


THE VOICE OF ŚĀṄKARA

Śāṅkara - bhāratī



Editor :

N. Veezhinathan

एषा शाङ्करभारती विजयते निर्वाणसन्दायिनी

eṣa śāṅkara-bhāratī vijayate

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Victorious is the Voice of Śāṅkara,

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[1]

HOMAGE TO ŚAÑKARA

॥ श्रीः ॥

निजभजनरतं वृषाद्रिनाथः
शिवगुरुविप्रमनुग्रहीतुमिच्छन् ।
स्वयमवतरणं चकार यस्मिन्
वपुषि, चकास्तु सदा तदस्मदन्तः ॥

Vṛṣādrinātha (the Lord of Tiruśivaperur), with a desire to bless Śivaguru of spiritual birth who was devoutly worshipping him, appeared in a human form (as Śaṅkara). May that form ever shine forth in my mind.

(Dr. Rāma Varma Parīkṣit,
The Mahārāja of the Former Princely State of
Cochin)



THE TEACHINGS OF ŚAṆKARA

N. Veezhinathan

The śrtui texts point to the Self as of the nature of non-dual, attributeless consciousness¹ and also as the material and the efficient cause of the world.² The Sāṅkhya school contends that the Self which is free from the power of action (kriyā-śakti) cannot be regarded as the cause of the world. It is only pradhāna which is constituted of the three strands of sattva, rajas, and tamas, and which, although insentient, has the power to manifest the world that should be viewed to be so. The word, "Sat" occurring in the beginning of the second section of the sixth chapter of the Chāndogya Upaniṣad³ signifies pradhāna and not the Self. The fifth adhikaraṇa entitled Īkṣatyadhikaraṇa comprising seven sūtras is a critique of this contention of the Sāṅkhya school.

The word, "Sat", Śaṅkara argues, cannot be taken in the sense of pradhāna of the following grounds:

- i) The second section of the sixth chapter of the Chāndogya Upaniṣad begins with the statement, "In the beginning Sat alone was, without a second"⁴, and proceeds to state that Sat considered the process of the creation of the world, resolved to carry it out, and put that resolve into effect.⁵ All these functions can have bearing upon an intelligent being only, and not upon an insentient principle like the pradhāna;
- ii) Havind diversified itself into the three elements of fire, water, and earth, the śruti states: Sat resolved, "I shall become immanent in these in my own form as the jīva, and differentiate them into names and forms."⁶ From this it is evident that the jīva is of the form of Sat. Hence the word, "Sat" stands for the Self, the sentient Being;
- iii) Referring to Sat which is mentioned in the beginning, the Chāndogya Upaniṣad identifies it as of the nature of the jīva in the words, "All this is of the essence of it; it is the real; it is the Self; and, you are that."⁷ It further mentions the attainment of the Self as the result of realizing one's true nature as the Self in the words, "He who has a preceptor, knows; for him there is delay only

so long as he is not freed (from the body), and then he remains as the Self"⁸ It is clear from this that the text, "tat tvam asi," speaks of the identity of the true nature of the jīva with Sat, and also of its realization as the means to liberation. If the word "Sat" is taken to signify pradhāna, then the above text would mean that the jīva is identical with pradhāna, and its realization would lead to liberation. This is unintelligible; for, in the first place, the śruti would never instruct the identity of the jīva, the intelligent being with an insentient principle, viz. pradhāna. In the second place, even the Sāᅅkhya school does not admit that the jīva is identical with pradhāna and the knowledge of such an identity constitutes the means to liberation. According to it, it is only the knowledge of the puruᅅa as distinct from pradhāna that is so. The word, "Sat" does not, therefore, refer to pradhāna;

- iv) The text, "satā saumya tadā sampanno bhavati, svam apīto bhavati,"⁹ states that the jīva, being freed from its limiting adjuncts in the state of deep sleep (tadā), becomes one (sampanno bhavati) with Sat (sāta), i.e, it lapses or falls back (apītaᅅ) into

its intrinsic nature (svam). This means that in the deep sleep state there is the manifestation of the identity of the true nature of the jīva, with Sat. Since there could be no identity of jīva, the intelligent being, with pradhāna the insentient one, the word "Sat" represents the Self only and not pradhāna; and,

- v) The Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad describes Īsvara as one who knows everything in its general aspect (sarvajñaḥ) and also in its specific aspect (sarvavit).¹⁰ Adverting to him, the Upaniṣad further states that he is the cause of the world and the Lord of the jīva.¹¹ From this it is known that, according to the Upaniṣads, it is the Self in its aspect of Īsvara, is the cause of the world, and it is the significance of the term "Sat", and not pradhāna.

It follows from this account that the Self in its aspect of Īsvara is the material and the efficient cause of the world. The Upaniṣads, Śaṅkara remarks, present the Self as endowed with attributes (saviśeṣa) and also as free from all attributes (nirviśeṣa). He adds that the Self which is saviśeṣa can only be worshipped and

that which is nirviśeṣa can only be realized as identical with contemplative's own self.¹²

NOTES :

1. Taittirīya Upaniṣad, 2.1
2. Ibid., 3.1.
3. Chāndogya Upaniṣad, 6.2.1.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid., 6.2.3.
6. Ibid., 6.3.2
7. Ibid., 6.13.3.
8. Ibid., 6.14 2
9. Ibid., 6.8.1.
10. Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad., 6.2.
11. Ibid., 6.9
12. Śaṅkara's bhāṣya on the Brahma-sūtra 1.1.12.

[3]

अनुभूतिप्रकाशः

ANUBHŪTIPRAKĀŚA*

AITAREYOPANIṢADVIVARAṆAM

Godabarisha Mishra

1.1. Superimposition

ऐतरेयेण सम्प्रोक्ता द्वितीयारण्यकान्तगा ।

ब्रह्मविद्या सुविस्पष्टं बालबोधाय तन्यते ॥ १ ॥

The knowledge of Brahman which has been imparted well by Sage Aitareya and, which is incorporated in the concluding section of the second Āraṇyaka of Ṛgveda is [now] being elaborated in an easy manner for its comprehension by those who are [intellectually] not capable of understanding the Bhāṣya text. (1)

The Aitareya Upaniṣad is a part of the Aitareyāraṇyaka of the Ṛgveda brāhmaṇa. This Upaniṣad forms the fourth, the fifth

*Anubhūtiprakāśa of Vidyāraṇya is a metrical exposition of the teachings of twelve Upaniṣads in twenty adhyāyas. The text of the first adhyāya is presented here with English Translation and Notes.

and the sixth adhyāyas of the second Āraṇyaka. The seventh adhyāya which contains only the peace-chant is also included in this Upaniṣad . The remaining parts deal with sacrifices and meditative worship. The main purpose of the Upaniṣad is to lead the mind of the sacrificer from external objects to the inner self.

आत्मैव सृष्टेः प्रागासीन्नामरूपविवर्जितः ।

सोऽप्येक एव नान्योऽस्ति जडं चान्यत्र विद्यते ॥ २ ॥

Prior to the creation [of the world] there existed only the Self free from name and form. That too is one only; and apart from it there is no other [sentient] principle; nor does there exist an insentient principle too [apart from it]. (2)

The three expressions in the text, namely, 'one only', 'no other sentient principle', and 'no insentient principle' are intended to convey respectively that the Self is free from internal distinction, distinction from like objects and also unlike objects (sajātīya-vijātīya-svagata-bheda-rahitaḥ). This and the succeeding three verses discuss the import of the text of the AU, 1.1.

मायां तु प्रकृतिं विद्यान्मायिनं तु महेश्वरम् ।

इति श्रुत्यन्तरे प्रोक्ता माया नास्त्यत्र तत्त्वतः ॥ ३ ॥

In another śruti text of a different branch of the Veda (namely, Yajurveda), māyā has been set forth

thus : 'Know māyā to be the material cause of the world and Brahman to be the one possessing māyā' (ŚU, 4.10). And it does not really exist in Brahman. (3)

निस्तत्त्वं व्यवहारार्हमनृतं बालयक्षवत् ।

बालो यक्षं प्रकल्प्यास्माद् बिभेति व्याघ्रतो यथा ॥ ४ ॥

Like a yakṣa falsely imagined by a child, avidyā which is indeterminable has practical efficiency. A child falsely imagining a yakṣa is afraid of him, just as one is afraid of a tiger (in ordinary life). (4)

When it is said in the last verse that māyā or avidyā is indeterminable and is the cause of the world, the question naturally arises as to how an indeterminable entity could have practical efficiency in the form of creation of the world. It is answered in this verse that an object in order to be practically efficient need not be real. A yakṣa falsely imagined by a child is not real. Yet that non-real entity causes fear which is more real than that entity itself.

The word anṛta in the Chāndogya text is taken in the sense of avidyā by Śaṅkara. See ŚB. on CU, 8.3.2. For details see ŚŚ, 2.235.

वस्तुतत्त्वं जडं किञ्चिन्नान्यदस्त्यात्मवस्तुनः ।

अद्वयानन्दरूपात्मा तदा सुप्ताविव स्थितः ॥ ५ ॥

Apart from the Self there does not really exist any inert object. In that state, the Self remains as non - dual bliss as in the state of deep sleep. (5)

Māyā, however, which is inert, exists there. But it does not exist really. In the state of deep sleep, the sense-organs do not function. Mind provisionally merges in avidyā. Although there is thus the absence of cognition, yet there is the experience of bliss; and that experience is of the nature of the Self only which is designated as sākṣin (witness-self).

निस्तत्त्वापि जगद्भ्रान्तिं माया निद्रेव कल्पयेत् ।
निर्विकारोऽप्यसावात्मा मायावृत्त्या व्यचारयत् ॥ ६ ॥

Māyā, although not real, would bring about the world illusion like nidrā (the state of dream). The Self, although immutable, has the resolve which is a mode of māyā (to create the world) (6)

Vide : (i) māyāvṛtṭyā vyacārayat - māyāvṛtṭya iti tṛtīyā abhedārthā, MP.

(ii) sa ikṣata lokānu srjā iti, AU, 1.1.

स विचार्याखिलान् लोकान् सृष्ट्वा पालकसृष्टये ।
कृत्वा विराट्तनुं छिद्रेष्वथ तद्देवता व्यधात् ॥ ७ ॥

Having (thus) reflected upon the orderly process of creation and (then) having fashioned the entire world, the Self assumed the cosmic body with a view

to create the guardians of the worlds (so created). And it placed them in the pores of the cosmic body (such as mouth, nose and the like). (7)

See sa imān lokānasrjata, AU, 1.2.

समुद्रतुल्ये देहेऽस्मिन् देवताः पतितास्तथा ।
तं देहं क्षुत्पिपासाभ्यां योजयामास स प्रभुः ॥ ८ ॥

The guardian deities fell (as it were) into this cosmic body which is as expansive as an ocean. That supreme Lord united the cosmic body with hunger and thirst. (8)

By association with body, each deity experiences transmigratory existence which is like an ocean. Vide : AU, 2.1

अन्नभोगायात्मदेहान् गवाश्वपुरुषादिकान् ।
सष्ट्वा प्रावेशयत् तत्र देवतास्ता यथायथम् ॥ ९ ॥

In order that these deities may appease their hunger (and quench their thirst), the Supreme Lord created for them the bodies of cows, human beings, etc., and made them enter into these bodies at the appropriate places. (9)

Vide : AU, 2.4 : Fire, air, the sun, the quarters, herbs and trees, the moon, the Lord of death and water became identified respectively with speech, vital airs, the sense of sight, the sense

of hearing, hair, mind, apāna, and male energy, and entered respectively into the mouth, nostrils, eyes, ears, skin, heart, navel and generating organ.

ईशोऽसाधारणं स्थानमपश्यन् क्षुत्पिपासयोः ।

प्रावेशयद् देवतासु तद्भोगात् ते च तृप्यतः ॥ १० ॥

The Lord not perceiving a distinct abode for hunger and thirst, ushered them into the deities; and they too derived satisfaction by the experience of the deities.

(10)

The deities become satisfied by experiencing the sacrificial offerings. Thirst and hunger too are satisfied by these. This is the import. See AU, 2.5.

अन्ने सृष्टे भोक्तृवर्गो ह्यजिघृक्षत् तदिन्द्रियैः ।

तत्र वागादयोऽशक्तास्तदापानो गृहीतवान् ॥ ११ ॥

When the food was created, the group of experients sought to experience it through the sense-organs. But the sense-organs such as speech and the like were not able to do so, and then apāna experienced it. (11)

The import of the AU, 2.3-10 is set forth in this verse.

जीवाभावे वृथा सर्वमित्यालोच्य परेश्वरः ।

शिरोमध्यं विदार्यात्र प्राविशज्जीवरूपतः ॥ १२ ॥

The Supreme Lord adequately considering that every thing would be futile in the absence of an individual soul, and having made an aperture in the midst of the head entered into it in the form of the individual soul. (12)

Entering means to get one reflected. Praveśaḥ - jivarūpeṇa pratiphalanam, ŚŚ, I. 260; vide AU, 2.12. The Supreme Lord, that is Brahman associated with avidyā when reflected in the psycho-physical organism is known as the individual soul.

प्राणानां धारकः कर्ता चेतनो जीव उच्यते ।

आनखाग्रमहंकाराश्चिद्व्याप्तश्चेतनोऽभवत् ॥ १३ ॥

That which is the sustaining factor of the vital airs, the agent of actions, and the sentient being is spoken of as the individual soul (in the Upaniṣads and the smṛti texts). The ego - principle (that is, the internal organ) when inspired by the (reflection of) consciousness (in it) pervades (the entire body) upto the tip of the nails and (thus) has become the sentient being. (13)

अन्तः करणभागौ द्वावहंकारो मनस्तथा ।

वृक्षस्य मूलमग्रं च यथाभागौ तथेक्ष्यताम् ॥ १४ ॥

Just as the top and the trunk portion are the parts of a tree, in the same way let it be viewed that the

ego-principle and the mind are the two parts of the internal organ. (14)

चिद्बिम्बप्रतिबिम्बाभ्यां युक्तोऽहंकार एव तु ।
चेतनाप्राणभृत् तस्य हृन्निष्ठं कारणं मनः ॥ १५ ॥

It is only the internal organ inspired by the reflection of consciousness in it and identified with the original consciousness is the ego-principle and it is sentient. It is the one that sustains the vital airs. (It is the individual soul). And, the mind which remains in the heart is its instrument. (15)

तस्य ह कण्ठनेत्रेषु प्रचारवशतोऽभवत् ।
सुप्तिः स्वप्नो जागरश्च सोऽयं संसार ईरितः ॥ १६ ॥

On account of the movement of the mind in the regions of heart, throat and eyes, there results (respectively the states of) deep sleep, dream and waking. And it is this (that is, the group of these three) that constitutes transmigratory existence (in the case of the individual soul). (16)

स्वप्नः स्वकाल एवास्ति नान्यदा सुप्तिजागरौ ।
तथैवेति स्वप्नसाम्यात् त्रयः स्वप्नाः उदीरिताः ॥ १७ ॥

The dream state does exist only at the time of its experience and not at other times (that is, during the

time of the experience of deep sleep state or waking state). The states of deep sleep and waking too are similar to the state of dream. On this ground, the three states are referred to (in the Upaniṣad) as dream.(17)

At the time of the experience of deep sleep state, neither the waking state nor the dream state is experienced. Exactly similar consideration applies to the waking state too.

trayaḥ svapnāḥ, AU, 3.12 : Dream is illusory on the ground that it exists only at the time of its experience. Deep sleep and waking too exist at the time of their experience. Hence, they too are illusory.

1.2. Subsequent Negation

अध्यारोपो मायिकोऽयमुक्तोऽथासावपोह्यते ।
अध्यारोपापवादाभ्यां निष्प्रपञ्चं प्रपञ्च्यते ॥ १८ ॥

Superimposition set forth (so far) is illusory and it is negated subsequently. The reality is expounded as acosmic by superimposition and subsequent negation.

(18)

स संसारीश्वरो जात ईश्वरानुग्रहात् पुनः ।
पृथिव्यादीनि भूतानि यथाशास्त्रं व्यचारयत् ॥ १९ ॥

The supreme Lord has attained the state of a transmigratory being. The latter, however, enquires

into the nature of the earth and other elements in accordance with the teachings of the śāstras by the grace of the Lord. (19)

परमात्मन उत्पन्नं जगदात्मैव नेतरत् ।

मृदो जातो घटो यद्वन्मृद्वस्त्वेव तथेक्ष्यताम् ॥ २० ॥

Just as pot originated from clay is clay only, in the same way let it be viewed that the world which is originated from the Supreme Self is the (supreme) Self itself and not anything different from it. (20)

For details vide SLS, pp. 48-90. See also PD, 13-38 and AP, 1.30.

घटः शराव इत्यादि विकाराणां मृदः पृथक् ।

तत्त्वं नास्ति प्रतिते तु नामरूपे प्रकल्पिते ॥ २१ ॥

There is no independent reality in the case of effects such as pot, pitcher and the like apart from clay (which is their substratal principle). And, the name and form that are manifested are really fancied. (21)

The illustrative example of clay and pot given in the previous verse is explained in this verse.

प्रतिबिम्बभ्रमो नीराद्युपाधिवशतो यथा ।

संनिवेशोपाधितोऽयं तथा कुम्भादिविभ्रमः ॥ २२ ॥

Just as there is the delusion of reflected image (of sun, moon, etc.). owing to the limiting adjuncts, water, etc., in the same way this delusion of pot, etc., is due to the limiting adjunct, namely, the specific disposition of the parts of the substratal principle (clay) (22)

'sanniveśopādhitāḥ - avayavasamyogaviśeṣarūpopādhibalāt', MP.

भ्रान्तिः सोपाधिकोपाधिनिवृत्त्यैव निवर्तते ।

न बोधात् तेन भासन्ते जानतोऽपि घटादयः ॥ १३ ॥

Illusion caused by a limiting adjunct will be removed only by the removal of the limiting adjunct and not by knowledge. On this ground, pot, etc., (which are illusions caused by limiting adjuncts) manifest even in the case of one who knows (that they are only the manifestations of clay). (23)

It may be objected: "Let the illusory manifestation of the pot be removed by the knowledge 'This is clay only', just as the illusory manifestation of silver is removed by the knowledge. 'This is only a piece of shell'. The above objection is answered in this verse. Illusions caused by the intervention of limiting adjuncts will be removed only when the limiting adjuncts are removed, and they will continue to manifest even though one knows the substratal principle. The illusory perception of silver is not caused by a limiting adjunct. Hence it is removed by the knowledge of its substratum, namely, shell.

The illusory manifestation of pot, etc., however, is caused by a limiting adjunct, namely the specific disposition of parts, like the reflected image of the Sun due to the limiting adjunct, namely a sheet of water. One may have the knowledge that the reflected image is illusory. Yet its manifestation would continue to exist till the limiting adjunct, namely, the sheet of water is removed. In the same way here too, one may have the knowledge that the pot is illusory. Yet its manifestation would be there till clay - the substratal principle (which is the limiting adjunct) is removed.

पृथग् द्रव्यस्वरूपः सन् समवेतो घटो मृदि ।

इत्याहुस्तार्किकास्तत्तु न द्वैगुण्यप्रसङ्गतः ॥ २४ ॥

Logicians assert that, pot by being an independent substratum, inheres in clay (that is, pot-sherds). This however, is not the case in view of the unwelcome position of the weight (of the pot) being doubled. (24)

Logicians argue that pot is a de novo entity existing over and above the pot-sherds (kapālas) through the relation of inherence (samavāya). This means that they accept the difference between the cause and the effect. If this position were true, then the weight of the pot would be doubled as there would be the addition of the weight of the pot-sherds to the weight of the pot.

See also STK, pp. 245 - 246.

मृद्भारात् घटभाराच्च गुरुत्वं द्विगुणं भवेत् ।
तथालङ्कारकर्ता स्यात् कृती हेमादिवृद्धितः ॥ २५ ॥

The weight would become doubled on account of the weight of clay and that of the pot. In the same way, one who bedecks oneself (with golden ornaments) would be fortunate by having increased amount of gold, etc. (25)

Vide also STK, pp. 245 - 246.

In the previous verse, the author has pointed out the unwelcome position of the weight of an effect becoming doubled in case a cause is admitted to be different from its effect. This unwelcome position is explained in this verse.

The point is that the weight of gold - the cause, would be added to the intrinsic weight of the golden ornaments - the effect.

न सन्निवेशमात्रेण पृथग्द्रव्यत्वसम्भवः ।
शयनोत्थानगमनैः न पुत्रे बहुपुत्रता ॥ २६ ॥

There is no possibility of a pot being viewed as a substance distinct from clay by mere disposition of parts.

Never indeed does a son become manifold on account of the several dispositions such as sleeping, waking, walking and the like. (26)

The logicians may seek to prove inferentially that pot is different from clay in the following manner : Pot is different from clay; it is because it has a specific disposition; that which has a specific disposition, when compared with another object is different from that object, like a horse which has a distinct disposition when compared with a cow is different from the cow.

Vidyāranya in this verse states that the invariable relation deduced from the above inferential argument lacks correspondence in the case of a boy whose physical disposition is different while he is asleep when compared with his own physical disposition when he is walking. If mere possession of specific disposition were to guarantee the difference of an individual from another, then, one and the same boy must be viewed as different on the basis of the distinct dispositions he possesses while asleep and while walking.

तस्मात् कार्यं न वस्तु स्यात् कारणव्यतिरेकतः ।

किन्तु कारण एवैतदनृतं भासते मृषा ॥ २७ ॥

Hence an effect cannot be real, independent of its cause. On the other hand, it is nothing but the cause. It is non real. It is indeterminable. (27)

The world is non-real. In the Advaita terminology, it means that it is indeterminable either as real or an absolute nothing.

अर्थक्रियानृतेऽप्यस्ति स्थाणौ चोरभयेक्षणात् ।

ततोऽनृता घटाद्याः स्युर्भान्तु कुर्वन्तु वा क्रियाम् ॥ २८ ॥

In the case of an indeterminable object too, practical efficiency exists. It is because, fear from a thief is noticed on seeing a stump (mistaken for a thief). Hence pot and the like shall be indeterminable; and let them manifest or have practical efficiency. (28)

सन्निवेशोपाधिहाने गच्छत्येव घटादिधीः ।
विवेकिनां तु वस्तुत्वं घटादीनां निवर्तते ॥ २९ ॥

The cognition of pot, etc., definitely ceases when there is the removal of the limiting condition, namely, the specific disposition (of parts). But in the case of men of discrimination (between what is real and what is unreal), (independent) reality in regard to pot, etc., vanishes. (29)

In verse 23, our author has stated that the erroneous cognition caused by a limiting adjunct is removed when there is the removal of the limiting adjunct. This is explained in this verse with reference to illusory cognition of pot. The latter is removed when the specific disposition of parts constituting the object - pot is removed. This, however, is related to an ignorant man. He who has an intellectual conviction that the substratal principle, namely, clay alone is real and the pot is non-real, in his case even at the time of the perceptual cognition of pot, knowledge that pot is real does not exist.

घटः शराव इत्येवं वाचैवारभ्यते वृथा ।
मृत्तिकेत्येव सत्यं स्यान्न तु सत्यं घटादिकम् ॥ ३० ॥

Pot, pitcher, etc., are merely referred to in vain by words. It is only the (element of) clay that is true. Never indeed are pot, etc., real. (30)

The meaning of the CU text-*vācārambhaṇam vikāro nāmadheyam* [6.1.4] is given in this text. For details see PD, 13,35 and KA, pp. 48-49.

एवमात्मन उत्पन्नं पृथिव्याद्यपि नात्मनः ।
पृथग्वस्त्वस्ति किं त्वात्मन्यारोपात् प्रतिभासते ॥ ३१ ॥

In the same way, earth, etc., which are originated from the Self are not different from the Self. On the other hand, they are manifested by being superimposed upon the Self. (31)

See PD, 13.38.

सद्वस्तु ह्यात्मनस्तत्त्वं तस्मिन् भूम्यादिकल्पनात् ।
पृथिव्यादीनि सन्तीति भासन्ते तत्तदिन्द्रियैः ॥ ३२ ॥

Existence is the essential nature of Ātman (the Self). And, because of superimposition of earth, etc., on it, earth, etc., are manifested as existent through respective sense-organs. (32)

इन्द्रियोपाधिका भान्तिरक्षरोधान्न भासते ।
इत्येतद् विशदीकर्तुं योगो वेदेषु वर्ण्यते ॥ ३३ ॥

Erroneous cognition, which is due to the limiting adjuncts, sense-organs, does not arise when sense-organs are controlled. In order to make this clear, yoga (that is, control of mind and sense organs) is described in the Vedas (ŚU, 2.8) (33)

The cognition of pot, etc., as sat is only illusory. It arises from the functioning of the sense-organs. If the sense-organs do not function, erroneous cognition would not arise. That the cognition of pot, etc., as sat is only illusory is explained in SLS, pp. 210. ff.

सदात्मनः पृथग्भूतमसद्भूम्यादि तेन तत् ।
भात्वक्षैः कार्यकृद्भस्तु मिथ्यैव स्याद् घटादिवत् ॥ ३४ ॥

Earth, etc., different from the Self which is of the nature of existence do not exist really. Hence let earth etc., be manifested by the sense-organs and be adapted to the practical needs of life. Yet, just as pot, etc. (which are manifested in clay, etc.,) are not real, in the same way earth, etc. are not real. (34)

The criteria of reality are not manifestation and adaptability to the practical needs of life. Pot is manifested and is adapted to practical needs of life. Yet it is not real. The criterion of reality

is non-sublatibility in the three divisions of time - past, present and future. It is applicable only in the case of Brahman and not in the case of pot, etc.

ईदृग्विवेकदृष्ट्येदं जगदात्मैव नेतरत् ।
एवं सत्यात्मनोऽन्यत् किं वस्तुतोऽस्तीति शङ्क्यते ॥ ३५ ॥

From the knowledge arrived at on the basis of (the above) reasoning, (it is determined that) the world is nothing but the Self. When such is the case, where is the scope for the doubt as to the real existence of any object apart from the Self. (35)

अद्वयानन्दरूपात्मा सृष्टेः पूर्वमभूद् यथा ।
तथैवाद्यापि सम्पन्नो बुद्ध्या सम्यग् विवेचितः ॥ ३६ ॥

When well-analysed by the application of one's intellect, it comes to this that the Self which remained as non-dual and bliss prior to creation remains so even after creation. (36)

The point of importance here is that the Self is not affected by its association with the world because the latter is illusory.

Vide : yatra yadadhyāsaḥ tatkr̥tena guṇena
doṣeṇa vā aṇumātreṇāpi sa na sambadhyate,

(Adhyāsa-bhāṣya, BS, 1.1.1)

इत्थं सर्वात्मकं ब्रह्म विविच्य पुनरप्यसौ ।
एवमेव स्वमात्मानं ब्रह्मत्वेन व्यलोकयत् ॥ ३७ ॥

This individual soul thus analysing (and coming to the conclusion) that everything is Brahman realised his own Self to be identical with Brahman (37)

See AP. 23.36. The import of the AU, 1.3.13 is explained in this verse.

अहंकारश्च चिच्छाया मिथ्या भूम्यादिवत् ततः ।
चिदात्मैकोऽवशिष्टोऽयं जीवो ब्रह्मैव नेतरः ॥ ३८ ॥

The ego-principle is the reflection of consciousness in the mind. Hence it is non-real, like earth, etc. The element of consciousness left (after distinguishing it from the element of mind) is the true nature of the individual soul. It is identical with and not different from it. (38)

Vidyāranya here adopts the ābhāsa-vāda to explain the nature of the individual soul. According to ābhāsa-vāda, the latter which is a reflection of pure consciousness in the mind is totally indeterminable either as real or an absolute nothing. It is because reflected images are considered to be fully indeterminable.

यथाशास्त्रं विविच्येत्थं प्रत्यग्दृष्ट्या चिदात्मनः ।
साक्षच्चकार ब्रह्मत्वं जीवः शान्त्यादिसंयुतः ॥ ३९ ॥

Having thus analysed in accordance with the (teachings of the) scriptural texts, the individual soul, associated with control of mind etc., with his intellect directed inward has realised his true nature, namely, the pure consciousness to be indentical with Brahman.

(39)

इदमित्यपरोक्षेण ददर्शेति विवक्ष्या ।

इदन्द्रनामाभूज्जानी वैयाकरणदृष्टितः ॥ ४० ॥

The knower of the Self is designated as idandra in accordance with etymology. And, this name is used with a view to convey that the soul has perceived the supreme Self directly as one perceives an object as 'this'.

(40)

For details see the following verse.

Vide : AU, 1.3.13.

तमिन्द्र इत्याहुरन्ये नाम्नः पारोक्ष्यसिद्धये ।

पूज्यस्य देवपित्रादेः परोक्षं नाम हि प्रियम् ॥ ४१ ॥

Him others call as Indra. This is with a view to refer to him by an indirect appellation, It is because reference by indirect appellation is indeed pleasing to Gods, parents and others who are venerable. (41)

Vide : AU, 1.3.14.

In this verse is said that the conventional meaning of the word idandra too is the knower of the Self. The word idandra is conventionally used with reference to the Supreme Lord. Since the knower of the Self is himself the Supreme Lord, the word idandra conventionally refers to him.

It might be asked: the Supreme Lord is referred to by the name Indra only in the Upaniṣadic texts such as indro māyābhih, [BU, 2.5.19] etc., and not by the word idandra.

To dispel the above doubt it is said in this verse that Gods and others are to be referred to only by indirect appellation. Hence instead of using the word idandra to refer to the Supreme Lord, the word Indra is used by dropping a syllable.

