

THE VOICE OF ŚAṄKARA

Śāṅkara-bhāratī



Editor:

N. Veezhinathan

एषा शाङ्करभारती विजयते निर्वाणसन्दायिनी

*eṣā śāṅkara-bhāratī vijayate
nirvāṇa-sandāyini*

Victorious is the voice of Śaṅkara,
leading, as it does, to liberation.

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[1]

HOMAGE TO ŚAṄKARA

नमः श्रीशङ्कराचार्यगुरवे शङ्करात्मने ।
शरीरिणां शङ्कराय शङ्करज्ञानहतवे ॥

*namaḥ śrīśaṅkarācārya-gurave śaṅkarātmane
śarīriṇām śaṅkarāya śaṅkarajñānahetave.*

Salutations to the *guru* Śrī Śaṅkara who is of the nature of Lord Śiva, who grants auspiciousness to the embodied souls, and who is the cause of the knowledge that leads to bliss.

(Nṛsiṃhāśramin)



THE TEACHINGS OF ŚAṄKARA

N. Veezhinathan

The world of culture is distinctively associated with human beings, who not only inherit it transmitted by tradition, but also in their turn transmit it to the posterity. Culture and tradition are so intimately fused with each other that it is difficult for us to distinguish the one from the other. In a significant sense, culture is tradition, and tradition is memory. It so happens that, when memory is weak, we are not able to recollect the tradition and the culture that remains behind it. As Radhakrishnan puts it, "the duration of this memory depends on the continuous appearance of creative personalities."¹ The advent of Śaṅkara has helped us to revive our memory of the past and thereby to get at a clear understanding of the Philosophy of Advaita — the Philosophy of Spiritual Life.

A realized soul like Vāmadeva of the Upaniṣadic fame, Śaṅkara proclaims that it is only the philosophy of Advaita that is spiritual and at the

same time rational and is in harmony with the teachings of the Upaniṣads. He was not an explorer of the philosophy of Advaita. He was only an expounder of it which has been traditionally handed down from God himself. It is not a fabrication of something new by him through the exercise of his imagination, as Bhāskara, his later day critic has alleged.²

That the philosophy of Advaita has been handed down by tradition, Śaṅkara respectfully acknowledges in his commentary on the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* thus:

I offer my salutations to the ancient preceptors by whom the Upaniṣads have been expounded on the basis of *Mīmāṃsā*, *Vyākaraṇa*, and *Nyāya*.

yairime gurubhiḥ pūrvam
padavākyapramānataḥ
vyākhyātāḥ sarvavedāntāḥ
*tān nityam praṇatośmyaham*³

He commences his commentary on the *Kaṭha Upaniṣad* with an offering of salutations to Naciketas and to Lord Yama whom he characterizes

as the preceptor imparting the knowledge of the true nature of the jīva.

*om namo bhagavate vaivasvatāya mṛtyave
brahmavidyācāryāya naciketase ca⁴*

That there has been a perennial and an uninterrupted flow of the philosophy of Advaita till his time, Śaṅkara refers to in his commentary on the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*. He states:

God imparted the knowledge of Advaita to Kaśyapa, Kasyapa to Manu, Manu to humanity at large; and, this knowledge handed down by tradition is perceived as present even now in the case of the enlightened ones.

*taddhaitat ātmajñānam sopakaraṇam . . .
brahmā hiraṇyagarbhaḥ parameśvaro vā
taddvāreṇa prajāpataye kaśyapāya uvāca.
asau api manave svaputrāya, manuḥ
prajābhyaḥ, ityevam śrutyarthasampra-
dāyaparamparayā āgatam upaniṣadvij-
ñānam adyāpi vidvatsu avagamyate.⁵*

The sixth *brāhmaṇa* of the second chapter of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* sets forth the line of teachers who transmitted the teachings of the

Vedānta from time immemorial. Sureśvara in his *Vārttika* on this section states:

The śruti gives a detailed list of teachers who have imparted the knowledge of the Self, i.e. the true nature of the jīva, with a view to clear the misapprehension that the truth of Vedānta may after all be something brought into being as the result of the intellectual effort of someone.

*pum matyūhotthita-āśaṅkā nīvr̥ttyartham
yathoditam
brahmajñānasya vā vaṁśaḥ yatnāt śrutyā
ayam ucyate.*⁶

In the *Sūta-saṁhitā* it is said:

The knowledge of the teachings of the Upaniṣads imparted by one who does not know the traditional interpretation of the Upaniṣads is not knowledge, but is exactly the opposite of it. This is the considered view of the enlightened ones.

*saṁpradāyavihīnā ya vidyā vedāntapāragā
sā avidyā naiva vidyā syāt iti tattvavidāṁ
sthitih.*⁷

Just as the knowledge of one's lineage is essential for one getting married, even so the knowledge of the traditional interpretation is so important as to be indispensable for attaining Self-realization.

*yathā gotraparijñānam vivāhasya upakāarakam
pāramparyaparijñānam tathā jñānopakāarakam.*⁸

It is with this in view, Śaṅkara states in his commentary on the *Gītā* that the person who does not know the traditional interpretation of the Upaniṣads must be kept away whatever his other academic acquirements may be.

*asampradāyavit sarva-śāstravidapi
mūrkhavat upekṣanīyah.*⁹

Śaṅkara got illuminating confirmation of the truth of Advaita from his preceptor, Govindabhagavat-pāda who had received it from his Guru, Gauḍapāda. Sureśvara while offering his obeisance to Śaṅkara says:

My preceptor, Śaṅkara while commenting upon the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* has explained the import of all the Upaniṣadic texts. He is the one who has

attained the knowledge of the teachings of the Upaniṣads from his preceptor by loving devotion toward him.

*yām kāṅvopaniṣacchalena
sakalāmnāyārthaśamśodinīm
vyācakruḥ guravaḥ anuvṛttaguravaḥ vṛttim
satām śāntaye.¹⁰*

Following the Upaniṣads as interpreted by the ancient preceptors, Śaṅkara states that Īśvara, jīva, and the world which constitute the subject-matter of many a school of religion and philosophy are only apparent diversifications, through avidyā or māyā, of a single Being, i.e. the Self which is the transcendent Subject and which is pure consciousness, immutably homogeneous, infinite and pure identity. It is the one and the only Real. It is *advaita* in the sense that it is the substratum of the absence of all duality (*na vidyate dvaitam yatra*).

Avidyā is indeterminable either as real (*sat*) or as an absolute nothing (*aśat*); and, it is located in the Self. On the strength of being related to the Self, it undergoes modification into the form of the world consisting of the five senses of knowledge, the five

senses of action, the fivefold vital air, and, the mind and the intellect — the two phases of the internal organ, and also as gross elements, viz. earth, water, fire, air, and space. The world as such is indeterminable; it is *mithyā*.

The Self which is the transcendent Subject gets reflected in avidyā and the mind and the reflected image (*pratibimba*) is the jīva. This means that the Self which is the transcendent Subject has attained to the state of an enworlded Subject. In relation to the reflecting media and the reflected image, the Self, though pure and simple, comes to be endowed with an adventitious feature, viz. the state of being an original (*bimbatva*). The Self as associated with the characteristic of being an original (*bimbatva-viśiṣṭā-caitanya*) is Īśvara. The essential nature of Īśvara is the Self which is real, but the characteristic of being an original is illusory. In the same way, the Self as associated with the characteristic of being a reflected image (*pratibimbatva-viśiṣṭā-caitanya*) is the jīva or the enworlded Subject. The essential nature of the jīva is the Self which is real, but the characteristic of being a reflected image is illusory. These two characteristics, viz. *bimbatva* and *pratibimbatva* are falsely presented upon the Self by giving rise to

the notions of *Īsvara* and *jīva*. The consciousness-element in *Īsvara* is represented as the all-pervading principle and is termed Brahman; and the consciousness-element in the *jīva* is termed *Ātman*.

Īsvara, being the original, is not influenced by the characteristics of the reflecting media while the *jīva*, being the reflected image, is affected by them. *Īsvara*, therefore, is eternally aware of His identity with the pure Being, and he is ever-released. It is the *jīva* who, under the influence of the reflecting media, loses sight of its identity with its essential nature which is the pure Being, falsely identifies itself with the mind, the sense-organs, and the physical body, performs the prescribed deeds and commits interdicted actions and thereby experiences their fruits by undergoing incessant births. In order to get rid of the experience of cyclic existence, the *jīva* should realize that its true nature, i.e. *Ātman* is the pure Being, viz. Brahman which is the essential nature of *Īsvara*. Such a realization would result from the *sruti* texts like *tat tvam asi*.¹¹ *Avidyā* will be removed thereby and the *jīva* would become free from its adventitious feature, viz. the state of being a reflected image and would cease to be a *jīva*. When *avidyā* is removed,

Īśvara too would become free from the characteristic of being the original and would cease to be Īśvara. What would remain then is the pure Being, i.e. the Self. And this is liberation.

This, in brief, is the philosophy of Advaita or more strictly the philosophy of the Upanisads as expounded by Śaṅkara.

NOTES:

1. Balasubramanian, R. Foreword to the Monograph '*The Advent of a Mahān*'. 2007. Chennai: Sri Sri Sri Mahalakshmi Mathrubhutheswarar Trust.
2. vide:

*sūtrābhiprāyasamvṛtṭyā svābhiprāya prakāśanāt
vyākhyātam yaiḥ idam śāstram vyakhyā iyam
tannivṛttaye. Vedānta-sūtra-bhāṣya* of Bhāskara.
1903. Benares: Chowkhamba Sanskrit Depot., p. 1.
3. *Śaṅkara's bhāṣya* (hereafter *ŚB*) on *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* (hereafter *TU*).
4. *ŚB* on *Kaṭha Upaniṣad* (hereafter *KU*).
5. *ŚB* on *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* (hereafter *CU*), 8.15.1.
6. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka- Upaniṣad- Bhāṣya-Vārttika* (hereafter *BUBV*), 2.62.

7. *Sūtasamhitā*. 3 Vols. 1924. Poona: Anandaśrama Press. 4.35.19.
8. *Ibid.*, 4.35.22.
9. *ŚB* on the *Bhagavad-Gītā* (hereafter *Bh.G.*), 13.2.
10. *BUBV.*, 1.1.2.
11. *CU*, 6.8.7.



EASTERN CONTRIBUTION TO HUMAN THOUGHT

C. P. Ramaswami Aiyar

There are many ways of dealing with alien civilisations, cultures and languages. Macaulay in his great *Minute*, said about oriental studies:

“Why is it necessary to pay people to learn Sanskrit and Arabic? Evidently because it is universally felt that Sanskrit and Arabic are languages the knowledge of which does not compensate for the trouble of acquiring them. On all such subjects the state of the market is the decisive test.”

This is a dictum which we have fortunately survived. Not content with those pearls of wisdom, he continued in this strain:

“To encourage the study of a literature, admitted to be of small intrinsic value, only because that literature inculcates the most serious errors on the most important subjects, is a courage hardly reconcilable with reason, with morality, or even with that neutrality which ought to be sacredly preserved.”

* Courtesy: The Centenarian. Vol I. 1994.

That is one way of looking at a foreign language, at a foreign literature, at an alien culture.

Another way is that of Ernest Renan of *la vie de Jesus*. That is a method of subdued unbelief, or half-belief in which careful, analytical, silent and destructive criticism is poured upon things which many hold sacred.

The last outlook is, of course, the frank, candid, destructive attitude of the Russian Revolution in its initial stage. "Away with it; We do not want these things of the spirit and intellect. We are done with them. We are living in a world of tractors, of machines, of agricultural production, of intensive economic upheaval."

By far the best way, it seems to me, of looking at things, is the way which has been evolved in our own country, where the truths of religion and of culture have not been too dogmatically asserted.

It must be said of us, of the East that, face to face with the mystery of things, we have not attempted to be dogmatic or assertive but we have adopted an attitude of humility and self-effacement.

A verse from *Omar Khayyam* which gives one aspect of that outlook.

literatures are especially distinguished and characterised by what may be called intuition and what follows from intuition. Let me illustrate. Ages ago, a great poet, singing of Sri Rama as he came from his conquest in Lanka, of Ravana and his embattled army, spoke of his voyage in that heavenly chariot, when accompanied by his devoted Sita he returned from Lanka to Ayodhya. That poet spoke of that voyage over the waste of waters in this way : Raghuvamsa : XIII-2

*vaidehi paśya-āmalayād-vibhaktam
mat-setunāphenīlam-amburāśim
chāyāpatheneva Śaratprasannam
ākāśam āviśkr̥tachārutāram*

The truth and the full meaning of those lines I learnt only when in 1926 it fell to my lot to make a voyage by plane to Europe. Rama and Sita were just passing over those places between Tuticorin and Ceylon from the Malaya Parvata which stretches to the sea, foam-flecked and broken in its line by the bridge. What does it remind one of? "It reminds me" says Rama, "of that *śarat* sky, late spring and early summer of India, broken only by the milky way from one end to the other, by a few flecks of foam." When travelling by aeroplane looking down from a mile above the sea, you see only those ripples of foam.

Why do I recite those words now? It requires a tremendous amount of intuition, of comprehension, and of placing oneself in new surroundings. The implication is that what science has demonstrated, our ancients were able to cognise, foresee and interpret a long time ago. And that I ascribe, as greater men than I have ascribed, to that great faculty of intuition of great men, poets, seers, scholars and thinkers in inspired moments.

We have heard of *daśāvatāra*, the ten incarnations of Vishnu. It occurs to me that perhaps it may not be too fanciful an analogy, too far-fetched a figure, to think of that as typifying or at all events partly symbolising the growth of humanity from the pristine stages of created life. Let us analyse it. The world started with the *matsya avatāra*. Vishnu incarnated as a fish in the waters; and then there came the tortoise; and from the tortoise there emerged the beginnings of warm-blooded life; and then came the half-man; then the warrior; then the great monarch; then the perfect man who was the author of the *Gītā*, then the Buddha and finally, the end of all things. It is possible to say that the incarnations of Vishnu are merely symbolic. But are they not something more than that? Are they not the conscious embodiment of intuition of the seer who wanted to typify in that manner the progress from less to more of humanity, the progress from the waste of waters to the highest attainment of man?

These are aspects of the matter which need a certain amount of study and collaboration. A great deal of work has been done—of Fraser in *The Golden Bough*, of anthropologists and others who have elucidated many dark things concerning mythology, history and lore; sacred and profane. At the same time, it appears to me that what has been attempted in this direction by orientalistes has been of the meticulous, of the scientific, of the elaborate and the technical kind. What is wanted is a wedding of the technical equipment and the scientific approach with that comprehension, with that humanity, which deals with religions and cultures as “moving in dim worlds half-realised” rather than as things scientifically labelled and collated.

Speaking in that way, there are many things which I might just bring to your notice. Take, for instance, one of the glories of modern science. We do not know where we are in modern science. We once spoke of a finite world. And then we spoke of the infinite world. We do not know where we are either in regard to space or time. Until a few years ago we were glorying in that doctrine called the nebular hypothesis which it was the glory of Laplace to elucidate. In relation to that theory a certain verse from the Upanisads comes to my mind:

etasminnu khalvakṣare gārgi
ākāśa otaśca protaśceti

“This Being is intermeshed, woven and interwoven with ether, and that is life, and that is the essence of life,” says the Upaniṣatkartā.

It appears to me that no more accurate, no more thorough definition could be given of the doctrine of that nebular theory, of the way in which the world came into being from the mists which came out from ether and which resolved themselves into constellations, worlds and suns:

*tadetat-satyam yathā sudīptāt
pāvakād-visphulingāḥ
sahasraśaḥ prabhavante
sarupsaḥ tathā akśarād vividhaḥ
somya bhāvāḥ prajāyante tatra
caivāpiyanti.*

If we read the last two books of Sir James Jeans, we shall realise the truth, the intuitive truth, of that saying. And what the saying means I shall venture to translate:

“This is the truth: As from a blazing fire, in a thousand ways similar sparks proceed, so O Beloved, are produced living souls of various kinds from the indestructible (Brahman) and they also return to Him.”

And in that direction other men in other countries have also thought and given expression to such thinking.

Many years ago, when the thoughts of a great English poet were moving towards pantheism, he came across an inscription in Crete and put it into verse as follows:

*The God I know of, I shall ne'er
 Know, though he dwells exceeding nigh,
 Raise thou the stone and find me there.
 Cleave then the wood and there am I.
 Yea, in my flesh his spirit doth flow,
 Too near, too far, for me to know. ''*

Three Beliefs

Thus, therefore, in dealing with some of the great problems of the universe, in dealing with things like pantheism, the doctrine of *karma* and the doctrine of transmigration, which may be said to be the three beliefs which have originated, or at all events, could very well be said to have originated in the East and to have travelled elsewhere; you find that many doctrines which are now considered to be modern were contemplated long ago. And it ought to be the function of every Indian and of every Orientalist, sooner or later, to compile a natural history of ideas, a natural history of intuition, so that it might be possible, when one finds one inscription here and another inscription there, not only to collate such inscriptions and old manuscripts, and to edit a full text of them, but to assimilate the spirit of them all and, by a comparative study, to realise how the human soul, in

its search after truth, has wandered from place to place, and tried, wherever it went, to start questionings, promptings and answers.

It appears to me that there is enough material in our country, in our scriptures and in our writings for a treatise of the kind which I have ventured to call "A Natural History of Ideas."

Lord Acton attempted to do something of the kind with regard to one branch of ideas, namely, the idea of freedom. "History of Freedom" is well known to historical scholars. Quests, search on such lines, will yield valuable results.

When I was a student of the Bible some years ago, I came across that memorable saying in St. John, when a blind person—one who was born blind—was led to Jesus Christ by his disciples. His disciples gathered round Jesus Christ and asked him: "Did this man or his parents sin, that he was born blind?" and Jesus answered: "Neither did this man sin nor his parents sin; but that the works of God should be made manifest in him." And the blind man got his sight restored. As I was reading this verse in the Holy Bible, it struck me that the idea of transmigration, the idea of Karma, the inheritance of curse through long generations, which we find in the Hebrew and Greek cultures and religion and literature, India

knew ages ago, that India is not far away from Palestine of old. If you go into this matter more and more deeply, you will find that many of these ideas have survived civilizations.

Symbolism in Art

Another important contribution that the East has made to the sum total of human thought and human action in the world is what I call symbolism in art, the idea that art is not mere photographic reproduction of nature, but an endeavour to demonstrate the inner spirit of things, to present ideas as far as possible. The ideas of Greek art of the perfect man and the perfect woman is well known. Every limb is perfectly proportioned; the nose is perfectly straight, and the eyes are set at the right mathematical angle. But irreverent men might say that there is something cold about Greek statuary, something wanting, something which does not satisfy the yearning of the human soul. Take, on the other hand, Eastern sculpture; absurd from the physiological point of view; twenty, thirty, even a thousand arms and legs; apt to rouse the laughter of ridicule in Macaulay-like minds.

As a matter of fact Macaulay did speak of Indian shrines and of gods and goddesses in slightly disparaging terms. But the idea underlying Indian sculpture is very

different from and far higher than common physiology. Naṭarāja, Kālī, these do not satisfy the ideals of the photographer. No, the idea of Naṭarāja is that of a whirling, dynamic force, dancing through destruction of life; and the idea of Kālī is that of infinite energy symbolised by the numerous heads and the thousand hands, and the accompaniments symbolise the gentleness of Umā whose also is the same spirit as that of Kālī. The ideal of Indian architecture, is, as I have already stated, not photographic accuracy but symbolic representation, successful in some cases and only partially successful in others and beyond ordinary visual and auditory comprehension.

That is the meaning of Indian music; that is the meaning of Indian architecture; that is the significance of Indian sculpture. These ideals were at one time derided; but it is very curious to notice that the world has rebelled against what has been called by a Victorian critic 'the Fleshy School.' And the glory of these ideals is slowly coming back, sometimes under difficult auspices, sometimes in more comprehensive ways. Recently I saw a photograph of Epstein's great statue of Jesus Christ. But the only thing I saw was the enormous pair of legs and feet; very little beyond that. But the idea is that, in proper perspective, you would see a shroud and nothing but the shroud. Jesus Christ really is in the

distance, and what you see is the earthliness of that particular moment. I saw again in Kensington Galleries the Christ's Mother. If it was not beautiful, it was symbolic. But I venture to say that our symbols are at least as expressive as these symbols. In any case, it is worthy of note that, as very often happens, the wheel of life turns high and low, and these ideas spread from world's end to world's end; and they produce repercussions and results wherever they go. Symbolism in art, again, is one of the contributions which the Eastern life and Eastern art have made to the world.

Teaching of Religion

Another notable contribution is the system of teaching religion and ethics by means of parables and stories. Consider what that means. It started with the Buddhist Jātakas, and the stories of the *Hitopadeśa*, *Pañcatantra*. From them and from Chinese and Arabian sources, the system went to Spain; it came to Italy. That led to the "Chanson De Roland", to Boccaccio's "Decameron" and Spenser's "Faery Queen." That method of conveying moral, ethical and religious maxims by means of stories was essentially an Eastern art and the parable and story, an essentially Eastern institution.



ADVAITA: AN OVERVIEW

R. Balasubramanian

INTRODUCTION

Advaita is as ancient as the Veda. While the glimpses of its teachings are seen in the hymns¹ (*mantras*) of the Veda, it is only in the Upaniṣads, which constitute the concluding portion of the Veda, that we have a fully-fledged account of its teachings. Advaita has, therefore, no founder in the sense in which we speak of founders of other schools, e.g. Gautama as the founder of the Nyāya school, Kapila as the founder of the Sāṅkhya school, and so on. Since we frequently speak of “Advaita of Śaṅkara”, one gets the impression that Śaṅkara is the founder or originator of Advaita. This, however, is not true, though it is undeniable that Śaṅkara, as the author of the commentaries (*bhāṣya-kāra*) on the Upaniṣads, the *Bhagavad-gītā*, and the *Brahma-sūtra*, not only elucidated, but also gave a final form to the basic doctrines of Advaita. So far as we know from the available literature on Advaita, Gauḍapāda who was Śaṅkara’s teacher’s teacher (*paramaguru*) and the

author of the *Māṇḍūkya-kārikā* was the first systematic expounder of Advaita. That there were teachers of Advaita even before Gauḍapāda is borne out from references contained in Bādarāyaṇa's *Brahma-sūtra*. Bādarāyaṇa, for example, refers to the views of Kāśakṛtsna² and Bādari,³ which lend support to the Advaita view.

The *Brahma-sūtra*, also called the *Vedānta-sūtra*, which attempts to bring out in an aphoristic manner the central teaching of the Upaniṣads, is the basic work of all the schools of Vedānta including Advaita. In addition to the Upaniṣads and the *Brahma-sūtra*, the *Bhagavad-gītā* is an important source book for Advaita. The central teaching of the Upaniṣads, the *Brahma-sūtra*, and the *Bhagavad-gītā*, which constitute the triple source of authority (*prasthāna-traya*), is one and the same: all of them, that is to say, (1) affirm the non-duality of Brahman, (2) the non-difference between the jīva and Brahman, and (3) the non-reality (or falsity) of the empirical world. Of the triple sources of authority mentioned above, while the Upaniṣads and the *Bhagavad-gītā* represent the standpoints of *śruti* and *smṛti* respectively, the *Brahma-sūtra* represents the standpoint of reason (*tarka*). It means that the basic doctrines of Advaita

which are based on *śruti* are supported by *smṛti* and *tarka*.

Śaṅkara's exposition of the basic doctrines of Advaita has been explained by a number of teachers of Advaita by way of sub-commentaries and glosses on his *Bhāṣya* on the *prasthānatraya* or through independent treatises on Advaita. Mention may be made of the two "ways" (*prasthāna*)—very often referred to as the "schools"—in which Śaṅkara's commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra* has been interpreted by his followers. The three important works of the *Bhāmatī-prasthāna* are (1) the *Bhāmatī* of Vācaspati, which is a brilliant commentary on Śaṅkara's *Brahma-sūtra-bhāṣya*; (2) the *Kalpataru* of Amalānanda, which is a further commentary on the *Bhāmatī*, and (3) the *Parimala* of Appayya Dīkṣita, which is again a commentary on the *Kalpataru*. In the same way, the three important works of the *Vivarāṇa-prasthāna* are (1) the *Pañca-pādikā* of Padmapāda which is, as available, a part of the commentary on Śaṅkara's *Brahma-sūtra-bhāṣya*, (2) the *Pañca-pādikā-vivarāṇa* of Prakāśātman, and (3) the *Vivarāṇa-prameya-saṅgraha* of Vidyāraṇya. Though these two post-Śaṅkara schools differ in the interpretation of certain aspects of Advaita, they agree on the essentials of Advaita. It may be stated here that

the differences between these two schools are only exegetical and not doctrinal; and these differences which have arisen in the course of the elucidation of the points of view, clarification of issues, answering objections, and so on, are within the framework of Advaita. Both the *prasthānas* take their stand on, and draw inspiration from, the writings of Śaṅkara; and through different modes of interpretation of the views of Śaṅkara, they help us to gain an insight into Śaṅkara and Advaita. Every perspective, every mode of interpretation, which is relative and significant from one's point of view, is intended, as Sureśvara has stated, to help us realize the inward Self.⁴ One must bear this in mind in dealing with the differences between the two *prasthānas*. These differences which are not irreconcilable within the framework of Advaita do not make Advaita a house divided against itself.

In Advaita, as in the case of some other schools, we speak of three kinds of works providing materials, as well as authoritative interpretation of these materials, for the school. They are the *Sūtra*-work, the *Bhāṣya*-work, and the *Vārttika*-work. Reference has already been made to Bādarāyaṇa's *Brahma-sūtra* and Śaṅkara's *Bhāṣyas*. Just as Kumārila Bhaṭṭa is the author of the *Vārttikas* in the Pūrvamīmāṃsā school, even so Sureśvara, Śaṅkara's direct disciple, is the

author of the *Vārttikas* in Advaita. Among his *Vārttikas*, which elucidate Śaṅkara's position, the one on the *Taittirīyopaniṣad-bhāṣya* and the other on the *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad-bhāṣya* are very important. The status which Sureśvara as the *Vārttikakāra* enjoys in the Advaita tradition is unique. The fact that influential teachers of Advaita like Madhusūdana Sarasvatī place Sureśvara along with Vyāsa and Śaṅkara brings out the greatness of Sureśvara.⁵

What is known as the *siddhi*-literature in Advaita contains important treatises which not only set forth the essentials of Advaita, but also add new facets to it in the course of dialectics with other schools. Four works in this group which have attracted the attention of scholars on account of their authoritative character as well as their polemics with other schools are the *Brahmasiddhi* of Maṇḍana, the *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi* of Sureśvara, the *Iṣṭasiddhi* of Vimuktātman, and the *Advaitasiddhi* of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī. Appayya Dīkṣita's *Siddhāntaleśa-saṅgraha*, which refers to the divergent interpretations of the different aspects of Advaita, is important as well as popular. While Dharmarāja's *Vedānta-paribhāṣā* sets forth in a technical way the basic tenets of Advaita, Sadānanda's *Vedāntasāra* states briefly the essentials of Advaita. Independent works which seek to expound the

teachings of Advaita are numerous. Only a few which are important and well known are mentioned here.

THE PERSPECTIVE

Any system of philosophy can be correctly understood and appreciated only if it is viewed through the right perspective. The guiding principles which are going to be mentioned now are already involved in both the epistemology and metaphysics of Advaita. They are not extraneous to, but are immanent in, them. Only they are singled out for the purpose of drawing pointed attention to the way in which the problems are analysed and tackled.

There is first of all the distinction between the absolute and the relative points of view, which runs through the entire system of Advaita. This is also referred to as *pāramārthika* and *vyāvahārika* points of view, as the standpoints of *vidyā* and *avidyā* respectively.⁶ What is true from one point of view or at one level is not true from another point of view or at another level. While the Advaitin is prepared to admit all kinds of distinctions from the empirical point of view, e.g. the distinction between one jīva and another jīva and the existence of a plurality of things, he denies them from the absolute point of view. Again, the Advaitin maintains that Brahman or the

Absolute by itself is *nirguṇa*; but when we view it in relation to the world, i.e. from the standpoint of *vyavahāra*, it is *saguṇa*. Unless one is clear about this distinction, one is likely to get the impression that the Advaitin is inconsistent in his explanation. Reference may be made in this connection to an oft-quoted passage from Śaṅkara taken from his commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra*, Śaṅkara says:

Brahman is known in two forms as qualified by limiting conditions owing to the distinctions of name and form, and also as the opposite of this, i.e. as what is free from all limiting conditions whatever... thus many (*śruti*) texts show Brahman in two forms according as it is known from the standpoint of *vidyā* or from that of *avidyā*.⁷

It is obvious from the above passage that the Advaitin does not speak of two Brahmanas as alleged by the critics, but of one and the same Brahman in two forms.

Secondly, the metaphysics of Advaita is immanent and not transcendent. It is an enquiry into the Real or the Absolute that is involved in, and is the basis of, our experience. Though the Absolute is entangled in our experience, it is unlike the stocks and stones given to us in our experience. One must,

therefore, catch it through *discrimination*; that is to say, the Absolute which is identical with the Self (Ātman) of the individual must be discriminated from the not-Self (*anātman*). One must apprehend it through negation, i.e. by negating it from the things known, which are gross and subtle, which are with form and without form. The search for the Absolute, according to Advaita, cannot be outside our experience. It is through an analysis of our day-to-day experience at different levels—waking, dream, and deep sleep—that we have to find out the Real or the Absolute which is no other than the Self of the individual.⁸

The Absolute of metaphysics is also the highest value of ethics. According to Advaita, man is in search of the highest value which was in his possession, but which he has lost. No one knows when this loss took place though all of us know, when given to reflection on the existential predicament, of the loss we have suffered. It does not matter how we characterize this supreme value. We may call it perfection or freedom; we may speak of it as the good (*śreyas*) or as liberation (*mokṣa*). What we have lost can be regained as a result of a change in our vision. The Self which is real and which is the highest value is eternal; and it is only due to ignorance (*avidyā*) that man thinks that he has lost

it. What is needed for regaining the object which is supposed to be lost is knowledge (*vidyā*). And this knowledge or vision, Advaita holds striking its optimistic note, can be attained in this life itself. So the third point to be noted here is that Advaita which is value-oriented in its outlook maintains that perfection or liberation is not a promise of a future life, but a possibility of the present life, provided of course that one prepares one's life in the right way for that consummation.

Fourthly, one has to bear in mind the fact of *adhyāsa* which is pervasive in everything we know and in everything we do in our empirical life.⁹ *Adhyāsa* is wrong knowledge; cognizing something as something else is *adhyāsa*. It is, as Śaṅkara put it, *atasmin tadbuddhiḥ*.¹⁰ So long as our perspective is empirical, we are victims of *adhyāsa* at the metaphysical, epistemological, and ethical levels.

Consider, for example, the metaphysical issue of the relation between Brahman and the world. We view Brahman which is not relational as relational, i.e. as what is related to the world as its source, support, and so on; and this is a case of *adhyāsa* or error.

The entire epistemology which works on the basis of subject-object polarity is based on *adhyāsa*. The

Self is pure consciousness; but it is wrongly viewed as a subject in relation to an object. The Self gets involved in what may be called the knowledge-situation (i.e. waking and dream states) only as a result of its relation to the mind. The Self becomes an "I" (*aham-padārtha*) because of its relation with the mind; and the mind, though insentient, becomes a knower (*jñātā*) due to its relation with the Self which is consciousness. Here the relation itself, the Advaitin says, is false. While the Self is real, the mind which is a product of *avidyā* is false; and there cannot be a real relation between what is real and what is false. In the absence of *adhyāsa*, no epistemology involving the subject-object relation is possible.

Adhyāsa plays its part in all our claims and actions when we transact our business of life. I claim myself to be a male, a Brahmin, and so on; and this is an instance of *adhyāsa* in the form of a wrong identification of the Self with the body. When I say, "I am blind," "I am deaf," there is *adhyāsa* in the form of a wrong identification of the Self with the sense organ. There is again *adhyāsa* through a wrong identification of the Self with the mind when I say, "I am happy," "I am miserable," and so on. Though *adhyāsa* is pervasive at all levels of our empirical life, it is not permanent. It can be overcome by right

knowledge, for *avidyā* which is the cause of *adhyāsa* disappears at the rise of knowledge.¹¹

Every system makes use of one or more key concepts. Consider, for instance, the part played by the concept of *samavāya* in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, the concept of *aprthak-siddhi* relation in Viśiṣṭādvaita, the concepts of *viśeṣa* and *bheda* in Dvaita Vedānta. *Avidyā*, which is the same as *māyā*, is the key concept in Advaita. This concept is presupposed in the distinction between Brahman as *nirguṇa* and Brahman as *saguna*, in the explanation of the one Brahman appearing as *jīva* and *Īśvara*, in the account of perceptual error, in the explanation of the appearance of the world, and in the scheme of discipline leading to liberation.¹² It is, therefore, no wonder that *avidyā* is characterized as the corner-stone of Advaita. Considering the significant role played by *avidyā-māyā* in the metaphysics, epistemology, and ethical discipline of Advaita, the critics of Advaita have gone to the extent of characterizing Advaita as *māyāvāda* and the Advaitin as *māyāvādin*. The Advaitin rejects this way of characterizing Advaita as unjust, though he does not, at the same time, wish to belittle the important role played by *avidyā-māyā* in his system. To the Advaitin, *māyā* is not the final category. It is not ultimately real. It cannot exist and function without

Brahman-Ātman as its locus; and it ceases to be when Brahman-Ātman is realized.¹³ Critics who characterize Advaita as *māyāvāda* mistake the means for the end. The end to be realized is Brahman which is the substratum of plurality. The means utilized by the Advaitin for the explanation of the one reality appearing as the many is the principle of *māyā*.

EPISTEMOLOGY

Of the six *pramāṇas* admitted by Advaita, only *śruti* is the source of our knowledge of Brahman. The other *pramāṇas*—perception (*pratyakṣa*), inference (*anumāna*), comparison (*upamāna*), postulation (*arthāpath*), and non-cognition (*anupalabdhi*)—give us knowledge of things empirical. While *anupalabdhi* which is called “the sixth *pramāṇa*” is the means through which we know the non-existence (*abhāva*) of something, the other *pramāṇas* such as perception convey the knowledge of positive entities.

According to Advaita, since there is a clear demarcation of the scope of *śruti* on the one hand and the other *pramāṇas* on the other—the former being concerned with Brahman, the trans-empirical reality, and the latter with empirical things—there is, strictly speaking, no conflict between *śruti* and the other *pramāṇas*. It means, first of all, that perception and

other *pramāṇas* can neither prove nor disprove Brahman, the super-sensuous reality. Secondly, when a *pramāṇa* such as perception transgressing its limit claims to prove something which goes contrary to the evidence of *śruti*, the latter alone is authoritative and final. In other words, the truth of non-duality revealed by *śruti*, the Advaitin maintains, can never be challenged by a *pramāṇa* such as perception. Thirdly, scriptural declarations about empirical things which are in conflict with the evidence of perception are not authoritative. That is why Śaṅkara says that “even a hundred scriptural texts, which declare fire to be cold or non-luminous, will not attain authoritativeness.”¹⁴

“It is necessary in this connection to explain the nature and work of *śruti* as a *pramāṇa*. *Śruti* as *apauruṣeya*; it means that it does not owe its origin to any person, human or divine. By virtue of its non-personal nature it is, unlike perception and other *pramāṇas*, absolutely free from error (*viparyaya*), doubt (*saṁśaya*) and other defects which are connected with a person.

Though Advaita accepts six *pramāṇas*, *śruti* alone, strictly speaking, is the *pramāṇa* according to it. What remains concealed and therefore what is to be known is Brahman-Ātman alone, and nothing else.¹⁵

Since *śruti*, and *śruti* alone, conveys the knowledge of Brahman-Ātman, the Advaitin holds that it alone is the *pramāṇa*. From the standpoint of the empirical realm (*vyāvahārika*), perception, inference, etc., are admitted to be *pramāṇas*, and here we proceed on the assumption that material things, due to concealment, remain unknown. Refuting this assumption, the Advaitin maintains that there can be concealment only for Brahman-Ātman which is consciousness. So long as we think that there are insentient objects which remain unknown to us (and this is what we ordinarily do), we can, according to Advaita, speak of perception, inference, etc., as *pramāṇas*.

There is yet another point to be noted here about *śruti*. *Śruti* as *pramāṇa* is just informative, i.e. it only reveals Brahman-Ātman which is already there, but which remains concealed and unknown due to *avidyā*. It means that the work of *śruti* as the *pramāṇa* is needed only so long as Brahman-Ātman is not known; and once it is known, there is no need for *śruti*. One who is ignorant of the truth needs *pramāṇa*, and not one who has known the truth. To one who has realized Brahman-Ātman, which is real (*satyam*), the Veda is no more Veda, as declared by the Upaniṣad.¹⁶

Śruti conveys the knowledge of Brahman only negatively by removing the various wrong notions that we have about it. It is impossible to describe the ultimate reality affirmatively as such-and-such, for it has no genus (*jāti*), no quality (*guṇa*), no relation (*sambandha*), and no activity (*kriyā*). It cannot even be named. Even the text, “the real, knowledge, and infinite,”¹⁷ (*satyam jñānam anantam*) which is usually quoted as containing the *svarūpa-lakṣana* of Brahman has to be interpreted negatively according to Śaṅkara. It conveys the idea that Brahman is different from the false, the insentient, and the finite. The things that we know in our ordinary experience are false, insentient, and finite; and Brahman, the Upaniṣad says, is different from these. One should try to know Brahman by removing from it qualities, relations, and distinctions which we have superimposed on it due to *avidyā*. This is the idea behind the celebrated *neti neti* method of the *Upaniṣad*. If the ultimate reality can be comprehended by the mind in a determinate way and if it can be described affirmatively as such-and-such, the Upaniṣad would not have declared that “words, along with mind, return without reaching it”¹⁸ (*yato vāco nivartante aprāpya manasā saha*).

The acceptance of *śruti* as the *pramāṇa* does not mean that there is no place for reason in the system.

While *śruti* provides the insight into the nature of the Absolute, reason has to explicate it, make it intelligible and tenable, and prepare the ground for attaining the direct and immediate apprehension of it. Reason does not become superfluous because of *śruti*; nor can *śruti* be superseded by reason. Reason is a necessary and useful supplement to *śruti*. *Śruti* itself conveys this idea when it says: "The Self, indeed, is to be seen. It is to be heard of, reflected on, and contemplated upon."¹⁹ *Śravaṇa* which is the study of the Upaniṣadic texts must be followed by rational inquiry (*manana*) and repeated contemplation (*nididhyāsana*). The triple discipline of *śravaṇa*, *manana*, and *nididhyāsana* is for the purpose of getting the direct vision of the Absolute. The insight which *śruti* provides through its teaching is only mediate knowledge (*parokṣa-jñāna*). In transforming the mediate knowledge into an immediate one, what is called *aparokṣa-jñāna*, reason plays an important part. Śaṅkara recognizes the importance of reason and makes use of the different forms of reasoning such as inference (*anumāna*), postulation (*arthāpatti*), comparison (*upamāna*), the methods of agreement and difference (*anvaya-vyalyireka*), and so on in his writings. At the same time he makes it clear that "mere reasoning" (*kevala-tarka*) will not do in the

matter of knowing the ultimate reality. *Kevala-tarka* is “dry reasoning” (*śuṣka-tarka*); it is withered, groundless, and unproductive. If reason is to be fruitful, it has to be used as a supplement to *śruti*.²⁰ It is wrong to say that Śaṅkara is opposed to reason. The real position is that he is neither pro-nor anti-reason. His primal aim is to set forth the nature of Brahman or the Puruṣa of the Upaniṣads (*aupaniṣadam puruṣam*);²¹ and he makes use of reason wherever necessary in the course of the elucidation of his position as well as the refutation of the views of others.

