā-avidyā*. Adopting the Platonic rather than the Aristotelian way of thinking, Eckhart characterises the world as a copy, an expression of the eternal God, falling far short of the prototype. "All that is created" he declares, "has no truth in itself. All creatures in so far as they are creatures, as they "are in themselves" are not even illusion, they are "pure nothing". All that is created is nothing." This declaration, however, does not mean that the creatures have no empirical existence. They do exist; but, as for Śaṅkara, they exist through *avidyā*. The two Masters are not interested in the "how" and "why" of *avidyā* so much as in the way to its transcendence. How creatureliness is to be overcome is what they are primarily concerned with.

Close as is the parallel between Śaṅkara and Eckhart in regard to their metaphysical doctrines, closer still is their agreement over the practical disciplines. Salvation or release and the means to it occupy the centre of attention in the teachings of the two Masters. Like Śaṅkara, Eckhart considers, not equality with God, but identity with Him as the goal. "God is the same one that I am" says Eckhart. This is almost the same as the Upaniṣadic teaching, "That thou art" (*tat tvam asi*). The direct way to the realization of transcendent unity lies not through occult practices or ecstatic *yoga* but through divine knowledge or *jñāna*. The soul has to come to its true nature by discarding the assumed limitations, by renouncing all "me and mine". It is by

withdrawing inwards through knowledge that the soul discovers its infinitude and divine glory.

After explaining the similarities between Śaṅkara and Eckhart in his penetrating comparative study entitled *Mysticism East and West*, Rudolf Otto speaks about the differences also. One of the points of difference, according to Otto, is that while Śaṅkara's Brahman is static Being, Eckhart's God is a living *process*. Another great distinction is that while the goal for Śaṅkara is the stilling of all *karmas*, all works, all activity of will, for Eckhart the goal is never a static rest and the "oneness" which the soul strives to gain is never closed as a boundary, but is continually opening afresh like a vault with an over-rising roof. Stating the differences in other words, Otto observes: "Śaṅkara knows the ātman in us but this Ātman is not the soul in the Christian and Eckhartian sense; it is not "soul" as identical with 'Gomut', infinitely rich in life and depth..... Least of all is his Ātman, "soul" in the sense of religious conscience, which "hungers and thirsts after righteousness"..... Śaṅkara's, mysticism is certainly mysticism of the ātman but it is not mysticism as Gomuts-mystik. Least of all is it a mystical form of justification and sanctification as Eckhart's is through and through. And Śaṅkara's mysticism is none of those things because it springs not from the soul of Palestine, but from the soul of India".

We are ready to acknowledge with Otto that there are differences. But we do not agree with him when he says that Brahman is static Being, that *mokṣa* is a state of passivity and that Śaṅkara has no ethic because the background of



His teaching is not Palestine but India. Otto is evidently wrong in several of the statements he has made about Śaṅkara, as for instance when he observes that "salvation in Brahman is for Śaṅkara realized only after death". The main difference between Eckhart and Śaṅkara, according to us, is that while the former is influenced by dogma, the latter is not. Shorn of the elements of dogma, Eckhart should be as universal as Śaṅkara undoubtedly is.



## THE ADVAITA VIEW OF LIBERATION

By

R. BALASUBRAHMANIAN.

Liberation is the supreme end of human endeavour. According to Advaita Vedānta, liberation consists in the attainment of the right knowledge of the Self (*ātman*). The Self is the sole reality. It is of the nature of unsurpassed bliss (*ānandam*) and unconditioned consciousness (*vijñānam*). It is immutable (*akṣaram*), trans-empirical, all (*sarvam*) and the otherless perfection of security (*abhayam*). But its real nature is veiled and the non-real sorrow which is *samsara* is projected on account of the perception of the illusory plurality of things which are related as causes and effects. Ignorance is the root cause of our pursuit of the non-real. The perception of the non-real world of diversity and the resultant attachment to it are responsible for the wanderings in the wilderness of *samsāra*. That is why the condition of ignorance is rightly characterised as *samsāra*. Ignorance is bondage and its

removal is release. The removal of ignorance takes place when there is the realisation of the Self as the sole reality. Since the rise of the right knowledge itself is the removal of ignorance, release can be characterised either as the removal of ignorance (*avidyāstamaya*) or as the attainment of the right knowledge (*vidyā*)<sup>1</sup>.

Is Knowledge the means to release ?

It is necessary to clear certain erroneous notions about liberation before we elucidate our standpoint. It is sometimes argued that knowledge is the means for the attainment of release. Various *śruti* texts are cited in favour of this view. The *Īsāvāsya Upaniṣad*<sup>2</sup> says : “He attains life eternal through knowledge”. The *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* declares : “He who has found out and who understands that Self obtains all worlds and all desires”<sup>3</sup>. These scriptural texts, it is claimed, purport to show that knowledge is the means through which release is attained. Knowledge itself is not release. If that were the case, the *Upaniṣad* would not have said that *mokṣa* is attained through knowledge. In so far as it maintains that knowledge is the means through which release is attained, the two are different, and they are related as cause and effect.

This way of conceiving *mokṣa* is not satisfactory. On this view, *mokṣa* would cease to be eternal, for it seeks to reduce *mokṣa* to the status of an effect, *sādhya*, brought into being by a cause. Anything that comes into being as an effect of a cause has a beginning; and whatever has a beginning has an end. If *mokṣa* were to be an effect like a pot, it would cease to be eternal ; and if it is not eternal, it

would be followed by the state of bondage. But *mokṣa* is an eternal condition characterised by the total absence of *samsāra*. Therefore, the view that *mokṣa* is an effect brought into being by knowledge militates against its eternality.

It might be suggested that *mokṣa* could be looked upon as an effect like annihilative non-existence (*Pradhvamsābhāva*). *pradhvamsābhāva* has a beginning, but no end. If *mokṣa* is treated as *pradhvamsābhāva*, it is undoubtedly an effect; nevertheless, it has no end. What this suggestion aims to show is that *mokṣa* is an effect without, however, ceasing to be eternal. This way of characterising *mokṣa* as an *abhāva* is wrong. *Mokṣa* is *bhāva-rūpa*; it is to be described positively as of the nature of incomparable and unsurpassable bliss. If any positive existent is an effect, it cannot escape the end; sooner or later it will be destroyed. It should be pointed out here that there is no contradiction between what we said about *mokṣa* earlier and what we are maintaining now. *Mokṣa* is a state in which there is the total absence of *samsāra*. This description is negative. Though *mokṣa* is positive, we have resorted to the negative characterisation for the simple reason that *samsāra* disappears at the advent of *mokṣa*, and that its removal is total and final. It is characterised negatively only in the figurative sense. There is, therefore, no contradiction between what we said earlier and what we now maintain.

Let us now consider another interpretation which seeks to show that *mokṣa* can be treated as an effect brought into being by a cause without any danger to its eternality. Avidyā is the cause of bondage; and the destruction of the

cause of bondage is *mokṣa*. Its destruction is caused by knowledge. *Mokṣa*, that is to say *pradhvamsābhāva*, though it is an effect, it is eternal like the destruction of a pot. This way of interpreting *mokṣa* is equally untenable. It is based upon the assumption that the destruction of *avidyā* which is the cause of bondage is different from *vidyā*, while it is not. Maṇḍana equates the removal of ignorance (*avidya-nivṛtti*) with Brahman-realisation (*vidyā or tattva-jñāna*)<sup>4</sup>. The rise of the right knowledge itself is the removal of *avidyā*. It is, therefore, not different from *vidyā*; only if it is different, it can be the effect of *vidyā*.

To remain in one's own state (*svarūpa-sthiti*) is *Mokṣa*. The *Upaniṣad* brings out this idea when it says: "Having reached the highest light, he becomes merged in his own true form."<sup>5</sup> If *mokṣa* is an effect, something that is brought into being by a cause, its nature cannot be what the *Upaniṣad* makes it out to be. What is accomplished cannot be of the nature of the Self which is eternal. *Mokṣa* is attained when the knower of the truth remains what he has always really been, *viz.*, the eternal, self-luminous Brahman, remains, that is to say, in his own state. The view that *mokṣa* is an effect brought into being by a cause runs counter to the *Upaniṣadic* teaching.

Release is not going to Brahman after departing from the body.—Release, according to others, is the attainment of Brahman by the individual soul. Just as a person would go by a particular path in order to reach his destination, so also the individual soul departing from the body, takes to a particular path in order to reach Brahman. The individual

soul will get release only when it reaches Brahman. There are *śruti* texts which seem to lend support to this view. It is said in the *Kāthopaniṣad*: "A hundred and one are the arteries of the heart; one of them leads" up to the crown of the head. Going upward through that, one becomes immortal; the others serve for going in various other directions."<sup>6</sup> The *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* says: "When he thus departs from this body, he goes upwards these very rays.....As his mind is failing, he goes to the sun. That verily is the gateway of the world".....<sup>7</sup> A passage in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* reads: "Those who know this as such and, those too who meditate with faith in the forest on the truth, pass into the light, from the light into the day, from the day into the half month of the waxing moon".....<sup>8</sup> These *śruti* texts, it is claimed, which describe the course after death make it clear how the individual soul, after departing from the body, goes by a certain path, reaches Brahman and attains immortality. Depending on the authority of these texts, it is argued that liberation consists in the attainment of Brahman by the individual soul proceeding along a particular path after death.

This way of conceiving *mokṣa* is untenable. It is intelligible to say that a person reaches his destination by proceeding along a particular path. His destination, say a certain village, is away from him. Limited as it is in space, the person must move towards it from his place, if he wants to reach it. But the same does not hold good in the present case. There is no need for the individual to go by a certain path to reach Brahman, for the latter is all-pervading; and if it is all-pervading transcending the limitation of space, it is

always attained. Only if it is away from the individual by being restricted in a space, the latter, it could be said, should reach it by taking a particular path. There are *śruti* texts which refer to Brahman as all-pervading. The *Īśāvāsyā Upaniṣad* says : “It (Brahman) is within all this.”<sup>9</sup> The *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad* speaks of Brahman as “eternal, all-pervading, omnipresent.”<sup>10</sup> For another reason also this view is not satisfactory. The village which a person wants to reach is different from him. Only if he proceeds along a certain path, he can reach it. Whereas the person is different from the village which he wants to reach, the *jīva*, is not different from Brahman which is to be attained. On the other hand, the *jīva*, in its true form, is Brahman itself. Only if it is taken to be non-different from Brahman the *śruti* text which declares most emphatically that “when verily the Self is known, then all this is known”<sup>11</sup> will be significant. If the two are different, the knowledge of the one will not entail the knowledge of the other. The non-difference of the *jīva* and Brahman is brought out directly by the *Upaniṣad* when it says “That art thou.”<sup>12</sup>

Release is not absorption in Brahman.—

According to another view, release consists in the individual soul losing its identity and merging itself in Brahman. This point will be clear, if we consider certain examples. The rivers which flow into the sea lose their identity and separate individuality by becoming one with it. They merge in the sea and become the sea itself. Bees prepare honey by collecting the juices of different flowers and reducing them into one essence. The juices of different flowers lose their

identity as soon as they are mixed to form one essence. The different juices are not seen with their distinguishing marks in the one essence which is a blend of different juices. In the same way, the *jīva* merges in Brahman and loses its identity. When it merges in Brahman in such a way that it cannot be discriminated from Brahman, it attains release. The authority of *śruti* texts is invoked in support of this view, Uddalaka Aruni instructs his son Śvetaketu in the following way. He says: “Just as, my dear, the bees prepare honey by collecting the juices of different trees and reducing them into one essence; and as these possess no discrimination (so that they might say) ‘I am the essence of this tree, I am the essence of that tree’, even so, indeed, my dear, all these creatures though they reach the Being do not know that they have reached it.” “These rivers, my dear, flow the eastern towards the east, the western towards the west.....They become the sea itself. Just, as these rivers which do not know “I am this one”, “I am that one,” in the same manner whatever they are in the world that they become”<sup>13</sup>.

Even this view of *mokṣa* cannot stand examination. It proceeds on the assumption that the *jīva* and Brahman are different, while they are not. We can talk about the rivers which flow into the sea becoming one with it, when they merge in it, or the different juices losing their identity in the one essence to which they are reduced, since the two—the rivers and the sea or the different juices and honey—are different. But Brahman is not different from the *jīva*, but is identical with it. If they are different, we can talk about the latter merging in the former and losing its identity. Since they are nondifferent, the very idea of the one merging in



the other is meaningless. There is also another reason to show that this view is absurd. It is possible to say that two things possessing form and parts get mixed with each other, losing their individual distinguishing marks. The Self or Brahman has no form and parts. The *Upaniṣad* declares that the self is "without parts, without activity"<sup>14</sup>. The very conception, then, of the Jīva becoming one with Brahman by losing its form and parts is meaningless.

Attaining the causal condition of Brahman by jīva is not release.—

Some others conceive of *mokṣa* in a different way. The individual soul comes forth from Brahman: for *śruti* declares that "as small sparks come forth from the fire, even so from this Self come forth .....all beings"<sup>15</sup>. The *jīva* that is to say, is the effect of Brahman. It attains release when it acquires the conditions of its cause, *viz.*, Brahman from which it has come forth. In support of this view, a text from the *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad* is cited: "Being a knower, shaking off good and evil and free from stain he attains supreme equality with the Lord"<sup>16</sup>. Release is, therefore, the attainment of the condition of Brahman, which is the cause, by jīva which is its effect. This view also does not stand to reason. The effect is always of the nature of its material cause. If so, the jīva is always of the nature of Brahman from which it has come forth. Since the jīva is always of the nature of Brahman, it is meaningless to say that it must attain the condition of its cause. Only if it is different from Brahman, can we say that it acquires the nature of Brahman which is its material cause and thereby attains release. In so

far as it is not different from it, the nature of Brahman is always attained.

Release is not transformation of jīva into Brahman.—

According to another view, the jīva should undergo transformation and become Brahman to attain release. Just as a person transforms himself into a tiger by means of the *yogic* powers, which he has developed, so also the jīva changes itself into the form of Brahman. *Śruti* itself speaks of such a transformation of the jīva into Brahman. The *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad* says: “He, verily, who knows the Supreme Brahman becomes Brahman himself.”<sup>17</sup> The transformation of the jīva into Brahman, is, therefore, release. This view also like the earlier ones cannot bear examination. The term “transformation” signifies that one thing becomes another. When a thing undergoes transformation, it changes into something quite different from the one it was previously. A person who is an adept in *yogic* practices transforms himself into the form of a tiger; he assumes a new form which is different from the one which he had previously. Transformation indicates that the thing which undergoes change and the object into which it is changed are different. Since the jīva is not different from Brahman, it is wrong to speak of the transformation of the jīva into Brahman. Further, whatever object undergoes transformation will acquire new characteristics which serve to distinguish it from its previous condition. Brahman is of the nature of consciousness and as such is not different from the jīva whose real nature is also consciousness. The jīva which is supposed to change into Brahman does not differ from it at all.

It may be argued that there is a vital difference between the *jīva* and Brahman. Even though the *jīva* like Brahman, is of the nature of consciousness, it differs from the latter in one important respect. It is subject to grief and delusion, while Brahman transcends all these. When the *jīva* changes into Brahman, there is the absence of grief and delusion in that condition. Thus the condition of the *jīva* is different from that of Brahman and we can, it may be argued, without any inconsistency talk about the transformation of the one into the other. This argument is untenable. The critics should be asked whether the *jīva* by its very nature is subject to grief and delusion or not. If it be said that the *jīva* by its very nature is consumed with grief and is afflicted by delusion, it can never get rid of them. If they constitute its nature, they can never be destroyed and the *jīva* will always be subject to them. If, on the other hand, they are treated as characteristics foreign to its nature, they cannot stick to it as permanent possessions; they will disappear of their own accord, and no special effort need be taken to remove them.

Release is the realisation of the nature of the self.—

So far we examined several views of *mokṣa* and all of them are erroneous. Release is not something to be accomplished through the agency of a cause. It does not signify the attainment of Brahman by the *jīva* proceeding along a particular path after departing from the body. It does not consist in the merging of the *jīva* in Brahman by losing its identity. The attainment of the condition of Brahman which is the cause by the *jīva*, which is the effect, is not even release. Nor does release mean the transformation of the

jīva into Brahman. According to Advaita, the realisation of the true nature of the Self is release. The Self or Brahman which is non-dual is of the nature of knowledge, bliss, and existence. It is ever-free; it is of the nature of eternal release. But its real nature is missed due to avidyā. The jīva is Brahman itself. It is on account of the limiting adjuncts that it appears to be different from it. Birth and death, finitude and limitation do not belong to it, for it is of the nature of Brahman which is infinite and immutable unborn and homogeneous, but they pertain to the psycho-physical complexes, which make for finitude and limitation and which are, therefore, non-atman and non-real. Attachment to the non-real is responsible for desire, sorrow, and suffering. And the root cause of all these is avidyā which obscures the real nature of the jīva. The obscuration is removed through knowledge. When the veil which covers the truth falls off at the onset of knowledge, the jīva shines, in its own true form, as the real, as knowledge, and as the infinite, in the same way as a crystal (*sphaṭika*) shines in its own true form when the *japa* flower which is responsible for the red colour which it has assumed is removed from its vicinity. The crystal by itself is not red; but it appears to be red when it is kept against the *japa* flower which is red. What its true nature is cannot be known so long as it is kept against the red background provided by the flower. The flower not only conceals the real nature of the crystal, but also makes it appear red. No sooner is it removed from the vicinity of the crystal the red colour of the crystal disappears and the crystal shines in its own true form. When the flower is removed, the crystal remains what it has always really been;

it has not attained a new form. When avidyā which has been obscuring the true nature of the jīva disappears at the onset of vidyā, the jīva shines in its respondent glory and supernal excellence; the knower of the truth remains what he has always really been—the eternal, free, self-luminous Brahman.

*Brahmaprāpti* or the attainment of Brahman is said to be release. Since the *jīva* is of the nature of the eternal, free, self-luminous Brahman, what is required for *brahmaprāpti* is just the knowledge of the truth. The jīva should realise its true nature by destroying the false belief in the psychophysical complexes which serve to limit and particularise it. When the false belief which is avidyā is destroyed, release is said to be attained by the knower of the truth. For release what is needed is the knowledge of the truth and nothing else.

If release signifies the realisation of one's real nature, how can it be said to be originated or brought into being? We can throw light on this question by considering an example. The dirt which has settled upon the cloth does not allow it to appear in its white colour. When it is removed, the cloth shines in its original colour and we say: "The cloth has *become* white". Here there is no origination of a new colour. The cloth was white even earlier. But still we say that it has become white as if it was not white previously. In the same way, the knower of the truth gives up the notion of the identity of the self with the body, etc., and becomes Brahman himself. A passage in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* reads: "Being Brahman, he attains Brahman."<sup>18</sup> If release is not interpreted as realising one's real nature, realising

what one has always been, the expression “being Brahman” (*brahmaiva san*) would be void of meaning.



## NOTES

1. Vide *The Brahmasiddhi* (Madras Govt. Oriental Series No.4., 1937) edited by S. Kuppuswami Sastri, Part I, p. 119.
2. 11.
3. 8-7-1.
4. *The Brahmasiddhi*, p.78.
5. *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, 8-12-2.
6. 2-3-16.
7. 8-6-5.
8. 6-2-15.
9. 5.
10. 1-1-6.
11. *Bṛhadāranyaka Upaniṣad*, 4-5-6.
12. *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, 6-8-7.
13. *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, 6-9-1-2, 6-10-1-2.
14. *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad*, 6-19.
15. *Bṛhadāranyaka Upaniṣad*, 2-1-20.
16. 3.3.
17. 3-2-9.
18. 4-4-6.



## DOCTRINES OF ADVAITA IN THE VEDIC HYMNS

N. Veezhinathan

The culture of our land has been for centuries, and is still, the central and dominating culture of the world. The complex of attainments, beliefs, customs, traditions, moral eminence implying rectitude, justice, integrity and all other virtues, and the absence of all taint of anything petty such as self-seeking, self-interest and the like which form the background of our people, and which distinguish us from all other people give our particular culture its peculiar character. India means not a race but a culture. It is not so much a particular country, a geographical entity, but an idea – the idea that the world matters not, but the spirit in man does. The ancient Indians were truly men of culture in the sense that they possessed spiritual enlightenment. Our land is called *bhārata-varṣa*. The term, *bhāratāḥ* etymologically means men of spiritual enlightenment, i.e. those who revel in their true nature which is self-luminous consciousness.

*bhārūpe brahmaṇi ratāḥ bhāratāḥ*



And this term is metaphorically applied to our land which abounds in such men of spiritual enlightenment.

Our ancients attained spiritual enlightenment as they pursued what is known as *Sanātana-dharma* which, as the name itself implies, has neither a beginning in time, nor will it have an end. In the words of Saint Augustine, it is "Wisdom Uncreate, the same now as it ever was, and ever will be". It was a "Single spiritual language which splintered into multiple, but parallel dialects" throughout the world. My revered Guru, the Paramācārya of Kañcī has maintained in his discourses that there was only one religion for which there was no name and there was no need for a name, as it was the only religion. It was called *Sanātana-dharma*. It is this religion with its spiritual language that spread all throughout the world. When there was a lapse in the religious-spiritual practices of the people, there was a need for new prophets to make their advent and convey the message to the people. Thus founded religions came into existence, registering some differences due to the new situations in which the message has to be given. It means that, though the fundamentals of all religions are the same, differences arose because of the place- time factor.<sup>1</sup>

*Sanatana-dharma* is our religion and it is enshrined in the Vedas. Each of the four Vedas consists of two parts - the ritual part called *karma-kāṇḍa* which forms the first part of the book and the knowledge part called *jñāna-kāṇḍa* which forms the later part of the book. There are four sections in each Veda. They are: Mantras (*Samhitas*), Brahmanas, Āraṇyakas, and the Upaniṣads. The Mantras are hymns in praise of Gods. The Brahmanas deal with sacrificial rites

and their significance. The Āraṇyakas shade off with the Upaniṣads which deal with the nature of the ultimate reality called Brahman or Ātman.