परमेश्वररूपत्वादपीन्द्रत्वमिहोचितम् ।

समाप्ता ब्रह्मविद्येयेमुत्तमस्याधिकारिणः ॥ ४२ ॥

It is but proper to designate the knower of the Self here as Indra as he is of the nature of Supreme Lord. So far the (elucidation of the) knowledge of Brahman in respect of aspirants of superior intellect. (42)

1.3. The Frightful Nature of Birth

विरक्तस्योक्तबोधः स्याद् वैराग्यं दोषदर्शनात् ।

जन्मैव प्रथमो दोषस्तद् बीभत्सा निरूप्यते ॥ ४३ ॥

The knowledge set forth above would arise to one who is detached. And detachment would result from the comprehension of defects. Birth is the primal defect and now its frightful condition is explained. (43)

स्वर्गाद्वा नरकाद्वायं वृष्टिद्वारान्नसंस्थितः ।
प्रविश्य पितरं तत्र गर्भो भवति रेतसि ॥ ४४ ॥

From heaven or hell, the soul (falls down with rain and) through rain comes into contact with rice, enters into the father and permeates the male energy. (44)

तद्रेतः पितृदेहस्थं सर्वाङ्गेभ्यः समुत्थितम् ।
पितुः स्वदेहो गर्भाख्यदेहश्चेति वपुर्द्वयम् ॥ ४५ ॥

That male energy present in the body of a father has arisen from all parts (of his body). A father has a two-fold body, one gross and the other, the male energy permeated by the soul to be born. (45)

स्त्रियां सिञ्चति तद्रेतस्तत्पुत्रोत्पादनं पितुः ।
पुत्ररूपेण तज्जन्म पितुराद्यं स्वयं कृतम् ॥ ४६ ॥

He transfers the male energy to the woman. And, this is the act of begetting a son on the part of a male parent. That is the first birth of the male parent brought forth by himself in the form of the son. (46)

योषिद्योनिं प्रविश्यायं योषिद्गर्भे स्फुटीभवेत् ।

योषिद्वीर्येण पुष्टोऽसौ तद्देहेनैकतां ब्रजेत् ॥ ४७ ॥

Entering into the generating organ of the woman, he becomes manifested in the womb of the woman and permeates her body. He is nourished by the essence of food and drink of the woman and becomes identical with the body of the woman. (47)

The second birth of the male parent is explained in this and in the following four verses. This verse gives the meaning of the Upaniṣadic text, *tat striyā ātmabhūyam*,.... (AU, 2.2)

अन्यथैनां स्त्रियं हन्याद् गुल्मव्याधिवदान्तरः ।
स्वाङ्गवन्न हिनस्त्येनां गर्भं रक्षति सा ततः ॥ ४८ ॥

Otherwise, just as the internal disease of spleen would kill one, in the same way, the foetus would kill the woman. It, however, does not cause any harm to the woman like the parts of the body. Since it does not harm her, she is able to nurse it. (48)

The expression 'otherwise' means: 'If the foetus does not become identical with the body of the woman.' See AU, 2.2.

गर्भरूपं भर्तृदेहं यतः सा पालयत्यतः ।
सापि भर्त्रा पालनीया तदिष्टान्नादिवस्तुभिः ॥ ४९ ॥

Since she nurses the body of her husband in the form of foetus, she must be fostered by her husband with food and other objects of her liking. (49)

गर्भो विण्मूत्रयोः स्थित्वा दशमे मासि जायते ।
पिता स्वात्मधिया पुत्रं संस्करोति यथाविधि ॥ ५० ॥

The foetus, by remaining in the faeces and urine (in the initial stage) is born in the tenth month. And the father ceremonially purifies the son in accordance with the scriptural injunctions viewing him as identical with his own self. (50)

पितुर्द्वितीयं तज्जन्म पुत्ररूपेण संस्थितम् ।
स्वोदराद् दारजठरादपि जन्मद्वयं ब्रूमात् ॥ ५१ ॥

The birth in the form of a son is the second birth in the case of the father. A two-fold birth successively occurs - one from one's body and the other from the body of his wife. (51)

See AU, 2.3.

पतिर्जायां विशत्यादौ गर्भो भूत्वा स्वमातरम् ।
जायैव माता सम्पन्नेत्यहो संसारकष्टता ॥ ४२ ॥

At first the husband joins his wife. He then joins (her who has become) his mother when he becomes

the foetus. The wife herself has become the mother. Alas! the plight of transmigratory existence. (52)

लौकिकं वैदिकं सर्वं पुत्रेऽवस्थाप्य तत्पिता ।
मृतो देहान्तरे पित्रोरन्ययोर्विशति स्वयम् ॥ ५३ ॥

That father, having entrusted all the sacred and secular activities to his son, dies and enters into different parents. (53)

See AU, 2.4.

पुत्ररूपेण यज्जन्मद्वयं पूर्वमुदीरितम् ।
तदपेक्षं तृतीयं तज्जन्म स्याद् देहधारिणः ॥ ५४ ॥

In the case of one who is associated with a physical body, this one is the third birth in relation to the two-fold birth in the form of son mentioned earlier. (54)

See AP, I. 46-51.

स्वोदरं दारजठ्रं तथा पित्रन्तरोदरम् ।
त्रय आवसथा इत्थं जन्तोः सर्वस्य जन्मने ॥ ५५ ॥

There are thus three dwelling places for every transmigratory being in all its births; the inside of his own body, the inside of the body of the wife, and the inside of the body of the male parent (in a subsequent birth) (55)

See AU, I. 3.12.

In this passage, the expression, *trayaḥ āvasathāḥ* occurs. It is interpreted by Śaṅkara as three states of waking, dream, and deep sleep wherein the individual soul exists in the sense of sight, the mind and space within the heart respectively, and also as one's own body, the womb of the mother, and also the inside of a male parent. It is the second meaning that is given in this verse.

For details, see Śaṅkara's commentary on AU, 1.3.12.

जन्मानि योनिलक्षाणां जन्तुश्चतुरशीतिषु ।
उत्तमाधमरूपाणि प्राप्नोत्येवं पुनः पुनः ॥ ५६ ॥

In this manner, the soul oftentimes attains to eighty - four lakhs types of births, high and low. (56)

दुष्टत्वं जन्मनः प्रोक्तं स्पष्टा रोगादिदुष्टता ।
विरक्तो बुद्धतत्त्वस्तु मुच्यते वामदेववत् ॥ ५७ ॥

The pernicious nature of birth has been fully explained. The harmful nature of disease, etc. (in a birth) has (also) been explained. One becomes detached (thereby from birth). He who realizes (his identity with) the reality is released like Vāmadeva.

It is supreme detachment from phenomenal existence that is the most potent auxilliary in the scheme of practical discipline in Advaita. One analyses the nature of birth and one's existence in the world and is disgusted with the transmigratory process.

He would then pursue śravaṇa, manana and nididhyāsana – the proximate means to the direct knowledge of the Self. If there is no cause to obstruct the rise of the direct knowledge of Brahman, the latter would arise in this life itself. If there are any impediments, then it would arise in the next life. This we know from the scriptural text [AU, 2.5] which declares the rise of the knowledge of Brahman in the case of Vāmadeva when he was in his mother's womb.

See the following verse. See also SŚ, III, 349-350 and BG, 6.41. (57)

पूर्वजन्मनि बोधेन स्वमुक्तिं चाब्रवीदृचा ।
गर्भस्थो वामदेवोऽयं प्रतिबन्धविवर्जितः ॥ ५८ ॥

The famous Vāmadeva, being free from the impediments by the pursuit of śravaṇa, manana and nididhyāsana in his previous birth (itself), gave expression to his state of release in the form of a hymn while being in his mother's womb itself. (58)

The impediments are three, namely, pramāṇāsambhāvanā, prameyāsambhāvanā, and viparītabhāvanā. These are respectively removed by śravaṇa, manana and nididhyāsana.

In the case of Vāmadeva, the above impediments were removed in the previous life itself. Yet his fructified deeds were such that knowledge could not rise in the earlier birth itself. When he entered into the womb of his mother in the next birth,

fructified deeds were exhausted and he attained the direct knowledge of Brahman.

जन्मन्यतीते वेदान्तं श्रुत्वाप्येष न बुद्धवान् ।
बलिना प्रतिबद्धत्वात् कर्मणा जन्महेतुना ॥ ५९ ॥

This Vāmadeva, although he had pursued Vedāntic study in his previous birth, did not realise Brahman as he was impeded by powerful merits and demerits that constituted the cause of fresh birth. (59)

गर्भे प्रविश्य तत्कर्म विनष्टं प्रतिबन्धकम् ।
नवमे मासि संस्मृत्य श्रवणं प्रतिबुद्धवान् ॥ ६० ॥

The impediments, namely, the merits and demerits, having made the soul (of Vāmadeva) enter into the womb (of his mother) got (themselves) removed. And, Vāmadeva, recollecting at the ninth month the Vedāntic study he had pursued in the earlier birth, realized Brahman. (60)

विद्वान् भूत्वा समुत्पन्नो जीवन्मुक्तोऽभवत् तदा ।
शरीरमात्मनो भिन्नं मिथ्यैवेत्यवगच्छति ॥ ६१ ॥

Having become the knower of Brahman (in the womb of his mother), Vāmadeva, when he was born, became a realised soul while alive. He directly felt the

physical body which is different from his Self to be indeterminable. (61)

See AU, 2.5.

इयन्तं कालमेतस्मित् भ्रान्त्या देहे निमग्नवान् ।
बोधेन देहादुत्क्रम्योत्कृष्टोऽभूज्जीवतां त्यजन् ॥ ६२ ॥

So far (that is, prior to the attaining of the knowledge of Brahman) he was immersed in the body owing to avidyā. And, by the knowledge (of reality) having given up attachment toward the body, and also the state of being an individual soul, he has become Brahman.(62)

See "sa ya evaṁ vidvān asmāt śarīrabhedāt
ūrdhvam utkrāmya...." AU, 2.6.

जीवत्वेऽपगते तस्य शिष्यते परमात्मता ।
स एव स्वर्गतुल्योऽभूदिन्द्रियाविषयत्वतः ॥ ६३ ॥

When the characteristics of being an individual soul are removed, the so-called individual soul remains as Brahman [which is liberation]. Liberation too has become similar to heaven since it transcends sense-perception. (63)

Heaven does not come within the range of sense-organs. In the same way, liberation, which is identical with Brahman, is supra-sensible. Thus liberation is being thought of as being

attained in the other world like heaven. Really it constitutes the essential nature of Brahman that is identical with the true nature of the individual soul.

See “amuṣmin svarge loke sarvān kāmān
āptvā amṛtaḥ samabhavat” AU. 2.6.

परोक्षोऽपि विमूढानां विद्वद्भिरवलोक्यते ।
सर्वेऽपि विषयानन्दाः प्राप्ता दृष्टे निजात्मनि ॥ ६४ ॥

Although Brahman is mediate to the ignorant, it is immediate in the case of the realised souls. When one's Self is realised as identical with Brahman, every form of happiness derived from (the contact of) sense-organs with their respective objects is attained. (64)

Bliss experienced from contact of sense-organs with objects is only the reflection of Brahman in the mental states resulting from the above contact. Thus every form of happiness is only an appearance of Brahman, the Bliss. Hence it is said that when Brahman, the Bliss is realised, every other form of happiness or bliss is attained.

आत्मानन्दसमुद्रस्य विप्लुषो विषयोत्थिताः ।
आत्मन्यन्तर्भवन्त्यन्ते समुद्रे बिन्दवो यथा ॥ ६५ ॥

Happiness derived from [contact of sense-organs with] objects are only particles of the ocean of bliss of

the Self. These merge in the Self at the end like the (watery) particles in the ocean. (65)

आत्मन्यानन्दमज्ञात्वा विषये सुखविभ्रमात् ।
भोक्तुमिच्छति तल्लाभाद् धीरात्मन्युपशाम्यति ॥ ६६ ॥

Not knowing that the Self is bliss, the mind desires for external objects under the mistaken notion that they are the source of bliss. After having attained the objects, the mind experiences the bliss (which constitutes the nature of the Self) (66)

आत्मानन्दं क्षणं भुक्त्वा पुनर्भ्रान्त्या बहिर्ब्रजेत् ।
विवेकिधीर्निजानन्दं भुङ्क्ते तत्स्थैव सर्वदा ॥ ६७ ॥

Having (thus) experienced the bliss, that is, the Self, the mind functions toward external objects under the mistaken notion that they are bliss. The minds of the wise ones, on the other hand, experience the bliss, that is, the Self by being rooted in it. (67)

विषये दुःखजातं यत् तद्वीक्ष्यापक्षपाततः ।
शक्यो बोद्धुं निजानन्दो बुध्यन्ते हि विवेकिनः ॥ ६८ ॥

Free from any predilections, if one discerns the group of misery pertaining to the objects of the world, one could realize one's own bliss (that is, the Self). Indeed men of discrimination realize the Self, which

is Bliss.

(68)

वामदेवोऽखिलानन्दानाप्यात्मन्यमृतोऽभवत् ।
देहप्राणवियोगाख्या मृतिश्चिद्वस्तुनो न हि ॥ ६९ ॥

Vāmadeva has become immortal after having realized every form of bliss in his own Self. Never indeed does death which is termed dissociation of body and vital-airs (from the Self) pertain to the consciousness.

(69)

The Self is the acme of all forms of bliss derived from the contact of sense-organs with their respective objects. Vāmadeva has realised his Self - the Bliss. Hence it is said here that every form of bliss referred to above which is only an appearance of the Self, the Bliss has been attained by Vāmadeva. He remains as the Self when he is dissociated from the psycho-physical organism.

इत्थं संसारदुष्टत्वं पुरुषार्थं च बोधतः ।
श्रुत्वा विरक्ता बोधार्थं मीमांसन्ते मुमुक्षवः ॥ ७० ॥

Having studied the Upaniṣads which convey respectively the evils of transmigratory existence and the supreme human end, those who are desirous of release become detached from the world and enquire into the nature of the Self with a view to attain the knowledge (of the Self).

(70)

Vidyāraṇya commences the discussion of the third chapter of the AU in this verse.

Having learnt from the Upaniṣads that transmigratory existence is harmful, and that (supreme) human end results from direct knowledge of Brahman, those who desire for release become detached from worldly objects and embark upon the sacred inquiry into the import of the Upaniṣads.

1.4. Enquiry into the Nature of the Self

अहं पश्याम्यहं वच्मीत्यात्मानं सर्वदा वयम् ।
उपास्महे योगिवन्द्यं कोऽसौ मूर्ध्नि प्रविष्टवान् ॥ ७१ ॥

Of what nature is the Self that is valued most by the Sages - the Self whom we always refer to in expressions such as 'I see', 'I speak' [and the like], and who has entered (into the body) through the [aperture of the] head? (71)

Vide(i) 'ko'yam ātmeti vayamupāsmahe", AU, 3.1.

(ii) "sa etameva sīmānam vidārya etayā dvārā
prāpadyata," ibid, 1.3.12.

मायावी शुद्धचिद्वात्मा कतरः सृष्टितः पुरा ।
बुभत्सन्ते द्वयोस्तत्त्वं जीवात्मपरमात्मनोः ॥ ७२ ॥

The sages desire to know the true nature of the individual soul and the Supreme Self thus: of what

nature is the Self? Is it one possessed of māyā or is it pure consciousness? [Of the two], who existed prior to the creation of the world? (72)

जीवस्य चेतनत्वेन चैतन्यं चिन्त्यन्तामिदम् ।
चक्षुरादिविशिष्टं तच्छुद्धं वा तत्त्वमस्य किम् ॥ ७३ ॥

Since the individual soul is sentient, let the nature of sentience be considered. Does its true nature consist in its being associated with the sense of sight, etc., or in its being a pure (principle)? (73)

The meaning of the texts of the AU, beginning with 'yenavā paśyati' (3.1) and ending with "nāmadheyāni bhavanti" (3.2) is discussed in the verses 73 - 96.

चक्षुः श्रोत्रे घ्राणजिह्वे त्वक् च धीन्द्रियपञ्चकम् ।
रूपशब्दौ गन्धरसौ स्पर्शश्च विषयाः क्रमात् ॥ ७४ ॥

The senses of sight, hearing, smell, taste and touch constitute the group of five senses of cognition. And colour, sound, smell, taste and touch are their respective objects. (74)

वाक्पाणिपादपायूपस्थाः कर्मेन्द्रियपञ्चकम्
भाषणादानगमनविसर्गानन्दकाः क्रियाः ॥ ७५ ॥

The senses of speaking, grasping, moving, excreting

and enjoying constitute the group of senses of action. And speech, seizure, movement, excretion and enjoyment are the (respective) actions (carried out by them). (75)

गोलकानि दशैतेषामक्ष्यादीनि स्फुटानि हि ।
ज्ञानक्रियाशक्तिरूपमिन्द्रियं गोलकस्थितम् ॥ ७६ ॥

Eyes, etc., are well-known to be the substrata of these ten sense-organs. The sense-organ which is present in its substratum is associated with the power to give rise to the knowledge of action. (76)

The substrata of the senses of cognition like sight, hearing, smell, taste and touch and senses of action like speaking, grasping, moving, excreting and enjoying are respectively the eyes, ears, nose, tongue, skin, mouth, hands, feet, anus and the generating organ.

प्राणोऽपानस्समानश्चोदानव्यानौ च वायवः ।
हृद्गुदे नाभिकण्ठौ च देहश्चैषु वसन्ति ते ॥ ७७ ॥

The five vital-airs are: prāṇa, apāna, vyāna, udāna and samāna. These are respectively located in the heart, anus, navel, throat and the entire body. (77)

श्वासाधोगतिवृत्ती द्वे वपुष्यन्नसमीकृतिः ।
उद्गरादिर्देहबलं पञ्च वायुक्रिया इमाः ॥ ७८ ॥

Going upward and going down are the functions of the first two, equalizing the food [that is eaten] in the body [is the function of samāna]; ejecting the undigested food-substance from the stomach is the function of udāna, and providing strength to the whole body is the function of vyāna. These are the functions of the vital-air.

(78)

अहंकर्ता वपुर्व्याप्य जडं चेतनतां नयेत् ।

मनोऽन्तर्हृद्यवस्थाय वृत्तीः कामादिकाः सृजेत् ॥ ७९ ॥

The mind [inspired by the reflection of the Self in it] pervading the insentient body makes the latter sentient. Mind, by remaining inside the heart gives rise to the mental states like desire etc.

(79)

Vide : BU, 1.5.3.

ज्ञानेन्द्रियाणि पञ्चात्र तथा कर्मेन्द्रियाण्यपि ।

वायवः पञ्च कर्ता च मनः सप्तदशं स्मृतम् ॥ ८० ॥

Here the five senses of cognition, the five senses of action, the vital-air, the intellect and the mind are taken to be the seventeen factors.

(80)

In the earlier texts on Advaita, the seventeen factors are stated to be five senses of cognition, five senses of action, five vital-air, the intellect [buddhi] and the mind [manas]. The last

two are the two phases of the internal organ. The latter when it stands for certitude is termed intellect and when it stands for desire and doubt is termed mind. The intellect that is inspired by the reflection of consciousness in it is known as kartā.

See vijñānam yajñam tanute, TU, 2.5.1.

सोऽयं सप्तदशस्तोमो लिङ्गदेहः स्वयोनिषु ।
सर्वासु संसरत्यस्य विनाशो मोक्ष उच्यते ॥ ८१ ॥

It is this group of seventeen factors that constitutes the subtle body. [Inspired by the reflection of pure-consciousness in it] it undergoes transmigration in the form of several births. Its annihilation is termed liberation. (81)

अज्ञानकल्पितो देहस्तत्त्वज्ञानेन नश्यति ।
ज्ञानोत्पत्तिर्विचारेण तस्मादात्मा विचार्यते ॥ ८२ ॥

The body [subtle as well as gross] is projected by nescience, and it is destroyed by the knowledge of the Self. Knowledge would arise from enquiry and hence [the true nature of] the Self is being enquired into. (82)

Enquiry into the nature of the Self is enquiry into the import of the Upaniṣadic texts that deal with the nature of the Self.

येन पश्यत्यसावात्मा यः पश्यति सा वा भवेत् ।
द्रष्टा पश्यति बोधेन चाक्षुषेण तयोस्तु कः ॥ ८३ ॥

The seer comprehends the object through the mental state arising from the sense of sight. Of the two, namely, the instrument through which one comprehends [the object] and the seer who comprehends the object, who is the Self? (83)

The doubt arises as to whether the seer is the Self or the mental state which is the instrument of cognition is the Self. It is precisely this that is the object of enquiry.

शृणोति येन यः श्रोता तयोरित्यादि योज्यताम् ।
चैतन्यमस्ति करणे कर्तरीत्यत्र चिन्त्यते ॥ ८४ ॥

Exactly similar consideration applies in respect of other propositions, namely, whether the factor through which one hears is the Self or the one who hears is the Self. (In short) what is enquired into is whether consciousness pertains to the instrument or to the seer.

(84)

Vide : AU, 3.1.

बहूनि करणान्येषु बोधा दृष्ट्यादिनामकाः ।
बहवः कर्तृबाहुल्यमपि द्रष्टादिभेदतः ॥ ८५ ॥

There are manifold cognitions such as visual (gustatory, olfactory, auditory and tactual) owing to different kinds of instruments (of cognition). And, owing to different kinds of perceivers (such as one who comprehends through visual perception, gustatory perception and the like) there are manifold cognisers too. (85)

करणानां च कर्तृणां भेदः स्याच्चक्षुरादिके ।
बाह्ये यथा तथैवान्तः शरीरेऽप्यवगम्यताम् ॥ ८६ ॥

In the case of external sense-organs like the sense of sight, etc., there is the difference between the instruments of cognition and the factors that comprehend (such as the one who sees, hears, etc). In the same way, let difference be understood (between the instrument and the factor that comprehends) inside the body. (86)

कर्तृपाधिरहंकारो वाच्यो हृदयशब्दतः ।
करणं स्यान्मनस्तस्य संज्ञानाद्यास्तु वृत्तयः ॥ ८७ ॥

The intellect which serves as the limiting adjunct of the individual soul, the agent, is referred to by the term - hr̥daya. The mind serves as its instrument. Apprehension, etc., are the modifications of the mind.

Vide AU, 3.2

In the previous verse the distinction between the external senses and the agent, that is the individual soul has been set forth. In this verse the distinction between the individual soul, the blend of the intellect and the pure consciousness and mind is set forth on the basis of manifold distinct effects such as apprehension etc.

तत्र सर्वत्र चैतन्यं लक्ष्यते हि पृथक् पृथक् ।
एवं सति बहुष्वेषु कः स्यादात्मेति संशयः ॥ ८८ ॥

In all these, consciousness is noticed severally. When such is the case, there arises the doubt as to which one is the Self among the manifold consciousness. (88)

1.5. Consciousness is the Ultimate Reality

प्रज्ञानमेकं सर्वेषु यत् स आत्मेति निर्णयः ।
प्रकृष्टं निरूपाधित्वात् चैतन्यं यत् तदीक्ष्यताम् ॥ ८९ ॥

Let consciousness which is Supreme by being unconditioned be realized. It is one and is present in all the factors (mentioned above). It is the Self and this is the final view. (89)

In this and the succeeding seven verses, the import of the statement - sarvāṇyeva etāni.... [AU, 3.2.] is explained.

अहंकारो मनोबाह्यं करणं चाप्युपाधयः ।
तेषु सर्वेषु चिच्छाया संक्रान्ता चेतनान्यतः ॥ ९० ॥

The intellect, the mind and the external organs are the limiting adjuncts (of the Self). In all these, the reflection of the consciousness is present. Hence they (too) are viewed as sentient. (90)

The expression cetanānyataḥ can be split in two ways - cetanā anyataḥ and cetanāni ataḥ. If the first form is adopted, then the translation would be: sentience in the intellect, mind and external senses which are the limiting adjuncts is caused by the external factor, namely, the reflection of consciousness which is present in all these. The translation given in the body of the text is on the basis of the second interpretation, cetanāni ataḥ.

न मुख्यं तेषु चैतन्यमात्मत्वस्याप्यमुख्यता ।
सुषुप्तौ तानि लुप्यन्ते न त्वात्मा तत्र लुप्यते ॥ ९१ ॥

Sentience in all these factors is not primary. [Hence] the state of being the Self (appearing therein) also is not primary. In the state of deep sleep, all these merge in avidyā, but the self does not merge (anywhere). (91)

प्रज्ञानं निरुपाधित्वात् नित्यं तल्लोपभासकम् ।
प्रज्ञानस्यात्मता तस्मान्मुख्या नान्यस्य कस्यचित् ॥ ९२ ॥

Consciousness being unconditioned is always the manifesting factor of the absence of the limiting adjuncts. Hence Self-hood is primary in the case of consciousness and not in any other case. (92)

द्रष्टाद्या अपि दृष्ट्याद्याः शब्दा मुख्यात्मवस्तुनः ।

नामान्युपाधिमालम्ब्य तस्मादात्मोपलक्षकाः ॥ ९३ ॥

The words like seer, etc., and perceptual knowledge, etc., are significative of the Self, which is associated with the mind and its states and which is not the real Self. They secondarily signify the (real) Self. (93)

यथैकस्यैव संबन्धविशेषोपाधिनाखिलाः ।

पुत्रभ्रात्रादयः शब्दाः नामत्वेनोपलक्षकाः ॥ ९४ ॥

उपलक्ष्यं तु हस्तादि युक्तमेकं वपुस्तथा ।

चेतनैः कर्तृकरणैः प्रज्ञानमुपलक्ष्यते ॥ ९५ ॥

Words like, son, brother, etc., serve as the appellations of a single individual on the basis of the adventitious feature of specific relationship [present in the latter]; the body-in-itself associated with hands, etc., is the object referred to. In the same way, by the ego-sense (the intellect inspired by the reflection of consciousness in it) and the instruments of knowledge,

pure consciousness is referred to as they appear to be sentient [by being identified with the latter.]

(94-95)

प्रज्ञानं कर्तृदेहादिसाक्षिभूतं यदस्ति तत् ।
जीवस्य वास्तवं रूपमित्येवं निर्णयो भवेत् ॥ ९६ ॥

The true nature of the individual soul is the pure consciousness which is the witness of the ego-sense, body, etc. Thus there arises this conclusive view.

(96)

प्रज्ञानं स्वशीरीरेऽस्ति तथा देहान्तरेष्वपि ।
ब्रह्मादिस्थावरान्तेषु तस्य स्यात् परमात्मता ॥ ९७ ॥

Consciousness is present in one's own body and in other bodies too beginning with Hiraṇyagrābha and ending with immovable objects. [Therefore] it is identical with the Supreme Self.

(97)

When it is thus clear that consciousness is one in all the bodies, it is identical with Brahman which is one without a second.

See eṣa brahma.... prajñāpratiṣṭhā, AU, 3.3

प्रज्ञानस्यास्य जीवत्वं प्राणधारणतो यथा ।
जगत्सृष्ट्यादिहेतुत्वात् ब्रह्मत्वं च तथेष्यताम् ॥ ९८ ॥

Just as this consciousness attains to the state of the individual soul by sustaining the vital-airs, in the same

way let it be accepted that it attains to the state of God by being the cause of the origination, etc., of the world.

(98)

स्थावरं जङ्गमं सर्वं जगदित्यभिधीयते ।
तस्य प्रज्ञैव नेत्रं स्यात् सृष्ट्यादिनयनादसौ ॥ ९९ ॥

Every object - mobile and stationary - is called the world. Since the consciousness is the cause of the origination, etc., of the world it is called its netram.

(99)

The etymological meaning of the word 'netram' is that by which origination, manifestation and dissolution of the world are effected.

प्रज्ञानं शुद्धचिद्रूपमासीद्यत् सृष्टितः पुराः ।
तस्मिन् प्रतिष्ठितं सर्वं माययोत्पादितत्त्वतः ॥ १०० ॥

In that consciousness which existed as pure intelligence prior to creation, every object, on account of its being originated by māyā is located. (100)

Māyā is present in pure consciousness. The world is the transformation of māyā. Hence the world appears in pure consciousness. The following inferential argument is intended in this verse.

'That which is the effect of māyā that is present in a substratum is located in that substratum, like a serpent which is

the effect avidyā present in the consciousness conditioned by the rope is located in the latter. The world too is the effect of māyā present in pure consciousness. Hence it is located in pure consciousness'.

See prajñāne pratiṣṭhitam AU, 3.3

उत्पत्तिस्थितिकालेऽसौ लोकः प्रज्ञाननेत्रकः ।
नेत्रत्वं व्यवहारस्य सुखादेर्नयनाद् भवेत् ॥ १०१ ॥

Just as the world has consciousness as the cause of its origination, in the same way, it has consciousness as the cause of its existence and manifestation. Since consciousness brings about the usages of happiness, etc., it is called netram. (101)

In ordinary experience every usage precedes cognition. And cognition is nothing but pure consciousness reflected in the mental state. It manifests the object and then follows verbal usage. It is thus consciousness is the cause of the manifestation of all objects that are created. In this sense it is called netram.

Happiness, etc., are the mental states resulting from the contact of sense-organs with their respective objects. Consciousness is reflected therein and it is known as the cognition of happiness, etc.,

See prajñānetro lokah AU, 3.3

लये प्रज्ञा प्रतिष्ठा स्यात् तत्र सर्वस्य संहते : ।
सृष्टिस्थितिलया इत्थं श्रुताः प्रज्ञानहेतुकाः ॥ १०२ ॥

At the time of dissolution, consciousness is the substratum of the entire world. It is because the entire world lapses back into it [then]. Thus, it is imparted by the Upaniṣad that creation, derivation of existence and manifestation and dissolution [of the world] have consciousness as their cause. (102)

See prajñāpratiṣṭhā, AU, 3.3

स्वप्नसृष्टिस्थितिलया जीवचैतन्यसाक्षिकाः ।
निर्जीवस्तम्भकुड्यादौ स्वप्नसृष्ट्यादयो न हि ॥ १०३ ॥

The creation, derivation of existence and manifestation, and dissolution of the dream world have consciousness aspect of the individual soul as their witness. Never indeed are there creations of dream, etc., in a stump, wall, etc., which are devoid of consciousness. (103)

Vide: jīvaḥ svapnasṛṣṭyādikartā, tatsākṣitvāt,
yannaivam tannaivam, yathā stambhādi, MP.

जगत्सृष्टिस्थितिलया ब्रह्मचैतन्यसाक्षिकाः ।
ब्रह्मचैतन्यरहिते वन्ध्यापुत्रे न सन्ति ते ॥ १०४ ॥

The creation, sustenance and the dissolution of the world have the consciousness aspect of Īśvara as their witness. They do not exist in a barren woman's son

which is devoid of the consciousness aspect of
Brahman. (104)

Vide: brahma sarvasrṣṭyādikaṛtā, tatsākṣitvāt,
vyatireke vandhyāputravat, MP.

जगत्सृष्ट्याद्यधिष्ठानं शुद्धचैतन्यमद्वयम् ।
परमात्मस्वरूपं स्यादिति तस्यात्र निर्णयः ॥ १०५ ॥

Pure consciousness which is non-dual, which is of
the nature of the supreme reality is the substratum of
the creation, etc., of the world. This is the affirmation
of the aspirant [who possesses the four-fold aid to the
study of Vedānta]. (105)

For a description of the four-fold aid, see ŚB on BS, 1.1.1

यत् प्रज्ञानं स्वात्मरूपं तद्ब्रह्मेति विबुध्यताम् ।
प्रज्ञानं ब्रह्म विज्ञाय तिष्ठेत् प्रज्ञात्मना सदा ॥ १०६ ॥

Let it be understood that consciousness which is
the essential nature of one's Self is Brahman. Knowing
[directly] that consciousness is Brahman, may one
always remain in the form of consciousness. (106)

From the great sayings of the Upaniṣads like prajñānam
brahma [AU, 3-3] etc., there arises the immediate knowledge
that the individual soul is pure consciousness which is non-
different from Brahman and which is viewed to be the ground of

the universe. This knowledge, however, is not efficacious in dispelling avidyā, because it is clouded by the three-fold impediment, namely, pramāṇāsambhāvanā, prameyāsambhāvanā and viparītabhāvanā. Śravaṇa, manana and niddidhyāsana remove the three impediments respectively. The immediate knowledge which has arisen already, being thus freed from the three-fold impediment, dispels avidyā. One who has thus attained the immediate knowledge remains as a jīvanmukta. This is the import of the verse.