The term “knowledge” as ordinarily understood in this system refers to *vṛtti-jñāna* which is a blend of the *vṛtti* (i.e. modification) of the mind and the reflection of consciousness therein. *Vṛtti-jñāna*, it may be said in a general way, is empirical knowledge, and this is of two kinds, immediate (*aparokṣa*) and mediate (*parokṣa*). Knowledge obtained through *anumāna* and *upamāna*, for example, is mediate. Knowledge which arises through *śabda* may be mediate or immediate, depending upon the nature of the object which is known. According to Advaita, immediate knowledge is of three kinds. We have immediate knowledge of external objects, e.g. a tree - which is in front and which is fit to be perceived,

obtained through the senses. In this case, in addition to the part played by consciousness and the mind, the functioning of the appropriate sense organ is required. We have also immediate knowledge of our subjective states such as pleasure and pain. These subjective states can never exist without our being conscious of them. In as much as they exist only when we are aware of them, our cognition of them and their existence and cognition are coeval. The difference between our immediate knowledge of subjective states and that of an external object is obvious. We do not say that a tree which I perceive exists only at the time of perception. Pleasure and pain, which are also *vṛttis* of the mind, are directly illumined by the Witness-consciousness. Further, every one has immediate knowledge of oneself as 'I' (*aḥam*).

The important point to be noted is that in every kind of knowledge, immediate as well as mediate, the functioning of the mind is absolutely necessary and that the mind which is material can give us knowledge, given the necessary conditions, only when it is inspired by consciousness which is the Self. Both waking and dream states may be characterized as 'knowledge-situation' because we have knowledge of objects, external and internal, in these states. While in the waking state (*jāgratī*) both the mind and the

senses function, in the dream state (*svapna*) there is the functioning of the mind alone. As distinguished from these two states, there is a third state called deep sleep (*susupti*) in which even the mind does not function. Sleep is not a knowledge-situation because a person in sleep does not know anything, external or internal. If the mind were to function in this state, it would not be *susupti* and if it is *susupti*, it means that the mind (as well as the sense) does not function at that time. Because of the absence of the functioning of the mind in sleep, the person concerned, when undergoing that experience, does not even know himself/herself. While the mind and the senses are the variable factors in the three states, the one factor which is invariably present in all the three states is consciousness.

Subscribing to the theory of self-validity of knowledge (*svatahprāmānya-vāda*), Advaita holds that validity is intrinsic to knowledge both in respect of its origin and ascertainment. A cognition is presumed to be valid or true even as it arises from a *pramāṇa*; and its validity holds good till it is shown to be false by subsequent experience. Applying the principle of non-contradiction as the test of truth, Advaita distinguishes a valid from an erroneous cognition. A valid cognition is one whose content

remains uncontradicted, whereas an erroneous cognition is one whose content is contradicted by a subsequent cognition. It may be noted that Advaita, which is realistic in its epistemology, holds that every cognition points to a cognitum and that this is as much true of an erroneous cognition as it is true of a veridical one. The object in front, let us say, is a rope; and when I cognize it as a rope, my cognition has an objective reference. When I perceive a rope as a snake and say, "This is a snake," my cognition, as in the previous case, has a cognitum, viz. snake. However, while the former is a valid cognition because it remains uncontradicted by a subsequent cognition, the latter is erroneous because it suffers contradiction by a subsequent cognition.

Advaita holds that anything that is perceived or experienced is real. It accords reality to objects of erroneous perception and dream objects as well as to objects of normal waking consciousness. The question to be considered is how real these objects are and also whether they have the same measure of reality as Brahman, the Absolute.

Advaita admits of three levels of reality—that which is apparently real (*prātibhāsika*), that which is empirically real (*vyāvahārika*), and that which is

absolutely real (*pāramārthika*). This may be called the three-level-theory, or three-decker-theory, of reality. If, for the reason to be given in the sequel, we club the *prātibhāsika* and *vyāvahārika* levels into one, we can speak of two levels of reality—the empirically real and the absolutely real. This is what may be characterized as the two-level-theory, or the double-decker-theory, of reality. The theory of levels (or degrees) of reality is a consequence of the epistemological realism of Advaita.

A rope-snake and a dream-lion, which belong to one category, cannot be dismissed as non-real (*asat*). What is non-real, e.g. a sky-flower, is never experienced by any person at any time. Since a rope-snake and a dream-lion are objects of experience, they are not, according to Advaita, non-real. Their reality, however, is very much restricted. They are real to the person concerned at the time they are experienced. The rope-snake ceases to be when subsequently the person concerned comes to know of it as a rope. It means that the earlier cognition of snake suffers sublation by the subsequent cognition of rope. Similarly, the lion experienced in dream ceases to exist when the person concerned wakes up. Like the rope-snake, the dream-lion also suffers sublation by subsequent experience. Objects such as the dream-

lion and the rope-snake, which exist only at the time of their perception, are called *prātibhāsika*.

The position is a little different in the case of objects of our normal waking consciousness. Their reality is not restricted, as in the previous case of objects, to the person and the time. While the dream-lion and the rope-snake are objects of "private experience", the table and the tree seen in normal waking consciousness are "public" in the sense that they are perceived by more than one person simultaneously. Further, they exist for a longer time. The empirical world persists until Brahman-intuition. The things of the empirical world are real so long as the empirical order lasts. They are, therefore, said to be empirically real. It may be noted that, despite the above difference between objects called *prātibhāsika* and those called *vyāvahārika*, all these objects are false or illusory (*mithyā*) because they suffer contradiction. For the real (*sat*), there is no contradiction; and that which is subject to contradiction is false (*mithyā*). Brahman alone is real. Being eternal, it is not subject to contradiction at any time, past, present, and future. What is *asat*, e.g. sky-flower, is never cognized; and the question of sublation does not arise in this case, because negation requires prior affirmation. But in the case of both

prātibhāsika and *vyāvahārika* objects, there is cognition (*pratīti*) as well as sublation (*bādha*). Since they are cognized, they are not *asat*; and since they are sublated, they are not *sat*. These objects which are different from both *sat* and *asat* are called *sadasad-vilakṣaṇa* or *anirvacanīya*. They are false or illusory (*mithyā*). Though a distinction is drawn between *prātibhāsika* and *vyāvahārika*, they are nevertheless *mithyā* for the reason stated above. And so the Advaitin clubs them together and speaks of them generally as *vyāvahārika* to be contrasted with the *pāramārthika*.

Expressions such as “absolutely real” (*pāramārthika*), “the unoriginated” (*ajam*) “the Fourth” (*turiya, caturtha*) which are used with regard to Brahman-Ātman are contextual.²² They are used with regard to the Absolute for the purpose of distinguishing it from the things of the empirical world and from the triple stream of experience we have—waking, dream and sleep. By contrast to the things of the world which are not real (*aparamārtha*), we call Brahman as real (*paramārtha*). The things of the world have origination; and by contrast to them we say that Brahman is unoriginated (*ajam*). And by contrast to the three states of experience in which we are involved, we say that Brahman is the Fourth

(*turīya*) which transcends, and remains unaffected by, the three states. Given the empirical world of plurality and the triple stream of experience, these expressions which are applied to Brahman are meaningful. To one who has known the truth and remains as Brahman, these expressions lose their significance. It has to be borne in mind that the three-level (or the two-level) theory mentioned above is not detrimental to the thesis of non-dualism. Non-duality would be at stake only if the empirical world were real. But inasmuch as the empirical world is not real, the truth of non-duality holds good.²³

Advaita explains perceptual error in terms of *anīrvacanīya-khyāti*. Mistaking a rope for a snake is a case of perceptual error. Of the several factors which give rise to this error, two of them are important. They are: (1) the substratum (*adhiṣṭhāna*) and (2) the chief defect (*doṣa*) called *avidyā*. Other factors such as similarity, absence of light, etc., which also play their part in this case, are absent in other cases of error; and so, being variable factors, they do not require special treatment in the explanation of perceptual error. We will confine our attention to the two important conditions mentioned above.

In the case of the rope being mistaken for snake, the rope is the substratum whose general feature alone (i.e. the "this" aspect) is perceived and not its specific feature, viz. ropeness. The substratum alone cannot account for this error. But for the work of *avidyā*, which is the material cause, there will be no appearance of snake in front. It is *avidyā*, Advaita holds, that projects itself as snake in unity with the object in front which is cognized in a general way as "this" with the result that we perceive the object in front as a snake.

According to Advaita, the ontological status of "this snake" (what may be called the "rope-snake" to distinguish it from the real snake), which is the object of erroneous perception, is unique. Since it is seen, it is not *asat*; and since it is sublated by subsequent experience, it is not *sat*. Being neither *sat* nor *asat*, it has a special ontological status. The expressions used by the Advaitin to bring out its peculiar status are *sadasad-vilakṣaṇa* and *anirvacanīya*. These expressions are intended to show that this entity is ontologically false (*mithyā*). Being a newly created object (*apūrva*) by *avidyā*, it is seen only by the person concerned at that time and in that place. In this case, while the rope remains a rope all the time without undergoing any change, there is,

nevertheless, the appearance of snake therein due to the modification of *avidyā* in the form of snake. Considering the part played by both the substratum and *avidyā*, Advaita says that, while the rope, the substratum in this case, is the transfigurative material cause (*vivarta-upādāna-kāraṇa*), *avidyā* is the transformative material cause (*pariṇāmi-upādāna-kāraṇa*). The moment the person gets the right knowledge of the object in front as a rope, *avidyā* disappears along with the snake of which it is the material cause.

The example of the rope appearing as the snake is important both in the epistemology and metaphysics of Advaita. What the rope is to the snake, the Advaitin argues. Brahman is to the world. Though analogy is no conclusive argument, it has, when properly utilized, great suggestive value. The analogy between rope-snake and Brahman-world relation has to be understood in the proper perspective.

METAPHYSICS

Every philosophical system seeks to explain three entities—the ultimate reality called Brahman or God as the case may be, the individual self (*jīva*) and the physical universe (*jagat*). According to Advaita,

though from the relative or empirical point of view there are these three entities, from the absolute point of view there is only one entity, Brahman-Ātman, which, the Upaniṣad says, is “one and non-dual” (*ekameva advitīyam*).²⁴ It means that pluralism which we experience in our day-to-day life and with which we start our philosophical inquiry is not the final truth. The one reality appears to be plural due to our *avidyā*. The Upaniṣad says: “Indra (the supreme Being) is perceived as manifold due to the powers of *māyā*.”²⁵ So long as there is *avidyā*, which is only another name for *māyā*, we are at the empirical realm. Conditioned by *avidyā*, we think of and accept pluralism as the truth. The redeeming feature is that *avidyā* which suppresses the truth and suggests the false is not permanent, for it can be terminated through *vidyā*, the right knowledge of the reality. When the truth of oneness is realized, plurality along with its cause disappears. In the words of Gauḍapāda. “*jñāte dvaitam na vidyate.*” The Advaitin is not averse to accepting plurality from the *vyāvahārika* standpoint, but he maintains on the basis of both scripture and reason that plurality is not ultimately real. To the Vedāntins of other schools, plurality is real both in the empirical state of bondage and in the final state of liberation.²⁶ Advaita holds that there is no

inconsistency between the empirical pluralism and the transcendental non-dualism.

Since Brahman-Ātman is ever existent, all that we have to do is to discover its real nature by removing the wrong notions about it which we hold due to ignorance. The method adopted for getting the disclosure of the truth is called "the method of *adhyāropa* and *apavāda*." Śāṅkara himself speaks of this method as "traditional."²⁷ *Adhyāropa* means superimposition, and *apavāda* means denial. According to this method, qualities, relations, and distinctions which are falsely superimposed on Brahman-Ātman are to be negated of it. Critics of Advaita ask: "Why should we first superimpose and then negate them?" Not that we deliberately superimpose them on Brahman-Ātman, knowing in advance that we will deny them subsequently. Our empirical existence is due to *avidyā*. Conditioned as we are by *avidyā* in our view of things and way of life, this superimposition is connate to us. Though it is already there, we do not know it. It is through *śruti* that we come to know of it; and it is *śruti* that helps us to remove it by negating what is false. Though Brahman is not an object of knowledge in the sense in which a table and a tree are objects of knowledge,

śruti helps us to discover it by negating the distinctions and relations falsely superimposed on it due to *avidyā*.

The method of *adhyāropa* and *apavāda* has been worked out through several ways. Here we may refer to three of them. There is first of all the technique of cause-effect inquiry (*kārya-kāraṇa-vicāra*) which helps to show that the physical universe is false (*mithyā*) and is not ultimately real. We view Brahman as the cause, and the world as the effect. We say that being the cause of the world is the *tatastha-lakṣaṇa* of Brahman. A careful examination of the whole issue will show that there are difficulties in the application of the category of causality to Brahman. Is it the material cause (*upādāna-kāraṇa*)? Or is it only the efficient cause (*nimitta-kāraṇa*)? Or is it both the material and the efficient cause rolled into one? Being immutable, it cannot be the material cause of the world in the same way as clay is the material cause of pot. Nor can it be just an efficient cause like a potter. Brahman is infinite; and there is no matter which exists in addition to, and independently of, it. In the absence of such an entity it is wrong to say that Brahman is only the efficient cause.

On the basis of *śruti* texts, "Being alone was in the beginning, one only without a second," "It

thought, may I become many...''²⁸ we say that Brahman associated with *māyā* is both the material and the efficient cause (*abhinna-nimitto-pādāna-kāraṇa*). What does this mean? The pure Brahman which is immutable cannot be the cause of the world. *Māyā* which is not an independent category cannot by itself be the cause of the world. Brahman associated with *māyā* is *Īśvara*; consequently *Īśvara* is *saguna*. If *Īśvara* (or Brahman with *māyā*) is the cause of the universe, how are we to understand this cause-effect relation? It cannot be understood in terms of the theory of actual transformation (*pariṇāma-vāda*), for Brahman which is not a composite entity is not subject to modification. Advaita, therefore, introduces the theory of transfiguration or apparent change (*vivarta-vāda*). The full explanation of this theory as worked out by the Advaitin will show that while Brahman is the transfigurative material cause (*vivarta-upadāna-kāraṇa*), *māyā* is the transformative material cause (*pariṇāmi-upadāna-kāraṇa*) of the physical universe.

Let us work out the implication of the theory of *vivarta*. While cause and effect have the same ontological status (*samasattāka*) in *pariṇāma-vāda*, they have different ontological status (*viśamasattāka*) in the theory of *vivarta*. If we take the rope-snake example, we find that while the rope, the substratum,

is empirically real (*vyāvahārika*), the snake which appears therein is apparently real (*prātibhāsika*); the effect, that is to say, has a lower ontological status while the cause has a higher ontological status in the theory of *vivarta*. The same thing is true between Brahman and the world when their cause-effect relation is explained in terms of *vivarta*. Brahman, being *pāramārthika*, has a higher ontological status while the world which is *vyāvahārika* has a lower ontological status. If Brahman is real and if the world does not have the same reality as Brahman, it follows that the world is not real. In other words, the world, the Advaitin says, is false (*mithyā*). Further, *māyā* is not ultimately real. It is *mithyā*. The world cannot be but *mithyā* when *māyā* is its *pariṇāmi-upādāna-kāraṇa*. Assuming the existence of the world, we seek its cause and say that Brahman associated with *māyā* is the cause. When both *māyā* and the world get negated, we cannot speak of Brahman as cause. The technique of cause-effect inquiry is intended to help us realize the oneness of Brahman by negating the world which is false. Śaṅkara brings out the full significance of the cause-effect relation and the application of this principle to Brahman in his commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra*, 1.1.2. 1.1.23, and 2.1.14.

It is wrong to think that Advaita has dispensed with God. It is Brahman that is God or Īśvara in relation to the world. He is not only the source and support of the world, but also its moral govern. He is the wielder of *māyā* (*māyin*) and is not affected by it. It means that He is both omnipotent and omniscient, It is He who reveals the Veda at the beginning of every cycle for the benefit of jīvas. He is the object of worship and meditation. So long as there is jīva as well as the world, there is Īśvara. According to Advaita, what is viewed and accepted as God or Īśvara in relation to the world will be realized, due to the new vision arising from the right knowledge, as the one without a second. Things are altogether different to one who has gained this new vision. To one who has attained this new perspective, every thing is Brahman. From his perspective, to use the words of Gaudapāda, "There is no dissolution, no creation, none in bondage, no aspirant, no seeker after liberation and none liberated. This is the absolute truth."²⁹ This cannot be said of those who lack this vision. The difference in the two standpoints should not be ignored. To mix up the two standpoints is a case of perspective mistake.

The second technique is inquiry into the five sheaths (*pañca-kośa*) for the purpose of bringing out

the real nature of (he) *jīva*. According to Advaita, the *jīva* as *such* conditioned or limited by the body, the senses, and the mind is not Brahman; but the *jīva* in its essential nature is Brahman itself. Owing to *avidyā*, not only do we not know its real nature, but also wrongly think of it as the body, as the senses, as the mind, and so on. In the empirical condition, the *jīva*, which is the Self, is conditioned by five sheaths or vestures—those of matter (*annamaya-kośa*), of vitality (*prāṇamaya-kośa*), of mind (*manomaya-kośa*), of intellect (*vijñānamaya-kośa*), and of bliss (*ānandamaya-kośa*)—which are arranged telescopically one inside the other with the *annamaya-kośa* as the outermost and the *ānandamaya-kośa* as the innermost one. Reference is also made to the three bodies (*śarīra*) of the *jīva* in its empirical condition. While the sheath of matter is the gross body (*sthūla-śarīra*), the sheaths of vitality, mind, and intellect constitute the subtle body (*sūkṣma-śarīra*) of the *jīva*; and the sheath of bliss is its causal body (*kāraṇa-śarīra*). The five sheaths (or three bodies) are not-Self; and the Self must be discriminated from them. There is a detailed account of the five sheaths in the second chapter of the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad*. Advaita adopts this technique of inquiry into the five sheaths for the purpose of negating the wrong notions that we have of

the Self identifying it with the body, the vital air, the mind, and so on due to *avidyā*.

This technique also is utilized for bringing out the real nature of the *jīva*. A full account of this technique is to be found in the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad* with a brilliant elucidation of it in the *Māṇḍūkya-kārikā*. In the empirical condition, the *jīva* has three kinds of experience (*avasthātraya*)—waking, dream, and sleep. The involvement of the Self in the triple stream of experience takes place through the adjunct (*upādhi*) with which the Self is associated. *Viśva* and *taijasa*, which are the names given to the Self at the waking and dream levels respectively, are subject to both ignorance and error; they suffer, that is to say, because of non-apprehension (*agrahaṇa*) as well as misapprehension (*anyathāagrahaṇa*) of truth in their empirical experience. *Prājña*, which is the name given to the Self at the deep sleep level, is subject to *agrahaṇa* alone, being conditioned by *avidyā*. What is to be noted is that the Self is not really affected by the triple stream of experience in which it appears to be involved. Its involvement is only adventitious (*aupādika*) and not natural (*svābhāvika*) to it. When a person realizes this truth by removing the false notions associated with it due to ignorance, he “attains” the Fourth (*Turiya*), which is Brahman-Ātman, which he

is all the time though he has not been aware of it due to ignorance.

Of the three entities, viz. Brahman (or God), the *jīva*, and the world, which constitute what may be termed a philosophical triangle, the world has been shown to be not ultimately real through the technique of cause-effect inquiry. Though the *jīva*, when it puts on the empirical dress, appears to be different from Brahman, it is in its essential nature Brahman itself, as seen from inquiries into the five sheaths and the triple states of experience. What remains finally is Brahman which the Upaniṣad characterizes as ‘one only without a second’ (*ekameva advitīyam*). It is the substratum on which everything which is false is superimposed. It is what is affirmed when everything is denied. If we attempt to describe this ultimate reality which is non-dual and non-relational through language which functions in the realm of duality involving relations, we can only describe it negatively as birthless, sleepless, dreamless, and non-dual (*ajam, anidram, asvapnam; advaitam*).³⁰ Since a positive account of it is not possible through language, the Advaitin admits of linguistic break-down without, however, denying the possibility of metaphysical knowledge. *Śruti* helps us to gain the knowledge of the ultimate reality through the negative method.

THE WAY AND THE GOAL

There is a close link between the metaphysics and the ethical discipline formulated in Advaita. The human being, has suffered a fall and is caught in empirical existence due to *avidyā*. No one knows when this fall took place. *Avidyā* is *anādi*, and so the *jīva* as well as its empirical existence is *anādi*. If *avidyā* is responsible for the fall of humans from their original condition and their suffering in empirical existence, then *vidyā* or *jñāna* alone is the remedy to their existential predicament, for knowledge alone is the antidote to ignorance. It does not matter how we think or the goal—as perfection, as liberation from the bondage of empirical existence, as destruction of *avidyā*, as bliss *par excellence*, as discovering *Brahma-bhāva*. It can be attained by means of knowledge alone. The means, Advaita holds, must be appropriate to the end. Given the goal, nothing else can be the means than knowledge. This saving knowledge which can be attained only through *śruti* is different from ordinary empirical knowledge known as *vṛtti-jñāna* whose content is finite object. It is also different from meditation, i.e. *dhyāna* or *upāsanā*. While *jñāna* is object-dependent (*vastu-tantra*), *dhyāna* is person-dependent (*puruṣa-tantra*). It is also different from *bhakti* or devotion. *Bhakti* is a

discipline which consists in having a continuous stream of ideas, all of the same kind, related to, and focussed on, the object of adoration. And so it is a discipline of the mind which is intended to pave the way for the rise of knowledge. Hence, it cannot be transformed into, or be identical with, knowledge.

Since the mind is the instrument through which alone Brahman is to be known, it must be made fit enough for comprehending the teaching of the Upaniṣad and getting the knowledge of Brahman therefrom. The preliminary discipline, which comprises the practice of *karma-yoga* and *bhakti-yoga*, control of the mind and the senses, and the cultivation of virtues such as faith, fortitude, etc. is intended for purifying the mind. Śaṅkara lays emphasis on all these factors of the preliminary discipline in his commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra*, 3.4.26 and 3.4.27. A person who has attained the purification of the mind as a result of the performance of obligatory and occasional rites is called upon to renounce all *karma*; and such a person alone is eligible for the study of the Upaniṣads. This renunciation for the purpose of getting Brahman-knowledge from the Upaniṣads is called *vividiṣā-sannyāsa*. The final discipline which consists of *śravaṇa*, *manana*, and *nididhyāsana* leads to

Brahman-realization. One who has realized Brahman remains as Brahman; and it is in such a person we find renunciation in the complete sense of the term. Renunciation of a realized person is called *vidvat-sannyāsa*.

Advaita holds that perfection or liberation from bondage can be attained *here and now* provided one makes oneself fit for that by treading the path prescribed by scripture and following the guidance of a competent teacher. A person who attains liberation, while being alive, is called a *jīvanmukta*, the liberated-in-life. The rise of right knowledge marks the end of *avidyā* and the empirical condition caused by it. A person gets liberated the moment he attains the saving knowledge. It does not matter how we characterize the goal. We may speak of it in terms of ‘the setting of *avidyā* (*avidyāstamaya*), or in terms of the attainment of knowledge, or liberation. *Jīvanmukti* is the state in which a person remains in one’s own natural condition as the Self or Brahman. It is, therefore, spoken of as ‘*svātmanyavasthānam*’,³¹ ‘*brāhumīsthiti*’,³² ‘*brahma-nirvāṇam*’,³³ and so on. A *jīvanmukta*, though tenanted a body from the standpoint of others who view him, is indeed free from the body. Being bodiless, neither pleasure nor pain touches him. So the condition of *jīvanmukti* is

described as the disembodied state (*aśarīratvam*).³⁴ A person who has regained his original state of bodilessness natural to the Self will be “steady in wisdom” (*sthitaprajña*) and will be in the world, without the sense of “I” and “mine” and without tomtoming to others what he is, like an insensible object, as Gauḍapāda puts it (*jaḍavat lokamācaret*).³⁵ He has no limitations whatsoever. He is, in the words of Radhakrishnan, a personality without frontiers. There are many *śruti* texts which lend support to this doctrine of *jīvanmukti*.³⁶ The Advaita conception of *jīvanmukti* is unique. It differs from the Sāṅkhya and the Śaiva Siddhānta view in this regard. The *Jīvanmukta* is spoken of as having attained *videhamukti* when the body, which continues for some time due to *prārabdhakarma*, or *prārabdhakarma-saṃskāra*, or *avidyā-leśa*, though it has already ceased to exist for him, falls off.

NOTES:

1. See the “Song of Creation,” *Rgveda*, 10.129.
2. *Brahma-sūtra*, 1.4.22.
3. *Ibid.*, 4.3.7.
4. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-upaniṣad-bhāṣya-vārttika*, 1.4.402: “*yayā yayā bhavetpumsām vyutpattiḥ pratyagātmani, sā saiva prakriyeha syāt sādhvī sā cānavasthitā.*”

5. See *Vedāntakalpalatikā*, ed., R.D. Karmarkar, Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona, 1962, p.2, verse 4.
6. What Gauḍapāda calls *bhūtadarśana* refers to the standpoint of *vidyā*, and what he calls *yuktidarśana* refers to the standpoint of *avidyā*, See his *Māṇḍūkya-kārikā*, 4.25.
7. Śāṅkara's commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra*, 1.1.11.
8. The *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad* contains a detailed study of experience at all the three levels, both from the individual (*vyastī*) and cosmic (*samaṣṭī*) points of view.
9. Śāṅkara discusses the nature of *adhyāsa* in detail before commencing his commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra*. This famous introductory part of his commentary is called *adhyāsa-bhāṣya*.
10. See Śāṅkara's *adhyāsa-bhāṣya*: "*adhyāso nāma atasmims-tadbuddhiḥ iti avocāma*."
11. Speaking of *adhyāsa* towards the close of his *adhyāsa-bhāṣya*, Śāṅkara observes: "In this way there goes on this *adhyāsa* (superimposition) which is natural, which is beginningless and endless, which appears in the form of erroneous conception, which is the cause of the *jīvas* appearing as agents and enjoyers, and which is experienced by every one."
12. Gauḍapāda says in the *Māṇḍūkya-kārikā*, 2.12: "*kalpayati ātmanā ātmānam ātmā devah svamāyayā*", and in 3.19: "*māyayā bhidythe hi etat anyathā ajam kathaṅcana*."
13. Ibid., 4.58: "*sā ca māyā na vidyate*."

14. See his commentary on the *Bhagavad-gītā*, 18.66.
15. See Sureśvara's *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi, sambandhokti* at the commencement of chapter III.
16. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, 4.3.22. See in this connection Śaṅkara's commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra*, 4.1.3. towards the close, beginning with the sentence, "prākprabodhāt samsāritvābhyupagamāt" till "isyata eva asmābhiḥ śruterapi abhāvah prabodhe."
17. *Taittirīya Upaniṣad*, 2.4.5.
18. *Ibid.*, 2.4.1.
19. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, 2.4.3.
20. See Śaṅkara's commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra*, 1.1.2: "śrutyaiva ca sahāyatvena tarkasya abhyupetatvāt." Also see the concluding sentence in his commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra*, 1.1.1: "So the first *sūtra* proposes, with a view to an inquiry into Brahman, a disquisition of the Vedānta texts, to be carried on with the help of *tarka* not opposed to it, and having for its aim the highest good."
21. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, 3.9.26. See Śaṅkara's commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra*, 1.1.4.
22. See *Māṇḍūkya-karikā*, 4.74: "ajah kalpitasamvṛtyā paramārthena nāpi ajah."
23. *Ibid.* 1.17-18. "prapañco yadi vidyeta nivarteta na saṁśayaḥ māyā-mātramidaṁ dvaitaṁ advaitaṁ paramārthataḥ." "upadeśādayaṁ vādaḥ jñāte dvaitaṁ na vidyate."
24. *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, 6.2.1.
25. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, 2.5.19.

26. *Māṇḍūkya-kārikā*, 3.18.
27. See his commentary on the *Bhagavad-gītā*, 13.13: “*tathā hi sampradāyavidām vacanam adhyāropa-apavādābhyām niṣprapañcam prapañcyate.*”
28. *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, 6.2.1. and 6.2.3.
29. *Māṇḍūkya-kārikā*, 2.32.
30. *Ibid.*, 1.16.
31. See Śaṅkara’s introduction to the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad*: “*ato avidyā-nivṛttau svātmanyavasthānam paraprāptih.*”
32. *Bhagavad-gītā*, 2.2.
33. *Ibid.*, 5.24; 5.26.
34. See *Kaṭha Upaniṣad*, 1.2.22. Also see Śaṅkara’s commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra*, 1.1.4.
35. *Māṇḍūkya-kārikā*, 2.36.
36. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, 4.4.6: “*brahmaiva san brahmāpyeti.*” Also, *Kaṭha Upaniṣad*, 2.2.1: “*vimuktaśca vimucyate*”.



THE NATURE OF ERRONEOUS COGNITION

[According to Kavitārṅkikacakravartī
Nṛsiṃhabhaṭṭopādhyāya.]

S. Revathy

In order to account for the nature of the world, Advaitins adopt the theory known as *vivartavāda* according to which the world is an illusory appearance of Brahman — the only Reality. They explain this position on the analogy of the illusory appearance or erroneous cognition of silver upon a shell. Erroneous cognition is termed *adhyāsa*. Śrī Śaṅkara in his celebrated introduction to his commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra* defines *adhyāsa* thus:

atasmin tadbuddhiḥ

When viewed in the light of this definition, the cognition of silver that appears in a shell can be proved to be erroneous in nature. In the substratum, namely, the this-element of shell, there is the total non-existence of silver. Yet it appears therein. The cognition of silver, therefore, is erroneous.

Śrī Śāṅkara has given a detailed definition of *adhyāsa* in such a way that it would cover both the erroneous cognition and its content. The definition runs as follows:

smṛtirūpaḥ paratra pūrvadr̥ṣṭāvābhāsaḥ

Herein the expressions *paratra* and *avabhāsaḥ* alone serve as the definition of *adhyāsa*. The other expressions *smṛtirūpaḥ* and *pūrvadr̥ṣṭa* are intended to elucidate it further.¹

The word *avabhāsaḥ* may be interpreted as that which is manifested, namely, silver.² The word *paratra* means the substratum wherein it does not really exist.³ Thus this interpretation of the above definition of *adhyāsa* is applicable to the content of erroneous cognition, namely, silver which appears in shell where it is not really present.

It might be said that it is only the silver which is being remembered on seeing the glitter-aspect of shell that is manifested in the shell, and as such the content of erroneous cognition is real. To disprove this contention the expression *smṛtirūpaḥ* is given. The word *smṛtiḥ* in this expression means 'that which is remembered', namely, the real silver. And the expression *smṛtirūpaḥ* as a whole means 'that which

is similar to the one that is remembered. Thus the object of erroneous cognition is *similar* to the one that is remembered.⁴ When it is said that the silver which is the content of erroneous cognition is *similar* to the one that is remembered, a clear distinction between what is superimposed and what is remembered is made out. And so the content of the erroneous cognition is not real.

The similarity between the object superimposed and the one that is recollected is explained by the expression — *pūrvadr̥ṣṭa*. The word *dr̥ṣṭa* means direct knowledge. The silver that is remembered and the silver that is the content of erroneous cognition do appear on the basis of the prior experience of silver through the latent impression left out by the latter. He who has not seen silver earlier cannot remember it; nor could he have the erroneous cognition of it. He may have the erroneous cognition of shell as a bright substance but he may not be able to identify it as silver as he does not have the latent impression of silver owing to the absence of the prior experience of silver. It is to emphasise that latent impression of silver which would arise only from the prior experience of silver is necessary to have the erroneous cognition of silver or the recollection of it, the expression *pūrvadr̥ṣṭa* is given. The similarity between the object

superimposed and the one that is recollected consists in this that both are the content of the cognition arising from latent impression.⁵

It might be said: silver is said to be the content of the cognition that arises from latent impression. In that case that cognition could only be recollection, as that which arises from latent impression is only recollection. Consequently its object, namely, silver too is only *remembered* and is not the one that is *similar* to what is remembered.

The above objection is answered by saying that recollection arises only from latent impression, while erroneous cognition arises not only from latent impression but also from the knowledge of the substratum in its general aspect as 'this' and defect either in the substratum or in the sense-organ. We shall explain this in some detail:

1. In order that there may be the superimposition of silver upon shell, what is required is the knowledge of shell in its general aspect as 'this'. If one has the knowledge of shell in its specific aspect as shell, then there is no possibility of mistaking it for silver.

The knowledge of the substratum in its general nature may arise from contact of defective sense-

organ as in the present case. But there are instances of superimposition such as dream objects and mind upon the consciousness associated with *avidyā*. The latter which is the substratum must be known. And its knowledge cannot be had from sense-contact as the consciousness conditioned by *avidyā* transcends sense-contact. But, being self-luminous, it manifests of its own accord in its general aspect as mere consciousness. It is not manifest in its specific aspect as non-dual consciousness as it is veiled by *avidyā*. Hence the condition of superimposition of an object upon a substratum is that the latter must be known in its general aspect either through sense-contact or of its own accord.

2. The cognition of the substratum in its general aspect through sense-contact would arise only when there is defect in the sense-organ like defective eyesight. It must be noted here that this condition is applicable only in those cases where the substratum of superimposition can come within the range of sense-contact. It is not applicable in the cases of superimposition of mind, etc., upon the consciousness conditioned by *avidyā*, as the latter transcends sense-contact.

Defect in the substratum of superimposition too is the cause of superimposition. Silver is not superimposed on a rope but only upon a shell. This shows that there must be some similarity between the substratum of superimposition and the object superimposed. And the similar feature common to both in the case of shell-silver illusion is brightness. And it is this similarity that is characterized as defect in the substratum of superimposition. Here also it should be noted that similarity does not pervade all cases of superimposition. In the case of superimposition of mind upon the consciousness conditioned by *avidyā* or of yellow colour upon the conch, or blue colour upon space, we do not have any similar feature common to the ground of superimposition and the object superimposed.

We have already stated that latent impression is the cause of superimposition. Besides this, as we have explained now, defect in the substratum of superimposition and also in the sense-organ and the knowledge of the substratum in its general aspect constitute its cause. Thus since superimposition or erroneous cognition of silver does not arise only from latent impression, the content of erroneous cognition is different from what is recollected. But since latent impression too plays a vital role in the rise of the

erroneous cognition, the content of the latter is said to be similar to the one that is recollected.

To sum up this part of the discussion: in a piece of shell there arises the erroneous cognition of silver on the strength of the cognition of shell in its general aspect due to contact with defective eye-sight and also of the latent impression of silver. The content of the erroneous cognition too must be admitted to be caused by the above factors. And it conforms to the definition of *adhyāsa*, namely, that which is manifested in a substratum wherein it does not exist. This fact is explained by the two expressions *smṛtirūpaḥ* and *pūrvadr̥ṣṭa*.⁶ Silver is similar to the one that is recollected and it appears due to latent impression born out of prior experience in a substratum wherein it does not exist.⁷

We have so far shown that the definition of *adhyāsa* is applicable to the content of erroneous cognition. It is applicable to the erroneous cognition too. It is thus: erroneous cognition (of silver) is a kind of knowledge (*avabhāsaḥ*); it is similar to recollection (*smṛtirūpaḥ*) and it arises owing to latent impression born out of the prior experience (of silver) [*pūrvadr̥ṣṭaḥ*] and it comprehends an object in a substratum where it does not exist (*paratra*).⁸

From the above it follows that the definition of *adhyāsa*, namely, *smṛtirūpaḥ paratra pūrvadr̥ṣṭāvabhāsaḥ* is applicable in respect of both the erroneous cognition and its content.

The content — silver is characterized as *anīrvacanīya*, that is, indeterminable either as real or as an absolute nothing. That alone is real which is not sublated in the three divisions of time. The silver that appears in a shell is sublated by the subsequent cognition of the form 'Here is not silver'. Hence it cannot be real. An absolute nothing is that which is never presented in a cognition. But silver appears in the cognition 'This is silver'. Hence it is not an absolute nothing. It cannot be real and an absolute nothing at once, because it is a discrepant notion. Hence it is designated as something different from either real or an absolute nothing.⁹

Silver is only occasionally presented in a shell. Hence its material cause must be referred to. The latter must obviously be of the same order as silver — the effect. This means that it must also be indeterminable. It is modal ignorance or *tūlājñāna* present in the consciousness conditioned by the shell that is misapprehended. In the case of the superimposition of mind upon the consciousness, it is

primal nescience or *mūlājñāna* present in the consciousness. that serves as the material cause.

According to the Advaitins, when a shell is mistaken for silver, for instance, what happens is this: when a defective sense of sight comes into contact with the shell in front, mind also comes out through the sense of sight, reaches the place of the object and undergoes modification in the form of 'this' and not in the form of shell because of defect in the sense of sight. Now the three delimiting conditions of consciousness, namely, mind, its modification and the object are located in one and the same place and as such the consciousness delimited by all the three is one and the same. This accounts for the immediate nature of the cognition 'this' and also of the object 'this'.

Then, owing to latent impression aided by imperfect vision and owing to the similarity between 'this, and silver, the *tūlājñāna* present in the consciousness conditioned by the 'this-element' undergoes transformation into an object of the form of silver and into an apparent cognition of silver of the form 'This is silver'. The latter is a cognitive modification of *avidyā*. Thus Advaitins regard

erroneous cognition as a complex consisting of two cognitive factors, one of them being a mode of mind in the form 'this' and the other being a mode of *avidyā* in the form 'This is silver'.¹⁰

Now an objection is raised: in order that there may be the erroneous cognition of silver upon the shell, the perceptual knowledge of the general aspect of shell as 'this' is required. Knowledge, according to Advaita, is only the mode of mind or the mental state in the form of an object inspired by the reflection of consciousness in it. And it becomes perceptual when it becomes identical with the consciousness conditioned by the object. Such an identity is possible only when the *tūlājñāna* present in the consciousness conditioned by the object is removed. And *tūlājñāna* will be removed by the mental state in the form of object. Thus in order that there may be the perceptual knowledge of shell as 'this', removal of *tūlājñāna* by the mental state in the form of 'this' is necessary .. And if *tūlājñāna* is removed, there cannot be the rise of silver and the cognition of it; for, *tūlājñāna* is the cause of the latter. If *tūlājñāna* is not removed, then perceptual knowledge of shell as 'this' is impossible. As a result there cannot be the erroneous cognition of silver.