The Vedas have the power to reveal everything that is supra-sensible. And this power they could derive only from their material cause, i.e. Īśvara who is their efficient cause too. From this it should not be thought that the Veda has an author, and so the basic view that it is *apauruṣeya* must be given up. The work, *Raghuvaṃśa*, for example is of personal origin (*pauruṣeya*),<sup>2</sup> because the author has composed it after ascertaining its sentence-structure (*vākya-jñāna*) preceded by the knowledge of the sentence-sense (*vākyaṛtha-jñāna*). In the case of the Vedas, however, Īśvara's knowledge of the sense and of the particular order (*ānupūrvī*) in which the words occur in it are contemporaneous. He reveals it to Hiraṇyagarbha at the beginning of each cycle precisely as it was in earlier cycles. In the language of Hiriyanna, he does not interfere with its content or with the order of its words. In this sense it is *apauruṣeya* and Īśvara who reveals it is omniscient.

The Vedas inculcate what is known as *dharma*. This word stands for the means of material prosperity (*abhyudaya*) and spiritual felicity (*niḥśreyas*). The former results from the performance of deeds prescribed in the ritualistic section of the Veda, and the latter from the direct knowledge that the true nature of the *jīva* is the Self – the knowledge which could be arrived at by the study of the Upaniṣads, reflection and meditation.

This paper seeks to present the philosophical doctrines

especially the doctrines of Advaita as could be gleaned from the hymns of the Vedas.

The principles of Advaita which find full expression in the Upaniṣads are foreshadowed in the Vedic hymns. These principles may be summed up as follows:

(1) The Self is the only reality and it is the true import of the Upaniṣads; (2) the indeterminable māyā or avidyā is responsible for making the Self appear as Īśvara, the jīva, and the world; (3) the jīva, is none other than the Self; (4) the world is non-real like the silver which appears where there is only nacre; and, (5) the direct knowledge or realization of the true nature of the jīva, as the Self is the sole means to liberation.

### *The Nature of the Self*

The Upaniṣads refer to the Self as free from any relation to phenomenal elements, and also as real, consciousness, bliss and infinite.

The *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* in its section entitled *mūrtamūrta-brāhmaṇa* first refers to the Self as having two forms, gross and subtle,<sup>2</sup> and states that the gross one consists of earth, water, and fire, and the subtle one, of air and ether.<sup>3</sup> Having thus described the Self as consisting of these two forms, the Upaniṣad proceeds to deny them thus: "Subsequent to the ascription of the two forms to the Self, since the Self is to be presented as free from any relation to the world, there is an instruction regarding the nature of the Self as "Not this, Not this" (*neti neti*).<sup>4</sup> The two negative

particles (*nañ*) deny the existence of the two forms ascribed to the Self and thereby instruct the latter as free from any relation to the world.

A doubt may arise at this stage that the text "Not this, Not this" referred to above merely negates the existence of the world without providing any instruction regarding the existence of the Self. In order to dispel such a doubt, the Upaniṣad states: "There is no other and more appropriate description of the Self than this, i.e. "Not this, Not this".<sup>5</sup> Since negation without any reference to a substratum is unintelligible, there is the principle which is different from the two forms that are negated and which serves as the substratum of the negation of the two forms. That principle is the Self wherein there is the absence of the world. It is, therefore, acosmic (*niṣprapañca*) in nature.

In the section entitled the *akṣara-brāhmaṇa* of the same Upaniṣad which contains the dialogue between Gārgī and Yājñavalkya, the latter describes the Self as *asthūlam*, *anaṇu*, etc.<sup>6</sup> These words must be taken in the sense of that where there is the absence of gross object, minute object, etc. They do not merely convey the absence of grossness, etc. but point to the substratum of their absence. And that substratum is the Self which is Advaita.<sup>7</sup> The word "advaita" means "that wherein there is absence of duality" (*na vidyate dvaitam yatra*). Sureśvara in his *Vārttika* on Śaṅkara's *bhāṣya* on the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* states: "The word "dvaita" means the state of being manifold and the expression "advaita" points to its negation in a substratum"<sup>8</sup>. It follows that the Self is the substratum of the absolute non-existence

of diversity in all its forms, and thereby suggests that it is like nothing and unlike everything, and is free from internal differences.<sup>9</sup>

This view of the Upaniṣad that the Self remains as the substratum of negation of everything else is referred to in a hymn of the *Atharva-veda* when it extols the remnants of the sacrificial food by comparing them to the Self which remains as the substratum of the negation of every form of duality. The hymn is as follows:

The objects consisting of names and forms are superimposed upon the "*Ucchiṣṭa*", i.e. the Self which remains as the substratum of negation of duality. In the *Ucchiṣṭa*, earth, etc. are falsely attributed. It is in this *Ucchiṣṭa*, Indra, the Lord of the heaven and Agni, the Lord of the earth are illusorily presented. As a matter of fact, the whole universe is falsely identified with it.<sup>10</sup>

### *The Self and Māyā-Avidyā*

Avidyā, identical with māyā, is the power present in the Self. The text of the *Svetāśvatara Upaniṣad* states:

The sages, absorbed in meditation, discovered the power (avidyā) which is present in the Self-luminous consciousness and which is inextricably blended with the three strands of *sattva*, *rajas*, and *tamas*.<sup>11</sup>

It is said in the above text that avidyā is present in the Self. The relation between the two cannot be real; for the Self is sentient and the latter insentient. The cause of their relation

is avidyā itself. Avidyā thus falsely related to the Self acquires a twofold power of veiling (*āvararṇa-śakti*) and of revealing (*vikṣepa-śakti*). By the former power it veils the non-dual aspect of the Self thereby giving rise to the experience and the corresponding expression "The Self as non-dual bliss is not manifest". By the latter one, it illusorily presents the Self as Īśvara, the jīva, and the world. The *vikṣepa* phase of avidyā gets itself transformed into gross elements of earth, etc. and into the psychical apparatus. From the gross elements arise the world farther and farther above and farther and farther below, and also the gross bodies of man and beast, birds and reptiles, brambles and trees, and lice and mosquitoes. The psychical apparatus consists of seventeen factors, viz., the five senses of knowledge, the five senses of action, the five vital airs, and the internal organ in its twofold aspect as the intellect and the mind. These constitute what is known as the subtle body. It may be added here that the mind is the predominant factor of the subtle body. The point that is of importance here is that the conceptions of Īśvara and the jīva are based upon avidyā. This we shall explain later on.

The texts of the *Aitareya* and the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* state that prior to creation, i.e. during the period of dissolution, what existed is only the Self identified with the world (in its latent form). The world could be present in avidyā only, as it is its primal cause. So when it is said that the Self alone identified with the world existed prior to creation, it must be understood that the Self alone existed by being associated with avidyā wherein the world remains in a latent form.<sup>12</sup>

This view of the Upaniṣads prefigures in the hymns of the *Ṛg-veda* and Śaṅkara in his work, *Sataślokī* or *Vedānta in Hundred Verses* records it.

The hymns are:

Before the creation of the world, there existed neither the lord of death, nor the nectar of the divine beings; there did not exist the sun and the moon – the marks of day and night. There existed only *That one (tad ekam)* which is free from any activity and is associated with avidyā (*svadhā*). Nothing existed apart from it. <sup>13</sup>

This hymns occurs in the *Taittirīya-brāhmaṇa* too. <sup>14</sup>

Śaṅkara refers to this hymn in his commentary on the *Vedānta-sūtra*<sup>15</sup> and states that the word “*ānīt*” in the hymn merely conveys the existence of the cause, i.e. the Self. He adds that it should not be taken in the sense of “vibrated” or “breathed”; for, the *Muṇḍaka* text “He is without *prāṇa* and without mind; He is pure”<sup>16</sup> speaks of the ultimate material cause as free from all such attributes as the *prāṇa*, etc.

Śaṅkara explains the import of this hymn in the *Sataślokī*. <sup>17</sup>

Yet another hymn of the *Ṛg-veda* refers to the principle of avidyā as the factor that conceals the world prior to creation. That hymn is:

Prior to the creation of this world, there existed avidyā, the primal cause. The world is concealed by it. Just as the water mixed with milk cannot be

differentiated from it, in the same way the world which remains in a latent form in avidyā could not be distinguished from it.<sup>18</sup>

The characteristics of avidyā are set forth in the following hymn:

Avidyā has four distinguishing features: She is ever young; has resourcefulness to bring in a relation between incompatible things (viz. the sentient Self and the insentient world); possesses the persuasive skill in directing the attention of men to external objects; and is endowed with the power to enshroud the scriptural teachings. The jīva and Īśvara rest therein like birds; and, the sense organs function towards their objects (because they are falsely identified with the Self by avidyā).<sup>19</sup>

Śaṅkara sets forth the view expressed in this hymn in the *Śataślokī*.

### *The Self as Īśvara and the jīva*

The śruti text explains the nature of the jīva on the analogy of a reflected image. The *Brahmabindu Upaniṣad* states:

The Self of all things is verily one. It is immanent in each and every being, and thus it appears to be one (as Īśvara) and many (as the jīvas). This is similar to the moon which, although one, appears to be many in water contained in various receptacles.<sup>20</sup>



On the basis of this and other similar texts, the Advaitin maintains that the Self which is pure and simple, and which is consciousness gets itself reflected in avidyā and the mind. The reflected image is known as the *jīva*. The *jīva*, in other words, is the Self associated with the characteristic of being a reflected image (*pratibimbatva-viśiṣṭa-caitanya*). The consciousness-element in the blend is termed *Ātman* and it is real, while the characteristic of being a reflected image (*pratibimbatva*) is non-real. In relation to the reflecting media and the reflected image, the Self acquires the adventitious feature known as the original (*bimba*). As associated with this feature, the Self is known as *Īśvara*. *Īśvara* thus is the Self associated with the characteristic of being the original (*bimbatva-viśiṣṭa-caitanya*). The consciousness-element in the blend is designated as *Brahman* and it is real, while the feature of being the original is non-real. It comes to this that the essential nature of both *Īśvara* and the *jīva* is the Self which is real. It is only the states of being *Īśvara* (*Īśvaratva*) and of being the *jīva* (*jīvatva*) that are illusorily superimposed upon the Self.

*Īśvara*, being the Self that serves as the original (*bimba*), is not overpowered by avidyā, His limiting adjunct. The characteristics of a revealing medium will be presented only in the reflected image (*pratibimba*) and not in the original (*bimba*). *Īśvara* thus is not affected by avidyā; on the other hand he controls it. Of the two powers that characterize avidyā, viz. the *āvaraṇa-śakti* and the *vikṣepa-śakti*, the *āvaraṇa-śakti* is inactive in his case. His essential nature, viz. the Self is never concealed from Him. He is ever aware of His identity with it and so He is ever-released (*nitya-mukta*). The *vikṣepa-*

*śakti*, however, is operative. Consequently, the world of variety appears to him, but he at the same time realizes that it is nothing more than an apparent diversification within Himself.

The *jīva*, on the other hand, being the reflected image is overpowered by the characteristics of the revealing media, viz. *avidyā* and the mind. It has lost sight of its true nature, the Self, sees through the veil of *avidyā* the phenomenal world of individuality and multiplicity, takes it to be real, performs deeds – righteous and unrighteous, and experiences their fruits by undergoing unending cycle of births and deaths. It can hope to find permanent freedom from this suffering only in the utter extinct of *avidyā*. And it is possible only through Self-realization.

It follows that, according to the Upaniṣads, the *jīva* is the Self immanent in *avidyā* and the mind; and, *Īśvara* is the Self that transcends *avidyā* and the mind. This view we find expressed in the following hymns of the *Ṛg-veda*.

- i) Two birds, viz. *Īśvara* and the *jīva* co-exist in a tree, i.e. the physical body. Of these two, the one, viz. the *jīva* experiences cheerfully the fruits of its (good) deeds (and painfully the fruits of its bad ones), while the other, viz. *Īśvara*, without experiencing the fruit of any action, merely manifests as the witness of the *jīva*, etc.<sup>21</sup>
- ii) The *jīva*, overpowered by *avidyā*, has forgotten its true nature and falsely takes the phenomenal world to be real.<sup>22</sup>

Śaṅkara summarizes the view expressed in these hymns in the *Śataślokī*.<sup>23</sup>

Another hymn refers to the jīva as the reflected image of the Self in several psycho-physical organisms.

The Self gets reflected In each and every psycho-physical organism.<sup>24</sup>

Furthermore the following hymn makes a pointed reference to the fact that the true nature of the jīva is concealed by avidyā and so the jīva is concerned with acquiring material ends only.

O, Men! you do not know the Self from which proceeds the entire world. There is something interposed between you and the Self. It is avidyā similar to mist. Your true nature is concealed by it and so each one of you entertains false notions such as “I am a human being”, “I am an agent of actions and the experient of the fruits of actions” and the like. And you desire for securing happiness here and in the hereafter.<sup>25</sup>

### *The Self and the world*

The *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* in the section entitled *Śāṅḍilya-vidyā* defines the Self as *tajjalān*, i.e. that (*tat*) from which the world arises (*ja*), into which it is reabsorbed (*li*), and from which it derives existence and manifestation (*an*).<sup>26</sup> Again, in the same Upaniṣad it is said that “All these beings originate from the Self (*ākāśa*) alone, and they merge in it.”<sup>27</sup> Śaṅkara in his commentary on the *Vedānta-sūtra* observes:

It is well-known that anything from which something originates and in which it merges must be its material cause, as for instance, earth is of paddy, barley, etc. Never indeed is an effect noticed to be absorbed in anything other than its material cause.<sup>28</sup>

From this it follows that the Upaniṣads convey the Self as the material cause of the world.

The Self is known to be the efficient cause as well from the Upaniṣads. An efficient cause is the one who has the knowledge of the things to be created, desire to bring about them, makes a decision after deliberation and puts that decision into effect. The *Taittirīya* text states: “The Self desired, ‘let me become many, let me be born’; It deliberated and having deliberated has created all this”.<sup>29</sup> The *Chāndogya* text declares: “That Being deliberated, ‘I shall become many, I shall be born’; it created fire”.<sup>30</sup> The *Aitareya* text declares: “The Self deliberated, ‘let me create the worlds’; and it created all these worlds.”<sup>31</sup>

From these texts it is known that the Self after deliberation has made a decision to become many and it has put the decision into effect. In other words, the Self has *jñāna*, *icchā*, and *kṛti* in regard to the origination of the world. Hence it is viewed as the efficient cause of the world. Another text of the *Taittirīya* expresses clearly that the Self *manifested itself* (into the form of the world) *by itself*. When it is said that the Self *manifested itself* into the form of the world, it is known that it is the material cause of the world.

And when it is said that the Self manifested into the form of the world *by itself* it is known that it is the efficient cause of the world.

The Self that serves as the *bimba-caitanya*, i.e. Īśvara is the material and the efficient cause of the world. He is the material cause in the sense that the consciousness-element in Him is the substratum of avidyā whose transformation is the world. He is the efficient cause in the sense that the consciousness-element in Him comes to be associated with the characteristics of having the knowledge of the world to be created (*jñāna*), the desire and resolve to create the world (*icchā*), and of putting the resolve into effect (*kṛti*). These characteristics are only the manifestations or the modes of avidyā. It must be noted here that the past merits and demerits of the jīvas which abide in avidyā in a latent form serve as the cause for the rise of desire on the part of Īśvara to create the world.

The following hymns of the *Ṛg-veda* set forth the above view:

- i) The world which remains in a latent form in avidyā is manifested into a gross form by the supreme power, viz. deliberation on the part of Isvara regarding the process of creation.<sup>32</sup>
- ii) On noticing that the merits and demerits that abide in the minds of the jīvas are in the process of fructifying, Īśvara attains the desire to create the world.<sup>33</sup>

Śaṅkara restates the view set forth in the above hymns in the *Śataśloki*<sup>34</sup>

The following hymn of the *Atharva-veda* explains in a graceful and aesthetically pleasing manner the process of creation of the world by Īśvara:

The Self is the bridegroom, and it joins in bonds of holy matrimony with the bride, avidyā. Deliberation upon the method or process of creation and the past merits and demerits of the jīvas for whose enjoyment the world is to be created – these constitute the bridal party.<sup>35</sup>

The world does not have any independent existence or manifestation apart from the Self. The Upaniṣads declare that the world is Brahman, or Ātman, or the Puruṣa, i.e. the Self. Compare:

- i) All this indeed is Brahman;<sup>36</sup> and,  
All this is Ātman only;<sup>37</sup>
- ii) All this is Brahman only;<sup>38</sup>
- iii) All this is but Ātman;<sup>39</sup>
- iv) This world is Puruṣa only.<sup>40</sup>

Śaṅkara in his commentary on the *Vedānta-sūtra* states:

The use of words “all” and “Brahman” in coordinate relation in the text “All this indeed is Brahman” is meant for the denial of the world in Brahman and not for proving that Brahman is of the nature of the world of diverse forms.<sup>41</sup>

It is in this sense we have to understand the following hymn of the *Rg-veda*:

The present world and the one that existed in the past and the other that would come into existence in future are the Self only.<sup>42</sup>

### *The Self as Liberation*

The jīva, falsely identifying itself with the body-mind complex has lost sight of its identity with its true nature, the Self. It must get itself detached from its relation to the mind, the relation caused by avidyā. And avidyā could be removed by the direct knowledge of the true nature of the jīva as the Self. To achieve this the jīva must first rise above the life of sensual impulse and act as a moral being. It must cultivate the will to turn the mind toward righteous thoughts when it is troubled by the sinful ones. Attaining "betterment of character" or "cleansing of the heart" by the performance of moral deeds prescribed in the Veda without any selfish end in view, and by pursuing Vedāntic study (*śravaṇa*), reflection (*manana*) and meditation (*nididhyāsana*), it would attain the realization of its true nature as the Self. The jīva would become free from avidyā and also from its relation to the mind. This is stated in the following hymn of the *Ṛg-veda*:

When a man realizes his true nature as the Self with the aid of the mind that is pure, then he leaves avidyā and avidyā too moves away from him.<sup>43</sup>

Such a one would continue to live in the body till the merits and the demerits that have caused the body by being present in which he has attained Self-realization are exhausted. He

is known as a *jīvan-mukta*. His life has two phases: it is either *samādhi* when he turns inwards and loses himself in the Self; or the condition known as *vyutthāna* or reversion to empirical life. In this state he would give expression to his mystic experience. Being the substratal principle of the whole world, he feels his presence in every being. Sage Vāmadeva, having attained the realization of his true nature states:

- i) I am Manu; I am the sun; I am the sage Kakṣivān; I glorify the sage Kutsa, the son of Arjunī by such acts of homage as prayer; I am the omniscient sage by name Uśanā; Oh men, discern me as of the form of every being.<sup>44</sup>
- ii) Even when I was in the womb of my mother, I knew the appearances of Gods; Prior to realization of my true nature as the Self, I was protected by physical bodies which are invincible; now I have flown away from the nest, i.e. the body like a falcon by realizing my true nature.<sup>45</sup>

Āmbhṛṇī, the daughter of the sage Ambhṛṇa expresses her experience of the Self thus.

- i) I am the supreme Self; I am the substratal principle of Rudras, Vasus, Ādityas, Mitra and Varuṇa, Indra and Agni and two Aśvins.
- ii) I am the one who bestows large fortune to People.
- iii) I am the one who is immanent in the heaven and the earth.<sup>46</sup>

The following hymn too in the *Taittirīya-Āraṇyaka* refers to the mystic experiences which a realized soul recounts.



In my earlier births as a person or an animal, when I was under the realm of avidyā, I was known or spoken of by words such as “human being”, “divine being”, “cow”, or “horse”. These are mere names only. There is no substance in them. I am the Self, the substratal principle of everything movable and immovable.<sup>47</sup>

The source of certitude of the Truth of Vedānta is the experience of the realized souls.

### CONCLUSION

Man who is a member of a society must act not as impelled by natural impulses, but in accordance with what is expected of him. His actions are governed by role-conferring rules and practices which are prescribed in the Vedas. The Vedas constitute the *śāstra* as they impart (*śāsanāt*) the knowledge of the Self – the knowledge which subserves the most desirable end, liberation (*hita*).