जीवन्नेव स्थितप्रज्ञो मुक्तः स्याद् वामदेववत् ।
प्रियतां यत्र तत्रास्य वपुः सोऽयं न जायते ॥ १०७ ॥

He, who is rooted in consciousness, will be released while living like Vāmadeva. Let his body fall off at any place; he will not be born again. (107)

ऐतरेयब्रह्मविद्यां व्याख्यातां संग्रहादिमाम् ।
सुस्थिरामनुगृह्णातु विद्यातीर्थमहेश्वरः ॥ १०८ ॥

इति श्रीविद्यारण्यमुनिकृते अनुभूतिप्रकाशे ऐतरेयोपनिषद्विवरणं
नाम प्रथमोऽध्यायः ।

Let Vidyātīrtha Maheśvara bless this knowledge of Brahman which is imparted in the Aitareya Upaniṣad and which is briefly set forth [in this treatise] be firmly rooted [in the expounders and the learners.](108)

Here ends Chapter I entitled "An Exposition of the Aitareya Upaniṣad in the treatise Anubhūtiprakāśa composed by the Sage Vidyāraṇya.

Abbreviations

AP	Anubhūtiprakāśa
AU	Aitareya Upaniṣad
BG	Bhagavad-Gītā
BS	Brahma-sūtra
CU	Chāndogya Upaniṣad
KA	Kṛṣṇālaṅkāra (A commentary on the Siddhāntaleśa-saṅgraha of Appayya Dīkṣita. Appayya Dīkṣitendra granthāvali - Prakāśana - Samiti. Secunderabad, 1973)
MP	Mitaprakāśa - Vivṛti (Commentary on AP by Kāśinatha Śarma. Vidyā Vilas Press, Varanasi (1923-24)
PD	Pañcadaśi of Vidyāraṇya
ŚB	Śaṅkara 's Bhāṣya
SLS	Siddhāntaleśa - Saṅgraha. see KA
SŚ	Saṅkṣepaśārīraka of Sarvajñātman
STK	Sāṅkhyatattva - kaumudī of Vācaspatimiśra Nirnaya Sagar Press, Bombay, 1940
TU	Taittirīya Upaniṣad

[4]

THE PHILOSOPHY OF ADVAITA

[Based upon the study of Śāyana - bhāṣya on the
Taittirīya - Āraṇyaka - Prapāthaks, 7-9]

THE WORLD

C.L. Ramakrishnan

In the history of Indian Philosophy, there are four major theories in regard to the origination of the world; and, they are : (1) the theory of aggregation; (ii) the theory of de novo creation; (iii) the theory of transformation; and, (iv) the theory of illusory manifestation. These theories are respectively admitted by the schools of Buddhism, the Nyāya - Vaiśeṣika, the Sāṅkhya and the Advaita.

Our author following the author of the Brahma - sūtras and Śrī Śaṅkara's commentary thereon sets forth the above theories and we shall explain them accordingly.

The Theory of Aggregation (Samghāta-vāda): the Sautrāntika and the Vaibhāṣika schools of Buddhism

advocate the theory of aggregation (*saṃghāta-vāda*). According to this theory, the external world is an aggregation of four kinds of atoms - earth, fire, water and air. The internal world is an aggregation of five factors (*skandhas*); *rūpa*, *vijñāna*, *vedanā*, *saṃjñā* and *saṃskāra*. The sense-organs along with their objects constitute the *rūpaskandha*. Knowledge of the form "I" stands for *vijñānaskandha*. The states of mind such as happiness, misery or the absence of the two which arise respectively from the experience of the objects that are pleasant or unpleasant, or neither pleasant nor unpleasant represent the *vedanāskandha*. Determinate knowledge is *saṃjñā-skandha*. Desire, aversion, pride, *dharma*, *adharma*, etc., constitute *saṃskāra-skandha*.

The above view is not sound. It may be asked as to whether there is an intelligent being serving as the efficient cause apart from the atoms and the *skandhas* to bring about the aggregation. If it is admitted that there is an intelligent being bringing about the aggregation, it may be asked as to whether that intelligent being is an enduring principle or a momentary one. The first alternative does not hold good because according to the schools of Buddhism

there is no permanent intelligent being. The second alternative too cannot be maintained. It is because the intelligent being is momentary by nature and such a one who comes into existence at a particular moment and ceases to exist during the next moment cannot bring about the aggregation. To get over this difficulty it may be argued that atoms and the skandhas respectively undergo aggregation by themselves. This assertion too is not correct; for, being inert by nature, neither the atoms, nor the skandhas could bring about the aggregation.

Our author cites the passage from the *Vaiyākīyanyāyamāla*:

samudāyau ubhau yuktāvayuktau vā aṇuhetukaḥ
eko 'paraḥ skandhahetuḥ ityevaṃ yujyate dvayam
sthiracetanarāhityāt svayaṃ ca acetanatvataḥ
na skandhānaṃ vā aṇūnāṃ va samudāyo 'tra
yujyate ॥¹

The *Yogācāra* school of Buddhism maintains the view that the external world does not exist and what is real is *vijñāna-skandha*. In the state of dream every activity and verbal expression are carried out by the intellect, that is, the *vijñāna-skandha* without any

external objects. In the same way, the acitivity during the waking too would hold good wihtout any external object.

This contention is wrong. It is because the illustrative example is not compatible. The dream world undergoes sublation during the waking state. But the objects of the waking state do not undergo such sublation.

It might be said that there is no valid proof in regard to the existence of the external objects. This contention too is wrong, for the very cognition of the objects consitutes the proof for their existence.

It might be said that it is only the intellect which is of the nature of momentary consciousness that appears as external objects like pot, etc.

This view also is wrong because the very assertion that the momentary consciousness itself appears as external objects is the proof for the existence of the external objects. It is because if there are no external objects one will not have the knowledge of the significative relation between the expression 'external objects' and the sense. And in the absence of the knowledge of such significative relation, the verbal

usage of the form 'external objects' does not hold good. Since the external objects do exist and since it could not be maintained that they are of the forms of momentary consciousness, their cause must be specified. It can neither be the group of atoms nor the group of skandhas. Nor could it be the momentary consciousness itself, but something apart from all these factors.

Our author cites the relevant passage from the *Vaiyāsakīyanyāyamālā* which are as follows:

vijñānaskandhamātratvam yujyate vā na yujyate |
 yujyate svapnadr̥ṣṭāntāt buddhyaiva vyavahārataḥ ||
 abhādhat svapnavaiṣamyāt bāhyārthastu upalabhyate |
 bahirvaditi te 'pyuktiḥ nāto dhīḥ artharūpabhāk ||²

The Nyāya - Vaiśeṣika school holds the view that an effect does not exist in its cause prior to its origination. In other words, there is prior non-existence of the effect in its cause. It is by the causal operation of the efficient cause like the weaver, the effect - cloth which is non-existent prior to its production comes into existence over and above the cause. Since this view upholds that an effect is non-existent in its cause prior to its production, it is termed a-sat-kārya-vāda. And since this view maintains that

the effect is a *de novo* creation, it is termed *ārambhavāda*.

In the wake of this basic theory, the Nyāya - Vaiśeṣika school attributes the creation of the world to the conjunction of primal atoms which are eternal and partless. There are four kinds of atoms: earth, water, fire and air. At the beginning of the creation of the world, there arises, owing to the will of God depending upon the merits and demerits of the soul for whose experience this world is to be created, movement in each and every atom which is of atomic size. Two atoms join together to form a binary compound (*dvyaṇuka*) which has invisible size (*aṇutva*) and minuteness in length (*hrasvatva*). Three such binary compounds join together to form a triad (*tryaṇuka*) which has visible size (*mahatva*) and visible length (*dīrghatva*). Four such triads combine together to form a *caturāṇuka* which has greater visible size and visible length. In this way, the effects - earth, water, fire and air come into existence.

One point that is to be noted in this connection is that the binary compound does not exist in the atoms prior to its creation. It is by the will of God when two atoms join together, the binary compound is produced

anew. The relation between the atoms and the binary compound is one of inherence or samavāya which is admitted to be eternal. The atoms are the inherent cause (samavāyi-kāraṇa) because over and above the atoms, the new product – binary compound has come into existence through the relation of inherence. The conjunction of two atoms is admitted to be the non-inherent cause (asamavāyi-kāraṇa). And God is the efficient cause (nimitta-kāraṇa).

The above view of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika is not sound. The theory that the effect does not exist in its cause prior to its production and that the causal operation brings into existence that which is non-existent is wrong. It is because the non-existence of the effect, namely, cloth is present everywhere prior to its production. Hence the cloth could arise even from a lump of clay. But it is not so. One who desires to have a cloth seeks only threads and not clay. This recourse to an appropriate material shows that the effect pre-exists in its cause. It is precisely on this ground that the theory that the effect does not exist in its cause prior to its production must be given up.

The view that atoms constitute the cause of the world which is advocated on the basis of the a-sat-

kārya-vāda must also be given up. When it is said that the world is only the combination of atoms, it may be asked as to whether the whole of an atom comes into contact, that is, conjunction with another atom or a part of it. If the former alternative were maintained, then since one atom will merge in another atom, there is no possibility of the rise of dvyaṅka at all. To overcome this difficulty, if the second alternative were maintained, then it amounts to admitting that atoms have parts, which however, is not the case.

Further it is admitted by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school that God directs one atom to come into contact with another atom. God's will is eternal and so there will be permanent contact between atoms as a result of which there will be the eternal presence of the world. And the view that the initial activity on the part of one atom leading to its contact with another atom is based upon the merits and demerits of the soul is wrong. It is because according to Nyāya - Vaiśeṣika school, the merits and demerits are present through the relation of inherence in the soul and they have no relation to the atoms at all.

Moreover, God is all - pervasive; and His all-pervasiveness lies in this that He is always in contact

with all the categories that have activity. So God in order that He may be all-pervasive must be in contact with atoms which have activity. In that case, since both God and atoms are partless, the contact between the two will not be spatially non-pervasive; but it will be the cause of one completely pervading the other. The result would be that God will be reduced to the state of an atom or the latter will become all-pervasive in nature like God. Neither of these positions is acceptable to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school. So the Nyāya - Vaiśeṣika view regarding the cause of the world is not sound.

Our author records the following relevant passages from the Vaiyāsakīyanyāyamālā in support of the above view.

janayanti jaganno vā samyuktāḥ paramāṇavaḥ ।
 ādyakarmajasamyogāt dvyaṇukādikramāt janiḥ ॥
 sanimittānimittādivikalpeṣu ādyakarmanāḥ ।
 asambhavādisamyoge janayanti na te jagat ॥³

The Śāṅkhya school advocates the theory known as sat-kārya-vāda according to which the effect pre-exists in its cause prior to its origination. This school holds that the very fact that an object is brought into existence by causal operation proves that the object must pre-exist in its cause.

It might be said that if the effect pre-exists in its cause, then no causal operation is necessary. It is because an existent entity cannot and need not be produced.

The Śāᅅkhya school would answer the above objection by saying that it is the lump-form of clay, for example, which has the potency to give rise to the pot that is considered to be the cause of pot. Potency present in a cause is only the state of the effect that is yet to come into existence. In other words, it is only the latent form of the effect. By causal operation what is latent in the cause gets itself transformed into the gross form. This means that causal operation brings about the manifestation of what exists in a particular form into another form.

It follows from the above that the Śāᅅkhya school holds that an effect pre-exists in its cause. This theory, therefore, is known as *sat-kārya-vada*. And since according to this theory, causal operation brings about the modification of what exists in a latent form into a gross form, this theory is known as *pariᅅāma-vāda* too.

Based upon the theory of the *sat-kārya-vada*, the Śāᅅkhya school maintains that the material cause of

the world is prakṛti or pradhāna. Such a cause is arrived at by taking into consideration the nature of the objects of the world. Apart from prakṛti which is insentient, there is another principle - Puruṣa which is self-luminous consciousness and is supra-relational. Prakṛti is totally independent of the Puruṣa.

The objects of the world such as pot, sound and the like are of the nature of happiness, misery and ignorance. Pot, for example, is of the nature of happiness in the case of one who has it. It is of the nature of misery in the case of one from whom it is lost. It is of the nature of ignorance in the case of the one to whom it is not known. Hence the cause also must be one which is of the nature of happiness, misery and ignorance. Such a cause is prakṛti which consists of the three strands of sattva, rajas and tamas. Of these, sattva is of the nature of happiness, rajas, of misery, and tamas, of ignorance. Thus by an analysis of the nature of the objects of the world, the concept of prakṛti is arrived at.

The three guṇas which are the constituents of prakṛti are absolutely dependent upon one another. They are in a state of perfect equilibrium at the time of dissolution. At the beginning of the period of

evolution, this state of equilibrium is disturbed. The guṇas become related to each other through primary-subsidary relation. And the creation of the world which is only the manifestation of what is latent into gross form proceeds.

Following the author of the Brahma-sūtras and Śri Śāṅkara, our author argues that the prakṛti which is insentient cannot evolve itself into the form of the world unless guided or directed by an intelligent being. The only intelligent being, namely, Puruṣa, however, is supra-relational and so it cannot have any relation to prakṛti in order to guide or direct it. Moreover, the first stage prior to the evolution of the world from the prakṛti, according to the Śāṅkhya system is the disturbance in the state of equilibrium of the three constituents of sattva, rajas and tamas. The question is asked as to how this disturbance could take place in the prakṛti, unless it is influenced by an intelligent being. As we have said, the Puruṣa which is the only intelligent being cannot exert its influence in view of the fact that it is supra-relational. If it were assumed that the Puruṣa influences the prakṛti, then it comes to this that the latter is dependent upon the Puruṣa. This is exactly the Advaita view according to which

prakṛti; or māyā which is dependent upon the sentient principle, Brahman is the transformative material cause of the world. The Sāṅkhya system, therefore, would be adopting the line of argument of the Advaitins.

Further the conception of prakṛti itself is not sound. It is because it is conceived as constituted of the three strands of sattva, rajas and tamas which respectively stand for happiness, misery and ignorance, and as the cause of the objects of the world which are of the nature of happiness, misery and ignorance. But it is not so. Happiness, etc., are internal factors, while pot, etc., are external ones. And what are internal objects cannot constitute the nature of external objects. On this ground the view that prakṛti constitutes the cause of the world is unsound.

Our author cites the relevant passages from the Vaiyāśakīyanyāyamāla in support of the above view. And the passages are:

pradhānam jagato hetuḥ na vā sarve ghaṭādayaḥ ।
 anvitāḥ sukhaduhkhādyaiḥ yato heturato bhavet ॥
 na hetuḥ yogyavacanā pravṛttyādarasambhavāt ।
 sukhādyā āntarāḥ bāhyā ghaṭādyāstu

kuto 'nvayaḥ ॥⁴

The theory that the effect pre-exists in its cause prior to its production and the causal operation brings about the manifestation of what is latent into a gross form is wrong. It is because manifestation must either be existent or non-existent. If it were existent, then it need not be produced and causal operation would become futile. If it were non-existent then it must be held that causal operation brings into existence that which is non-existent prior to its production. This is exactly the *asat-kārya-vāda* which the Śāṅkhya school does not admit. On this ground the theory of *sat-kārya-vāda* must be given up.

The Pāśupata school argues that the world comes into existence from *prakṛti* which is directed by God who is thus the efficient cause of the world. In order to lay emphasis upon the absolute independence of God, this school states that God in creating the world does not depend upon the merits and demerits of the soul for whose experience this world is created. Just as the potter without being the material cause of pot, etc., is the efficient cause of pot, etc., in the same way God is the efficient cause of the world.

This view of the Pāśupata school is not correct. Our author following the author of the *Brahma-sūtras*

and Śrī Śaṅkara argues that God according to this school would have to be considered as partial and cruel. It is because the world, the field of experience of the souls affords pleasure to some souls and cause misery to others. This implies partiality and a resulting inclination in favour of some souls and cruelty or positive pleasure in inflicting misery upon some other souls on the part of God who creates the world in such a manner. God would cease to be God then.

Further the view that God is only the efficient cause of the world would be in direct conflict with the teaching of the Upaniṣadic text- *bahu syām prajāyeya*,⁵ according to which Brahman itself desired to become many. This text specifically refers to the fact that Brahman itself is the material cause of the world. It may be added here that Brahman as possessing the characteristic of being the material cause of the world is God.

The author cites the relevant passages from the *Vaiyāsakīyanyāyamālā* in support of the above view. And the passages are :

taṣṭheśvaravādo yaḥ sa yukto 'tha na yujyate ।
 yuktaḥ kulāladṛṣṭāntāt niyanṛtvasya sambhavāt ॥
 na yukto viṣamatvādidoṣāt vaidhika īśvare ।
 abhyupete taṣṭhatvam tyājyam śrutivirodhataḥ ॥⁶

The difficulties in regard to the theories of creation advocated by the other schools and also in regard to the source of the world have led the Advaitin to formulate his view known as vivarta-vāda according to which Brahman without undergoing any change whatsoever appears as the World.

The Taittirīya text -

yato vā imāni bhūtāni jāyante, yena
 jātāni jīvanti, yatprayantyaabhisamviśanti
 tadvijijnāsasva, tad brahmeti. 7

states: From which all beings arise and from which they derive existence and manifestation and into which they lapse back at the time of dissolution, seek to realize that as identical with your Self; That is Brahman. Here the Sanskrit expression 'From which' is yataḥ. This is an ablative case-ending one. Our author states that from the aphorisms of Pāṇini -

i) The material cause of the origination of an object acquires the designation apādāna;⁸ and;

ii) The word that signifies apādāna acquires the ablative case-ending.⁹

it is known that Brahman which is referred to by the expression, yataḥ in the ablative case-ending is the material cause of the world.

Another text of the Taittirīya upaniṣad -
tadātmānam svayam akuruta.¹⁰

states that Brahman manifested itself into the form of the effect by itself. Since it is said that Brahman manifested itself it is known that it is the material cause of the world. And, since it is said that Brahman manifested itself by itself, it is known that Brahman is the efficient cause of the world.

Further text-

tadaikṣata bahusyām prajayeyeti
tattejo 'srjata¹¹

states that Brahman deliberated and then created the fire. This text refers to the fact that Brahman is the efficient cause of the world. And when it states that the deliberation of Brahman is of the form 'I shall

become manifold', it refers to the fact that Brahman itself is the material cause of the world. And the characteristic of being the material and the efficient cause of the world is given as the definition of Brahman.¹²

There is one difficulty in viewing Brahman as the material cause of the world; and it is this: a material cause is that which undergoes modification or a different configuration which is a positive change. If we view Brahman as the material cause then it must be held that it undergoes modification. It may be asked as to whether the whole of Brahman undergoes modification or a part of it. To either of the views there are difficulties. If the first alternative were held, then it amounts to admitting that Brahman as such would cease to exist as it has undergone a different configuration. To overcome this difficulty, if the second alternative were maintained, then it amounts to admitting that Brahman has parts and so it will be non-eternal, as that which ever is composed of parts is non-eternal. It comes to this that Brahman cannot be viewed as the material cause of the world.

Brahman cannot be considered as the efficient cause too. It is because an efficient cause is the one

who makes a choice, resolves it into an intention and puts that intention into an effect. This process is not possible in the case of Brahman which is admitted to be pure consciousness. It comes to this that Brahman could not be defined as the material and the efficient cause of the world.

Our author following the prevalent view in Advaita states¹³ that Brahman could be defined as the material and efficient cause of the world thus: the Upaniṣads in order to account for the material and the efficient causality of Brahman introduces the principle of māyā. The Śvetāśvatara text -

te dhyānayogānugatā apaśyan devātmaśaktim
svaguṇair nigūḍhām¹⁴

states māyā to be the creative power.

Yet another text of the same Upaniṣad -

māyām tu prakṛtim vidyāt māyinam tu maheśvaram¹⁵

speaks of māyā as the material cause of the world and Brahman as possessing māyā.

On the authority of the above texts it must be concluded that pure consciousness in relation to māyā is to be viewed as the material cause of the world. It

may be noted here that in relation to *māyā* and the reflected image therein Brahman which is pure consciousness without any distinction whatsoever comes to be endowed with an adventitious feature, namely, the state of being a original. And the pure consciousness as associated with the characteristic of being a original is God. And as associated with the characteristic of being a reflected image it is the soul. The pure consciousness that transcends *māyā* is God. And it is God who is the material and the efficient cause of the world. This characteristic serves as the qualification per accidens (*tatasthalakṣaṇa*) of Brahman.

When it is said that God is the material and the efficient cause of the world it comes to admitting both the consciousness - element and *māyā* are so, as God is only a blend of both the consciousness and *māyā*. We have already outlined the difficulties in admitting consciousness either as the material cause or as the efficient cause.

In order to maintain the validity of the two texts - one proclaiming Brahman to be the cause and another - *māyā*, the Advaitin admits that *māyā* is the transformative material cause (*pariṇāmyupādāna*) and Brahman, the pure consciousness to be the

transfigurative material cause, (vivartopādāna). Praināma signifies actual diversification by losing its form into another; and, the thing that undergoes diversification and the effect of such a diversification would belong to the same level of reality. Vivarta, on the other hand, is apparent diversification of one thing into another. Here the thing that undergoes apparent diversification and the resultant effect of such a diversification would belong to different levels of reality. When viewed in this light, the consciousness element in God which transcends māyā could be taken as the material cause of the world. Māyā which is the adjunct of God undergoes transformation into the form of the world. The consciousness-element in God appears as the world. It is the transfigurative material cause. God as a complex whole is the material cause of the world.

It has been objected that Brahman cannot be taken as the efficient cause in view of the fact that dominant desire that determines one's decision and effecting of one's decision into effect which go to make up the concept of efficient causality could not be had in the case of Brahman, as the latter is free from instruments of cognition.

This objection is not valid. It is because just as desire, etc., are admitted to be the modification of the mind in the case of the soul, in the same way in the case of God they are admitted to be the modifications of māyā. Thus by māyā, the consciousness-element in God acquires knowledge, desire, etc., that are essential for bringing the world into existence. Since māyā is all-pervasive its modification known as māyā-vṛtti inspired by the reflection of consciousness in it is all-comprehensive. It is omniscience and having this is termed omniscient.

It comes to this: the pure consciousness that transcends māyā is the material and the efficient cause of the world. Material causality pertains to both māyā and the consciousness-element in God. In the case of māyā, it is transformative in nature, while in the case of God it is transfigurative. Efficient causality, however, pertains to the consciousness-element in God. And the material and the efficient causality present in God is capable of defining per accidens the pure consciousness.

This view is based on the authority of the text of the Muṇḍakopaniṣad -

yaḥ sarvajñāḥ sarvavit yasya jñānamayam tapaḥ
tasmāt etat brahma nāma rūpam annam ca jāyate.¹⁶

This text means: 'He who knows everything generally and in detail and in whose case deliberation (to create the world) is the consciousness reflected in the mode of māyā, from Him proceed Hiraṇyagarbha, name, form and earth.

One noteworthy feature about this view is that it accommodates the two texts of the Upaniṣads one affirming Brahman as the material cause of the world and other, māyā.¹⁷

Our author makes a reference to two more views in regard to the cause of the world.

One view is: independent causality in the case of Brahman is unintelligible as Brahman is immutable. And māyā which is superimposed upon the immutable consciousness serves as a subsidiary cause. It attributes noticeable effectiveness in the consciousness thus enabling the latter to appear as the world. Thus it is pure consciousness that is the transfigurative material cause of the world and māyā is not at all the material cause.

It might be said that if *māyā* is not admitted to be the material cause, then there would arise conflict with the teaching of the text-

*māyām tu prakṛtim vidyāt*¹⁸

which assigns material causality to *māyā*.

This contention is rejected by stating that the text ascribes material causality in the case of *māyā* by taking into consideration its power to make Brahman serve as the material cause of the world. It is with this in view that *māyā* is referred to as the supreme power of Brahman with variegated functions in the text -

*parāśya śaktiḥ vividhaiva śrūyate.*¹⁹

Never indeed does the power that is present in a lump of clay, for example serve as the material cause of pot. Since *māyā* is the power of the Brahman it is not to be viewed as the material cause. Hence there is no need to make a distinction in the form that Brahman is the transfigurative material cause of the world and *māyā* is the transformative material cause.

It might be said: If *māyā* were not admitted as the material cause of the world, then there will not be any transformative material cause of the world; and

Brahman being an immutable entity cannot undergo transformation into the form of the world.

It is answered that the world is not to be admitted as the transformation of any principle; it is admitted to be the transfiguration of Brahman which is the content of *māyā*.

Thus according to this view it is pure consciousness that is the transfigurative material cause of the world through *māyā*. And it is the transfigurative material causality along with the efficient causality that serves as the qualification *per accidens* of the pure consciousness.

Another view which our author records in regard to the material causality of Brahman is: it is only *māyā* that must be admitted as the material cause of the world and not Brahman on the authority of the text -

na tasya kāryaṃ karaṇaṃ ca vidyate

parāsyā śaktiḥ vividhaiva śrūyate

svābhāvikī jñānabalakriyā ca.²⁰

which states that Brahman is free from any cause and is free from any relation to effect. And it has the supreme power known as *māyā*.

Māyā is the transformative material cause of the world and Brahman being the substratum of māyā is figuratively spoken of as the material cause. And the characteristic of being the substratum of māyā whose transformation is the world serves as the definition per accidens of the pure consciousness.

The difference among the above three views may be explained thus:

1) according to the first view that God who is the pure consciousness that transcends māyā is the material and the efficient cause of the world, efficient causality pertains to the consciousness-element in God; and, the material causality pertains to both the consciousness element and to māyā. The consciousness-element is the transfigurative material cause; and māyā, the transformative material cause;

2) according to the second view, it is pure consciousness alone that serves as the transfigurative material cause and the efficient cause of the world. Māyā is not the material cause; it is only a subsidiary cause. And it is under the influence of māyā, the pure consciousness becomes efficacious to appear as the world; and,

3) according to the third view, it is only *māyā* that is the material cause of the world; and, Brahman – the pure consciousness is figuratively spoken of as the material cause by being the substratum of *māyā* whose transformation is the world. The efficient causality, however, pertains to the pure consciousness.

It may be added here that the first view is advocated by Ānandānubhava in his *Padārthatattvanirūpaṇa*; the second one, by Sarvajñātman in his *Samkṣapaśārīraka* and, the third one, by Prakāśananda in his *Vedānta-siddhānta-muktāvali*.²¹

And, all the three views are noticed in the *Vivarana*²² and our author records them in his work.²²

Our author favours the view that God who is a blend of the pure consciousness and *māyā* is both the material and the efficient cause of the world. The transfigurative material causality and the efficient causality pertain to the consciousness –element in God. And the transformative material causality pertains to *māyā*. It is from the pure consciousness associated with *māyā* the manifestation of the world proceeds. First there takes place the manifestation of the subtle elements (*tanmātras*) which are non-quintuplicated. The Taittirīya text –

ātmana ākāśaḥ sambhūtaḥ ākāśāt vāyuh
vāyoh agni agnerāpaḥ, adbhyaḥ pṛthivī²³

states that space sprang into being from the pure consciousness associated with avidyā; from space, air; from air, fire; from fire, water, and from water, earth. Since inertness preponderates in them, tamas is assumed to predominate in their cause.

These five subtle elements which are unquintuplicated become the gross elements of space, air, fire, water and earth. Quintuplication means dividing each of the elements into two first, then dividing the first half into four and combining each with the remaining halves other than the one of its kind. According to this view, a particle of earth (say), is $1/2$ earth + $1/8$ water + $1/8$ fire + $1/8$ air, + $1/8$ space. Each of the four $1/8$ th parts of each element is to be combined with one of the reserved halves. In this way, there is the manifestation of the gross elements of space, etc. It must be noted here that each gross element is alike made up of all the five; yet, it is justifiable to designate them as merely earth, etc., according to the principle derived from the aphorism-

vaiśeṣyāt tu tadvādaḥ tadvādaḥ.²⁴

At this stage sound manifests itself in earth; sound and touch, in air; sound, touch and colour, in fire; sound, touch, colour, and taste in water; and sound, touch, colour taste and odour, in earth. Our author in this connection cites the passage from the Pāñcabhūtaviveka-section of the Pañcadaśī of Śrī Vidyāraṇya which is as follows:

śabdasparśau rūparasau gandho bhūtaguṇā ime
ekadvitricatuḥ pañcaguṇā vyomādiṣu kramāt.²⁵

From the sattva aspect of the subtle elements all taken together there springs into existence the internal organ in its two-fold phase of manas and buddhi. The organs of knowledge, namely, the ear, skin, eye, tongue and nose spring forth respectively and in order from the sattva-aspect of the elements, namely, space, etc., taken singly. The organs of action, namely, the tongue, the hands, the feet, the anus and the generating organ come into being in order from the rajas - aspect of the subtle elements such as space, etc., taken separately. The group of the five airs, prāṇa, apāna, vyāna udāna and samāna comes into being from the rajas-phase of the subtle elements such as space, etc., taken together.²⁶

Thus we see that the world is only a manifestation of pure consciousness associated with māyā.

Now we shall discuss the nature of the world as to whether it is real or indeterminable.

In the Chāndogya Upaniṣad, Āruṇi - the father asks his son Śvetaketu thus: "Have you ever sought after that principle which could be known only through instruction and by knowing which that which is not heard will become heard, that which is not deliberated will become deliberated and that which is not ascertained will become ascertained".

uta tamādeśamprākṣyaḥ yenāśrutam śrutam bhavati
amataṁ mataṁ avijñātam vijñātam iti.²⁷

From the text -

taṁ tu aupaniṣadam puruṣam pṛcchāmi²⁸

it is known that it is only Brahman that could be known through instruction from the Upaniṣads and the preceptor. It follows that by the knowledge of Brahman there would arise the knowledge of everything else.