The above difficulty can be overcome by admitting a distinction within the substratum as *ādhāra* and *adhiṣṭhāna*. The element which appears in the erroneous cognition as related to the superimposed object is termed *ādhāra*; and the element whose misapprehension leads to the presentation of something else in its place is *adhiṣṭhāna*. In the case of shell-silver illusion, it is the this-element of shell that appears in relation to the superimposed object — silver and so it is the *ādhāra*. The misapprehension of shell in its specific aspect consisting of black exterior, triangular form, etc., leads to the apprehension of silver and so the specific aspect of shell is termed *adhiṣṭhāna*. Now the *tūlājñāna* present in the specific aspect of shell, that is, the *adhiṣṭhāna* is the material cause of silver. It is not removed by the mental state in the form 'this'. The *tūlājñāna* present in the *ādhāra*, that is, the consciousness conditioned by the general aspect of the shell is removed by the mental state in the form 'this' thereby leading to the perceptual knowledge of 'this' — the general nature of the substratum. Hence there is no impossibility as regards the rise of the erroneous cognition of silver.¹¹ It may be added here that the distinction of the substratum into *ādhāra* and

adhiṣṭhāna was first made by Sarvajñātman in his *Samkṣepaśārīraka*.¹²

Appayyadīkṣita records the view of some other preceptors who do not favour the admission of two *tūlājñāna*-s, one present in the consciousness conditioned by the general aspect of shell and the other, in the consciousness conditioned by the specific aspect of it. They are of the view that the erroneous cognition of the form 'This is silver' involves reference to the identity between the this-element and silver and hence it is but proper to hold that it is only the 'this-element' that serves as the substratum of silver. Consequently there is only one *tūlājñāna* present in the consciousness conditioned by the 'this-element' of the shell. When the mental state of the form of 'this' arises, it is only the *āvarāṇa*-phase of the *tūlājñāna* that is removed and the *vikṣepa*-phase of it continues to exist. It is this *vikṣepa*-phase that serves as the material cause of silver and its cognition. Hence, according to this view, the material cause of silver and its cognition is the *vikṣepa*-phase of the *tūlājñāna* present in the consciousness conditioned by the this-element of the shell and it is not removed by the mode of mind in the form of 'this'. The *āvarāṇa*-phase of the *tūlājñāna*, however, is removed thus enabling the manifestation of the shell in its general aspect. It is the

latter that serves as the efficient cause of the rise of silver and its cognition.¹³

The preceptor Kavitārkkikacakravarti Nṛsimha-bhaṭṭopādhyāya at this stage argues that in cases of erroneous cognitions there are not two cognitive modes — one of the nature of the mode of mind in the form of 'this' which arises earlier and another of the nature of the mode of *avidyā* in the form 'This is silver' that arises subsequently. On the other hand, there is only one cognitive mode of the form 'This is silver' and it is only a mode of mind. It is thus: the *tūlājñāna* that is present in the consciousness conditioned by the 'this-element' of the shell becomes efficacious in giving rise to its effect when there is the contact of defective sense of sight with the shell. In the next moment, it gets itself transformed into silver. At the same time there arises the cognitive mode of mind in the form 'this'. This cognitive mode of mind comprehends the 'this-element' as associated with silver that has arisen along with it. And the cognition 'This is silver' is a single mode of mind.¹⁴ Since there does not arise the initial mode of mind in the form of 'this', the question whether it removes the *tūlājñāna* present in the consciousness conditioned by the 'this-element' or not does not arise at all.¹⁵

It follows from the above that according to Kavitārka the whole of the erroneous cognition of the form 'This is silver' is only a mode of mind. This is against the prevalent view in Advaita according to which erroneous cognitions of the above kind consist of two cognitive modes, one of the mode of mind referring to 'this' and another of the mode of *avidyā* referring to the identity of the 'this-element' and silver. It may be added here that those who admit the mode of mind in the form 'this' are known as *dharmijñāna-kāraṇa-vādin-s* as according to them the consciousness reflected in the mode of mind in the form 'this' is the cognition of the substratum in its general aspect and it serves as the cause of erroneous cognition of silver in the form 'This is silver'. Further according to them the consciousness conditioned by the 'this-element' becomes free from the veil of *tūlājñāna* by the operation of the mode of mind in the form 'this'. And the cognition of the form 'This is silver' is of the nature of that consciousness. It is *sākṣī-pratīti*. According to Kavitārka, it is the contact of defective sense with the substratum that is the cause of erroneous cognition. And the cognition of the form 'This is silver' is of the nature of the mode of mind.¹⁶

Kavitārkika rejects the contention of the *dharmi-jñāna-kāraṇa-vādin*-s by stating that the mode of mind in the form 'this' is not given in experience. It is not to be assumed on the strength of the effect, namely, erroneous cognition too. Nor is it to be admitted on the basis of the presence of certain causal factors. In other words, it is not *anubhavasiddha* or *kāryakalpya* or *sāmagrīkalpya*.¹⁷ We shall explain his position, the position of the *dharmi-jñāna-kāraṇa-vādin*-s and Acyutakṛṣṇānanda's critical appraisal of Kavitārkika's position.

Kavitārkika states that the mode of mind in the form of 'this' is not given in experience, as no one has the experience of a duality of cognition as 'this' and 'This is silver.'¹⁸

Kavitārkika then proceeds to say that the mode of mind in the form of 'this' need not be assumed on the strength of the effect, namely, erroneous cognition. It is thus: *dharmi-jñāna-kāraṇa-vādin* is of the view that there arises the erroneous cognition of silver, only when there is the contact of defective sense with the object in front and not otherwise. This contact gives rise to the knowledge of the general nature of the object as 'this'. Then there results the erroneous cognition of silver. This means that the mode of mind

in the form of 'this' is an essential condition for the subsequent rise of the erroneous cognition.

Kavitārkika rejects the above contention by stating that it is easier to assume that the contact of defective sense itself is the cause of the erroneous cognition in the form 'This is silver'. We need not assume that from such a contact there arises the mode of mind in the form 'this' which is the *dharmi-jñāna* and that it serves as the cause of erroneous cognition.¹⁹

It might be said that contact of sense organ does not pervade all cases of erroneous cognitions, but the *dharmi-jñāna* does so. In the case of erroneous cognition of mind upon the consciousness conditioned by *avidyā*, there can be no sense-contact with the latter. Yet, since it is manifested of its own accord by being self-luminous, we have the *dharmi-jñāna* and hence there is the erroneous cognition of mind upon it. From this it follows that *dharmi-jñāna* covers all cases of erroneous cognition, while contact of sense is not so. This means that prior to the rise of the erroneous cognition, one must have the knowledge of the substratum — *dharmi-jñāna* which is the mode of mind in the form 'this'.²⁰

Kavitārkika argues that if the consciousness conditioned by *avidyā* could manifest of it its own

accord and thereby serves as the cause of the erroneous cognition of mind upon it, then the consciousness conditioned by the 'this element' of the shell too can manifest of its own accord and thus serve as the cause of the erroneous cognition of silver. This means that the contact of sense-organ with the 'this-element' of shell is not at all necessary and so even prior to such a contact there could arise the erroneous cognition of silver. This, however, is not the case.²¹

The *dharmi-jñāna kāraṇa-vādin* might say that in the case of the erroneous cognition of an apparently real object like shell-silver, the substratum, namely, the consciousness conditioned by the 'this-element' is veiled by *tūlājñāna* and so there is not the manifestation of the above consciousness. In order that there may be the manifestation of the latter, what is required is the removal of *tūlājñāna*. The latter can take place only when there arises the mode of mind in the form this, which, in turn, would arise only when there is sense-contact. Hence there is no possibility of the rise of the erroneous cognition of silver prior to sense-contact with the 'this-element' of shell. It comes to this: because of contact of the defective sense of sight with shell, there arises the mode of mind in the form 'this' which, through the removal of *tūlājñāna*, attains to the state of the direct knowledge

of the substratum — ‘this’ (*dharmi-jñāna*). The latter serves as the cause of the erroneous cognition of silver. Thus *dharmi-jñāna* or the mode of mind in the form of ‘this’ is an essential condition of the erroneous cognition of apparently real objects like silver.²²

Kavitārīkika is of the view that the above rule that *dharmi-jñāna* which results from sense-contact is essential for the rise of the erroneous cognition of the apparently real objects like silver lacks correspondence in the cases of the erroneous cognition of conch as yellow in colour.²³ It is thus: according to the theory that *dharmi-jñāna* of the form of the mode of mind inspired by the reflection of consciousness in it is the cause of the erroneous cognition of apparently real objects, there arises first, because of sense-contact, the mode of mind in the form ‘this’ which removes the *tūlājñāna* present in the consciousness conditioned by the ‘this-element’. The consciousness is manifested thereby and there is then the erroneous cognition of an object.²⁴

In the case of the erroneous cognition of a conch as yellow, the question arises whether the mode of mind in the form of ‘this’ that arises from sense-contact comprehends the mere conch, or the conch as associated with white colour or the conch as

associated with yellow colour.²⁵ The first alternative does not hold good because there could be no visual mode of mind in the form of a colourless entity. For, otherwise there could arise a visual mental state or mode of mind in the form of air too.²⁶

The second alternative too does not hold good. If the conch is cognized as associated with white colour, then there is no possibility of the rise of the erroneous cognition of yellow colour.²⁷ It cannot also be said that the conch is cognized as associated with yellow colour. It is because, according to the *dharmi-jñāna-kāraṇa-vādin* who maintains two cognitive modes, conch as associated with yellow colour is the content of the second mode which is the mode of *avidyā*. If it is comprehended by the first cognitive mode itself which is the mode of mind, then there would be no need for a second cognitive mode. Thus in the erroneous cognition of the form of 'The conch is yellow' we cannot maintain the initial cognitive mode in the form 'this'.²⁸ Thus the rule that *dharmi-jñāna* that results from sense-contact is essential for the rise of the erroneous cognition of apparently real objects like silver lacks correspondence in the case of erroneous cognition of conch as yellow in colour.

The *dharmi-jñāna-kāraṇa-vādin* might say that within the fold of the erroneous cognition of apparently real objects, it is only in respect of shell-silver, *dharmi-jñāna* is admitted to be the cause and not in respect of yellow colour in the conch. Hence *dharmi-jñāna* is necessary to account for the rise of the erroneous cognition of certain apparently real objects.²⁹

Kavitārka rejects the above contention by pointing out that if *dharmi-jñāna* is not admitted to be the cause of the erroneous cognition of conch as yellow, then one must admit that the contact of defective sense at least is its cause. Otherwise there would arise the contingency of the rise of such an erroneous cognition even prior to the sense-contact.³⁰ Hence it is better to assume on the basis of parsimony that in respect of all erroneous cognitions of apparently real objects it is only the contact of defective sense that is the cause.³¹ *Dharmi-jñāna* is not, therefore, necessary.

Acyutakṛṣṇānanda is of the view that it is not correct to say that it is only the contact of defective sense with the substratum is the cause of the erroneous cognition of all apparently real objects. It is because there are instances of erroneous cognitions

such as dream objects which are apparently real wherein we have only the direct knowledge of the substratum — the consciousness conditioned by *avidyā*. There cannot be sense-contact with it as it transcends sense-contact. The direct knowledge of the substratum, however, is due to its self-luminous nature. From this it follows that *dharmi-jñāna* is essential for the rise of the erroneous cognition of all apparently real objects. In the case of the erroneous cognition of apparently real objects like silver too, the contact of defective sense with the substratum is useful in giving rise to the mode of mind which reveals the substratum, namely, the consciousness conditioned by the 'this-element' of the shell by removing the *tūlajñāna* present in it. And it is the mode of mind inspired by the reflection of such a consciousness is known as *dharmi-jñāna* or the knowledge of the substratum in its general nature. Thus while contact of defective sense does not pervade all cases of erroneous cognitions of apparently real objects, *dharmi-jñāna* does so. Hence *dharmi-jñāna* is the essential condition of erroneous cognitions of all apparently real objects.³²

Kavitārkika might say that *dharmi-jñāna* too does not pervade all cases of erroneous cognitions of apparently real objects, as in the case of the erroneous

cognition of conch as yellow we cannot have it as explained earlier. We can have only sense-contact with the substratum and it gives rise to the cognition of yellow colour.³³

Acyutakṛṣṇānanda disproves the contention of Kavītārkika set forth in the above paragraph. He argues that even in the case of the erroneous cognition of conch as yellow in colour, one can maintain the contact of defective sense and the mode of mind in the form of conch that results from it. It is thus: just as the specific features of the shell, namely, black exterior, etc., are not comprehended by the sense of sight prior to the illusory cognition of silver, in the same way, because of defect in the sense of sight, the white colour of the conch is not comprehended prior to the cognition of yellow colour in it. In order that an object may be comprehended by the sense of sight, what is essential is that that object must possess colour. Air does not come within the range of sense of sight because it does not possess colour. But it is not an invariable rule that the colour that is present in the object must become the content of the mode of mind that arises through the function of sense of sight. In the case of the conch, it possesses white colour and hence it comes within the range of sense of sight. But due to defect in the sense of sight, the white colour is veiled

and the conch alone is comprehended. This view is advocated by Vacaspatimísra in his *Bhāmatī*.³⁴

Acyutakṛṣṇānanda further states that the rise of the mode of mind in the form of conch prior to the rise of the cognition of yellow colour in it can be explained in another way too. The sense of sight comes into contact with the conch and there arises the mode of mind in the form of conch as associated with white colour. Yet the defect in the sense of sight is the factor that prevents the comprehension of the class-characteristic — whiteness that is present in the white colour. Thus there arises the mode of mind in the form of conch. The white colour of it is either veiled or the whiteness present in the white colour is not comprehended because of defect in the sense of sight. It is this mode of mind when inspired by the reflection of consciousness in it is the knowledge of the substratum, that is, the *dharmi-jñāna*.³⁵ And it serves as the cause of the erroneous cognition of yellow colour in the conch. The erroneous cognition is only the mode of *avidyā*. When it is thus clear that *dharmi-jñāna*, through contact of defective sense of sight, can be had even in the case of the erroneous cognition of conch as yellow, it is only in a superficial manner Kavitārkika has said that one cannot have *dharmi-jñāna* therein.³⁶ It follows from this that *dharmi-jñāna*

which is only the cognitive mode of mind in the form of the substratum is there in all cases of erroneous cognitions; and so the question whether *tūlājñāna* present in the consciousness conditioned by the substratum is removed by it or not does arise.

The *dharmi-jñāna-kāraṇa-vādin* emphasizes the need for *dharmi-jñāna* as the cause of erroneous cognition in a different manner thus: erroneous cognition of conch as yellow does not require the knowledge of similarity between the conch and the yellow colour—its substratum and content. But erroneous cognition of shell-silver does stand in need of the knowledge of similarity between the ‘this-element’—the general aspect of the shell and silver—its substratum and content. The ‘this-element’ and silver are similar in this that they have the common feature of brightness. One cannot have the knowledge of similarity between the above two unless one has the knowledge of the latter. Thus the knowledge of similarity presupposes the knowledge of the substratum which is *dharmi-jñāna*. The latter thus is essential in order to have the erroneous cognition of the apparently real object like silver.³⁷

If it is said by Kavitārka that it is merely the contact of defective sense that is the cause of the

erroneous cognition of shell-silver, then there could arise the erroneous cognition of silver even upon a cinder when the latter is in contact with a defective sense-organ.³⁸

Kavitārkika argues that similarity is admitted to be the cause. But it is enough if it is merely present and it need not be known. Since in a cinder similarity with silver does not exist, there is no erroneous cognition of silver upon it. What Kavitārkika wants to emphasize is that similarity need not be known. The result is that one need not have the knowledge of the substratum as associated with the features common to the object that is superimposed. Hence there does not result the knowledge of the substratum or *dharmi-jñāna*.³⁹

The *dharmi-jñāna-kāraṇa-vādin* is of the view that if similarity were admitted to be the cause without being known, then there cannot be the erroneous cognition of an object on the basis of the delusion of similarity between the substratum and the content of erroneous cognition.⁴⁰ In order to have the delusion of similarity, the latter must be known and it is not enough if it is merely present.

The above view is illustrated thus: there is the erroneous cognition of a blue rocky surface upon the

distant expanse of the waters of the ocean. Water has white colour and so it is in no way similar to a blue rocky surface. Hence it must be held that it is on the basis of the delusion of similarity between the water and the blue rocky surface there is the erroneous cognition of the latter upon the former. If similarity were admitted to be the cause of erroneous cognition by being merely present and not by being known, then in the above case, since similarity is not present, there will be no erroneous cognition of a blue rocky surface upon water. But we do have such an erroneous cognition and it can be explained only by admitting that the substratum is falsely cognized to be blue in colour and it is on the basis of the assumed blue colour that is common to both the substratum, namely, water and the blue rocky surface there proceeds the erroneous cognition of blue rocky surface upon the water. This erroneous cognition is thus based upon the knowledge of similarity. The latter implies the knowledge of the substratum that has common features with the object superimposed. This is exactly the *dharmi-jñāna* and this serves as the cause of the erroneous cognition.⁴¹

Kavitārīkika states that even according to the view that *dharmi-jñāna* is the cause of erroneous cognition, the contact of defective sense must be admitted to be

the cause of *dharmi-jñāna*. Hence it could be said that the contact of defective sense itself is the cause of erroneous cognition.⁴²

The *dharmi-jñāna-kāraṇa-vādin* argues that *dharmi-jñāna* revives the latent impression of silver which is an auxiliary cause to the *tūlājñāna* — the material cause of shell-silver and thus is responsible for the rise of the indeterminable silver. If it is said that the contact of defective sense which gives rise to the *dharmi-jñāna* is the cause, then it is to be admitted as the cause in respect of the origination of indeterminable silver. This, however, is not sound. It is because contact, unlike knowledge, is never known to be the cause of the origination of an object. Hence *dharmi-jñāna* must be admitted to be the cause of the origination of silver and not mere contact.⁴³ Further it has already been said that if mere contact were the cause of erroneous cognition and not knowledge of similarity, there would arise the contingency of the erroneous cognition of silver upon a cinder.

Kavitārka is of the view that in order to explain the absence of the erroneous cognition of silver upon cinder with which there is sense-contact one need not admit that the knowledge of the substratum as possessing the qualities that are similar to the object

superimposed is the cause. We can very well say that it is the very nature of shell and not of cinder to be the substratum of silver. This is illustrated thus: there is the superimposition of blue colour on water only and not on pearls although both water and pearls are white. The reason is that it is the nature of water only and not of pearls to be the substratum of the erroneous cognition of blue colour. Thus, without depending upon the cognition of similarity, we can preclude the possibility of the rise of the erroneous cognition of silver upon cinder by stating that it is the innate nature of shell and not of cinder to be the substratum of the erroneous cognition of silver. *Dharmi-jñāna*, therefore, is not necessary.⁴⁴

The *dharmi-jñāna-kāraṇa-vādin* says that the above contention of Kavitārka is wrong on the following ground: in a piece of cloth as such there is no superimposition of a lotus bud. But the superimposition of that is seen on that form of cloth when the latter is fashioned into the form of a lotus bud by scissoring. From this it is known that the superimposition of an object conforms to the existence of the cognition of similarity between the substratum and the object of superimposition. It does not at all conform to the nature of the substratum. For, if that were the case, then in a piece of cloth prior to its being

fashioned into the form of a lotus bud, there would be the contingency of the superimposition of a lotus bud. Hence it must be held that superimposition is based not upon the innate nature of its substratum but on the cognition of similarity between the substratum and the object superimposed. The knowledge of similarity involves the knowledge of the substratum, that is, *dharmi-jñāna*. The latter is, therefore, necessary for the rise of superimposition or erroneous cognition.⁴⁵

Kavitārka rejects the contention of the *dharmi-jñāna-kāraṇa-vādin* thus: even on the view that the cognition of similarity is the cause of superimposition, its causality must be admitted only in respect of the superimpositions of silver, etc., which are obstructed by the cognition of the specific nature of the substratum.⁴⁶ This means that when there is the cognition of the specific nature of the shell there will not be the erroneous cognition of silver. The cognition of the specific nature of an object is opposed to either doubt or erroneous cognition in regard to that object. This is the view of Raghunātha Śiromaṇi set forth in his *Dīdhiti* on the *Anumitiprakaraṇa* of the *Tattvacintāmaṇi*.⁴⁷ And Kavitārka adopts this view.

The erroneous cognition of yellow colour in the conch is not at all obstructed by the cognition of the

specific nature of its substratum. There is the erroneous cognition of the form 'The conch is yellow', while we have the cognition of the specific nature of its substratum in the form 'This has conchness which is invariably related to the absence of yellow colour'. There exists no similarity between the conch and the yellow colour and so we cannot maintain that knowledge of similarity is the cause of erroneous cognition of this kind.⁴⁸

It follows from the above that the cognition of similarity could be admitted as the cause of those erroneous cognitions only which are obstructed by the cognition of the specific nature of their respective substratum. Kavitārka argues that when it is said that the cognition of the specific nature of the substratum serves as an obstruction, then it amounts to saying that the causal aggregate of the obstructing cognition too, as causal aggregate, is an obstruction. Hence we may say that an erroneous cognition of an object or its absence conforms to the non-existence or the existence of the causal aggregate of the cognition of its substratum. Hence there is no need for *dharmijñāna* in the form of 'this' prior to superimposition.⁴⁹

It may be added here that the view that the causal aggregate of an obstructing cognition, as causal

aggregate, is an obstruction is held by Gaṅgeśopādhyāya in his *Tattvacintāmaṇi*.⁵⁰ It is said in the latter text that the valid knowledge of the absence of *sādhya* — the thing that is sought to be established in the *pakṣa* — the subject of inference is the counteracting factor of the inferential knowledge of *sādhya* in the *pakṣa*. The valid knowledge that the *pakṣa* has the factor that is co-existent with the absence of *sādhya* is the cause of the valid knowledge that the *pakṣa* has the absence of *sādhya* — the valid knowledge that obstructs the inferential cognition of *sādhya* in the *pakṣa*. Thus the valid knowledge that the *pakṣa* has the factor that is co-existent with the absence of *sādhya*, as the cause of the cognition of the absence of *sādhya*, in the *pakṣa*, obstructs the inferential cognition of the presence of *sādhya* in the *pakṣa*.⁵¹

Kavitārka is of the view that when it is held that the causal aggregate of the obstructing cognition too is an obstruction, it is easier to explain the absence of erroneous cognition of silver upon a cinder without admitting the need for the knowledge of similarity that finally ends in *dharmi-jñāna*. It is thus: in the case of cinder, there is the causal aggregate of the cognition of its specific nature, namely, black colour. The causal aggregate in the present case is the mode of sense-

contact, namely, identity with what is in conjunction [*saṁyukta-tādātmya*]. The sense of sight is in conjunction with the cinder in which black colour exists through the relation of identity. It may be noted here that according to the Nyāya school, the mode of sense-contact in the present case would be inherence in what is in conjunction [*saṁyukta-samavāya*].⁵² The sense of sight is in conjunction with the cinder in which black colour exists through the relation known as *samavāya*. Advaitins who do not admit *samavāya*⁵³ admit an approximation to it in *tādātmya*.⁵⁴ Thus the causal aggregate of the cognition of the specific nature of cinder, namely, black colour serves as an obstruction as a result of which there is no superimposition of silver upon cinder.⁵⁵ Kavitārkika points out that even in the case of shell if there is the causal aggregate of the cognition of the specific nature of shell, namely, black exterior, then it serves as an obstruction and so there is no erroneous cognition of silver.⁵⁶ If, on the other hand, there is the causal aggregate of the cognition of brightness which is the common feature of both the shell and the silver, then there is the absence of the causal aggregate leading to the cognition of the specific nature of shell and so there is the superimposition of silver.⁵⁷

It might be said, the causal aggregate leading to the cognition of brightness of the shell is only identity with what is in conjunction [*samyukta-tādātmya*]. The sense of sight is in conjunction with the shell wherein brightness exists through the relation of identity. This causal aggregate is the same for the cognition of the specific nature of shell, namely, black colour too because the sense of sight is in conjunction with the shell wherein black colour exists through the relation of identity. Thus since the causal aggregate of the cognition of brightness of the shell that is conducive to the rise of the superimposition of silver and of the cognition of the specific nature of shell which is an obstructing factor of the above superimposition is one and the same, there is the unwelcome position of the absence of superimposition of silver even when there is the causal aggregate of the cognition of the brightness of the shell. But we do have the superimposition of silver when there is sense-contact with brightness of the shell. To get over this difficulty it must be held that the cognition of similarity, that is, of the feature of brightness, constitutes a defect and it is the cause of the superimposition. The causal aggregate leading to the cognition of the specific nature of the shell is impeded by the above defect and so there does not result the cognition of the specific nature of the shell. In the absence of the latter there

ensues the superimposition of silver. Thus to avoid the unwelcome position of the absence of the rise of the superimposition of silver even when there is sense-contact with the brightness-aspect of the shell, Kavītārīkika has to admit that the cognition of similarity serves as a defect and the sense-contact as associated with this defect is not efficacious in giving rise to the cognition of the specific nature of the shell. As a result there is the rise of the superimposition or erroneous cognition of silver. If cognition of similarity is admitted as a defect then we have the knowledge of the substratum too which is *dharmi-jñāna*. The latter, therefore, is necessary for the erroneous cognition of silver.⁵⁸

This part of the discussion may be summed up as follows: the mode of contact, namely, identity with what is in conjunction (*samyukta-tādātmya*) is the causal aggregate of both the cognition of brightness and the cognition of the specific nature of the shell which is the obstructing factor of the superimposition of silver. Thus when there is sense-contact with only that which is similar to silver, namely, brightness there is the superimposition of silver. But the latter could not arise as this sense-contact would give rise to the cognition of the specific nature of the shell which obstructs the rise of superimposition. To overcome

this difficulty, the *dharmi-jñāna-kāraṇa-vādin* has suggested that one must admit some defect by being associated with which this mode of sense-contact becomes ineffective in giving rise to the specific cognition of the shell and thus enables the rise of the superimposition of silver. This defect, according to the *dharmi-jñāna-kāraṇa-vādin*, is the knowledge of brightness that constitutes similarity to silver. The knowledge of similarity involves reference to the knowledge of the substratum — the *dharmi-jñāna*. *Dharmi-jñāna*, therefore, is necessary.

Kavitārka argues that it is true that some defect must be admitted and that defect is not knowledge of similarity as the *dharmi-jñāna-kāraṇa-vādin* thinks. It is only distance. Hence even as a defect the knowledge of similarity does not function as a cause. As a result there cannot be the knowledge of the substratum which is *dharmi-jñāna*.⁵⁹

Kavitārka makes his position explicit by stating that knowledge of similarity does not neutralize the function of the mode of sense-contact that gives rise to the cognition of the specific nature of shell. It is because after noticing silver one goes near and perceives the glittery-aspect that constitutes similarity to silver. At the same time one perceives the specific

nature of the shell too. From this it is clear that the cognition of similarity is not at all an obstacle to the causal aggregate of the cognition of the specific nature of the shell. Hence it must be said that the latter is rendered ineffective not by the cognition of similarity but by the defect, namely, distance.⁶⁰ Thus even without the knowledge of similarity there would be the superimposition of silver when the causal aggregate of the specific cognition is neutralized by the defect, namely, distance.

Kavitārkika proceeds to say that just as there is the superimposition of silver without the knowledge of similarity, there could be the superimposition of a blue rocky surface upon the distant expanse of the waters of the ocean. It is thus: in respect of the superimposition of a blue rocky surface upon the waters, the specific cognition of white colour of the water and that of watery expanse constitute the counteracting factors. Thus the causal aggregates leading to the above cognition too are the counteracting factors. It follows that the non-existence of the causal aggregates of the above two cognitions would lead to the superimposition of a blue rocky surface upon the waters of the ocean. The causal aggregate leading to the specific cognition of white colour of the water is the mode of contact, namely, the

identity with what is in conjunction (*samyukta-tādātmya*). The sense of sight is in contact with water wherein the white colour exists through the relation of identity.

The blue colour in the waters of the ocean is noticed not only from a distance but even when one goes near it. Hence there is some defect that invariably causes the superimposition of blue colour. It is this defect with which the causal aggregate is associated. As a result the causal aggregate ceases to be an obstructing factor of superimposition.

In the same way, because of the defect, namely, distance, the causal aggregate, namely, contact [*samyoga*] of sense of sight with the waters of the ocean that normally reveals the watery expanse to be an ocean is impeded. Hence this causal aggregate too which leads to the specific cognition of the ocean and thereby obstructs the erroneous cognition of it as a blue rocky surface is impeded. Thus the two causal aggregates lose their character of being obstructing factors and so there is the superimposition of blue rocky surface upon the waters of the ocean.⁶¹

In the same way, even without depending upon the knowledge of similarity one would explain the superimposition of a lotus bud upon the cloth which is

fashioned into that form by scissoring. It is thus: the causal aggregate of the specific cognition of the extended form of the cloth is the counteracting factor of the superimposition of a lotus bud. When the cloth is fashioned into the form of a lotus bud by scissoring, the causal aggregate of the extended form of the cloth which is the counteracting factor of the superimposition of a lotus bud is not present and hence there will be its superimposition. Thus there is no need for admitting the knowledge of similarity as the cause of the superimposition of a lotus bud.⁶²

Kavitārka concludes by saying that the knowledge of similarity is not the essential condition of superimposition. This means that one need not have the knowledge of the substratum of superimposition — *dharmi-jñāna* as possessing the features similar to the object superimposed. *Dharmi-jñāna* is not, therefore, necessary.

Acyutakṛṣṇānanda critically examines the position of Kavitārka. He says that Kavitārka is of the view that the knowledge of brightness that constitutes similarity to silver is noticed along with the knowledge of shell in its true nature when one goes near the shell-silver and so the former is not at all an obstacle to the causal aggregate of the specific

cognition of shell. He holds that it is only distance that serves as the defect. This position of Kavitārkika is not sound. It is because a person who is at a distance may perceive a shell as shell. It follows that distance does not always serve as an obstacle to the causal aggregate of the specific cognition of the shell. If it is argued that in respect of certain superimpositions, that too at certain times, distance serves as an obstacle to the causal aggregate of the specific cognition of an object, then knowledge of similarity too that exists in a flame causes the erroneous cognition of the form 'This is that flame'. It must be noted here that the flame is different at every moment and the cognition that the flame at a particular moment is the same as the one in the previous moment is certainly erroneous. What Acyutakṛṣṇānanda wants to emphasize is that knowledge of similarity too serves as the cause of superimpositions by serving as a defect and by leading to the knowledge of the substratum of superimposition [*dharmi-jñāna*].⁶³

In the same way, in the case of the erroneous cognition of a blue rocky surface upon the waters of the ocean, it is true as Kavitārkika thinks that the absence of the causal aggregates of the specific cognitions of the white colour and also of the watery expanse is required. But by this much alone there

cannot be the superimposition of a blue rocky surface upon the waters. On the other hand, it is only after acquiring the knowledge of similarity to the blue rocky surface owing to the delusion of blue colour and stationary nature in water, there results the above superimposition. That is why one who has such a superimposition when one is at a distance from the ocean says after drawing near to it thus: 'I had the erroneous cognition of the ocean as a blue rocky surface as it appeared similar to the latter by being blue in colour and stationary; now the erroneous cognition is removed'. Thus knowledge of similarity is the essential condition of this superimposition too.⁶⁴

Exactly similar consideration must be extended to the case of the superimposition of a lotus bud in a cloth that is fashioned into that form by scissoring. There is the experience and the corresponding expression in the form 'I had an erroneous cognition of this cloth as a lotus bud owing to its similarity to the latter: and, now it is removed'. This experience must be taken as the valid ground for establishing knowledge of similarity as the cause of specific kinds of erroneous cognitions. When once knowledge of similarity is established as the cause of erroneous cognition, *dharmi-jñāna* as the cause ensues as a matter of course.

The *dharmi-jñāna-kāraṇa-vādin* emphasizes the need for the knowledge of similarity as the cause of certain erroneous cognitions in the following way: the knowledge of similarity which results from the contact of sense of sight and which is therefore visual in character is the cause of the erroneous cognition of an object by providing the *dharmi-jñāna* and also by serving as a defect. In the same way, the knowledge of similarity which results from the contact of tactile sense and which is therefore tactual in nature is the cause of the erroneous cognition of certain objects. But, according to *Kavitārkika*, the knowledge of similarity is not accepted as the cause of any erroneous cognition whatsoever. It is only the contact of sense-organ that serves as the cause. This being the case, when there is the contact of tactile sense with a piece of iron held in one's hand, the essential condition of erroneous cognition, namely, sense-contact is present and so there must arise the erroneous cognition of the silver, but it does not.⁶⁵

Kavitārkika argues that there would arise the erroneous cognition of the silver in the above case too provided there exists the causal aggregate of the specific cognition that excludes copper, etc. If the latter exists, then there would arise the erroneous

cognition of copper too and there would then be doubt regarding the exact content of the erroneous cognition.

The *dharmi-jñāna-kāraṇa-vādin* points out that at times there is the absence of the erroneous cognition of silver too in respect of the piece of iron held in one's hand. This, however, is not possible in the view of Kavitārkika. It is because, according to him, sense-contact exists, and the causal aggregate of the specific cognition of iron is not present and so there must necessarily be the erroneous cognition of silver. The *dharmi-jñāna-kāraṇa-vādin*, however, could easily explain the absence of the erroneous cognition by attributing it to the absence of the knowledge of similarity which is the cause of erroneous cognition.⁶⁷

Kavitārkika answers the above objection by stating that according to the *dharmi-jñāna-kāraṇa-vādin* too there is the absence of the erroneous cognition of silver upon a shell when one goes near the shell although one has the knowledge of brightness that constitutes similarity to silver. From this it follows that the effect, namely, the erroneous cognition of silver does not exist when the cause, namely, the knowledge of similarity exists. In the same way, there can be the absence of the erroneous cognition of silver upon a piece of iron, when the cause, namely, sense-

contact exists. Hence knowledge of similarity which culminates in *dharmi-jñāna* need not be admitted as the cause of the erroneous cognition.⁶⁸

It may be added here that it is true that when one goes near the shell there is the absence of the cognition of silver. It is also true that one has the knowledge of brightness that constitutes similarity to silver at that time. But one has the experience in the form 'I had the mistaken notion of this piece of shell as silver on account of similarity between the two; and that mistaken notion is now removed'. This experience is the valid ground that proves that the knowledge of similarity is the cause of erroneous cognition.⁶⁹ It ends in *dharmi-jñāna* or the knowledge of the substratum in the form of 'this' which is only a cognitive mode of mind and which precedes the rise of the erroneous cognition of silver in the form 'This is silver' which is the cognitive mode of *avidyā*. Thus the cognitive mode of mind in the form of 'this' must be admitted on the strength of the effect, namely, the erroneous cognition. This is the view of the *dharmi-jñāna-kāraṇa-vādin*.

So far we have set forth the view of Kavītārka that the cognitive mode of mind in the form 'this' or *dharmi-jñāna* cannot be assumed on the strength of

the effect, namely, the erroneous cognition. We have also set forth Acyutakṛṣṇānanda's critical appraisal of Kavītārkika's position. Now we shall deal with Kavītārkika's view that the above cognitive mode of mind cannot be assumed on the strength of its cause, namely, sense-contact too. We shall also set forth Acyutakṛṣṇānanda's views on Kavītārkika's position.

Kavītārkika argues that the *dharmi-jñāna-kāraṇa-vādin* might say that *dharmi-jñāna* must be assumed prior to the cognition of silver, as its cause, namely, the sense-contact with the object in front exists. According to him the cognitive mode of mind that arises due to sense-contact is a valid cognition in the form of mere 'this' preceding the rise of the erroneous cognition in the form 'This is silver' which arises later and which is a cognitive mode of *avidyā*. This, however, is not correct. The cognitive mode of mind which arises due to sense-contact is of the form 'This is silver' and it is erroneous. It is thus: the efficient cause of the superimposition of silver is the contact of defective sense, and the material cause is the *tūlāvidyā* that is present in the consciousness conditioned by the 'this-element'. The *tūlāvidyā* becomes efficacious in giving rise to its effect when the defective sense comes into contact with the 'this-element'. During the next moment, it gets itself transformed into silver. At the

same time there arises the mode of mind in the form of 'this' too. This mode of mind comprehends the 'this-element' as associated with the silver that has arisen along with it. Thus the cognition 'This is silver' is erroneous and it is the cognitive mode of mind.⁷⁰

The *dharmi-jñāna-kāraṇa-vādin* might say that the contact of defective sense with the 'this-element' cannot give rise to the cognitive mode of mind in the form of silver on the following ground: in order that there may be the cognitive mode of mind in the form of silver, there must be sense-contact with it. But there could not be sense-contact. It is because silver is said to arise along with the mode of mind in the form 'this'. So prior to the rise of the latter, silver does not exist and hence there cannot be sense-contact with it. As a result, the cognitive mode of mind that arises because of the contact of defective sense with the 'this-element' cannot comprehend silver. Thus it is the absence of the cause of the rise of the cognitive mode of the form of silver that leads one to conclude that the cognitive mode of mind in the form of 'this' comprehends only the 'this element' that is the substratum of erroneous cognition.⁷¹

Kavitārkika rejects the contention of the *dharmi-jñāna-kāraṇa-vādin* thus: the contact of defective

sense with the 'this-element' can very well be the cause of the cognitive mode that would comprehend silver too.⁷²

It might be said that if the contact of sense with a particular object could give rise to the mode of mind in respect of another object, then by the contact of sense with pot there may arise the mode of mind in the form of cloth.⁷³

Kavitārka argues that it must be assumed that in order that there may be the mode of mind in respect of a particular object—silver, what is necessary is that silver or the substratum where in silver exists through the relation of identity must come into contact with the defective sense. In the present case, the this-element is the substratum wherein silver exists through the relation of identity. The 'this-element' comes into contact with the defective sense. And so there arises the mode of mind in the form of silver too. In the case of pot which is in contact with the sense-organ, there cannot arise the mode of mind in the form of cloth, as pot is not the substratum wherein cloth exists through the relation of identity. It comes to this; silver exists through the relation of identity in the 'this-element' which is in contact with the defective sense. And the mode of mind that arises in the form of 'this'

comprehends silver too. Hence there results the cognitive mode of mind in the form 'This is silver' and it is erroneous in nature.⁷⁴

Kavitārka further states that silver although is not in direct contact with the sense of sight is to be admitted as the content of the mode of mind that arises from such a contact as there is the experience of the form 'I perceive the silver with the sense of sight'.⁷⁵

The *dharmi-jñāna-kāraṇa-vādin* is of the view that the above experience is intelligible even otherwise. And he seeks to establish that the contact of sense of sight with the 'this-element' gives rise to the cognitive mode of mind in the form of 'this' only and not in the form of silver too. It is thus: according to the view that the apparently real silver is the content of the mode of mind that arises from sense-organ, one must assume that the contact of defective sense with a particular object, namely, 'this' gives rise to the mode of mind in the form of another object too, namely, silver. Further sense-contact which is well-known as the cause of cognition only is to be admitted as the cause of the origination of silver too. These two assumptions are quite unwarranted.⁷⁶

It might be asked: if sense-contact is not the cause of the erroneous cognition of silver, then what else could be conceived as its cause?