## REFERENCES

1. I owe this way of presenting the views of the Paramācārya of Kañcī, and also the reference to Saint Augustine to Prof. R. Balasubramaniam.
2. द्वे वाव ब्रह्मणे रूपे – मूर्तं चैव अमूर्तं च, *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, (hereafter *BU*), 2.3.1.
3. तदेतत् मूर्तं यदन्यत् वायोश्च अन्तरिक्षाच्च, अथ अमूर्तम् – वायुश्च अन्तरिक्षं च, *Ibid.*, 2.3.2,3.
4. अथात आदेशः नेति नेति, *Ibid.*, 2.3.6.
5. न हि एतस्मात् इति, नेति अन्यत् परमस्ति, *Ibid.*
6. अस्थूलम् अनणु अह्रस्वम्, etc., *Ibid.* 3.8.8.
7. सलिल एको द्रष्टा अद्वैतः, *BU*, 4.3.32.
8. द्विधेतं द्वीतमित्याहुः तद्भावो द्वैतमुच्यते।  
तन्निषेधेन च अद्वैतं प्रत्यग्वस्तु अभिधीयते॥ *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad-bhāṣya- vārttika*, 4.3.1807.
9. सकलद्वैतात्यन्ताभाववद्वस्तुप्रतिपादनेन सजातीयविजातीयस्वगतभेदशून्यं वस्तु प्रतिपादितं भवति – *Advaita-ratna-rakṣana*, p. 2.
10. उच्छिष्टे नामरूपं च, उच्छिष्टे लोक आहितः।  
उच्छिष्टे इन्द्रश्च अग्निश्च विश्वमन्तः समाहितम्॥ *Atharva-Veda*, 11,9.
11. ते ध्यानयोगानुगताः अपश्यन् देवात्मशक्तिं स्वगुणैः निगूढाम्, *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad*, 1.3.
12. i) आत्मा वा इदम् एक एव अग्रे आसीत्, *Aitareya Upaniṣad*, 1.1.1.  
ii) सदेव सोम्य इदम् अग्रे आसीत्, *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, 6.2.1.
13. न मृत्युरासीत् अमृतं न तर्हि न रात्र्याः अह्न आसीत् प्रेक्तः।  
आनीत् अवातं स्वधया तदेकं तस्मात् ह अन्यत् न परं किञ्चिन् आस॥ *Rg-Veda*, 8.7.17.2.
14. तैत्तिरीयब्राह्मणम्, 2.8.9.

15. श्रेष्ठश्च, *Vedānta-sūtra*, 2.4.8.
16. अप्राणो हि अमनाः शुभ्रः, *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad*, 2.1.2.
17. बन्धो जन्मात्ययात्मा यदि पुनरभूत् तर्हि मोक्षोऽपि नासीत्  
यद्वद्रात्रिः दिनं न भवति तरणौ किन्तु दृग्दोष एषः।  
अप्राणं शुद्धमेकं समभवदथ तन्मायया कर्तृसंज्ञं  
तस्मादन्यच्च नासीत् परिवृतमजया जीवभूतं तदेव॥ *Śataślokī*, 24.
18. तम आसीत् तमसा गूढम् अग्रे प्रकेतं सलिलं सर्वमा इदम्।  
तुच्छेन आभु अपिहितं..... *Rg-Veda*, 8.7.17.31.  
*Cf.* प्रागासीद्भावरूपं तम इति तमसा गूढम् अस्मात् अतर्क्यम् क्षीरान्तर्वद्वम्भः...  
*Śataślokī*, 25.
19. चतुष्कपर्दा युवतिः सुपेशा घृत्प्रतीका वयुनानि वस्ते।  
तस्यां सुपर्णा वृषणा निषेधतुः यत्र देवा दधिरे भागधेयम्॥ *Rg-Veda*, 8.7.16.3.  
*Cf.* चत्वारोऽस्याः कपर्दाः युवतिः अथ भवेत् नित्यमेषा।  
माया वा पेशला स्यात् अघटितघटनापाटवं याति यस्मात्॥  
स्यादारम्भे घृतास्या श्रुतिभववयुनान्येवमाच्छादयन्ती।  
तस्यामेतौ सुपर्णौ इव परपुस्तौ तिष्ठतः अर्थप्रतीत्या॥ *Śataślokī*, 26.
20. एक एव हि भूतात्मा भूते भूते व्यवस्थितः।  
एकधा बहुधा चैव दृश्यते जलचन्द्रवत्॥ *Brahmabindu Upaniṣad*, 12.
21. द्वा सुपर्णा सुयुजा सखाया समानं वृक्षं परिषस्वजाते।  
तयोः अन्यः यं पिप्पलं स्वादु अस्ति अनश्यन् अन्यः अभिचाकशीति॥ *Rg-Veda*,  
1.164.20.
22. एकः सुपर्णः स समुद्रम् आविवेश। स इदं विश्वं भुवनं विचष्टे॥ *Ibid.*, 1.6.16.4.
23. एकः तत्र अस्ति असङ्गः तदपरः अज्ञानसिन्धुं प्रविष्टः।  
विस्मृत्वात्मस्वरूपं स विविधजगदाकारम् आत्मानमैक्षत्॥ *Śataślokī*, 27.
24. रूपं रूपं प्रतिरूपो बभूव, *Rg-Veda*, 4.7.33.3.
25. न तं विदाथ य इमा जजान अन्यद्युष्माकम् अन्तरं बभूव।  
नीहारेण प्रावृता जलया च असुतुष उक्थशासः चरन्ति, *Rg-Veda*, 8.3.17.7.

26. सर्वं खलु इदं ब्रह्म, तज्जलान् इति शान्त उपासीत – *Chândogya Upaniṣad*, 3.14.1.
27. इमानि भूतानि आकाशादेव समुत्पद्यन्ते, आकाशं प्रति अस्तं गच्छति, *Ibid.* 1.9.1.
28. यद्धि यस्मात् प्रभवति यस्मिंश्च प्रलीयते तत् तस्य उपादानं प्रसिद्धम्। यथा ब्रीहियवादीनां पृथिवी।...प्रत्यस्तमयश्च न उपादानात् अन्यत्र कार्यस्य दृष्टः – Śaṅkara's *bhāṣya* on the *Vedānta-sūtra*, 1.4.25.
29. सोऽकामयत, बहुस्याम् प्रजायेम इति। स तपो तप्यत, स तपस्तप्त्वा, इदं सर्वमसृजत – *Taittirīya Upaniṣad*, 2.6.1.
30. तदैक्षत, बहुस्यां प्रजायेय इति। तत्तेजः असृजत – *Chândogya Upaniṣad*, 6.2.3.
31. स ईक्षित, लोकान् सृजा इति। स इमान् लोकान् असृजत – *Aitareya Upaniṣad*, 1.1.1,2.
32. तपसः तन्महिना अजायत एकम् – *Rg - Veda*, 8.7.27.31.
33. कामस्तदग्रे समवर्तताधि मनसो रेतः प्रथमं यदासीत्, *Ibid.* 8.7.11.47.
34. कामात् धातुः सिसृक्षोः अनुगतजगतः कर्मभिः संप्रवृत्तात् रेतोरूपैः मनोभिः प्रथममनुगतैः सन्ततैः कार्यमाणैः॥ *Śataślokī*, 25.
35. यत् मन्युः जायामावहत् सङ्कल्पस्य गृहादधि। *Athrva-Veda.*, 11.10.1. तपश्चैवास्तां कर्म च अन्तः महत्यर्णवि। ते उवासन् जन्वाः, ते वाराः, ब्रह्मज्येष्ठवरोऽभवत्॥ *Ibid.*, 11.10.1.
36. सर्वं खलु इदं ब्रह्म – *Chândogya Upaniṣad*, 3.14.1.
37. आत्मैव इदं सर्वम् – *Ibid.*, 7.25.2.
38. ब्रह्मैव इदं सर्वम् – *Nṛsimhottarāpinī Upaniṣad*, 7.
39. इदं सर्वं यदयमात्मा, *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, 2.4.6.
40. पुरुष एवेदं विश्वम् – *svetāśvatara Upaniṣad*, 3.15.
41. “सर्वं ब्रह्म” इति तु सामानाधिकरण्यं प्रपञ्चप्रविलापनार्थम्, न अनेकरसताप्रतिपादनार्थम् – Śaṅkara's *bhāṣya* on the *Vedānta-sūtra*, 1.3.1.
42. पुरुष एव इदं सर्वं यद्भूतं यच्च भव्यम्, *Rg - Veda*, 8.4.17.2.

43. तं पाकेन मनसा पश्यति, ततः तं माता रेहि, स उ रेहि मातरम्, *Rg-Veda*, 8-6-13.4.
44. अहं मनुरभवं सूर्यश्चाहं कक्षीवान् ऋधिरस्मि विप्रः।  
अहं कुत्सम् आजुर्नयं नयञ्जे अहं कविः उशाना पश्यत मा॥ *Rg - Veda*, 3.6.15.
45. गर्भे नु सन् अनु एषां अवेदम् अहं देवानां जनिमानि विश्वा।  
शतं मा पुरः आयसीः अरक्षम् अथ श्येनः जवसा निः अदीयम्॥ *Ibid.*, 3.6.16.1.
46. i) अहं रुद्रेभिः वसुभिः चरामि अहमादित्वैः उत विश्वदेवः।  
अहं मित्रावरुणौ विभर्मि अहमिन्द्राग्नी अहमश्विनोमा॥ *Ibid.*, 8-4-17-2.
- ii) अहं राष्ट्री संगमनी वसूनाम्, *Ibid.*
- iii) अहं द्यावापृथिवी आविवेश, *Ibid.*
47. नाम नामैव नाम ते नपुंसकं पुमान् स्त्री अस्मि स्थावरोऽस्मि अथ जङ्गमः –  
*Taittirīyāranyakam - 1.11.*



## JĪVANMUKTA AND HIS SOCIAL CONCERN (According to Śaiva-Siddhānta)

C. MURUGAN

Some among Indian thinkers are of the opinion that liberation can be attained here and now. Even those who do not formally accept the doctrine of *jīvanmukti*, i.e. liberation here and now may be said to acknowledge a state which is equivalent to it, for they believe that the knower will attain release immediately after physical death, implying thereby that nothing more is to be done by him to win final freedom. We may therefore look upon the ideal of *jīvanmukti* to be implicit, if not explicit, in many of the doctrines.

The schools of Sāṅkhya-yoga, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Advaita, and Śaiva-Siddhānta explicitly accept the doctrine of *jīvanmukti*.

According to Śaiva-Siddhānta, Śiva is the absolute of metaphysics and also the God of religion. He is the saviour and *guru* and He assumes this form out of His love for mankind. The *jīva* called *paśu* is enmeshed in the web

of bonds, namely, *āṇavamala*, *karma*, and *māyā*. By the grace of God and the *dīkṣā* of *guru*, the *jīva* attains the experience of the Spiritual Presence of God in him. Śaivism (சைவ நெறி) blended with Vedism (வேத நெறி) advocates the doctrine of *jīvanmukti* in accordance with the Upaniṣadic teachings.

According to the *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad*, in the case of one who has the experience of the Spiritual Presence of God in him, all his *sañcita-karma* comprising the merits and demerits which the person has accumulated in his previous lives and also in this life prior to attaining the direct experience of the presence of Lord in him will be rendered ineffective.

क्षीयन्ते च अस्य कर्माणि. <sup>1</sup>

Śivāgrayogī in his *Śaiva-paribhāṣā* states:

यथा वह्निः महादीप्तः काष्ठमात्रं च निर्दहेत्।  
तथा शुभाशुभं कर्म ज्ञानाग्निर्दहति क्षणात्॥<sup>2</sup>

It must be noted here that the force of the attainment of the Spiritual Presence of Lord would remove only the *sañcita-karma* which has not yet fructified, but not the portion of it which has fructified and begun to bear fruit and which is known as *prārabdha-karma*. This *karma* has given rise to the present body by being present in which the soul has attained the experience of the Spiritual Presence of God. It is thus obvious that it is fully dependent for its rise upon the *prārabdha-karma* which is a live force. When such is the case, Śaṅkara says, its acquired momentum like the wheel

of a potter must exhaust itself out.

कुलालचक्रवत् प्रवृत्तवेगस्य वेगक्षयप्रतिपालनम्.<sup>3</sup>

Umāpati Śivācārya in his *Śataratnasaṅgraha* states the same thus:

जातायां घटनिष्पत्तौ यथा चक्रं भ्रमत्यपि।  
पूर्वसंस्कारसंसिद्धिं तथा वपुरिदं स्मृतम्॥<sup>4</sup>

Such a one who is free from the *sañcita-karma* that has not yet fructified and who is living out only his *prārabdhakarma* is called a *jīvanmukta*.

Śivāgrayogin states that a *jīvanmukta* is one who is associated with the body that is not real and who is free from *maḷa*.

मायिकदेहादि युक्तत्वे सति निर्मलत्वम्।  
निर्मलत्वं च मलध्वंसवत्त्वम्॥<sup>5</sup>

He further states: In the case of such a *jīvanmukta*, the bliss of Lord is manifested.

ईदृशे च जीवन्मुक्ते शिवानन्दः प्रकाशते। शिवानन्दानुभव  
एव जीवन्मुक्तस्य ज्ञानानन्दस्वरूपमुपयुज्यते।<sup>6</sup>

The *jīvanmukta* has overcome the illusion of individuality so that he sets others on the same level of himself. He has realized the presence of God in himself and in all living beings. He invites all humanity to share his joyful experience.

Nāyanmārs who were mystics or *jīvanmuktas* were no escapists retiring into a cell seeking their own salvation. Dissociating themselves from that which is mundane,



material and transitory and realizing the spiritual presence of God in them, they dedicated all the actions of their life to the one end – removal of sufferings of mankind. This they did out of love – love not in the ordinary sense which like compassion involves a sense of duality which they had already transcended, but love born out of their discernment of the Spiritual Presence of God in every being. The innumerable religious songs (பதிகம்) sung by the Nāyanmars are chiefly intended to remove the threefold misery of their fellow-beings, i.e. misery caused by intrinsic influences, bodily or mental, such as the predominance of bile or phlegm or desire or anger and so on (*ādhyātmika*), by extrinsic natural influences, such as other men, beasts and birds or inanimate objects (*ādhibhautika*), and by extrinsic super-natural influences such as spirits and so on (*ādhidaivika*). Misery due to heat and cold, wind and rain, etc. are also *ādhidaivika*.

Tirumūḷar identifies God with Love (அன்பே சிவம்). By such an identification he experiences ineffable bliss. Not satisfied with his own self experiencing that supernal bliss, he invites all mortals to share his bliss.

நான் பெற்ற இன்பம் பெறுக இவ்வையகம்,<sup>7</sup>

Arulnandi Śivam, the author of the *Śivajñānasiddhiyār* states:

Those who do not love God's devotees do not really love Him; nor do they love others; may, they do not love even themselves.

ஈசனுக்கன்பில்லார் அடியவர்க்கன்பில்லார்

எவ்வயிர்க்கும் அன்பில்லார் தமக்கும் அன்பில்லார்.<sup>8</sup>

We have a Hymn of a Śaivite of 10th Century which is as follows:

## HYMN OF ŚAIVAITE PURTAINS

When once I knew the Lord,  
What to me were the host  
Of pagan deities,  
Some fixed in temple shrine  
Or carried in the crowd;  
Some made of unbaked clay;  
And some burnt hard with fire?  
With all the lying tales  
That fill the sacred books,  
They've vanished from my mind.  
How many flowers I gave  
At famous temple-shrines!  
How often told my Cede  
And washed the idol's head!  
And still with weary feet  
Encircled Śiva's shrines!  
But now at last I know  
Where dwells the King of Gods,  
And never will adore  
A temple made by hands.

But yet I have a shrine—  
The mind within my breast.  
An image too is there—  
The soul that came from God.  
I offer ash and flowers—  
The praises of my heart.

The Nāyanmars are poets and philosophers, saints and mystics. They have found symbols and foot-prints of the divine in all that is good, true, and beautiful on earth. May we offer our respectful homage to them.



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5. *ŚP*, p. 331.
6. *Ibid.*, p 351.
7. *Tirumandiram*, 85.
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## THE GREAT MEDIATRIX

By

C. JAGANNATHACHARIAR

This article deals about the unparalleled eminence of Goddess Lakṣmī. Śrī Mahālakṣmī, otherwise known as Periya Pirāṭṭiār is considered mainly as the Goddess of Wealth and a harbinger of all prosperity and auspiciousness (*maṅgaḷam*) for a family. This is no doubt the basis for the worship of that deity but there is an inner philosophical content which is the essence for the existence of Lakṣmī Tattvam; this is to be found in the *Praṇavam* “Om”, especially in the “Akāram”<sup>1</sup> imbedded in that *Mantra*. She is the “*Sarvaloka Jananī*” the origin of all the worlds; She is always taking Her permanent abode in Viṣṇu’s chest-“*Viṣṇu Vakṣassthalthithām*”. She is all-pervasive (*Viśva Mātā*) though said to have taken Her birth from the Celestial Ocean of Milk. “*Kṣīra Samudrarāja Tanayā*”. She is the Mother of all the Universe – *Mātus*

*samastha Jagatām*—and is called “*Trailokya Kuṭumbini*”. With Her Consort Viṣṇu She is controlling the entire Universe shedding lustre, grace, love and affection on all beings animate and inanimate. In the *Guruparamparā* (heirarchy of preceptors) She is spoken of as immediately next to Nārāyaṇa; still She is said to command equal dignity with the Lord, for the *Guruparamparā* commences with the expression “*Lakṣmīnātha samārambhām*”. Hence She is called *Periya Pirāṭṭiār*. Just as the Veda named the Lord Absolute as “*Śriyaḥ-patī*”, Lakṣmī is named as “*Viṣṇu-Patnī*”. Just as the avatars of Lord Nārāyaṇa are legion, so also are the Avatārs of Lakṣmī. Whenever the Lord takes His avatār, Lakṣmī also takes Her avatār simultaneously along with Him. (Cp.: Rāma and Sītā; Kṛṣṇā and Rukmiṇī.). Just as the Lord is called by various names, She is also called by various names as “*Śrī, Bhagavatī, Devī, Mātā, Padmā, Padmālayā, Jaladhitanayā, Kamalā, Hariṣriyā, Hari Vallabha, Indira, Tirumagalar, Cheyyal, Tamaraiyal, Pangayattal,*” etc. These names carry a lot of significance and each is pregnant with celestial meaning. The *Sahasranāma Stotram* of Lakṣmī catalogues 1008 names describing the characteristics and divine qualities of this Divine Mother.

Adi Śaṅkara says in his *Śrī Kanakadhārā Stotra*- “I pray to you to just see me with your eyes of grace, a little bit askew and that will do for me to get your flood of grace, O! Mother.”<sup>2</sup>

Thus She is the bestower of all grace and blessings and anyone who prays to Her with devotion and sincerity will be free from poverty, disease, pests and all kinds of

miseries in his lifetime and later after Nirāyaṇa (death) will attain “*sāyujyam*” and will become a *Nitya-sūri* (Eternal Resident in the Lord’s Abode).

The other important aspect of the Lakṣmi Tattvam is that She is the “*Puruṣakāra- bhūthai*” playing a recommendatory role in compelling Her Spouse Viṣṇu to bestow grace on a *cetana* (individual), though, he is “*doṣabhūyiṣṭha*” - that is, full of sins and crimes. She acts as the Mediatrix and compels Him to forgive man’s foibles and to entertain him into His Bliss of Grace by saying “*Na kaścin nāparādhyati*” and “*Kāryam karuṇām āryena*” - that is to say, She will plead with Him as follows:

“After all, who is free from sins in this mundane world? You cannot find even a single soul free from faults; and hence to do a fault, whether knowingly or unknowingly in this *prakṛti* (earthy earthly world) is quite common; “to forgive is divine”; You are the Divinity and hence You must excuse their weaknesses and sins”. She even goes to the extent of pleading that they have not at all done anything wrong, and “if all the *cetanas* were to desist from doing anything wrong, then, where is the place for exhibiting Your grace or the necessity for calling You as “*Karuṇā Kākutstaḥ*”, “*Kṛpā Jalanidhe*” etc..... then it becomes a misnomer.”

The all-gracious Pillai Lokacharya opines that the benefit Lakṣmī bestows on a *cetana* is this- “that unless She mediates and recommends clemency, even the Lord-, who is considered to be a *Niraṅkuṣa svatantra*, i.e., one who acts on His own, and whom nothing external can impel into

action – cannot do His stipulated work of *Iṣṭa-prāpti* (conferring desires) and *Aniṣṭa-nivṛtti* (destroying the opposite) (*Sūtra 119-Mumukṣuppaḍi*). The Mediational Function of pleading with the Lord on the one hand and comforting the souls on the other by this Mediatrix Lakṣmī is metaphorically expressed by this Sage thus:-“She is like the Mother who cannot leave the cradle of the children on the one side and cannot leave the bed of Her Lord on the other side”. (*Sūtra 42- Mumukṣuppaḍi*). She is thus permanently meant to propitiate for our sins by Her endless acts of self-oblation.

Nanjiyar once asked Parāśara Bhaṭṭar the following question – “For attaining salvation is it not enough to resort directly to the Universal Lord; why should it be necessary to go to Him through the mediation of the Mother?<sup>3</sup> To which Bhaṭṭar quoted Nammalwar’s Thiruvoimozhi lines<sup>4</sup>:

“*Nālum Nam Tiruvuḍai Aḍigal tam Nalam Kazhal Vanāṅgi*  
*Mālum Ōr Idattilum Vanakkodu maḷvadu valame*” (1-3-8).

that is to say- “daily we have to prostrate before the Feet of Lakṣmī Nārāyaṇa (that is the Lord with His Consort Lakṣmī) and even when we are going to shuffle off this mortal coil, it is better to die with folded hands contemplating on Lakṣmī Nārāyaṇa”. Further, he expatiated the significance of the Holy Formula “Śrīman Nārāyaṇa” by saying:- “Generally we find the mother affording protection to a child when it is found guilty, while the father is thereby irate; the mother knows exactly the opportune time when the father is in the proper mood to be pacified and made to forgive the child, and renew his natural affection for him. Similar is the case



with God in protecting His Creatures. As Father, He is the Dispenser of Justice; as Mother He is the forgiver". In this connection it is befitting to quote the words of B.B. Nagarkar of the Brahma Samaj at the Chicago Parliament of Religions in 1893. He said:- ".....the world has yet to understand and realise as it never has in the past, the tender and loving relationship that exists between mankind and their Supreme Universal Divine Mother. O! What a world of thought and feeling is centred in that one monosyllabic word "*Mā*" (mother).....Words cannot describe, hearts cannot conceive of the tender and self-sacrificing love of a human mother. Of all human relations that of mother to her children is the most sacred and elevating relation and yet one frail and fickle human mother is nothing in comparison with the Divine mother of the entire humanity, who is the primal source of all love, all mercy and all purity."