Now the question arises as to how could there arise the knowledge of everything else by the knowledge of Brahman. The Upaniṣad itself proceeds to explain what

has been said in general terms by providing three illustrative examples which are as follows:

- i. yathā saumya ekena mṛtpiṇḍena sarvaṁ mṛṇmayam vijñātam syāt, vācārambhaṇaṁ vikāro nāmadheyam mṛttiketyeva satyam;
- ii. yathā saumya ekena lohamañinā sarvaṁ lohamayam vijñātam syāt vācārambhaṇaṁ vikāro nāmadheyam lohamityeva satyam; and;
- iii. yathā saumya ekena nakhanikṛutanena sarvaṁ kārṣṇayāsaṁ vijñātam syāt vācārambhaṇaṁ vikāro nāmadheyam kṛṣṇāyāsamityeva satyam.²⁹

We shall now explain the first illustrative example and then extend the line of explanation to the other two instances too.

The first illustrative example relates to the knowledge of effects such as pot, dish, etc., that results from the knowledge of their cause, namely, the clay. In order that there may result the knowledge of effects from their cause what is required is that there must be identity between the cause and the effects. And this point is explained in the text -

vācārambhaṇaṁ vikāro nāmadheyam mṛttiketyeva satyam.

This text means: pot, etc., which are only different configurations (vikāra) of the lump of clay do not have any substance in them. They do not have any independent existence apart from the lump of clay. They come within the range of verbal expression such as 'This is pot', etc. (vācārambhaṇam). They are mere names only (nāmadheyam). It is only the lump of clay which exists prior to the manifestation of pot and subsequent to its disappearance that is real. From this it follows that the cause alone is real and the effect is non-real. From the Taitirīya text-

yato vā imāni bhūtāni jāyante yena jātāni
jīvanti yatprayantya bhisamviśanti, tad
vijijñāsasva, tad brahmeti ³⁰

we understand that Brahman is the cause of the world. And from the Śvetāśvatara text -

māyām tu prakṛtiṃ vidyāt māyinaṃ tu
maheśvaram³¹

it is known according to one interpretation that māyā is the material cause of the world. In order to have no conflict with either of the two Upaniṣadic texts we have said that Brahman as associated with māyā is the material cause. We have also said that Brahman is the

transfigurative material cause and *māyā* is the transformative material cause. When viewed in this light, the world, the effect does not have any independent existence apart from Brahman, the cause. It comes to this that the lump of clay, etc., which constitute the cause of pot, etc., also come under the world, the effect. And the world is not real.³²

Exactly similar consideration applies to the other two instances cited in the Upaniṣad earlier. The lump-form of gold and the lump-form of the black-iron respectively attain different configurations and names appropriate to the latter. And there is no difference between the lump-form of gold, the cause and the golden necklace, etc., the effects. In the same way, there is no difference between the lump-form of black iron, the cause and the effects made up of black iron.

It may be added here that we have a similar promissory statement in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* where in *Yājñavalkya* instructs *Maitreyī* that by knowing Brahman everything else will become known. The relevant texts are:

*ātmano vā are darśanena śravaṇena matyā vijñānena idam sarvaṁ viditaṁ.*³³ and,

. ātmani khalu are dṛṣṭe śrute mate vijñāte idaṃ sarvaṃ veditam.³⁴

It might be said that the knowledge of Brahman could not result in the knowledge of the world. It is because the world is an appearance of Brahman like silver in a shell. The knowledge of the shell does not result in the knowledge of the silver; on the other hand, it removes the appearance of silver. In the same way, when the knowledge of Brahman arises there would result the removal of the world and not the knowledge of the world. So the assertion that by the knowledge of Brahman there would ensue the knowledge of the world is not valid.

The above contention is answered by saying that when it is said that by the knowledge of Brahman there would result the knowledge of everything, what is intended to be conveyed is that there will arise the knowledge of the true nature of every object. And this knowledge is of the form that Brahman is the essential nature of every object and no object has any independent existence apart from Brahman.

An analysis of the import of the promissory statements leads us to conclude that the world is non-real. The Chāndogya text -

sadeva saumya idamagre āsīt ekameva advitīyam³⁵

affirms that the world is non-real. It is thus: this text states that prior to creation this world which is now found to be differentiated into names and forms remained as identical with Brahman thereby giving us the knowledge of Brahman as associated with the world. The complement of the text -

ekameva advitīyam

conveys that Brahman is like nothing, unlike everything and is free from any internal differentiations. It is specific in stating that Brahman is advitīya, that is, an entity where there is no duality whatsoever, Thus this text as a whole conveys that Brahman which is associated with the world is free from the world. If an entity is noticed to be absent in a substratum where it is noticed to be present then that entity is non-real. This aspect is known in the case of shell-silver. The silver is noticed to be not present in the shell when there arises the knowledge 'This is not silver'. But it is noticed to be present therein prior to the rise of that knowledge and the silver is not real. In the same way, the world too is not real.

Further the Bṛhadāraṇyaka text -

dve vā brahmaṇo rūpe mūrtam caiva amūrtameva ca³⁶
 first ascribes two forms to Brahman - corporeal and non-corporeal. Earth, water and fire fall under the first category, while air and space, under the second category. Then the text -

athāta ādeśo neti neti³⁷

refers to the two forms and negates them by stating 'not this, not this'. From this it is known that Brahman is free from any duality in the form of the world. Here too the Upaniṣad predicates the absence of the world in Brahman after ascribing its presence there. The question now arises as to why the Upaniṣad first ascribes the world in Brahman and then denies it there. It is answered that if the Upaniṣad denies the existence of the world in Brahman without ascribing its presence therein, then there would arise the notion that the world could be present elsewhere. And the presence of the world elsewhere would impair the non-dual nature of Brahman. That is why the Upaniṣad first ascribes the presence of the world in Brahman and gives us the impression that the world if at all it is present is present in Brahman alone and nowhere else. Then it denies the existence of the world in Brahman

too, thus giving rise to the conviction that the world which is not present anywhere expecting in Brahman is not really present therein too, and therefore it is not real.

The promissory statement affirms that by the knowledge of Brahman there will arise the knowledge of the true nature of everything else. We have said that apart from Brahman which is viewed to be the material cause of the world there is no efficient cause. We have also said that the soul is not different from Brahman and the world is non-real. Thus when the direct knowledge of Brahman arises the so-called soul ceases to be a soul as it remains one with Brahman and the world ceases to exist. The one who has attained this knowledge while continuing to live in the body till his fructified deeds which have given rise to the body by being present in which he has attained the knowledge of Brahman will perceive the world as an illusory manifestation of his own self.

From the above discussion it follows that the Advaitin concludes that the non-dual nature of Brahman is not contradicted by the presence of the world as the world that is given in perception is known to be non-real from the Upaniṣadic texts.

Now it may be objected that one cannot conclude that the world is not real as such a conclusion is opposed to perception. The latter in forms like 'The pot is real' (ghaṭaḥ san) comprehends the reality of the objects of the world like pot, etc. Our author is of the view that the conflict between perception and the Upaniṣad is based on the assumption that perception too like the Upaniṣad is a pramāṇa or proof. It is not so. It is because a proof is that which makes known an unknown object, that is, an object veiled by māyā. This definition of proof is applicable only in the case of the Upaniṣad whose content is Brahman. It is because the latter alone, by being self-luminous can be veiled. Everything apart from it is inert and needs no external cause for being veiled. It follows from this that the Upaniṣad alone gives us the knowledge of an unknown entity, namely, Brahman that is, an entity veiled by māyā. Hence it alone can be termed pramāṇa in the strict sense of the term.

Perception, on the other hand, has a semblance of a pramāṇa. Its object - pot (say) cannot be concealed by māyā as it is inert by nature. But the consciousness delimited by pot which could manifest the pot is veiled by tūlāvidyā or modal ignorance which is derivative

of *māyā*, the primal nescience. The consciousness delimited by pot, thus being veiled by *tūlāvidyā*, could not manifest the pot. Perception gives rise to a mental state in the form of pot and the mental state inspired by the reflection of consciousness in it removes the *tūlāvidyā*. Thus consciousness delimited by pot manifests itself then and manifests the pot too. And it is this function of perception that answers to its validity in ordinary experience. Since perception does not manifest the pot, etc., directly in the manner in which the Upaniṣad manifests Brahman by removing *māyā* concealing it, it is called *pramāṇābhāsa*, that is, the one which has a semblance of a *pramāṇa*. And a *pramāṇābhāsa* can never contradict a *pramāṇa*.

Our author cites the following verse in this connection:

pratyakṣādi pramāṇānām prāmāṇyam vyāvahārikam ।
 āsṛitya ayam prapañcaḥ syāt alīko 'pi pramāṇavān ॥
 advaitāgamavākyaṁ tu tattvāvedanalakṣaṇam ।
 pramāṇabhāvaṁ bhajatām na ato anyonyavirodhitā ॥³⁸

The world although non-real is taken to be real till there arises the knowledge of Brahman. This is similar to a dream state which is taken to be real till one comes

back to the waking state. Since the world is removed only by the direct knowledge of Brahman it is considered to be pheomenally real or vyāvahārika - satya.

To sum up: the world is only an illusory manifestation of Brahman through māyā. It is taken to be real by the unenlightened till one attains the knowledge of Brahman.

NOTES

1. Brahma - Sūtra (hereafter BS), 2.2.18.

see also Vedārtha-prakāśa (hereafter VP). Bhāṣya on the Taittirīya - Āraṇyaka from 7 - 9 Prapāthakas by Sāyaṇa Poona: Ānandāśrama Sanskrit series, 36, 1927. [p.583]

2. BS, 2.2.28 ff.

see also VP, pp. 583 - 594

3. BS, 2.2.11 ff.

see also VP, pp. 582.

4. BS, 2.2.1.

see also VP, p. 581.

5. Taittirīya Upaniṣad (hereafter TU) 2.6.

see VP, 621.

6. BS, 2.2.37 ff.

see VP, p. 585.

7. TU, 3.1.1.
8. Pāṇini - sūtra, 1.4.30.
9. Ibid., 2.3.28.
See VP, p. 564.
10. TU, 2.7.1.
11. Chāndogya Upaniṣad (hereafter CU), 6.2.3.
12. BS, 1.1.2
13. VP, p.568
14. Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad (hereafter ŚU), 1.3.
15. Ibid., 4.10.
16. Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad, 1.1.9.
17. VP, p. 570.
18. ŚU, 4.10.
19. Ibid., 6.8.
20. Ibid
21. Siddhāntaleśa-saṅgraha (here after SLS) with the commentary, Kṛṣṇālaṅkāra, Secunderabad: Śrī Appayya Dikṣitendra granthāvali - Prakāśana - Samiti. 1973. pp.50 ff., 67-68.
22. Vivaraṇa (hereafter V), commentary on the Pañcapādikā along with Bhāvaprakāśa by Nṛsimhāśrama. Madras : Govt. Oriental series, Vol. CLV., Madras, 1958. p. 652.

See also VP, pp. 670 - 1,

23. TU, 2.1.

24. BS, 2.4.22; VP, p.567.

25. Pañcadaśi, 2.2.

26. VP, pp. 592 ff.

27. CU, 6.1.3

28. BU, 3.9.26

29. CU, 6.1.4 ff

30. TU, 3.1.

31. ŚU, 4.10.

32. VP, p. 577.

33. Brhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad (hereafter BU), 2.4.5.

34. Ibid., 4.5.6.

35. CU, 6.2.1.

36. BU, 2.3.1.

37. Ibid., 2.3.6.

38. VP, p.483.

THE VEDĀNTACŪĻĀMAṆI - TEXT

with Translation

M. Partiban

(92-93)

ஆங்காரான் மாவிற்கு நானெனலாற் கயிற்றி
னரவமென நிருபாதி காத்தியா சந்தா
னாங்கார வியலான்மா விற்குநான் கருத்தா
வாமெனலாற் சிவப்புவலம் போற்சோ பாதிகமா
மீங்காகுங் கரணதரு மான்மாவிற் கிச்சா
மியநானென் றிருத்தலினா லலைபுனலிற் புக்க
வீரங்கதிரின் விம்பமெனத் தத்தருமாத் தியாச
மெனவுரைப்பார் நான்குடும்ப வானெனநிற் கையினால்.

மைந்தர்முத லாயினா ருடனான்மா விற்கு
மண்ணுலகிற் பஃறியத்தர் விவகார மெனவே
யந்தமுறுஞ் சம்பந்த மாத்திராத் தியாச
மாமென்ப ரிவ் வத்தியாசங்க டம்மா
னந்துநிர்வி காரியான் மாவென்றல் பெற்றா
நவிறருமைந் தவத்தையுள வவையாவை யென்னிற்
றொந்தமுறு நனவொடுசொப் பனஞ்சுமுத்தி தூரியந்
தூரியாதீ தந்தானா மவற்றியல்பு மொழிவாம்.

Self-awareness in the form 'I' is the erroneous cognition; and, it is not based upon any limiting condition.¹ It is similar to the erroneous cognition of a serpent on a rope. The erroneous cognition of the form 'I am an agent' is the one based upon the limiting condition.² It is similar to the erroneous cognition of real colour in a white crystal. In the same way, there is the rise of the erroneous cognition of the form 'I desire', in the consciousness reflected in the mind. It is similar to the appearance of wavering notion in the reflected image of the cool moon in water (when the latter is set in motion by breeze). The false notion of the characteristics of the mind in the consciousness - element reflected in the mind is specified as *taddharmādhyāsā* (the erroneous cognition of the characteristic feature of one thing in another) by the wise men.³

The experience 'I have a family' is the result of the false identification of the consciousness reflected in the mind with son and others during phenomenal existence. This is similar to the notion of 'mine' toward the co-travellers in a boat. And this relation is subject to an end. This is an instance of erroneous cognition of relation only.

On the basis of these erroneous cognitions, the immutable reality undergoes five states; and, they are waking state, dream state, deep sleep state, the fourth one, and that which transcends it. These are inter-related to one another. And we shall explain the nature of each one of these states now.

Notes :

1. The relation of the mind to kūṭastha caused by avidyā results in the self-awareness in the form 'I'. This is reckoned as erroneous cognition not based upon any limiting adjunct (nirupādikādhyāsa) in the sense that excepting avidyā no other factor plays any role in causing this erroneous cognition.
2. The cognition 'I am an agent' is an erroneous one. It is because agency is the characteristic of the mind and it is falsely presented in the consciousness reflected in the mind. This kind of erroneous cognition is taken as the one based on limiting condition (sopādhikādhyāsa) in the sense that apart from avidyā, mind too plays a decisive role in its rise.
3. The erroneous cognitions of the forms 'I am an agent' and 'I desire' are instances of taddharmādhyāsa coming under the category of sopādhikādhyāsa.

Definition of the waking State :

(94)

பெருந்தூல வைம்பூத மீரைந்திந் திரியம்
 பிராணபஞ் சகமொடுநாற் காணமிவை யுருவா
 மருந்தூல சரீரத்திற் சாத்துவித குணமோ
 டகாரவெழுத் தரிதெய்வம் விழியிடமே யாக
 விருந்தாக விதயமல ரட்டதள கதியில்
 விசுவசீ வலும்விராட் டிறையுமொருங் கடைந்து
 வருந்தாவில் விடயங்கள் கரணமனைத் தானு
 மருவிநுகர்ந் திடுதல்சாக் கிரமதா மன்றே

The gross body consists of the five quintuplicated elements, five senses of action, five senses of knowledge, five vital airs, and four kinds of internal organ. In it which is difficult to be attained, *viśva* and *virāt* - the individual and the collective form of the pure consciousness¹ who are represented by the letter *a*², who are associated with the *sattva-guṇa*, who have Lord *Viṣṇu* as their presiding deity and who have the right eye as their abode³, experience in the region of heart which is in the form of a fresh lotus with eight petals, the objects of the world through sense- organs. And, this constitutes the waking state.

Notes :

1. The gross bodies conceived as one and many respectively constitute an aggregate like a forest and individuals like a tree. Pure Consciousness delimited by this aggregate is designated as *virāṭ* or *vaiśvānara*. And, the pure consciousness as defined by the individual gross body is termed *viśva*.
2. i) *Jāgaritasthānaḥ bahiṣprajñāḥ saptāṅgaḥ*
..... *sthūlabhuk vaiśvānaraḥ prathamah pādah*
Māṇḍ. Up., 3.
ii) *viśvo hi sthūlabhuk,* Mk, 1 - 3.
iii) *akāro nayate viśvam,* *ibid., 1-23.*
3. *dakṣiṇākṣimukhe viśvaḥ,* *ibid., 1-2.*

Definition of the Dream State :

(95)

பஞ்சபூ தமுஞ்சித்த புத்தியினின் ரொழிந்த

பதினேழின் மயமாஞ்சூக் குமதனுவி னின்று
விஞ்சுரசோ குணமுகர வெழுத்ததிதெய் வந்தான்
விரிஞ்சனிடங் களமாக நல்லிதய மென்னுங்
கஞ்சமலர்க் கன்னிகா கதியிற்றை சதனுங்

கனககர்ப் பனுமருவி நனவின்வா தனையை
நெஞ்சமெனுங் கரணத்தா லனுபவிக்கை தானே

நிகழ்ந்திடுஞ்சொப் பனமென்று நகழ்துவர்மூ தறிஞர்.

The subtle body consists of five senses of knowledge, five senses of action, five vital airs, mind

and the 'I' cognition; and, it is free from the five quintuplicated elements and the two forms of internal organ, namely citta and buddhi. In it, taijasa and Hiranyagarbha¹ who are represented by the letter u,² who are associated with the rajo-guṇa, who have Brahmā as their presiding deity and who have throat as their abode, experience in the pericarp of the lotus, that is, the heart the latent impressions born out of the experience of the walking state through the mind. Wise men declare this to be dream state.

Notes :

1. All the subtle bodies viewed as one form an aggregate like a forest; and viewed severally are individuals like a tree. Pure Consciousness as conditioned by this aggregate is termed Hiranyagarbha and as conditioned by the individual subtle body is termed taijasa.
2. i) svapnasthānaḥ antaḥprajñāḥ saptāṅgaḥ
..... praviviktabhuk taijasaḥ dvitīyaḥ pādaḥ, Māṇḍ. Up., 4.
ii) taijasaḥ praviviktabhuk, MK, 1.3.
iii) ukāraścāpi taijasam, ibid, 1.23.

Definition of the Deep Sleep State:

(96)

மேய்ந்துதிரி பார்ப்படக்கி யுறங்களகு போல
 விரிந்தகா ரியங்களையுட் கொண்டுவா தனையோ
 டாய்ந்தவான் மாசிரயத் தவத்தையற விருக்கு
 மரும்பகுதி மயமாங்கா ரணவுடம்பிற் றமமே
 யேய்ந்தகுண மகரவெழுத் தரன்றெய்வ மிதய
 மிடமாந்தத் கமலமலர்ப் பொகுட்டுநடுக் கதியி
 லோர்ந்தபிராஞ் ஞானும்பரனு மாய்ப்பிரமா நந்த
 முறுமாயா விருத்தியெனு நுண்கரணந் தன்னால்.

The causal body is well - known as avidyā which is located in the pure consciousness, wherein the two states of waking and dream (provisionally) merge and which absorbs within itself the entire objects of waking and dream and which comprises within itself the latent impressions born out of the experience of the waking and the dream state, like a hen that sleeps by keeping under its wings offspring that were pecking corn. In it, prājña and antaryāmi which are the individual and the collective form of pure consciousness respectively¹, which are represented by the letter ma², which are associated with the tamo-guṇa, which have Rudra as their presiding deity and which have the heart as their abode³, experience in the middle of the pericarp of

the lotus, that is, the heart, the bliss that is Brahman through the mode of avidyā which is a subtle instrument.

Notes :

1. i) Pure consciousness conditioned by the individual avidyā is termed prājña; and by the collective one, antaryāmi.
ii) suṣuptasthānaḥ ekībhūtaḥ prajñānaghana eva ānandamayaḥ hi ānandabhuk prājñaḥ trtīyaḥ pādaḥ, Māṇḍ. Up.. 5
iii) eṣa sarveśvaraḥ eṣa sarvajñaḥ eṣo 'ntaryāmi Ibid., 6
2. makāraśca punaḥprājñam, MK., 1 - 23
3. ākāśe ca hr̥di prājñaḥ, MK, 1 - 2

Definitions of Turīya and Turīyātīta and The experients of the states of waking, etc.,

(97-98)

அனுபவித்தல் சுழுத்தியா மிந்நனவா திகண்மூ
வவத்தையொடு முத்தரும முப்புரமுத் தானம்
பினுமுத்தெய் வங்களெனும் பரியாய நாமம்
பெறுமுரைத்த சாக்கிரத்தே தத்கமல மழிந்து
மனவழக்கந் தவிர்ந்துபரந் தனைச்சிந்தித் திடலே
வருதுரிய மப்பரமான் மாவினமன் மடங்கன்
முனமுரைத்தல் செய்துரியா தீதமெனப் புகல்வர்
மொழிந்தவற்றுட் டாவரங்கள் பெறுதலிருட் சுழுத்தி

விலங்குமுத லனபெறுவ கமுத்தியொடு கனவாம்
 விண்ணவர்க்கு நனவுநராக் கம்மூன்று மாகுங்
 கலங்கலறு மருளர்க்குத் தூரியம்வர யோகி
 கட்குவரு வதுதூரியா தீதமுதன் மூன்று
 மலங்கலறு மனிதர்க்குத் தமிழ்நாமே தோன்றி
 வருபந்த மாமேனை யிரண்டுமியோ கத்தா
 விலங்குமுத்தி சாதனமா மவைகளிலொன் றினிலொன்
 றிலாமையினாற் காலத்தே சங்கணிய மம்பொய்

Deep sleep state is characterized by the experience of Brahman-bliss. These three states of waking, dream and deep sleep are referred to by synonymous terms such as three characteristics, three bodies, three abodes and three deities. The renowned state of *turiya* is characterized by the centering of the mind withdrawn from the objects of the world upon Brahman that transcends the heart (wherein it is immanent)¹. The *turiyātīta* is affirmed by the wise ones as the state where mind is dissolved in Brahman or pure consciousness.²

Of these five states, trees experience only the state of deep sleep characterized by darkness; animals, both deep sleep and dream; divine beings, waking only; human beings, the three states of waking, dream and deep sleep; persons who have discriminating

knowledge and are absorbed in pure consciousness, the state of turīya; the renowned mystics, the state of turīyātīta.

The first three states arise of their own accord in the case of human beings whose minds are unsettled and they constitute what is known as bondage. The remaining two which constitute the means to liberation – the supreme human end, result by the pursuit of yoga, the means of controlling the mind. These five states, being exclusive of one another and also not conforming to specific time and place, are not real.

Notes :

1. This is savikalpaka-samādhi wherein the distinctions of one who contemplates, the object contemplated and the act of contemplation exist.
2. This is nirvikalpaka-samādhi wherein the distinctions of one who contemplates, the object contemplated and the act of contemplation vanish away.

Experience of Tamas in the state of deep sleep:

(99)

சொற்றவவத் தைகளிலுனு சூதனா யறியுந்
 துரியனே யுளன்னவு கனவிலறி வுண்மை
 பெற்றமைச் சுமுத்தியினிற் பெறலுரைப்பி னெழுந்து
 பிறிதொன்று மறியாது ஈ ஈ த்துறங்கி னேனென்

றுற்றவிரு நினைவுமனு பவஞ்சமுத்தி யதனி

லுறாதுவரா தெனுமருத்தா பத்தியினாற் பொருள்கண்
முற்றுமடக் கிருள்விழிகான் குதலெனக்கா ரியங்கண்
முழுதையுமுட் கொண்டபே ரவித்தையிரு வினையும்.

It is the *kūṭastha* who pervades the states referred to earlier and remains as their witness. It is accepted that there is cognition of objects both in the waking state and in the state of dream (through the well-known instruments of cognition).¹ To affirm that there is cognition in the state of deep sleep too, reference is made to two forms of recollection, namely 'I did not know anything when I was asleep' and 'I slept happily' which one has when one comes back to the waking state from that of deep sleep. Since recollection is not possible without prior experience, it is presumed that there has been the experience of ignorance (*tamas*) which has absorbed within itself all its effects. This is similar to the experience, through sense of sight, of darkness that has enveloped all objects.

Notes :

1. There is the functioning of the senses of action, senses of knowledge and the mind in the state of waking. In the state of dream there is the functioning of the mind. In the state of deep sleep there is the absence of the functioning of all these three instruments.

Experience of Bliss in the state of deep sleep:

(100)

அந்தவவித் தையின துசூக் குமவிருத்தி தன்னி
 வலையுமரத்திலையிடையின் வெண்ணிலாத் துளிபோல்
 வந்திலங்கி யடங்குநிசா நந்தக்கூற் றினையும்
 வருகரணாந் தராபேட்சை யின்றியே யான்மா
 முந்துரைசெய் சுமுத்தியினி லனுபவிக்கை யாலே
 மொழிந்ததனி லறிவுளதா மேதுமறி யாமை
 நந்துசுகத் துறங்கினே னெனற்கேது விடய
 ஞானமிலா மையுங்குடும்ப நிவிர்த்தயுமா முறையே

Just as the white rays of the moon penetrate and are manifested under a tree through the intervening spaces of its leaves when the leaves are in restless motion due to wind, and just as there is the disappearance of the rays of the moon (under a tree) when the leaves are stationary, in the same way, the bliss (which is consciousness and) which is one's true nature gets reflected in the subtle modes of avidyā. It is the reflection of bliss in the subtle modes that is known as the experience of bliss in the state of deep sleep.¹ Such an experience arises without depending upon any instrument of cognition.

The means of the recollection of the form "I did not know anything when I was asleep and I slept

happily”, are only the experience of the subtle modes of avidyā (which result in the absence of mental states in the form of objects of the world) and the removal of the characteristics of being an agent, an experient and a knower.

Notes :

1. The subtle modes of avidyā which are inspired by the reflection of bliss, that is, consciousness is known as experience of ignorance in the state of deep sleep.

Vide:

- i. sukhamasvāpsamatrāham na vai kiñcidavediṣam
iti supte sukhājñāne parāmrṣeti cottitaḥ.
- ii. parāmarśo 'anubhūte ' stītyāsīdanubhavastadā
cidātmatvāt svato bhāti sukhamā jñānadhīstataḥ.
- iii. antarmukho ya ānandamayo brahmasukham tadā
bhunkte cidbimbayuktābhirajñānotpannavṛttibhiḥ.
- iv. ajñāna-vṛttayaḥ sūkṣmā vispaṣṭā buddhivṛttayaḥ
iti vedāntasiddhāntapāragāḥ pravadanti hi.

PD, 11-59, 60, 65, 66.

(101)

மன்றசுழுத் தியிலதற்குக் கரியாமா நந்த

மயவுயிருண் டெனிலொருவ ராகிலுமாண் டறிந்தே

என்றலில தேதுகா ரணமெனிலோர் பொருளை

யெடுப்பநீர் மூழ்கினோ னாண்டுளதென் பதுமேற்

சென்றலது புகலவொனா ததுபோலக் கருமச்
 செயலினா லெழுந்துதுணை யாங்கரணங் கூடி
 னன்றியதி லறிந்தபொருள் கூறொணா தாகு
 மாதலினா லுயிர்ச்ச்சி தாநந்த வொளியாம்

If in the state of deep sleep there is the manifestation of the bliss form of *kūṭastha* as its witness, then it may be asked as to why no one has the cognition in the form 'I experience the *kūṭastha*' then. It is answered thus: one who is immersed in the water of a well with a view to take an object that has fallen into it cannot express in words about the existence of the object under the water till he comes out from the bottom of the well. In the same way, the experience of the bliss form of *kūṭastha* cannot be expressed in the state of deep sleep unless one comes back to the waking state when the fructified merit that has caused the deep sleep state comes to an end and one identifies oneself with the mind. Thus the *kūṭastha* which is the witness of the deep sleep state is existence, consciousness and bliss and is self-luminous.

The Five Sheaths of the Pure Consciousness:

(102 - 103)

அன்னமொடு பிராணன்மனம் விஞ்ஞான மிக்க
 வாநந்த மயமாமைங் கோசமுள வவைதாஞ்
 சொன்னமுறை சுக்கிலசோ ணிதத்தாகி நின்ற
 தூலவுடம் பன்னமய கோசஞ்சூக் குமெய்
 மன்னலுறு பிராணனும்வாக் காதியுமே பிராண
 மயகோச மனமுஞா னேந்தியமும் புணரிற்
 பன்னுமனோ மயகோசந் தூரியன்சிற் சாயை
 பதிதலொடு லோகாந்த குந்தமே போன்று
 இருந்தவகங் காரமுஞா னேந்தியமுங் கூடி
 னிசைத்தலுறும் விஞ்ஞான மயகோச மாகும்
 பொருந்துகா ரணதேக ரூபாவித் தையுந்தாம்
 புகல்விடய தரிசனமா மீப்பியசை யோகந்
 தரும்பிரிய மோதமொடு பிரமோத மென்னத்
 தக்கவையு மாநந்த மயகோச நானென்
 றரந்தைதரும் விஞ்ஞான மயகோச வடிவா
 மாங்காரந் தனையான்மா வென்பரறி விழந்தோர்

There are five sheaths for the kūtastha; and, they are the sheath of food, the sheath of vitality, the sheath of consciousness, the sheath of self-consciousness and the sheath of bliss. These may be described in due order thus: the sheath of food is the physical body that results from the union of the male and the female

energy. The group of five vital-airs along with the senses of action constitutes the sheath of vitality. The sheath of consciousness is the mind when it is taken with the organs of knowledge.

Like a spear which has dart at its top, the mind inspired by the reflection of pure consciousness or the *kūṭastha*; is the content of the cognition of the form 'I'. This one along with the senses of knowledge constitutes the sheath of self-consciousness.¹ *Avidyā* - the causal body along with the pleasant feeling caused by the perceptual cognition of the desired objects, pleasure in possession, and happiness in enjoyment, respectively termed *priya*, *moda* and *pramoda* constitutes the sheath of bliss. The content of 'I-cognition' along with the other constituents of the sheath of self-consciousness is considered to be the true nature of one's Self by those who could not make any distinction between the Self and the not-self.

Notes :

1. This is what is termed the *jīva* or the empirical soul which migrates from this world to the other fancying itself as the agent and the experient and as happy or miserable.

(104)

நீலகுண விசேடமொடுற் பலவிசே டியந்தா
 னிகழ்தரவேத் தியமாதல் போலிளைத்தே னெனிணான்
 றூலதனு வொடுங்கேட்ப னானெனிலிந் தியத்துஞ்
 சூழ்வனா னெனிற்சுரண முடனும்வேத் தியமாய்ச்
 சாலவுயர் தூரியனிற்சை யாலேயாங் காரந்
 தானான்மா வன்றாகி லசேதனவாங் காரஞ்
 சீலமொடு புளவிடய மறிவதென் னெனிலூ
 சிக்கலின்முன் னூசிசேட் டித்திடுதல் போலும்

Just as the substantive element, lotus is clearly manifested by being associated with the adjectival feature - blueness, in the same way, the soul - the content of the cognition 'I' is manifested as associated with the gross body, sense-organs and the mind respectively in direct experiences such as 'I am lean', 'I hear', and 'I deliberate' by the kūṭastha, the distinguished one. Since the soul is manifested by the kūṭastha, it is not the pure Self.