The *dharmi-jñāna-kāraṇa-vādin* states that by the contact of sense-organ there arises the cognitive mode of mind in the form of 'this'. It too is an efficient cause in respect of the erroneous cognition of silver. The *tūlājñāna* rendered effective by the mode of mind in the form of 'this' transforms itself into the form of silver. For the latter, the consciousness conditioned by the 'this-element' which is revealed by the mode of mind in the form of 'this' is the substratum. Thus silver is manifested by the consciousness-element which is known as *sākṣī*. Since the cognitive mode of mind which is the efficient cause is occasional, the erroneous cognition of silver too is occasional.⁷⁷

It might be said that if the shell-silver is manifested by the consciousness conditioned by the 'this-element', then how can we account for the experience of its being an object of the sense of sight in the form 'I see the silver with the sense of sight'.⁷⁸

The *dharmi-jñāna-kāraṇa-vādin* states that the consciousness conditioned by the 'this-element' is the manifesting factor of the shell-silver. And in order that the consciousness may be manifested what is required

is the mode of mind in the form 'this'. The latter arises from the contact of sense of sight. Thus sense of sight is indirectly the cause of the shell-silver by giving rise to the cognitive mode of mind in the form 'this' which reveals the consciousness conditioned by the 'this-element' that serves as the manifesting factor of shell-silver. Thus shell-silver for its manifestation depends upon the sense of sight in an indirect manner. And it is on the basis of this indirect dependence there is the experience that silver is the object of the sense of sight.⁷⁹

Acyutakṛṣṇānanda explains the above position on the basis of an analogy. The 'this-ness' is actually present in the 'this-element'. But it is attributed to the silver-element as is evident from the experience 'This is silver'. In the same way, the characteristic of being an object of the sense of sight is present in the 'this-element' only. But It is attributed to the shell-silver.⁸⁰

Dharmi-jñāna-kāraṇa-vādin, therefore, concludes that the experience that the silver is an object of the sense of sight does not suggest that silver too is the content of the mode of mind as Kavitārkika imagines. The cognitive mode of mind that arises from sense-contact refers only to the 'this-element' and not to silver. Thus it is the presence of the contact of sense

of sight—the causal aggregate, that forces us to assume the cognitive mode of mind in the form of 'this'.

So far it has been said that according to the *dharmi-jñāna-kāraṇa-vādin*, the contact of the defective sense of sight gives rise to the cognitive mode of mind in the form of 'this' only and not to that in the form of 'This is silver' as Kavitārkika thinks. The silver is manifested by the *sākṣī* and it is not the content of the cognitive mode of mind.

Kavitārkika rejects the above position thus: the sense-contact is admitted by the *dharmi-jñāna-kāraṇa-vādin* as giving rise to the cognitive mode of mind in the form of 'this' — the substratum of superimposition and not to the one in the form of 'This is silver'. But this position cannot be maintained by him in the case of the superimposition of yellow colour upon the conch. It is because the *dharmi-jñāna-kāraṇa-vādin* has to state that the contact of sense of sight is responsible for giving rise to the cognitive mode of mind in the form of the substratum of superimposition only. Here the substratum is the conch. The sense of sight cannot give rise to the cognitive mode of mind in the form of mere conch as there could not be any visual mode of mind in the form of a colourless entity. It cannot give rise to the mode of

mind in the form of conch as associated with white colour, because there will then be no possibility of the rise of the erroneous cognition of yellow colour. It cannot be said that the sense-contact gives rise to the mode of mind in the form of conch as associated with yellow colour. It is because the *dharmi-jñāna-kāraṇa-vādin* does not admit the superimposed object as the content of the mode of mind. Hence the *dharmi-jñāna-kāraṇa-vādin* cannot hold the view that sense-contact gives rise to the cognitive mode of mind in regard to the substratum of superimposition. In other words, the latter which is *dharmi-jñāna* cannot be assumed on the strength of the cause, namely, sense-contact.⁶¹

We have already set forth the view of Acyutakṛṣṇānanda that even in the case of the erroneous cognition of conch as yellow in colour, one can explain the contact of defective sense and the mode of mind in the form of conch that results from it. Hence the entire argument of Kavitārkika contained in the previous paragraph is unsound.⁶²

The *dharmi-jñāna-kāraṇa-vādin*, however, admits for the sake of argument that the conch, without being associated with colour, cannot come within the range of sense of sight. He proceeds to say that what is superimposed upon the conch is not the

yellow colour as such, but is only the relation of the yellow colour of the bile that is present in the eye. And the contact of sense of sight is required for the cognition of that yellow colour—the cognition which is essential for the superimposition of the relation of the latter to the conch.⁶³

It may be added here that this kind of superimposition is similar to the superimposition of red colour of a flower in a crystal. In a crystal which is placed near a red flower, there is the superimposition of the red colour of the latter. Unlike shell-silver, the red colour as such need not be admitted as an indeterminable creation because it is directly presented before us. So what is indeterminably created is only the relation of the red colour to the crystal.⁶⁴

Kavitārkika raises the question whether the sense of sight comprehends the yellow colour in the bile that is present in the region of the eyes or that is present in the region of the conch to which place it has gone forth through the rays of the eyes.⁶⁵ To either of the views there are difficulties.

1. If the first alternative were maintained, then there would arise the unwelcome position of the non-manifestation of the conch as well as the relation of

yellow colour to the conch. It is thus: the manifestation of the conch and of the relation of yellow colour to it may be due to the consciousness that is revealed by the mode of mind in the form of the yellow colour of the bile. Or it may be due to the consciousness that is revealed by the mode of mind in the form of conch as associated with yellow colour.⁸⁶

The former position does not hold good. It is because by the mode of mind in the form of the yellow colour of the bile present in the region of the eyes, it is only the consciousness conditioned by the yellow colour that is present in the region of the eyes that is revealed. And this revealed consciousness can have no contact with the conch and its relation to the yellow colour. Hence there cannot be the direct perception of the latter.⁸⁷

The *dharmi-jñāna-kāraṇa-vādin* who admits that the superimposed object is manifested by the consciousness revealed by the mode of mind in the form of the substratum would not subscribe to the latter position according to which the superimposed object would be sensory by nature.⁸⁸

2. According to the second alternative, namely, that the sense-contact comprehends the yellow colour of the bile that has gone forth together with the rays

from the eyes to the region of the conch, there would no doubt result the manifestation of the conch and of the relation of the yellow colour to the conch. It is because by the mode of mind in the form of the yellow colour of the bile the consciousness conditioned by the conch would be revealed and it would manifest the conch as well as the relation of yellow colour to it.⁸⁹ But there would arise the unwelcome position of the yellow colour being perceived by others too. It is thus: when a person with his eyes affected by bile sees the conch, then the yellow colour of the bile goes forth together with the rays from the eyes to the region of the conch and envelops the latter. Since the conch is thus associated with yellow colour, it will be perceived so by others too.⁹⁰

The *dharmi-jñāna-kāraṇa-vādin* gets over the above difficulty thus: one could perceive a bird when it flies at a lofty height, only when one sees it starting from the ground to fly upward and watches its further movement throughout. In the same way, he alone could perceive the yellow colour in the conch who sees the yellow colour of the bile throughout its course from the region of the eye to that of the conch. It is only the person whose eyes are affected by bile sees the yellow colour of the bile in the above manner and not others. So there does not arise the contingency of

the yellow colour in the conch being perceived by others when the conch is looked at by a person with jaundiced eyes.⁹¹

Kavitārkika disproves the above contention by stating that the illustration cited by the *dharmi-jñāna-kāraṇa-vādin* does not serve the intended purpose. He who sees a bird flying at a lofty height instructs the other person thus: 'if you place your sense of sight close to that of mine, then you will also be able to see the bird that soars up in the sky'. The other person does so and perceives the bird. In the same way, if another person places his sense of sight close to that which is affected by bile, then he must also be able to see the conch as yellow in colour. This, however, is not the case.⁹² Hence it must be held that there does not arise from sense-contact the cognition of yellow colour. There could not arise the cognition of the mere conch or of the conch associated with white colour for the reasons set forth above. The only alternative that is left out is that by sense-contact there arises a cognitive mode of mind in the form 'The conch is yellow' which is erroneous in character. There does not arise the cognitive mode of mind in the form of 'conch' first and then the cognitive mode of *avidyā* in the form 'conch is yellow' as the *dharmi-jñāna-kāraṇa-vādin* contends. Since in the above case there cannot arise

the cognition of the substratum (*dharmi-jñāna*) by sense-contact, the contention of the *dharmi-jñāna-kāraṇa-vādin* that *dharmi-jñāna* is to be assumed on the strength of its cause, namely, sense-contact is not logically sound.

Kavitārkika extends this line of explanation to the cases of superimpositions such as blue colour upon the waters and the like. Sense-contact cannot give rise to the cognition of the mere substratum—water, that is unassociated with any colour. For, there would be no visual mode of mind in the form of a colourless entity. In the same way, if sense-contact gives rise to the cognition of the substratum—water as associated with white colour, then there is no possibility of the rise of the erroneous cognition of blue colour upon it. Hence it must be held that sense-contact gives rise to the cognitive mode of mind in the form 'The water is blue'. Thus blue colour is sensory by nature. And prior to its erroneous cognition, there does not exist the cognitive mode of mind in the form of the substratum — *dharmi-jñāna*, as sense-contact, in the present case, cannot give rise to the latter. Hence the *dharmi-jñāna* or cognitive mode of mind in the form of the substratum cannot be maintained on the strength of the presence of sense-contact as the *dharmi-jñāna-kāraṇa-vādin* thinks.⁹³

It may be added here that Acyutakṛṣṇānanda has proved that there can be *dharmi-jñāna* in the case of erroneous cognitions of conch as yellow, etc.⁹⁴ Hence Kavitārkika's criticism has no basis whatsoever.

To sum up this part of the discussion: the *dharmi-jñāna-kāraṇa-vādin* argues that in the case of the erroneous cognition of silver, there first arises due to sense-contact, the cognitive mode of mind in the form of 'this'. This is *dharmi-jñāna* and it serves as the cause of the cognition 'This is silver' which is a cognitive mode of *avidyā*. The silver is manifested by the consciousness conditioned by the 'this element'. It is not sensory by nature.

Kavitārkika is of the view that in the cases of erroneous cognitions of the conch as yellow and water as blue, one cannot maintain the *dharmi-jñāna* due to sense-contact. One has to maintain that by sense-contact there arises the cognitive mode of mind in the form 'Conch is yellow' or 'The water is blue', The yellow colour as well as blue colour are sensory by nature.

Acyutakṛṣṇānanda has proved that one can very well maintain *dharmi-jñāna* in the case of the erroneous cognitions of the conch as yellow in colour and the water as blue. The yellow colour and the blue

colour are manifested by the consciousness conditioned by the conch and the water respectively. They are not sensory by nature.

Kavitārkika now tries to prove that the object of erroneous cognition is only sensory by nature by citing as authority a text from the *Pañcapādikā* which is as follows:

*anāsvāditatiktarasasyāpi bālakasya
madhure tiktatāvabhāsaḥ katham smaraṇam
syāt, ucyate — janmāntarānubhūtatvāt.*⁹⁵

This text means: the experience of bitterness in the mother's milk by an infant who has not yet tasted it is due to the latent impression of the experience of bitterness in the previous birth.

Kavitārkika is of the view that the above text affirms that the object of erroneous cognition is sensory by nature. He proceeds to say that the experience 'I perceive the silver with the sense of sight' could be explained by stating that silver — the superimposed one is the content of the cognitive mode of mind that arises from the contact of sense of sight.

The *dharmi-jñāna-kāraṇa-vādin* who admits that the superimposed object is manifested by the consciousness conditioned by the substratum—the ‘this-element’ states that the latter is revealed by the cognitive mode of mind in the form ‘this’ which arises from the functioning of sense of sight. Thus sense of sight is indirectly responsible for the manifestation of silver. And the experience ‘I perceive the silver with the sense of sight’ is based upon this indirect dependence upon the sense of sight.

Kavitārka argues that the above explanation could be offered by the *dharmi-jñāna-kāraṇa-vādin* only in respect of the experience ‘I perceive the silver with the sense of sight’. Here both the shell-silver and its substratum come within the range of sense of sight. But he cannot extend this line of explanation to the case of the experience ‘I cognize bitterness with the gustatory sense’; for, the substratum and the superimposed entity are not comprehended by one and the same sense-organ, The substratum—the sweet substance is comprehended by the tactile sense, while the superimposed entity, by the gustatory sense. The *dharmi-jñāna-kāraṇa-vādin* who admits that the superimposed entity is manifested by the consciousness conditioned by its substratum should explain the experience ‘I cognize bitterness with the

gustatory sense' in the following way: bitterness — the superimposed object is manifested by the consciousness conditioned by the sweet substance. The latter is revealed by the cognitive mode of mind that arises from the contact of gustatory sense. Thus the manifestation of bitterness is dependent in an indirect manner upon the functioning of the gustatory sense. And it is on this basis there is the experience 'I cognize bitterness with the gustatory sense'. This explanation of the *dharmi-jñāna-kāraṇa-vādin* would hold good only if the sweet substance - the substratum could come into contact with the gustatory sense. But it is not so. It comes into contact with the tactile sense. Hence the *dharmi-jñāna-kāraṇa-vādin* cannot even hold that the experience 'I cognize bitterness with the gustatory sense' is based upon the indirect dependence upon the functioning of the gustatory sense.⁹⁶

It is on the above ground that Kavitārka says that it must be held that the tactile sense comes into contact with the sweet substance and thereby the consciousness conditioned by it is manifested. Then by the functioning of the gustatory sense affected by the bile there arises the indeterminable creation of bitterness. At the same time there arises the mode of mind in the form of bitterness too. Bitterness is thus

the content of the cognitive mode of mind. It is sensory by nature.⁹⁷

To sum up this part of the discussion: Kavitārka is of the view that in the case of the erroneous cognition of bitterness there is the need for the functioning of the gustatory sense. Hence the cognitive mode of mind arising from the contact of the gustatory sense comprehends the bitterness and so the latter is sensory by nature. He has also proved that the *dharmi-jñāna-kāraṇa-vādin* who holds that bitterness is manifested by the consciousness conditioned by the substratum cannot explain the experience of bitterness through the contact of gustatory sense, as the substratum of bitterness is the sweet substance with which the gustatory sense cannot come into contact.

Acyutakṛṣṇānanda points out that the substratum of bitterness is not the sweet substance, but it is only the sweet taste. The gustatory sense affected by bile comes into contact with the sweet taste. There arises the cognitive mode of mind in the form of sweet taste. But the sweetness present in the latter is veiled because of the defect in the sense-organ. The consciousness conditioned by the sweet taste is revealed and therein arises the erroneous cognition of bitterness. Bitterness, therefore, is manifested by the

consciousness conditioned by the sweet taste. Since gustatory sense is responsible for revealing the latter, there is the experience that bitterness is cognized by the gustatory sense. Hence the *dharmi-jñāna-kāraṇa-vādin* can very well explain the experience 'I cognize bitterness with the gustatory sense'.⁹⁸

It may be added here that Kavitārka has taken the word *madhura* in the *Pañcapādikā* text cited above in the sense of a sweet substance. But it can be taken in the sense of sweet taste too as it is common to both the substance and the quality of taste.⁹⁹

Thus bitterness is manifested by the consciousness conditioned by the sweet taste. The latter is manifested by the gustatory sense. Since the manifestation of bitterness is dependent upon the functioning of the gustatory sense in an indirect manner, the experience 'I cognize bitterness with the gustatory sense', holds good.

Acyutakṛṣṇānanda further points out that even if we admit that the sweet substance itself and not the taste of sweetness is the substratum of bitterness, then also the experience 'I cognize bitterness with the gustatory sense' can be explained. In the state of dream there is the experience of taste, colour, etc., in the form 'I cognize the taste with the gustatory sense',

'I perceive the colour with the sense of sight', etc. The state of dream is characterized by the absence of the functioning of all sense-organs. Hence the above experiences are but delusions. Like the objects of the dream state, the apparently real objects like bitterness, etc., too do not come within the range of sense-organs. Hence the experience that they are cognized by the sense-organs cannot but be delusion.¹⁰⁰

Kavitārkika maintains that silver arises when the defective sense comes into contact with the shell in front. At the same time there arises the cognitive mode of mind in the form 'this'. The latter comprehends the silver too that has arisen along with it. Thus the shell-silver is sensory by nature.

The *dharmī-jñāna-kāraṇa-vādin* raises an objection against this view of Kavitārkika. He says that according to Kavitārkika the sense of sight does not come into contact with shell-silver, as the latter arises only after the sense-contact with the shell in front. So Kavitārkika has to admit that an object which is not in contact with the sense of sight is the object of the latter. This position, however, is in direct violation of the causal relations such as that in respect of the perceptual knowledge in general, conjunction of

sense-organ with the object is the cause, that in respect of the perceptual knowledge of a substance, the contact of sense with that substance is the cause, and that in respect of the perceptual knowledge of silver, sense-contact with silver is the cause.¹⁰¹

Kavitārkika argues that of the three causal relations mentioned above, it is the second one alone that is valid and it is not in conflict with the view that shell-silver is the object of sense of sight although the latter has not come into contact with the former. He proceeds to say that the first causal relation is not valid because one cannot maintain a single mode of contact common to conjunction etc.¹⁰²

The second causal relation must be restricted to empirically real substances, as otherwise it would lack correspondence in the case of the perceptual knowledge of an object which is not really a substance. It is thus: one-ness [*ekatvam*] is not a substance. It is a quality. But on the basis of the experience that 'One-ness is one', it is falsely taken as the substratum of number [*saṅkhyā*] which is a quality. Since that which is the substratum of a quality is a substance, one-ness too being the substratum of number which is a quality is to be viewed as a substance, while it is not really so.

Thus there is the superimposition of substanceness upon what is not a substance.

If it is merely held that in respect of the perceptual cognition of a substance, conjunction of sense-organ with the latter is the cause, then it must be said that in respect of one-ness which is not a substance but wherein substanceness is assumed, conjunction with the sense-organ is the cause of its perceptual knowledge. But conjunction is possible only with what is really a substance and it is impossible with one-ness which is actually a quality. Hence the causal relation that in respect of the perceptual knowledge of a substance, conjunction with that substance is the cause would lack correspondence in the case of perceptual knowledge of one-ness which is assumed to be a substance.¹⁰³

To get over this difficulty, it must be held that the second causal relation is restricted to empirically real substances. In the present case, one-ness is not an empirically real substance. It is only assumed to be so. Hence in regard to its perceptual cognition, conjunction of sense-organ is not the cause. On this ground Kavitārkika argues that the second causal relation must be amended thus: 'in respect of the

perceptual knowledge of an empirically real substance, conjunction of sense is the cause'.

Shell-silver is not an empirically real substance. And so in regard to its perceptual cognition, sense-contact is not necessary. Thus the second causal relation which relates to the empirically real objects is not operative in the case of the perceptual knowledge of shell-silver as it is only apparently real. Hence it does not lack correspondence in the case of the latter.¹⁰⁴

Having thus proved that the second causal relation is valid but is not in conflict with the position that silver which is not in conjunction with the sense of sight is the content of the latter, Kavitārkika proceeds to say that the third causal relation, namely, that in respect of the perceptual knowledge of silver conjunction with the silver is the cause must be set aside. It is because the postulation of a special causal relation between the perceptual knowledge of silver and conjunction with silver apart from the general causal relation in the form of the second one involves the defect of prolixity.¹⁰⁵

Kavitārkika concludes by saying that the first and the third causal relation are not valid. The second one is valid and it must be restricted to empirically real

substances. Shell-silver is apparently real and so in respect of the perceptual knowledge of it the second causal relation is not applicable. Thus there is no contingency of the violation of this causal relation.¹⁰⁶

Acyutakṛṣṇānanda rejects the contention of Kavitārkika. He states that it is not correct to say that the first causal relation is not valid on the ground that one cannot maintain a single mode of contact common to conjunction, etc. A single mode of contact common to conjunction, etc., can definitely be maintained. And it is the characteristic of being one among conjunction, etc. (*saṁyogādyananyatamatvam*). The first causal relation is, therefore, valid and Kavitārkika's position that silver which is not in conjunction with sense-organ is the object of the latter is in direct violation of this causal relation.¹⁰⁷

The explanation offered by Kavitārkika in regard to the second causal relation too is not valid according to Acyutakṛṣṇānanda. Kavitārkika has said that shell-silver is apparently real and the second causal relation is restricted to empirically real contents; and as such it is not operative in the case of the perceptual knowledge of shell-silver. Acyutakṛṣṇānanda points out that in shell-silver too as in the case of the empirically real pot, there is the attribute of

substance-ness from the empirical stand-point. If it is said that the latter does not exist, then silver-ness also will not exist. It cannot be said that this position is a welcome one. It is because if silver-ness does not exist, then on the part of one who notices silver, there will not be activity toward the latter. Hence shell-silver too must be admitted to be the substratum of substance-ness from the empirical stand-point. In the empirical state there is the negation of silver in the shell. But there is not the experience of the negation of substance-ness or silver-ness in the shell-silver. Hence the latter is the substratum of substance-ness. And in regard to its perceptual knowledge sense-contact is necessary. It comes to this: if shell-silver which is not in contact with the sense of sight is admitted to be the content of the cognitive mode of mind that arises from sense-contact then there will certainly be conflict with the second causal relation.¹⁰⁸

In regard to the third causal relation, Kavitarika has said that the postulation of a special relationship of the perceptual knowledge of silver and conjunction of sense with silver, other than the general relationship of the perceptual knowledge of substance in general and conjunction of sense-organ must be set aside by considerations of prolixity. It must, however, be noted that if the general relationship alone were maintained,

then there would arise the unwelcome position of the perception of one substance from the conjunction with a different one. To get over this difficulty, the special relationship of effect and cause in the form that in respect of the perceptual knowledge of silver, conjunction of sense with silver is the cause must be admitted. We have said already that the view that silver which is not in conjunction with sense-organ is an object of the latter is in direct conflict with the second causal relation. The third causal relation is included within the second one and so the above view is in conflict with this too. Thus according to Acyutakṛṣṇānanda if the view that silver which is not in contact with sense of sight is the object of the latter were maintained by Kavitārkika, then there is the contingency of the violation of the three causal relations.¹⁰⁹

Kavitārkika anticipates the above difficulty and so he says that there would be no harm even if the well-known causal relations were violated here. The experience 'I see this silver' should be explained only by admitting that silver is the content of the cognitive mode of mind arising from the contact of sense of sight. Shell-silver, however, is not in contact with sense of sight as it arises only when the latter is in contact with the shell in front. Thus there will be

conflict with the well-known causal relations. To get over this difficulty it must be held that all the above causal relations are restricted to empirically valid contents. And so there arises no question of violation of the above causal relations in their amended form in respect of an apparently real content, namely, shell-silver.¹¹⁰

Acyutakṛṣṇānanda argues that Kavitārkika is wrong when he says that the experience 'I see silver' should be explained only by admitting that silver is the content of the cognitive mode of mind arising from sense-contact. As in the case of dream objects, in the case of shell-silver too the experience that it is the object of sense of sight can be explained as a case of delusion. The state of dream is characterized by the absence of the functioning of all sense-organs. Hence the experiences in the state of dream such as 'I see colour' and the like are to be treated as delusions. In the same way, the apparently real object — silver too does not come within the range of sense of sight. Hence the experience that it is cognized by the sense of sight cannot but be delusion.¹¹¹

The experience 'I see silver' can be explained in another manner also. The superimposed object — silver is manifested only by the consciousness

conditioned by the substratum, namely, the 'this-element'. The latter is revealed by the cognitive mode of mind in the form 'this' which arises from the functioning of sense of sight. Thus sense of sight is indirectly responsible for the manifestation of silver. And the experience 'I perceive the silver with the sense of sight' is based upon this indirect dependence upon the sense of sight. This point we discussed in detail earlier.¹¹² Hence Kavitārka is wrong when he says that the experience 'I see silver' could be explained only by admitting that silver is the content of the cognitive mode of mind arising from sense-contact.

It comes to this: since the experience 'I see silver' can be explained even otherwise, Kavitārka need not amend the well-known causal relations in such a way as not to have any conflict with his cherished view that shell-silver is the object of sense of sight although it is not in contact with the latter. Thus sense-contact by itself can lead neither to the rise of shell-silver nor to the cognitive mode of mind in the form 'This is silver'. It does so by first giving rise to the cognitive mode of mind in the form 'this' which is *dharmi-jñāna*. The *tūlājñāna* present in the consciousness conditioned by the 'this-element' gets itself transformed into the form of silver and into an

apparent cognition of the silver of the form 'This is silver'. The latter is the cognitive mode of *avidyā*. Thus the erroneous cognition is a complex of two cognitive factors, one of them being a mode of mind in the form 'this' and the other being a mode of *avidyā* in the form 'This is silver'.

To sum up the entire discussion:

Kavitārkika is of the view that the erroneous cognition 'This is silver' is only a cognitive mode of mind. The defective sense of sight comes into contact with the object — shell in front. The *tūlājñāna* present in the consciousness conditioned by the 'this-element' is rendered effective thereby getting itself transformed into the form of silver. At the same time there arises the cognitive mode of mind in the form 'this'. The latter comprehends the 'this-element' associated with the silver. The silver, therefore, is sensory by nature.

The prevalent view in Advaita is that by the contact of defective sense, there arises the cognitive mode of mind in the form 'this' which is *dharmijñāna*. Then the *tūlājñāna* present in the consciousness conditioned by the 'this-element' gets itself transformed into the silver and also into an apparent cognition 'This is silver'. The latter is a cognitive mode of *avidyā*. The silver is manifested by the

consciousness conditioned by the 'this-element'. It is not sensory by nature. According to this view, the *dharmi-jñāna* which is the cognitive mode of mind and which is valid is the cause of the cognition of silver which is the cognitive mode of *avidyā* and which is erroneous. This view is, therefore, called *dharmi-jñāna-kāraṇa-vādin*.

Appayyadīkṣita in the *Siddhānta-leśa-saṅgraha* simply records the view-points of Kavītārka. Acyutakṛṣṇānanda subjects the latter into critical examination and has proved that the *dharmi-jñāna-kāraṇa-vāda* alone is sound.

NOTES:

1. *Ratnaprabhā* (hereafter *RP*) - A commentary on Śaṅkara's *bhāṣya* on the *Brahma-sūtra* (hereafter *BS*). Bombay: Nirnaya Sagar Press. 1907. p. 11.
2. *Ibid.*,
3. *Ibid.*,
4. *Ibid.*, p.12.
5. *Ibid.*,
6. *Ibid.*, pp.12 - 13.
7. *Ibid.*,
8. *Ibid.*,
9. *Siddhānta-leśa-saṅgraha* (hereafter *SLS*) of Appayya Dīkṣita with the commentary, *Kṛṣṇālaṅkāra* (hereafter *KA*) of Acyuta - Kṛṣṇānandatīrtha. Secunderabad:

- Appayya Dīkṣitendra Granthāvali Prakāśanasamiti. 1973. p. 195. See also *KA*, p.195.
10. *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* (hereafter *VP*), of Dharmarājādharīndre. Ed. by Pañcānana Bhaṭṭācārya, Calcutta. 1961. pp.61-62.
 11. *SLS*, pp.174-175.
 12. *Samkṣepaśārīraka* (hereafter *SS*) of Sarvajñātman. Chennai: University of Madras, 1985. I. 31. See also *SLS*, p.175.
 13. *SLS*, pp.175-76.
 14. *KA*, p.187.
 15. *SLS*, p.177.
 16. *KA*, pp.176-177.
 17. *Ibid.*,
 18. *Ibid.*,
 19. *Ibid.*,
 20. *Ibid.*,
 21. *SLS*, p.176.
 22. *KA*, p.178.
 23. *SLS*, p.178; *KA*, p.178.
 24. *KA*, pp.178-79.
 25. *Ibid.*, p.179.
 26. *Ibid.*,
 27. *Ibid.*,
 28. *Ibid.*,
 29. *SLS*, p.179.
 30. *KA*, pp.179-180.

31. *SLS*, pp.179-180.

32. *KA*, pp.180-181.

33. *SLS*, p.178.

34. *KA*, p.179.

See also: *Bhāmatī*, A Commentary on Śaṅkara's *Bhāṣya* on the *Brahma-sūtra*. Published along with the commentaries *Kalpataru* and *Parimala*. Bombay: Nirnaya Sagar Press, 1917. p.21.

35. *KA*, p.179.

36. *Ibid.*, p.181.

37. *SLS*, p.181.

38. *Ibid.*,

39. *Ibid.*, See also *KA*, p.181.

40. *SLS*, p.181; *KA*, p.181.

41. *SLS*, p.181.

42. *Ibid.*, pp.181-182; *KA*, p.181.

43. *SLS*, p.182; *KA*, p.182.

44. *SLS*, p.182.

45. *Ibid.*,

46. *Ibid.*,

47. *Dīdhiti* on the *Anumiti-prakarana* of *Tattva-cintāmani* (hereafter *TC*) of Gaṅgeśa with Gadādhari. Benares: The Chaukhamba Sanskrit Series. 1927, p.56.

48. *KA*, p.183.

49. *SLS*, p.183.

50. *TC*, p.1798.

51. *KA*, p.183.

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52. *Kārikāvalī* of Viśvanātha Pañcānana, 59 and 60.
53. *BS*, 2.2.13.
54. *VP*, pp.58-59.
55. *SLS*, p.283.
56. *Ibid.*,
57. *Ibid.*,
58. *SLS*, p.184; *KA*, p.184.
59. *Ibid.*,
60. *SLS*, pp.184-185.
61. *Ibid.*,
62. *Ibid.*, p.186.
63. *KA*, p.184.
64. *Ibid.*, p.186.
65. *Ibid.*, p.186.
66. *SLS*, p.186.
67. *KA*, p.186.
68. *SLS*, p.186.
69. *KA*, p.185.
70. *SLS*, p.187.
71. *KA*, p.187.
72. *Ibid.*,
73. *Ibid.*,
74. *Ibid.*,
75. *SLS*, p.187.
76. *KA*, pp.187-188.
77. *Ibid.*,

78. Ibid.,
79. *SLS*, p.188.
80. *KA*, p.188.
81. *SLS*, pp.188-189.
82. *KA*, p.189.
83. *SLS*, p.189.
84. *KA*, p.189.
85. Ibid.,
86. Ibid.,
87. *SLS*, p.189.
88. Ibid.,
89. *KA*, p.189.
90. *SLS*, pp.189-190.
91. *KA*, p.190.
92. Ibid.,
93. *SLS*, p.190.
94. *KA*, p.190.
95. *Pañcapādikā* of Padmapāda with the Commentary *Vivaraṇa* of Prakāśātman and the Commentary *Bhāvaprakāśikā* on the *Vivaraṇa* by Nṛsiṃhāśrama. Madras: Madras Government Oriental Series. Vol. CLV. pp.43-44. See also *SLS*, p.190.
96. *SLS*, p.192.
97. Ibid.,
98. *KA*, p.191.
99. Ibid.,
100. Ibid., p.192.

101. *SLS*, p.192.

102. *Ibid.*,

103. *KA*, p.193.

104. *Ibid.*, p.193.

105. *SLS*, p.193.

106. *Ibid.*, p.194.

107. *Ibid.*,

108. *Ibid.*,

109. *Ibid.*,

110. *SLS*, p.194.

111. *KA*, p.194.

112. See Note No.79.



THE VEDĀNTACŪLĀMAṆI - TEXT
WITH TRANSLATION*

M. Parthiban

(55)

இந்துவினை யநாதியடைந் ததைமுழுது
மறையாம லிந்துதன்னா,
லந்திறனை யொளிர்வித்துக் கொள்களங்க
மெனவெனையானறியே னென்னு,
முந்துலக விவகாரந் தனிலுயிரை
யடைந்ததனை மூடாதென்று,
மந்தவுயி ராலறியப் பட்டுமனற் றம்பிக்கு
மந்தி ரம்போல்.

Māyā which is (to be admitted as) related to Brahman on the basis of the beginningless and the universal experience 'I do not know myself'¹ does not fully obscure Brahman² and is manifested by the latter. In this respect, it is similar to the dark spot of the moon which without fully obscuring the moon is manifested by the light of the latter, and to an incantation which checks the power of burning in the fire (without extinguishing the fire).

* Continued from the Issue of The Voice of SANKARA, Vol. 36
No.1, 2. 2013.

NOTES:

1. The experience 'I do not know' is a perceptual one and its content is not absence of knowledge but *māyā*.
2. For details see Veezhinathan, N., 'Does *Avidyā* conceal the Witness-Self', *Voice of Śaṅkara*, Vol.III No.I. May, 1978.

Dṛśya Viveka:

(56)

விளங்குறுமான் மாவுருவு மல்லாம
 லான்மாவின் வேறாத் தோன்றா,
 துளங்கொள்வியோ மாதிகா ரியங்கடமைத்
 தோன்றாவா றொடுக்கிநின்று,
 துளங்கலக் ககடிதகடனா சாமர்த்தி
 யாகியுமே தோன்றா நின்ற,
 வளங்கடரு காரணமா மதுவாகுந்
 திரிசியமா மாயா சத்தி.

Māyā which comes under the category of *dṛśya* (that is the one which is manifested by the witness-self) is not of the nature of Brahman that always manifests. Nor does it appear as different from Brahman. It conceals the true nature of Brahman and it projects the world of objects such as the ether and the like which constitute the expression of the will of God. It is manifested in the cognition 'I do not know' myself and is the source of all evil.

(57)

அனையதொரு மாயையிலக் கணமசத்துச்
 சடந்துக்க மறித்தங் கண்ட,
 மெனுமிவையுண் முயற்கோடு முதலசத்துச்
 சடவுருக்கல் லெழுவாய் புத்தி,
 தனையடையுங் கோரமொடு
 மூடவிருத்திகடுக்கந் தபுமெய் யாதி,
 முனமுரைசெய் யறித்தங்கண்
 டங்கால பரிச்சேத முதல வாசும்.

The special characteristics of *māyā* referred to now are as follows:

- 1) it is *asat*;
- 2) it is insentient;
- 3) it is of the nature of misery;
- 4) it is non-eternal; and,
- 5) it is conditioned.

Of these five, *māyā* is *asat* or an absolute nothing like a hare's horn;¹ it is insentient like a mountain; it is of the nature of misery, that is, it gives rise to mental excitement and stupefaction. It is non-eternal like physical body, etc., which are referred to earlier and which too appear and cease to exist; and, it is conditioned as it is subject to destruction (at the dawn of the right knowledge of Brahman).

NOTES:

1. When viewed from the stand-point of the direct knowledge of Brahman that arises from the *Upaniṣad-s*, *māyā* is an absolute nothing.

Vide:

*tucchānirvacanīyā ca vāstavi cetyasau tridhā
jñeya māyā tribhirbodhaiḥ śrautayauktikalaukikaih*

PD. 6-130.

See also Verse 59 of the present text.

(58)

பின்னமோ டசத்துச்சா வயமுமெதிர்
மறையுமவை பிரிந்து தம்மின்,
மன்னியவு மொழிந்தநிர்வாச் சியமாகு
நவவிதமம் மாயை யெய்து,
முன்னலருஞ் சுருதிசம் பந்தமுத்தி
சம்பந்த முலோக பந்த,
மென்னவரு ஞானங்கண் முறையேயம்
மாயைபடு மியல்பு கூறின்.

Māyā cannot be described as different from Brahman, absolute nothing,¹ and as one composed of parts; nor can it be defined as identical with Brahman, real and partless. It cannot also be described as possessing the characteristics that are opposed to each other.² *Māyā* is thus indeterminable as it defies (the above) nine modes of interpretation.

Further when viewed from the stand-point of *śruti* whose range cannot be thought of, and of reasoning and empirical experience *māyā* is known to be having three characteristics (which may be described as follows).

NOTES:

1. In the previous verse it has been said that *māyā* is an absolute nothing. Here it is said that it cannot be treated as an absolute nothing. Thus there is an apparent contradiction between these two statements. This apparent contradiction is to be resolved thus: from the stand-point of empirical experience *māyā* cannot be admitted to be an absolute nothing as it is manifested in the experience 'I am ignorant'. An absolute nothing will never come within the range of perceptual experience. But when there arises the knowledge of Brahman, *māyā* is destroyed and so it does not then come within the range of perceptual experience. It is thus from the stand-point of the knowledge of Brahman it is stated to be an absolute nothing.

See Note on the previous Verse.

2. *Māyā* cannot be described as different from and identical with Brahman, real and an absolute nothing, partless and as one composed of parts as such an admission would violate the law of contradiction.

See the following verse.

(59)

விண்ணின்மல ரெனத்துச்ச மேயெனவு
 மிப்பிவரு வெள்ளி போல,
 வெண்ணுமநிர் வாச்சியமா மெனவுமுயிர்
 போனித்த மெனவு நிற்கு,
 முண்ணிலவு தமமாயை மோகமுட னவித்தை
 பொய்ம்மை யுருவி யென்றே,
 நண்ணுமிவை மாயாபஞ்
 சகமாகுமெனவறிஞர் நவில்வ ரன்றே.

[When viewed from the stand-point of the direct knowledge of Brahman that arises from the *śruti*] *māyā* is an absolute nothing.¹ [When viewed from the stand-point of reasoning] it is indeterminable.² [When viewed from the stand-point of empirical experience] it is known as real.³ Wise men declare that that which is manifested in the cognition 'I am ignorant' is designated in a five-fold manner as *tamas*, *māyā*, *moha*, *avidyā* and *mithyā*.

NOTES:

1. See Note on Verse 57 of the present text.
2. See Verse 58 of the present text.
3. In ordinary experience *māyā* and its effect, namely, the world do appear as real.

(60)

சீவசே தனமறைத்துத் தமமயலா
 கியவுலகத் திறத்திற் கெல்லா,
 மேவுகா ரணமாகி மாயைவிப
 ரிதஞானம் விளைத்து மோக,
 மோவவுணர் வழித்தவித்தை சத்தின்வே
 றாகிப்பொய் யுருவியாகும்,
 வீவிலா மாயையிதற் கிருத்தருமஞ்
 சங்கோச விகாச மென்றாம்.

Māyā is referred to as *tamas* as it conceals the true nature of the soul. It acquires the name - *māyā*, as it is the appropriate cause of the world that is different from the true nature of the soul.¹ It is spoken of as *moha* or delusion, as it projects Brahman as something else, that is, God, soul and the world. It is characterised as *avidyā*, as it is sublated by the knowledge of Brahman which is eternal. It is termed *mithyā* or false as it is different from *sat* or reality.

Of this *māyā* which cannot be removed (excepting by the knowledge of Brahman) there are two more characteristics, namely, contraction and expansion.

NOTES:

1. The world is not real in the strict sense of the term. It does appear and so there must be a cause to it. And the

cause also must be of the same nature of the effect. *Māyā* too being not real is considered to be the appropriate cause of the world.

(61)

விரிந்துபட மோவியங்கள் பலதிகழ்த்திக்
 குவிந்தொடுக்கும் விதமே போல,
 வரந்தைதரு மாயையுந்தன் விகாசதரு
 மத்தினாலகிலங் காட்டிப்,
 பரந்தவைகள் சங்கோச தருமத்தா
 லடக்குமெனப் பகர்வர் மாயைக்,
 கிருந்தகுண மிரண்டுளவில் சுதந்திரமுஞ்
 சுதந்திரமு மென்ன வன்றே.

Wise men state that just as the artistically worked cloth then unrolled displays manifold pictures drawn therein and when rolled withholds them from sight, in the same way, *māyā* which brings in evil with its power of projection presents the expansive world (in the states of waking and dream) and by its power of contraction withdraws it within itself (in the state of deep sleep and at the time of dissolution)¹.

Further, *māyā* has two more characteristics - dependence and independence.²

NOTES:

1. *Vide:*

*asya sattvamasattvam ca jagato darśayatyasau
prasāranācca saṅkocāt yathā citrapaṭastatha PD. 6-131.*

2. See the following verse.

(62)

பொய்யாகிச் சத்துருவப் பொருளின்வே
றாகியொரு பொரு ளாய்த்தோற்றல்,
செய்யாமை யாலுளதில் சுதந்திரஞ்சான்
றாய்வொரு சேதனன்பா,
லுய்யாத சீவாதி யாக்குதலாற்
சுதந்திரமுமுளது மாயை,
மெய்யான தலதென்றல் விசும்பலர்போ
லில்லையென விளம்பலன்றே.