Added to this "*Puruṣakāram*" Role, She plays the parts of being a "*Prāpyai*" and "*Kaiṅkarya-vartakai*", when the Lord acts as the "*Prāpya*" that is, one to whom all should go and look for salvation. That is to say, She, *like Him*, accepts equally the *Kaiṅkarya* or service of the *cetana* done to Her Consort (the Lord), and also infuses the idea in the mind of the Lord that the *Kaiṅkarya* rendered by the *cetana* should be accepted without reservation, by multiplying his sincerity ten thousandfold. This is the quintessence of the Lakṣmī Tatvam and service to this "*Mithunam*" or "Divine Couple" is to be sought after by everyone, as the ultimate goal of his existence. Like Lakṣmaṇa, who had done service to the Divine Couple (Rāma and Sītā) at all levels: – ("*Aham Sarvam Kariṣyāmi Jāgratassvapataśca te*") – it is

incumbent on everyone to do service to the Divine Lord and His Consort.

In fine, let me end this treatise with the text of the initial words of Sage Yāmunācārya's Hymn to the Mother and Goddess of the Universe, which runs as follows:--

- (a) *Kāntaste Puruṣottamaḥ*
- (b) *Phaṇipatiḥ Śayyāsanam*
- (c) *Vāhanam Vedātmā Vihageśvaro*
- (d) *Yavanika Māyā Jagan Mohinī*
- (e) *Brahmeśādi Suravrajāḥ sadayitāhātvad dāsa dāsī gaṇāḥ*
- (f) *Śrīrītyevāca nāma te Bhagavati! Brūmaḥ katham tvām vayam.*

This verse has been translated into English by Śrī Pārthasārathi Yogī, one of the greatest savants of the last century and his translation will be a fitting conclusion for this article:--

- (a) The Soul Supreme,'s Thy Lord Beloved!
  - (b) The Angel most wise, strong -Thy Couch and Chair!
  - (c) Thee, bears Ved-Essence Bird Who Flies with wings of Light and Love!
  - (d) Thy veil is Wondrous Matter Gross -Which all the Universe doth blind!
  - (e) Gods, set to make and end this world, With all their peers and queens, serve Thee, As male and female servants true !
  - (f) Thy very name is "Bliss" O Seat of ev'ry attribute benign!
- How We are worthy, Thee to praise?

Let us bow down before Her as Śrī Śaṅkarācārya does:

“*Namostu Devādibhirarcittāyai Namostu Nandātmaja  
Valliabhāyai*”



### NOTES

1. *Cp:* “When Lord Nārāyaṇa protects a *cetana* individual soul), the presence of the Devī is essential there and hence the letter “*Akaram*” which represents Nārāyaṇa includes all the Śrī content in it, integrated and inseparable. The Lakṣmī Tantram 28-14 says: “*Lakṣmyā Saha Hṛīṣikeśo Devyā Kāruṇyarūpayā; rakṣakas sarvasiddhānte Vedāntepi ca gīyate.*”
2. *Cp:* “*Kamale! Kamalākṣa Vallabhe! tvām Karuṇāpūra taraṅgitair apāṅgaiḥ avalokaya mām*” (Verse:20).
3. There is also a theory that Goddess Lakṣmī like Lord Nārāyaṇa can Herself directly give salvation (*Mokṣa*).
4. “நாளும் நம் திருவுடையடிகள் தம் நலங்கழல் வணங்கி மாளும் ஓரிடத்திலும் வணங்கொடு மாள்வது வலமே” (1-3-8).



## ŚAṄKARA AND PŪRVAMĪMĀMSĀ

P. RAMACHANDRUDU

Śaṅkara is not in favour of accepting the view that Pūrvamīmāṃsā and Uttaramīmāṃsā constitute one *śāstra*; for once it is found that three of the four *anubandhas*, i.e. *viśaya*, the subject matter, *prayojana*, the purpose to be achieved, and the *adhikārin*, the person who is qualified to undertake the study, are different in each one of the two systems with also two different authors, they should be taken as two different treatises as in the case of Sāṅkhya and Yoga, or Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika. This point is made clear by Śaṅkara in his commentary on the first *sūtra* of the *Brahmasūtra* itself. In reply to the suggestion that “*atha*” may be understood in the sense of “after knowing about karma,” i.e. after the study of *Pūrva-mīmāṃsā-śāstra*, he states that this meaning cannot be accepted on three counts - first, even before studying *pūrvamīmāṃsā*, one can seek and acquire the knowledge of Brahman, because there is no

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authority to say that *karmajijñāsā* is the *aṅga* of (auxiliary to) *brahmajijñāsā* or vice versa, or that the same person who is qualified to perform *karma* is qualified to know Brahman. Secondly, these two *jñānas-karmajñāna* and *brahmajñāna* - have two different purposes, the former having prosperity here and hereafter as its purpose, and the latter, salvation. The *dharma*, the subject of *Pūrvamīmāṃsā*, is a thing to be achieved or produced afresh through action, whereas Brahman, the subject of Vedānta, is a thing ever existing with no scope for any action, which cannot produce mokṣa, the Brahmic state, or bring about changes in it, or acquire it or bring some improvements in it. Moreover *dharma* can be known only through *Veda*, while Brahman can be known not only through the *Veda*, but also through one's own experience. After explaining these fundamental differences between these two systems, regarding the subject and the purpose, Śaṅkara indicates how the *adhikārin*s also are different; for a man of various desires is the *adhikārin* for *dharmajñāna*, and a man free from all desires (*ihāmūtrārthabhogavirakta*) is the *adhikārin* for *brahmajñāna*. With so much of difference in *viśaya*, *phala* and *adhikārin* persisting, how would it be possible to accept these two Mīmāṃsās as constituting one *śāstra*?

But Śaṅkara is not unaware of the fact that, though differing from each other in some of the fundamental issues, these two *śāstras*, engaged as they are in interpreting Vedic passages, contain many points of common importance. Therefore, they are not only two allied systems like Sāṅkhya and Yoga or like Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika, but are also complementary to each other. Thus he quotes many *nyāyās*

(rulings) from Pūrvamīmāṃsā to explain a subject of discussion on hand on many occasions. In some places an objection is raised on the basis of a *nyāya* of Pūrvamīmāṃsā, and in some places, an objection is met by showing a *nyāya* as an authority (as is done very often in the third *adhyāya* of his *Brahmasūtra-bhāṣya*). He accepts *pramāṇas* like *arthāpatti* (implication) and many more theories like the *svataḥprāmāṇyavāda*, the *apauruṣeyatva* of the *Vedas* (of course with a slight modification), etc., following the Bhāṭṭa school, and thus is responsible for the well-known śāstric maxim, “*vyavahāre bhāṭṭanayaḥ.*” But he has emphatically declared that Vedānta is a *śāstra* different from, and independent of, Pūrvamīmāṃsā on account of difference in the fundamental issues” (*svatantrameva brahmaśāstra-pramāṇakaṃ vedāntavākyaśamanvayāditi. evam ca sati 'athāto brahmajijñāsā'*, *iti etadviṣayaḥ*;, *prthak śāstrārambhaḥ upapadyate*, etc. *BS*, 1.1.4).

But there are two places in the *Brahmasūtra bhāṣya* where Śaṅkara appears to be contradicting his own proclaimed view about these two systems being different. While discussing the meaning of “*atha*” in the first *sūtra*, he states “*svādhyāyānantaryam tu samānam*” which means that ‘*athā*’ need not be understood in the sense of “after studying the Vedic texts” because, in the first *sūtra* of Pūrvamīmāṃsā itself (*athāto dharmajijñāsā*), ‘*atha*’ is taken in this sense and the same would hold good regarding *brahmajijñāsā* also. This would be possible only when these two Mīmāṃsas are accepted as constituting one scripture. In the *Śārīrabhāvādhikaraṇa* under the *sūtra* “*eka ātmanaḥ, śarīre bhāvāt*” (3.3.53), he raises a question. He asks: where is the need to establish in this *adhikaraṇa* that there is a *jīva*

who survives the body after death; because this point has been mentioned at the beginning of the *śāstra*, in the first *pāda*, “*śāstra-pramukha eva prathame pāde.*” Here too “*śāstra*” referred to is *Pūrvamīmāṃsā*. In reply to this Śaṅkara says: “Though Śabarācārya and Vṛttikāra had mentioned this point at the beginning of *Pūrvamīmāṃsā*, keeping this *adhikaraṇa* of the *Brahmasūtra* in view, it was not mentioned by Jaiminī, the author of the *Mīmāṃsā-sūtras*; therefore Bādarāyaṇa had to mention it in his *Brahmasūtra*”. This implies that had Jaimini discussed this point in his *sūtras*, Bādarāyaṇa would not have discussed this again in his *sūtras*. This question and answer of Śaṅkara suggest that he is of the opinion that these two *Mīmāṃsās* do not constitute one scripture.

Perhaps to avoid this apparent contradiction the *Pañcapādikā* “explains the word “*samānam*” in the sentence – “*svādhyāyānantaryam tu samānam*” as mere ordinary cause only, but not a perfect cause which is sure to produce the result”. The *Bhāmatī* explains this sentence as follows: *Vedādhyayana* is a cause common to both *dharmamīmāṃsā* and *brahmamīmāṃsā*, because the word “*dharma*” in “*athāto dharmajijñāsā*” includes “Brahma” also by *upalakṣaṇa*. Thus the author of the *Bhāmatī* appears to feel that according to Śaṅkara, in the first *sūtra* of *Pūrvamīmāṃsā* itself it is stipulated that *brahmajijñāsā* is possible only after *Vedādhyayana*. After a long discussion, Appayadīkṣita states (in the *Parimala*) that Śaṅkara accepts *ekasāstratva* (being one scripture) for these two *Mīmāṃsās* by *prauḍhivāda*, deliberately, though there are some fundamental differences.

But this apparent contradiction on the part of Śaṅkara

may be explained away like this. Many *nyāyas* - the interpretatory rules which are finalised in the *Pūrvamīmāṃsā* system are frequently used and cited as authority by Śaṅkara, and his followers like Padmapāda, Vācaspatimiśra and others, which means, all of them are required in the *Uttaramīmāṃsā*, but are not discussed in the *Brahmasūtras* as they can be borrowed from that *Mīmāṃsā*, the main purpose of which is to lay down the rules of interpretation of Vedic passages. In the first *sūtra* of *Mīmāṃsā* "*athāto dharma-jijñāsā*" the sentence "*svādhyāyodhyetavyaḥ*" is taken as the *viśayavākya* and it is maintained that the purpose of *svādhyāya* (acquiring the knowledge of Vedic text under a *guru*) is the *arthajñāna* (knowing the meaning of the *Veda*) and therefore one should study *dharma*. As far as the author of this *sūtra* is concerned, the whole *Veda* whether it is in the form of *mantra* or *brāhmaṇa* or *āraṇyaka* or *upaniṣat*, teaches *dharma* only. How each section teaches *dharma* is a different question. According to him, *Upaniṣads* also may be useful in teaching *dharma* by discussing about the nature of *jīva* who is the performer of *karma* and these *Upaniṣadic* discussions, can be interpreted in such a way as to suit *dharma*, the main subject of the *Veda*. Thus as the first *sūtra* itself makes it clear *vedādhyayana* is an essential prerequisite for the study of *Upaniṣads* also which should teach *dharma* being a part of the *Veda*. Therefore, by introducing the *nyāya* finalised in the *Dharmajijñāsā-sūtra*, Śaṅkara is correct in saying, "*svādhyāyānantaryam tu samānam*". In view of the argument, this interpretation of Vācaspatimiśra (of this sentence) appears to be more appropriate than the one given by Padmapāda.



Regarding the second statement of Śaṅkara (in the *śarīra bhāvādhikāraṇa*) it may be said that he has raised the question and answered it to show that, in some theories of common interest, what is implicit in Jaimini's system is made explicit in that of Bādarāyaṇa. As was clearly stated by Kumarilabhaṭṭa, the Pūrvamīmāṃsā may have to depend on Uttaramīmāṃsā for solving certain problems as in the case of *ātmāstitva* and the correct knowledge of Ātman.

“*ityāha nāstikyanirākariṣṇuḥ ātmāstitām  
bhāṣyakṛdatra yuktyā dr̥ḍhatvam - etadviśayasya  
prabodhaḥ prayāti vedānta-niṣevanena*”

(*Ślokavārtika*, 1.1.5, verse 148)

At the beginning of his *Bhāṣya* on the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, Śaṅkara states that the existence of Ātman is known only through *śruti* and so he finds fault with the Mīmāṃsakās and Naiyāyikās saying that having known about the existence of Ātman specially its *lokāntara-sambhandha* from the *Veda*, they start asserting that it can be known through perception and inference. This is an indication to show how Mīmāṃsakās have to depend on Vedānta (*uttara-kāṇḍa*) for some theories. Therefore, these two statements do not alter the position of Śaṅkara who accepts that these two *tantras* are different because of their divergent views on some fundamental issues which are briefly presented below.

1. According to the Mīmāṃsakās there is no beginning or end of this world. Having admitted the theory that the world would continue for ever as it is existing now (*na kadācidanīdṛsam jagat*) they do not accept *mahāpralaya* and creation of the world by God, though agreeing that *avāntarapralaya* is possible. Therefore the *Veda* is eternal

and *apauruṣeya* – not the product of human intelligence. But Śaṅkara accepts *mahāpralaya* and creation, etc. According to him, the *Vedas* are produced by God, but not by ordinary human beings. From what he writes under the *sūtra*, “*śāstrayonitvāt*” (*BS*, 1.1.3) it appears as though he, like the Naiyāyikās, is in favour of accepting independence of God in composing the *Veda* because he maintains omniscience of God on the strength of his producing such a vast Vedic literature which itself is like omniscient (*sarvajñakalpa*) by citing the example of authors like Pāṇini who must be knowing much more than what they could convey through their writings. All this implies that God had composed the *Veda* to convey whatever he knew through it. But, while commenting on the *sūtra*, “*ata eva ca nityatvam*” (*BS*, 1.3.29) Śaṅkara says that there is no author of the *Veda* who has composed it by himself and even God had been handing down the *Veda* at the end of each *pralaya* to the next creation. Thus there is not much difference regarding the *apauruṣeyatva* of the *Veda* between the *Mīmāṃsakas* and Śaṅkara. The only difference is that even the *Veda* cannot be *nitya* ultimately according to Śaṅkara, because Brahman alone is *nitya*, everything else being *anitya*.

2 Śaṅkara does not agree with the *Mīmāṃsaka* that the whole Vedic literature is intended to teach *karma* and that any passage which does not have bearing on *karma* should be deemed as without purpose or it may be interpreted as having a direct or indirect connection with the passages teaching *karma* by extolling the same. He maintains that it may be possible to connect some of the *arthavādas* with the *vidhivākyās* – sentences ordaining *karma*, but it is impossible to connect the *Upaniṣads*, which teach about the Ātman,

which is free from all kinds of *karma*, with them. Therefore, he asserts that the *Upaniṣads* have unquestionable authority of their own, independent of the Vedic portions teaching *karma* revealing the nature of the ever-existing Ātman which is beyond the purview of *karma* (see *samanvayādhikaraṇa*, *BS*, 1.1.4).

3. Ignoring the authority of *arthavādas* which are part of the Vedic literature, and of the *Itihāsās* and the *Puraṇās*, etc. the Mīmāṃsakas maintain that the different gods mentioned in the *Vedas* and *Itihāsas* have no body. But Śaṅkara argues that the so-called *arthavādas* cannot be set at nought (*BS*, 1.3.3) and that on the authority of much works, *devatās* should be accepted as having body (*BSB*, 1.3.26).

4. While refuting the theory of *sphoṭa*, Mīmāṃsakas accept that the *varṇas* (letters) are eternal. But Śaṅkara is not very particular regarding the *nityatva* of the *varṇas* also (*BS*, 1.3.28).

5. *Karma* only can give either pleasure or pain to the beings according to the Mīmāṃsakās. In the *parāyattādhikaraṇa*, Śaṅkara has established that it is only Īśvara that gives pleasure or pain being guided by their actions (*BS*, 2.3.42).

In order to justify the capacity of *karma*, which perishes immediately after it is performed, to produce the result in future after many years or even births, Mīmāṃsakas accept an unseen power called *apūrva* which is generated by the action and remains associated with the doer till the result is produced, which means that the result is produced by *apūrva*. In *phalādhikaraṇa* (*BS*, 3.2. 39-41) Śaṅkara contends that

an inert *apūrva* cannot produce *phala*, and therefore God has to be accepted as the dispenser of *phala* of the actions. He is not very particular about accepting or rejecting *apūrva*: he is mainly concerned with maintaining that an inert *apūrva* is not capable of producing *phala* by itself (*BS*, 3.2.4).

6. Śaṅkara is never tired of repeating five points in all his *Bhāṣyas*, viz. that (1) *karma* and *brahmajñāna* are antagonistic to each other and therefore they can never go together, (2) that *jñāna* alone is the direct means of *mokṣa*, (3) that *karma* can never lead to *mokṣa* which is nothing but the Brahmic-state, (4) that *karma* may be one of the many means of *jñāna* through the purification of mind, and (5) that *karma* and *upāsanā*, which also comes under *karma*, may lead one to the *saguṇabrahmaloka*.

Under the *puruṣārthādhikaraṇa* (*BS*, 3.4.1-17) it is established that the *ātmajñāna*, got through *Vedānta* which destroys the feeling of *kartṛtva* and *bhokṛtva* (the sense of being performer and enjoyer) makes a person lose his *adhikāra* for the performance of *karma*, which requires the sense of agency and enjoyership, etc. on the part of a performer. At the beginning of the *Bhāṣya* on the *Īśāvāsyā Upaniṣad*, Śaṅkara states that the *mantras*, "*Īśāvāsyam*," etc. do not have their application in the performance of *karma*, because they talk about the real nature of Brahman which is pure, free from sin, one, eternal, bodiless, and all-pervading. Under the second *mantra* of the same *Upaniṣad* he declares that the conflict between *karma* and *jñāna* is unshakable like a mountain. At the beginning of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad-bhāṣya*, Śaṅkara clearly states that *karma-phala* and *jñāna-phala* are entirely different.

In his *Bhāṣya* on *śikṣāvallī* of the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad*, while declaring that *jñāna* alone can lead one to *mokṣa*, Śaṅkara says that *karma* may be helpful to attain *jñāna* through the purification of the mind. He also declares that even without *karma*, which is expected to destroy the obstructions (*pratibandha*) to *jñāna*, one can get *jñāna*, because there are other things like the grace of God, penance, meditation, observing the virtues like non-violence, celibacy, etc. which are helpful in producing *jñāna* through the destruction of *pratibandha*. Moreover, *śravaṇa* (listening to the texts) *manana* (understanding), and *nididhyāsana* (contemplation), etc. are said to be the direct means of *jñāna*. Therefore, *karma* alone need not be considered as the means of *jñāna*, he declares.

Jaimini and Śabara do not appear to be much concerned with *mokṣa* and its means. But later Mīmāṃsakas like Kumarilabhaṭṭa have some theory of their own about *mokṣa* and its means. According to them *mokṣa* is nothing but being oneself (*svātmanyavasthānam mokṣaḥ*). This can be achieved thus: by not performing *kāmya-karma* (actions which give some desired results) and *niṣiddha-karma* (prohibited actions), the need to take another birth to enjoy their results is avoided. The *prārabdha-karma*, the action which has started giving its result, can be destroyed by enjoying its result. The *pratyavāya* (the sin which accrues by not performing *nitya-naimittika karmas*) can be avoided by strictly performing all of them. Thus one can get *mokṣa* in course of time in this system of *karma* without any other means like *jñāna* in a just natural way. This view of Mīmāṃsakas is refuted by Śaṅkara at the beginning of the commentary on *Śikṣāvallī* of the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad*. It is

impossible for any person either not to do *kāmya-karma* and *niṣiddha karma*, or to exhaust the previous *karma* accumulated in the past without beginning. It is also not correct to say, as the Mīmāṃsakas do, that *nitya-karmas* do not produce any *phala*, while their non-performance gives *pāpa*, because the non-performance, which is an *abhāva*, cannot produce a *phala*. Therefore, one has to accept *phala* for *nitya-karmas* also. According to Śaṅkara, *nitya-karmas* also are useful to some extent in removing the obstruction like the *pāpa* of earlier birth. While refuting the above views of the Mīmāṃsakas in the *Gītā-bhāṣya* (18.6), Śaṅkara repeats the same arguments and adds to say that *nitya-karmas* also can result in *puṇya* by which one can reach *puṇyaloka* (heaven, etc.).

In the beginning of the third *brāhmaṇa* of third *adhyāya* of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, Śaṅkara states that *nitya-karmas* performed with no aspiration for *phala* give *brahmatva* etc., but if performed without desire they can produce *ātmajñāna*, thus becoming a means to *mokṣa* indirectly. He does not agree with the views of the Mīmāṃsakas who maintain that *nitya-karmas* and *naimittika-karmas* do not have any *phala* of their own, but their performance which involves so much of discomfort to the performer, being the result of the sin of the earlier births, removes the same.