If it is asked as to how the soul which is different from the pure Self could comprehend the external objects in an orderly manner, it is said that it is similar to an iron needle that moves about in the presence of the magnet.

The Soul as Related to the Waking, the Dream and the Deep Sleep State :

(105)

வெயிலிடைக் காட்டுபடி மக்கலமுண் மனையை
 விளக்குதல்போ லுந்துரியன் றன்றிருச்சந் நிதியி
 னியலுறுதற் சைதன்யப் பதிவிம்பந் தன்பா
 லெய்தலும்பெற் றிடுதலினா லச்சடவாங் காரம்
 பயில்விடய வுணர்வினொடு நனவுகன வுழன்று
 பகர்சுமுத்தி தனிலடங்கு மன்வழக்க முரைப்பிற்
 செயிர்தருமாங் காரமடங் குறுசுமுத்தி தன்னிற்
 செறியவித்தை யுட்சவருந் துயிற்கதவு மன்றி.

(106)

நடுக்கமறு தீபமாந் தனைத்தானே விளக்க
 னவில்பிரத்திய கான்மாவின் சோதியாம் பின்னர்த்
 தொடக்கிவரு காலகரு மாதிசமீ ரணனாற்
 றுயிற்கதவந் திறந்திடவவ் வவித்யையது தன்னி
 லடுக்குமுத லவத்தைமக தத்துவமாந் தெற்றி
 யடுத்திருந்தாங் காரமெனும் வெண்பளிக்கு மனிதான்
 படைத்தலருந் தூரியசுடர்ப் பதிவிம்பம் பதியப்
 பட்டுமுனம் போற்சீவ னென்னவே நின்று.

(107)

சொற்பனமா நடுமனையை விளக்கியே பொறியாஞ்
 சுருங்கையினிற் போந்துநன வெனுமுன்றில் விளக்கு

முற்பகருங் காலகரு மாதிரி ரணனான்
 மூடலுமத் துயிற்கதவங் காரியவாங் கார
 நற்படிக மணியவித்தை தனிலடங்கச் சென்று
 நனவுகன வெணுமுன்றி னடுமனைக ளிருளாந்
 தற்படிக மணிக்கதுவு மறிவொளிதன் முதலாந்
 தனித்துரிய விளக்கையடைந் தேகமா மன்றே

A mirror placed before the rays of the sun in front of a house would manifest the objects inside the house (by receiving the reflection of the rays). In the same way, the mind which is inert, which is in the august presence of the pure consciousness and which thereby receives the reflection of the latter in it experiences the objects in the state of waking and dream and (provisionally) merges in avidyā in the state of deep sleep. The mind which is the source of all evil ceases to function in the state of deep sleep wherein there is the manifestation of avidyā which is similar to an inner wall and the mode of avidyā which is sleep and which is similar to a door.

(106)

(In the state of deep sleep there is the manifestation of the pure consciousness - kūtastha which is self-luminous). The self - luminosity of the pure consciousness consists in manifesting its own self

which is similar to the light of a lamp that remains steady. Then activated by time and past merits and demerits of the soul, sleep which is similar to a door is opened. And in avidyā which is like an inner wall is present its first modification, namely, the mahat-tattva which is similar to doorway. In the latter is present, the mind which has the predominance of sattva and which is like a white crystal. In it the self - luminous consciousness undergoes reflection. Thereby it comes to be endowed with the characteristics of being a jīva as before.

(107)

The jīva then would manifest the state of dream which is similar to an inner court-yard of a house. Then it comes out through the wicket-gate in the form of sense -organs and comprehends the waking state which is like an outer court-yard of a house. Then by time and merits and demerits of the soul specified earlier, when the vital airs shut off the door in the form of sleep, the mind which is like a crystal and which is the effect of mahat-tattva merges in avidyā. The inner and the outer court-yard, namely, the dream and the waking state are not manifested then. The consciousness reflected in the mind (being now

free from the relation to mind) remains identical with its incomparable pristine nature.

Notes :

1. This is means sleep comes to an end.
2. This means that the individual soul experiences the state of deep sleep.

The Self and the Not - Self:

(108)

இத்திறமிங் சுகமினது பாவாபா வங்க
 ளிலங்குநன வாதுகளி னவிகார மாசி
 யுய்த்துணரு முயிர்வேறொன் றித்தலினா லென்று
 முறைத்தலக மான்மாவன் றெனவறிக புறம்பு
 வைத்தலிட யங்கடமக் கான்மாவாய்ப் பரமான்
 மாவிற்கு வேத்தியமா தலிற்சடா சடமா
 யத்தமதின் முன்பின்போ லொளியிலதா மகந்தைக்
 காகஞ்சிற் சாயையான் மாவுடனாம் புணர்ச்சி

Since the presence of the mind in the state of waking and dream and the absence of it in the state of deep sleep are invariably manifested by the kūtastha, the immutable consciousness, know that mind inspired by the reflection of consciousness in it, (in view of its variation) is not the pure Self (which is kūtastha and which is constant).

Mind inspired by the reflection of consciousness in it no doubt serves as the Self, that is, the cognizing agent of the external objects; yet, since it is manifested by the kūtastha, it is not the pure Self. It is a blend of the insentient element of the mind and the consciousness - element of kūtastha. It is similar to a mirror whose front part is lustrous and the rear one dull or black. The mind which is inspired by the reflection of consciousness in it and which is thus known as ahaṅkāra or the ego-sense falsely identifies itself with the physical body, with the reflected image and with the kūtastha.

Notes:

See the following verse.

(109)

வெப்பினே னானெனலாற் சிற்பதிவிம் பந்தான்
 மேவுமாங் காரசம் பந்தத் தாற் றூல
 மெய்ப்படுவ வெம்மைமுத லனவறிதல் கரும
 விளைவாகிக் கருமசமா நானறிந்தே னெனலாற்
 றப்பிரிய சிற்சாயை யுடனவ்வாங் கார
 சம்பந்தஞ் சிருட்டிமுதன் முத்தியள வாகப்
 பொய்ப்பரிசி னியல்பாகு நான்கருத்த னெனலாற்
 புணர்ச்சியிலான் மாவினுட னனையதின்சம் பந்தம்.

(110)

இசைப்பிலது பிராந்திசென் னியமாகு மென்னு
 மிவைமுழுதுஞ் செப்புதிரி சியவிவே கந்தான்
 மிசைப்புகல்வ வஞ்ஞான மாவரண மிக்க
 விட்சேபம் பரோட்சமப ரோட்சஞா னம்பின்
 வசைப்படுத லுறுஞ்சோக நிவிர்த்தியதன் மீது
 வருநிரங் கிசதிருத்தி யெனுமவத்தை யேழுந்
 திசைப்புறுத லுறுஞ்சீவர்க் காவனவா மிவற்றின்
 நிறமனைத்து முறைபிறழா தினியெடுத்து மொழிவாம்

The mind inspired by the reflection of consciousness in it acquires self-awareness in the form 'I'. The identity of the mind with the reflected consciousness in it is natural as it continues to exist as real till one attains liberation. The content of 'I - cognition' when falsely indentified with the kūtastha is endowed with the experience 'I am an agent'. And this identity is due to erroneous cognition. Further, the content of 'I - cognition' which is endowed with the characteristic of being an agent and which is falsely identified with the kūtastha when further identified with the physical body comes to be associated with the experience of heat and cold, etc. This relation of the content of 'I - cognition' to the body is brought about by past merits and demerits.

What has been said so far falls under the category of *drśya*.

The souls which are bewildered are associated with seven conditions which are as follows: (i) ignorance; (ii) concealment; (iii) illusory projection; (iv) mediate knowledge; (v) immediate knowledge (vi) removal of misery that is despicable; and, (vii) experience of unconditioned bliss.

We shall now set forth the nature of each one of them in due order.

Seven Conditions of the Soul :

(111)

புன்னெறிகொள் குடும்பியாய் வலியறுமோர் சித்துப்
 போலியாஞ் சீவனுயர் சுருதிவிசா ரத்தின்
 முன்னமொரு தன்சொருப மாகியபே ரொளியா
 முதற்றுரிய நிலையறியா திருந்திடலஞ் ஞானம்
 பின்னொருகா லுயிரியல்பு கூறுமிடத் தின்று
 பிரத்தியாகான் மாத்தோன்றா தெனுங்கலக்க மிரண்டும்
 பன்னியவஞ் ஞானகா ரியமாகு மென்னப்
 பகர்தருமா வரணமென்பர் பலகலைகற் றுணர்ந்தோர்.

Ajñāna or ignorance is related to the soul which is

the reflected image of pure consciousness in the intellect, which pursues the course of actions that lead to finite results, and which thereby undergoes transmigration and which does not have the power to effect all desired ends. It consists in the soul remaining by losing sight of its identity with its true nature which is incomparable self-luminous consciousness prior to enquiry into the renowned scriptural texts.¹ Wise men conversant with the teaching of the scriptures affirm that āvaraṇa or concealment is the effect of ignorance consisting in the soul having false notions and corresponding expressions, at the time of the instruction of the kūṭastha or Brahman or the pure consciousness, that the pure consciousness does not exist and it is not manifest.²

Notes :

1. Vide:

samsārāsaktacittaḥ san cidābhāsaḥ kadācana

svayamprakāśakūṭastham svatattvaṁ naiva vettyayam.

PD, 7-29.

2. na bhāti nāsti kūṭastha iti vakti prasāṅgataḥ

ibid, 7-30.

(112)

கருத்தனுமொன் கருமபலப் போத்திருவுந் தானாய்க்
 கருதியுடம் பபிமானி யாஞ்சீவன் றானே
 யுரைத்தலரும் விட்சேபஞ் சுருதிசுரு வுண்மை
 யுரையாலுண் டுயிரெனவே யறிதலசத் தென்று
 நிரைத்தமுத லாவரண நிவர்த்தகமாம் பரோட்ச
 நீபிரம மெனும்வேத மொழிவிசா ரத்தால்
 வரத்துரியன் றானெனவே யறிந்திடுத லபாவா
 வரணநிவர்த் தகமாகு மபரோட்ச ஞானம்

Vikṣepa or illusory projection consists in the false identification of the soul with the gross body which results in having the notions of the forms 'I am an agent of actions' and 'I am an experient of the results of actions'¹. Parokṣajñāna is mediate knowledge consisting in the intellectual conviction that the kūtastha or the pure consciousness exists. It arises from the instruction of the Upaniṣadic texts (such as sadeva saumya idamagra āsīt, Chānd.Up. 6.2.1) elucidated by the preceptor. And, it removes the first type of concealment of the form "The pure consciousness does not exist."² Aparokṣajñāna or immediate knowledge consists in the realization that the transcendental kūtastha identical with Brahman is none other than one's Self; it arises from an earnest enquiry into the

import of the Upaniṣads, and it removes the second type of concealment of the form 'The kūṭastha is not manifest'.³

Notes :

1. Vide :

kartā bhoktā ahamasmīti vikṣepam pratipadyate, PD , 7-30.

2. i. asti kūṭastha ityādaḥ parokṣam vetti vārtayā

ibid, 7-31.

ii. parokṣajñānato naśyet asattvāvṛtihatutā,

ibid, 7-45.

iii. sadevetyādi vākyena brahmasattvaṃ parokṣataḥ,

ibid, 7-61.

3. i. paścāt kūṭastha evāsmītyevaṃ vetti vicārataḥ,

ibid, 7-31.

ii. aprokṣajñānanāśyāhi abhānāvṛtihatutā

ibid, 7-45.

iii.... tat tvamasyādivākyāt vyaktim samullikhet,

ibid, 7-45.

(113)

துரியநிலை யடைந்ததற்பி னான்கருத்த னான்போத்

திருவென்னுஞ் சீவவுருத் துக்கமகன் றிடுத

லரியதெனு மச்சோக நிவிர்த்தியாஞ் செய்தே

யடைதலுறும் பலனைனத்து மடைந்தனமென் றமைதல்

பரிவினிரங் கிசதிருத்தி யிரண்டு மபரோட்ச

பலமாகு மறிவுருவா மான்மாவிற் கென்றுந்

தெரியுமப ரோட்சமுள தாதலினா லவற்குச்

சேர்தலெவ்வா றஞ்ஞான முதலினலிங் கென்னில்

Śoka -nivr̥tti or removal of misery consists in the annihilation of the false notion of jīva-hood along with the cognition 'I am an agent of actions and an experient of the results of action' when one attains the direct knowledge of one's true nature.¹

Niraṅkuśatṛpti or ecstatic felicity consists in experiencing unconditioned bliss with a feeling that one has performed all obligatory duties and has achieved their fruits.²

The above two, namely, the removal of misery and ecstatic felicity are the fruits of the direct knowledge of kūṭastha as identical with Brahman.

If it is asked as to how could there be the seven conditions of ignorance, etc., to the kūṭastha who is of the nature of consciousness that is immediate it is answered (thus).³

Notes :

Vide :

1. abhānāvarāṇe naṣṭe jīvatvāropasamkṣayāt

karṭṛtvadyakhilāḥ śokāḥ saṁsārākhyo nivartate.

2. nivṛtte sarvasaṁsāre nityamuktatvabhāsanāt
niraṅkusā bhavet tṛptiḥ punaḥśokāsamud bhavāt.

ibid, 7-47.

3. See the following verse.

(114)

கடந்துநதி பதின்மர்தமை யெண்ணுங்கா லொருவன்
கண்டுநவ புருடரைப்பத் தாமவன்றா னெனவே
யடைந்தறியா திருத்தலே யஞ்ஞானம் பத்தா
மவனிலைகா ணப்படா னென்னுமிரு பிராந்தி
யிடும்பைதரு மாவரண நதியுளவ னிற்றதா
என்னுந்துக்கம் விட்சேபம் வேறொருவன் மொழியாற்
கிடந்தவொரு துக்கமென வு னெனவே யறிதல்
கிளர்ந்தவவ னிலையென்ற லொடுபகைத்த பரோட்சம்.

Ten persons crossed a river. And, in order to ascertain that all the ten have reached the shore safely, one checks over one by one the individuals. In this process, leaving out oneself who is the tenth, one ascertains the total number to be nine only. Here, losing sight of one's identity as the tenth man constitutes ignorance.¹

Concealment which causes misery consists in two types of false notions that the tenth man is not here and he is not seen.²

Illusory projection consists in the misery caused by the notion that the tenth man is lost in the river.³

Just as there arises the belief in the existence of heaven, on the authority of the scriptural text⁴, in the same way there would arise the cognition from the statement of a trustworthy person that the tenth man is alive. This cognition is mediate in nature and it removes the first type of concealment that the tenth man is not here⁵.

Notes :

Vide :

1. navasaṅkhyāḥṛtajñāno daśamo vibhramāttada
na vetti daśamo 'smīti vīkṣamaṇo' pi tānna.

PD, 7-23.

2. na bhāti nāsti daśama iti svam daśamam tadā
matvā vakti tadajñānakṛtamāvaraṇam viduḥ.

ibid, 7-24.

3. nadyām mamāra daśama śocanprarodīti
ajñānakṛtavikṣepam rodanādīm vidurbudhāḥ.

ibid, 7-25

4. jyotiṣṭomena svargakāmo yajeta.

5. na mṛto daśamo 'stīti srutvāptāvacaṇam tadā'
parokṣatvena daśamam vetti svargādilokavat.

PD, 7-26

(115)

சங்கைநவ புருடரொடு முறையெண்ணி நீயே
 தசமெனனத் தனைத்தானே யிருந்தபடி யறித
 லிங்குவரு தசமன்கா ணப்படா னெனலோ
 டிகலுமப ரோட்சமா நதியிலிறந் தனெனன்
 றங்குவரு துயரகறல் சோகநிவர்த் தியதா
 மடைந்ததன தியனிஸையிற் சுகித்திருத்த றானே
 துங்கநிரங் கிசதிருத்தி யெனவறிக வினிமேற்
 றொல்வேத வாக்கியமாம் விசாரமெடுத் துரைப்பாம்.

Immediate knowledge consists in the realization of the one to be the tenth man when one who, leaving out oneself has ascertained the total number of persons to be nine only by counting one by one, is instructed to be the tenth man. The person now realizes himself to be the tenth man although he is so all along. And his knowledge is immediate in nature as it is opposed to the false notion that the tenth person is not manifest.¹

Removal of misery consists in the annihilation of the grief caused by the false notion that the tenth man is lost in the river. Know that to remain in one's nature as the tenth man constitutes the experience of happiness.

We shall here-after explain the interpretation of the great sayings of the Upaniṣads that are beginningless.

Notes :

Vide :

1. tvameva daśamo 'sīti gaṇayitvā pradarsītaḥ
aparokṣatayā jñātvā hr̥ṣyatyeva na roditi.

PD, 7-27.

Three types of Scriptural Texts :

(116)

விரிந்தவிதி நிதேதஞ்சித் தார்த்தபோ தகமாம்
வேதவாக் கியமூன்று திறனாகு மவற்றுள்
வருந்திமக முதலனசெய் கென்றல்விதி விடுக
மதுபானா திகனென்கை நிதேதம்விதி யின்றித்
திருந்துசிவ வுயிரயிக்கப் பொருடனையே தெருட்டல்
சித்தார்த்த போதகவாக் கியமாகு மென்னப்
பொருந்துமறை நான்கினுநான் குளவாஞ்சித் தார்த்த
போதகமா கியமகா வாக்கியங்க னன்றே.

Scriptural texts are three-fold as injunctive, prohibitory and assertive. Of these, the injunctive texts are those that prescribe sacrifice, etc., which involve great effort as the means to heaven, etc., Prohibitory texts are those that forbid one from (committing interdicted actions like) taking wine, etc., Assertive

texts are those which signify the identity between the true nature of the soul and God, that is, *kūṭastha* and Brahman, and which neither prompts one towards some activity nor forbids one from committing an interdicted action.

There are four great sayings of the Upaniṣads each one to each of the four-vedas.

Notes :

1. The *mahā-vākyas* are usually reckoned as four, one taken from each Veda. These are *prajñānam Brahma* (Ait. Up., 5), *tat tvam asi* (Chānd.Up., 6.8.7), *aham brahmāsmi* (Bṛh.Up., 1.4.10) and *ayamātmā brahma* (Māṇḍ.Up., 2). Svayamprakāśānanda in his commentary *Haritattvamuktāvali* on Śrī Śaṅkara's *Haristuti* states that the Taittirīya text - *sa yaścāyam puruṣe yaścāsāvāditye sa ekaḥ*, belonging to the Kṛṣṇa - Yajurveda must also be taken as a great saying.

The Four Great-Sayings of the Upaniṣads:

(117)

உரைத்தவையுட் சிறந்ததுநற் சாமமறை புகலு
 மோங்குதத்தொ மசிமகா வாக்கியமங் கற்குப்
 பரத்தலுறு தற்பதந்தொம் பதமொடசி பதமாய்ப்
 பதமூன்றாஞ் சிவமுயிரங் கவற்றயிக்க முறையே
 யருத்தமென லாம்பதமே பதார்த்தமொடு வாக்கி
 யார்த்தங்க மடக்குச்சம் பந்தமுறை மூன்றாம்

விரிக்கிலவை தாஞ் சமா னாதிகர ணம்பின்
விசேடவிசே டியமிலக் கணமொடிலக் கியமாம்

Of the four Vedas, the Sāma Veda - the distinguished one contains the great saying, *tat tvam asi*. This text consists of three terms - *tat*, *tvam* and *asi*. The senses of these are respectively Brahman, *kūṭastha* and the non-difference between the two. The text *tat tvam asi* conveys the sense of the partless ultimate when viewed under three relations which are as follows:

- i) apposition between the terms *tat* and *tvam*;
- ii) the relation of substance and attributes between their meanings; and,
- iii) the relation of the implied and the implying between the words and the secondary senses or the meanings of the words and the secondary senses.

The Primary senses of the terms *Tat* and *Tvam*:

(118)

அறைதலுறு பதார்த்தங்கட் கிருபொருளிங் குளவா
மவைவாச்சி யார்த்தமில்க் கியார்த்தமென வற்றுண்
முறைமைதரு விராட்புருடன் முதலாகி நின்ற
மூவுருவ வீசனுமப் பிரமமுமொன் றாகிப்

பிறிதலற நிற்புழிதற் பதத்திற்கெய் துறுவ
 பெயர்வாச்சி யார்த்தமுக் கியார்த்தமபி தார்த்த
 நெறிகொள்விக வாதிகளுந் தூரியனுமொன் றாகி
 நிற்புழித்தொம் பதத்திற்கு வருமம்மூ வகையும்.

The word -meanings referred to above are of two types; and, they are primary one and the secondary one. Of these two, the primary meaning of the term *tat* is the aggregate of the three-fold cosmic form of *Virāt*, etc., and *Brahman* - its substratum when these appear undistinguished as one. The primary meaning is referred to as *vācyārtha* or *mukhyārtha* or *abhidhārtha*. The aggregate of the three-fold individual form of *Viśva*, etc., and the *kūṭashta* its substratum when these appearing together as one is the primary sense or the *vācyārtha* or the *mukhyārtha* or the *abhidhārtha* of the term *tvam*.

The Secondary Senses of the terms *Tat* and *Tvam*:

(119)

தற்பதத்தி னுக்குவிராட் புருடாதி யகன்ற
 தனிநிருபா திகப்பிரம மேயிலக்கி யார்த்தஞ்
 சொற்பரவு சோதிததற் பதார்த்தமென நிற்குந்
 தொம்பதத்திற் குற்றவிசு வாதிகளின் வேறாம்
 பொற்பினிரு பாதிமமாந் தூரியனிலக் கியார்த்தம்
 பொருந்துறுசோ திததொம்ப தார்த்தமென வாமவ்

விற்பரவு மிலக்கணைவிட் டதுவும்விடா ததுவும்
விட்டுவிடா ததுவுமென மூவகையா மன்றே.

The unconditioned Brahman free from the limiting adjunct - the three-fold cosmic form is the celebrated secondary or the clarified sense of the term tat. The kūtastha free the limiting adjunct - the three-fold individual form is the effulgent secondary or the clarified sense of the term tvam.

The secondary sense is arrived at through secondary signification which is well-known to be three-fold as jahallakṣaṇā, a-jahallakṣaṇā and jahadajahallakṣaṇā.

Three kinds of Secondary Signification:

(120)

கங்கையினி லிடைச்சேரி மருவலுறுஞ் சொல்லுங்
கவன்குந்த மொடுசோயந் தேவதத்த னெனுஞ்சொ
லிங்கிவைக ளுதாரணமா மவற்றினுக்குக் கங்கை
யெலுமொழிநீர் வடிவாந்தன் முக்கியார்த் தத்தைத்
தங்குமிடைச் சேரிதனக் கிடமாகா மையினாற்
றணந்துகரை காட்டுந்தன் முக்கியார்த் தத்தைத்
துங்கமுறு குந்தமொழி விடாமற்குந் தத்தைச்
சுமப்பதனைக் காட்டுமென வுணர்ந்திடுக துணிந்தே

The expressions 'The hamlet is in the Ganges', and 'The spear goes' and 'This is that Devadatta' serve respectively as the illustrative examples of jahallakṣaṇā, a-jahallakṣaṇā, jahad-a-jahallakṣaṇā.

Of these, the primary sense of the word 'Ganges' (in the first example), namely, the current of the river cannot serve as the substratum of the hamlet; and, so the word 'Ganges' wholly gives up its primary sense and signifies the bank.

The primary sense of the word 'spear' (in the second example), which is inert cannot be the substratum of the activity of going; and, so the word 'spear' without excluding its primary sense signifies the person who carries it. Understand this distinction clearly.

(121)

முன்னமொழி தருஞ்சோயந் தேவதத்த னென்னு

மொழியுண்முத லவனென்னு மொழியிறந்த காலந்
தன்னில்வரு தேசவயோ விசிட்டனாந் தேவ

தத்தனைக்காட் டிடுமிவனென் மொழிநிகழ்வா லத்தி
லுன்னவரு மவையுடைய தேவதத்தன் றன்னை

யுணர்த்திடுமிவ் விருத்ததரு மப்பொருள்க ளிரண்டு
மன்னுதல்செய் யயிக்கமுறா மையினாலப் பொருட்கண்
வருவிருத்த தருமங்க ளனைத்தினையும் விட்டே.

(122)

விருத்தமறு தருமமாந் தேவதத்தன் றனையே
 விடாதுகொளி னவனிவனே யிவனவனே யென்னுந்
 தெரித்தலரி தாயதா தான்மியங்கூ டுறுமாற்
 றேரினிதை விட்டுவிடா விலக்கணையி னொடுதா
 னருத்தவிலக் கணைபாகத் தியாகவிலக் கணையென்
 றறைதலினா லிதுவேதத் தொம்மசிவாக் கியத்திற்
 குரைத்திடுவ ருதாரணமா யுரியதென வுண்மை
 யுணர்ந்னுடையோ ரஃதெவ்வா றெனின்முறையே யுரைப்போம்.

In the expression - 'This is that Devadatta', the word 'that' primarily conveys the sense of Devadatta as associated with past time, different place and a specified age. The term 'this' primarily conveys the sense of Devadatta as related to present time, a particular place and a distinct age. These two senses possessing mutually contradictory attributes cannot be appropriately related to each other. Hence the words 'that' and 'this' leave out the contradictory features and signify the sense of the person - in - himself which involves no contradiction. Thereby the text as a whole gives rise to the cognition that Devadatta seen in the past time is the same as the one that is seen now, and the one who is seen now is the same as the one seen in the past thus affirming the identity of Devadatta.

This kind of secondary signification is known as ardhalakṣaṇā or bhāgatyāgalakṣaṇā. Those who have realized the truth of Vedānta affirm that this kind of secondary signification is fit to be adopted in the interpretation of the text tat tvam asi.

ABBREVIATIONS :

1. Ait. up., Aitareya - Upaniṣad
2. Bṛh. up., Bṛhadāraṇyaka - Upaniṣad
3. Chānd.up., Chāndogya - Upaniṣad
4. Māṇḍ .up Māṇḍūkya-Upaniṣad
5. MK, Māṇḍūkya-kārikā
6. PD, Pañcadaśī

BHAJAGOVINDAM

THE MOHAMUDGARA OF ŚĀṆKARA

(A Topic-wise Treatment)*

T.P. Ramachandran

1. Introduction

All the classical philosophies of India with the exception of Cārvāka are religious philosophies. They do not indulge in speculation for the sake of speculation. Their entire effort is devoted to releasing man from the miseries of life. The conception of liberation varies from school to school. But basically the goal is regarded as the complete and permanent rest for the soul from the ills that beset life. The chief obstacle to release is man's infatuation (moha) with the various attractions of life in spite of the fact that their pursuit is riddled with innumerable difficulties. This infatuation is entrenched in the mind by its taste

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in repeated births. Naturally, therefore, the first lesson impressed upon us by teachers in every school is that we should learn to wrench ourselves away from the snares of the world if we must devote our attention to the goal of liberation. Such a discipline is generally called *vairāgya*. We are here concerned with the nature and significance of *vairāgya* according to Advaita.

The term *vairāgya* needs some clarification. *Rāga*, or *rakti*, is attachment to the various aspects of worldly life. *Vairāgya* is the state of non-attachment (*virāgasya bhāvaḥ*). It is easy to mistake absence of attachment for aversion (*dveṣa*), which is the opposite of attachment. But we are taught that aversion to the world is as dangerous to spiritual pursuit as attachment. Attachment and aversion form an inseparable pair (*dvandva*). And, therefore, the mind has the tendency to swing from the one to the other in recurring modes. So, though *vairāgya* is described as non-attachment, it implies equally non-aversion.¹

In this connection it is worth making a distinction between the attachment (*rāga*) of ordinary people and the love (*priya*) that reigns in heart of a *jīvanmukta*. Attachment is bestowed on select individuals and objects excluding others from its purview. It is also

governed by one's own interests, though they may be subtle and sub-conscious. But the love of a *jīvanmukta* knows no preferences and exclusions. It is equally showered on all. It is also absolutely free from any selfish consideration, since the *mukta* is one who has risen above all sense of agency and enjoyership. Such love becomes possible for him because he has realized the one supreme Self (*Ātman*) that manifests itself as the many individual selves. It is this basic love that expresses itself as the narrow attachment of the ignorant for specific persons and objects.² It becomes narrow, as it gets conditioned by the limitations (*upādhi*) created by *avidyā*. Forgetting our non-difference from Brahman, we think of ourselves as individuals bound to separate bodies, each seeking his own worldly desires and cultivating likes and dislikes.

Complete freedom from attachment is possible only when Brahman is realized. But it is also true that a measure of detachment should initially be imbibed for embarking on the path to enlightenment. Such preliminary detachment becomes possible through discriminative knowledge (*viveka*) relating to the nature of the world in which we live and the consequences

of attachment to it. Reflection on the nature of things shows that they are not worth the attachment that we in our ignorance bestow on them. Even the best of allurements have their sordid aspects and are perishable in the long run. Correspondingly, reflection on the psychology of attachment reveals that it is a futile exercise. A necessary concomitant of attachment to worldly ends is desire (kāma) with reference to them. From desire there follows effort (karma) to fulfill it. It is well known that there is no guarantee that our efforts for worldly ends will succeed. Effort has often to encounter human as well as natural obstacles. It invites envy from others and strife with them, and may ultimately end up with defeat and frustration.³ Even assuming that effort succeeds, worldly ends by their very nature cannot give us lasting satisfaction. And hence attachment and desire shift from one object to another in an endless chain. Constant reflection, both on the limitations of worldly objects and on the perils of seeking them, helps to break down attachment and cultivate vairāgya. Scripture helps us in such reflection by dwelling on these aspects.

The Mohamudgara of Śrī Śaṅkara (also called Bhajagovindam) is an excellent treatise relating to vairāgya. The term mudgara means a hammer. The poem stands for relentless mental pounding on the weakness of infatuation (moha). Easy to recite, the poem of thirty-one delectable stanzas is a ready remedy to this deep-seated malady. But it does not teach vairāgya in isolation from the rest of Advaita discipline. Vairāgya is not an end in itself. It is necessary as one of the preliminaries to Brahman-knowledge. Hence the poem contains as well lessons on other aspects of discipline which follow vairāgya, namely disinterested karma, bhakti, yoga and jñāna. It reveals also the nature of jīvanmukti as the consummation of the whole effort and the importance of the preceptor's grace throughout. All these form the perspective in which vairāgya is to be understood.