Māyā which is illusory is not independent as it cannot be manifested independent of being related to the reality, that is, pure consciousness. In one sense it is independent too, for, it projects the pure consciousness which is incomparable and which is its witness as soul, that is entangled in the trammels of transmigration, and as God and the world. The reference to *māyā* as *mithyā* or false is to be understood in the sense that it is not similar to a flower sprung from the sky.¹

NOTES:

1. A flower sprung from the sky is an absolute nothing in the sense that it does not come within the range of perceptual cognition. *Māyā* does come within the range of perceptual cognition of the form ('I am ignorant'). Hence it is not an absolute nothing.

See Notes on Verse 57-59 of the present text.

(63)

புலனில்கனாக் கரியாதி போற்றோன்றி
 விசாரிக்கிற் பொன்றும் பொய்யா,
 நிலவுதல்செய் சுத்தசத் துவவடிவ
 மாயையொடு நிகழ்த்துகின்ற,
 மலினசத் துவவடிவ வித்தைதமப்
 பிரதான வடிவ மாகு,
 நலமில்பிர கிருதியென விருத்திமூன்
 றுடையதுமுன் னவின்ற மாயை.

Like elephant, etc., which appear in dream that is characterized by the absence of the functioning of sense-organs *māyā* too appears. When its true nature is enquired into it is reduced to the state of indeterminability. *Prakṛti* or the primal cause of the world is designated as *māyā* when it is principally constituted of pure *sattva-guṇa* not overpowered by the *rajo-guṇa* and the *tamo-guṇa*. It is designated as *avidyā* when its *sattva-guṇa* is overpowered by the *rajo-guṇa* and the *tamo-guṇa*. It is principally

constituted of the *tamo-guṇa* too. Thus one and the same principle has three modes;¹

NOTES:

1. i) The constituents of the primal cause of the world are *sattva-guṇa*, *rajo-guṇa* and *tamo-guṇa*. When these three are in a state of equilibrium as in the state of deep sleep and dissolution it is technically termed *Prakṛti*.
See Verse 65 of the present text.
- ii) *sattvaśuddhyaviśuddhibhyām māyāvidye ca te mate, PD. 1-16*
- iii) *tamapradhānaprakṛteḥ, Ibid, 1-18.*

(64)

மாயைவரு சுழுத்திலயங் களினத்தி
யாசயிக்க மாயிற் றுண்மை,
யாயபிர மத்தினன வொடுபடைப்பி
னிதுபேத வவத்தை யெய்து,
மேயவதிற் பிரமசை தன்யம்பிம்பித்
திட்டதுவே விளங்கு ஞானத்,
தூ யசைதன் னியவீசன் பதியிறையென்
றிடநிற்குந் துணிவு தன்னால்.

Māyā at the time of deep sleep and of dissolution remains falsely identified with Brahman - the reality. Then at the time of waking and dream and of the creation of the world it undergoes modification and

appears to be different *as it were* from Brahman. Brahman when it undergoes reflection in *māyā* that is related to it, is viewed as God possessing the characteristics of omniscience, etc., and as the creator and also the controller of the world.

(65)

அப்பரற் குபாதியாகி யமோககா
 ரணியா மாயை
 பொய்ப்புறு மவித்தை யெண்ணிற்
 போத்திருப்பசு வென்றோது
 மொப்பருஞ் சீவர்க் கெல்லா
 முபாதியாய் மோகஞ்செய்யு
 மெய்ப்புறு பகுதி பாச
 மெனச்சம குணமாய் நின்று.

Māyā is the limiting adjunct of God of the nature described above. It does not cause delusion in the case of the latter¹. *Ayidyā* which is indeterminable is the limiting adjunct of the souls who in their essential nature are incomparable, who are numerous and are referred to as experients and as the controlled ones. It causes delusion in their case. The primal cause which is termed *prakṛti* when its three constituents are in a state of equilibrium is characterized as bondage and is the cause of repose as in the case of deep sleep and dissolution.

NOTES:

- i) *Vide: māyābimbo vasīkṛtya tām syāt sarvajña īśvaraḥ, PD. 1-16.*
- ii) *avidyāvaśagastvanyaḥ, Ibid, 1-17.*

(66)

Nature of Kālatattva :

அவித்தையின் விம்பித் துள்ள
 வாருயிர் நுகர்ச்சிக் காகத்
 துவக்குறு காரியங்க டோற்றிட
 வெதிர்கு நித்த
 வுவப்புறு மீச னோக்க
 மாத்திரத் துற்ற லர்ந்து
 பவப்படு கால மாகி
 யதுகொடு பரிணா மித்து.

In order that there may be the creation of physical body, etc., that will be conducive to the experience of the souls who are reflected images of pure consciousness in *avidyā*, (and mind), the *tamas*-predominant *prakṛti* which is known as time¹ unfolds itself by the mere will of God, who, out of gracious compliance has decided to create the world. And this *prakṛti* undergoes transformation (into the form of the world).

NOTES:

1. Time according to Advaita represents the relation between pure consciousness and *prakṛti*.

See *SLS*, p.362.

(67)

Origination of the *Mahāttattva* :

இருமக தத்து வந்தா
 னெனநிற்கு மதுதா னீபெய்
 தரும்விதை முளையா மன்முன்
 போவிரா தாதல்போலக்
 கருவெனும் பகுதியோடாங்
 காரமு மாகா மற்பொய்
 யுரமுறு நிருவி கற்ப
 வருநடு வவத்தை யாகும்.

The first manifestation has the well-known designation of *mahat-tattva*.¹ It has no determinate form and is indeterminable either as real or as an absolute nothing. It is similar to the state that lies in between the hardened state of a seed and the state of sprouting. And, this intermediate stage is the swollen state like the seed which has been softened by being permeated with water. This *mahat-tattva* is in between the *prakṛti* - the cause and the principle - *ahankāra* - the effect.

NOTES:

1. This *mahat-tattva* is not the same as the one advocated by the Sāṅkhya school. According to the latter it is *buddhi-tattva*. Here it is to be identified as self-awareness on the part of the Consciousness-element owing to its association with *māyā*.

(68)

Origination of the *Ahaṅkāratattva* :

கொன்மக தத்து வத்திற்
 குணபேத முறாப்பொய்ஞ் ஞான
 மன்சவி கற்ப மாக
 வருமுத லத்தி யாச
 மென்முத லாங்கா ரந்தோன்
 றிடுங்குணஞ் சத்து வந்தான்
 பின்வரு மிராச தஞ்சொற்
 பெருந்தமோ குணமென் றாகும்.

From the well-known principle - *mahat-tattva* there arises the first illusory manifestation, namely, the *ahaṅkāra-tattva* which is determinate in the form 'I exist'. It consists of the three strands of *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*.¹

NOTES:

1. *Ahaṅkāra-tattva* is only the state of the Consciousness-element when it is endowed with the resolve to create the

world. The resolve is only the mode of *māyā* or *māyāvṛtti*. This is designated as collective *ahaṅkāra* to contrast it with the individual *ahaṅkāra*. (See *VC*, 70)

(69)

Three forms of *Ahaṅkāra*:

உரைப்பருஞ் சத்து வாதி
 யுருவங்கள் பிரகா சம்பின்
 புரைப்பிர விருத்தி மோக
 மென்குவர் புகல்கு ணங்க
 ணிரைப் பெயர் தானவை
 காரிநிகழுந்தை சதம்பூ தாதி
 விரிப்பருங் குணங்கண் மூன்றுந்
 தருவமேல் விளம்பலுற்றாம்.

Wise men give the description of the three constituents of *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* which characterise the *ahaṅkāra-tattva* as that which illuminates, actuates and deludes respectively. The three constituents described now are respectively referred to by the synonymous words *vaikāri*, *taijasa* and *bhūtādi*.² The functions of these three constituents that are fit to be elaborated we shall set forth in the following verse.

NOTES:

1. See *Sāṅkhya-kārikā*, Verse 13.

2. The *ahaṅkāra-tattva* is referred to as three-fold as *vaikṛta* or *vaikāri*, *taijasa* and *bhūtādi* in accordance with the predominance of *sattva-*, *rajo-*, and *tamo-guṇa-s*.

See *Ibid*, verse 25.

(70)

Effects of the Three forms of Ahaṅkāra

சத்துவ குணத்திற் றோன்றுந்
 தயங்குமுட் கரண நான்கும்
 புத்தியித் தியங்க ளைந்தும்
 போந்துதித் திடுமி ராச
 தத்தில்வாக் காதியைந்துந்
 தகும்பிரா ணாதி யைந்து
 மத்தமோ குணத்திற் றோன்று
 மகல்விகம் பாதி பூதம்.

From the *ahaṅkāra* wherein *sattva-guṇa* predominates there arise the four kinds of internal organ¹ and five senses of knowledge which are bright or do illumine the objects. From the *ahaṅkāra* wherein the *rajo-guṇa* predominates there come into existence the five senses of action, the five-fold vital airs which are conducive to the functioning of the souls. From the *ahaṅkāra* wherein *tamo-guṇa* predominates there come into existence the five subtle elements (space, air, fire, water and earth) which are non-quintuplicated.

NOTES:

1. The above four kinds of internal organ along with their functions are mentioned by Sureśvara in his commentary *Mānasollāsa* on Śrī Śaṅkara's *Dakṣiṇāmūrti stotra*, ii. 35-60.

There are four functions of the internal organ; and they are: doubt, certitude, pride and recollection. In relation to these functions, the internal organ is respectively termed *manas*, *buddhi*, *ahaṅkāra* and *citta*. Thus the internal organ which is the product of the *sattva*-predominant *ahaṅkāra* bears the designation *ahaṅkāra* when its function is pride.

(71)

Theory of Quintuplication - Functions of Internal organ - The Presiding Deities of the latter:

அப்பெரும் பூதம் பஞ்சீ
 கரித்துல காசி நிற்குஞ்
 செப்பிய கரண நான்கின்
 செயல்கடா நினைத்த லந்தப்
 பொய்ப்பொரு டுணிதன் மானம்
 புரிதல்சிந் தித்த றிங்க
 டிப்பிய நான்மு கன்கேத்
 திரிபுராந் தகன்றே வன்றே.

The subtle elements when quintuplicated become gross elements constituting the whole universe.¹ The

functions of the four kinds of internal organ, namely, *manas*, *buddhi*, *ahaṅkāra* and *citta* referred to above p are doubt, certitude, pride and recollections.² This four-fold internal organ is controlled by the moon, Brahmā, Śiva and Viṣṇu.

NOTES:

1. Quintuplication means dividing each of the five subtle elements beginning with space into two equal parts, and then sub-dividing each of the first five of the ten halves into four equal parts and combining those fourth parts (one each) with the remaining halves excepting only the second half of its own kind. See Hiriyanna, M., *Vedānta-Sāra*, Oriental Book Agency, Poona, 1929, P.51.

According to this view, a particle of gross *prthivī* (say) consists of $1/2$ earth + $1/8$ water + $1/8$ fire + $1/8$ air + $1/8$ space. See *Ibid.*, p.31.

2. See Note on the previous verse.

(72)

Abodes of the Four kinds of Internal-Organ - Their Functions, Presiding Deities and the Abodes of the Senses of Knowledge:

இக்கர ணங்க டான

மிதயஞா னேந்தி யங்கட்

குய்க்குறு தொழிலாங் கேட்ட

லுறல்காண்ட லுண்டன் மோத்த

றிக்குமா ருதமே நன்மித்
 திரனுயர் வருணனோடு
 தக்கசு வினியாந் தெய்வந்
 தானங்கா தாதி யாமே.

The abode of the four kinds of internal organ is the heart. The functions of the five senses of knowledge, namely, the sense of hearing, the sense of taste and the sense of smell are respectively the experience of sound, touch, colour, taste and smell. The Presiding deities of these senses of knowledge are respectively, Dik, wind, the Sun, Varuṇa and the Aśvin-s. Their abodes are respectively ear, skin, eye, tongue and nose.

(73)

Internal Functions of Senses of Knowledge and the External ones of Senses of Action :

புந்தியிந் திரியங்க டாமுணரும் விடயம்
 புறமெனவே யுள்ளுமுணர்ந் திடுஞ்செவிகள் புதைப்பி
 னுய்த்தபிரா ணாதியொலி கேட்கையன்னா திகளை
 யுண்ணும்போ தழல்குளிர்ச்சி யறிதல்விழி மூடின்
 மெத்துமக விருளறித லுற்காரா திகளின்
 விளங்குகவை கந்தமறிந் திடன்முறையே யாகும்
 வைத்தகரு மேந்திரியத் தொழிலுரைத்த னடத்தல்
 வழங்கல்விட லானந்தித் திடுதலென வறியே.

Just as the senses of cognition comprehend the external objects, in the same way, they comprehend their respective objects internally too. It is thus: if the ears are closed with fingers, then there is the experience of the sound of vital-airs that cause exhalation and inhalation. Hotness and coldness which pertain to food and drinks which are taken in are experienced by the sense of touch inside the body. Darkness is cognized inside in close quarters when the eyes are closed. The qualities of taste and smell present in the substance which is taken in are comprehended by the sense of taste and smell when they are ejected through the mouth.¹

Know that the functions of the five senses of action² are speech, grasping, motion, excretion and enjoyment.

NOTES:

1. *PD*, 2.7-4.
2. Senses of action are the organs of speech, hands, feet and the organs of excretion and generation.

(74)

Presiding Deities and Abodes of the Senses of Action:

அங்கிமக பதியிரவி மிருத்தியுபிர சேச

னதிதெய்வம் வாய்மதலாங் கோளகங்க டான

மிங்கிவைக ளுட்கரன மிருவகையிந் திரிய
 மென்னவரு பதினான்கு மத்தியான் மிகமாந்
 தங்குமிவற் றுறுவிடய மாதிபவு திகமாந்
 தகுமதிதே வதையாகி தெய்வீக மாமிப்
 புங்கவரே யிந்திரியம் விராட்புருடற் கதுமெய்
 பொன்கருப்பற் கதுமறைப்பா மந்தரியா மிக்கே.

Of these senses of action, the presiding deities are respectively Fire, Indra, the Sun,¹ Yama and Prajapati. The abodes of these sense-organs are mouth, etc.

The fourteen factors, namely, the four kinds of internal organ, the five senses of knowledge and of action are intrinsic.² The respective objects of these fourteen factors constitute what is known as *ādhibhautika*. The fourteen-presiding deities of these fourteen factors are designated as *ādhidaivika*. These fourteen presiding deities constitute the sense-organs present in the body of Vaiśvānara.³ They constitute the subtle body in the case of Hiraṇyagarbha.⁴ In the case of the *antaryāmin* or the indwelling spirit or God the presiding deities are concealed (as they merge in *māyā* which is the limiting adjunct of God).

NOTES:

1. According to the *Vedānta-Paribhāṣā* and the *Vedānta*

Sāra, Viṣṇu is the presiding deity of the feet.

See *VP*, p.121 and *Vedānta Sāra*, p.7.

2. These cause intrinsic influences such as desire or anger and so on (*ādhyātmika*).
3. Vaiśvānara is pure consciousness delimited by the aggregate of all gross-bodies. See *Vedānta Sāra*, p.6.
4. Hiraṇyagarbha is pure-consciousness conditioned by the aggregate of all subtle bodies.

See *Vedānta Sāra*, p.5.

(75 - 76)

Nature and Functions of Ten kinds of Vital Airs:

நின்றிதயந் தனையடைந்து பிராணனுச வாச
 நிகவாச மியற்றுமபா னன்குதத்தி னுற்றுச்
 சென்றொழிய மலசலங்க ளொழித்தலுறுஞ் சமானன்
 சேர்ந்துந்தி யன்னரச முறுப்பனைத்தும் பகுக்கு
 மென்றுமுதா னன்களமுற் றுற்காரம் புரியு
 மிருந்தங்க மெங்கும்பியா னன்பரிக்கு முடம்பைக்
 குன்றுதலி னாகன் சோம் பாவித்தல் விளைக்குங்
 கூர்மனால் விக்கலொடு தேக்குவரு மன்றே.

(76)

தும்மலுட னிருமல்வருங் கிரிதரனா னகுதல்
 சொல்லுதலாந் தேவதத்தனாற்சோக ராக
 மென்மைதருந் தனஞ்செயனத் தனஞ்செயனாம் வாயு
 வியனுயிர்போ பைந்நாளின் வீங்கிவெடித் தகலு

மிம்மையி னாகாதிபுற வாயுக்க ளைந்தா
 யிசைத்திடுங்கள் மேந்திரியங் கட்கதுசேட் டிக்குந்
 தன்மையாம் பிராணாதி பஞ்சவா யுக்க
 டாமியக்கும் விடாமன்ஞா னேந்திரியங் களையே.

(The five vital-airs are known as *prāṇa*, *apāna*, *samāna*, *udāna* and *vyāna*). Of these, *prāṇa* rests in the heart and causes inhalation and exhalation. *Apāna* resides in the region of the organ of excretion and it causes excretion of the waste material from the body. *Samāna* resides in the region of the navel and it always distributes the essence of what is eaten or drunk throughout the body. *Udāna* is in the region of the throat causing vomiting. *Vyāna* resides in the entire body sustaining the latter.

(Some are of the opinion that there are five other 'airs' named *nāga*, *kūrma*, *kṛkala*, *devadatta* and *dhanañjaya*). Of these, *nāga*, which is powerful causes laziness and yawning; *kūrma* is what brings about hiccough and belching; *kṛkala* is what gives rise to sneezing and coughing; *devadatta* is what brings about the activities of laughing and speaking; and, *dhanañjaya* is what brings about infirmity owing to grief and passion. Five days after the body becomes lifeless and thereby becomes swollen and when the skull breaks off¹ this kind of air leaves it.

The five vital airs, namely, *nāga*, etc., are referred to as external ones. They activate the senses of action. The vital airs *prāna*, etc., always activate the senses of knowledge.

NOTES:

1. See *Tamil Lexicon*, Vol. III, Part I, p.1814 (b).

(77)

சாற்றின்வயி ரம்பண்முகக் கியன்பிரபஞ் சனனந்
 தரியாமி யொடுமகாப் பிராணனெனும் பெயர்கொள்
 காற்றிவைகள் சீவசம் பந்தமா யேயுட்
 கரணங்க ளியக்கியிடு மண்முதலைந்திற்கும்
 பாற்றிகழும் வியாபாரம் பொறைபிண்ட கரணம்
 பாகமொடு விரகமிடங் கொடையாகுந் தரும்
 மாற்றலுறுந் திண்மைநெகிழ் வழற்சிபரி வெளியா
 மயனொடரி யரஸீசன் சதாசிவன்றே வதைகள்.

The five vital airs associated with the soul activate the internal organs such as mind and the like; and, they bear the designations of *Vairambha*, *mukhya*, *prabhāñjana*, *antaryāmī* and *mahāprāna*.

The five functions of the five gross elements, namely, earth, etc., are respectively sustentation, agglutination, transmission of heat, deprivation of moisture, furnishment of space. Their intrinsic

characteristics are hardness, fluidity, burning sensation, tepid touch and openness. The presiding deities of these five elements are respectively, Brahmā, Viṣṇu, Rudra, Īsa and Sadāśiva.

The Qualities of the Five elements and the Three factors, namely, the Knower, Knowledge and the objects Known:

(78)

கந்தமுத லாயினவே குணங்களவை தம்நுட்
 ககனத்திற் கொலியொன்றே வளிக்கிரண்டு றுடனே
 யந்தழலுக் கொளியோடுமூன் றறற்கிரத மொடுநான்
 கைந்துமண மொடுபுலிக்கென் றறிகதிரி புடிகண்
 முந்துஞா திருஞான ஞேயமா மிவற்றின்
 மூலவகங் காரஞ்சேர் சீவசை தன்னிய
 நந்துஞா திருமனத்திற் கதுவறிவு ஞான
 நவின்றபவு திகவிடயஞேயமென வறியே.

Know that smell, etc., constitute the qualities of five elements of earth, etc. Of these, sound manifests itself in space; sound and touch, In air; sound, touch and colour, in fire; sound, touch, colour and taste; in water; sound, touch, colour, and smell, in earth.

Hereafter the three factors, namely, knower, knowledge and the objects known will be explained.

Of these, knower is the soul which is pure consciousness reflected in mind.¹ The consciousness reflected in [the modification of] the mind is knowledge. The five elements set forth earlier [along with their qualities and also mind and its qualities] all come under the category of the objects known.

NOTES:

1. Pure consciousness when reflected in *avidyā* which is *prakṛtitattva* wherein *sattvaguna* is less predominant is the soul. Since there is the distinct manifestation of soul in the form 'I', only when there is the relation to mind it is stated here that the reflection of pure consciousness in mind is the soul. Strictly speaking the 'I-cognition' involves reference not to pure consciousness or mind but to the blend of the two.

Total Number of Principles:

(79)

ஈங்குமன மிருபத்து நான்காவ தாகு
 மிருபத்தைந் தாவதுதான் மூலவகங் கார
 மாங்கதனை யடைதலுறு சிதாபாச சீவ
 னறையினிரு பத்தாறா மவன்மாயை மருவு
 மோங்கொளியா மீசனிரு பத்தேழா மவனவ்
 வுயிர்முதலாந் துரியனிரு பத்தெட்டா மவனா
 நீங்கலரு மீசனதிட் டாத்திருவாம் பிரம
 நிகழ்த்தினிரு பத்தொன்ப தாவதுவா மன்றே.

Mind is the twenty-fourth principle.¹ The collective *ahaṅkāra* which is termed *mūlāhaṅkāra* is the twenty-fifth principle.² The reflected image of pure consciousness in mind is the soul which is the twenty-sixth principle. God- the effulgent principle who is in association with *māyā* is the twenty-seventh principle. The substratum of the soul referred to above is the *kūṭastha* and is the twenty-eighth principle. The substratum of God who is all-pervasive is Brahman which is the twenty-ninth principle.

NOTES:

1. The twenty-four principles are five senses of knowledge, five senses of action, five vital-airs, five elements, namely, earth, etc., and four kinds of internal organ, namely, *manas*, *buddhi*, *ahaṅkāra* and *citta*;
2. See note on Verse 68 of the present textā.

Two types of Creation of the World;

(80)

தெரித்தகா ரியத்தோற்ற மிருவகை யாங் கிரம
 சிருட்டியுக பற் சிருட்டி யெனமுலப் பகுதி
 விரித்தமக தத்வமக முந்தன்மாத் திரையாம்
 விளங்கு சத்தப் பிரகிருதி யாற்பஞ்ச பூத
 முரைத்தவற்றிற் பிரமாண்ட பிண்டமுத லாய
 வுலகுதயந் தான்கிரம சிருட்டிநிறை கடலின்

மருத்துவசத் தலையாதி போற்சிவத்தின் மாயா
மயநாம வருவநிகழ் வாழுகபற் சிருட்டி.

The creation of the world is two- fold: (i) Creation in due order; and, (ii) simultaneous creation. Of these, creation of the world in due order is as follows: from the *prakṛti-tattva*¹ comes into existence the *mahat-tattva*; this *mahat-tattva* gives rise to the *ahaṅkāratattva*. From the latter (wherein the *tamo-guṇa* is predominant); the five non-quintuplicated subtle elements come into existence. From these seven factors,² there come into existence the five elements [namely, earth, water, fire, air and space]. From the five elements arise the worlds that are farther and farther above and farther and farther beneath and also four varieties of gross bodies.³

Simultaneous creation consists in the appearance of the world which consists of name and form and which is indeterminable, from pure consciousness like the appearance of waves, etc., in the ocean due to wind.⁴

NOTES :

- 1) See Verse 63 of the present text?.
- 2) The *mahat-tattva*, the *ahaṅkāratattva* and the five non-quintuplicated elements.

- 3) The four varieties of gross bodies are *jarāyujā aṇḍajā, udbhijjā* and *svedajā*. Of these, the first are born of wombs; the second are born of eggs; the third are born of cleaving the earth; and the fourth are born of sweat.
- 4) By the expression "simultaneous creation", the author makes a reference to *dr̥ṣṭisr̥ṣṭivāda* otherwise known as *ekajīvavāda*. According to this view, pure consciousness associated with *avidyā* is *jīva* or the soul. Since *avidyā* is one, *jīva* also is one only. Creation of the world consists in the perception of it. The entire objects of the world including other gross bodies are only apparently real and not empirically real unlike in the view that the soul perceives the world of objects created by God. In contrast to this view, the other one, namely, the creation of the world in due order may be characterised as *Sr̥ṣṭadr̥ṣṭivāda*, that is, perception by the soul of the world created by God. See *SLS*, p. 272 and *SB*, pp. 234-237.

(81)

கருதிசித்த மாதலினா லிவையுடன்பா டாகுந்
 தூயபரப் பிரமமாம் விகாரமிலா விறையாற்
 றகுதலெங்ஙன் காரியங்கள் சடப்பகுதி யென்னிற்
 றாளிலாக் கதிர்ச்சிலையி லிச்சையிலா தெழுந்த
 பரிதியினா லழல்வரல்போற் பரசிவனான் மூலப்
 பகுதியிடை மகதாதி காரியங்கள் வரற்குக்
 கருதின்முர ணிலையாகு மெனப்புகல்வ ரறிஞர்
 காரியங்க டோற்றுதனால் வகையவையீண் டுரைப்பாம்.

These two kinds of creations are setforth in the *Upaniṣad-s* and hence they are commendable.¹

If it is asked as to how could pure consciousness which is immutable could create the world of objects through *prakṛti* which is insentient, it is answered thus: just as from the sun-stone which is free from any desire or effort there arises fire when it comes into contact with the sun that arises in an effortless manner without any apparent desire whatsoever, in the same way, there arises the world of objects beginning with *mahat-tattva*, etc., from the *prakṛtitattva* which is in the immediate presence of the immutable pure consciousness. Wise men affirm that this way of viewing the creation of the world is not in conflict with any valid proof whatsoever.

The process of creation is four-fold, which we shall set forth now.

NOTES:

1. The Upaniṣadic text - *tadetattrayam svapnamāyā mātram* which treats of God, soul and the the world as illusory supports the view of simultaneous creation.
2. *tamaḥpradhānaprakṛteḥ tadbhogāyā īśvarājñayā viyatpavana tejo, mbubhuvo bhūtāni jajñire, PD. 1.18.*
3. The instance of the Sun cited as an illustration to explain the process of creation of the world by the pure

consciousness through the *prakṛtitattva* must be understood in a restricted sense, namely, that just as in the presence of the sun the sun-stone emits fire, in the same way, in the presence of the pure consciousness the insentient *prakṛti* gets itself transformed into the form of the world. The sun rises in an effortless manner without any desire whatsoever. But the pure consciousness, owing to its association with *prakṛti*, comes to be endowed with the adventitious characteristics of the knowledge and the will to create the world. Knowledge and will are the modifications of *prakṛtitattva*. Pure Consciousness comes to be associated with these modes of *prakṛti* and is viewed as God and as an omniscient being. And in accordance with the past merits and demerits of the souls, pure consciousness associated with *māyā* has the desire and the will to create the world for the experience of the souls.

Four-fold Process of Creation:

(82)

விருத்திபரி ணாமமா ரம்பம் விவர்த் தகமாம்
 விரிந்தபடங் குடிபாவம் பாறயிரா கார
 முரைத்தலுறு தந்துபட நியாயம்வன் பமுதை
 யுரகவுரு முறையவற்றின் றிட்டாந்த மாகும்
 வருத்துகயிற் றரவங்கத் திருவநகர் குற்றிர்
 மகன்கனவிந் திரசாலஞ் சுத்திகா ரசிதந்
 தெரித்தவிவை முதலனவாந் திரிதலின்மெய்ப் பொருளிற்
 றிரிந்திடுபொய்ப் பொருளதுகற் பிதமாதற் குவமை.

The process of creation of objects is four-fold as *vṛddhi*, *pariṇāma*, *ārambha* and *vivarta*.¹ Of these *vṛddhi* may be explained with the illustration of a cloth wherein the picture of a house is artistically worked out and which when unfolded appears as house itself. *Pariṇāma*, *ārambha* and *vivarta* may be explained with the illustrations of milk that undergoes modification into the form of curd; of threads, which give rise to a cloth, and, of a thick rope that appears as serpent respectively.

The appearance of serpent that causes fear in a thick rope, and the appearances of an imaginary city in the sky, of a stump in the form of a person, of dream, and of an image caused by magic, and of the appearance of silver in a piece of shell - all these serve as examples to show the false appearance of the fleeting world in the pure consciousness that is permanent.

(83)

பொய்ப்பொருள்கற் பிதமாயிற் றவிகாரி யாகப்

பொருந்துமுயி ரிடத்தெனின்முன் பிராந்தியார்க்கென்னி

லொப்பில்சதி பதிரதிமா லுருவச் சொப் பனந்தா

னொரு முனிவன் பாலுதிப்பி னதனாலங் கவனுக்

கெப்பமுது மிலாததுபோற் சான்றாமான் மாவி

லிலங்குகுண வுருவமாம் பகுதியினான் மருளு

மெய்ப்பரிய ஞாதிருவும் பிராந்திஞா னமும்பொய்
விடயஞே யமும்வரினு மவற்கிடையூ நிலையே.

It may be asked as to whom does the erroneous-cognition of the world that appears in the pure consciousness belong, it is answered thus: a saint may perceive an incomparably chaste woman, her husband and the amorous activities between the two in a dream; but he will not be emotionally affected thereby. In the same way, the appearances of the knower [who is the blend of pure consciousness and mind], of mental states or modes of *avidyā* and also the objects of these cognitions due to *prakṛti* that consists of the three strands of *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* in the witness-self do not impair the true nature of the latter.¹

NOTES:

1. According to our author, the pure consciousness conditioned by the gross and the subtle body is the *kūṭastha*. The reflection of the latter in mind is the soul. Knowledge is either the modification of mind or the modification of *avidyā* inspired by the reflection of consciousness in it. The cognition of pot is the mental state inspired by the reflection of consciousness in it, while the cognition of shell-silver, dream objects, etc., are the modes of *avidyā* inspired by the reflection of consciousness in them. The *kūṭastha* is the witness or the

sākṣi of all these and it is not affected in any way by their appearances. The erroneous cognition of objects pertains to the soul.

Two-fold form of the World:

(84)

இறைவனாற் றோன்றியமா யாமயமா முலக
 மிருந்தபடி யிருக்குந்தன் வடிவினா லதனுண்
 மறைவிலாச் சீவபுத்தி விருத்திகற் பிதமா
 மற்றொருபோக் கியவடிவ மேவிருப்பு விடயம்
 வெறுவிதாம் வெறுப்புவிட யத்தினொடு நொதுமல்
 விடயமெனத் திரிவிதமா மவையாவை யென்னின்
 முறையின்வனி தாதிபுலி யெழுவாய்வீழ் துரும்பு
 முதலனவா மெனமொழிவர் முற்றுமுணர்ந் துடையோர்.

Wise men declare that each object of the world projected by God through *māyā* is of uniform nature. And, the objects of the world are fancied in a three-fold form by the souls through their mental modes that are not concealed.¹ It is thus: a damsel, a tiger, and a straw strewn over the earth respectively become the objects of desire, aversion and indifference.

NOTES:

1. Mental modes like desire, aversion, etc., are manifested by the witness-self. They do not exist independent of

their being perceived. This is what is meant when it is said that the mental modes are not concealed.

(85)

ஈசனிநுமிதமான வேகாகா ரமும்பி
 னெய்துமுயிர்க் கற்பிதமாம் பலவாகா ரமுமோர்
 தேசவிட யத்துறுதற் கெவ்வாறிங் கென்னிற்
 றிட்டாந்த மீசனிநு மிதமணியா திகடாம்.
 பேசிலொரு தகையாய்ப்பேசத் திருபுத்தி தன்கற்
 பிதநானா விதத்தினா லவைதமைப்பெற் றோணுக்
 காசைவிட யமதாகிப் பெறாற்குவெறுப் பாகி
 யரியதுற விக்குபேட் சாவிடய மாமே.

Each object created by God is of uniform nature. [Now], the question arises as to how it could be viewed in a manifold manner by the individual soul. This question is answered on the basis of the following illustrative example. Gems created by God are of uniform nature. Yet, they are fancied to be of different nature by the individual souls thus: in the case of one who is in possession of them, they are objects of attachment. In the case of one who could not get them, they are objects of aversion. In the case of one who has commendable aloofness from them, they are objects of indifference.¹

NOTES:

1. *Vide:*

- i) *īsanirmitamaṇyādau vastunyekavidhe sthite
bhoktrdhīvr̥ttinānātvāttadbhogo bahudheṣyate,*
- ii) *hr̥ṣyatyeko maṇim labdhvā kṛuddhatyanyoyalābhataḥ
paśyatyeva virakto'tra na hr̥ṣyati na kupyati*
- iii) *priyo'priya upekṣyaścetyākārā maṇigāstrayaḥ
sr̥ṣṭā jīvairīsasr̥ṣṭam rūpam sādharāṇam triṣu*

PD, 4-20, 21, 22.

(86)

அப்பொருடா னேவிளங்கித் தோன்றுறுதற் கின்னு
மறைதுமோர் திட்டாந்தந் தோன்றியவோர் மாது
மெய்ப்பரிசோர் திறமாகப் போத்திருக்கள் புத்தி
விருத்திகற் பிதத்தினாற் றாதைக்கு மகளாய்த்
தப்பில் கொழு நற்குக்கா தலியாகி மகற்குத்
தாயாகி மாதுலற்கு மருகியா யிருப்ப
ளிப்பரிசு விடயமெலா மிறைவனிரு மிதமு
மிலங்குயிர்க்கற் பிதமுமென விருதிறத்துற் றிடுமே.

To clarify further what is set forth above¹ we shall now set forth another illustration. The physique of a damsel is of uniform nature. Yet, she is viewed in a manifold manner by different souls thus: the parent views her as his daughter; the sincere husband, as wife; the son, as mother; and the father-in-law, as

daughter-in-law.² Similar consideration applies to every object of the world. It comes to this: the object of the world assume a two-fold form: (i) as created by God; and, (ii) as fancied by the souls

NOTES:

1) This refers to the view that every object of God's creation is of uniform nature but it is viewed to be manifold.

2) *Vide:*

*bhāryā snuṣā nanānda ca yātā mātetyanekadhā
pratiyogidhiyā yoṣidbhidyate na svarūpataḥ*

PD., 4-23.

Two-fold Path adopted by the Souls:

(87)

அண்ணனிரு மிதப்பிரபஞ் சந்தான்வா திப்ப
தல்லாமை யானுநூ லாசிரிய வடிவாய்
நண்ணலரு முத்திசா தனமாயுந் தன்னா
னமுவவொண்ணா மையினானு மனையதுதா னிற்க
வெண்ணரிய சீவகற் பிதமாய வதுதா
னிருபிரபஞ் சங்க்ளசாத் திரத்தொடசாத் திரமாங்
கண்ணுமசாத் திரப்பிரபஞ் சங்கொலிரு திறனாங்
கழறிற்றீ விரமந்த மெனவவையீண் டுரைப்பாம்.

Let the objects of the world created by God be severally uniform in nature. They are not sublated till the rise of the knowledge of Brahman and they serve

as the basis for the souls to attain liberation - the supreme human end through the instruction of the scripture and the preceptor.

And, the path adopted by the souls is two-fold as the spiritual path and the material one. Of these two, the latter one is two-fold as intense and moderate. We shall explain these now.

(88)

சீவபர விசாரணையே யுரைத்தலரி தாஞ்சாத்
 திரப்பிரபஞ் சங்காமா திகளேதீ விரமாங்
 காவலுறு சாதிகரு மாதிகமொ டேதான்
 கருதுமனக் கற்பிதமே மந்தமசாத் திரத்தின்
 மேவுறுமீவ் விருதிறமு மாருயிர்மெய்க் காட்சி
 விரோதிகளா தலின்ஞானம் பயிறற்கு முன்ன
 மோவுவசாத் திரப்பிரபஞ் சந்தான்மெய்க்ஞான
 வுதவியா யான்மகாட் சியின்பின்விடு வதுவாம்.

Enquiry into the nature of the soul constitutes the spiritual path. Passion, hatred, etc., constitute the path that is material and intense. The mental resolves to carry out the ritual-actions based upon one's class and stage of life constitute the path that is material and moderate. The pursuit of the material path which is two-fold must be abandoned prior to the commencement of the pursuit of the spiritual path, as

it is opposed to the realization of the aim, namely, the attainment of the direct knowledge of the true nature of one's soul. The pursuit of spiritual path, being the means of the realization of the true nature of one's self, is to be given up after one attains the latter.

Forms of Superimposition:

(89-90)

தீவிரமந் தஞ்சுஞயிர்க் காட்சியுற்ற பின்னுந்
 திகழ்முத்தி பெறற்பொருட்டு விடுவனவென் றறிக
 பாவமுறு மவிச்சின்னோ பாதிபதி விம்போ
 பாதியுட னத்தியா சோபாதி யெனவே
 மேவுமுபா திகளொருமுன் றுளவவற்றை முறையே
 விளம்பியிடிற் சுழுத்தியுரு வாமவித்தை தானே
 யாவரண வவிச்சின்னோ பாதியாம் பிரத்திய
 கான்மாவிற் கதனதுகா ரியமாம்புத் தியினில்.

(90)

பற்றியவான் மாப்பதிவிம் பித்திடுத றானே
 பதிவிம்போ பாதியாம் புத்திகத மாய
 முற்றுசுக துக்கங்க ளுயிர்நுகர்தல் போல
 முயலுதலே யத்தியா சோபாதி யாகு
 முற்ற வத்தி யாசவிலக் கணமாம்வே றொன்றி
 லொன்றுணர்த லாமிப்பி வெள்ளியது போல
 மற்றதுநால் வகைப்படுமா மித்தையுட னிதர
 மற்றிதரே தரஞ்சத்தி யங்களினா லன்றே.

Know that the latent impressions born out of the pursuit of material path in its two-fold form - intense and moderate may continue to exist even after one has attained the realisation of the true nature of one's soul; and, in order that the realized soul may experience the bliss of *jīvanmukti*, the above latent impressions must be overcome with conscious effort. In order that the pure consciousness may be viewed as *kūṭastha*, the soul and as the agent, experient and knower there are three limiting conditions designated as *avicchinopādhi*, *pratibimbopādhi* and *adhyāso-pādhi*. These three may be described respectively as follows: *avidyā* in its concealing phase veils the true nature of consciousness. This state is known as deep sleep state.¹

In the mind which is the effect of *avidyā*, the *kūṭastha* gets reflected. Since mind serves as the reflecting medium it is termed *pratibimbopādhi*.²

The relation of mind, sense-organs, etc., to the pure consciousness conditioned by *avidyā* serves as the condition for the soul to make efforts to experience happiness, etc., through contact with the objects of the world. The above relation serves as a condition for the soul to be viewed as a knower, an agent and an experient. Hence it is termed *adhyāso-pādhi*.³ *Adhyāsa* is defined as cognition of an object in a substratum where it does not exist.

It is similar to the appearance of silver in a shell. It is four-fold as *mithyādhyāsa*, *itarādhyāsa*, *itaretarādhyāsa* and *satyādhyāsa*.

NOTES:

- 1) Since *avidyā* envelopes the pure consciousness in all the three states of waking, dream and deep sleep, it is termed *avicchinopādhi* or a continuous limiting condition.
- 2) Mind cannot be termed as *avicchinopādhi* in the sense that it functions as the limiting condition of the pure consciousness only in the state of dream and waking.
- 3) In the state of waking pure consciousness associated with *avidyā* is falsely related to the psycho-physical organism and considers itself to be of the nature of what it is not.
- 4) See for details Verses 91, 92 and 93.