There are some thinkers, according to whom *karma*, in association with *jñāna*, is responsible for *mokṣa*. This theory is called *jñāna-karma samuccayavāda*. This kind of combination may be possible between *karma* and

*saguṇabrahmajñāna*. But once it is established that the ultimate truth is *advitīya-brahma* only (non-dualistic absolute) it can be realised only through *jñāna*, which repels *ajñāna*, and there is no scope for the co-existence of *karma* and this type of *jñāna*. Therefore, Śaṅkara refutes vehemently the *samuccayavada* in almost all his *Bhāṣyas* (beginning of the *Kenopaniṣad-bhāṣya*, and of the *Aitareya Upaniṣad-bhāṣya*, at the end of the commentary on *Śikṣāvallī* of the *Taittiriya Upaniṣad*, in *Bhagavadgitā-bhāṣya*, 2.11, in the beginning of the third *brāhmaṇa* of third *adhyāya* of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣadbhāṣya*, etc.).

As the foregoing discussion goes to show, Śaṅkara while accepting the authority of *Pūrvamīmāṃsā* feels that the two Mīmāṃsās cannot be considered as constituting one scripture, because of their differences in some fundamental issues. As he indicates in a very long discussion at the end of the first *brāhmaṇa* of the second *adhyāya* of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* the authority of the *karmakāṇḍa* is not affected by the *Upaniṣads* because the former has value in its own sphere, and the *prāmāṇya* of latter begins where that of the former ends.



### ABBREVIATIONS

- BS* — *Brahma-sūtra*  
*BSB* — *Brahma-sūtra-Śaṅkara-bhāṣya*



THE CONCEPT OF MUKTI IN THE KṚTIS OF  
ŚRĪ MUTTUSVĀMI DĪKṢITA

R. ASHA (SIVASREE)

(continued from the previous issue.....)

While the articles in the previous issues dealt with the concepts of Brahman, māyā, Īśvara and jīva as incorporated in the kṛtis of Śrī Muttusvāmi Dīkṣita, the present article deals with the concept of *mukti* (liberation).

Liberation in Advaita is realising the nature of one's own self as being essentially non-different from Brahman. Brahman, due to avidyā, falsely identifies itself with its adjuncts, and so the jīva undergoes the travails of transmigratory existence. This avidyā cannot be removed except by the knowledge (*jñāna*), the direct experience of identity with Brahman, which is the substratum for its superimposition. For instance, in the case of superimposition of snake on rope, it is only through knowledge of the



substratum, rope that the illusion vanishes. So, it is through knowledge and knowledge alone, that avidyā is removed and one is liberated. When it is maintained that knowledge (*jñāna*) is the cause of liberation, the role of action (*karma*) and devotion (*bhakti*) is not to be dismissed. Both these are the indirect means to liberation. Karma-yoga, i.e. the performance of one's duties with no attachment to their fruits leads to *cittaśuddhi* (purification of the mind). So does devotion to a personal God. Both help in destroying the six enemies (*aṛiṣaḍvarga*) like passion (*kāma*), anger (*krodha*) etc., and divest the mind of worldly impressions (*viṣayavāsanā-s*) which hinder spiritual progress. For it is only when the mind is purified of the three types of impressions, viz., *deha-vāsanā*, *loka-vāsanā* and *śāstra-vāsanā* that it can contemplate the Supreme.

Echoes of these ideas in Dīkṣita are —

1. कर्मज्ञानयोगसाक्षात्काराय (in सिद्धीश्वराय)
2. अरिषड्वर्गरहितहृत्संचार (in पाहिमां रत्नाचलनायक)
3. विश्वमोहन विषयवासनादिविदारण (in निषधादि)
4. वासनात्रय विवर्जितवरमुनिवन्दितमूर्ते (in श्री सरस्वति)
5. लोभमोहादिवारणकरणौ (in श्रीपार्वतीपरमेश्वरौ)
6. कामक्रोधादिनिवारिणि (in मामव मीनाक्षि)
7. रागद्वेषादिरहितरमणीयहृदयविदितं (in श्रीगणनाथं भजरे)

Once the mind is purified, the aspirant qualifies himself for enquiry into the nature of Brahman (*Brahma-jijñāsā*).

At this stage, if one pursues the path of devotion, it leads to the attainment of Brahma-loka or the four kinds of

liberation, namely, *sārūpya*, *sālokya*, *sāmīpya* and *sāyujya*. In *Brahma-loka*, the meaning of the *mahāvākya-s* like *tattvamasi* (That thou art) is manifested and liberation is achieved. Śaṅkara makes a beautiful reference to the four kinds of liberation in his *Śivānandalaharī* (28)

सारूप्यं तव पूजने शिवमहादेवेति संकीर्तने  
सामीप्यं शिवभक्तिधुर्यजनतासाङ्गत्यसंभाषणे।  
सालोक्यं च चराचरात्मकतनुध्याने भवानीपते  
सायुज्यं मम सिद्धमत्र भवति स्वामिन्कृतार्थोऽस्म्यहम्॥

(*Śivānandalaharī*)

In the succeeding *śloka* (29), complete Self-surrender is advocated to elicit the grace of God, guru through which the liberating wisdom can be gained.

त्वत्पादाम्बुजमर्चयामि परमं त्वां चिन्तयाम्यन्वहं  
त्वामीशं शरणं ब्रजामि वचसा त्वामेव याचे विभो।  
वीक्षां मे दिश चाक्षुषीं सकरुणां दिव्यैश्चिरं प्रार्थितां  
शंभो लोकगुरो मदीयमनसः सौख्योपदेशं कुरु ॥ (Ibid.29)

There are references to the four kinds of liberation in Dikṣita's *kṛtis* too;

1. सायुज्यादिमुक्तिप्रदं (in मायूरनाथम्)
2. सालोक्यादिमुक्तिदायिनीम् (in त्रिलोचनमोहिनीम्) etc.

At one place, Dikṣita exhorts one to strive intensely for liberation inasmuch as a human birth is rare to obtain and therefore, should be utilized to the maximum – मानव जन्मनि संप्राप्ते सति परमात्मनि निरतिशयसुखं ब्रजरे (in मानसगुरुगुरुरूपं भजरे).

As puts it, Lord Kṛṣṇa —

तस्माद् देहमिमं लब्ध्वा ज्ञानविज्ञानसंभवम्।  
गुणसंज्ञं विनिर्धूय मां भजन्तु विचक्षणाः॥

(*Śrīmad Bhāgavatam* XI.25.33.)

And so, in the same *kṛti* referred to above, Dīkṣita exhorts one to seek a guru, worship him and overcome the delusion of *samsāra*.

नत्वा श्रीगुरुचरणं कृत्वानामस्मरणम्।  
जित्वा मोहावरणं मत्वा तदेकशरणम्॥

Regarding devotion, we find many phrases expressive of this in his *kṛtis*. Egs. are

कमलाम्बां भजरे, गुरुगुहस्वामिनि भक्तिं करोमि, पाहि दुर्गे  
भक्तिं देहि, अभयाम्बिकायाः तव दासोऽहं।

and so on.

The fact that his compositions are mostly on some form of personal Godhead underscores the importance of devotion.

For an aspirant whose mind has been purified and who is ready to embark upon the path of knowledge, certain prerequisites are necessary. They are

(i) the discrimination of the real from the unreal —  
नित्यानित्यवस्तुविवेक

(ii) detachment towards enjoyment of objects here in this world and in heaven इहामुत्रार्थभोगविराग

(iii) control of mind (शम) and the senses (दम)

- (iv) renunciation (उपरति)
- (v) powers of endurance and fortitude (तितिक्षा)
- (vi) power of peace and concentration (समाधान)
- (vii) faith in the teaching of the scripture (श्रद्धा)
- (viii) intense desire for liberation (मुमुक्षुत्व)

These are collectively termed *sādhana-sampat*. Dīkṣita makes a mention of these at two places. In the *kṛti* सदाचलेश्वरं, he sings of the Lord as शमदमोपरत्यादिसंयुक्त साधुजनहृदयसरसिभृङ्गम् - beautiful expression indeed; a description of the Lord as the bee which sits on the lotus hearts of great souls who have qualities like *śama*, *dama*, etc.

The other reference is आत्मतत्त्वादिशोधनसाधनसम्पत्ते in श्री गुरुगुहमूर्ते. It is noteworthy that Dīkṣita mentions both disciplines (*sādhana*) and logical enquiry (*śodhana*) in the above composition.

The method of logical enquiry consists in listening to determining the import of Vedāntic texts (*śravaṇa*), reflection (*manana*) and sustained contemplation (*nidhidhyāsana*) of the sense and significance of the identity- texts like "that thou art" (*tat tvam asi*). This enquiry dispels the doubts of the seeker regarding the epistemological authority of proof (*pramāṇa-asambhāvanā*), the nature and status of the object that is desired to be known (*prameya-asambhāvanā*), the inborn prejudices, oppositions and thought patterns (*viparīta-bhāvanā*) and generates a state of mind wherein is reflected Brahman-reality which is pure, unconditioned consciousness (*akhaṇḍākāra-mano-vṛtti*). This final state of mind removes the veil of nescience (*avidyā*), and Brahman is intuitively

expressed as one's self. This is called *sākṣātkāra*. This is said to be liberation (*mokṣa*) and this liberation takes place here and now, instantaneously, in this world itself. It is called *jīvan-mukti*.

This is in contrast to gradual release involving ascent to the higher worlds till the world of Hiraṇyagarbha is reached. From there, Hiraṇyagarbha imparts Vedāntic knowledge to the soul which then becomes realized. Dīkṣita puts these ideas in a nutshell in the phrases —

1. श्रवणमनननिदिध्यासनसमाधिनिष्ठाषरोक्षानुभवस्वमात्रावशेषितप्रकाशमानमहेश्वरेण  
in आनन्देश्वरेण
2. मननध्यानसमाधिनिष्ठमहानुभावहृद्गुहस्य in श्री गुरुगुहस्य, etc.

One can see expressions like “*aparokṣa-anubhava*” (immediate experience), “*sva-mātra-avaśeṣita*” (one's own self alone being the sole remaining reality), “*prakāśamāna*” (existing self-luminously) etc.

Dīkṣita lists the epistemic processing of

(i) learning the Vedānta texts from the preceptor with all of their nuances of one's Self being the same as Brahman-Reality.

(ii) revolving in one's mind the reasonability of such instruction by the teacher to carry conviction to oneself and

(iii) the continued contemplation of the truth of the identity-texts uninterrupted by any other thought.

These three epistemic processes result in the direct experience

(*darśana*) or *aparokṣa-anubhava* and the person becomes a *mahānubhāva* in Dīkṣita's words. Dīkṣita's use of the term *mahānubhāva* (meaning the persons who have directly experienced the consummate Reality), is to be noted as it is an interesting usage.

Incidentally, Dīkṣita, a keen student of Advaita Vedānta, seems to agree with the view of Vācaspatimiśra, the progenitor of Bhāmati tradition in the history of Advaita, that continued contemplation by the mind on the truth of identity-texts is a sine-qua-non for immediate realisation of one's Brahman-hood. There are others who hold that even the very learning and listening to identity-texts (*śravaṇa*) will bring about the direct experience.

(To be continued)



## THE ADVAITIC EXPERIENCE AND MEDITATION

By

MICHAEL VON BRÜCK

### *1. Theory and Practice*

Continuous practice alone is the secret for success. Really, there is no doubt about it,

says the *Haṭhayogapradīpikā*,<sup>1</sup> admonishing everybody who wants to attain spiritual maturity. This sentence is the basic principle of all Hindu and Buddhist, certainly also Christian, piety. Practice is here first of all exercise in different kinds of meditation, mind-control or *jñāna*. Practice is not only applied theory, but also any theory which finds its verification only in this practice, a practice which leads into experience (*anubhava*) and justifies the theory.

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Courtesy: Indian Philosophical Annual, Vol. 17. University of Madras. 1984-85.

In the more popular forms of devotion there is the cult as a form of practice. Even if on the more primitive levels of religious life the cultic action such as offering gets its effect *ex opere operato*, it has to be noted that surrender and ability of identification with the offering, in other words, the existential unity of attitude and action, play an important part for most of the Indian people.

For those who do not know, the cultic action is a first step, an aid on the way towards perfection.<sup>2</sup> The offering at the temple is the rather external self-offering which gets later more and more internalized by meditation and mental effort.<sup>3</sup> The cultic action is the expression of an internal process, and that is why it can become a precondition for further leading inspiration.<sup>4</sup> Cult serves the purpose of tuning and preparing the believer for receptivity of the divine gift of the Spirit. It has the function to lead into concentration, selfless surrender and physico-psychic purification. Thus, what is achieved gradually in Yoga by an internal process, happens externally in cultic action, because Yoga is nothing else than preparation of body and mind for the intuitive experience.<sup>5</sup> Yoga harmonizes and tranquillizes the psychosomatic system. This is the precondition for the activation of certain energies (*prāṇa*), which are regarded as basis for the Advaitic experience. In most schools of Yoga as well as in Tāntric systems the practice of physical exercise and experience plays a great part for the spiritual experience.<sup>6</sup> This is not always the case in Advaita Vedānta, however.

Obviously theory and practice cannot be separated in the cultic religion, but both condition each other. The same relation can be found in all definite ways of meditation



(Yoga, Buddhist schools of Vipassanā, Zen, etc.). How is this compatible with the understanding of Advaita Vedānta as *jñāna-mārga* (way of knowledge)?

In Advaita Vedānta the point is not a theoretical knowledge about the theory of non-duality, but the existential realization of the *advaita* of *ātman* and Brahman and the whole world of appearances. This experience induces a change in man's being. Such experience cannot be achieved by intellectual questioning from a distant point of view, but it requires total surrender and concentration which forms the life of the seeker. The whole life is penetrated by this question: Who am I? — and then: Who is it who is asking this question? etc. This questioning after the ground of one's existence is called *vicāra*, a method which plays) a part also in Yoga and Buddhist Zen. For Ramaṇa Maharṣi it has been the means to prepare the person to receive *jñāna*<sup>7</sup>. In Ramaṇa Maharṣi it is extraordinarily clear that theory and practice cannot be separated at all. He speaks of four states in the spiritual path. But these states do not occur successively. They are infixed into each other 1. Teaching (*upadeśa*), 2. Practice (*abhyāsa*), 3. Experience (*anubhava*) and 4. Attaining the goal (*arūḍha*)<sup>8</sup>.

In Advaita Vedānta theory has to be regarded as guide for spiritual practice, and theory can be verified and interpreted only by practice and personal spiritual experience. *Jñāna* is not only theoretical knowledge, but it is the essence of an integrated personality who has realized the nature of his being, living now in unity. *Jñāna* is a gift as well as a task, it is a reality which is constituted in a continuously new practice of genuine living.

## 2. *The Understanding of Liberation (Mokṣa)*

The word *mokṣa* is derived from the root *muc:* to liberate. *Mokṣa* is liberation from unknowing. Unknowing means that man mistakes his being as separated from God. Only by knowledge that *ātman* and *brahman* are not different, one attains *brahmavidyā*, the realization of non-duality which causes liberation.<sup>9</sup> Here we have to remember an oft quoted principle that the one who *knows brahman* intuitively *becomes brahman*. The ontic and noetical level cannot be separated, because it is a meditative realization affecting man as a whole.<sup>10</sup> That is why *mokṣa* is a holistic event changing man as physical-psychic-spiritual unity.

*Mokṣa* does not have its root in a special ability or capability of man. It is a knowing of the *ātman* which transcends all individual traits and yet has to be regarded as non-different from the empirical and individual personality. The *ātman* is the transcendental dimension, as it were, experienced beyond, in and through the empirical as its basis.

The *ātman* is not rooted in anything external, does not perish and is not subjected to becoming and vanishing. It is eternal (*nitya*). That is why *ātman* is the only possible foundation for a final liberation. Yet it seems to me that *ātman* is not necessarily an everlasting substance of the soul. It does not have to be conceived of in substantial terms, because it is connected with a dynamical experience. It is rather the absolute dimension in and beyond empirical reality, which is a spatial-temporal actualization of the absolute energy due to *māyā*. Thus, the *ātman* is beyond temporality and therefore subject of *mokṣa*.<sup>11</sup>

“ ‘Redemption’ or ‘Liberation’ means that the absolute, *brahman*, brings to light the Egos (*jiva*), which had been hidden by ignorance (*avidyā*), conflicting and fighting. Once awakened, one can attain wisdom and return to the true Self. Redemption, thus, can be understood as the return of the absolute Spirit to itself.”<sup>12</sup> It is an awakening to the true nature of reality. It is more than intellectual “knowing”, but liberation means that we get in tune with the real life by overcoming the egocentric illusion. It is the unity of onto-gnoseological transformation.

*Mokṣa* does not mean, therefore, that one attains something which would exist far and apart from the normal experience of life.<sup>13</sup> *Mokṣa* is rather the realization of what really is.<sup>14</sup> By *mokṣa* a wrong attitude towards reality (including a wrong perception) is negated so that the One Reality can be experienced; the veil of dualistic unknowing disappears, so that what always is can be seen.<sup>15</sup> Hence, *mokṣa* is an existential acceptance of this truth that we are not separated from God in our true nature.<sup>15</sup>

To see things as they really are, to recognize the essence beyond the form without negating the necessity of the form as means of expressing the essence is *saccidānanda*, or all pervading energy, is *mokṣa*<sup>17</sup>. *Mokṣa*, or in other terms, the reality of God’s grace is always present. But in the actual experience which is liberation, all hindrances which are to be found in us hiding the true reality, are removed. To experience things in their total inter-relatedness, to realize that things do not have any existence in themselves, to be

aware that everything is interconnected expression of the one *prāṇa*-energy. is experience of *advaita*. It should not be substantialized again – as it is done occasionally with the concept of *ātman* – in order to avoid new tendencies for dualism.

For the description of the path towards *mokṣa* the same is valid as what has been said about the path towards *jñāna*: By listening to the scripture, a longing and readiness for liberation is induced. At the same time a first guide into meditative exercises is found here. All the doing which has the Ego as subject disappears more and more after the scripture has been read and meditated upon. Man becomes gradually exposed to the One Reality. If the Ego has been perfectly calmed down, *mokṣa* is attainable. This means that the realization of *mokṣa* is experienced as a breakthrough coming from outside, because it starts there where all doing wanted by the Ego (including physical, psychic and mental activity) vanishes.<sup>18</sup> Neither good nor bad deeds – according to the ordinary discrimination – are helpful to attain *mokṣa*, because the good and the bad are integrated and transcended into a higher unity.<sup>19</sup> “This is the eternal glory of the one who has realized *brahman*: it does not grow or decline by action.”<sup>20</sup>

At this point we have to include a few remarks concerning the understanding of evil and sin in Advaita Vedānta in order to be able to determine the essence of *mokṣa* more clearly. Evil is rooted in the ignorance of *brahman* (and again: ignorance should not be understood as a mere intellectual shortcoming but as existentially

egocentred behaviour), yet finally via *māyā*, the *brahman* itself has to be regarded as cause – otherwise we would establish a duality.<sup>21</sup> One who thinks that he and the world are separated from God commits error and evil actions, because on the basis of the feeling of isolation there arises fear, and fear causes aggressivity. Thus, man's attitude towards himself is the cause of all evil.<sup>22</sup> *Avidyā*, causes a wrong identification with finite things,<sup>23</sup> and this again causes the thirst for being (*tr̥ṣṇā*) in a continuous struggle of competition and egocentricity of individuals. And this is the direct cause of evil. In Advaita Vedānta, we can summarize, evil is rooted in an existential illusion which is, however, very effective and throws the world into a chain of suffering.

Self-righteousness and egocentricity are the attitudes which will be overcome by *mokṣa*. This is especially evident in one saying of the *Bhagavad-gītā*.<sup>24</sup> The one who has attained *mokṣa* lives in modesty, integrity and non-violence. The one who lives this way has *śānti*, peace. Śaṅkara explains the term integrity (*adambhitvam*) in this way, that one should not display his own virtues, *i.e.* one should not fall into self-righteousness (*svadharmā-prakaṭikaraṇam*). At another place the term *dambha* occurs in order to indicate hypocrisy.<sup>25</sup> Śaṅkara explains that the hypocrite pretends to be righteous by himself (*dharmā-dhvajitva*). This attitude is the main characteristic of those who are of demonical nature as opposed to those who have found their identity in the *ātman* and derive their righteousness from the non-duality with God.<sup>26</sup> Self-righteousness is the root of evil, it is sin and the direct contrary to *mokṣa*.

*Mokṣa* is of highest value. *Mokṣa* is bliss (*ānanda*).<sup>27</sup> The content of *mokṣa* is described not only negatively as vanishing of all uncertainty and duality, but positively as *ānanda* and *śānti*, as joy and fearlessness.<sup>28</sup> *Śānti* is the essence of the bliss experienced once the non-duality with God as the essence of one's being has been established. This attitude causes *gelassenheit* (calmness) concerning the heavy blows in our life.<sup>29</sup> Only the One is essential. God is the centre or the density of the essential (if we conceive of the reality as something like a field of the one energy, *prāṇa*), which can be experienced as the ground of one's own existence (*ātman*). God and man are totally inseparable, this is the basis of *mokṣa*, and according to the degree of realization is inseparability experienced deeper and deeper.<sup>30</sup>

*Mokṣa* is the realization of the true nature or the Self and corresponds with the nature of the Self. That is why *mokṣa* is basically attainable in this life itself. The Indian speaks of the ideal of the liberated one who is still in physical existence (*jīvanmukta*). He is above good and evil, because he has become non-dual with the absolute.<sup>31</sup> Thus, *mokṣa* is the liberation from the cycle of rebirths (*saṃsāra*) because the differentiation into the duality of good and evil under the influence of *māyā* is the cause for continuous reward in the cycle of rebirths according to the principle of *karman*.