In the following pages the contents of the poem are classified according to the topics they mainly deal with. The preparation of this article is based on a close study of the work Śrī Bhajagovindam with the Tamil translation and notes published by Śrī Kāmakoṭi Kośasthānam, Madras, in 1955. (Śrī Kāmakoṭi Granthāvali-3). The book frequently cites the views

of Svayamprakāśa found in his commentary on the work. It also cites the observations of Jagadguru Śrī Candrasekharendra Sarasvatī on different points arising from the poem in his discourses (also published by Śrī Kāmakoṭi Kośasthānam in 1933). Both these citations have been of immense help to me in grasping the true import of the verses and their implications. I acknowledge my indebtedness to the above publication. There is no attempt at literal translation of the verses in this article.

2. The glory of reunciation

सुरमन्दिरतरुमूलनिवासः
 शय्या भूतलमजिनं वासः ।
 सर्वपरिग्रहभोगत्यागः
 कस्य सुखं न करोति विरागः ॥ (18)

Nothing gives pure pleasure as the practice of vairāgya. Whatever pleasure that comes from pursuing worldly ends can only be impure, i.e., mixed with pain. The ascetic may live in the precincts of temples and at the foot of trees, and he may sleep on the bare floor. In short, he renounces all objects, such as a good house, nice clothes and bed, and so on. Even if he somehow happens to be associated with them, the thought of

the pleasure accruing from them will not sully his mind. There is nothing equal to the pleasure of renunciation.

3. The nature of vairāgya

शत्रौ मित्रे पुत्रे बन्धौ
 मा कुरु यत्नं विग्रहसन्धौ ।
 भव समचित्तः सर्वत्र त्वम्
 वाञ्छस्यचिराद् यदि विष्णुत्वम् ॥ (25)

Vairāgya is not hatred towards the world. Attachment and aversion are an inseparable pair. We have to avoid both if we are to prepare ourselves for jñāna, which is the final means to release. In common life we hate the enemy; we love the friend, the son, and the relative. Even with those whom we love we are sometimes sore. We are here asked to avoid any activity that will either bind us to others or involve us in conflict with them. If we are keen to attain liberation without delay, we have to practise equidistance of mind between attachment and aversion in respect of all.

4. The futility of wealth

The world provides opportunities as well as obstacles to detachment. Discriminative knowledge enables us to overcome the obstacles and utilize the

opportunities. There are aspects of the world which are distinctively spiritual distractions, e.g sense pleasure. There are others like disease and death, which if reflected upon, serve as means to detachment. Sometimes the same aspect is both an opportunity and an impediment to spiritual life depending upon how we view it. Wealth is one such aspect.

मूढ जहीहि धनागमतृष्णाम्
 कुरु सदबुद्धिं मनसि वितृष्णाम् ।
 यल्लभसे निजकर्मोपात्तम्
 विप्तं तेन विनोदय चित्तम् ॥ (2)

No one can live without money. Physical well-being is indispensable even to perform one's daily duties. But desire for money should not become a passion. One should be constantly aware its subordinate value. One should give up greed for money, and with a mind free from avarice, one should contemplate on the ultimate reality (sat). A person should be content with whatever wealth he happens to acquire by virtue of his past karma as well as by the performance of the duties relating to his station and stage in this birth.

अर्थमनर्थं भावय नित्यम्
 नास्ति ततः सुखलेशः सत्यम् ।
 पुत्रादपि धनभाजां भीतिः
 सर्वत्रैषा विहिता रीतिः ॥ (29)

Wealth (artha) is worthless (anartha). There is not even a trace of happiness therein. This is the truth. Think of this always. Why, the wealthy man has to dread even his son (children in general). The lure of wealth blinds one to blood relationship and respect for parents. This is the established way of the world everywhere.

The condemnation of wealth in this verse does not mean that there is need for money at all, but only that excessive attachment to wealth should be avoided. Money is not an end in itself, but a means to an end. How we use it depends on our discriminative knowledge. The ignorant person puts wealth to wrong use and earns demerit (pāpa). Only the wise use it for good ends. One should pray for wisdom before praying for money.

यावत् वित्तोपार्जनसक्तः
 तावन्निजपरिवारो रक्तः ।
 पश्चात् जीवति जर्जरदेहे
 वार्ता कोऽपि न पृच्छति गेहे ॥ (5)

The concern shown to a person by those connected with him often centres round his capacity to earn money. When in later life the person becomes frail of body and unfit to earn, none of those who hung on him would feel like calling on him to make a kind enquiry. Attachment is often motivated by desire for personal ends such as money and other favours. And gratitude for favours received is a rare phenomenon. Affluence wins respectability in society; and when a person runs out of money, his desertion by others becomes unbearable. Therefore one should beware of the delusive power of wealth.

5. The perils of sense pleasure

नारीस्तनभरनाभीदेशम्
 दृष्ट्वा मा गा मोहावेशम् ।
 एतन्मांसवसादिविकारं
 मनसि विचिन्तय वारंवारम् ॥ (3)

The lure of the flash is a dangerous impediment to the acquisition of Brahman - knowledge. One should not be deluded by the charms of the human body, which it should be constantly brought to mind, are mere modifications of the flesh, fat, and so on. Vairāgya is necessary not only for acquiring knowledge of the Self, but also for sustaining it after its acquisition.

6. The inevitability of death

नलिनीदलगतजलमतितरलं
तद्वज्जीवितमतिशयचपलम् ।
विद्धि व्याध्यभिमानग्रस्तं
लोकं शोकहतं च समस्तम् ॥ (4)

Life on earth is as amazingly fickle as the pellet of water on a lotus leaf. One must also realize that the entire world is seized by disease and egoism and stricken with sorrow. Like this world, even the other worlds, attained by one's karma are imperfect and perishable. Therefore one should not postpone seeking Brahman-knowledge in all seriousness.

यावत् पवनो निवसति देहे
तावत्पृच्छति कुशलं गोहे ।
गतवति वायौ देहापाये
भार्या बिभ्यति तस्मिन् काये ॥ (6)

Dependent persons visit one's house and make kind enquiries about one's welfare only so long as one's life lasts. But when one's life is ebbing out, anxiety about themselves grips the minds of dependents, including one's wife, even as they see the dying body. Attachment to another ultimately centres round one's own interests.

दिनयामिन्यौ सायं प्रातः
 शिशिरवसन्तौ पुनरायातः ।
 कालः क्रीडति गच्छत्यायुः
 तदपि न मुञ्चत्याशावायुः ॥ (12)

Day and night, morning and evening, the winter and the spring- these recur without end. Life ticks on to its close as time plays with us as it were. And yet, how surprising it is that we continue to be swept away by the whirlwind of desire for paltry worldly ends which are so hard to attain!

अङ्गं गालितं पलितं मुण्डं
 दशनविहीनं जातं तुण्डम् ।
 वृद्धो याति गृहीत्वा दण्डं
 तदपि न मुञ्चत्याशापिण्डम् ॥ (15)

The limbs are worn out; the hair has gone white; the mouth has become toothless; old age has set in;

and one moves about leaning on the staff. Een so, alas, this stuff called desire does not leave the mind! Persistent effort is called for to wear out desires, which are hard set in the mind through innumerable births.

अग्रे वह्निः पृष्ठे भानुः
 रात्रौ चुबुकसमर्पितजानुः ।
 करतलभिक्षस्तरुतलवासः
 तदपि न मुञ्चत्याशापाशः ॥ (16)

So strong is the phenomenon called desire that even old age spent in provery and anxiety may not deter its preying on the mind. Here is an old man who lives by a handful of food earned by begging and rests at the foot of a tree. He spends the night with his chin resting on his knees, facing the fire, and awaiting the dawn at his back. With all this, his mind is not free from the fetters of desire.

सुखतः क्रियते रामाभोगः
 पश्चाद्धन्त शरीरे रोगः ।
 यद्यपि लोके मरणं शरणम्
 तदपि न मुञ्चति पापाचरणम् ॥ (28)

A sinful person enjoys illicit connections with women, but alas, only to invite fatal disease as the

result. Though life is bound to meet with death, such sinful habits do not leave such a person.

7. Petty distractions

बालस्तावत् क्रीडासक्तः
 तरुणस्तावत् तरुणीसक्तः ।
 वृद्धस्तावत् चिन्तासक्तः
 परे ब्रह्मणि कोऽपि न सक्तः ॥ (7)

There are enough distractions to spiritual life in the world. In childhood one is lost in play; in youth one's mind is drawn into love of young women; in old age one is sunk in worry. As life is wasted in this manner, no one, we may say is at any stage seriously engaged in contemplating the ultimate Brahman. It requires a firm mind to brush aside even small distractions.

8. The gravity of transmigration

पुनरपि जननं पुनरपि मरणम्
 पुनरपि जननीजठ्रे श्यनम् ।
 इदं संसारे बहुदुस्तारे
 कृपयाऽपारे पाहि मुरारे ॥ (21)

So long as ignorance persists, there is bound to be rebirth. Ignorance leads to action (karma) done with

desire for fruit. The results of such action are bound to be experienced by the agent, whether the action is good or bad. There is freedom in choosing actions, but not in undergoing the results of what has already been done with a result-motivation. Since the present life is not sufficient for experiencing the results of all the actions of the past, and since this life itself involves further action, there is bound to be recurring rebirth until the soul is released through knowledge of reality. This beginningless and seemingly endless alternation of birth and death is called *samsāra*. It can be compared to a boundless ocean, which is wellnigh difficult to cross, except by the grace of God. Constant prayer paves the way of release from attachment to worldly results; and desireless action as taught in the *Bhagavad-gītā* prepares the mind for the saving knowledge.

9. *Vairāgya* and world-illusion

The reason put forward by most Indian schools for the practice of detachment is that the world is impermanent. But Advaita has a stronger reason for it. The world is more than impermanent - it is illusory. To pursue things of the world is as futile as pursuing the mirage in the desert. The Buddhists came close to

this theory. The doctrine of impermanence is central to Buddhism. The Mādhyamika school pushed forward this doctrine to take the stand that because they are momentary, things as we taken them must be illusory. But the illusion theory of Buddhism has a vital difference from that of Advaita. It did not occur to the Buddhist that any illusion must have a real basis. By reducing even the self to an illusion, Mādhyamika Buddhism denied itself the chance of recognizing a real basis for world-illusion. But to Advaita, Brahman is the basis for the entire world-illusion. Hence turning away from the world is not an end in itself; it implies seeking Brahman in its stead. There are places in the Mohamudgara where the exhortation of vairāgya is based explicitly on the reason that the world and its objects are an illusory appearance of Brahman.

वयसि गते कः कामविकारः
 शुष्के नीरे कः कासारः ।
 क्षीणे वित्ते कः परिवारः
 ज्ञाते तत्त्वे कः संसारः ॥ (10)

With old age, the play of sensual desire disappears. There is no pond as such when all the water has evaporated. When a person goes poor, his people

desert him. Likewise, when the ultimate reality, Brahman, which underlies the world-illusion, is realized in experience, the cycle of births and deaths, which has its source *advidyā* comes to an end. An illusion cannot last when its real basis is discovered.

मा कुरु धनजनयौवनगर्वं
हरति निमेषात् कालः सर्वम् ।
मायामयमिदमखिलं हित्वा
ब्रह्मपदं त्वं प्रविश विदित्वा ॥ (11)

It is futile to take pride in the possession of wealth, the support of people, and the gift of youth. All these could be wiped out in a trice by the fell effect of time. What was not manifest earlier and is bound to become unmanifest later, exists in the middle only by semblance. It is of the nature of *māyā*, a mere superimposition on Brahman⁴. Realizing this, one should give up attachment to everything in the world and prepare for entering the state of Brahman, i.e., for experiencing one's non-difference from Brahman, which is identical with release.

कस्त्वं कोऽहं कुत आयातः
 का मे जननी को मे तातः ।
 इति परिभावय सर्वमसारम्
 विश्वं त्यक्त्वा स्वप्नविचारम् ॥ (23)

This world and everything in it is ultimately an illusion like a dream and, thus, without substance. Therefore giving up attachment to the world, one should seriously consider the true nature of one's own self, which has entered into various relationships in the world. A person should inquire into his own identity (aham) and its origin (kuta āyātaḥ), the identity of the person addressed by him (tvam), and even the identity of close relations like mother (jananī) and father (tātaḥ). Such reflection will pave the way for the experience of his true self, which is non-different from Brahman.

10. The value of Satsaṅga

So far we have seen how discriminative knowledge, acquired by reflection on the various aspects of the world and life, helps to develop (vairāgya). Reflection of this kind is not easy. A valuable means to facilitate such reflection and cultivate detachment is to seek the company of virtuous people (sajjanāḥ), who are

already well set in vairāgya and who are ever devoted to spiritual life. This is called satsaṅga.

का ते कान्ता धनगतचिन्ता
 वातुल किं तव नास्ति नियन्ता ।
 त्रिजगति सज्जनसङ्गतिरेका
 भवति भवार्णवतरणे नौका ॥ (13)

One who runs about feverishly after worldly concerns is compared to a hurricane. Having no one to guide him such a one has worries, for example, about wife and possessions. Such a person is told to seek the company of the virtuous. In all the three worlds, the company of the good can be said to be the only boat to cross the ocean of saṁsāra - the cycle of births and deaths. These great ones constantly remind us of the need for vairāgya and bhakti to attain liberation.

सत्सङ्गत्वे निस्सङ्गत्वम्
 निस्सङ्गत्वे निर्मोहत्वम् ।
 निर्मोहत्वे निश्चलितत्वम्
 निश्चलितत्वे जीवन्मुक्ति ॥ (9)

The immense value of satsaṅga is that step by step it ultimately leads to liberation even while the body is alive. From satsaṅga the mind learns to be detached

from worldly objects. This is *vairāgya*, which is described as *nissāṅgatva* here. The more the mind becomes detached from objects, the less it is enticed by them. This is *nirmohatva*. Given this freedom from distracting objects, the mind becomes steady in contemplating Brahman, about which one has learnt from scripture. This state of mind is referred to as *nīścalitatva*. Such steady contemplation culminates in actual experience of Brahman even while the physical frame continues to live (*jīvanmukti*). Those who have attained *jīvanmukti* have, in effect, neither death nor birth, and so they are described in scripture as *amṛtāḥ*, or death-less ones.

11. *Vairāgya* and other disciplines

The cultivation of *vairāgya* is the foundation for the practice of other disciplines for liberation. *Karma-yoga* and *bhakti-yoga* purify the mind and prepare it for *jñāna-yoga*. *Upāsana* secures the ever-flitting mind and fixes it on the chosen goal. *Bhakti-yoga* also has this advantage of mental fixation. *Jñāna-yoga* consists of the study of scripture (*śravaṇa*) under a preceptor, reflection on what has been learnt about Brahman (*manana*), and meditation on Brahman (*nididhyāsana*) with a view to facilitating the

conversion of mediate knowledge into immediate experience. Hence the poem refers to all these disciplines, though its central theme is vairāgya.

भज गोविन्दं भज गोविन्दं
 भज गोविन्दं मूढमते ।
 सम्प्राप्ते सन्निहिते काले
 न हि न हि रक्षति डुकृञ्करणे ॥ (1)

Pray to Govinda, serve him, and meditate on him, oh ignorant one, exhorts this verse. In fact, this exhortation is the refrain of every verse in the poem. The importance of the name "Govinda" is that, though the Lord has several names, in common life we more often utter this name than any other. When the destined time of death is drawing near, mere scholarship as in grammar will not help. Only the name of the Lord will give us peace. This does not mean that scholarship as such is condemned. Scholarship becomes really valuable only when it conduces to the knowledge of Brahman, which alone leads to liberation.

भगवद्गीता किञ्चिदधीता
 गङ्गाजललवकणिका पीता ।
 सकृदपि येन मुरारिसमर्चा
 क्रियते तस्य यमेन न चर्चा ॥ (20)

Even a small measure of devotional practice like studying a portion of the Bhagavad -gītā, drinking a drop of the holy Gaṅgā water, and ardently worshipping Śrī Kṛṣṇa at least once a day, will pave the way for release. A person who lives thus will willingly accept death when it comes, because he knows that it relates only to the body. The importance of the Bhagavad -gītā is that it is the essence of all the teachings of the Upaniṣads and was propounded by the Lord himself on the battlefield where one's life itself is at stake.

गेयं गीतानामसहस्रं
 ध्येयं श्रीपतिरूपमजस्रम् ।
 नेयं सज्जनसङ्गे चित्तं
 देयं दीनजनाय च वित्तम् ॥ (27)

Always study the Bhagavad -gītā taught by the Lord himself. Recite the psalm of the thousand names of Lord Viṣṇu. Ever meditate on the form of Śrī Kṛṣṇa, the Lord of Śrī Lakṣmī. In fact, reciting the names of the Lord itself trains the mind in meditating on him. Keep the mind for ever in the company of the holy ones. Give charity to the poor (as an act of service to the Lord). Thus bhakti takes many forms.

प्राणायामं प्रत्याहारं
 नित्यानित्यविवेकविचारम् ।
 जाप्यसमेतसमाधिविधानं
 कुर्ववधानं महदवधानम् ॥ (30)

Though difficult as compared to devotion, the practice of yoga is an excellent preliminary to the pursuit of jñāna-yoga. The essence of yoga, according to Patañjali, is the control of the ever-turbulent mind. The technique as such is found in most schools of Indian philosophy, but as adapted to their respective metaphysics. We are here concerned with its orientation in terms of Advaita. Patañjali's yoga is allied to Sāṅkhya. According to Sāṅkhya, reality consists in the separate existence of the soul (puruṣa) and matter (prakṛti). And the goal of yoga is for the soul to sever its false connection with matter. But according to Advaita, the reality is the non-dual Brahman from which the soul is not different. The aim of yoga therefore, should be to enable the soul to realize its non-difference from Brahman.

Yoga consists of eight steps; yama, niyama, āsana, prāṇāyāma, pratyāhāra, dhāraṇā, dhyāna and samādhi. The first two steps are the moral pre-requisite to the

practice of the other steps. The third is regulating the body posture as a preparation for mental control. Prāṇāyāma is the regulation of breath, as breath is closely connected with the disposition of the mind. Following this, the senses are withdrawn from distracting external objects (prātyāhāra), and the mind is set on the reality, viz Brahman (dhāraṇā). A steady stream of thought is then directed at this chosen target, and this is called dhyāna. The process continues until the mind gets absorbed and identified with the object (Brahman). This is samādhi.

Verse thirty exhorts the aspirant to begin with reflection on the distinction between the eternal and the evanescent (nityānitya-vastu-vicāra) with a view to earning detachment (vairāgya), Endowed with vairāgya, he is advised to practise (kurvavadhānam) all the eight steps of yoga with great care (mahadavadhānam).

The need for the care called for becomes evident when we remember that the practice of yoga incidentally endows the practitioner with certain miraculous super-human powers (siddhi), such as the power to become very small or very big or very light, the power to obtain anything, and so on⁵. These

powers have their own attractions in the world. But the temptation to cultivate and use these powers—even to bring temporary benefit to people — is born of avidyā. Hence the yogin who falls to such temptation is sure to miss the real goal of yoga, viz, liberation. Rigorous detachment is required even here. The yogin, fixing his aim firmly at liberation, has to brush aside the taste of the siddhis, though they occur in the course of yoga⁶.

Meditation on Brahman as nirguṇa is difficult. Hence the aspirant has to get initiated into it by practising meditation on Brahman as saguṇa. This can be done by mentally repeating a prescribed mantra or nāma relating to Saguṇa Brahman. This is called japa. Meditation aided by japa will lead to mental absorption in Saguṇa Brahman in the first instance (jāpya-sameta-samādhi - vidhānam). If the yogin stops with meditation on Saguṇa Brahman, he will attain brahma-loka at death. Though the attainment of brahma-loka is not final release according to Advaita, one who attains to it acquires the experience of the non-dual Brahman with greater facility than on earth. But if the yogin follows up meditation on Saguṇa Brahman with meditation on Nirguṇa Brahman, the

result will be *jīvanmukti* - liberation here and now irrespective of body.

12. The importance of *jñāna*

According to Advaita, *jñāna* is the final and direct means to release. Bondage is the result of ignorance. Therefore, knowledge, which removes ignorance, alone can be the direct means to release. All other disciplines are necessary and useful only as means to *jñāna* by purifying and steadying the mind. One who has realized Brahman may continue to perform good actions and offer devotion. But this has no motive and is purely the result of past tendency (*vāsanā*).

Jñāna is either mediate or immediate. Since our perception of duality, which is born of ignorance, is immediate, it is only immediate knowledge of Brahman, i.e., experience, that can bring release. Mediate knowledge, which results from the study of scripture and reflection on its teaching, only precedes immediate knowledge. It is transformed into experience when all mental obstacles to it are removed by meditation on Brahman.

The importance bestowed on *Jñāna* in this poem is brought out when the Ācārya refers to one who has

not attained Jñāna as a mūḍha. The first and second verses address the reader thus. The term literally means "one who lacks intelligence". But this conventional sense cannot apply here, for no one could be expected to listen to Vedānta if addressed in this disparaging sense. Hence the term is to be taken in the special sense of a person who lacks the experience of Brahman.⁷ Verse twenty-six makes this clear by the statement: ātma-Jñāna-vihīnā mūḍhāḥ. The same idea occurs in verse fourteen where a mūḍha is stated to be one who fails to realize Brahman in spite of the opportunities met with in life: paśyannapi ca na paśyati mūḍhāḥ. Nothing is more certain and closer to the ultimate reality than our own selves. One may doubt the existence of anything external, but no one can doubt one's own existence. And yet, failing to wake up to our real nature as Ātman, we drift in the current of ignorance, doubt, and folly. This import of the term mūḍha is confirmed when we find that verse eight addresses the reader as bhrānta, because he is still subject to the delusion (bhrānti) of the world of duality.

का ते कान्ता कस्ते पुत्रः
 संसारोऽयमतीव विचित्रः ।
 कस्य त्वं कः कुत आयातः
 तत्त्वं चिन्तय तदिदं भ्रान्तः ॥ (8)

This cycle of transmigration is extremely puzzling. One is born as somebody and enters into various relationships such as to wife and son. The insubstantiality of one's personal identity and of the resulting relationships will become evident when one experiences that one's real Self is non - different from Brahman. Īsvara bereft of māyā and the jīva devoid of avidyā are the same as pure consciousness. Even the mediate knowledge of this truth as learnt from the Upaniṣadic statement tat tvam asi helps to break down the force of attachment to one's body and blood relations. Hence we are asked to reflect on this truth (tattvam cintaya tadidam bhrāntaḥ).

जटिलो मुण्डी लुञ्छितकेशः
 काषायाम्बरबहुकृतवेषः ।
 पश्यन्नपि न च पश्यति मूढो
 ह्युदरनिमित्तं बहुकृतवेषः ॥ (14)

The aspirant for Brahman-knowledge adopts sannyāsa to facilitate its onset. sannyāsa involves total

control of body and mind. Even the regulations that govern the physical life of the sannyāsin are intended to turn the mind inward. If these regulations come to be observed for their own sake instead of being put to the service of jñāna, they become futile. Matting the hair, shaving the head clean, forcibly pulling off the hair one by one, wearing saffron robes of all kinds - all these could be described as mere means to livelihood so long as they do not help the ascetic to realize the ultimate reality, which is his true essence. Thus, feeling the reality in himself, though as the jīva, and yet not experiencing it as Ātman, he remains essentially a mūḍha.

कुरुते गङ्गासागरगमनं
 व्रतपरिपालनमथवा दानम् ।
 ज्ञानविहीनः सर्वमतेन
 मुक्तिं न भजति जन्मशतेन ॥ (17)

Undertaking a difficult pilgrimage to a holy place like the confluence of the Gaṅgā and the sea, strictly observing fast on prescribed days, and rendering alms with due faith - these varieties of religious rite do have their value as means to self-purification. But unless jñāna sets in one cannot get released on any account even after a hundred births. Karma cannot

be a direct means to mokṣa; only jñāna can.

त्वयि मयि चान्यत्रैको विष्णुः
 व्यर्थं कुप्यसि मय्यसहिष्णुः ।
 सर्वस्मिन्नपि पश्यात्मानं
 सर्वत्रोत्सृज भेदाज्ञानम् ॥ (24)

In me, in you, in any other person or place, is the same Brahman. This being so, in truth, there is no room for impatience and anger towards any one. To get angry with another amounts to getting angry with oneself. A loving attitude to all comes into practice only when Brahman is actually realized. Perceiving the same Brahman in all, the sage is free from all sense of difference, which is the root cause of dispute and distress, sorrow and infatuation. But even before actual realization, believing in the doctrine of non-difference, one should endeavour to rise above the notion of difference, which is born of avidyā, and recognize the same Ātman in all.

कामं क्रोधं लोभं मोहं
 त्यक्त्वात्मानं भावय कोऽहम् ।
 आत्मज्ञानविहीना मूढाः
 ते पच्यन्ते नरकनिगूढाः ॥ (26)

Mental purity is necessary to seek knowledge of Brahman. Therefore giving up desire, anger, greed, infatuation and such other infirmities, one should constantly inquire into the true nature of one's Self. This will ultimately lead to the realization that one's self (Ātman), which is bereft of limitations, is non-different from the infinite Brahman. So long as we remain ignorant of the Self (ātma-jñāna - vihināḥ), we cannot attain liberation; we shall continue to suffer the torment of transmigration, which is worse than hell. Body-consciousness cause worse suffering than the nether regions described in scripture.

13. The nature of jīvanmukti

योगरतो वा भोगरतो वा
 सङ्गरतो वा सङ्गविहीनः ।
 यस्य ब्रह्मणि रमते चित्तम्
 नन्दति नन्दति नन्दत्येव ॥ (19)

The jīvanmukti passes between samādhi and vyutthāna. Samādhi is the culmination of yoga. In samādhi the mukta's consciousness is completely absorbed in Brahman; in vyutthāna it comes down to a lower plane where the mukta experiences the duality of the world, but is not deceived by it. But

this difference in states is relevant only to the onlookers. As for the *jīvanmukta* himself, it makes no difference, since his consciousness permanently delights in the experience of Brahman, which is bliss. Hence it is said here that whether the *mukta* passes through *samādhi* (*yogarataḥ saṅgavihīnaḥ*) or through *vyutthāna* (*bhogarataḥ / saṅgarataḥ*), his mind is engrossed in nothing but bliss (*nandatyeva*).

रथ्याचर्पटविरचितकन्थः
 पुण्यापुण्यविवर्जितपन्थः ।
 योगी योगनियोजितचित्तो
 रमते बालोन्मत्तवदेव ॥ (22)

The *yogī* may wear apparel made out of torn cloth picked up from the street; but acquiring neither merit (*puṇya*) nor demerit (*pāpa*) by his selfless conduct, he, with his mind rooted in yoga, is firmly established on the path to *mokṣa* and delights verily in Brahman like a child and a mad man.

The *jīvanmukta* is impervious to the body from which he is virtually separate; hence he is indifferent to bodily needs like clothes and food. He is not necessarily inactive. Actions at times do flow from him. But having experienced Brahman, bad actions

are impossible for him. Hence he does not earn demerit (pāpa). His actions are always good. But merit (punya) does not accrue to him either, because his good actions are not deliberate. They spontaneously emanate from his experience. The truth of the matter is that, being absolutely free from all sense of agency and enjoyership, he is untouched by the results of action. Having once for all realized Brahman, which is bliss, with his mind ever dwelling on Brahman, this perfect yogī delights in the self-forgetful manner of a child and a mad man.

14. The grace of the preceptor

गुरुचरणाम्बुजनिर्भरभक्तः
 संसारादचिराद्भवमुक्तः ।
 सेन्द्रियमानसनियमादेवम्
 द्रक्ष्यसि निजहृदयस्थं देवम् ॥ (31)

Both for initiation into spiritual practice and for its success the grace of one's preceptor is absolutely necessary. In a poem devoted to the guru (Guruvaṣṭakam) the Ācārya asks at every stage, "what avails thee if the mind does not rest in the lotus feet of the guru?"

मनश्चेन्न लग्नं गुरोरङ्घ्रिपद्मे

ततः किं ततः किं ततः किं ततः किम् ।

In the same spirit the present verse assures us that with unflinching devotion to the feet of the guru, we shall attain freedom from transmigration. Disciplining the senses and the mind by the diligent practice of all the steps taught so far, the aspirant will experience Brahman in his own heart, i.e. as his true nature. Learning Vedānta well from the guru, observing sannyāsa, and practising yoga without desiring the powers (siddhi) that incidentally accrue from it – all these are means to Brahman – experience. When the mind and its tendencies dissolve themselves in the experience of the infinite Brahman, though the body is alive, there is jīvanmukti.

This poem named Mohamudgara is otherwise called Bhajagovindam. Govinda is the name of Śrī Śaṅkara's preceptor even as it is the name of Lord Mahāviṣṇu. Hence the composition of this poem by Śrī Śaṅkara, we learn, is as much a dedication to his guru as it is to the Lord.

Notes

1. Vide Bhagavad-gītā, 2.64
rāgadveṣa - viyuktaistu
viṣayān - indriyaiś caran
ātmavaśyair - vidheyātmā
prasādam - adhigacchati.
2. Vide Brhadāranyaka Upaniṣad, 2.4.5. and
4.5.6. ātmanastu kāmāya sarvam priyam bhavati.
Also 4.3.32; etasyaiva ānandasya anyāni bhūtāni
mātrām upajīvanti.
3. Vide Bhagavad-gītā, 2.62 and 63.
4. Vide Śrī Śaṅkara's Commentary on the
Bhagavad-gītā :2.28. ko vā pralāpaḥ adrṣṭa-drṣṭa-
praṇaṣṭa - bhrāntibhūteṣu ityarthah.
5. The powers are summed up thus:
aṇimā laghimā prāptih
prākāmyam mahimā tathā
īśitvam ca vaśitvam ca
tathā kāmavasāyitā.
6. Vide. Yogasūtra of Patañjali, 3.51 : tad
vairagyādapi doṣa-bīja- kṣaye kaivalyam.
7. I owe this explanation to Pazhuvur
Sri S.V. Subrahmania Sastri.

Conceptual Divide between Advaita and Viśiṣṭādvaita

N. Veezhinathan

1. Introduction

In all the schools of Vedānta, there is a trinity, Īśvara, jīva, and world, each having its own rights. There, of course, lies a difficulty in explaining how these three act and react upon each other. The Advaitin has sought to overcome this difficulty by interpreting all the three as apparent diversifications of a single Being which is termed Brahman and which is non - dual, pure consciousness, and bliss. The apparent diversification of Brahman into Īśvara, jīva, and world is explained as the effect of avidyā, or māyā, which is indescribable either as real (sat) or as an absolute nothing (asat). On the strength of being related to Brahman, māyā undergoes transformation into the form of the world consisting of mind, sense - organs, and

*Courtesy : Theistic Vedānta, Vol. II. Part III. Centre for Studies in Civilizations. New Delhi. 2003.

objects such as earth. The world, like *māyā*, its cause, is indeterminable either as *sat* or *asat* and is not ultimately real.