(91)

நெருப்பினொடு புணர்ச்சியாற் புனற்சுழற்சி வரல்போ
 னித்தமுறு மான்மசந் நிதியதனின் முறையே
 சரிப்பினொடு காண்டனினை வறலறிதல் வரலாற்
 றகுந்தூல மெய்மி த்தி யாத்தியா சந்தா
 னிரிப்பருமிந் தியங்களே யிதராத்தி யாச
 மிதரேத ராத்தியா சங்கரண மாகுந்
 தரிப்பரிய மூலவகங் காரமது தானே
 சத்தியாத்தி யாசமெனச் சாற்றுவர்தக் கவரே.

Just as water [which has cool touch] comes to be endowed with hot touch owing to its association with fire, in the same way, in the case of the *kūṭastha* owing to its (false) association with the gross body that

is fit for the experience of happiness, misery, etc., there arises erroneous cognition of the forms 'I move about, 'I see', 'I deliberate', 'I know', etc. The false identification of the *kūṭastha* with the physical body is termed *mithyādhyāsa*.¹

The relation of *kūṭastha* to the senses of knowledge and senses of action, to the four kinds of internal organ and to *māyā* are respectively termed *itarādhyāsa*, *itaretarādhyāsa* and *satyādhyāsa*.

NOTES:

The *kūṭastha* which is the primary self (*mukhyātmā*) (See Note on Verse 34) which is real (*satya*) acquires self-awareness in the form 'I' when it is associated with mind getting reflected therein. This erroneous cognition of *kūṭastha* in the form 'I' is termed *satyādhyāsa*. This is also known as *nirupādhikādhyāsa*. (See Note No.1 on the following verse).

There is the false notion of 'I' in the physical body which is known as *mithyātmā* (See Note on Verse 34). This false notion is designated as *mithyādhyāsa*.

The sense organs are not directly related to the content of 'I-cognition, as one does not have the experience of the forms such as 'I am the eye' and the like. But there is the false cognition of their characteristics such as blindness and the like upon the content of the 'I'-cognition. This false cognition of the characteristics alone and not of the sense-organs is termed *itarādhyāsa*.

In the case of the content of the 'I'-cognition which is the soul and which is a blend of the *kūṭastha* and the mind there is the erroneous cognition of mind and its characteristics upon

the *kūṭastha* and also the erroneous cognition of the relation of the essential nature of *kūṭastha*, namely, manifestation to mind and the reflected image of *kūṭastha* therein. This is termed *itaretarādhyāsa*.

It must be noted here that these two forms of erroneous cognitions fall under what is known as *taddharmādhyāsa*, that is, *sopādikādhyāsa* (See Note on the following verse).

There is the false notion of 'mine' in the case of son and others who are characterized as *gauṇātmā* (See Note No.6 on the verse 34). This false notion is known as *sambandhādhyāsa*.

ABBREVIATIONS:

- PD* - *Pañcadaśī* of Vidyāraṇya with the commentary of Rāmakṛṣṇa. Bombay: Nirnaya Sagar Press. 1912.
- SB* - *Siddhāntabindu* of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī with the Commentary, *Nyāyaratnāvalī* of Brahmānanda. Bombay: Nirnaya Sagar Press, 1917.
- SLS*, - *Siddhānta-leśa-saṅgraha* of Appayya Dīkṣita with the Commentary, *Kṛṣṇālaṅkāra*. Secunderabad: Śrīmad Appayyadīkṣitendra Granthāvalī Prakāśanasamiti. 1973.

(To be continued)



THE PHILOSOPHY OF ADVAITA

(Based on the study of The *Śāyana-bhāṣya* on the
Taittirīya-Āraṇyaka-Prapātakās 7-9)

C.L. Ramakrishnan

INTRODUCTION

1. The Text and Its Contribution

The *Taittirīya-Āraṇyaka* consists of ten sections each section known as *prapāṭaka*. The seventh, the eighth and the ninth *prapāṭaka-s* constitute the *Taittirīyopaniṣad* in three *Vallī-s* - *Śikṣavallī*, *Brahma (Ānanda) Vallī* and *Bhṛguvallī*. Of these, the *Śikṣavallī* is termed *Samhitī-Upaniṣad* and the remaining two *Vallī-s* are called *Vāruṇī-Upaniṣad*.

A brief outline of the text is as follows:

The First Chapter or the *prapāṭaka* known as *Śikṣavallī* consists of twelve sections. The first section contains the prayer to Gods for attaining congenial relation between the disciple and the teacher. The second section deals with the science of

pronunciation, as a mastery over it is absolutely essential for the recitation of the Vedic texts. The third section deals with meditation on the *Samhitā*, that is, intimate connection, between two syllables which will secure fruits here and in a hereafter. If this meditation is carried out without any desire for fruits, then one will attain the purity of heart which is the prerequisite for the attainment of the knowledge of Brahman. The fourth section sets forth the *mantra-s* to be recited for attaining good memory, sound health and intelligence and also of the oblations to be offered for attaining wealth. The fifth section deals with the meditation upon the *Vyāhṛti-s*, namely, *bhūh*, *bhuvah* and *suvah* which would give rise to the fruit of sovereignty. In the sixth section, meditation upon Brahman as immanent in the heart as possessed of attributes such as *manomayatva* is prescribed. The seventh section deals with the meditation upon Brahman as associated with the perceptible qualities. The eighth section deals with the meditation upon the mystic syllable 'Om'. The ninth section deals with the meditation upon 'Om' along with the performance of obligatory rites prescribed in the *śruti-s* and *smṛti-s*. The tenth section is to be recited by those who could not recite the entire *Veda*. The eleventh section prescribes *karma*, the performance of which without any desire for fruit would give rise to an intense desire

for attaining the knowledge of Brahman. The twelfth section contains the expressions of gratitude to God by the disciple.

The Second Chapter or the *prapāṭaka* entitled *Brahma-vallī* consists of nine sections. The first section sets forth the hymn to be recited for the maintenance of the congenial relationship between the disciple and the teacher. The second section in the beginning sets forth in an epigrammatic manner the essence of the *Upaniṣad-s* in the statement - *brahma vid āpnoti param* and proceeds to state that Brahman is real, consciousness and infinite by nature. It is immanent in the heart of every being as self-luminous consciousness; and, he who realizes it as his true nature experiences all the objects of the world simultaneously by remaining as their witness. In order to explain the infinite nature of Brahman, the *Upaniṣad* sets forth the manifestation of the entire world from it. Brahman which is of the nature of pure consciousness is concealed as it were by *māyā* or *avidyā* which is the causal body and by the subtle and the gross body. These three when expanded are viewed as *annamaya-kośa*, *prāṇamaya-kośa*, *manomaya-kośa*, *vijñānamaya-kośa* and *ānanda-maya-kośa*. Of these, the *ānandamaya-kośa* is the causal body, while the *annamaya-kośa* is the gross body. The

other three constitute the subtle body. Brahman as pure consciousness is said to be the support of all these sheaths. The details regarding these are set forth in the third, fourth and the fifth sections. In the sixth section, reasons for the existence of Brahman are given. It is said in the seventh section that the experience of bliss by every being is only a reflection of Brahman which is unconditioned bliss in its mental states. The incomparable, transcendental and the unconditioned bliss that constitutes the nature of Brahman is explained by contrasting it with the worldly happiness experienced by everyone beginning with the human being and ending with Hiraᅇyagarbha in the eighth section. It is said herein that he who has withdrawn his mind from the external objects and fixes his mind upon the physical body leaves out the false notion of the self in the son, wife and others. In the same way, he who concentrates his mind upon the *prāᅇamaya-kośa*, the *manomaya-kośa*, the *vijñānamaya-kośa* and the *āᅇandamaya-kośa* successively leaves out the false notion that each preceding one is the self. And when he realizes Brahman - the substratum of all sheaths he gives up the false notion that the *āᅇandamaya-kośa* constitutes the self. The ninth section states that he who has realized Brahman is freed from the transmigratory process and is not concerned with the meritorious and the demeritorious

acts he had performed, as the fruits of these are annihilated by the knowledge of Brahman which he has attained.

The third section or the *prapātaka* known as *Bhṛgu-vallī* deals with the sacred dialogue between Bhṛgu - the disciple and Varuṇa, his father and teacher. It consists of ten sections. In the first section Brahman is defined as that from which all beings come into existence, from which all these derive their existence and manifestation and into which they lapse back at the time of dissolution. In sections two to six, the process through which Bhṛgu identified Brahman as the cause of the universe by enquiring into *anna*, *prāṇa*, *manas*, *vijñāna* and *ānanda* is set forth. Herein, it is said that he who knows Brahman in the manner in which Bhṛgu realized it would remain as Brahman itself. The sections beginning with seven and ending with ten set forth meditative exercises upon food. And it concludes with the description of the mystical outpourings of the realized soul.

While commenting upon these Chapters *Sāyana*, our author, discusses the Advaita concepts as propounded by the author of the *sūtra-s* and by Śrī Śaṅkara. The import of the relevant *adhikaraṇa-s* of the *Brahma-sūtra-s* is discussed in an elegant manner.

2. Commentaries on the Text

There are three important commentaries on the text from the Advaita stand-point; and, they are:

1. the *bhāṣya* by Śrī Śaṅkara,
2. the *Vedārthaprakāśa* by Śrī Sāyaṇa; and,
3. the *Dīpikā* by Śrī Śaṅkarānanda.

Of these, Śrī Śaṅkara's *bhāṣya* has been commented upon by Śrī Acyutakṛṣṇānandatīrtha and Ānandagiri. Śrī Sureśvara wrote a metrical paraphrase of Śrī Śaṅkara's *bhāṣya* and it is known as *Vārttika*.

3. The Author - His Identity, Date and Works

Dr. M. Kripacharyulu in his monumental work - *SĀYANA AND MĀDHAVA-VIDYĀRĀNYA - A Study of Their Lives and Letters* provides us with a wealth of information regarding the life, date and works of *Sāyaṇa*. He refers to a copper-plate inscription dated 1376 A.D unearthed near a village by name *Brahmaṇakra* in the Nellore District of Andhra Pradesh which mentions that that village was granted to some vedic scholars by Harihara II. Our author *Sāyaṇacārya* is mentioned as one of the donees in that inscription -

*yo vedabhāṣyakṛt dhīmān māyaṇācāryanandanah
asau śrī sāyaṇacāryaḥ bhāradvājo yajurnidhiḥ*

From this we may take that our author Sāyaṇa had flourished during the fourteenth century A.D.

Sāyaṇa and Mādhava - Vidyāraṇya were the sons of Māyaṇa, who was a minister to Saṅgama, a vassal king of Maṅgala Nilaya, now known as Maṅgala giri on the southern banks of the river Kṛṣṇavenī in Guntur District. A stone slab inscription in the temple of Arulāla Perumāl at Kāncīpuram in Tamil Nadu, mentions the name of our author's mother as Śrīmayī.

Sāyaṇa's eldest brother was Mādhavācārya, a great scholar and an outstanding statesman, who served as the Prime Minister of Harihara of Vijayanagara Empire. He took the name Vidyāraṇya on entering sannyāsa and adorned the Śārādā pīṭha at Śṛṅgeri as its pontiff. His youngest brother Bhoganātha was a poet of repute and adorned the court of Saṅgama II. Sāyaṇa had a sister by name Siṅgala.

Apart from the commentaries on the *Veda-s* - the *Taittirīya-Saṁhitā*, the *Rg-veda-Saṁhitā*, the *Sāmaveda-Saṁhitā*, the *Atharvaveda-Saṁhitā*, the *Taittirīya-Brāhmaṇa*, the *Taittirīyāranya*, the *Aitareya-Brāhmaṇa*, the *Aitareyāranya*, the eight

Brāhmaṇa-s of the *Sāmaveda*, the *Śatapatha-Brāhmaṇa* of the *Śukla-Yajurveda*, Sāyaṇa is credited with having authored *Subhāṣita-sudhānidhi*, *Mādha-vīyadhātuvṛtti*, *Puruṣārtha-sudhānidhi*, *Yajña-tantrasudhānidhi*, *Alaṅkāra-sudhānidhi*, *Prāyaś-citta-sudhānidhi* and *Āyurveda-sudhānidhi*. The contents of these works and their authorship have been dealt with in great detail in the research work of Dr M. Kripacharyulu referred to above.

4. Substance of this Paper

This Paper seeks to present the essence of the Philosophy of Advaita as elucidated in the commentary of Śrī Sāyaṇa known as *Vedārthaprakāśa* on the *Prapāṭaka-s* 7-9 of the *Taittirīyāranyaka* in regard to the nature of Brahman.

BRAHMAN

In the famous dialogue between Yājñavalkya and Maitreyī set forth in the *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad*, Yājñavalkya instructs Maitreyī thus:

*na vā are patyuḥ kāmāya patiḥ priyo bhavati
ātmanastu kāmāya sarvaṁ priyaṁ bhavati*

.....
*na vā are sarvasya kāmāya sarvaṁ priyaṁ bhavati,
ātmanastu kāmāya sarvaṁ priyaṁ bhavati.¹*

This means: 'Verily, not for the good of the husband is a husband dear, but for the good of the Self is he dear... verily, not for the good of anything is anything dear, but for the good of the Self is it dear'.

The *Upaniṣad* concludes by saying -

*ātmā vā are draṣṭavyo śrotavyo mantavyo
nididhyāsītavyaḥ*²

'It is the Self that is fit to be realized; and for realizing it one must pursue vedāntic study, reflection and meditation'.

From the above it is understood that the objects of the world are not loved for their own sake, but for the sake of the Self. If a thing is good for something else, then that something constitutes the true end. The passages cited above state that everything in the world gets its worth in reference to the Self. We must, therefore, conclude that the Self constitutes the Ultimate Value.

Now the question arises as to the exact nature of the Self. In the celebrated dialogue between Janaka and Yājñavalkya recorded in the section known as *Jyotirbrāhmaṇa* in the *Bṛhadāraṇyakā Upaniṣad*, Janaka raises the question as to what may be the light

on the basis of which the person with body-mind-complex acts.

*yājñavalkyā kiṃ jyotirevāyaṃ puruṣa iti.*³

Yājñavalkya initially suggests the luminaries like the Sun, the moon, the fire and the speech and finally affirms that it is the Self that serves as the light for the person to act.

*ātmaiva asya jyotirbhavati iti. ātmanaiva
ayam jyotiṣā āste palyete karma kurute
vipalyeti.*⁴

To the question as to what is the nature of the Self, Yājñavalkya replies -

*yo 'yam vijñānamayaḥ prāṇeṣu hr̥dyantarjyotiḥ
puruṣaḥ. sa samānaḥ san ubhau lokau anusañcarati
dhyāyati iva lelāyati iva.*⁵

'It is the self-luminous consciousness immanent in the heart, distinct from the vital airs and identified with the intellect. And being identified with the intellect it moves between the two worlds; it thinks *as it were*, moves *as it were*'.

Yājñavalkya proceeds to say that this self which is pure consciousness, by being falsely identified with

the internal organ experiences the three states of waking, dream and deep sleep. He explains this on the basis of the analogy of a large fish and a falcon thus:

- i) *tad yathā mahāmatsyaḥ ubhe kūle 'nusañcarati pūrvam ca aparam ca evamevāyam puruṣa etāu bhāvantānusañcarati svapnāntam ca buddhāntam ca.*⁶
- ii) *tadyathā asminnākāṣe śyeno vā suparṇo vā viparipatya śrāntaḥ samhatya pakṣau samlayāyaiva dhriyate evamevāyam puruṣa etasmā antāya dhāvati yatra supto na kañcana kāmam kāmāyate na kañcana svapnam paśyati.*⁷

These two texts mean:

'Just as a large fish swims alternately to both the banks of a river, so does this Self move to both the states of dream and waking';

'Just as a hawk or falcon roaming in the sky becomes tired, folds its wings and hastens to its nest so does this Self hastens for the state of deep sleep where falling asleep it cherishes no more desires and has no more dreams'.

It may be added here that the Self is pure consciousness. When associated with *māyā* or *avidyā*, the subtle body consisting of the five organs of

knowledge, the five organs of action, the five-fold vital air and the internal organ in its two-fold aspect of intellect and mind and the gross body, is the experient of the waking state. When associated with *māyā* and the subtle body, it is the experient of the dream state. And when associated with *avidyā* only it is the experient of the deep sleep state. It comes to this that the blend of the consciousness and the body-mind complex constitutes the soul. The consciousness-element in the soul is constant in and is also the witness of the three states.

Yājñavalkya further proceeds to state that the self-luminous consciousness is supra-relational as it is unattached.

*sa yat tatra kiñcit paśyati ananvāgataḥ
tena bhavati asaᅅgo ' hyayaᅅ puruᅅaḥ.*⁶

This is as it should be; for, the world of dream and that of waking are not present in the state of deep sleep. The world of dream is not present in the waking state and the objects of the waking state are not present in the state of dream. All these three appear alternately and so they are not real. The self-luminous consciousness which serves as the underlying principle of the three states which are not real is never

affected by them. This is the significance of the teaching of Yājñavalkya referred to above.

It should be noted here that the self-luminous consciousness is the true nature of the soul, as the soul is only a blend of the self-luminous consciousness and the body-mind-complex. The blend is caused by *māyā* which is identical with *avidyā*.

The Upaniṣadic text -

*ayamātmā brahma.*⁹

identifies the self-luminous consciousness known as Ātman as Brahman. Brahman is described in the *Taittirīya* text -

*satyam jñānam anantaṁ brahma.*¹⁰

as real, of the nature of consciousness and infinite. The three terms - *satya*, *jñāna* and *ananta* are in syntactic equation to one another. A syntactic equation is two-fold as primary and secondary. The primary one is that where the terms convey an unitary entity involving no relation; while the secondary one is that where the words convey the sense of relation. In statements such as 'This is that Devadatta' the words are said to be in primary syntactic equation as they convey the person - Devadatta-in-himself. And

in the statements such as 'The lotus lying in water is blue, fragrant and big', the words are said to be in secondary syntactic equation as they signify the object, lotus with different characteristics.

A characteristic is two-fold as *viśeṣaṇa* and *lakṣaṇa*. The former one is that which distinguishes the object to be defined from the objects of its own kind. The second one is that which distinguishes the object from everything that is different from it. The terms - *satya*, *jñāna* and *ananta* serve as *lakṣaṇa* in the sense that they distinguish Brahman from the non-real, insentient and limited entities. When it is said that space is an expanse extending in all directions (*avakāśa*), this characteristic does not exclude space from an object of its kind, as space is one only. Yet, this characteristic distinguishes the space from objects which are dissimilar to it. In the same way, the terms - *satya*, etc., distinguish Brahman from objects dissimilar to it.¹¹

Of these, the term - *satya* signifies that which does not leave out its true nature like the rope which serves as the substratum of the snake-illusion. An object is non-real, if it leaves out its form at some point of time. For example, the snake that appears in the rope. When viewed in this light, Brahman which is

the underlying principle of everything remains to be the same even during the state of liberation. Hence it is *satya* or real. The world, on the other hand, is sublated at the dawn of right knowledge and as it ceases to exist during the state of liberation, it is non-real. The text -

*māyāmātramidaṁ dvaitam advaitam paramārthataḥ.*¹²

states that the world characterised by duality is illusory and Brahman - the substratum of the absence of duality is real. The *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* provides the illustrative examples of pot, etc., which are the effects, and the lump of clay, etc., which constitute the cause to prove that the world which is the effect is non-real and Brahman - the cause is real.¹³

When it is said in the *Chāndogya* text that Brahman is real on the analogy of the lump of clay which is said to be real, a doubt may arise that Brahman may be insentient in nature. It is thus: Brahman is insentient; it is because it is real, like the lump of clay. In order to dispel this doubt, the *Upaniṣad* states that Brahman is *jñāna*. The lump of clay which is only provisionally real till there arises the knowledge of Brahman is insentient. Brahman, on the other hand, is absolutely real in the sense that it does not undergo any change at any point of time.

When it is said that Brahman is of the nature of knowledge, there may arise the doubt that it is limited. The basis for this doubt is: 'Brahman is limited; it is because it is the significance of the term - *jñāna*, like the knowledge of pot'. In ordinary experience the significance of the term - *jñāna* is the specific kind of mental state that brings in a relation between pot and its manifestation. Such a sense is arrived at on the basis of the etymological derivation of the word of the form 'that by which pot, etc., are known' (*jñāyate sphoryate ghatādikam anena iti*). In order to dispel this doubt, the word - *ananta*, is given in the text. It is because of the presence of the term - *ananta*, the word - *jñāna* is taken in the sense of knowledge-in-itself (*jñaptih, jñānam*). Unlike the knowledge of pot, for example, which is a kind of mental state and which is, therefore, limited, the significance of the term - *jñāna* is not a mental state and so it is not subject to limitation.

The word - *ananta* signifies that which is free from limitations. There are three kinds of limitations; and, they are: limitation by time, limitation by space and limitation by objects. Limitation by time consists in an object being existent at one point of time and non-existent at another point of time. Limitation by space consists in an object being present at one place

and not present at another place. Limitation by objects consists in an object being existent in its own form and non-existent in the form of another object.

Our author states that the *Śruti* text -

ākāśavat sarvagataśca nityaḥ

affirms that Brahman is eternal and omnipresent like space. It is eternal in the sense that it is related to all points of time. It is omnipresent in the sense that it is present everywhere. Further, the Upaniṣadic text -

brahmaivedam amṛtam purastāt

paścāt brahma dakṣiṇataśca uttareṇa

adhaścordhvaṃ ca prasṛtam

*brahmaivedam viśvamidam variṣṭham*¹⁴

states that Brahman is of the form of every object and is immortal. From this it is known that since there is no object apart from Brahman there is no question of Brahman being limited or conditioned by other objects. Thus that which is distinguished from entities which are non-real, insentient and limited is Brahman.

An objection suggests itself at this stage: the terms - *satya*, *jñāna* and *ananta* are stated to be intent upon eliminating or excluding that which is not real, which

is not of the nature of consciousness and which is not all-pervasive. In that case since the sense of the term - Brahman is not well known in ordinary experience the text consisting of these words as a whole cannot refer to anything.

Our author answers this objection by saying that the word - Brahman in the text -

satyam jñānam anantaṁ brahma

etymologically means that which is all-pervasive.¹⁵ He further cites the following passage from Śrī Śaṅkara's commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra* -

*sarvasya ātmatvācca brahmāstitvaprāsiddhiḥ
sarvo hyātmāstitvaṁ pratyeti.*¹⁶

This passage means that the existence of Brahman is well-known as the Self of every being. And every being experiences the existence of one's own Self. That Brahman is the true nature of the individual soul is proclaimed by the Upaniṣadic text -

*ayamātmā brahma.*¹⁷

Since the sense of the term - Brahman is well-known, the terms - *satya*, *jñāna* and *ananta* could serve as the *lakṣaṇa* of Brahman.¹⁸

Our author further states that the terms - *satya*, *jñāna* and *ananta* can serve as the *viśeṣaṇa-s* of Brahman too. It is thus: these three terms together convey the true nature of Brahman. And each term has a restrictive force upon the other two. The term - *satya* which signifies absence of sublation conveys the three-fold reality, namely, apparent reality, empirical reality and absolute reality. Shell-silver, etc., possess apparent reality as they are not sublated as long as they are manifested. The world of objects possesses empirical reality as it is not sublated in ordinary experience prior to the rise of the knowledge of Brahman. Brahman has absolute reality as it is not sublated even after the rise of the knowledge of Brahman. The word - *satya* conveys these three kinds of *real* objects. But when restricted by the terms - *jñāna* and *ananta* it signifies Brahman only. It is because neither the apparently real object nor the empirically real one is of the nature of consciousness or is infinite or is all-pervasive. The word, *jñāna* too signifies both consciousness and also the mental state inspired by the reflection of consciousness in it. But its significance is restricted by the other two words - *satya* and *ananta* and therefore it stands for Brahman only. Never indeed is the mental state unsublatable like Brahman, or is free from the three kinds of limitations. The word *ananta* too conveys the sense of

space which is free from the limitations of the form 'it exists here', 'it does not exist there' and also Brahman which is free from any limitation whatsoever. But its significative power to convey the sense of space is precluded by the terms - *satya* and *jñāna*. Never indeed does space possess absolute reality and also independent manifestation. Thus these three terms convey Brahman which is immutably real, which is of the nature of consciousness and which is free from any duality. In this connection our author cites the following verse in support of the view set forth above:

*kauṣasthyameva satyatvam
sphuraṇam jñānamucyate
ānantyam ekatā ca evam
bodhyate brahma taiḥ tribhiḥ*¹⁹

It must be noted here that the term - *ananta* conveys Brahman as that which is free from the three limitations. The terms - *satya* and *jñāna*, however, convey Brahman not only as different from that which is unreal and insentient but also as being of the nature of real and of consciousness.²⁰

It may be asked that if these three words convey one and the same Brahman, then there is the unwelcome position of treating these as synonyms. But this objection is not valid. It is because these three

words although convey one and the same entity cannot be treated as synonyms in view of the fact that the processes through which these terms convey Brahman are different from one another. The words - *satya*, *jñāna* and *ananta* convey Brahman through the elimination of three different characteristics, namely, non-reality, insentience and finite nature. Thus Brahman is known to be real, consciousness and infinite by nature. These three constitute the *svarūpa-lakṣana* of Brahman.

The *Taittirīya* text -

*yato vā imāni bhūtāni jāyante
yena jātāni jīvanti yat prayant-
yabhisamviśanti tadvijijñāsasva.*²¹

conveys Brahman as the cause of the world. The characteristic of being the cause of the world serves as the *qualification per accidens* (*taṭastha-lakṣaṇa*) of Brahman.

To sum up this part of the discussion: the self-luminous consciousness is viewed as the soul which is the experient of the states of waking, dream and deep sleep; it is identical with Brahman which is real, consciousness and infinite by nature and it acquires the characteristic of being the cause of the world; and,

as associated with this characteristic it is viewed as God. In the text - *tat tvam asi*, the primary meaning of the word - *tvam* is the soul and its secondary meaning is the pure consciousness. In the same way, Brahman as possessing the characteristic of the world is the primary meaning of the word - *tat* and Brahman as real, consciousness and infinite by nature is its secondary sense.

Now we have to discuss the question as to whether Brahman could be known from the means of knowledge other than the *śruti*-texts. To begin with, Brahman identical with Ātman cannot be known through external sense-organs.

The *Kena Upaniṣad* -

*na tatra cakṣurgacchati na vāggacchati no manaḥ*²²

states that Brahman transcends the sense of sight, sense of speech and mind. The reason as to why Brahman transcends the sense of sight is set forth in the text of the *Kaṭha Upaniṣad* -

*na sandṛ'se tiṣṭhati rūpamasya
na cakṣuṣā paśyati kascana enam.*²³

This text means: there is no colour or material shape in Brahman which would enable one to perceive it

through the sense of sight. Just as Brahman transcends the sense of sight in view of the fact that it does not possess colour, in the same way it transcends the sense of hearing, the sense of touch, the sense of taste and the sense of smell in view of the fact that it is free from sound, touch, taste and smell. This is stated in the following text -

*aśabdam asparsam arūpam avyayam
tathā arasam nityam agandhavacca yat.*²⁴

It comes to this that Brahman could not be comprehended by the sense-organs.

Brahman cannot be known through inference also. It is because in order that a factor may be established on the basis of inference what is required is the ground of inference. Brahman being the supra-relational entity cannot have any relation to any ground of inference. On this ground it is ascertained that Brahman cannot be known through inference.

It might be said that Brahman can be known through the following inferential arguments -

'Earth, etc., is produced by an agent; it is because they are effects; like a pot'.

This contention is not correct. It is because from this inferential argument what could be known is that there is an agent and it could not be known that that agent is real, consciousness and infinite in nature.

The *Chāndogya* text -

*sadeva saumya idamagra āsīt ekameva advitīyam.*²⁵

states that Brahman is free from any duality whatsoever. On this ground we cannot have any analogy on the basis of which we can identify Brahman. Hence Brahman cannot be known through the proof, comparison too.

It might be said that Brahman could be known through the ritualistic section of the Veda. The latter provides us with the knowledge that a particular sacrifice is the means to a desired end, namely, heaven. The physical body perishes here and so it cannot experience the fruit in a hereafter. There must, therefore, be an enduring principle different from the physical body as the experient of the fruits of heaven, etc. And that experient is the Self. Thus it may be argued that the Self which is said to be identical with Brahman is known from the ritualistic section of the Veda itself.

Our author states that this argument does not hold good. No doubt the ritualistic section of the Veda implies that there is the Self different from the physical body. Yet it is not known thereby that that Self is of the nature of pure consciousness, real and infinite.

Śrī Śaṅkara in his *adhyāsa-bhāṣya* states -

*śāstriye tu vyavahāre yadyapi buddhipūrvakāri na aviditvā ātmanah paralokasambandham adhikriyate tathāpi na vedāntavedyam aśanāyādyatītam apeta brahmakṣatrādibhedam asaṁsāri ātmatattvam adhikāre apekṣyate anupayogāt adhikārivirodhācca.*²⁶

Our author refers to the following verse from the *Brahmasiddhi* of Maṇḍana -

*sarvapratyayavedye ca brahmarūpe vyavasthite prapañcasya pravilayaḥ śabdena pratipādyate.*²⁷

This text means: every object that is known through the means of knowledge is known as *sat*. And *sat* is Brahman. It might be argued that Brahman is known through all means of knowledge. But it is not correct. It is because what is known through means of knowledge is not Brahman - the Pure Being but only Brahman as associated with the objects of the world.

In other words what is known through the means of knowledge is Brahman which is cosmic in nature. The supreme human end, namely, liberation would result from the knowledge of Brahman which is acosmic in nature. And Brahman of this nature could be known only through the *Upaniṣad-s*.

Maṇḍana confirms the above view in the passage -

*pravilīna prapañcena tadrūpeṇa na gocarah
mānāntarasya iti matam āmnāyaika nibandhanam.*²⁸

This text means: Brahman free from its relation to the world never comes within the range of any means of knowledge excepting the *Upaniṣad-s*.

Our author while re-confirming the above view states that it is with this in view the author of the *Brahma-sūtra-s* in the aphorism -

*śāstrayonitvāt.*²⁹

states that scripture or the śruti is the means of knowing Brahman. The ritualistic section of the Veda prescribes several ritual-acts the performance of which without any attachment toward their fruits will purify one's heart and make one eligible to pursue vedāntic study, etc., with a view to attain the knowledge of Brahman. The meditative exercises

prescribed in the Upaniṣadic-section of the veda when pursued with earnestness would give forth concentration of thought. And the major-texts of the *Upaniṣad-s* such as *tat tvam asi* and the like would give forth the direct knowledge of Brahman. It is with this in view, the author of the *Brahmasūtra* has said that the scripture is the means of knowing Brahman.

Our author in support of the above view cites the relevant passages from the *Vaiyāsakīyanyāyamālā* which are as follows:

*astyanyameyatāpyasya kim vā vedaikameyatā
ghaṭavatsiddhavastutvādbrahmānyenāpimīyate
rūpalṅādirāhityānnāsyā māntarayogyatā
tam tvaupaniṣadetyādau proktā vedaika meyata.³⁰*

From the above it follows that the *Upaniṣad-s* constitute the means of knowing Brahman. But the *Taittirīya* text -

yato vāco nivartante aprāpya manasā saha.³¹

states that words cannot convey Brahman. Our author in this connection cites a passage from the *Naīskarmyasiddhi* of Sureśvara which sets forth the reason for the words not conveying Brahman. And that verse is -

*ṣaṣṭhīgunakriyājātirūḍhayaḥ śabdahetavaḥ
nātmānyanyatamomiṣām tenātmā nābhidhīyate.*³²

This text means that the primary signification is that power which is present in a word and which enables the latter to convey a sense through one of the following media, namely, a relation, a quality, an activity, a class-characteristic and customary or traditional usage. For example, the word 'one who has a stick' signifies the person having a stick through the medium - the relation of contact between stick and the man. The word - 'white' in the expression - 'white cloth' conveys the sense of cloth through the medium - the quality of whiteness. The word 'sacrificer' signifies a person who performs sacrifices through the medium - the act of performing a sacrifice. The word 'cow' signifies the object cow through the medium - cowness which is the class-characteristic. The word 'cloud' conveys the sense of cloud through customary or traditional usage. None of these media is possible in the case of Brahman. The first four, namely, relation, quality, action and class-characteristic, in order that they may be viewed as existing in a particular object must be related to that object. And the relation through which they are related to the object is known as inherence. It comes to this that the above four

factors are to be viewed as present in Brahman, it must be admitted that they are related to Brahman through the relation of inherence.

The concept of relation as such does not stand logical scrutiny. It is because the relation - contact (*samyoga*) rests in two relata, namely, pot and the cloth. The relation known as contact in order that it may serve as a relation must be related to the relata. Thus we arrive at two more relations each one of them must be related to its respective relata. And so on *ad infinitum*. Further the Upaniṣadic text -

*asaṅgo hyayaṁ puruṣaḥ*³³

states that Brahman is supra-relational. Hence none of the above four factors is present in Brahman; and, so the words of the *Upaniṣad-s* cannot convey Brahman through primary signification.

In the same way, customary usage also cannot serve as the medium for the words of the *Upaniṣad-s* to convey Brahman through primary signification. For, it holds good only in those cases where the sense that is conveyed by a word could be comprehended by perception or proofs other than verbal testimony. The object 'cloud' is the conventional sense of the word

'cloud'. In this case the object cloud is known through perception and the significative relation between the word - cloud and the object - cloud is known from the usage of the elders. If Brahman should be conveyed in the above manner by the words of the *Upaniṣad-s*, then it must come within the range of perception and the significative relation between the words of the *Upaniṣad-s* and Brahman should be comprehended. And Brahman in order that it may come within the range of perception must first come within the range of mind. The *Taittirīya* text cited above, however, states that mind does not function in respect of Brahman. This is because Brahman is that which manifests mind and other factors and so it is not reasonable to hold that what is manifested, namely, mind should comprehend its manifesting reality, namely, Brahman. It follows from this that mind does not function in respect of Brahman and hence the latter does not come within the range of perception. And in view of this, the significative relation between the words of the *Upaniṣad-s* and Brahman could not be comprehended. Hence the former cannot convey through customary usage.³⁴ Thus the absence of the media through which words could convey Brahman through primary signification suggests that Brahman

cannot be conveyed through primary signification. This is the import of the *Taittirīya* text -

yato vāco nivartante.

Now the aphorism -

*śāstrayonitvāt.*³⁵

and the Upaniṣadic text -

*taṁ tu aupaniṣadam puruṣam pṛcchāmi.*³⁶

which convey that Brahman could be known only through the *Upaniṣad-s* must be understood in the sense that Brahman is secondarily conveyed by the words of the *Upaniṣad-s*. And this requires a discussion regarding the nature of the secondary signification.

The secondary signification is the power that is present in a word through which the latter conveys a sense which is different from but invariably connected with its primary sense.

The above is of three kinds:

- i) *jahallakṣaṇā* or exclusive secondary signification;

- ii) *a-jahallakṣaṇa* or non-exclusive secondary signification; and,
- iii) *jahad-ajahallakṣaṇā* or exclusive-cum-non-exclusive secondary signification

These three may be defined and illustrated as follows:

Jahallakṣaṇā is that power through which a word completely leaves out its primary sense and signifies some other sense that is invariably connected with its primary sense. This kind is noticed in the case of the sentence 'The hamlet is on the Ganges'. The literal meaning of the text is the presence of the hamlet on the current of the river Ganges; and, it is opposed to perception. The word 'Ganges', therefore, leaves out its primary sense and conveys the sense of bank which is invariably connected with the current of the Ganges - the primary sense.

Ajahallakṣaṇā is that power through which a word retains its primary sense and further conveys some other sense connected with its primary sense. This kind is noticed in the case of the sentence 'The red (horse) runs'. The literal meaning of the latter is 'The quality of redness runs'. This is opposed to perception and hence the word 'red' retains its primary sense of

redness and conveys the sense of horse to which redness belongs.

Jahad-ajahallakṣaṇā is that power through which a word leaves out a part of its primary sense and conveys another part. This kind is operative in the case of sentences such as 'This is that Brahmin'. The word 'that' conveys primarily a Brahmin related to past time and a different place. The word 'this' conveys primarily a Brahmin related to present time and a particular place. The sentence as a whole should convey the identity between the meanings of the two words constituting it. Here the meanings of the two words are opposed to each other and hence the identity between the two is impossible. Hence the two words leave out a part of their primary senses, namely, the spatial and temporal relation and convey another part, namely, the person-in-himself.³⁷

We shall now consider the process through which the words of the text -

satyam jñānam anantam brahma

convey Brahman. We have said that a word could secondarily signify only that sense which is associated with its primary sense. So we must first discuss the

primary senses of the words - *satya*, *jñāna* and *ananta*. The phenomenal entities are empirically real; Brahman is absolutely real and the blend of the space, etc., which are empirically real and Brahman which is absolutely real has a third mode of reality. The word - *satya* primarily conveys the blend of space, etc., and Brahman.³⁸ In the same way, according to Advaita the modification of the mind which is known as *vṛtti* reveals the consciousness conditioned by the object that is cognized. It is the mental state inspired by the reflection of consciousness in it that is figuratively spoken of as knowledge. The true nature of the soul is self-luminous knowledge which is absolutely real. And in the blend of the two there is the state of being knowledge. The word - *jñāna* primarily conveys the blend of the mental state and the self-luminous consciousness which is Brahman, that is Ātman.³⁹ In the same way, all-pervasiveness is noticed in space and also in Brahman. And in the blend of the two, there is another mode of all-pervasiveness. And the word - *ananta* primarily conveys the blend of the two. The primary senses of the words having been considered it is now easier to identify the secondary sense. Out of the three kinds of secondary signification mentioned earlier, we have to adopt the third one,

namely, exclusive-non-exclusive secondary signification. It is because the primary sense of each of these terms is a complex entity and so the adjectival part must be excluded and the substantive part must be retained. And this is possible only if this kind of secondary signification is adopted. Thus the word - *satya* primarily conveys the blend of space and Brahman. Through exclusive-non-exclusive secondary signification, it leaves out the adjectival part, namely, the space which is empirically real and retains the substantive part which is the consciousness-element. And exactly similar consideration applies to the other two words too. Hence the text as a whole conveys Brahman as real, consciousness and infinite. In this process they eliminate their opposites, namely, non-reality, insentience and finitude.

It may be noted that these words do not give us the complete knowledge of the nature of Brahman. The author of the *Brahma-sūtra-s* in the aphorism -

*ānandādayaḥ pradhānasya*⁴⁰

prescribes a method of gathering the unrepeated words that are found in the Upaniṣadic passages that

speak of the nature of Brahman. According to the traditional interpretation of Advaita, the words thus gathered amount to ten; and, they are *nitya, śuddha, buddha, mukta, satya, sūkṣma, sat, vibhu, advitīya* and *ānanda*.⁴¹ These words constitute a sentence and they convey the nature of Brahman to be real, consciousness, bliss, etc., and at the same time they eliminate their opposites.

One objection may be raised as to why it is admitted that the word, *satya*, etc., convey one and the same Brahman. It is answered that according to rules of language, if the words constituting the sentence are juxtaposed and have similar case-endings they are intended to convey an unitary sense involving no relation whatsoever. This we have noticed in expressions such as '*rājā aśokaḥ*' wherein the two words having similar case-endings are juxtaposed to each other and they convey the unitary sense of the king, that is Aśoka.