Yet this connection shows also that the ideal of the *jīvanmukta* and the understanding that final liberation is attainable only after death are combined in the notion of *mokṣa* in Advaita Vedānta,<sup>32</sup> because the difference of the phenomenal world and the absolute, body and spirit, death

and life does not exist any more for the person who has realized the *ātman/brahman*.<sup>33</sup>

For the one who has the experience, the difference of the two aspects of eschatology (present and future) has disappeared because the reality which had been expected in the future has become already present. Time is transcended.

The normal life in its individual pluriformity is negated in *mokṣa*. This is interpreted in two different ways in Advaita Vedānta. On the one hand, *mokṣa* is not regarded as destroying something. *Mokṣa* is not destruction but blossom of reality. This is illustrated by the story of the little tiger growing up among goats. The tiger remains tame, playing and forgetting totally its true nature. Only when a tiger coming from the jungle forces the little tiger-kid to eat meat, it gets awakened to its true nature.<sup>34</sup> *Mokṣa* in this sense is "coming to one's own self". And there is continuity between the empirical man and the Self insofar as the empirical does not have any independent existence, actually, but is always comprehended by the Self. To see man in this or that way is a question of standpoint, namely the absolute or the relative standpoint.

On the other hand, there is a strong stream of thought which has a pessimistic feeling towards life and devalues the empirical world,<sup>35</sup> because it is *only māyā*. Here *mokṣa* means that the individual is extinguished. As different rivers melt into one ocean and are not any more discernible even so the individual disappears into the absolute and by this way finds rest and perfection.<sup>36</sup>

As far as I can see both interpretations can be drawn back to the *Upaniṣads* and they influenced the spiritual development of India for centuries in a polar tension.

We summarize: *Mokṣa* is the highest goal for spiritual maturity. *Mokṣa* can be experienced by different means: meditation, intuitive knowledge, action and faithful surrender to God.<sup>37</sup> But all these ways have one thing in common: the realization of non-duality of *ātman* and *brahman* or the personal God (*puruṣa*), respectively. *Mokṣa* helps man out of the disastrous ignorance to be related only to his individually limited being. This is an awakening to his deepest potentialities it is perfection.<sup>38</sup>

### 3. *The Absolute Experience*

In Advaita Vedānta everything goes to this point that *mokṣa* does not remain an intellectual concept but becomes a real experience. Realization or experience (*anubhava*) has been called the central idea of the *Upaniṣads* by Vivekananda, and the notion of experience has an ontological connection (*anu-bhū*: to be according to, to be along). *Mokṣa* is the new being. The central sentence: *aham brahmāsmi* (I am *brahman*)<sup>39</sup> originates in an experience which has overcome the Ego as something in contrariety to an opposite. Without this connection this *mahāvākya* would not make sense and would be a blasphemy. But in contrast, in Advaita Vedānta it expresses the highest veneration for the all pervading One.

The experience is a long path which has to be gone and lived in a unity which integrates more and more all activities and expressions of life.<sup>40</sup> The subject is here as always the *ātman*. A chain of factors which lead into



realization is described in the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*:<sup>41</sup> *Ātman* is the cause for the desire for the infinite because only the infinite brings bliss (*ānanda*). This creates real bliss, which liberates to blissful activity. If activity is directed into the right direction, steady equilibrium is established, which again leads towards faith in the truth revealed in the scriptures. Where this truth is reflected it creates understanding which leads by contemplative interiorization to the experience of the *advaita* of *ātman* and *brahman*.

At another place it is said that by right meditation with the help of the syllable *OM*, sinlessness emerges because the separative thinking of the Ego is overcome. Thus, the way is free for the realization of non-duality with *brahman*.<sup>42</sup>

All the exercises of Yoga, different forms of asceticism, etc. have the purpose to extinguish wrong identifications with finite things, in order to enable the seeker to concentrate on the One. Therefore, detachment from all contradictory things is a precondition and the first fruit of meditation as well.<sup>43</sup> This attitude can be described also as calmness or equanimity. The unconcerned and self-evident attitude of the child (*bāla*) serves, therefore, as an example for the immediateness which the absolute experience is built upon. Since the child is "free from pride, deceit, etc .... due to the immaturity of its senses it does not try to present itself in self-righteousness to the other."<sup>44</sup> Who knows himself in *advaita* with the *brahman*, however, overcomes this pride and self-centredness because he attains the "attributes" of *brahman*: liberation from sin, unity with the will of God and finally the pure simplicity of a perfectly cleansed

consciousness.<sup>45</sup> Therefore, the absolute experience cannot be interpreted as an esoterical insight in some hidden facts, but it is a reduction of all intentionality to the One, highest simplicity, pure consciousness. It is the experience of genuine freedom because there is nothing different which could cause bondage. It is the experience of unity of autonomy and theonomy.<sup>46</sup>

According to Gauḍapāda the experience is no activity but something which happens.<sup>47</sup> It is the realization of the truth of the Self (*atmasatyānubodha*),<sup>48</sup> and the Self is subject as well as object of the experience,<sup>49</sup> or better: this duality is totally overcome in the absolute experience.

The absolute experience is, as has been already said, no supra natural knowledge but a holistic experience of the One Reality which we experience empirically separated and partially.<sup>50</sup> It is an integrative experience which passes beyond all contraries such as matter and spirit.

#### 4. *The Inexpressibility of the Experience*

In the last paragraph we have tried to describe the absolute experience to some extent. But we have to say here the same as with regard to the notion of the absolute: the experience cannot be expressed by means of thinking and language, since it is a reality which transcends all contradictions and since the difference between subject and object is negated in a field of energy or pure consciousness.

The paradox is the only possibility to point towards the inexpressible. In Advaita Vedānta this possibility is utilized extensively in contrast to some Buddhist schools which try to avoid any metaphysical statement at all.<sup>51</sup>

However, there are many attempts to make the absolute experience intelligible by means of relative categories. This is certainly legitimized in Advaita Vedānta because critical reason has a correlative and absolutely necessary function.

A good help for understanding is H. Nakamura's description of the Avatamsaka philosophy, which he sees as a parallel to Japanese Kegon-Buddhism. The principle of this world-view is mutual relation and penetration of all things on the basis of their unity,<sup>52</sup> and this is precisely one aspect of the Advaitic experience, too. Nakamura compares further with the four states of spiritual development in Meister Eckart: 1. The many is seen as One, 2. The many is seen in the One, 3. The One is seen in the many, 4. The One is seen.<sup>53</sup> This spiritual development is extremely similar to the realization of *jñāna* in Advaita Vedānta. It is the way of the ongoing transgression of one's own limitation via the more and more perfect participation in the One until the final *advaita* with the *brahman*.

Ultimately these are all inadequate attempts to rationalize the *advaitic* experience. You can only say what it is not (the *neti ... neti* of the *Upaniṣads*). It is definitely totally different from hypnotic states of consciousness,<sup>54</sup> and it is also not an extinction of consciousness because in this case it would be the same as dreamless sleep. Rather, it combines the sleep-like rest and simplicity with highest awareness.<sup>55</sup>

Cannot this experience be a self-deception? As genuine as it might be subjectively, is there a criterion which excludes

that it is an illusion?<sup>56</sup> The philosophers of Advaita Vedānta point towards the self-evidence of the experience, and even more, its rationality can be proved. Reason as critical instance separates illusory fault from the true experience. Yet, the experience of liberation itself cannot be derived from reason or anything else.

### 5. *Yoga and Meditation*

We cannot describe here the practice of Yoga nor discuss the philosophical system of Yoga, but we will speak only of the relationship between the practice of Yoga and Advaita Vedānta.

Yoga passes for a means to open the person for *advaitic* realization.<sup>57</sup> The old descriptions of Yoga in the *Upaniṣads* say that the senses and the mind should become one-pointed, so that all external activity of the mind disappears, consciousness rests in one point and can be experienced as such, *i.e.* not affected by its objects.<sup>58</sup> Thus Yoga means that the spirit reaches as psychic-mental unity a non-dual state.

However, Yoga can be interpreted also dualistically with the help of Sāṅkhya philosophy where the spiritual principle (*puruṣa*) is freed from its material bonds (*prakṛti*) by certain exercises. This view is rejected by Advaita Vedānta.<sup>59</sup>

For the Advaitin, the goal of Yoga is the experience of *mokṣa*, the experience of the *advaita* of *jīvātman* and *paramātman*.<sup>60</sup> Yoga is also a means for control of the will<sup>61</sup> or of the confusing world of senses in general.<sup>62</sup> It can

be described as a way which unites rhythm and harmony of life with one's own existence,<sup>63</sup> a way which is also the spiritual anticipation of one's own death.<sup>64</sup> All these determinations we had shown already in connection with the *advaitic* experience. Yoga is a *katharsis* (purification) which destroys all the veils and masks of man until the true Self, the *ātman* is brought to light.<sup>65</sup> Yoga is the way of radical self-knowledge. It contains utmost concentration on and reduction to the essential. Therefore, Yoga and Advaita Vedānta do have the same goal: Yoga is the means of realization of the *advaitic* experience.

This gets even more clear when we have a look at the practice and the exercises of meditation, which are a subsystem in the Yoga practice. Meditation leads towards integration. Since one identifies himself with what one meditates upon, it leads also towards identification. Meditation on the *ātman* transcends, therefore, our intentionality towards the relative.<sup>66</sup> It arouses the vital force (*prāṇa*) which is seen now as the only and unifying principle of the world.<sup>67</sup> In this way death is integrated meditatively, i.e. death is transcended. All fear disappears.<sup>68</sup> Meditation is the interiorization of the cosmic process of the development or unfolding of the absolute (cf. I. 2) in the reverse direction: one penetrates more and more from one state to the other towards the One and participates, therefore, in the reality of the *hiranyagarbha* so far as one is penetrated by it.<sup>69</sup> Ultimately, the non-duality of the Self and the universe is to be meditated upon.<sup>70</sup>

Advaita Vedānta, however, is concerned that one

does not remain at a certain stage or form and so miss to penetrate to the full *advaitic* experience. Meditation presupposes – at least at the initial stages – an intuitive image of God, and because of and for the sake of meditation the *brahman* assumes different forms and attributes (*saguṇa brahman*).<sup>71</sup> Meditation of *prāṇa* makes the meditating person realize *prāṇa* etc.<sup>72</sup> But how does the meditating one know that he finally did not remain at an image projected by his own mind?

This problem is the reason that meditation is not an end in Advaita Vedānta, but a means for the *advaitic* realization.<sup>73</sup> In other words, meditation is the preparation for the “self-revelation” of *brahman*, and this ultimate event cannot be derived from meditation.<sup>74</sup> Finally, it is the goal to meditate objectless without any symbol or image.<sup>75</sup> But first one needs a point for concentration. This is *ālambana*, a mental exercise in order to realize the gross form (*virāḥ*) of the *brahman*. Śaṅkara calls this meditation with an object *upāsana*.<sup>76</sup> For him it has to be completed by *advaitic* understanding (*viveka*: true knowledge, right discrimination),<sup>77</sup> which surpasses the *saguṇa* aspect attained by *upāsana*<sup>78</sup> in going beyond to the *nirguṇa brahman*. This can be attained only by objectless meditation because only here duality is perfectly overcome.

Only in regard to the meditation of the *OM*, *advaitic* vision and meditation come closely together because *OM* is identical with the *ātman/brahman*<sup>79</sup> which integrates all states of consciousness<sup>80</sup> and represents the perfect divine presence. No objectivity is left. *OM* (a-u-m) comprehends

the phenomenal world and the basic states of consciousness, namely waking, dream and deep sleep, whereas the silence following the utterance of the first and the last vowel and the nasal leads into the state of *turīya* which is identical with the absolute experience. As Heinrich Zimmer says:

A: the waking state, U: the dream, M: the deep sleep, and the *silence*, Turiya "the fourth"; all four together contain the wholeness of the *ātman-brahman* which manifests itself as syllable. As the sound *OM* manifests itself, grows, changes vocally and goes into the following silence, the four "states" or components of being occur also. They are alterations of the one being, which are all together the wholeness of its modalities, be they microcosmically or macrocosmically regarded. A and U are likewise essential for the sound as M or the silence which the sound contrasts with. It would be even wrong to say that there would not be any *AUM* as long as there is *silence*; it is still there potentially. At the other hand the real manifestation of the syllable is transitory and disappearing, whereas *silence* remains. The *silence* is even always there when somewhere the syllable *AUM* is uttered – thus analogically also in the transcendent meaning: during the creation, manifestation and dissolution of a universe.<sup>81</sup>

Herewith it is said that *OM* represents the vision of Advaita Vedānta in the utmost reduction and simplicity. Meditation

upon the *OM* leads into the experience of the One. It is rooted in the world of pluriformity and gets its dynamism from physic as well as psychic processes, namely from the arousal of *prāṇa* or *kuṇḍalinī* along the power centres of the spine (*cakra*).<sup>82</sup> It leads to liberation (*mokṣa*) through the *advaitic* realization in which all contradictions are transcended. Thus, freedom from all finite beings is achieved, detachment which is not bound by any external thing or event.<sup>83</sup> It is the freedom from desire and non-desire,<sup>84</sup> freedom from sin because the supposed own is not sought any more, but the true and genuine will as realized in unity with the will of God<sup>85</sup>.

This freedom is true freedom, because it does not have its basis in the destruction of unfreedom alone. It is a positive value, which has its reference in the vision and realization of the unity of Reality.<sup>86</sup> The ignorant person is dependent on its particular wishes and ideas and therefore unfree. The experienced Advaitin is free, because he knows the *ātman* in himself as non-dual with the harmony of the world.

The *advaita* of *ātman/brahman* has transcended the contradiction of autonomy and heteronomy in the experience of the Self. This is the goal of Yoga which is realized by meditation. This is also the essence of the basic experience in Advaita Vedānta.





## NOTES

1. *Hathayogapradīpikā* (HYP), I, 64 ff.
2. Śaṅkara's Commentary on the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* (BU), V, i, 1.
3. Swāmi Vimalānanda, Introduction, *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, Sri Ramakrishna Math, Madras 1975<sup>3</sup>, pp. XLIII and LVI.
4. SU II, 6; cf. Iyer, *Advaita Vedānta*, Bombay 1964, pp.13 ff.
5. It is possible to draw parallels between the single elements of the temple cult and the exercises of Yoga. Cf. Tara Michael, *Religion and Yoga*, French Institute of Indology, Pondicherry 1977. T. Michael says that Yoga be the climax of religion, because everything external is integrated into an internal practice here. (pp. 2ff.)
6. M. Eliade, *Yoga, Immortality and Freedom*, Princeton 1973<sup>3</sup>, pp. 227 ff.
7. Rāmaṇa Maharṣi, *Spiritual Instruction*, Tiruvannamalai 1969, pp. 6 f.
8. R. Maharṣi, op. cit., p. 6.
9. Śaṅkara's Commentary on BU 1, iv, 7.
10. MU III, ii, 9; Śaṅkara's Comm. on BU IV, iv, 25.
11. KeU II, 4f.; Śaṅkara's Comm. on KeU II, 4 and BU IV, iii,
12. H. Nakamura, *Weisheit und Erlösung durch Meditation. Ihr Sinn in der Philosophie Śaṅkaras*, in: *Munen muso. Ungegenständliche Meditation. Festschrift für P. Lassalle* (Ed. by G. Stachel), Mainz 1978, pp. 55 f.
13. Such eschatological ideas are not rare in popular Hinduism. They are connected with the understanding of *brahmaloka* which exists beyond our present, world as a certain kind of paradise which the redeemed ones will enter (cp. CU VIII, 4, etc.). This dualism is strange to Advaita Vedānta.

14. Śaṅkara's Comm. on BU I. iv, 7; I, iv, 15.
15. Ibid., III, iii, 1; IV, iv, 20.
16. Ibid., II, iv, 12,
17. Cf. Śaṅkara's Comm. on BU IV, iv, 6. This aspect is stressed most clearly in Buddhist literature in the doctrine of suchness (*tathātā*), the true nature of things which is not different from the appearance. For the enlightened one, in Zen, trees are trees, mountains are mountains; the difference to ignorance is that here the inter-relatedness of all things, the unity of being is realized. Cf. the short but very instructive article by Masao Abe, "Emptiness is Suchness." in: *The Eastern Buddhist* XI, 2, Kyoto 1978, pp. 132 ff.
18. Śaṅkara's Comm. on BU I, iv, 7.
19. BU IV, iv, 22; Comm. IV, iv, 9.
20. Ibid., IV, iv, 23: *eṣa nityo mahimā brāhmaṇasya na vardhate karmaṇā no kaṇīyān.*
21. BSB I, iv, 19.
22. Ibid, II, iii, 46.
23. BG XIV, 7 (similar in Buddhism).
24. Ibid., XIII, 7.
25. Ibid., XVI, 4.
26. This understanding I owe Dr. T. M. P. Mahadevan due to a letter dated April 1979.
27. Śaṅkara's Comm. on BU III, ix, 28. 7.
28. TU II, vii, I.
29. Śaṅkara in the Comm. on BG XIII, 7 describes *kṣānti* as *parāparādhaprāptau avikriyā*: changelessness of the heart when others have done any injury.
30. TU II, iv. I.
31. For the description of the ideal of the *jīvanmukta* and its

- explanation with the help of the theory of *karman* cf. BU IV, iv, 7; KU VI, 14; cf. also H. Zimmer, *Philosophie und Religion Indiens*, 1976, pp. 394 ff.
32. Cf. Iyer M. K. V., *Advaita Vedānta, According to Śaṅkara*, Bombay 1964, pp. 191 ff. Death has been described as the great problem of Indian philosophy which has recognized it as the gateway to life. Search for eternity had been expressed in the meditation of death. (H. Nakamura, *Ways of Thinking of Eastern Peoples*, Honolulu 1971, p. 165) This is correct in so far as in Yoga e.g. a meditative anticipation of death is wanted (Eliade, op. cit., pp. 362 ff; cf. also the initiational experiences of Ramaṇa Maharṣi and many other saints). But in the *advaitic* experience the contradiction of this world and a world beyond has been overcome. The contradiction of death and eternity is also *māyā*. The same experience is, by the way, linked with Buddhist enlightenment which leads to the well known expressions of "identity" of Buddha, nature and empirical realm in Zen (cf. *The Three Pillars of Zen*, ed. by Ph. Kapleau, Boston 1967<sup>2</sup>, pp. 301 ff.).
33. T. M. P. Mahadevan, *Invitation to Indian Philosophy*, New Delhi 1974, p. 402.
34. Zimmer, op. cit., pp. 21f.
35. Ibid., pp. 531.
36. MU III, ii, 8; PU VI, 5; cf. Iyer, op. cit., pp. 186 ff.
37. BG XIII, 24 ff.
38. R. DeSmet, "A Twofold Approach, Sankara-Aquinas. Sankara and Aquinas on Liberation (*mukti*)," in: *Indian Ecclesiastical Studies* 1971, 10, p. 17. The author refers to Śaṅkara's Comm on TU II, i, 1.
39. BU I, iv, 10; IV, iv, 12; Kaiv U 19.

40. Cf. PU I, 2. In this way the whole path of Yoga has to be explained which is a transformation of the whole life and not a special exercise at special times with special purposes. Cf. Patanjali's *Yoga-sūtra*.
41. CU VII, xvi, 1 ff.; VII, xxiii, I; VII, xxv, 2.
42. PU V, 5.
43. BSB I, iii, 18; Cf. also BSB II, iii, 48 where this attitude is applied with reference to all casuistical morality.
44. Ibid., III, iv, 50.
45. Ibid., IV, iv, 5.
46. Ibid., IV, iv, 9.
47. GK III, 36: *nopacārah kathañcana* (no activity in any regard).
48. Ibid., III, 32.
49. Ibid., III, 33: *ajena ajam vibudhyate*: By this unborn (knowledge) is known the birthless (reality). Śaṅkara comments: "The thus expressed thought is, that the Self which is always a homogenous mass of consciousness like the sun, which is by nature constant light, that the self does not depend on other knowledge for its revelation.
50. R. Panikkar, *The Vedic Experience*. London 1977, p. 64-9.
51. Zimmer, op. cit., pp. 401 ff.; 420. Zimmer's hint on Kant and Schopenhauer in connection with the *advaitic* view to understand time and space only phenomenally is important. In the case of Schopenhauer it is clear that there is historical dependance from India even if he was not in a position to know the whole of Advaita Vedānta and thus could have been easily misled to wrong conclusions.
52. H. Nakamura speaks of inter-relatedness and interpenetration. Cf. H. Nakamura, *Parallel Developments, A Comparative History of Ideas*, Tokyo/New York 1975, pp. 439 ff.