Brahman gets itself reflected in *māyā* and the mind, and the reflected image (*pratibimba*) is the *jīva*. Though Brahman is pure Being, yet in relation to the reflecting media, (*māyā* and the mind) and also in relation to the reflected image (the *jīva*), it acquires an adventitious characteristic, viz. the state of being the original or the prototype (*bimbatva*). And as associated with this characteristic, it is known as *Īśvara*. *Īśvara* and *jīva* are thus complex entities. *Īśvara* is Brahman as associated with the characteristic of being the original (*bimbatva*), and the *jīva* is Brahman as associated with the characteristic of being a reflected image (*pratibimbatva*). The essential nature of both *Īśvara* and the *jīva* is the pure Being, i.e., Brahman. The characteristics of being the original and the reflected image are indeterminable and are not real as they are caused by *māyā*.

Īśvara, being the original, is not influenced by the characteristics of the reflecting media while the *jīva*, being the reflected image, is affected by them. *Īśvara*, therefore is eternally aware of his identity with the

pure Being, and he is ever - released. It is the jīva who, under the influence of the reflecting media, loses the sense of its identity with its essential nature which is the pure Being, falsely identifies itself with the mind, the sense -organs, and the physical body, performs the prescribed deeds and commits interdicted actions and thereby experiences their fruits by undergoing incessant births. In order to get rid of the experience of cyclic existence, the jīva should realize that its true nature is the pure Being, i.e., Brahman. Such a realization would result from the śruti texts like “tat tvam asi”. Māyā will be removed thereby, and the jīva would become free from its adventitious feature, viz. the state of being a reflected image and would cease to be a jīva. When māyā is removed, Īśvara, too would become free from the characteristic of being the original and would cease to be Īśvara. What would remain then is the pure Being, i.e. Brahman - and this is the state of liberation.

Viśiṣṭādvaita holds that Īśvara, the jīvas, and the world are distinct realities. Īśvara identified as Nārāyaṇa is Brahman. He possesses innumerable auspicious qualities. The jīvas and the world constitute the body (śarīra) of Īśvara; and Īśvara is the Self (śarīrī)

of both the jīvas and the world. The interrelation among the three, viz. Īśvara, the jīvas and the world is explained through the self - body (śarīrī - śarīra - bhāva) relation between Īśvara on the one hand, and the jīvas and the world on the other. From the causal point of view, the body is defined as an instrument of Īśvara. The jīvas and the world are said to constitute the body of Īśvara in the sense that they are controlled and supported by Īśvara and that they exist in a subordinate relation to him solely to fulfil his purpose.¹ From the conceptual point of view, Viśiṣṭādvaita holds that the Self and the body are inseparable (aprthaksiddha). The jīvas and the world are inseparable attributes (aprthaksiddha - viśeṣaṇa) of Īśvara and thus together stand as an adjectival feature of him who is, therefore the substantive one (prakārin).² By loving devotion (bhakti) to Īśvara, the jīva would reach the world of Īśvara wherein there would be the manifestation of its essential nature and the experience of Īśvara and his sublime qualities. And this is liberation. Because of the doctrine of inseparability (aprthaksiddhi), this system holds that even in liberation a liberated soul has a non-prākṛtic body retaining its individuality.

From the above it could be discerned that there is a great anithesis between Advaita and Viśiṣṭādvaita. While Advaita maintains that there is the One only and not many, the Viśiṣṭādvaita holds that there is the One in the many, or the many in the One. The term 'Advaita' etymologically means 'wherein there is the absence of duality'. It is the pure Being. And it secondarily signifies the school that advocates the nature of the ultimate Reality to be so. According to the view that all things, the sentient *jīvas*, and the insentient world, are subsumed under *Īśvara*, the non-duality of the latter is maintained. The term 'Viśiṣṭādvaita' primarily signifies *Īśvara*, the ultimate Reality as a complex whole (*viśiṣṭa*) and as non - dual (*advaita*); and it figuratively conveys the school that holds the nature of the ultimate Reality to be so. Both the schools claim that their respective view-points are based on the authority of *śruti* texts. The difference in their viewpoints is dependent on the difference in the mode of the interpretation of the texts. In this paper I shall discuss the interpretations of some of the *śruti* texts by both the schools and set forth their relative merits. The *śruti* texts that are taken up for consideration here relate to the nature of the ultimate Reality, the *jīva*, the world, and liberation and its means.

2. Brahman, The Ultimate Reality

There are two sets of śruti texts, one revealing Brahman as associated with attributes (saviśeṣa) and the other as free from all attributes (nirviśeṣa). The following texts fall under the first group:

The Self, i.e., Brahman, is the creator of the world. It cherishes all (righteous) desires, contains all (pleasant) odours, and is endowed with all (agreeable) tastes³. From him, who possesses knowledge of everything both in its general and specific aspects, and whose volition to create the world is of the form of knowledge, evolve Hiraṇyagarbha, name, material shape, and food.⁴

The Self, is free from sin, old age, death, sorrow, hunger, and thirst. It is the one which possesses desire and resolve that never go unfulfilled.⁵

There are two forms of Brahman - corporeal (i.e. earth, water, and fire) and incorporeal (i.e. air and space)⁶

These and similar texts speak of Brahman as associated with attributes and also with the world

(saprapañca). The texts that present Brahman as nirviśeṣa are :

The Self is not composed of parts; it is free from any activity; it is immutable. It is blemishless and unattached.⁷

It is neither gross nor subtle, neither short nor long. It is neither air nor space; it is unattached; it is without taste or smell, without eyes or ears, without tongue and mind, etc.⁸

The Self cannot be perceived and grasped, which is without source, features, eyes, and ears, which has neither hands nor feet, which is eternal, the substratum of every being, all-pervasive, extremely subtle, and changeless.⁹

Devoid of sound, of touch, of form, undecaying, devoid of taste, eternal, devoid of odour, beginningless, endless, other than the mahān, and ever constant.¹⁰

Then there is the description of Brahman, “Not this, not this”, etc.¹¹

Brahman is real, consciousness, and infinite.¹²

Brahman is consciousness and bliss.¹³

These and similar texts state that Brahman is free from all attributes and from phenomenal elements, and is of the nature of consciousness and bliss.

It would be evident from the above that the śruti texts present opposite views in regard to the nature of Brahman. Śāṅkara is of the view that the contradictory features, viz. saviśeṣatva and nirviśeṣatva cannot both be truly applied to the same thing, viz. Brahman. If one of the two opposites is true, the other must be false. The question, therefore, arises that, if one of them is to be regarded as true, even then it has to be decided which one is true, saviśeṣatva or nirviśeṣatva. It may be said that both the aspects are to be taken as true as they are referred to by śruti texts. This view is wrong. Brahman, the transcendental Being per se, cannot have both the aspects which are mutually exclusive. It may be argued that the aspect of saviśeṣatva is due to the association of Brahman with the limiting adjuncts like earth, etc. and so it is also to be regarded as true. Śāṅkara points out that an entity of a specific nature would never acquire a different characteristic even by its association with limiting adjuncts. Never, indeed, does a crystal pure by nature

become really tainted by its association with the limiting adjuncts like red lac, etc. The cognition that it is tainted is erroneous. The limiting adjuncts like earth, etc. are projected by māyā. Hence, even if we are to take up either of the two opposites to be true, then that one which is attributeless and distinctionless is to be taken as true, and not the other. For, in all the texts which are intent upon conveying the essential nature of Brahman, as for instance in, “Free from sound, touch, colour, change”¹⁴ Brahman is said to be free from all attributes.¹⁵

An objection that would suggest itself at this stage is that the texts that speak of Brahman as *saviśeṣa* will then be rendered futile. Śaṅkara answers this objection by saying that just as the light of the sun or the moon, which pervades the whole space, appears to be straight or curved owing to its association with limiting adjuncts like finger etc., which are curved or straight as the case may be, in the same way Brahman too, owing to its association with the limiting adjuncts like earth, etc. assumes as it were their features. And the teaching regarding Brahman as endowed with attributes is based upon its relation to limiting adjuncts; and it is for the purpose of meditation. Hence, the texts that speak of

Brahman as saviśeṣa do not become insignificant. The point that is to be noted here is that Brahman cannot be viewed as both nirviśeṣa and saviśeṣa, placing the two aspects on an equal footing. The nirviśeṣa aspect is natural to it, and the saviśeṣa aspect is imposed upon it by the limiting adjuncts, viz. māyā and its effects such as earth etc. And no feature that is adventitiously presented upon an entity could become the essential nature of that entity. Here the attributes are ascribed to Brahman through the limiting adjuncts which are projected by māyā, and so they are not real. They are intended for the purpose of meditation.¹⁶ Śaṅkara further points¹⁷ out that the Bṛhadāraṇyaka text¹⁸ states that Brahman is of the nature of consciousness, is devoid of any characteristic, and is without any difference. Just as a lump of salt has one and the same saline taste both inside and outside and not any other taste, in the same way Brahman does not have any characteristic apart from consciousness. Simple undifferentiated consciousness constitutes its essential nature.¹⁹

We shall now explain the nature of some of the attributes that are adventitiously superimposed on Brahman by māyā. The Taittirīya Upaniṣad states: “The

Self desired, 'let me become many, let me be born,' he deliberated and having deliberated created all this that exists."²⁰ The Chāndogya Upaniṣad declares: "That being deliberated, 'I shall become many, I shall be born,' It created fire."²¹ The Aitareya Upaniṣad says: "The Self deliberated, 'let me create the worlds,' and it created all the worlds."²² The Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad refers to Brahman as having knowledge of everything, both in its general and specific aspects.²³ Thus we see that Brahman is spoken of as having knowledge of everything, as making a decision after deliberation, and as putting that decision into effect. All these features, according to Advaita, are the modification of māyā (māyā-vṛtti) inspired by the reflection of consciousness in it.²⁴

We started our discussion by saying that there is opposition between the two sets of śruti texts, one stating Brahman to be saviśeṣa and another as nirviśeṣa. But in the course of our discussion we have found that there is no conflict between the two. The texts that speak of Brahman as saviśeṣa refer to the attributes that are projected by māyā and which are, therefore, illusory. And the texts that refer to Brahman as nirviśeṣa speak of the essential nature of Brahman.

Śāᅅkara reconciles them thus: the śruti texts speak of Brahman as associated with attributes for the purpose of meditative worship; and they refer to Brahman as free from attributes for being realized as identical with one's true nature.²⁵

So far, the Advaitin's view. The Viśiᅅtādvaitin maintains that Brahman is Īśvara identified as Lord Nārāyaᅅa. He possesses auspicious attributes which are innumerable. By nature Īśvara is real (satya), knowledge (jñāna), infinite (ananta), bliss (ānanda), and pure (amala). And he possesses these as his characteristics too. Rāmānuja is of the view that, when it is known from the Taittirīya text²⁶ that Īśvara is the cause of the origination, etc. of the world, we identify Īśvara as distinct from all other objects. But there will always linger a doubt that Īśvara may belong to the class of insentient matter or the sentient jīvas. The texts like 'Brahman is real, consciousness, and infinite,²⁷ "Brahman is consciousness and bliss,²⁸ and 'It is neither gross nor minute, neither short nor long, etc.²⁹ do function in order to dispel such a doubt. These texts convey Īśvara as satya, jñāna, ananta, ānanda, and amala (i.e. free from qualities such as grossness, etc. that belong to the mundane world). These factors

distinguish Īśvara from insentient matter and the three classes of jīvas, viz. bound, released, and ever-released.³⁰ Īśvara by nature is satya, jñāna, ananta, ānanda, and amala, and he possesses these as his attributes too. The śruti texts prescribe several forms of meditative exercises upon Īśvara. Each one involves reference to Īśvara as akṣara,³¹ daharākāśa,³² the controller of the universe,³³ as one possessing desire and resolve that never go unfulfilled,³⁴ as the cause of the origination, etc. of the world.³⁵ Rāmānuja is of the view that one must have a clear idea of Īśvara as distinct from insentient matter and the classes of sentient souls before proceeding to pursue meditation upon Īśvara as akṣara, etc. in accordance with the meditative exercises prescribed in the śruti texts. One could have the conception of Īśvara of such nature only from the five features of satyatva, jñānatva, anantatva, ānandatva, and amatatva. Rāmānuja characterizes these features as svarūpa-nirūpaka - dharmas as these give us a clear understanding of the essential nature of Īśvara. These five features should form the content of each and every meditation upon Īśvara besides the specific features referred to in the individual meditative exercises. These features Rāmānuja

characterizes as *nirūpita-svarūpagata-dharmas*.³⁶ Īśvara is thus endowed with all attributes. It is in this sense that the texts which speak of Īśvara as omniscient³⁷ and as one whose desire and resolve never go unfulfilled³⁸ must be understood.

The text of the Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad³⁹ speaks of Brahman as free from all attributes (*nirguṇa*). The Bṛhadāraṇyaka text⁴⁰ refers to Brahman as not gross (*asthūla*), as not minute (*anaṇu*), as not short (*ahrasva*), etc. Sundarśana Sūri in his commentary on the Śrībhāṣya points out that the former text negates in Īśvara attributes in general, while the latter one, specific attributes.⁴¹ He adds that the word 'guṇa' is well-known in philosophical treatises as representing *sattva*, *rajas*, and *tamas*, the constituents of *prakṛti*. Hence, when it is said that Īśvara is *nirguṇa*, it does not mean that he is free from any attribute as the Advaitin thinks. It only means that Īśvara is free from all attributes that are related to *prakṛti*. In the same way, the Bṛhadāraṇyaka text cited above must be understood as signifying that Īśvara is free from grossness, etc. that have a bearing upon *prakṛti*.⁴²

Rāmānuja points out⁴³ that the scope of the texts that deny attributes in Īśvara (Brahman) and also of

those that speak of Īśvara as endowed with attributes, is unalterably fixed in the following text of the Chāndogya Upaniṣad: “Brahman is free from sin, decay, death, grief, and thirst. It has desire and resolve that will never go unfulfilled.”⁴⁴ This text negates the factors beginning with sin and ending with thirst that belong to the realm of prakṛti and speaks of auspicious qualities such as desire and resolve that will never go unfulfilled. From this it is to be gathered that the text of the Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad, ‘Brahman is free from any attribute,’⁴⁵ which denies the existence of attributes in general and the Bṛhadāraṇyaka text, ‘Not gross, not minute, not short’ etc.⁴⁶ which denies the existence of specific qualities must be understood as conveying Brahman as free from attributes that pertain to the world of prakṛti. Rāmānuja concludes that this text itself defines the scope of the texts that refer to Brahman as saviśeṣa and as nirviśeṣa. There is no conflict between the two, and so there is no need to treat the texts that convey Brahman as saviśeṣa as referring to the attributes illusorily projected by māyā as the Advaitin thinks.⁴⁷ Rāmānuja considers that the scope of the text, ‘Brahman is free from any attribute (nirguṇa)’⁴⁸ is restricted. It does not seek to deny the

attributes such as omniscience, true desires, and resolve, and the like that are mentioned by śruti texts in the case of Brahman. On the other hand, it denies only those attributes which are different from them and which are projected by prakṛti.

Advaitānanda in his commentary, *Brahma-vidyābharāṇa* on Śaṅkara's *Vedānta-sūtra-bhāṣya* rejects the view set forth above. He argues that in the case of Brahman, which is extra-empirical, the qualities that are projected by prakṛti cannot be discerned by perception in which case alone they may be denied. Nor are they mentioned in the śruti texts. Hence the qualities that pertain to the realm of prakṛti are improbable in Brahman. Hence it cannot be said that the text, Brahman is free from any attribute,⁴⁹ denies the qualities that are projected by prakṛti. The text, Brahman is not gross nor minute,... etc.⁵⁰ is also admitted to be negating grossness, etc. that pertain to the mundane world. Advāitananda argues that grossness which belongs to the realm of prakṛti and which is said to be denied of Brahman cannot be taken as the essential nature of Brahman. For, there is no śruti text that speaks of grossness as its essential nature. But grossness as an adventitious feature is possible

(*prasakta*) in Brahman because of its false association with the world of objects it has created. So, what is denied is grossness that is adventitiously superimposed on Brahman. This is a welcome position for the Advaitin; for the very denial of grossness which appears in Brahman accounts for its non-reality or *mithyātva*.

It cannot be said that grossness caused by past merits and demerits is denied of Brahman by the text, 'Brahman is not gross,' etc. For, the Chāndogya text, 'Brahman is free from sin,' etc.⁵¹ negates the existence of sin in Brahman. The word 'sin' signifies both merits and demerits. It follows that there is no possibility of the presence of grossness caused by merits and demerits in Brahman in which case it may be said that the text 'Not gross', etc. negates it. Hence, the text 'Not gross', etc. will be rendered futile. Further, the śruti text, 'Brahman is supra-relational; it never gets itself attached to anything,'⁵² refers to Brahman as free from relation to any attribute without exception. Hence, Rāmānuja's view that Brahman possesses attributes of omniscience, etc. and that the śruti text "Brahman is free from any attribute" denies only those qualities that are projected by *prakṛti* does not seem to be correct.⁵³

Vāsudeva Śāstrī in his *Advaitāmoda* states that omniscience (*sarvajñtva*), true desire (*satya-kamatva*), and resolve (*satya-saṅkalpatva*) cannot be viewed as the intrinsic qualities of Brahman as the Viśiṣṭadvaitin thinks. For, the *Bṛhādāraṇyaka* text, ‘Desire, resolve, doubt, faith, lack of faith, firmness, lack of firmness, modesty, cognition, fear—all these are but the mind,’⁵⁴ identifies knowledge, desire, and resolve as the qualities or attributes of the mind. Hence, these cannot be considered as the attributes of Brahman.⁵⁵ These, however, are viewed by the Advaitin as the extrinsic attributes of Īśvara, the complex of Brahman and māyā. They are extrinsic in the sense that they are the modifications of māyā (*māyā-vṛtti*). Māyā is the limiting adjunct of Īśvara. And its modes are falsely presented in the consciousness-element of Īśvara. In the case of the jīva, knowledge, desire, and resolve are the modifications of the mind, which is the limiting adjunct. And its modes are falsely presented in the consciousness-element in it.

According to Advaita, the ultimate Reality termed Brahman transcends Īśvara, the jīva, and the world. It is *nirviśesa*. Īśvara, an apparent variation of Brahman, is *saviśesa*. He can only be meditated upon while

Brahman can only be intuitively realized as one's true nature. According to Viśiṣṭādvaita, Brahman is Īśvara, and it possesses all auspicious attributes.

3. JĪVA

The jīva according to Advaita is a blend of Brahman which is pure consciousness and mind. It is cid-ācid-granṭhi and is the content of the cognition 'I' (aham). It is the aham-padārtha. The texts of the Aitareya⁵⁶, Bṛhadāraṇyaka-⁵⁷, Chāndogya-⁵⁸, and Taittirīya-⁵⁹ Upaniṣads speak of the entrance (praveśa) of Brahman to the objects of the world created by it to explain the nature of the jīva. The word 'praveśa' does not mean actual reflection (pratibimba) like the reflection of the sun in water. In his commentary on the Vedānta-sūtra,⁶⁰ Śaṅkara records the prima facie view in regard to the reflection of Brahman in the mind on the analogy of the reflection of the sun in water. Water has a material shape, and it is seen to be different and at the same time far off in space from the sun, which also has a material shape. Hence, the occurrence of the reflection of the sun in water is natural. Brahman, however, does not have a material shape. It is all-pervasive and is non-different from every object. Hence, the limiting adjunct, viz. the mind, cannot be viewed as remotely

placed or different from it. On this ground the contention that the *jīva* is the reflection of Brahman in the mind on the analogy of the reflection of the sun in water is not appropriate.

Having set forth the *prima facie* view, Śaṅkara explains⁶¹ the position of the Advaitin. He points out that the illustrative example of the reflection of the sun in water is quite apt inasmuch as it contributes to the understanding of what is to be comprehended. Between an example and the thing exemplified, no one can show likeness in every respect apart from some point of similarity. If likeness in every respect is intended, then the very relation between an example and the thing explained would be lost. Further, the reference to the illustrative example is not based upon the exercise of one's imagination. It is given in the śruti text,⁶² and its purpose is to be explicated. The point of similarity that is intended to be emphasized here is: "The state of sharing the characteristics of expansion and contraction." The reflection of the sun in water spreads out in every direction when there is the expansion of water; and it becomes less in extent when water shrinks. Further, the reflection appears to move to and fro when the surface of the water

quivers. It also appears to be many in water contained in different receptacles. Thus, it partakes of the characteristics of water while in reality it does not have any of these. In the same way, Brahman which, in reality, is immutable and uniform by nature acquires, owing to its immanence in the limiting adjunct, viz. the mind, the characteristics of the latter. It is to emphasize this fact the reflection of the sun in water is mentioned as an illustrative example.

In his commentary on the Taittirīya text,⁶³ Śaṅkara states: 'Entrance or praveśa of Brahman is only its specific manifestation in the mind as the one who sees, hears, thinks, and resolves.' Again while commenting on the Bṛhadāraṇyaka text⁶⁴ Śaṅkara observes: 'Like the reflection of the sun in water, the entrance of the Self means only its being perceived like a reflection in the differentiated universe. Before the manifestation of the latter, the Self is not perceived; but after it is manifested, it is perceived within the mind, like the reflection of the sun in the water. Bādarāyaṇa in his aphorism, 'abhāsa eva ca,'⁶⁵ lays stress upon the view that the jīva is a reflection only. Śaṅkara in his commentary remarks:

The *jīva* is to be considered a mere appearance of Brahman like the reflection of sun in water; it is neither identical with nor different from it. When one reflected image of the sun quivers, another reflected image in another receptacle does not on that account quiver; in the same way, when one *jīva* is related to the performance of actions and to the experience of the results of those actions, another *jīva* is not, on that account, connected likewise.⁶⁶

From the above it follows that the *jīva* is Brahman immanent in the mind. Its essential nature is pure consciousness. Owing to *māyā*, it is identified with the mind and acquires the characteristics of the mind such as agency (*kartr̥tva*), enjoyership (*boktr̥tva*), and knowership (*pramātr̥tva*). These characteristics constitute what is known as *saṁsāra*. They are not natural to the *jīva*, but are borrowed from the mind. In his commentary on the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, Śaṅkara observes:

The intellect, being transparent and next to the Self, i.e. Brahman, easily receives the reflection of the consciousness, i.e. the Self. Hence, even wise men identify themselves with it first. Next

comes the mind which receives the reflection of the Self through the intellect; then the organs, through the contact with the mind; and, lastly the body, through the organs. Thus, the Self successively illumines the entire aggregate of the body and the senses. It is, therefore, that all people identify with the body and also with their attributes.⁶⁷

In ordinary experience it is noticed that the *jīva* is the knower, an agent, and an experient. This is restated in the *Praśna Upaniṣad*: ‘The *jīva* is the one who sees, touches, hears, smells, tastes, thinks, knows, and is the agent; and, it is consciousness by nature.’⁶⁸ It may be objected that, if Brahman were to attain the state of the *jīva*, then since the latter is noticed to be a knower, an agent, and an experient, Brahman too must be admitted to be so. This objection does not hold good. The *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* says: ‘Brahman is pure consciousness immanent in the heart; it is identified with the intellect, and is in the midst of the sense-organs; and being identified with the intellect, it thinks as it were and moves as it were.’⁶⁹ Here the *Upaniṣad* uses the expression “as it were” in regard to the functions of the *jīva* and suggests thereby that

they are not real; for, they are only due to the false identification of Brahman with the intellect or the mind. In the same way, the Kāṭha Upaniṣad declares: ‘Wise men affirm that Brahman associated with the physical body, the sense-organs, and the mind is the experient.’⁷⁰ Thus, according to Advaita, the jīva which is the content of the cognition “I” (ahamartha) is only a blend of pure consciousness and the mind. Owing to the false association of consciousness with the mind caused by māyā, the characteristics of the mind such as agency, etc. are imposed upon the consciousness-element in the blend. Consequently, the jīva considers himself an agent, an experient, and a knower. Agency, etc. do not constitute the essential nature of the consciousness-element in the jīva, but are falsely imposed upon it. They are not real (mithyā).

The jīva, being the same as Brahman, is essentially all-pervasive. Śāṅkara states:

The essential nature of the jīva is consciousness just as heat and light constitute the essential nature of fire. A separation of the two as quality and that which is qualified does not exist here. If consciousness pervades the entire body, then the jīva whose nature is consciousness cannot be

atomic in size. It cannot be of the same size as the body as it would be non-eternal. The only alternative left is that it is all-pervasive.⁷¹

There are some śruti texts which imply that the jīva is atomic in size. They are: ‘The jīva departs to the other world from the body through the brightened top of the heart;’⁷² ‘The jīva having experienced the fruits of its karma in the other world returns from that world to this world for doing fresh work.’⁷³ These two texts state that the jīva passes out of the body, reaches the other world, and comes back from there. The characteristics of passing out of the body, going to the other world, and coming back from there would not be compatible in the case of the jīva, if it were all-pervasive. And these would be intelligible only if the jīva is atomic in size. The following text directly conveys that the jīva is atomic in size: ‘The soul which is atomic in size is to be known through the mind’.⁷⁴ Śaṅkara in his commentary on the Vedānta-sūtra points out:

Apart from the qualities of the mind, there is nothing that could account for transmigration in the case of Brahman. And transmigration is altogether due to the attributes of the mind and

the other limiting adjuncts, being wrongly transferred to Brahman; the truth is, Brahman is free from transmigration, is eternally free, and is neither an agent nor an experient; however, it is declared to be of the same size as the mind due to its fictitious association with the mind. And it is said that it departs from the body and so on. These features, however, pertain to the mind, but are ascribed to the consciousness-element in the *jīva*.⁷⁵

The *jīva*, therefore, is not atomic in size. It is all-pervasive. The Muṇḍaka text which states that the *jīva* is atomic in size and is to be realized by the mind must be understood in the sense that it is extremely subtle in nature and not atomic in size.⁷⁶ The Śvetāśvatara text⁷⁷ says that the *jīva* is to be known as a part of the hundredth part of the tip of a hair divided a hundred times. Having said so, it affirms that it is infinite. Śaṅkara points out that this would be appropriate only if the atomic nature is extrinsic and the all-pervasive nature is intrinsic to it.⁷⁸ The Bhagavad-gītā text, 'The Self, i.e. Brahman, is of uniform nature always, all-pervasive, immutable, free from activity, and beginningless,⁷⁹ refers to the *jīva* as

all-pervasive. Further, the Śvetāśvatara text which says, ‘The jīva, endowed with the attributes of the mind and of the body, is seen small like the point of a goad,⁸⁰ teaches that the jīva’s small size is dependent upon its association with the mind and not upon its own Self.

Thus, we see that, according to Advaita, it is only Brahman, owing to its false association with the mind, attains the state of the jīva. The jīva is, therefore, a blend of consciousness, i.e. Brahman, and the mind. It is the content of the cognition ‘I’. In other words, it is the ahampadārtha. It appears to be limited in size depending upon its limiting adjuncts. By nature it is not an agent, an experient, and a knower. And agency, etc. are falsely ascribed to it due to its association with the mind. It experiences the three states of waking, dream, and deep sleep. In the state of waking, the jīva is associated with māyā, the subtle body, and the gross body. Māyā is the causal body. The subtle body consists of the five senses of knowledge, the five senses of action, the fivefold vital air, and the intellect and the mind. The gross body is the effect of the five elements of earth, water, fire, air, and space. In the state of dream, the sense-organs become quiescent by being

united with the mind. There is no cognition of 'I' or 'mine' with reference to the physical body. The vital air and the mind, which are the conative faculty (*kriyā-śakti*) and the cognitive faculty (*jñāna -śakti*) of the internal organ are present. The conative faculty is the principle of unconscious activity. The mind fashions the world of forms based upon the latent impressions born out of its experience of the objects in the waking state. The experience of the dream objects is only the mode of *māyā* (*māyā-vṛtti*) inspired by the reflection of consciousness in it. The dream world and its experience are only apparently real (*prātibhāsika-satya*).

In the deep sleep state, the mind too becomes quiescent. The vital air or the principle of unconscious activity, however, is present. The *jīva*, free from its relation to the mind, remains as the Self which is consciousness and which is associated with *māyā*. According to Advaita, there are three modes of *māyā* (*māyā-vṛtti*) in the state of deep sleep. One is of the form of the Self which is bliss; the other is of the form of the state of deep sleep; and the third is of *māyā* itself. The consciousness that is reflected in these three modes is known as the perceptual cognition of the

bliss-form of the Self, of deep sleep, and of *māyā*, respectively. That is why on coming back to the waking state from that of deep sleep, one has the recollection of the form 'I slept happily, and I was ignorant' (*sukhamaham asvāpsam, na kiñcid avedīṣam*).

According to Rāmānuja, the *jīva* has knowledge as its essential nature and also as its attribute. The text of the Praśna Upaniṣad, "The *jīva* is the one who sees, feels, hears, smells, tastes, thinks, and knows; it is the agent of actions, and it is of the nature of knowledge",⁸¹ refers to the *jīva* as the knower and at the same time as of the nature of knowledge too. The knowledge which the *jīva* possesses as its attribute is known as attributive consciousness (*dharmābhūta-jñāna*). In his commentary on the Vedānta-sūtra,⁸² Rāmānuja observes that the Bṛhadāraṇyaka text⁸³ that there is no loss of cognition or knowledge in the case of the *jīva*, who is the knower specifically ascribes the substance-attribute relation between the *jīva*, who is the knower, and its knowledge. The text further declares that the *jīva* being eternal, its knowledge too which is its attribute is eternal.⁸⁴ It follows from this that the *jīva* is of the nature of knowledge and is the one who has knowledge as its eternal attribute. The text of the

Praśna Upaniṣad⁸⁵ cited earlier is clear in stating that the jīva is the agent too. In other words, according to Rāmānuja, the jīva is essentially a jñātā and a kartā.

It may be objected at this stage that, if the jīva were of the nature of consciousness and a knower, then there is the contingency of its cognizing all objects at all times without depending upon sense-contact. This objection, according to Rāmānuja, is not valid. For, the jīva is not all-pervasive. It is atomic in size. The Brhadāraṇyaka text⁸⁶ says that the jīva has the characteristics of passing out of the body, going to the other world, and returning from there. These will be intelligible in the case of the jīva only if it is atomic in size.