There are certain other Upaniṣadic texts which are negative in nature. The *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* text -

asthūlam anaṇu ahrasvam adīrgham

. . . . *avāyu anākāśam*

*arasam agandham acakṣuṣkam
aśrotram avāk amanah, etc.*⁴²

states that Brahman is neither gross nor subtle, neither short nor long ... it is neither air nor space, it is unattached; it is without taste or smell, without eyes or ears, without tongue or mind. This text thus speaks of the nature of Brahman as free from any material shape. But the *Chāndogya* text -

*tadetat catuspāt brahma*⁴³

refers to Brahman as having the senses of speech, nose, eyes and ears as his four feet. From this a doubt arises as to whether Brahman has a material shape or not.

Further the *Chāndogya* text -

*eṣa ātmā apahatapāpmā vijaro vimṛtyuḥ
viśokaḥ vijighatsaḥ apipāsaḥ satyakāmaḥ
satyasaṅkalpaḥ*⁴⁴

states that Brahman is free from sin, decay, death, grief, hunger and thirst; it has desire and resolve that never go unfulfilled. And the *Śvetāśvatara* text -

*nirguṇaḥ*⁴⁵

speaks of Brahman as free from any attribute. A study of all these texts shows that Brahman is attributeless and at the same time endowed with attributes. It has material shape and at the same time free from it. But logically viewed an entity cannot have two mutually contradictory features. Hence the author of the *sūtra-s* in the *adhikaraṇa* entitled *ubhayalingādhikaraṇa*⁴⁶ states that Brahman is attributeless and formless. Yet, for the purpose of meditation it is referred to as having attributes and forms. These are not real. They are only illusorily projected by *māyā*. Our author in this connection cites the relevant passages from the *Vaiyāsakīyanyāyamālā* in support of the above view. And the passages are:

*brahma kim rupi vārūpi bhavennīrupameva vā
dvividhaśrutisadbhāvādbrahma syādubhayātmakam
nīrūpameva vedāntaiḥ pratipādyamapūrvataḥ
rūpam tvanūdyate dhyātumubhayatvam virudhyate*⁴⁷

We shall now set forth the logical significance of the text - *tat tvam asi*. The word - *tat* primarily signifies Brahman which possesses the characteristic of being the cause of the universe, that is, God. The word - *tvam* primarily signifies the soul which is the experient of the three states - waking, dream and deep

sleep. Any identity between the two senses is impossible as God and soul - the primary senses of the words - *tat* and *tvam* possess mutually contradictory features such as omniscience and finite knowledge, omnipotence and limited power, etc. God and soul, are complex - entities. God is only pure consciousness associated with the adventitious feature of being the source of the world. And the soul is only the pure consciousness associated with the characteristic of being an agent, experient and knower. The terms - *tat* and *tvam* through exclusive-cum-non-exclusive secondary signification leave out the adjectival features and convey the consciousness-element in both the primary senses. The logical significance of the text, therefore, is that Brahman - the true nature of God is non-different from Ātman - the true nature of the soul.

To sum up:

Brahman identical with Ātman is the Ultimate Reality; it is free from any form or attribute; it is of the nature of pure consciousness and bliss; it appears as God, world and the soul through the principle *māyā* which is identical with *avidyā*.

NOTES:

1. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* (hereafter *BU*), 2.4.5.
2. *Ibid.*,
3. *Ibid.*, 4.3.2.
4. *Ibid.*, 4.3.6.
5. *Ibid.*, 4.3.7.
6. *Ibid.*, 4.3.18.
7. *Ibid.*, 4.3.19.
8. *Ibid.*, 4.3.15, 16.
9. *Ibid.*, 4.4.5.
10. *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* (hereafter *TU*), 2.1.
11. *Vedārtha-prakāśa* (hereafter *VP*), *Bhāṣya* on the *Taittirīya-Āraṇyaka* from 7th to 10th *Prapāṭaka* by Sāyaṇa. Poona: Anandaśrama Sanskrit Series, 36. 1927.
12. *Māṇḍūkya-kārikā*, 1.17.
13. *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* (hereafter *CU*), 6.1.4. ft.
14. *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad*, 2.2.11.
15. *VP*, p.555.
16. Śāṅkara's *Bhāṣya* (hereafter *ŚB*) on *Brahmāsūtra* (hereafter *BS*), 1.1.1.
17. *BU*, 4.4.5.
18. *VP*, p.555.

19. Ibid., p.556.
20. Ibid.,
21. *TV*, 3.1.1.
22. *Kena Upaniṣad*, 1.3.
23. *Kāṭha Upaniṣad*, 2.3.9.
24. Ibid., 1.3.15.
25. *CU*, 6.2.1.
26. *ŚB* on *BS*, 1.1.1.
27. *Brahma-siddhi*, Ed. by Mm. Kuppuswami Sastri. Delhi: Sri Sadguru Publications, 1984., 4.3.
28. Ibid.,
29. *BS*, 1.1.3.
30. *VP*, pp.457-9.
31. *TU*, 2.9.
32. *Naiṣkarmya-siddhi* (hereafter *NS*) with the Commentary, *Candrikā* (hereafter *C*). Ed. by M. Hiriyanna, Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute. 1980., p.165.
33. *BU*, 4.3.15.
34. *C.*, p.165.
35. *BS*, 1.1.3.
36. *BU*, 3.9.26.

37. *Samkṣepaśārīraka* (hereafter *SS*) of Sarvajñātman. Chennai: Madras University Philosophical Series, No.18. University of Madras, 1985., 1.154-156.
38. Ibid., 1.178.
39. Ibid., 1.179.
40. *BS*, 3.3.11.
41. *SS*, 1.170.
42. *BU*, 3.8.8.
43. *CU*, 3.182.
44. Ibid., 8.1.15.
45. *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad*, 6.11.
46. *BS*, 2.2.11. to 21.
47. *VP*, p.560.



TATTUVARĀYAR - THE FIRST NOTABLE TAMIL ADVAITIN

S. Radha

INTRODUCTION

The philosophy of Advaita enjoys a very long tradition. Drawing from the Vedas, specifically the Upaniṣads, Advaita was for a long time considered synonymous with Sanskrit language. The language of Sanskrit itself is ancient and was well-developed, and could be mastered only by the scholarly inclined. Over a period, this philosophy with its Sanskrit and Upaniṣadic roots came to be closely guarded and selectively propagated by the elite few scholars of Sanskrit and the Vedas. All the texts, treatises and exegetical commentaries were written and taught in Sanskrit. The philosophical truths of Advaita were traditionally and personally handed down from a preceptor to his disciples leaving the non-Sanskrit knower out of bound to access this rich knowledge. It was against this background, that the need was intensely felt by a few to master the Upaniṣadic knowledge in Sanskrit, and take it to the masses through regional languages and dialects. Notable

among these regional Advaitin exponents are Sādhu Niścaldas of Haryana, Bellamkoṇḍa Rāmarāya Kavi of Andhra Pradesh, and Kaṇṇuḍaya Vaḷḷal, Sorūpānandar, Tattuvarāyar, Tāṇḍavarāyar, Mahākavi Subramanya Bhārati and others in Tamil Nadu.

All of them had formally learnt and mastered the Sanskrit language, the Vedas, Upaniṣads, Nyāya, Mīmāṃsā, etc. for several years, and later propagated Advaita through regional languages.

Beginnings of Advaita works in Tamil

The tradition of Advaita is thought to have begun with Śaṅkara (788-828 A.D), while, in fact, the tradition existed even before the times of Gauḍapāda (1st century or 5th century A.D.)¹ So too in Tamil, Advaita is considered synonymous with Tāṇḍavarāyar. However, we come across the beginnings of Tamil works in Advaita with *Śaiva siddhānta* leanings in the works of Kāli Kaṇṇuḍaiya Vaḷḷal (14th century). Sorūpānandar's *Sorūpasāram* and Tattuvarāyar's works followed in the 15th century. Later, Tāṇḍavarāyar raised the bar of Advaita works in Tamil. Thanks to Ramaṇa Maḥarṣi, the world at large came to know about the works of these great Tamil Advaitins. Tattuvarāyar surpasses all Tamil Advaitins in the volume and lyrical prowess of his works.

Tattuvarāyar's period

Scholars arrive at the period of Tattuvarāyar only through inference. Vaiyapuri Pillai, an author on the *Ettut-tokai* works, was the first to remark that Tattuvarāyar might have compiled the *Peruntirattu* towards the end of the 14th century. We infer about his period from two references Tattuvarāyar is mentioned in a section titled '*Neñcirku amaivurai*' in '*Sivānandamālai*', a work that was perhaps written between 1350 and 1375.¹ Maraijñāna Desikar, in his commentary to verse 294 of '*Sivajñāna Siddhiyār*', quotes verse 74 of Tattuvarāyar's '*Aññavadaipparani*'. Maraijñāna Desikar belonged to mid-16th century. Vedānta works in Tamil began to appear in later part of the 15th century. Śivajñāna Vallal is known to have written his works on Vedānta during this period. The title page of Tattuvarāyar's *Pāduturai* published by Koviloor Madalayam in 1953 says that he was born 300 years ago. The story of Sasivaṅṅan, which is the core of Tattuvarāyar's *Sasivaṅṅa bodam*, features in the *Virutāccala Purāṇam* written in the 17th century.² Perhaps based on such pieces of information, the editors of *Mountain Path* published by Ramaṅśramam say that Tattuvarāyar belonged to the 17th century. Based on the evidences quoted by Vaiyapuri Pillai and other scholars, we may assume that Tattuvarāyar's period would fall between 1450

and 1475, and that he belonged to the later part of the 15th century.³

His life

Koviloor Chidambaram Maṭālayam has published almost all the works of Tattuvarāyar. Any account on Tattuvarāyar's life is drawn from the Maṭālayam's hagiography given in their introduction to *Pāḍuturai* and *Aḍaṅganmurai*.⁴ & ⁵ Tattuvarāyar and his maternal uncle were born in an orthodox Smārta (Śaiva) family around the year 1653, in the town of Veerai also known as Veeramānagar in 'Nadunāḍu'. Some are of the view that both belonged to a Madhva family, and that Tattuvarāyar was born at Veeramānagar and Sorūpānandar was born at Sēntamangalam.⁶

Tattuvarāyar and Sorūpānandar were well-versed in Sanskrit and Tamil, and Vedānta scriptures. Sorūpānandar, found the guru he was searching for in Śivap-prakāsa Swāmikal, a strictly orthodox Śaivite.⁷ Later, Tattuvarāyar joined Sorūpānandar and began to study Vedānta under him. The nephew-uncle relationship turned into a lifelong disciple-master bonding. 'Tattuvarāyar' and 'Sorūpānandar' were etymological names accorded to them, presumably by their disciples - because the former had deeply analyzed, thoroughly understood and also taught the nature of Truth (*tattvam*) and the latter, the nature of Self (*sorūpam*).

The Advaita Vedānta of Tattuvarāyar

The title page of '*Pāḍuturai*', published by Koviloor Chidambaram Maṭālayam, when translated reads as follows: '*Pāḍuturai* - graciously granted by Erumbūr a.k.a. Iṟumbūdūr Śuddhādvaita Vedāntācārya Śrī Tattuvarāyar Swāmigaḷ'. From this title, we infer two pieces of information about Tattuvarāyar; that he was associated with the place called Erumbūr otherwise known as Iṟumbūdūr, and that he was a preceptor in Advaita Vedānta. Records reveal that he passed away at Erumbūr and a temple in his memory stands at the site till date.

It is known that Tattuvarāyar strove to follow Śaṅkarācārya, the foremost preceptor and exponent on Advaita. The mention of '*Vedānta*' rules out that Śuddhādvaita of Tattuvarāyar does not pertain to the *Śuddhādvaita* of *Śaiva siddhānta*. The mention *Śuddhādvaita* rules the possibility of Tattuvarāyar's Advaita being the Viśiṣṭādvaita of Rāmānuja or the Śivādvaita of Śrīkaṇṭha. Therefore the adjective '*śuddha*' (pure) in the title '*Śuddhādvaita Vedāntācārya*' is meant to clearly distinguish his philosophy from the earlier Kaṇṇuḍaiya Vaḷḷal's philosophy of *Siddhānta-Vedānta-Samarasa-Aikyavādam* (a symbiosis of Śaiva siddhānta and Vedānta). However, the '*Śuddhādvaita*' of Tattuvarāyar clearly spells out the

role of Māyā and relegates the world-phenomenon to lesser reality (vyāvahārika-sattā) in contrast to the Śuddhāvaita of Vallabhācārya (also of the later part of the 15th century), a philosophy of pure monism devoid of the conception of Māyā, and in which the world-phenomenon has the same reality as individual souls.

His works in brief

Individual works

1. *Śivap-prakāsa veṅbā* is the first work of Tattuvarāyar in 43 *veṅbā* verses. It is in praise of his guru Sorūpānandar's guru Śivapprakāsar.

2. *Tattvāmirtam* is a work of 137 verses in *viruttam* metre under five heads known as *pattatis* namely, *Adhikāra pattati*, *Vākya pattati*, *Śravaṇa pattati*, *Manana pattati*, and *Nididhyāsana pattati*.

Anthologies:

1. *Śivap-prakāsap Peruntiraṭṭu* is an anthology of 2821 verses on Vedānta quoted from 146 Tamil texts belonging to various schools of philosophy. Many of the texts quoted here have disappeared. The Preface of a 1912 edition of *Śivappirakāsap Peruntiraṭṭu* with *Kuruntiraṭṭu* attributes *Śivappirakāsap Peruntiraṭṭu* to Sorūpānandar. Mu. Arunachalam, however,

attributes *Śivappirakāsap Peruntiraṭṭu* to Tattuvarāyar.⁹

2. *Kuṟuntiraṭṭu* with a total of 1340 verses is an anthology of select verses from the Peruntiraṭṭu interspersed with 424 verses by Tattuvarāyar in keeping with various topics. There are verses from *Tiruvāsagam* and a few verses are reminiscent of *Tevāram*.

The disciples who studied both these Tirattus were referred to as *Tiraṭṭu santānattar* (those belonging to the *Tiraṭṭu* lineage),¹⁰ though in tradition, there was not a lineage by the name *Tiraṭṭu santānam* (the *Tiraṭṭu* lineage).¹¹ Swayam-prakāsa Yogi of this 'lineage' compiled the *Āyirat-tiraṭṭu* (Anthology of 1000 verses), probably in the 16th century. This anthology consisted of 1100 select verses from *Tevāram* and *Tiruvoimoli*. Since the collection of verses was on Lord Śiva as well as Lord Viṣṇu, the *Āyirat-tiraṭṭu* was referred to as *Śaṅkara-Nārāyaṇa-t-tiraṭṭu* (Anthology of verses on Śaṅkara - Śiva and Nārāyaṇa - Viṣṇu).

3. *Pāḍuturai* is a collection of 1140 verses grouped under 138 topics. The construction of verses suggests that they were meant for the lay people to understand the Absolute Reality. The verses eulogize his preceptors Sorūpānandar and Śivap-prakāsar, and

a certain Tattuvap-prakāsar and Paripūrṇa-prakāsar. The latter two do not feature in the lineage of Tattuvarāyar's tradition. Arunachalam says that the novel poetic compositions and their constructions are not seen elsewhere. All the verses are in chaste Tamil style and were popular among the people until recent times.¹²

4. *Aḍaṅgamuṟai* is a collection of 18 small poetic works. Each work bears a name based on the distinct literary style in which it is written, and an alternate name in keeping with the topic it deals with. The 18 works are: *Tiruttālāṭṭu* also known as *Tattuvap prakāsam*, *Pillai-t tirunāmam* or *Pillai-t tamil* also known as *Tattuva-nilayam*, *Veṅbā-antāti* also known as *Tattuva-vilakkam*, *Kalittuṟai antāti* also known as *Tattuva-sāram*, *Cinnappoo veṅbā* also known as *Tattuva-caritai*, *Dasāṅgam* also known as *Tattuvabodam*, *Iraṭṭai-manimālai* also known as *Tattuvadeepam*, *Mummaṇik kovai* also known as *Tattuvarūpam*, *Nanmaṇimālai* also known as *Tattuva anubavam*, *Kalippā* also known as *Tattuvāsiddhi*, *Jñāna-vinodan-kalambakam* also known as *Tattuvajñānam*, *Ulā* also known as *Tattuva-kāmiyam*, *Siledaiyulā* also known as *Tattuva vākkiyam*, *Neṅju viḍu toodu* also known as *Tattuva nicchayam*, *Kali maṭal* also known as *Tattuva-t tuṇivu*, *Ajñavadai-p paraṇi* or *Tattuva-k kāṭchi* also known as *Jñāna paraṇi*, *Mōhavadai-p paraṇi* or *Tattuva nirupakam*,

and *Amirtam* or *Amirtasāra venbā* also known as *Tattuva darśanam*.

Translations from Sanskrit to Tamil:

1. *Īśwara-gītai* also known as *Śivap-prakāsam*. The Saivite author Śivāgra Yogi often refers to the Sanskrit work of *Īśwara gītā* consisting of 495 verses and featuring as the eleventh chapter in the *Uttarārdha* of *Kūrma Purāṇa*. It is in the form of a teaching imparted by Īśwara (Lord Śiva) to Lord Viṣṇu. Tattuvarāyar presents the contents of this work in Tamil through 338 verses in eleven chapters.

2. *Brahma-gītai* also known as *Sorūpānanda siddhi*. The Sanskrit text of *Brahma Gītā* is found in slokas 96 and 97 of Chapter 35, and Chapters 37 and 38 in the first part of *Brahmapurāṇa*. It also occurs in the *Sūta-samhitā - Yajña-vaibhava Kāṇḍam uparī bhāga*, where Lord Brahma, the creator, presents the essence of twelve Upaniṣads in twelve chapters. The Tamil translation by Tattuvarāyar consists of twelve chapters but presents the essence of nine Upaniṣads only in 547 verses.

His contribution to Tamil literature and Advaita Vedānta

Tattuvarāyar was well-versed in the prevalent philosophical and religious systems and an erudite

scholar in Sanskrit and Tamil. He was hailed as 'ubhaya-kavi' due to his erudition in Sanskrit and Tamil. His felicity with the Tamil language, scholarship in Sanskrit and his deep knowledge of Advaita philosophy are seen in his works. He has written several poetical works in Tamil adhering to Śaṅkara's tradition of Vedānta. His works include *Pāḍuturai*, *Aḍaṅganmurai*, *Śivap-prakāsa-p Peruntirattu*, *Kuruntirattu*, *Brahma gītai*, *Īśvara gītai*, etc. 'Sasivaṅṅa bodam' featuring as a part of *Mohavatai-p paraṅi* in *Aḍaṅganmurai* is studied by beginners as a text in itself. His *Pāḍuturai* was also known as '*Tattuvarāyar sāttiram*' ('the philosophy of Tattuvarāyar').⁸

Allegorical philosophical plays have existed in Sanskrit since the times of Aśvaghōṣa (c. 80 - c. 150 C.E.), Jayanta Bhaṭṭa (10th century), Kṛṣṇamiśra (11th century), Veṅkaṭanātha more popularly known as Vedānta Deśika (14th century), upto V. Raghavan of recent times. Among these, Vedānta Deśika's *Saṅkalpa-sūryodhaya* is based on the annihilation of delusion. It is not known if Tattuvarāyar drew inspiration from this Sanskrit to write his *paraṅi*-s. However, his poetical works *Ajñavatai-p paraṅi* (Sanskrit - *Ajñavadaiè bharāṅi*) and *Mokavatai-p paraṅi* (Sanskrit - *Mohavadai-bharāṅi*), are the first of their kind in Vedānta literature in Tamil.

Venpā, āsiriyaṅpā, andādi, tālāṭṭu, Pillai-t tamil, cinnappoo venbā, kalippā, kalambakam, ulā, siledai, toodu, kali maṭal, paraṇi, and *vallai-p pāṭṭu* are among the literary styles used by Tattuvarāyar in his works. He coins some novel phrases and employs terms with different significances. For instance, '*elil*' generally means 'beauty'; it also means 'accomplished', 'majesty', 'loftiness', etc. The phrase '*elilāru jñāni*' in verse 3 of 'Sasivaṅṅa bodam' refers to both the inner beauty of compassion, detachment, knowledge and *Brahma-svarūpa* in the guru Nandi-parāyaṅar and his being an accomplished *jñāni*, a wise man who had realized liberation here and now. Tattuvarāyar's works are on Advaita Vedānta, which is based primarily on the Upaniṣads. The Upaniṣads being in Sanskrit, and the original works on Advaita Vedānta being in Sanskrit, usage of Sanskrit terminologies is natural and at times unavoidable. He uses the Tamil versions of Sanskrit words as in Tamil *viccuvam* for Sanskrit *viśvam* (universe or entirety) and Tamil '*caṅkam*' for Sanskrit '*jagat*' (world). Wherever possible, he opts for Tamil translations as in the case of the Tamil *viṭṭa lakkaṅai, viṭātha lakkaṅai* and *viṭṭu-viṭāta lakkaṅai* for *jahal-lakṣaṅā, ajahal-lakṣaṅā* and *jahad-ajahal-lakṣaṅā* respectively. His verses shine with analogies, Tamil *etukai* and *monai* (comparable to the Sanskrit poetics of *anuprāsa*), the

poetics of *anī* (known as *alaṅkāra*-s in Sanskrit), and the Tamil rhetoric of *cuvai* (the *rasa*-s of Sanskrit poetry).

There are also instances when Tattuvarāyar does not state an idea clearly, but leaves it to the reader to infer or arrive at his own conclusions. A mere reading of verse 97 in Sasivaṇṇa Bōdam, '*marittatu ... maritta itantaṇile ... turiyamāi-t telintēṇ*' - the words '*marittatu*' and '*maritta itam*' meaning 'that which was or were resolved' and 'the state of resolution' respectively, does not reveal what was or were resolved. The phrase '*turiyamāi-t telintēṇ*' also does not throw much light. Again, verses 98 to 101 speak of four states beyond *Īśvara*'s deep sleep state. Tattuvarāyar does not term the ultimate state as '*turiyam*', nor does he specify to whom these four states belong. This allows commentators the liberty to interpret the final four states. Therefore, Kāñcī Ā. Cenkalvarāya Mutaliār, in his commentary '*Tattuva-p prakāśikai*', and Kāsikānanda Jñānāccārya Swāmigaḷ, in his commentary '*Padārta Bhāskaraṇ Urai*', use the term '*Śiva*' to mean 'auspiciousness', and refer to these four states as *Śiva-cākkiram* (Sanskrit - *Śiva-jāgrat* - waking state of *Śiva*), *Śiva-coppaṇam* (Sanskrit - *Śiva-svapna* - dream state of *Śiva*), *Śiva-cuḷutti* (Sanskrit - *Śiva-suṣupti* - deep sleep state of

Śiva), and *Śiva-turiyam* (fourth state of *Śiva*). On the other hand, the Kovilūr Ādheenam, in their *Kovilūr Marabu Vedānta Nūlkaḷ* - Volume I, refer to these four states as the 'sorūpa' (Sanskrit - *svarūpa*-nature) of *Brahman* - *Brahma-jāgrat*, *Brahma-svapna*, *Brahma-suṣupti*, and *Brahma-turiyam*. *Brahman* being immutable, these four states cannot refer to *Brahman per se*, but must be presumed to be the understanding in stages about *Brahman* beyond *Īśvara's turiyam*. Herein lies the uniqueness of Tattuvarāyar's presenting Advaita Vedānta in Tamil.

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THE KAMALĀMBĀ NAVĀVARAṆA KṚTIS OF ŚRĪ MUTTUSVĀMI DĪKṢITA

R. Asha

AN OVERVIEW

Śrī Muttusvāmi Dīkṣita was one of the greatest composers in the history of carnatic music. An advaitin par excellence, he was also a śrīvidyopāsaka. To him, the Mother Goddess represented the Non-Dual Reality, the supreme Brahman of Advaita. While his compositions are replete with Advaitic terminology, there are also compositions, more specifically the navāvaraṇa kṛtis (on Goddess Kamalāmbā of Tiruvārūr, his birth place), which contain intricate details about the worship of Mother Goddess, like cakras, mantras, etc. The Navāvaraṇa kṛtis are also well known for their vibhakti structure, musical, lyrical and rhythmic excellence. They are noteworthy in many other ways too. A brief overview of some of their features is attempted in this article.

There is a profound philosophy underlying the concept of Śrīcakra. The presiding deity Goddess

Lalitā Mahātripurasundarī is identified with one's own true nature filled constantly with bliss - *sadānandapūrṇaḥ svātmaiva paradevatā lalitā*. Contemplation of the non-difference between the knower, known and the object of knowledge is Śrīcakrapūjā. And so, Dīkṣita refers, to this Advaitic aspect in these kṛtis.

For eg.

1. In Kamalāmbām bhajare, the kṛti pertaining to the 2nd āvaraṇa, the Goddess is described as 'nirviśeṣa caitanya rūpiṇīm', i.e., the attributeless Brahman of Advaita Vedānta.
2. In Śrī Kamalāmbikāyāḥ param, in the phrase 'abheda-nitya-śuddha-buddha-mukta-sacci-dānandamaya-paramādvaita-sphūrteḥ, Dīkṣita asserts that She is the non-dual Absolute, who is Existence, Consciousness and Bliss and who is eternal, pure, intelligent and free.¹
3. Dīkṣita also uses poetical imagery to bring out that the Goddess is Ātma-svarūpa. For eg., 'hṛt-kamalā-nagara-nivāsinī' - She resides in the heart-lotus. The Upaniṣads describe the Self as residing in the heart. Again, in the same kṛti, She

is described as the parrot residing in the cage of Omkāra.

4. The world is an illusion. And so, Dīkṣita says, give it up and worship Goddess Kamalāmbā - Kamalāmbām bhajare, kalpita māyā-kāryam tyajare. Her worship elicits Her grace and glance. Her glance is extremely powerful in removing māyā and its effects - anādi-māyāvidyā-kārya-kāraṇa-vinoda-karāṇa-paṭutara-kaṭākṣa-vīkṣaṇ-yāḥ (in Śrī Kamalāmbāyāḥ param).

She is, therefore, capable of conferring liberation -vikalebara mukti-dāna-nipuṇe (in Kamalāmbike).

5. Dīkṣita himself stands testimony to the fruit of Śrīvidyopāsanā. A recipient of the grace of the Goddess, he articulates his advaitic experience as 'saccidānanda-paripūrṇa-brahmāsmi' in Śrī kamalāmbikayā kaṭākṣitoham. What a categorical and profound assertion from a jīvanmukta! Be it the details of āvaraṇa pūjā, the references to kuṇḍalinī, the mantra, the worshippers, yoga, allusion to deep concepts like viyadādi-bhūta-kiraṇe, the sounds heard by yogis, the kalās of fire, descriptions of the levels of speech, the description of the deity Śrī Mahātripurasundarī

(with references to the inner significance of Her weapons too!), the allusions from Lalita Sahasranāma, the usage of Sanskrit language in all its glory and beauty, or the grand condensation of concepts (and vibhakti as in Śrī Kamalāmbā jayati) the musical excellences displayed through rāgas and tālas, these kṛtis are 'non-pareil'.

One cannot but help make a reference to Dīkṣita's poetic skill too. For eg.-

1. In the Ghaṇṭā kṛti, Śrī Kamalāmbike avāva, cleverly using the rāga mudrā, he beautifully describes Her ability to liberate — santatam mukti - ghaṇṭāmaṇi - ghoṣāyamāna - kavāṭadvāre, i.e., in the doorway of Her abode an ornamental bell constantly announces salvation. It seems to ring out, 'Come to Her, She will liberate!'
2. Another eg., which can be cited as a blend of imaginative poetry and depth of knowledge is 'kamalajānanda-bodha-sukhi' in the kṛti 'Kamalāmbā samrakṣatu'. 'Kamalajānande - if 'kamala' is taken to refer to the thousand - petalled lotus in the crown of the head upto which the yogi succeeds in raising the kuṇḍalinī, what results is bliss. Goddess is of the form of this bliss.

3. The play on the word 'ambā' with philosophy thrown in as 'cidbimba - pratibimbendu - bimbā' is simply delightful.² The whole section runs thus -

*Śrī kamalāmbā jayati amba Śrī kamalāmbā jayati
jagadamba Śrī kamalāmbā jayati śṅgāra - rasa kadambā
madambā Śrī kamalāmbā jayati
cidbimba pratibimbendu bimba
Śrī kamalāmbā jayati*

Dīkṣita also addresses Her fondly and intimately as my mother - madambā. An ordinary man may in these kṛtis seeming apparently out of reach, to be worshipped by complex and elaborate rituals. This endearing phrase of Dīkṣita as also the phrase 'sakṛd-ālokaya-mām' (please look at me once) in the kṛti 'Śrī kamalāmbike avāva', puts all misgivings to rest. This phrase echoes the sentiment expressed by Ācārya Śaṅkara in the Saundaryalaharī śloka 'dṛśā drāghīyasyā'.

She is the Universal Mother, easily approachable through a melting heart. Our hearts do melt-that is the power of Dīkṣita's music.

And to dissolve this melting, devoted heart in Her is what Dīkṣita himself asks for (on our behalf too) -

'prītiyukta maccittam vilayatu' in Śrī Kamalāmbā jayati.

NOTES:

1. See pg.17 of 'Concepts, Contexts and Conflations in the kṛtis of Śrī Muttusvāmi Dikṣita,' Asha, R., 2013.
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THE ABSOLUTE AND GOD

R. Balasubramanian

SOME PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS

It will be helpful to start with a few preliminary remarks which will provide the right mental set for understanding the distinction between the Absolute and God, i.e. between Brahman and Īsvara, in the philosophy of Advaita which, as the name indicates, is rigorously non-dualistic. First of all, Advaita Vedānta speaks of the real, which is one without a second, as the Absolute and as God, on the basis of the distinction between two standpoints—absolute and relative known as *pāramārthika* and *vyāvahārika*. From the absolute standpoint, the real is called the Absolute or the Ultimate; and from the relative standpoint, it is called God. It means that the terms “Absolute” and “God” are used with reference to one and the same entity from two perspectives. Secondly, though Advaita recognizes the importance of theism, it holds that theism is not final as it involves duality. The dualism of the theistic position must pave way to non-dualism which is the ultimate truth.

Advaita, therefore, is trans-theistic and not anti-theistic. Thirdly, the real cannot be known through perception and other sources of knowledge. It can be known only through scripture. It may be pointed out here that even scripture cannot describe it affirmatively as such-and-such; it can reveal the nature of the real only negatively, *via negativa*, as what it is not. Fourthly, since the Ultimate is devoid of qualities and relations, names and forms, it can be spoken of as Nothing, as Void, not in the sense that it does not exist, but in the sense that it is nothing, that it is not a phenomenon we are familiar with in our day-to-day experience. Fifthly, the real is transcendental, and so we have to search for it and discover it in our experience. The philosophical investigation, which is a cognitive enterprise, is transcendently grounded. Sixthly, the Ultimate which is non-relational and unoriginated and which is the ground of the world, is no other than the Self of the human being. Since the Self of a human being is limited by the mind-sense-body complex with which it is associated, it appears to be different from the Ultimate. Just as God is no other than the Ultimate, even so the Self in a human being is no other than the Ultimate. Finally, according to Advaita to know the Self is to be the Self. Self-knowledge is unique. It is not knowledge of the Self involving subject-object

relation. Knowing the Self is not like knowing the objects of the world through all kinds of relations. It is a special kind of knowing in which knowing and being are identical.

ABSOLUTE AND RELATIVE STANDPOINTS

As a journeying self in empirical existence, a human being is in the state of ignorance (*avidyā*). Not knowing the Ultimate which is the ground of everything and which, therefore, remains hidden, human beings think of the manifested universe as real. Not knowing that the Ultimate, which is infinite, is no other than the Self in them, they think of themselves as finite beings thrown into the pluralistic universe of sentient and insentient objects. As a result of some reflection, they know that their knowledge of objects, their power to accomplish things, and their love for others are limited. They are ignorant not only about the real nature of the things of the world, but also of themselves. However, the redeeming feature is the fact that they know that they are ignorant.

Knowledge worth the name is knowledge of the Ultimate, because the Ultimate alone is worthy of knowing. That is why the Upaniṣad says that the Self (*Ātman*) should be realized—should be heard of, reflected on, and contemplated upon.¹ Śaṅkara in his

commentary on this text says that the Self should be realized because it is worthy of realization. The Self is worthy of realization for the reason that, when the Self is known, everything else which is *dependent* on it comes to be known.² “Brahman”, “Ātman”, “Sat”—these are the Upaniṣadic terms by which the Ultimate is spoken of. So long as human beings do not know the Ultimate, even though they know everything else, they are still ignorant. Nārada, as portrayed at the commencement of the seventh chapter of the *Chândogya Upaniṣad*, is a classic example in this regard. When Nārada approaches Sanatkumāra for instruction, the latter asks him what he knows so that he could teach him what he does not know. Nārada, therefore, enumerates the various disciplines in which he is proficient—the scriptures such as the Vedas and the epics, grammar, mathematics, and astronomy, logic, ethics, and politics, and so on. But still he is in sorrow because he does not know the Self. And so he requests Sanatkumāra to enlighten him about the Self as the knowledge of the Self alone will help him to cross over sorrow. The knowledge which Nārada possessed when he approached Sanatkumāra for instruction is “lower knowledge” (*aparā-vidyā*) as it relates to everything other than the Self, and “lower knowledge”, Śaṅkara holds, is ignorance. The point is that, so long as human beings do not know the

Ultimate, they are in the state of ignorance. And when they know the Ultimate, that is to say, when they attain Self-knowledge, they are in the state of knowledge. By way of contrast to "lower knowledge", self-knowledge, i.e. knowledge of the Ultimate, is called "higher knowledge" (*parā-vidyā*).

In the state of ignorance a person experiences a plurality of objects of various kinds including empirical dualities. As contrasted with this, in the state of knowledge a person who knows the Ultimate has no experience of plurality. As stated earlier, one who knows the Self; which is the Ultimate, the Infinite, remains as the Self; that is to say, everything has become the Self and so one does not experience plurality. The contrast between the state of ignorance and the state of knowledge is vividly brought out in many places in the Upaniṣad. Consider, for example, the following passage:

Because when there is duality, as it were, then one smells something, one sees something, one hears something... But when to the knower of Brahman everything has become the Self, then what should one smell and through what, what would one see and through what, what should one hear and through what...?³

In Advaita, the state of knowledge is called *pāramārthika* whereas the state of ignorance is called *vyāvahārika*. The term “*vyāvahārika*” is comprehensive enough to include everything other than the Ultimate—the starry heavens above and the moral law within, the choir of heaven and the furniture of earth, the cosmic order and the triple states of experience—waking, dream, and deep sleep. Even God who, as the cause of the world, is related to the world, is brought within the realm of the *vyāvahārika*. The expression “absolute standpoint” refers to the state of knowledge called *pāramārthika*, and the expression “relative standpoint” refers to the state of ignorance called *vyāvahārika*.

What distinguishes a human being from other animals is his/her competence for knowledge and eligibility for the performance of religious duties.⁴ The point to be noted here is that a human being who is equipped with the mind,⁵ the marvellous instrument indispensable for the acquisition of knowledge of everything, has the ability for acquiring knowledge of the Ultimate through the study of scripture under the guidance of a competent teacher followed by rational reflection and contemplation on the content of scripture. When we speak of progress from less knowledge to more knowledge, it is progress within

the state of ignorance. Strictly speaking, it is no progress at all, as it does not help one to overcome one's sorrow. What is required is progress from the state of ignorance to the state of knowledge, from the *vyāvahārika* to the *pāramārthika*, from "lesser knowledge" to "higher knowledge." At the *vyāvahārika* level, human beings experience plurality. They consider themselves different from the objects of the physical world. Also, they are inclined to think that the physical world must have been created by God and that, being finite and limited, they are not only different from God, but are dependent on Him as well. In short, they accept the pluralism of God, living beings, and the physical world. However, when they know the Ultimate, there is a change of vision in them such that they experience unity in the place of plurality. Just as there is a change of perspective with reference to the value system of our day-to-day life as we grow, even so there is a change of perspective when there is transition from the *vyāvahārika* to the *pāramārthika*. Referring to the change of perspective following the dawn of knowledge, Gaudapāda observes that all kinds of distinctions such as the teacher, the taught, scripture and its teaching, which are presupposed for the purpose of instruction to the disciple will disappear when the truth is known.⁶

THE ABSOLUTE AND GOD

Making use of the distinction between immanent metaphysics and transcendent metaphysics, we can say that the metaphysics of Advaita is immanent metaphysics inasmuch as the Ultimate which is to be discovered is immanent in our experience. According to Advaita, metaphysics which is inquiry into the nature of reality must analyse the data of our experience with a view to discover the real in it. It means that the real which is immanent in our experience remains concealed in it. What prevents us from seeing the real is the false, which is not real; the real, that is to say, remains concealed by what is not real. Metaphysics, therefore, aims at discovering the real by removing the covering or the veil put up by the false. It means that the real cannot be discovered unless we are able to identify the false and discard it through inquiry. The discrimination of the real from the not-real can be done on the basis of the criterion of the real and of the false. Also, the criterion itself must be transcendently grounded if it is to be accepted.

The purpose of definition is to distinguish the thing defined from everything else. There are two ways in which a thing may be defined. We may define a thing in terms of its essential nature, as when we

say, "Man is a rational animal." Or, we may define a thing in terms of its accidental attributes, as when we say, "Man is a dress-wearing animal." The two kinds of definition are called *svarūpa-lakṣaṇa* and *taṭastha-lakṣaṇa* respectively. "That is the essential nature (*svarūpalakṣaṇa*) of a thing which is present in that thing so long as it lasts and distinguishes it from the rest."⁷ Whatever a human being is and does, rationality constitutes his/her essential nature; and we distinguish a human being from other animals in terms of the essential nature of a human being. "That is the qualification *per accidens* (*taṭastha-lakṣaṇa*) of a thing which remains in that thing only for a time and distinguishes it from the rest."⁸ Wearing dress, walking with the help of a stick, etc. are accidental attributes of a human being. Though they may help to differentiate a human being from others, they do not constitute the essential nature of a human being.

The Upaniṣads define the Ultimate in two ways—in terms of its essential nature as well as through its accidental attributes. Brahman, the Ultimate, the Upaniṣad says, is "the real, knowledge, infinite."⁹ When the Upaniṣad says that Brahman is "that from which all beings come into existence, that by which they live after coming into existence, and that towards which they move and into which they

merge,'¹⁰ it defines Brahman in terms of its accidental attribute, because causality of the world is an external qualification or attribute of Brahman, which is meaningful only in the context of its relation to the world. It is not a definition of what Brahman is *in itself*; on the contrary, it is a definition of Brahman *in relation* to something else.

Thus, from the twofold definition of Brahman we get two concepts of Brahman—Brahman-in-itself and Brahman-in-relation. The former is called Nirguᅇa-Brahman or the Absolute, while the latter is called Saguᅇa-Brahman or Īsvara or God. It means that one and the same reality is viewed in two ways or from two standpoints. When Brahman, the Ultimate, is viewed in itself, it is called the Absolute; and when it is viewed in relation to the world, it is called God. It means that God is the Absolute from the cosmic point of view, and the Absolute is God from the acosmic point of view. So long as we are at the *vyāvahārika* level, which is relative and relational, we cannot but speak of the Ultimate as God. We try to relate the world with the Ultimate as the cause of it. But the dualism of God and world, which is inherent in the category of causality, does not satisfy the demands of reason and has, therefore, to be transcended. It is for this reason that Advaita holds that the dualistic

position of theism, even though methodologically significant and valuable, is not final. Unless the Ultimate is known in itself, there is no overcoming of the *vyāvahārika* realm of dualities. It follows that the metaphysics of Advaita, which is trans-theistic and not anti-theistic, is oriented towards the discovery of the Ultimate.