53. Nakamura, op. cit., p. 439. Cf. R. Otto, *We. st. ostliche Mystik* Gotha 1926, especially pp. 71 ff.
54. Eliade, op. cit., p. 78.
55. Zimmer, op. cit., pp. 386 ff. W. Johnston, *Silent Music*, New York 1974, pp.32ff. Johnston presents a survey on the scientific results which have been collected on the basis of measurement of brain waves with Yogis and Zen-monks. This is not the place to discuss the literature on brain physiology and religious psychology. We speak here only about the theological interpretation of the *advaitic* experience. Only a few titles should be given: H. Motoyama, "The Mechanism through Which Paranormal Phenomena Take Place", in: *Religion and Parapsychology*, Vol.2,2, Tokyo 1975; Motoyama, "Hypnosis, Psychosis and Religious Experience" in: *Research for Religion and Parapsychology* Vol.2,2, Tokyo 1976; Motoyama, *Das Mystische Erlebnis und das "Absolute Nichts"; Der Gott, der Geist und die Naturc*, Tokyo o.J. (maschinenschriftl.); C.F.v. Weizsacker/G. Krishna, *Die biologische Basis religiöser Erfahrung*, Weilheim 1971; C. Albrecht, *Psychologie des mystischen Bewusstseins*, Bremen 1951. Cf. also all the publications of the International Transpersonal Association. At present a lot of research is done in this field, especially in India, Japan and USA.
56. Ch S. Rao, "Can We Know God?" *Indian Philosophical Annual* VII, Madras 1971, pp. 140 ff.
57. T. M. P. Mahadevan, *Gaudapāda - A Study in Early Aavaita*, Madras 1975, p 23.
58. KU II, iii, 10 f.: *yadā pañcavatiṣṭhānte jñānena manasā saha buddhiṣca na viceṣṭate tāmāhuḥ paramām gatim* (When

- the five senses of knowledge come together for rest with the mind and also the intellect is not active, this is called the highest state.) Cf. SU II, 8 ff.
59. BSB II, i, 3: *etena yogaḥ pratyuktah* (herewith Yoga is rejected). Cf. Śaṅkara's Comm. on GK III. 39.
60. B. K. S. Iyengar, *Light on Yoga*, London 1977<sup>9</sup>, p. 19.
61. Eliade, op. cit., p. 73.
62. Iyengar, op. cit., p. 30.
63. Eliade, op. cit., p. 97.
64. Ibid., pp. 362 ff.
65. Zimmer, op. cit., p. 152 ff.
66. Śaṅkara's Comm. on BU I, iv, 7.
67. BU I, iii, 19.
68. Śaṅkara's Comm. on BU I iii, II.
69. Ibid., I, iv, I,
70. BU IV, iv, 13.
71. BSB I,ii,7.
72. BU VI, i, I.
73. MU III, i, 8.
74. Ānandagiri's Comm. on KU I, iii, 12 and the corresponding interpretation of Śaṅkara: "When the mind gets concentrated by the perfection of meditation and thus becomes helpful, then such a conviction as "I am *brahman*" emerges from the great *mahāvākya* (*tat tvam asi*) which comes together with this attitude (of concentration). On the basis of this spiritual pattern the reality of *brahman* is revealed; and this is usually described as the self-revealed immediate knowledge of the *brahman*."
75. BSB IV, iii, 15.
76. Śaṅkara's Comm. on CU 1, i. 1.

77. Thus already Gauḍapāda, cf. Mahadevan, *Gauḍapāda*, op. cit., p. 185.
78. For Gauḍapāda, too, the meditator reaches only the *saguṇa brahman*, because meditation remains in the objective realm. Cf. G.K. III, 1; III, 16.
79. Mahadevan, op. cit., p. 174.
80. This is the content expressed in Zen-Buddhism with MU, in the tradition of the Upaniṣads as OM.
81. Zimmer, op. cit., pp. 338 f. OM contains three letters a, u, m. The diphthong appears in Sanskrit as o.
82. We cannot discuss the *Kuṇḍalinī* -meditation here. Cf. Swami Sivananda, *Kuṇḍalinī Yoga*, Sivanandanagar 1971; C. F. v. Weizsäcker/. G. Krishna, *Biologische Basis der religiösen Erfahrung*. Weilheim 1971; J. Woodroffe, *The Serpent Power*, Madras 1974<sup>10</sup>; Zimmer, op. cit., pp. 518 ff.
83. MU III, ii, 6.
84. BSB IV, iv, 2.
85. Ibid., IV, iv, 5.
86. Śaṅkara's Comm. (Introduction) on TU I.



## ॥ अद्वैताभिमानी पूर्वमीमांसकः खण्डदेवः ॥

RAMANAN VASUDEVAN

English Summary:

The *Pūrva Mīmāṃsā* and *Uttara Mīmāṃsā śāstras* and their respective *darśanas* have always been interrelated. One finds works in either *śāstra* repeatedly referring to works in the other.

Khaṇḍa Deva is a 17<sup>th</sup> century Mīmāṃsaka known for being the *navīna sampradāya pravartaka* in the *Mīmāṃsā śāstra* owing to his new contributions in the matters of *adhikaraṇavicāra* as well as *śābdabodha*. Despite being such an involved expert in *Pūrva mīmāṃsā*, he is very much an Advaitin, and in fact, he is first an Advaitin and then a *Mīmāṃsaka*. This leads to his rejecting Jaimini's *siddhānta* in the *Pūrva Mīmāṃsā Devatādhikaraṇa* (9-1-4) that deities do not have bodily form like us, since the *Uttara Mīmāṃsā Devatādhikaraṇa* (1-3-8) has clearly



अथ च खण्डदेवः महासिद्धिं विद्विष्यति विद्विष्यति विद्विष्यति विद्विष्यति  
विद्विष्यति विद्विष्यति ।

खण्डदेवस्य अद्वैतवेदान्तं यः अभिमानः संः सङ्कीर्णं अत्र लेखने प्रसूयते  
एवं सति श्रीमत्सिद्धिं नवीनसंस्कृतप्रवर्तकत्वेन विद्विष्यति प्रसूयते  
श्रीमत्सिद्धिः अद्वैतसिद्धिः अद्वैतसिद्धिः अद्वैतसिद्धिः अद्वैतसिद्धिः  
इति । विद्विष्यति च उन्मत्सिद्धिः प्रथमः प्रथमः प्रथमः प्रथमः  
अथ येषु अद्वैतसिद्धिः अद्वैतसिद्धिः अद्वैतसिद्धिः अद्वैतसिद्धिः  
- अद्वैतसिद्धिः अद्वैतसिद्धिः

उन्मत्सिद्धिः अद्वैतसिद्धिः अद्वैतसिद्धिः अद्वैतसिद्धिः  
इत्येवमपि विद्विष्यति प्रवर्तकः अद्वैतसिद्धिः अद्वैतसिद्धिः  
इत्येवमपि विद्विष्यति प्रवर्तकः अद्वैतसिद्धिः अद्वैतसिद्धिः  
- अद्वैतसिद्धिः अद्वैतसिद्धिः

एकवेदान्तसिद्धिः अद्वैतसिद्धिः अद्वैतसिद्धिः अद्वैतसिद्धिः  
न च उन्मत्सिद्धिः अद्वैतसिद्धिः अद्वैतसिद्धिः अद्वैतसिद्धिः  
सिद्धिः अद्वैतसिद्धिः अद्वैतसिद्धिः अद्वैतसिद्धिः अद्वैतसिद्धिः  
'एतद्विद्विष्यति विद्विष्यति विद्विष्यति विद्विष्यति' इति श्रीमत्सिद्धिः अद्वैतसिद्धिः

the *Utiara Mimāṃsā* tradition.  
a *Pūrva Mimāṃsaka*, is at heart, indeed, one devoted to  
shows how *Khaṇḍa Deva*, despite being by academic affiliation  
*Pūrva Mimāṃsā* and *Utiara Mimāṃsā adhikarāṇas* and  
This article summarizes the contents of the relevant  
*pāpa* precisely because it is *vihitā*.

the *Pūrva Mimāṃsā* stand that *vihitāhimsā* does not entail  
brings in *Vyāsa sūtras* and other *Vedānta* texts to support  
reputed this stand. On the other hand, *Khaṇḍa Deva* also

















NOTES

1. ब्रह्मसूत्रेषु १/१/१ इत्यत्र भामती।
2. श्लोकवार्तिके आत्मवादप्रकरणे १४८.
3. ब्रह्मसूत्रेषु ३/३/५३.
4. काशीहिन्दुविश्वविद्यालये १९९७ वर्षे पी-हेच्-डी-उपाधिप्राप्तये समर्पितः प्रबन्धः।
5. अयं च खण्डदेवस्य कालनिर्णयः खण्डदेवग्रन्थप्रकाशकैः विद्वद्भिः तत्र तत्र प्रस्तावनादिषु विचारितोऽपि विस्तरेण अचिरात् समर्पयिष्यमाणे “पूर्वमीमांसायां खण्डदेवस्य अनितरसाधारणं योगदानम्” इति नामके मदीये पी-हेच्-डी-प्रबन्धे लौकिकवर्ष-गणनोपायाद्युपन्यासपूर्वकं निरूपितः।
6. १९८७ वर्षे देहलीस्थैः सद्गुरुप्रकाशकैः पुनःप्रकाशिते भाट्टदीपिकापञ्चमभागपुस्तके ९९९ पुटे। अत्र “ज्येष्ठे” “परस्य” इति शब्दौ “चेषे” “परस्याम्” इति परिष्कृतौ षष्ठभागे २१९ पुटे। प्रौष्ठपद्याः इत्येतदपि प्रौष्ठपद्याः इति परिष्करणीयं, यतः संस्कृताः राधेश्यामशास्त्रिणः षष्ठभागे भूमिकायां ३ पुटे वदन्ति यत् सामान्यानां मुद्रणाशुद्धीनां (यथा पट्वैकता इति स्थाने पट्वैकता इति) शोधनम् अत्र न दीयते इति।
7. तैत्तिरीयसंहिता २/५/४.
8. तैत्तिरीयसंहिता १/६/४.
9. उत्तरमीमांसायां तृतीयेऽध्याये द्वितीये पादे अष्टमम् अधिकरणम् “फलमत उपपत्तेः” इत्येवमादिकम्।
10. उत्तरमीमांसायां १/३/८ अधिकरणम्।
11. तैत्तिरीयारण्यके (महानारायणोपनिषदि) १०/७९.
12. भगवद्गीतासु ६/४०.
13. ब्रह्मसूत्रेषु ३/१/२५.
14. उदाहरणाय “श्रीकाञ्चीकामकोटिपीठाधिपतिजगद्गुरु - श्रीचन्द्रशेखरेन्द्रसरस्वती-शताभिषेक-स्मारकोपन्यासावलिः, तत्र द्वितीया सरणिः” इत्यस्यां सरणौ “सर्वेषां दर्शनानाम् अद्वैते तात्पर्यम्” इति ब्रह्मश्री-वी-एस-रामचन्द्रशास्त्रिभिः कृतानाम् उपन्यासानाम् आङ्ग्लानुवादः मुम्बापुरीस्थेन भारतीयविद्याभवनेन १९७७ वर्षे प्रकाशितः।
15. अयमपि समकालिकत्वविषयः मदीये पी-हेच्-डी-प्रबन्धे खण्डदेवकालविचारे प्रस्तुतः।



THE EMPIRICAL SUBJECT: A COMPARATIVE STUDY  
OF NYĀYA AND ADVAITA VEDĀNTA THEORIES

By

SIBAJIBAN BHATTACHARYYA

I. *Introduction*

By “Advaita Vedānta theories” I shall mean here not merely the theories of Śaṅkara and his followers but also the theories of Gauḍapāda. The empirical subject is that which cognises objects, feels pleasure and pain, desires to obtain or avoid objects, acts morally or immorally. It is the unity of thinking, feeling and willing. I shall first explain some features of the Nyāya theory.

II. *The Nyāya Theory*

1. According to Nyāya, the empirical subject is a substance, a finite self (*jīvātmā*) to which cognition, feeling and willing belong as qualities. There are infinitely many selves which are all eternal substances, and all of them are different from the supreme self, *i.e.*, God.

2. Because the finite empirical subject is an eternal substance, it remains identical with itself in dream, dreamless sleep and even in liberation.

3. According to Nyāya the finite self has fourteen qualities five of which it shares with inanimate objects. So self and matter are not contradictory to each other.

4. Although the remaining nine qualities belong only to a finite self-substance, still they are not known in the same way. According to Nyāya, consciousness or awareness is identified with cognition, the other eight special qualities of the self are unconscious qualities. Thus pleasure and pain, desires and aversion, mental effort etc., are all unconscious qualities although belonging to the self. One can be aware of them only by knowing them in a subsequent state of the self which is, of course, inner preception (*mānasa pratyakṣa*). Even though cognition is identified with consciousness or awareness, it is awareness of objects but not of itself. A cognition as a state of the self has to be itself cognised in a second-order cognition (*anuvyavasāya*). The second-order cognition, again, can be known or cognised only by a third-order cognition and so on.

5. Consciousness, according to Nyāya, is momentary (*kṣaṇika*). But momentariness of cognition in Nyāya is different from the momentariness of Buddhists. According to Nyāya, a cognition as a quality of the self has three moments – one moment of origination (*utpattikṣaṇa*), a moment of duration, and the next moment of cessation. According to the Buddhists, on the other hand, an object is momentary if and only if it has two moments – a moment of

origination and the next moment of cessation. Thus according to the Buddhists, a momentary object cannot have any moment of duration, cannot endure even for a moment.

6. The reasons for the Nyāya conception of momentary cognition enduring for one moment are the following. We have seen that according to Nyāya cognition is awareness of objects. To be aware of the cognition another cognition having the first cognition as its object has to follow. Now this higher order cognition is inner perception and so the object cognition has to be present when the higher order cognition originates. As according to Nyāya two cognitions cannot originate at the same moment, the object cognition has to *endure* when the *anuvyavasāya originates*. So every cognition has to endure at least for one moment.

7. According to Nyāya the empirical subject, *i.e.*, the finite self is a substance of which consciousness or awareness, feeling and willing are all adventitious qualities. In deep dreamless sleep there is no consciousness in the self, the vital functions of the body being carried out by the force of *adr̥ṣṭa*.

8. According to Nyāya the inner sense (*antaḥkaraṇa*) consists of *manas* alone which is atomic in size. The I-sense is identical with the awareness of the self and is identical with this awareness. Every finite self is different from every other finite selves all of which have their I-sense built into them.

9. The *manas* being atomic there cannot be any images of objects, any modes or transformations of the *manas*.

10. According to Nyāya all consciousness is directly internally perceived by a higher order consciousness or cognition. So the Nyāya theory of consciousness may be regarded as a surface theory of consciousness, having no inner unexplored depths.

11. The finite self is not omniscient or omnipotent, but is omnipresent in the sense that all objects of limited size are in contact with it. A finite self is omnipresent in the same sense as the infinite self, *i.e.*, God. No *vibhu* can be located anywhere, hence God cannot be immanent, an indwelling reality.

12. The infinite self or God is again a self-substance having eternal, immediate knowledge of all objects, past, present and future. God is omnipotent in the sense that he creates everything that is created, not in the sense of having the power to create everything. According to Nyāya, the atoms, space, time etc., are all as eternal as God himself.

13. Liberation does not mean transcending the world of appearance or ignorance, the self being *vibhu*, being omnipresent, cannot move from place to place, cannot transcend the world. To be liberated is to be free from sorrows for all time to come. But to attain this state the self has not to transcend the world, but being incapable of movement remains where it always is, *i.e.*, everywhere. To be liberated, therefore, the self has to stay in itself and not be related to the *manas*, to the body, to *karma* or to any of the qualities which are destroyed for good if they are noneternal; otherwise although they exist, the self is not related to them. Thus liberation in the sense of destruction

of all present sorrows and avoidance of all future sorrows, is achieved by the destruction of the *relation* of the self to not-self, not by the wholesale destruction of the not-self.

### III. *The Advaita Vedānta Theory*

(a) According to Advaita Vedānta philosophers the empirical subject is pure infinite consciousness illusorily cognised as finite. There are three different theories about how this unreal appearance is caused - (i) *avacchedavāda*, (ii) *ābhāsavāda* and (iii) *pratibimbavāda*.

(i) According to the first theory, the empirical subject *i.e.*, the *jīva*. is pure consciousness illusorily restricted by *antaḥkaraṇa*, which is constituted by *manas*, *buddhi*, *citta* and *ahaṅkāra* (the I- sense or the ego). When there is an awareness of doubt or vacillation it is the function of *manas* as an element of the *antaḥkaraṇa* (the inner sense). When there is awareness of certainty it is the function of the element of *buddhi* in the inner sense. The I-sense which is present in every cognition in the form "I cognise" is due to the element of *ahaṅkāra* (ego) of the inner sense. Recollection or memory is due to the element of *citta* in the inner sense. As a matter of fact the inner sense is a unity which does not contain these four factors but which only functions in four different ways in an epistemological context. Because of this functional difference the one *antaḥkaraṇa* is called by four names.

Now according to the *avacchedavāda*, this *antaḥkaraṇa* is different in different individuals and so the individuals also are different. This theory is usually explained by a metaphor. Space is one and infinite; yet it is restricted

by things like rooms etc. In room space inside is restricted by its walls, yet this space so restricted is not really a part cut off from the infinite space, but is identical with the infinite space which is not affected by being bounded by the four walls of the room. Yet one may say that rooms of different sizes enclose different portions of the infinite space; so also the different empirical subjects are really partial manifestations of the infinite consciousness.

If we accept this theory, then we can easily distinguish between finite selves and the infinite pure consciousness and so can explain how a finite self can meditate on the infinite consciousness. For meditation or contemplation requires a difference between that which contemplates and that which is contemplated upon. The contemplator and the contemplated cannot be identical as that would identify the subject of the act with the object which would make the action impossible (*karṭṛ karma bhāva*).

(ii) According to the second theory, finite selves are so many reflections of the one infinite pure consciousness in the different *antaḥkaraṇas*. This theory also is explained with the help of a metaphor of the sun reflected in different pots of water. The reflected pure consciousness is the empirical subject (*ābhāsa eva ca, Brahmaśūtra, 2.3.50*).

Now the question arises whether the reflection and the reflected are one or different. According to Sureśvara, the *bimba* (the original object) and the *pratibimba* (the reflection) are different. The *pratibimba* is the shadow (*chāyā*) or *ābhāsa* of the *bimba*. But the shadow is not real, is *mithyā*. Hence the finite selves being *pratibimbas*, i.e., shadows, cannot be real.

(iii) According to the third theory, the *bimba* and the *pratibimba* are not really different, their difference is the product of, *ajñāna* and is, therefore, itself *mithyā*. The face reflected in a mirror and the face itself are not really two objects. According to Vidyāraṇya if the *bimba* and the *pratibimba* are really different then there cannot be any relation of reflection between them. One object cannot be a reflection of an altogether different object. According to the *ābhāsavāda* explained above [in (ii)] it is only the reflection which is illusory. But this theory cannot be accepted because if it were illusory then it would have been cancelled by a true cognition of the form “this is not the face”; but this cognition never arises. Hence it cannot be said that the reflection of the face in the mirror is illusory. It is, of course, true that one realises that there is no face in the mirror, but this realisation cancels not the face itself, but only the relation of the face with the reflection in the mirror. As a matter of fact, what one recognises is that this face reflected in the mirror *is* my face, which shows that the *bimba* and the *pratibimba*, the object and its reflection, are not different, that they are really one.

There are some Advaita Vedānta philosophers who try to conceive the reflection as a copy or imprint of the object. But this interpretation of the relation between the reflection and the object reflected cannot be accepted. For the imprint, say, of a seal on a wax is of the same size and shape as the object itself, yet the face reflected in a small mirror is smaller in size than the face itself. So the reflection cannot be regarded as an imprint of an object as on wax.



According to others the face reflected in the mirror is not the face which is on the body of the person. The reflection is a different face. But this theory, too, cannot be accepted. If the face in the mirror is a different face, the question, then inevitably arises: Where from does it come? What produces it? There cannot be any satisfactory reply to such questions. Moreover, everyone recognises that his face which is on his body is reflected in the mirror, which shows that they are identical.

Against this theory it may be objected that if the face on the body and the face reflected in the mirror are one and the same then how is that the reflection is seen in the mirror? The reply to this objection is that the face seen as reflected in the mirror is the function of *ajñāna*. This *ajñāna* wrongly reveals one object as another, one object located here as the object located there and so on. When the face on the body is mistakenly cognised being in the mirror, this wrong cognition is the reflection.

According to some philosophers, there is no such thing as reflection. It is an illusion that we seem to see the reflection of our face in the mirror. When we look at the mirror the light rays are reflected back on our face and therefore the eyes see the face itself. Unless the light rays are reflected back on to our face we cannot see our face. This reflection of the light rays requires the presence of a mirror and that is why we cannot see our face except in the presence of a mirror. Hence it is an illusion to see the reflection of the face in the mirror.

Against this theory it is pointed out that what we see

in the mirror cannot be the real face because in the mirror the image is inverted. If what we see in the mirror is the real face then this inversion of the image becomes inexplicable. Hence it has to be admitted that the face and its reflection have different locations, and this difference in location can easily explain the inversion of the image.

We can easily explain how pure infinite consciousness can be the indwelling spirit of the *jīva*. This cannot be explained on *avacchedavāda*.

In any case the Advaita Vedānta theory of the empirical subject is fundamentally different from the Nyāya theory. For, according to Nyāya philosophers consciousness is a quality of the self, whereas according to Advaita Vedānta philosophers consciousness *is* the self. Moreover, according to Nyāya the finite selves are infinite in number and are all eternal substances, whereas according to the Advaita Vedānta the finite selves are unreal.

(b) While according to Nyāya philosophers, the self and matter are not contradictory to each other, according to Advaita Vedānta they are as opposed as light and darkness. Philosophy begins with the realisation of the mystery that an impossible unity of two contradictory realities is yet an actual fact, namely, the unity of body and soul in the person of every individual. The whole of Advaita philosophy is an attempt to explain rationally how the impossible can yet be actual.