Śaṅkara formulates the criterion of the real (*sat*) in different ways. The purpose of formulating the criterion is to distinguish the real from the non-real (*asat*) on the one hand, and from the false or the indeterminable (*mithyā* or *anirvacanīya*) on the other. One formulation of the real may be stated as follows: that is real which exists in itself. If the Ultimate, which is called Brahman or Ātman, is said to be real, it is for the reason that it exists in itself. There is the Upaniṣadic support for this criterion. To Nārada's question, "Venerable Sir, on what is the infinite established?" Sanatkumāra's answer is: "On its own greatness."¹¹ The idea that is sought to be conveyed here is that the Ultimate which is infinite and which is real does not have a dependent existence. Conversely, anything that has a dependent existence is not real and, therefore, cannot be the Ultimate.

Applying this criterion, we can first of all exclude the non-real (*asat*) from our consideration. What is totally non-existent is non-real, e.g. the sky-flower. ‘‘Sky-flower’’ is a term by which we convey the idea of what is totally non-existent. Since there is no entity called ‘‘the sky-flower’’ even though we speak about it, the question whether it has dependent or independent existence is absurd. As distinguished from the real and the non-real, there is another category, which may be characterized as the third category, comprising objects of our experience such as the table and the tree, the mountain and the ocean. Since these objects are cognized by us, they cannot be dismissed as non-real. However, they do not fulfil the criterion of the real and so they cannot be called real.

A brief explanation is necessary to show why the objects of the world do not answer to the criterion of the real. The objects of the world have originated because each one of them is an effect of some other object. It means that every object of this world has a dependent existence. A little reflection is enough to show that dependent existence is no existence at all in the strict sense of the term. Take for example two objects, A and B. Let us say that A is dependent on B, and B, on A. If objects are mutually dependent, then no object really exists on its own; and we cannot

answer whether A exists or B exists. Nor does it help us to explain these objects in terms of a causal series. If A is dependent on B, if B is dependent on C, if C, on D, and so on, there arises the difficulty of infinite regress. Here also we cannot say whether any object exists on its own. Nor will it improve the matter if we come back to the first member in the causal series with a view to avoid infinite regress. If we say that A is dependent on B, B on C, C on D, ... and X on A, then there is the difficulty of circularity. Once again it will show that objects which have dependent existence have no existence at all worth the name. According to Advaita, the idea of dependent existence will be intelligible only if there is something which exists on its own, something which is unrelated in itself, something which is unoriginated in itself. That which exists on its own, which is unoriginated and unrelated, is the Ultimate, and that is the real. The real, because it exists on its own, is the *ground* of all objects which are originated and which are relational. Therefore, the objects of the world are not real. Since they are neither real nor non-real, Śaṅkara characterizes them as indeterminable (*anirvacanīya*), as different from both real and non-real (*sadasad-vilakṣaṇa*), as false (*mithyā*). The Ultimate, which is real, and the world consisting of originated and

relational objects are related as the ground and the grounded.

THE ULTIMATE: ONE WITHOUT A SECOND

According to Advaita, the Ultimate which is real is one without a second. Objects other than the Ultimate, which have only a dependent existence, are not real. It means that there is no second reality besides the Ultimate. A text of the *Chândogya Upaniṣad* says that "in the beginning there was Being (*sat*) alone, one only without a second."¹² One way of establishing duality is by proving the reality of difference. Difference is of three kinds. The first variety of difference is the one that obtains between two objects belonging to the same class, e.g. difference between two trees. This kind of difference is called *sajātīya-bheda*. Difference that obtains between two objects belonging to two different classes, e.g. a stone and a tree, is the second variety, which is called *vijātīya-bheda*. The internal distinction in a thing is the third variety of difference called *svagata-bheda*. For example, we analyse a tree, which is a whole, into its parts such as the root system, trunk, branches, and so on. Here we resort to internal differentiation in a given object. According to Advaita, there is nothing like or unlike the Ultimate. It means there is no plurality of

reals. Also, the Ultimate is free from internal differentiation. It is neither a whole consisting of parts nor a substance possessing attributes. The three words in the Upaniṣadic text, "*ekam*" (one), "*eva*" (only), and "*advitīyam*" (without a second), are intended to deny the three kinds of difference in respect of the Ultimate reality. So the Ultimate is one and non-dual, homogeneous, infinite, and without beginning and end.

OBJECTIVE-SUBJECTIVE APPROACHES

There are two approaches to the study of reality—objective and subjective. The objective approach consists in finding out the source of the world, the stuff out of which it is made, through the methods of analysis and synthesis of the things of the world. Very often this approach results in materialism. As contrasted with this, the subjective approach which consists in the analysis of a human being and his/her relation to the objects which are presented to him/her very often results in subjectivism, sometimes, even in scepticism. Since the exclusive application of any one approach leads to the undesirable consequence of reductionism of some kind or other, Advaita makes use of what may be called the synthetic method, which combines both the

objective and the subjective approaches to the study of reality. In several places the Upaniṣad itself provides the clue for the synthetic approach to the study of the Ultimate. For example, the Upaniṣad says: "He who is here in the human person and He who is there in the sun, are one."¹³ The sun which is the source of energy for the entire world is singled out in a suggestive way for all the objects of the world. The idea that is sought to be conveyed here by this text is that the real which is immanent in the world is identical with the real which is immanent in a human being and that, therefore, we have to search for the one reality which is manifest both in human beings and in the world.

As stated earlier, the objective approach to the study of reality consists in the search for the source or cause of the world. Just as every object requires a cause, even so the world requires a cause. What, then, is the cause of the world? The search for the cause of the world must lead to that which is itself uncaused; otherwise there will be the problem of infinite regress. The uncaused cause alone must be real for that alone, as stated earlier, has independent existence.

According to Advaita, the uncaused cause, or what is generally called the First Cause, responsible for the world must be an intelligent principle. Śaṅkara rejects the Sāṅkhya theory which holds that the world has evolved from a primal material stuff called *prakṛti*.¹⁴ The order as well as sequence manifest in the world suggests that it must be due to an intelligent principle capable of planning and willing; and the alleged primordial material stuff, because it is insentient, cannot be credited with thinking, desiring, willing, and so on, which are all required for the creation of the world. A material stuff may be subject to change in course of time. But mere change itself is not evolution; and no material object ever reveals any conscious tendency to evolve. It is, therefore, necessary to hold that the cause of the world must be an intelligent principle. The Advaitin supports his position by citing the authority of scripture in this regard. The Upaniṣad says that Brahman or Sat, which was one only without a second in the beginning, thought: "May I become many, may I grow," and then "It projected Fire."¹⁵ The text of the Upaniṣad makes it clear that Brahman or Sat, the First Cause of the world, was capable of thinking, desiring, and so on. So Brahman which is the Ultimate is the source of the world. The objection raised against the Sāṅkhya theory in this regard holds good in the case of other

theories as well which trace the source of the world to matter in some form or other as the First Cause.

Brahman-in-self is neither the cause nor the effect of anything. If it is the effect of something else, then it has a beginning, and whatever has a beginning must have an end. It means that it will cease to be eternal. If it is the cause of anything, then it becomes relational. In that case it is no better than the things of the world, which are relational. If we leave out Brahman, there is nothing else which could serve as the cause of the world. The world requires Brahman, the Ultimate, as its cause; but the nature of Brahman is such that it cannot be the cause of the world. The Advaitin solves the difficulty through *māyā*, the creative principle.

Creation, no doubt, is a mystery. The mystery of creation, according to Śaṅkara, is rooted in the creative principle itself whose ontological status as well as functioning is a paradox. *Māyā* is not real like Brahman; nor is it non-real like the sky-flower. It has a unique ontological status such that we cannot say that it is real or non-real. Being different from both real and non-real, it is indeterminable (*anirvacanīya*). It serves as a conditioning principle, as it were, of Brahman. What is really unconditioned becomes

conditioned, as it were, by *māyā*. In other words, ‘‘Brahman-in-itself’’ becomes ‘‘Brahman-in-relation’’ because of its association with *māyā*. According to Advaita, when the association between Brahman and *māyā* took place, no one can say. So long as there is the world, there is *māyā*, the creative principle, in association with Brahman. The Advaitin holds that the relation between Brahman and *māyā* is beginningless (*anādi*).¹⁶ The point to be noted here is that from our perspective there is a climb down, as it were, in the status of Brahman due to its association with *māyā*, the creative-principle. Though the association of *māyā* does not affect the nature of Brahman, it becomes conditioned as it were. And the conditioned Brahman is called Īsvara or Saḡuṇa-Brahman or God.¹⁷ So God is Brahman from the cosmic point of view.

A brief explanation of the causality of Brahman is necessary at this stage. We have already said that Brahman-in-itself is not the cause of the world. In the same way, *māyā* by itself cannot function as the creative principle. Like the *prakṛti* of the Sāṅkhya school, *māyā* is material by its very nature though, unlike *prakṛti*, it is not all independent principle. It can function only when it is associated with Brahman. So Brahman and *māyā* together are the cause of the

world. While Brahman which serves as the ground or the substratum (*adhiṣṭhāna*) of the world is the transfigurative material cause, *māyā* which is subject to change is the transformative material cause, of the world.¹⁸ The objects which are related as cause and effect cannot be totally different; nor can they be completely identical. For example, clay and pot are not totally different; they are not identical either. It means that there must be identity as well as difference between cause and effect. Since *māyā*, the creative principle, is material like the world, there is identity between cause and effect. While Brahman is sentient, the world is insentient; and so there is also difference between cause and effect.

The relation between the Ultimate and the world is just like the relation between rope and snake. Just as the rope without undergoing any change is responsible for the appearance of the snake, even so the Ultimate without undergoing any change is responsible for the appearance of the world. It is not necessary to go into the epistemological issues involved in the appearance of one thing as something else. In the rope-snake example, the rope is the substratum for the appearance of snake thereon; even so the Ultimate is the substratum for the appearance of the world thereon. Apart from saying that the Ultimate and the

world are related as the ground and the grounded, as reality and appearance, we cannot spell out the relation that obtains between them. There cannot be any *real* relation between them, since the relata possess different ontological status. While the Ultimate is absolutely real (*pāramārthika*), the world is not so; the World, that is to say, is only phenomenally or empirically real (*vyāvahārika*); and so there cannot be any real relation between them.

God who is the cause of the world cannot be known through sense perception or reasoning. Though God is immanent in the world, we cannot perceive Him through any of our senses. It is true that God is the substratum of the world providing a *basis* for the existence of the things of the world. Nevertheless, we do not see the substratum because of the names and forms (*nāma* and *rūpa*) of the objects which are superimposed thereon. Nor can inference help us to know God. Though inference is a source of knowledge in respect of empirical or phenomenal objects, it is of no avail in the present case. If we argue, on the analogy of pot and potter, or house and builders, that there must be a creator of the world, we could, at the most, establish only a creator with limited knowledge and power, or a multitude of co-operative creators, not a single, omniscient,

omnipotent, omnipresent creator. Realizing the limitations of both sense perception and reasoning, the Advaitin holds that the nature of Brahman, both in its conditioned and unconditioned aspects, can be known only through scripture.¹⁹ God occupies an important place in the metaphysical system of Śaṅkara. Not only is God the creator of the world, but He is also the support and controller of the world and the dispenser of justice.²⁰ Of course, the interest of the Advaitin is not in establishing the theistic position as the final truth. His interest is in the non-dual Absolute whose realization will mark the termination of the bondage of empirical existence.

The analysis of the nature and the constituents of a human being occupies the central place in the subjective approach to the study of reality. The philosophy of the human as worked out by Advaita is unique. A human being, as she is in empirical existence, is complex consisting of the Self and matter. Without going into details we could say that the material component which serves as the outfit or vesture for the Self consists of the mind, the senses, and the body.²¹ The material adjunct which is not-Self and which serves to limit the Self is not real; it is only phenomenal in the same way as the objects of the world are phenomenal. It has the same ontological

status of the objects of the world. For the sake of convenience we can say that anything other than the Self is not-Self (*anātman*). Advaita holds that the Self alone is real.

With a view to establish the reality of the Self and the unreality of the material component, Advaita formulates the criterion of the real in another way. This criterion of the real, it should be borne in mind, is not inconsistent with the one formulated earlier. According to this criterion, that is real which is uniformly present in all our experience. There are three states of experience—waking, dream, and deep sleep. In the waking state (*jāgrat*) we are conscious of the objects of the external world through the functioning of our mind and the senses. In the dream state (*svapna*), the mind alone functions and projects objects of its own. The mind as well as the senses do not function in the state of deep sleep (*susupti*) with the result that there is no awareness of anything, external or internal, at that time. While the waking and dream states provide us with what may be called a knowledge situation, the state of deep sleep is not a knowledge situation. While the mind and the senses are sometimes present and sometimes absent, only the Self which is consciousness is uniformly present in all the three states of experience. Advaita, therefore, holds that the Self alone is real.

Śaṅkara maintains that consciousness is one and indivisible. It will not be possible to prove that there is a plurality of consciousness. However, there is a plurality of mind-sensebody complex. Two persons differ not because of the Self or consciousness in them, but because of their mind-sense-body complex which qualifies consciousness. One and the same consciousness appears to be plural because of the plurality of adjuncts. Further, consciousness is not relational. However, it appears to be relational due to the functioning of the mind. It is well known that consciousness is intentional in the waking and dream states. There is consciousness *of* a tree or a table in the waking state; there is consciousness *of* various (dream) objects in the dream state. But in the state of deep sleep there is no consciousness of anything, external or internal. In other words, while consciousness is intentional in waking and dream states, it is not intentional in deep sleep. It is the presence or absence of the mind that makes consciousness intentional or not intentional. Consciousness by its very nature is not intentional; its intentionality is only adventitious. It follows that consciousness is not relational. Moreover, consciousness is not an object of knowledge. While everything else is known through consciousness, how is consciousness known? Not through another

consciousness; for there is no second consciousness; and such an argument will result in the difficulty of infinite regress. Further, since consciousness is one and indivisible, it cannot be said that it is both the knower and the known in the same act of cognition. In view of these difficulties, the Advaitin maintains that consciousness is not an object of knowledge. Consciousness is self-luminous (*svapprakāśa*) in the sense that, while it reveals everything else, it itself is not revealed by anything.

Considering the nature of the Ultimate, which is the ground of the world, and of the nature of the Self in a human being, Advaita maintains that the Ultimate which is called Brahman is no other than the Self (*Ātman*) of a human being. It is this identity of Brahman and *Ātman* that is taught as the purport of the scriptural teaching by the principal texts of the Upaniṣads such as "This Self is Brahman."²² "That thou art."²³

A human being is, indeed, the Self, though in empirical existence she is associated with the material adjunct. Though the Self is the reality in a human being, the latter does not realize this due to ignorance (*avidyā*). Not only do we not know the Self in us, but also we identify ourselves with the mind-sense-body

complex and thereby transact our business of life. It is this identification with the mind-sense-body complex that is said to be the bondage of empirical existence. If the mind is controlled and stilled through ethical and spiritual discipline, one can achieve the state of the absence of mental modifications (*citta-vṛtti*). When the mind becomes a non-mind, the Self which is ever present remains in its natural state; a person who has come up to this stage of development *knows* or *realizes* the inward Self, and remains as the Self. It is a case where to know the Self is to be the Self. That is why the Upaniṣad says that the knower of Brahman remains as Brahman.²⁴ Such a person is the liberated-in-life (*jīvanmukta*).

NOTES:

1. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, 2.4.5. See Śāṅkara's commentary on this text.
2. *Ibid.* Also see *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, 6.1.3, and Śāṅkara's commentary thereon. Śāṅkara observes: "Even after having read all the Vedas and learnt all else that there is to be learnt, until one knows the Self, one's main purpose in life remains unfulfilled."
3. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, 2.4.14. See also *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, 7.24.1.
4. In the words of Śāṅkara, "*Karma-jñāna-adhikāraḥ.*" See Śāṅkara's commentary on the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad*, 2.1.1.

5. See *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*; 4.4.19: "Only by the mind is it (i.e. Brahman) to be known."
6. Gauḍapāda, *Māṇḍūkya-kārikā*, 1.17-18.
7. T.M.P. Mahadevan, *The Philosophy of Advaita*, (London: Luzac & Company, 1938). p. 104.
8. *Ibid.*
9. *Taittirīya Upaniṣad*, 2.1.1.
10. *Ibid.*, 3.1.1.
11. *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, 7.24.1.
12. 6.2.1.
13. *Taittirīya Upaniṣad*, 2.5.5.
14. See Śaṅkara's commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra*, 2.2.1-10 for a detailed discussion on this issue.
15. *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, 6.2.2-3. See also *Aitareya Upaniṣad*, 1.1.1-2.
16. Advaita speaks of six things as *anādi*: (1) *jīva*, (2) *Īśvara*, (3) the pure consciousness (i.e. Brahman), (4) the difference between *jīva* and *Īśvara*, (5) *avidyā* (otherwise called *māyā*), and (6) the relation between *avidyā* and consciousness.
17. See *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad*, 4.10: "Know that *prakṛti* is *māyā* and the wielder of *māyā* is the great Lord..."
18. In the technical terminology, *māyā* is the *pariṇāmi-upādāna-kāraṇa*, whereas Brahman is the *vivarta-upādāna-kāraṇa*.
19. See Śaṅkara's commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra*, 1.1.3.
20. See *Brahma-sūtra*, 2.1.34, and Śaṅkara's commentary thereon.

21. The detailed explanation of the material component should be given in terms of five sheaths (*pañca-kośa*) or three bodies (*śarīra- traya*).
22. *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad*, 2.
23. *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, 6.8.7.
24. *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad*, 3.2.9.



NATURE AND ART — SOME POINTS OF SIGNIFICANCE

T. P. Ramachandran

1. *The place of beauty in the Indian philosophy of values*

Truth, beauty, and goodness are the trinity of values familiar to Western philosophers from the time of Plato. They correspond to the three facets of the mind, the intellectual, the emotional, and the volitional, respectively. They may well be described as cultural values, or values of the mind, since it is their pursuit that, lifts man above the material level of economic and hedonistic pursuits. They represent the finer aspects of human civilization. If we compare this Western list of values with the Indian list of *puruṣārthas*, we find that only goodness is represented under the name of *dharma*. Truth and beauty are not formally referred to in the Indian list. Thus the conventional list of *puruṣārthas* remains the class of four (*caturvarga*), described as *dharmārtha-kāma-mokṣa*.

The absence of a formal inclusion of truth and beauty among the puruṣārthas does not mean that these two values were unknown to Indian thinkers or were neglected by them. As for truth, the importance given to epistemology by all the Indian philosophical schools precludes any doubt regarding the attention given to it. And yet, if truth, which may be rendered as *jñāna*, was not expressly mentioned among the puruṣārthas, the reason might well be that truth is basic to the study of all the other values. What a person holds true about the nature of reality—his metaphysics—is the foundation for his conception of the other values. As one believes reality to be, so one conceives of the purposes of life. For example, a materialist has no idea of liberation, and a spiritualist is bound to look upon wealth and pleasure as subordinate pursuits. Thus truth, which presupposes all the other values, needs no formal mention.

As regards beauty, the wealth of discussion that is available in Indian works on the ideal of beauty belies any impression that it was of no importance to Indian thinkers. The beauty present in nature finds a place in the Vedic Mantras. God himself is described in terms of beauty in the Itihāsas and Purāṇas. Beauty in art has given rise to the whole of Alāṅkāra-śāstra.

The presence of such a vast material on beauty could not have escaped the notice of Indian philosophers. And yet, if beauty was not explicitly included in the *puruṣārthas*, there must be a special reason for it, which we shall see in due course.

The point that we are making now is that the triad of values—truth, beauty, and goodness—is basic to human nature and, therefore, must be found in all philosophical traditions, implicitly, if not explicitly, in some. The Indian list comprising *artha*, *kāma*, *dharma*, and *mokṣa* is to be taken more as representative of human aspiration than as exhaustive of it. There is, however, an important difference between the Indian and the Western traditions in regard to the treatment of truth, beauty, and goodness. Western philosophers, with the exception of the religious philosophers of the middle ages, regard truth, beauty, and goodness as ultimate, as ends in themselves; Indian philosophers have uniformly regarded them as avenues to the highest value of liberation. In assessing the place of these values in the overall scheme of values, they are judged in terms of their relevance to *mokṣa*.

A peculiar feature about beauty is that, unlike the pursuit of truth and goodness, its pursuit is not

essential for liberation, though it can be useful for the purpose in certain ways. Truth is indispensable, as liberation depends on the direct experience of reality. As a preliminary to direct experience, mediate knowledge of reality has to be gained through scripture and reasoning. Goodness is indispensable for liberation, because purity of mind, which can result only from moral conduct, is an essential condition for the onset of immediate knowledge. No such reason can be stated for the pursuit of beauty as an unavoidable means to *mokṣa*.

All the schools of Indian philosophy, Vedic and non-Vedic, stress the need for truth and goodness, but none makes a similar demand for the pursuit of beauty. There are even occasional warnings that, if beauty is not sought after with discrimination, it may serve as a distraction from the highest goal. Beauty in natural objects affords pure self-forgetful delight. But, being part of the actual world, one's attitude towards these objects could sometimes slide from the aesthetic to the personal. And the danger of attachment to sense objects is a refrain of religious teaching. As regards art, Manu regards certain forms of art like dance, song, and instrumental music as human weaknesses

(*vyasana*)¹, though Yājñavalkya commends music for its utility in concentration.² The statement that “all prattle about poetry should cease” (*kāvyaḥ ca varjayet*)³ is typical of this warning. Such observations need not be taken as downright condemnation of artistic beauty, but they underline the genuine apprehension that, if the pursuit of art is not deliberately coordinated with other higher values, it may well degenerate into a variety of *kāma*. Thus beauty—whether in nature or in art—is almost an autonomous value and can normally be expected to have only an incidental relation to *mokṣa*. It is probably this consideration that prevented Indian philosophers from including it in the list of *puruṣārthas*, while they conceded and acknowledged its irresistible appeal to man.

The connection of beauty with other values is the theme of this paper. But the problem cannot be discussed by taking beauty in a uniform sense. Since beauty is of different orders, the question has to be examined with reference to each order of beauty. A connection that applies to one order of beauty may not apply to another. For example, there is a moral dimension to artistic beauty, but natural beauty is

non-moral. Nature comprises the inanimate world and non-human life. Man is also part of nature so far as his biological life is concerned. The question of moral significance does not arise with reference to nature. Moral judgement pertains only to the conscious actions of normal, adult, human beings. Hence with reference to beauty in nature, we are left only with two relations—to truth and to liberation.

2. Nature and truth

Some objects and events in nature are beautiful. These objects and events are certainly also facts presented to perception; in other words, they are true in the ordinary sense of the term. At the same time, there are other aspects of nature to which we are unable to apply the term beauty, though they too are factual. Thus beautiful things in nature are facts, but not all facts in nature are necessarily beautiful. The realm of truth in nature is wider than the realm of natural beauty.

Now, the very reason that natural beauty belongs to reality could impose an extra-aesthetic dimension to our response to it. The object being real, the appreciation of it could over-step the purely aesthetic

attitude. An aesthetic attitude is impersonal, disinterested, free from practical considerations. Such an attitude cannot always be ensured with reference to beautiful objects in nature. Being Part of the real world, a thing of natural beauty could easily tend to get associated with some personal desire. On seeing a beautiful place, one may desire to build a house or a hotel there. No such desires could arise with reference to an imaginary landscape represented in a painting. One may desire to possess the painting or any other artefact, but this shows only love of art; and the general attitude, therefore, remains aesthetic in this case.

3. *Nature and liberation*

Two typical views stand out in India on the significance of natural beauty to liberation. To the Sāṅkhya school, natural beauty has no importance for *mokṣa*. In fact, the *puruṣa* has to withdraw from nature to attain liberation. The Sāṅkhya attitude to nature is negative. *Prakṛti* is opposed to *puruṣa*. Nature tempts the mind with mixed experiences and diverts it from the final goal. The *puruṣa* has to realize that it has nothing really to do with nature, utilizing for this purpose the instrument provided by nature

itself, viz. the *buddhi*. When nature's game is up and it withdraws like a dancer after a performance, the enlightened *puruṣa* becomes free.⁴

To Vedānta, the entire universe is an expression of Brahman. The finer aspects of it reveal Brahman to a greater degree than others. The Lord says in the *Bhagavad-gītā* that whichever being is possessed of greatness, auspiciousness, or energy is a manifestation of a part of his splendour.⁵ The *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad* points out that Brahman is the supreme light by which all the sources of illumination in the world—the sun, the moon, stars, lightning, and fire—show lustre.⁶ The *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, speaking of Brahman in terms of joy, declares that all other joy is but a particle of it.⁷ Such an assurance from the metaphysics of Vedānta is sufficient basis for regarding beauty in parts of nature as manifestations of Brahman and, in turn, as pointers to Brahman. To a saint, they serve as instant reminders of the presence of God. Śrī Śaṅkara felt the divine essence in the spells of nature when he described Devī as the “creatress of the charms of the lotus” (*sarasīruha saubhāgya-janani*).⁸ Of recent times, it is said of Śrī Rāmakṛṣṇa that he often fell into a trance when he came across a

lovely scene in nature. The divine intimation from nature may occur even to the layman on a much fainter scale—and this, according to Vedānta, is the real significance of his being enthralled at the sight of an ice-capped mountain or a trilling water-fall. Bhāravi says that the very appearance of the Himālaya induces thoughts of liberation.⁹ But the common man sometimes misses this significance and takes such vistas as mere pleasure-spots (*bhoga-bhūmi*). The doctrine of the divinity of nature has an important corollary—the feeling of respect for it and the sense of folly in its unbridled exploitation.

4. *Art and truth*

The artist may start from the facts of nature and life. But the facts are subjected to imaginative treatment. In imitative art, the beauty is close to fact, but even here it cannot be said to be identical with fact, as it is not without an imaginative touch. In abstractionist art, the content may not bear even a distant resemblance to facts. In idealized art, the content, which is a general idea, has an unique status. It cannot be said to be real, because it does not exactly correspond with anything in the actual world. This is the reason why it does not evoke in the spectator any

personal desire for what is represented, as actual things could do. The content is not unreal, because it evokes response and holds our attention. It is not illusory, because, unlike illusory objects, it is not first taken to be real and then rejected. Neither believing nor disbelieving it, we entertain it in our minds purely for its beauty. In short, ontological considerations simply do not apply to it. It is because of this unique non-ontological status that it evokes nothing but disinterested, impersonal response from the appreciator and becomes a source of pure delight. Thus the content of art has no correspondence with truth.

The method of communicating the ideal content of art has also to be considered with reference to its connection with truth. But truth in this context has naturally to be taken in the epistemological sense. In the metaphysical sense, the term "truth" stands for reality as such. But in the epistemological sense, truth means the fidelity of our knowledge to the object known. Now, in communicating his content, the artist may either resort to the overt, direct method of depiction (*varṇana, nidarśana*) or to the subtle, indirect method of suggestion (*dhvanana*). Even open depiction in art involves a lot of figurative devices, or

ornamentation. These are inappropriate to the realm of logic where understanding things as they are is called for. The distance from logical truth becomes even more prominent in the case of *dhvani*, which is the unique discovery of Indian thinkers, Ālaṅkārikas.

Ālaṅkārikas speak of three kinds of *dhvani* with reference to what is suggested (*vyāṅgya*), namely *vastu-dhvani*, *alaṅkāra-dhvani*, and *bhāva-dhvani*. In *alaṅkāra-dhvani* what is suggested is not a fact as such, but only a fact as figured (*alaṅkṛta*) in the mind of the artist. In *bhāva-dhvani* the content is an emotion, whether transient or permanent. But emotions as suggested by the artist are not personal like in actual life. They are of a generalized kind (*sādhāraṇīkṛta*), and, as such, they are out of the actual world (*alaukika*). Otherwise, they cannot be expected to produce uniform delight. Thus the only type of *dhvani* that comes close to the real world is *vastu-dhvani*, where a fact (*vastu*) is suggested. But even here, as examples show, *dhvani* can only remind a person of a fact already known to the recipient. It cannot newly inform a person of a fact which is not hitherto known to him. Hence *dhvani* as a method of art can never serve as a means to true knowledge, nor is it intended

to do so. Its legitimate function in art is to communicate the ideal content and give delight. As a matter of fact, it was in reply to those who questioned the legitimacy of *dhvani* from the logical point of view that Ānandavardhana pointed out that the question of logical truth and falsity in regard to suggested meaning in poetry is entirely futile.¹⁰ Thus, just as the content of art ought not to be viewed from the ontological point of view, the method of art also ought not to be judged from the epistemological point of view.

In passing, it is of interest to consider the place of *dhvani* in spiritual training. In view of its strictly a-logical character, no philosophical school in India could afford to employ *dhvani* as a means of instruction on the nature of reality. But *dhvani* comes of use in preparing the pupil's mind to receive such instruction and also in inducing religious practice for experiencing the reality. By holding up the sordid aspects of life and after-life, the *dhvani* method could suggest the need for and inculcate the spirit of dispassion (*vairāgya*) towards worldly life. In fact, this is what the Itihāsas and Purāṇas do. Again, by suggesting the spiritual emotions of peace (*sānti*) and devotion (*bhakti*), which are adopted as themes by many an artistic work, the *dhvani* method comes of

use in cultivating the same feelings in the minds of the appreciators.

5. *Art and goodness*

Art may enter into relationship with morality through its content. When the artist deals with purely natural phenomena, the question of morality does not arise for the reason, which we have stated earlier, that nature is amoral. The moral question arises only when the artist's theme involves human life. In the history of Western aesthetics there are two extreme views on this question. There is also a third view which mediates between these two, and the Indian view accords with this. We shall briefly recount the three views for placing the Indian view in the right perspective.

Art for morality

This view reduces art to a position of subservience to morality. It holds that the purpose of the artist should always be to convey moral lessons through his works. The theme chosen for artistic works should be such as to edify and instruct men on what they ought and ought not to do. This view of art as a deliberate means to morality, called didacticism,

or moralism, is a very old one. It is present in Plato's thought, Among its later representatives are Phillip Sydney in the sixteenth century and John Ruskin and Leo Tolstoy in the nineteenth century.

The chief defect of this view is that it ignores the spontaneous nature of fine art. It is generally recognized that art creation is the free natural outcome of an inner urge—howsoever that urge is interpreted. It is not a deliberate, though a conscious, activity. It is not intended to achieve a purpose. In fact, art governed by any purpose is, properly speaking, useful art rather than fine art. There are works of a didactic nature. But these are valued in history for their instruction rather than for any aesthetic quality they may possess. Hence fine art cannot be supposed to have a moral purpose.

Art for art's sake

In the nineteenth century there arose a strong reaction against the moralist view of art, and this led to another extreme position—that art has nothing to do with morality. The reaction first arose in France under the slogan "art for art's sake." In America, Whistler and Allen Poe and, in England, Walter Pater and Oscar Wilde became its chief proponents.

As a movement to vindicate the freedom of the artist in choosing his theme, the reaction against moralism was a healthy trend and has been rightly described as "autonomism." But in its anxiety to do this, it took the untenable stand that art is indifferent to moral considerations. Art is to be judged by its own standards irrespective of how it stands to moral sentiments and ideas. Such a recommendation could have dangerous consequences for humanity: there would be nothing to restrain an artist from portraying what is patently immoral. Art could then end up as a disservice to mankind. Though truth, beauty and goodness are distinct values, truth and beauty cannot be pursued at the expense of goodness. There is need for a moral foundation for all our pursuits, since they happen in a society.

The moral condition for art:

The third view neither subordinates art to morality nor absolves it of all moral obligation. Art has nothing directly to do with morality. The theme of art need not be moral in the sense that it should carry a moral lesson. Moral instruction is the business of the philosopher. The artist, in seeking expression to his inner urge, is free to choose his subject. The chief

value of his work is the delight that it produces.¹¹ But this does not mean that the artist has nothing to do with morality at all, so that he could afford to go against moral considerations. He is certainly circumscribed by the condition that his theme must not be such as to degrade moral standards and corrupt the character of its votaries. This means that at least the artist's outlook, his attitude to the subject, must be moral. He need not teach morals. But his respect for morality will sufficiently ensure that his content does not transgress the considerations of virtue. As Hiriyanna puts it, "...art should not have a moral *aim*, but must necessarily have a moral *view*."¹² The majority of thinkers in the West have subscribed to this middle view. This has also been uniformly the position of Indian thinkers.

With regard to human life, we may conceive of two types of themes. The artist may pay predominant attention either to human activities or to human emotions. We have to consider the moral dimension of both. As for human activity, although any variety of it could lend material to the artist to construct his theme, the moral condition requires that he selects his material from the higher and nobler aspects of life,

such as loving service and charity or even fighting for a noble cause. Even when he is obliged to bring in the seamy side of life, such as crime or greedy acquisition, his treatment must be such as to leave the unmistakable impression of disapproval and warning. In short, whatever be the aspect of conduct that is dealt with, the artist has the moral responsibility to represent it in its due place and proportion in life. Though the primary value of art is delight, when dealing with human activities, it should also serve in this indirect way as a "criticism of life." In that manner, art could produce discriminative insight (*vyutpatti*) into the ends of life.¹³

The indirect moral influence of art lies in the way in which the artist chooses his central characters. Conduct flows from a person's character. The artist's respect for morality makes him look for the type of "the good and the great," though technically any type of character could serve as his material. Characters like Duṣyanta and Rāma are the right examples for art. This does not mean that bad characters like Śiśupāla and Rāvaṇa are necessarily excluded. But the artist's portrayal of them should be such that they serve as models of what ought not to be emulated. And in this process, the bad serve as foils for the good. Such a

work is bound to have a chastening influence on the behaviour of the appreciators in life.

We now come to the second type of theme within human life. Here the artist's focus is not activity as such, but the emotion behind it. When emotion occupies the predominant place in the theme, the indirect moral influence of art is even greater. The role of emotion in moral life can never be exaggerated. Emotions are the basic springs of moral action. They supply the urge for conduct, while reason gives it a direction. They are the inner motivations which ultimately determine the goodness or badness of actions. When the artist presents emotions in his work through his chosen characters, they are no longer of the same order as we find them in common life; they emerge purer and nobler, rid of their usual imperfections, and shining as models of ideal measure and proportion in life. And when such emotions are taken in and experienced by the appreciator, there is, unawares, a corresponding transformation of his own emotional equipment. The process consists not only in the revival (*udbodhana*) of an emotion in the spectator or reader corresponding to the one portrayed in the work, but also in the simultaneous elevation of the

revived emotion its ideal state (*sādhāranīkaraṇa*) as presented by the artist. Hence, during the period of appreciation, the subject is enabled to live through the emotion free of its usual defects. Such an experience naturally results in the refinement and culture of the emotion in himself. In this manner, the *rasa* type of work provides an excellent exercise in the sublimation of personal feelings.

The right way to discipline the emotions is not to suppress them, but to refine them according to their true place in life. Art of the *rasa* type is immensely useful in putting us in the way of achieving this end. It is thus wonderfully suited as a means of emotional culture. While the predominantly action-centred theme sets up examples of conduct and thus influences the appreciator in an external way, the predominantly emotion-focussed type goes verily into the psychology of the appreciator and helps to chasten his moral equipment from within. In this sense, we may say that it goes beyond the negative condition that art must not go against morals and positively allies itself with morality. The theme is no longer merely controlled by the moral outlook of the artist. On the contrary, the moral ideal comes to be intimately

woven into the structure of the theme. Art of the *rasa* type is thus invested with a double benefit—the direct one of pure delight and the indirect one of moral reformation. Its status as art renders its moral influence pleasant also. It can refine character in such an unobtrusive way as to leave the least strain on the novice, As Hiriyanna puts it, “it can not only teach, but also please, and while it can successfully persuade, it can keep its persuasive character concealed from view,”¹⁴ For this reason, the moral influence of *rasa* art has been compared to the gentle persuasion of a devoted wife (*kāntā-sammīta*).¹⁵ In fact, its influence has been eulogized as holding a definite advantage over the influence of the Veda, which acts in the form of a master’s command (*prabhu-sammīta*) and that of the Itihāsas and Purāṇas, which operates in the manner of a friend’s counsel (*mītra-sammīta* or *subhṛt-sammīta*).¹⁶

It may be added that the moral condition that applies to the artist applies also to the critic of art. While aesthetic concepts like *rasa* and *dhvani* could be explained by referring to any emotion, some of the later Ālaṅkārikas overplayed and debased the emotion of conjugal love (*rati*) in their examples to the point of impairing the dignity of the subject.

NOTES:

1. *Manu-smṛti*, VII, 47.
2. *Yājñavalkya-smṛti*, III, 113-16.
3. cited by M. Hiriyanna in *QAP*, p. 31 and in *ICV*, p. 23.
4. vide *Sāṅkhya-kārikā* of Īsvara-kṛṣṇa.
5. *Bhagavad-gītā*, X, 41.
6. VI, 14.
7. IV, 3, 32.
8. *Saundarya-laharī*, v. 51.
9. vide *Kirātārjunīya*, v. 22.
10. *DAL*, Uddyota III, *Vṛtti* on *Kārikā*, 33.
11. ...*ānanda eva pāryantikam phalam* / *DAL*, udyota I, *vṛtti* on *kārikā* 1.
12. *AE*, p. 53.
13. *dharmārtha-kāma-mokṣeṣu*
vaicakṣanyam kalāsu ca
karoti kīrtim prītim ca
sādhukāvya-niṣevanam
 Bhāmaha, *Kāvya-lāṅkāra*, I. 2, cited by M. Hiriyanna in *ICV*, p. 330.
14. *AE*, p. 7.
15. *KP*, *Ullāsa* I, *kārikā* 2.
16. *Ibid.*, *vṛtti* on *kārikā* 2.

ABBREVIATIONS:

1. *AE* - Art Experience. Mysore: Kavyalaya Publishers, 1954.
2. *DAL* - *Dhvanyāloka-Locana*.
3. *ICV* - Indian Conception of Values, Mysore: Kavyalaya Publishers, 1957.
4. *KP* - *Kāvya prakāśa* of Mammata.
5. *QAP* - The Quest After Perfection. Mysore: Kavyalaya Publishers, 1952.





ABOUT THE PUBLISHERS

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संसाराध्वनि तापभानुकिरणप्रोद्भूतदाहव्यथा-
खिन्नानां जलकाङ्क्षया मरुभुवि भ्रान्त्या परिभ्राम्यताम् ।
अत्यासन्नसुधाम्बुधिं सुखकरं ब्रह्माद्वयं दर्शय-
न्त्येषा शाङ्करभारती विजयते निर्वाणसन्दायिनी ॥

*samsārādhvani tāpabhānukiraṇaprodhbhūtadāhavyathā-
khinnānām jalakāṅksayā marubhuvi bhrāntyā paribhrāmyatām
atyāsannasudhāmbudhim suhakaram brahmādvayam darsaya-
ntyēsā śāṅkara-bhārati vijayate nirvāṇa-sandāyini.*

To those who are afflicted, in the way of the world, by the burning pain given rise to by the scorching sun-shafts of misery, and who through delusion wander about in the desert (of worldliness) seeking water - showing the felicitous ocean of nectar, which is very near, the non-dual Brahman, this - The Voice of Śaṅkara is victorious, leading, as it does, to liberation.