(c) According to Advaita Vedānta, there cannot be unconscious inner states. According to Nyāya, even a cognition of an object has to be cognised by another higher

order cognition (*anuvyavasāya*) and so on ad infinitum. Advaita Vedānta philosophers avoid this infinite regress by postulating that inner states are directly revealed to the witnessing consciousness. There is no need for introspection in the Nyāya sense.

(d) According to Advaita Vedānta consciousness is unchanging, and remains ever identical with itself. Contents of consciousness are not contents *in* consciousness. The rapid succession of ideas, impressions and other mental states are states of the *antaḥkaraṇa*, a plastic material substance which assumes forms of objects.

This *antaḥkaraṇa* of the inner sense is not consciousness, but belongs to the world of objects revealed by consciousness.

(e) The self is not conscious, as in Nyāya, but *is* consciousness. Even in deep dreamless sleep the witnessing consciousness remains ever awake and directly reveals the state of sleep. If sleep were not directly experienced, there can be no proof of its existence. Its existence cannot be validly inferred from bodily wellbeing of the person when he wakes up from sleep.

(f) The self which is pure consciousness is devoid of the ego according to Advaita Vedānta. The ego is one function of the material *antaḥkaraṇa*, and hence the difference among persons cannot belong to consciousness. Consciousness cannot be mine or yours; "my consciousness" literally is meaningless, for consciousness is the ultimate owner; it cannot be owned by anything else.

(g) The *antaḥkaraṇa* assumes forms of objects, which are its modifications. The modes of *antaḥkaraṇa* are like mental images of objects. This also explains how two cognitions can arise simultaneously in the *antaḥkaraṇa* which is as it were a spread-out plastic matter. All awareness of outer objects (*pramā*) is due to the *vṛttis* of the *antaḥkaraṇa*.

(h) But the awareness of the *vṛttis* themselves cannot require further *vṛttis*; for this will lead to infinite regress. So the *vṛttis* themselves have to be known directly without *vṛttis*. This direct awareness is the awareness which is the witness. Thus there are different senses of consciousness according to Advaita Vedānta. At the surface level, there is *vṛtti-jñāna*, i.e., awareness of outer objects through images etc., then behind this awareness there is the witnessing consciousness which directly reveals the surface awareness.

(i) As has been already explained, the finite selves (*jīvas*) are not real, but mere appearances. Really there is only one consciousness which is universal and is the foundation of the empirical world including the finite selves. There is no question of finite selves being *vibhu*. According to Nyāya all *vibhu padārthas* as well as atoms are eternally real and there is an infinite number of them. This is an extreme form of pluralism. According to Advaita Vedānta, however, the concept of many realities is self-contradictory. There cannot be different realities, because the very concept of manyness involves self-contradiction. If, for example, we want to say that there are two things, then the two things have to be both different and non-different at the same time. If there is one table here and another table there, we

may say that there are two tables. But if there is one chair and one table, we cannot say either that there are two tables or two chairs. We shall have to find out a feature in which the two things are not different. We may, therefore, say that there are two pieces of furniture. But if there is a table and litre of milk we cannot say that there are two tables or two litres of milk. We shall have to rise higher or go deeper to find out in what respect they are non-different. We may say that there are two measurable objects, for the table can be counted and the milk measured. As counting itself is one kind of measure in the technical mathematical sense both the chair and the glass of milk are measurable objects. This shows that to be able to say that there are *two* realities, we must show in what respect they are different and in what respect they are non-different. This shows again that every object has many aspects and the problem of relating them again into the unity of the object will arise, and so on ad infinitum. Thus the concept of duality is logically inconsistent. Hence Advaita Vedānta is non-dualistic.

(j) According to Nyāya, liberation is due to cancellation of ignorance about the nature of the self and other specific objects. When this ignorance gets removed, it does not follow that the whole world is realised as a false appearance. The world which has been known correctly and truly through perception, inference and other *pramāṇas*, remains unaffected by the removal of ignorance about specific objects. The self, by attaining liberation, transcends the world only in the sense that it escapes the beginningless cycle of birth and deaths. It does not transcend the world in the sense of going beyond the world; it remains very much as an item of the real world.

In achieving this sort of liberation, the finite self being devoid of all its connections with its body and *manas* becomes totally unconscious. A moot point which arises here is whether liberation, in the sense of becoming unconscious for all time to come can be ever a *puruṣārtha*, something of prime value for the individual.

Advaita Vedānta avoids this absurdity by postulating that the self is essentially consciousness which it cannot lose even in liberation. The self by attaining liberation transcends the world by realising that the world is a false appearance. This is attaining the highest or the deepest level of consciousness as when one realises the utter unreality of his dreams when he wakes up. As there is a passage from dream to waking consciousness, so also there is a passage from empirical consciousness to transcendental consciousness. But when one attains this state one realises that one was never bound and limited, never suffered any pain, and so on. Thus it is not merely that the whole world is cancelled and realised as unreal, but it is also cancelled with retrospective effect. This may be explained by our experience of disillusionment. When, for example, we mistake a piece of rope for a snake, and then immediately afterwards realise our mistake, we know not merely that there is no snake now, but that there was no snake even when I perceived it. Thus cancellation of illusion of this type is always with retrospective effect.

#### IV. *Analysis of Dream*

The Nyāya analysis of dream is radically different from the Advaita Vedānta analysis for various reasons. We first explain

the Nyāya theory as propounded by Gautama and his followers.

### A. *The Nyāya Theory*

The Nyāya theory of dream has the following main points:

1. Dreaming is not recollecting or remembering; it is a direct experience, is perceptual in nature.
2. Dream, however, presupposes memory, and has many similarities with it.
3. Dream experience is radically different from waking experience, and presupposes it. It cannot be said meaningfully that all our life is a dream. Dream is one kind of illusory perception.
4. As dream is illusory experience, it shares all features of illusory experience.

Now we explain these points in some detail

1. Dream experience is direct experience, not memory. This is proved by the immediate awareness of the dream experience on waking. In Sanskrit, as in many vernacular languages in India, the idiom is "I saw an elephant in a dream" and not that "I remembered an elephant in a dream."<sup>1</sup> Whether this linguistic idiom is correct or not, our immediate awareness of dream experience is of a direct experience.

2. Yet dreaming is not possible without past experience leaving its trace, or the trace remains inactive. Just as recollection is not possible without traces of past experiences being activated, so also dream is impossible without them. In this respect dreams are similar to memory.

It may be argued that often we dream about things which we have never seen or directly experienced. Sometimes we dream about wholly novel objects, sometimes we dream about objects or events which it is impossible for us to have experienced. For example, one may dream that one is beheaded, an event which it is impossible to have experienced before. So it is not correct to say that in all *cases dreams are caused* by memory traces of past experiences.

To answer this objection it is necessary to examine what causes dreams. There are various types of causes for various types of dreams. (a) There are some dreams which are caused by the intensity of traces of thoughts, desires etc. When an angry man goes to sleep thinking continuously and deeply about his enemy, then all these thoughts and the chain of memory impression produce perceptual awareness in dream. (b) Physiological disorders may cause some types of dreams. For example, one may dream of flying if one is suffering from excess of gases, or may dream of falling into water if one feels cold when asleep, and so on. This type of dream usually does not depend on impressions or memory traces. (c) One may dream of pleasantly riding horses if one is happy, *i.e.*, the dream is due to accumulated merits (*dharma*), or one may have unpleasant dreams of evil omen because of demerits. This type of dreams is not due to either memory impressions, or physiological disorders, but due to merits and demerits. One may dream of things already experienced, or of wholly novel things in this case. One may dream about objects totally unknown to him owing to merits or demerits. For example Damayantī dreamt about King Nala even though she had never seen him before.



Now the cases (c) which are allegedly not caused by memory impressions are shown by Gautama to be reducible to case (a). On this point there is a fundamental difference between Praśastapāda who distinguishes among the three cases, and Gautama who accepts only the first type of dreams. Thus the case of Damayantī may be explained by pointing out that although she had not seen King Naḷa, still she had heard about him, and known many details about him. It is the memory impressions of this knowledge which are the real causes of the dreams. Even in case (b), the details of the dreams vary from person to person having the same type of disorders. This shows that the physiological disorders really activate memory impressions which, then, cause the dreams. Thus, according to Gautama, recollection and dream are similar in this that both are caused by traces of previous knowledge.

3. Dream is illusory perception: so analysis of dream is dependent upon an analysis of illusory perception. One problem is to show whether all our life is a dream. Now it may be pointed out that waking consciousness is different in kind from dream experience. So it cannot be reduced to dream. The other argument is to show that all dream is illusory, so also all waking experience is illusory. Waking experience is *often* mistaken; one may generalise and say that it is *always* mistaken. As Descartes has argued, it is not "*prudent*" to trust that which has deceived us even once. And it is established that many things seen even in waking experience are non-existent; for example, sometimes one sees a whole city in the sky, or is deceived by mirage and so on.

The reply to this type of argument is that mere examples of illusory perception in waking experience cannot prove that whatever is known in waking experience is non-existent. For that a cogent reason has to be adduced. In the absence of any such reason, the thesis that waking experience is always deceptive cannot be established. Now what reason is there for holding that all dreamt objects are non-existent? One reason is that one cannot find them on waking. This absence of knowledge of object which in the dream were present shows that they are unreal. Now if it be asserted that even if objects found to exist in waking experience are, nonetheless, non-existent, then absence of knowledge cannot be a cogent reason for their non-existence. If objects of dream not found on waking are non-existent, and if objects known in waking experience, too, are non-existent, then not-finding cannot be a cogent reason (or even relevant) for proving non-existence of objects of dream. For, whether the objects are found or not-found in waking experience, they would be, in any case, nonexistent. To make non-finding of objects of dream on waking a cogent reason for their non-existence, it has to be admitted that if objects are found in waking experience, then they are real. Objects which are *only* not found in waking experience are nonexistent.

Moreover if all things are unreal, then there cannot be any cause of the rich variety of dreams – some dreams are pleasant, some are terrifying nightmares, and so on. Moreover, dreams have a beginning, they also end, even before a person wakes up or when a different dream begins. There cannot be such difference in the beginning, the end, and duration of dreams without causes. But if everything is

unreal, then there can be no causes of dreams, their variety, their beginning or end. So everything cannot be proved to be unreal on the ground of dream objects being unreal.

Now are the objects of dream utterly unreal? Can we say that they did not exist in the past, do not exist now, and will never exist? If the objects of dream are non-existent at all times, still it would be wrong to say that they are unactualisable, *i.e.*, *cannot* be actualised and hence impossible. To say that something *does* never exist is not to say that it *can* never exist. Even in Western traditional logic many logicians made a distinction between inseparable accident and property. The mere fact that some attribute *is* present always does not prove that it *has* to be so present. So the Indian concept of *alīka* is not the concept of an impossible object, but of an object which happens to be always nonexistent. That objects of dream are not utterly unreal follows from the fact that the objects have to be first known in the waking state in order to have their impressions on the self, which produce dreams. Unless the objects were real, they could not have been known, and if they were not known, their impressions could not be present in the self, and no dreams could occur. Moreover, the dreamer must be the identical person who knows the objects in the waking state. Thus the self must be real and be an enduring subject.

It may be argued: if the objects of dream be real objects, then how can dream be illusory? That objects of dream are unreal is admitted by all. In reply, it may be pointed out that it is enough to hold that the dreamt objects do not exist where and when they are dreamt to be present

in order to explain how dream is illusory. It is not necessary to suppose that they do not exist anywhere or at any time.

Now it may be argued that it is not necessary to postulate that one has to *know* objects in waking experience in order to explain how he can dream about them, it is enough to hold that he has impressions (ideas) of the objects, which he can get even from illusory experience. Illusory experience of objects causes impressions on the self as much veridical perception. This argument is not tenable, for if all waking experience is illusory and so also is all dream experience, then there cannot be any distinction between waking and dreaming. But then the argument to prove waking experience to be illusory on the analogy of dream experience becomes unfounded; for, now, there is only one type of experience which is dream experience. Then there can be no question of waking experience at all.

Nyāya philosophers further strengthen their case by an analysis of illusory perception. In illusory perception something real is mistaken for something else. Thus when a shell is mistaken for a piece of silver, one knows "this is a piece of silver". Now although the silver is non-existent there, the "this" is real. That is, in every illusory perceptual experience the subject is real, although the predicate is not. So every illusory perception involves a veridical perception of the subject. Hence the subject has to be real. According to Nyāya, the so-called hallucinations which do not have any real subject are really cases of illusion .

Now it may be objected that if dreams are caused by true impressions, then how can one dream that one is

beheaded? From the nature of the case, one could not have any veridical perception of this event. The method followed by Nyāya philosophers here to reply to this objection is the general method of conceptual analysis of the dream content. One must have a veridical experience of one's own head, and must have a veridical experience of what it is to be cut; in the dream one combines these two ideas of one's own head and something being cut, to form the complex content of one's own head being cut off. Thus all the simpler elements of the dream are real objects.

Moreover, Nyāya philosophers argue what waking experience cancels is only the dream experience, but not objects of dream experience. True cognition contradicts false cognition, but not objects of false cognition. For if the objects be contradicted, they would be unreal, but as has been shown above, every illusion presupposes true cognition of the subject. If the object of illusion were utterly unreal, then everyone ought to have illusion about that object. But a person from a distance may perceive water in a desert when there is no water, and have an illusory perception of water there, but a person standing near will not have that illusion. If everything is illusory in this world, if all experience is dream experience, then it remains an inexplicable mystery why some persons have a particular illusion, while others do not have it. So also those who see a whole town in the sky must view the sky from a particular point of view, others who are placed differently do not have that illusion. These facts prove that illusions have special causes which produce them. Only a real thing can have causal efficacy; an utterly unreal thing like a sky-lotus can have no causal efficacy.

Thus, according to Nyāya, dreaming proves the reality of the dream, of the dreaming which is the object of internal perception and also of all the elements of the dreamt object. The subject who dreams is the subject of waking experience.

### B. *Gauḍapāda's theory*

That dream objects are unreal is admitted by everyone even though the dream may be very vivid. Gauḍapāda gives the following reasons for regarding dream objects as unreal.

Dream objects are unreal because they are seen within the body in a very limited space. Mountains, chariots etc., seen in a dream cannot possibly be accommodated in the small limited space occupied by the body of the dreamer. So they must be unreal or imaginary.

It may be objected here that the mountains etc., are not within the body; the dreamer may be actually travelling to those regions, in which case things seen in a dream may be regarded as real. The reply to this objection is that it is impossible for the dreamer to actually travel to the regions within the short period of time he is dreaming; the dream hardly lasts, say ten minutes or so; how could he be travelling thousands of miles during that period? Secondly, many a time the dreamer awakes suddenly, but he does not find himself, when awake, in the regions which he had visited in his dream. All these show that the objects seen in a dream are within the body itself; the dreamer does not go out to see them.

Professor Kalidas Bhaṭṭācārya has interpreted Gauḍapāda as holding that not merely the dream objects but also the dream experience, and indeed, the dreamer, himself

are *mithyā* just as, according to Advaita Vedānta, in the case of illusory perception, not merely the snake is unreal but also the perception of the snake is unreal. When the illusion is corrected, we realise not merely that there was no snake at all to be seen, but also there was no seeing of a snake at all. As there was not snake, there could not have been any perception of snake also. The same is true about dream objects and dream experience. Both are equally unreal – the objects as well as the dream.

Not merely the dream objects and the dreaming are unreal, but also the dreamer, too. Professor Bhaṭṭācārya gives the following three reasons for holding the dreamer to be unreal. (i) The dreamer is not accepted as identical with the subject of waking experience. The person who dreamt these absurd things is felt as alien and foreign to me when I wake up. I have an immediate awareness that the person who dreamt these objects could not have been myself. (ii) We dream not merely about objects, but also about persons who are equally unreal. Now if the persons that I dream about are unreal, and as I myself as the dreamer am one among them, then the dreamer should be equally unreal as they. (iii) There cannot be any intelligible relation between me as a waking subject and me as a dreamer; for, the dream experiences of the dreamer and the waking experiences of myself cannot be related at all, are not integrated into my life-history, nor do I want them to be integrated into it. The realm of experiences and also the dreamer, stand out from me as an altogether different individual totally unrelated to me. The dreamer and his experiences hang completely unsupported by me. Hence the dream objects, dream

experiences and the dreamer belong to a region which floats without any connection to my world, my experiences and myself.<sup>2</sup>

Gauḍapāda, however, goes further and reduces waking experience to dream. According to him, the world of waking experience is as unreal as dream objects from the ultimate point of view. This does not, however, mean that there is only one experience which can be called indifferently dream experience or waking experience. Although dream experiences and waking experiences are fundamentally of the same kind to persons who have attained knowledge of the ultimate reality, still, from the empirical standpoint, they are different. Gauḍapāda points out the following of similarity and dissimilarity between them.

(i) Dream experiences and waking experiences are equally experiences, *i.e.*, inner states of the individual. Yet dream differs from the waking state because dream objects are within the mind (the subtle body), whereas objects of waking experience are outside. But this difference between location of entities cannot mean a difference in their ontological status. For both these types of objects come into being and pass out of existence. "What is not at the beginning and at the end, cannot be also in the present." As dream objects and empirical objects are not eternal, they are equally unreal.

(ii) If dream objects are contradicted by waking experience, so also waking experiences are contradicted by dream experience. The hearty meal that a person takes in the dream is of no avail in the waking state where he has to



satisfy his hunger by having another meal. Now exactly the same is the situation about objects in the waking state. The dreamer goes on eating in a dream as though he had never eaten in the waking state. So objects of waking experience stand on the same level as the objects of dream in that each is contradicted in the other state.

It may be objected here that objects of waking consciousness can contradict or be contradicted by dream objects if we had the same objects always in dream and waking experience. But many a time the dreamer sees in a dream quite abnormal, fantastic and novel objects which he has never seen in his waking state. Are we not therefore justified in saying that the dream is an entirely unique state having no correspondance to the waking state?

The reply to this objection is as follows. It is true that the dream objects are novel. But this novelty is characteristic of the dream state. An ordinary person when anointed as king, comes to possess extra-ordinary powers. Similarly the dream is a privileged place. To us in the waking state the things seen or done in a dream may appear impossible or abnormal, but the dreamer considers them as just ordinary routine and they are real to the dreamer only. The reality or unreality of things does not depend upon whether the things are normal or abnormal, but upon whether they are capable of being belied in another state.

(iii) Even in dream we sometimes distinguish between the real and the unreal, between a person speaking the truth and a person telling a lie, just as we do in waking experience.

(iv) Dream objects are objects within, staying as long as the dream lasts. Objects without which are the objects of waking consciousness, are dependent upon or correlated to two factors – the internal and external. The outer objects can be perceived by the self only by means of external sense-organs. But in spite of this difference all objects, whether within or without, are imagined objects. It is true that objects within are not distinctly experienced while those without are distinct, but this distinction between the two is caused merely by the difference in the means of their cognition. This does not imply any ontological difference between them. Thus according to Gauḍapāda, the empirical world, the empirical subject and his experiences are as unreal as those in dreams. As a matter of fact spiritually gifted persons do have immediate awareness of the world as a dream world. Wittgenstein, for example, once wrote, “Our life is like a dream. But in our better hours we wake up just enough to realize that we are dreaming. Most of the time, though, we are fast asleep.” (LLW, 5,7).”<sup>3</sup>

### NOTES

1. This idiom is foreign to English. In English one says “I dreamt that there was an elephant.” But I am told that in Greek, at least in classical Greek, one says “I see a dream”, whereas in English one says, “I dream” or at most, “I dream a dream.”
2. *Māṇḍūkyopaniṣader kathā* (in Bengali), Calcutta University.
3. Anthony Kenny, *Wittgenstein*, Harvard, 1973.



## ABOUT THE PUBLISHERS

The Ādi Śaṅkara Advaita Research Centre was established in 1975 under the guidance and with the blessings of His Holiness Jagadguru Śrī Śaṅarācārya of Kāñcī Kāmakoti Pīṭha. The main objectives of the Centre, among other things, are:

- (1) to undertake research for the extension of knowledge in the fields of Natural and Applied Sciences generally, and in particular in the fields of Physics and Metaphysics;
- (2) to undertake and carry on scientific study and analysis of the Advaita system of thought as expounded by Ādi Śaṅkara and to conduct research as regards the relevance of his teaching in solving present day ills of mankind;
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- (4) to undertake research for the purpose of establishing norms necessary for realizing the divinity in man through moral, spiritual, and cultural infrastructure.

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
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संसाराध्वनि तापभानुकिरणप्रोद्भूतदाहव्यथा-  
 खिन्नानां जलकाङ्क्षया मरुभुवि भ्रान्त्या परिभ्राम्यताम् ।  
 अत्यासन्नसुधाम्बुधिं सुखकरं ब्रह्माद्वयं दर्शय-  
 न्त्येषा शाङ्करभारती विजयते निर्वाणसन्दायिनी ॥

*saṁsārādhvani tāpabhānukiraṇaprodhbhūtadāhavyathā-  
 khinnānām jalakāṅkṣayā marubhuvī bhrāntyā paribhrāmyatām  
 atyāsannasudhāmbhūdhim sukhakaram brahmādvayam darśaya-  
 ntyeṣā śāṅkara-bhārati vjayate nirvāṇa-sandāyini.*

To those who are afflicted, in the way of the world, by the burning pain given rise to by the scorching sun-shafts of misery, and who through delusion wander about in the desert (of worldliness) seeking water — showing the felicitous ocean of nectar, which is very near, the non-dual Brahman, this — The Voice of Śaṅkara — is victorious, leading, as it does, to liberation.