It may be pointed out that the Śvetāśvatara text cited earlier⁸⁷ states first that the jīva is atomic in size and concludes by saying that it is infinite in nature. In the same way, the Bhagavad-gītā text⁸⁸ affirms that the Self is all-pervasive. When such is the case, how, are we to conclude that the jīva is atomic in size? The answer is that the Śvetāśvatara text, when it states that the jīva is infinite in nature, refers to the maximum expansion of its attributive consciousness at the time of liberation. The Bhagavad-gītā text has reference to

the subtle nature of the *jīva* which enables the latter to be immanent in all insentient objects.⁸⁹ It follows that the *jīva* is not all-pervasive as the Advaitin thinks, but is atomic in size.

Although atomic in size, the *jīva*, Rāmānuja holds, could experience sensations all over the body. The attributive consciousness that is present in the *jīva* which is atomic in size pervades the entire body. It is similar to a lamp, which, although placed in a corner of a room, would illumine the whole room.⁹⁰ It is subject to contraction and expansion. During dissolution, it is contracted to such an extent that it could very well be said as not existing at all. After creation when the *jīva* comes to be associated with the physical body, the *dharma-bhūta-jñāna* would expand. But being concealed by the karma of the *jīva*, it will not expand to its maximum stage. In the state of liberation, it would expand to the maximum state, and the *jīva* could comprehend every object without depending upon the instruments of cognition.⁹¹ In the state of transmigratory existence, as we have said, it is contracted. When a particular sense-organ comes into contact with its respective object, the *dharma-bhūta-jñāna* reaches the place of the object through the sense-

organ and comes into contact with the object. This is known as the knowledge of the object. It is in this way that the dharma-bhūta-jñāna presents the objects to the jīva.

Rāmānuja holds the view that the jīva is a distinct reality; it is complete in itself. It is not a cid-ācid-granṭhi as in Advaita, and it is the content of the cognition 'I'; but the Advaitin maintains that in the state of deep sleep the mind provisionally merges in māyā, and so the jīva does not have the cognition in the form of 'I' then. The jīva, being free from its relation to the mind, becomes one with its source, viz. Brahman. But Rāmānuja contends that in the state of deep sleep the jīva is manifested as 'I' or 'aham.' Two characteristics of the jīva are to be identified in this connection; they are: pratyaktva and jñatva. Of these, pratyaktva is the characteristic on the basis of which there is the manifestation of the jīva as 'aham' to itself by its essential nature of consciousness. And the specific features of the jīva such as 'I am of this nature' and the like are provided to the jīva through its attributive consciousness (jñatva).⁹² At the time of deep sleep, the attributive consciousness is contracted. Hence, there is no manifestation of the jīva in its specific

form such as 'I am of this nature,' etc. But due to the characteristic of *pratyaktva*, there is the manifestation of the *jīva* to itself as 'I'.

Advaitānanda in his *Brahma-vidyābhāraṇa* points out that the admission of the attributive consciousness in the *jīva* is not based on the authority of the śruti text. Rāmānuja relies upon the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* text, 'There is no loss of the knowledge of the knower' (*na hi draṣṭuḥ drṣṭeḥ viparilopo vidyate*). He interprets it by saying that the genitive case-ending in *draṣṭuḥ* signifies the substance-attribute relation between the one who sees and one's knowledge. In that case, Advaitānanda argues, the usage of the word 'draṣṭuḥ' is futile. For, in ordinary experience we find *drṣṭi* or cognition as the attribute of the *draṣṭā* only. If there could exist cognition as the attribute of the one who is not a *draṣṭā*, then it may be said that the word 'draṣṭā' is significant by excluding the cognition of the one who does not see. This, however, is not the case. So, if the relation between the one who sees and one's knowledge is taken as substance-attribute relation, then the word 'draṣṭuḥ' in the śruti text would be insignificant. Hence, the genitive case-ending must be taken in the sense of the relation of identity. The text

means, "There is no loss of the knowledge which is the essential nature of the one who sees, i.e. Brahman". In this case, the expression 'draṣṭuḥ' becomes significant. It excludes cognitions which are only the modifications of the mind.⁹³ The result of this argument is that there is no scriptural basis for admitting dharmabhūta-jñāna. Knowledge, etc. which pertain to the jīva are to be admitted as the modifications of the mind illusorily transferred to the jīva; and the jīva is a blend of consciousness and mind.

Rāmānuja is of the view that the jīva who comes to the waking state from that of deep sleep has the recollection of the form 'I slept happily'. And from this recollection it is gathered, Rāmānuja argues, that the jīva (ahampadārtha) in the state of deep sleep is known to be the one possessing happiness (sukhitva) and knowledge (jñātrtva).⁹⁴ Rāmarāyakavi in his Śāṅkarāśāṅkara-bhāṣya-vimarśa points out that in that case the jīva must have the experience of the form 'I possess happiness and knowledge' in the state of deep sleep. But one has only the experience of bliss of the deep sleep state and of māyā. As we have said, these are only the modifications of māyā.⁹⁵

Rāmānuja further argues that the ahamārtha persists in the state of deep sleep and in the waking state. He who comes back to the waking state has the recollection 'I slept happily'. From this it follows that there must be the experience of 'I' or ahamārtha in deep sleep too. It is the jīva, and there is the manifestation to itself as 'aham' then, due to pratyaktva, or the essential nature of consciousness.⁹⁶ This contention is wrong; for, in that case the jīva must have the experience of the form 'I sleep happily' in the state of deep sleep so that it could have recollection of the form 'I slept happily' at the waking state. One cannot have the experience 'I sleep happily' in the state of deep sleep. For, this experience refers to the specific nature of the jīva, which could be known through dharma-bhūta-jñāna only, and dharma-bhūta-jñāna is admitted by Rāmānuja as contracted in deep sleep.

Rāmānuja argues that, if the aham -padārtha is not experienced in the state of deep sleep, then how are we to account for the recollection of the form 'I slept happily', which involves reference to the aham -padārtha? The answer is that the Advaitin does not admit the state of recollection in so far as the element

of aham -padārtha is concerned. For, in the state of sleep there is the experience of the bliss-element identical with the consciousness-element and of māyā. These, as we have said, are the modes of māyā inspired by the reflection of consciousness in them. The consciousness-element is real, and the modes of māyā are non-real. The moment when one comes back to the waking state, there takes place the destruction of the modes of māyā. The latter leave out the latent impression which leads to recollection of the bliss-element of the state of deep sleep and of māyā. The consciousness-element which is recollected is conditioned by the mind at the time of waking, resulting in the cognition of 'I'. The result of the argument is that the aham -padārtha, i.e. the blend of consciousness and the mind, does not persist in the deep sleep state.⁹⁷

According to Advaita, the jīva is the blend of consciousness and the mind. The element of the mind is involved in the conception of the jīva. It is the aham -padārtha. Since the mind is not operative in deep sleep state, there is no manifestation of aham -padārtha then. The jīva becomes an agent, an experient, and a knower due to its false association with the mind. In reality, the jīva is not any of these.

The Viśiṣṭādvaita holds that the jīva is distinct from the mind. It is the content of the cognition 'I' (aham - padārtha). It is essentially an agent, an experient, and a knower. It is consciousness by nature, and it has knowledge as its attribute. Since the element of mind is not involved in the conception of the jīva in the state of deep sleep too, there is the manifestation of the jīva as 'I'.

4. THE WORLD

The Advaitin holds the view that the world is non-real or mithyā. Brahman which is pure consciousness appears as the world through māyā. In this sense it is the material cause of the world. It is also its efficient cause. An efficient cause is the one who has the knowledge of the thing to be created, makes a decision after deliberation, and puts the decision into effect. This process becomes possible through māyā in the case of Brahman which is free from any instrument of cognition and which is pure consciousness. Knowledge, desire, and resolve which are the constituents of an efficient cause are modes of māyā (māyā-vṛtti) inspired by the reflection of Brahman in them. Thus Brahman, by being the substratum of māyā and of the modes of māyā inspired by its

reflection, comes to possess knowledge, desire, and resolve. It is thereby viewed as the efficient cause of the world. The Taittirīya text says: "The Self (Brahman) manifested itself (in the form of the world) by itself."⁹⁸ When it is said that Brahman manifested itself in the form of the world, it is known that it is the material cause of the world. Since this manifestation took place by itself, it is known that it is its efficient cause.⁹⁹

An analysis of the relation between cause and its effect has led the Advaitin to conclude that the effect is non-real. There are two theories concerning the cause-effect relation, one held by the Nyāya Vaiśeṣika school and the other by the Śāᅅkhya school. According to the Nyāya - Vaiśeṣika school, the effect is different from the cause. The effect, e.g. a pot, does not exist in its cause (the clay) prior to its production. It is brought into existence over and above the cause by the causal operation of the efficient cause, viz. the potter. The effect is entirely different from its cause. Since according to this view an effect is non-existent in its cause prior to its origination, it is termed *asat-kārya-vāda*. Since this doctrine maintains that the effect is a *de novo* creation, it is also known as *ārambha-vāda*.

The Sāṅkhya school maintains that the effect exists in its cause prior to its production. It considers as wrong the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view that the effect does not exist in the cause prior to its production and that the causal operation brings into existence that which is totally non-existent. For, if an effect could come into existence from non-existence, then since non-existence can be found everywhere, anything may come into existence from any source. For example, the non-existence of cloth is present everywhere prior to its origination. So cloth could arise even from a lump of clay. But it is not so. He who desires to have a cloth seeks only the threads and not the clay. This recourse to an appropriate material cause shows that the effect exists in its cause prior to its production. When it is said that the effect pre-exists in its cause, what is meant is that it exists in its subtle form, and the causal operation brings about the transformation of what is subtle into a gross form. Thus, the effect is not a *de novo* creation; it is only a transformation of what is subtle into a gross form. This theory is, therefore, called *sat-kārya-vāda*. Another name for it is *pariṇāma-vāda*. The Śāṅkhya school further maintains that, if the effect were not existent in its cause prior to its production, then it is similar to a hare's horn, and so there is no possibility

of its origination at any point of time. Further, the cognition 'The pot is originated' involves reference to the pot as the substratum of the activity of origination. If the pot were non-existent prior to the moment of its origination, then it cannot be viewed as the substratum of the activity of origination. In that case the cognition referred to above has to be treated as invalid. But it is not so. Hence, it must be admitted that pot in its subtle form exists in its cause prior to its origination, i.e. prior to its transformation into a gross form. Since the effect exists in a subtle form in the cause prior to its origination, there is no valid reason to maintain that the two are different then. When such is the case, it must be held that, even after the transformation of the effect into a gross form by the causal operation of the efficient cause, the effect is identical with the cause.

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school which upholds the *asat-kārya-vāda* would argue that, if the effect pre-exists in its cause, then the causal operation is futile. It might be said that the causal operation is fruitful in the sense that it brings about the transformation of what is subtle into a gross form. But this contention is wrong. 'Transformation' means 'manifestation' of what is subtle into a gross form. If it is said that the causal

operation manifests an effect, it amounts to saying that it adds some qualities to the effect, or removes certain defects from it. According to the Śāṅkhya school which advocates the theory of *sat-kārya-vāda*, qualities as well as defects are existent already. They could neither be added nor be removed. Hence, the concept of transformation or manifestation is not logically sound. The Śāṅkhya school further maintains that there is identity between the cause and the effect. This too is not correct. For in that case, one and the same object has to be viewed as cause and effect, and so the causal relation between the two cannot be maintained. Moreover, if the cause were identical with the effect, then there will be no difference in the practical efficiency of the two. Clay, the cause, fulfils the purpose of bringing into existence the effect, viz. pot, while pot, the effect, is adapted to the practical need of bringing water. Thus, the practical efficiency of the one differs from that of another. If the cause and the effect were identical as the Śāṅkhya school holds, then clay, like pot, can accomplish the result of bringing water, and pot, like clay, can be efficacious in bringing into existence a pot. This, however, is not the case. So, one has to maintain that the cause and the effect

are distinct. It must be noted here that, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school, the cognition of the form 'mṛd-ghaṭaḥ', which confirms the relation of identity between mṛt, the cause, and ghaṭaḥ, the effect, cannot be treated as valid. But it is valid.¹⁰⁰ Gauḍāpada, referring to the theories of origination held by the Śaṅkhya and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika schools, observes:

Some disputants contend the origination of an already existent entity. Disproving their contention, others predicate the non-existence of the effect in its cause prior to its production. Thus, both the schools controvert the viewpoint of the other.¹⁰¹

An entity that already exists cannot (and need not) be produced; and an entity which does not exist already can never be produced. Thus by refuting each other's view concerning the origination of an effect as to whether it exists in its cause prior to its production or not, they subscribe to the view of the Advaitin that nothing is originated¹⁰²

We commend the view that nothing is originated, the view that emerges from their disputation.¹⁰³

Referring to the problem as to whether the effect is different from the cause or identical with it, Vidyāraṇya observes:

When analysed on the basis of reasoning, we are not able to discern that pot is different from clay. Nor could it be ascertained as identical with clay as we do not perceive the form of pot in the unmoulded form of clay.¹⁰⁴

It follows from the above discussion that an effect cannot be treated either as existent or non-existent in its cause prior to its origination. Nor can it be treated either as identical with, or different from, its cause. Hence, it is non-real or *mithyā*, or *anirvācānīya*. It is merely an appearance. The cause, however, endures prior to the appearance of the effect, at the time of the existence of the effect, and also after the destruction of the effect. Hence, it is real when viewed in relation to its effect. It must be noted that, although clay, etc. are said to be real when we compare them with their effects, yet they are not admitted to be real, or unsublated for all time. For, the Upaniṣad speaks of everything other than Brahman as undergoing sublation at the dawn of the knowledge of Brahman. Brahman, however, is taken to be absolutely real, i.e.

unsublated for all time as it is free from any factor that would stultify it. In order to emphasize the exclusive reality of Brahman, the cause of the world, and the absolute non-reality of the world, which is the effect, the śruti text, 'vācārambhaṇam vikāro nāmadheyam, mṛttiketyeva satyam,'¹⁰⁵ mentions as examples the reality of clay, etc. and the non-reality of the effects such as pot and the like. Vidyāraṇya points out: 'The śruti has said (by way of example) the non-reality of the effect (pot) and the reality of clay that is the substratum of pot.'¹⁰⁶ Vācaspatimiśra in his Bhāmatī states: 'The non-reality of the group of effects and the reality of the causal factors are known on the basis of reasoning. The śruti text, 'vācārambhaṇam,' restates these and provides them as examples'.¹⁰⁷ The text, 'vācārambhaṇam vikāro nāmadheyam, mṛttiketyeva satyam,' is intended to substantiate the promissory statement found in the Upaniṣad. In the Chāndogya Upaniṣad, the sage Āruni asks his son; Śvetaketu thus: 'Have you ever asked about that principle which could be known only through instruction (ādeśa) and by knowing which that which is not heard so far will become heard, that which is not deliberated will become deliberated, and that which is not ascertained will become ascertained'.¹⁰⁸ This text conveys that by

the knowledge of one thing there would result the knowledge of everything else. The question arises as to how the knowledge of one thing could lead to the knowledge of everything else. To answer this question, the illustrative example of the knowledge of the effects such as pot, jar, etc., that results from the knowledge of clay, is provided by the śruti text, 'yathā saumya ekena mṛtṣiṇḍena sarvaṃ mṛnmayam vijñātam syāt'.¹⁰⁹ From this it is known that by the knowledge of the cause there would result the knowledge of its effects; also, this implies that the effects have no independent existence of their own apart from their cause. If the effect, viz. pot, were real, then it will be independent of clay, and so there will not arise the knowledge of pot from the knowledge of clay. The text, 'vācārambhaṇam vikāraḥ nāmadheyam, mṛttikā iti eva satyam' effectively drives home the truth that the pot which is the effect is non-real. The word 'vikāraḥ' stands for pot, etc. The term 'ārambhaṇam' means that by which pot, etc. are being referred to. The word 'vācā' means 'by the expressions such as 'The pot exists,' 'The cloth exists', and the like. Pot, etc. are being referred to by words, and they do not really exist. For, they cannot be proved either as

existent or non-existent in their respective causes prior to their production; nor can they be said to be identical with, or different from, their causes.

The question arises as to how, then, there is the usage 'Pot has come into existence from clay' which involves reference to the difference between the cause and the effect. The text answers this question by stating that it is *nāmadheyam*. It means that the verbal usage involving reference to the difference between the cause and the effect is in name only; it is devoid of any substance. In other words, like the effect, the causal relation too is indeterminable. It may be asked: what, then, is real? It is answered '*mṛttikā iti eva satyam.*' The particle *iti*, according to the *Amarakośa*, is used in the sense of a qualifying attribute (*prākara*) too.¹¹⁰ Here the qualifying attribute is the state of being the material cause (*upādānatva*). The expression '*mṛttikā iti*' signifies clay as qualified by the state of being the material cause. It alone (*eva*) is real (*satyam*). The particle '*eva*' excludes reality in the case of the effect.¹¹¹ From this it emerges that effects are not real. And when it is said that by the knowledge of the cause there would ensue the knowledge of its effects, what is meant is that there would result the knowledge of

the form 'The true nature of the effects is only the cause.' This is as it should be; for, the effects are proved to be non-real.

In this context, the word 'cause' must be taken in the sense of 'material cause' For, it is only the knowledge of the material cause that enables one to have the knowledge of its effects. Never does there arise the knowledge of the effects such as pot, jar, etc. by the knowledge of the efficient cause, viz. the potter. In the promissory statement given in the Chāndogya Upaniṣad cited earlier, there is reference to 'ādeśa' by knowing which everything else would become known. The word 'ādeśa' is derived by the addition of the kṛt suffix, ghañ to the verbal stem diśi preceded by the preposition āñ. According to Pāṇini, this suffix is introduced after a verbal stem to derive forms denoting a kāraka other than the agent when the derivative is a proper name.¹¹² So the word 'ādeśa' refers to the object (karma) of an action. It means 'that which is the object of instruction.' In other words, it signifies that which could be known only through instruction, and that is Brahman. It cannot be taken in the sense of the agent of action, viz. the one who directs (praśāsītā).

It is said that by knowing the ādeśa, i.e. that which could be known through instruction only, everything else will become known. Brahman which is signified by the term 'ādeśa' is known to be the material cause from the text 'I shall become many.'¹¹³ The expression 'everything else' includes within itself the efficient cause, the jīvas, and the world. If these were different from Brahman, then by the knowledge of Brahman, they will not be known. In that case the teaching of the promissory statement that by the knowledge of Brahman 'everything else' will become known will be contradicted. Hence the text 'It deliberated'¹¹⁴ identifies Brahman as the efficient cause. And the text, 'By entering into these three creatures (born of eggs, born of wombs, and born of plants) in the form of the jīva, I shall clearly differentiate their names and forms,'¹¹⁵ states that Brahman itself has attained the state of the jīva thus emphasizing the truth that the jīva is none other than Brahman. Hence, by the expression 'everything else' we have to take only the world, and not the efficient cause and the jīvas, as they are shown to be none other than Brahman. The Vedānta-sūtra¹¹⁶ describes the relation between Brahman and the world as ananyatvam. Śāṅkara explains the term as 'non-existence apart from'

(vyatirekeṇa abhāvaḥ). It means that the world has no independent existence apart from Brahman. This may be stated in a generalized form that the effect does not exist apart from its material cause. The world, being only a phenomenal appearance of Brahman through māyā and not an actual emanation from it, cannot have any real relation to Brahman. Vācaspatimiśra clearly states that by 'ananyatvam', we have to understand only negation of difference or separateness, but not affirmation of identity.¹¹⁷ There cannot be any identity between the sentient Brahman and the insentient world. From this it follows that the relation between Brahman and the world is neither difference (bheda), nor identity (abheda), nor difference-cum-identity (bhedābheda). It is durnirūpa or inexplicable. This is precisely the teaching of the text 'vācārambhaṇam vikāro nāmadheyam.'¹¹⁸ The experience and the corresponding expression 'The pot is real' (ghaṭaḥ san) involve reference to the superimposed identity between Brahman, the real, and the pot. The relation between the two is a superimposed one (ādhyāsika). The Upaniṣad negates only the reality of the world independent of Brahman. When it is said that by the knowledge of Brahman there would arise the

knowledge of the world, what is intended to be conveyed is not the knowledge of the world in all its specific aspects, but only the knowledge of the true nature of every object. The promissory statement in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* text¹¹⁹ must be understood only in this sense.

It may be argued that the literal meaning of the promissory statement is the knowledge of everything in its specific aspect; and there is no stronger reason to reject this meaning and adopt the Advaita interpretation. This argument is untenable. At the dawn of the knowledge of Brahman, the world which is its appearance gets sublated. This is analogous to the sublation of silver in the shell by the knowledge of the shell of the form 'This is shell', which helps one to know the real status of silver. The latter is merely an appearance of shell, having no independent reality apart from it. In the same way, by the knowledge of Brahman there would arise the knowledge that the world is merely an appearance having no independent reality apart from Brahman. Further, the śruti text 'He who perceives duality in Brahman would undergo cyclic existence continually'¹²⁰ reproves the cognition of duality. Even if we assume for the sake of argument

that there results the knowledge of everything in its specific aspect by the knowledge of Brahman, the question remains concerning the purpose of such a knowledge. It is on these three grounds, viz. the sublation of the world by the knowledge of Brahman (bādhitatva), disapproval of the knowledge of duality (ninditava), and purposelessness (prayojanābhāva), that the Advaitin concludes that there results only the knowledge of the true nature of every object by the knowledge of Brahman and not the knowledge of its specific aspect.¹²¹

Another stronger reason to prefer the view that there results only the knowledge of the true nature of every object from the knowledge of Brahman is based on the teaching of the Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad. Therein too the promissory statement occurs. The sage Śaunaka asks Aṅgiras, 'What is the principle by knowing which everything else will become known?'¹²² Aṅgiras explains to him in detail the nature of Brahman, the immutable reality, and concludes by saying that by attaining the knowledge of this reality one would become free from the grip of māyā.¹²³ He has not said that by knowing Brahman everything else will become known. He has only said that by the knowledge of

Brahman there will be the removal of māyā. This answer is significantly relevant, for it touches the real point at issue, and suggests a solution to the problem. By the knowledge of Brahman there will be the removal of māyā, and thereby there will be the manifestation of Brahman free from māyā. The knowledge of Brahman is termed 'jñāna', and the manifestation of Brahman free from māyā is termed 'avagati'.¹²⁴ There will remain nothing else to be known. Thus the answer of Āṅgiras that by knowing Brahman one would become free from the tie of māyā is closely related in spirit to the question of Śaunaka concerning the principle by knowing which everything else will become known. Vidyāraṇya sums up the import of the promissory statement thus:

In the Upaniṣads it is said that by the knowledge of the One, i.e. Brahman, the entire world will become known. It is chiefly designed with a view to impart the knowledge of Brahman as free from any duality. It does not intend to convey the knowledge of everything in its specific aspect by the knowledge of Brahman.¹²⁵

Thus, the promissory statement in the Upaniṣads that by knowing Brahman everything else will become

known attests to the validity of the conclusive view of the Advaitin that the world is non-real.

Rāmānuja is of the view that the world is real. The promissory statement found in the Upaniṣads does not speak of the world as non-real as the Advaitin thinks. He takes the word 'ādeśa' in the promissory statement in the sense of the controller of the world (ādiśati iti ādeśaḥ) and not in the sense of that which could be known through instruction (ādiśyate iti ādeśaḥ) as the Advaitin considers. According to him, the promissory statement in the Chāndogya Upaniṣad conveys that by the knowledge of Brahman, i.e. Īśvara, who is the controller of the world, there would result the knowledge of everything else. To the question as to how there could arise the knowledge of everything by the knowledge of Īśvara, the Upaniṣad itself answers by providing the illustrative examples of the clay and the like. The illustrative example of clay relates to the knowledge of the effects such as pot, dish, etc., that results from the knowledge of their cause, viz. the clay. The knowledge of the effect could result from the knowledge of its cause only when there is identity between the cause and its effect. And, according to Rāmānuja, it is this point that is explained in the text,

‘vācārambhaṇam vikāro nāmadheyam’ etc. The configuration of pot and also the name of pot get attached to clay in order that there may be the verbal usage ‘This is a pot’, and also adaptability to the practical needs of life such as bringing water, etc. The form of pot is clay only. This sense is valid (satyam) as it is known through recognition (pratyabhijñā) which is of the form ‘This pot is clay only’ (mṛdayam ghaṭaḥ).¹²⁶ Thus, according to Rāmānuja, the lump of clay and the pot constitute one and the same substance. It is only the clay that attains another configuration and also a new name. There is identity between the lump of clay and the pot, as the latter is only another form of the cause.¹²⁷

According to Rāmānuja, at the time of dissolution the world becomes free from its name and form and remains in an exceedingly subtle form as prakṛti in Brahman. The jīvas too become free from names and forms that pertain to their respective physical bodies and remain in a subtle form in Brahman. Their attributive consciousness is fully contracted then. These two, viz. the world and the jīvas, remain subtle in such a manner that it is very difficult to identify them as existing at all, although they constitute the

body of Brahman.¹²⁸ At the time of creation, there is change by the will of Brahman in its body, i.e. the subtle form of the world and of the jīvas changes into gross form. The world becomes differentiated into names and forms, and the jīvas become associated with physical bodies, and their attributive consciousness becomes subject to expansion or contraction in accordance with their past merits and demerits. Brahman as associated with the world and the jīvas in their gross form is the effect. On the basis of the illustrative example of clay and pot, the identity between the cause and the effect has been emphasized on the ground that the cause and the effect are one and the same substance having two different configurations. In the same way there is identity between the cause, viz. Brahman associated with the world and the jīvas in their subtle form, and the effect, viz. Brahman associated with the world and the jīvas in their gross form. The promissory statement that by the knowledge of the cause there would result the knowledge of everything else holds good.¹²⁹

An objection may be raised at this stage: the promissory statement that by the knowledge of Brahman everything else will become known would

become significant only when it is held that Brahman is both the material and the efficient cause. If there should exist an efficient cause different from Brahman, then by the knowledge of Brahman the efficient cause will not be known. As a result, the import of the promissory statement that by the knowledge of Brahman everything else will be known would become insignificant. In the same way, the *jīva* is not an effect; and so it falls outside the scope of the significance of the expression 'everything else' in the promissory statement. The *jīva*, being not an effect, will not be known by the knowledge of Brahman. Hence, the promissory statement is to be treated as invalid.

The above objection, according to Rāmānuja, does not hold good. Like the Advaitin, Rāmānuja too admits that Brahman is both the material and the efficient cause of the world.¹³⁰ Since there is no efficient cause different from the material cause, the objection that by the knowledge of the material cause there will not arise the knowledge of the efficient cause and so the promissory statement will become insignificant has no force at all. The *jīva* which is eternal is of the nature of knowledge, and also the substratum of knowledge. The latter is known as attributive consciousness or

dharma-bhūta-jñāna. It is also eternal, but is subject to expansion and contraction. At the time of dissolution when the jīva remains in its subtle form in Brahman as its body, its attributive consciousness is totally contracted. After the creation of the world, the jīva comes to be associated with the physical body, and its attributive consciousness undergoes expansion thereby. Taking into consideration the change from contraction to expansion in the attributive consciousness of the jīva, the latter is viewed as having a change and also as the effect-form of Brahman.¹³¹ Thus, Rāmānuja maintains that in respect of the world there is no efficient cause apart from the material cause, viz. Brahman. Unlike the world which undergoes modification in its essential nature from the subtle form to the gross form, the jīva undergoes modification in respect of its attributive consciousness only. Brahman which is associated with the world and the jīvas in their subtle form as its body during the state of dissolution continues to be associated with the world in its gross form and with the jīvas whose individual attributive consciousness is manifested after the creation of the world. Brahman in the former aspect is the cause, and in the latter aspect, the effect. The cause

and the effect are identical with each other. Hence, the promissory statement is valid. It must be noted here that the promissory statement in the Upaniṣad could very well be explained, according to Rāmānuja, by admitting the reality of the world. It does not imply the non-reality of the world as the Advaitin thinks.

Rāmānuja's interpretation of the texts is not correct. He has taken the word 'ādeśa' in the sense of an agent, i.e. the controller of the world. An agent is the efficient cause. But by the knowledge of the efficient cause, there will not result the knowledge of the material cause. Hence, Rāmānuja has to explain the significance of the word 'ādeśa' as the material cause as well. This he does on the basis of the text, 'sadeva saumya idam agre āsīt, ekam eva advitīyam.'¹³² This text states that, prior to creation, this world existed as Brahman alone which is one only without a second. Sudarśana Sūri in his Śruti-prāsikā observes that the reference to Brahman in the śruti text as 'one only' (ekameva) will be meaningful only if we admit that it is both the material and the efficient cause of the world. The reference to Brahman as one without a second shows that there is no efficient cause apart from Brahman. Brahman is thus proved to be the material

as well as the efficient cause of the world in this śruti text.¹³³

Tyāgarājādhvarī in his work, *Sadvidyā-vilāsa*, points out that, when the meaning of the word 'ādeśa' is construed in the sense of the material cause by making reference to some other śruti text, its being the efficient cause too could be known thereby. Hence, there is no point in construing the word, 'ādeśa' found in the promissory statement in the sense of an efficient cause. That is why it is construed by the Advaitin in the sense of that which could be known through instruction; and it is identified as both the material and the efficient cause on the basis of other śruti texts.¹³⁴

Advaitānanda in his *Brahma-vidyābhāraṇa* examines Rāmānuja's interpretation of the text, 'vācārambhaṇam vikāraḥ nāmadheyam mṛttikā iti eva satyam' which provides the illustrative example of clay and its effects to explain the significance of the promissory statement. The interpretation of the text by Rāmānuja is as follows: in order that there may be the verbal usage 'This is a pot' and in order that there may be adaptability to the practical needs of life such as bringing water, etc., the configuration of pot and

also the name of pot get attached with the clay. Advaitānanda points out that in this interpretation the word 'vak' in the expression 'vācā' is taken to convey through non-exclusive secondary signification (ajahallakṣaṇā) the sense of the verbal usage 'This is a pot' and also adaptability to practical needs of life. The expression 'vācā' used with the instrumental case is taken to convey the sense of the dative case, viz. 'for the purpose of'. Then the word 'mṛttikā' in the expression 'mṛttikā iti eva' is drawn out from that unit and is changed into one having the ending of the instrumental case as mṛttikayā. The word 'āraṁbhaṇam' means 'get associated' with mṛttikā (mṛttikayā). The expression 'mṛttikā iti eva satyam' is interpreted by incorporating the word 'ghaṭaḥ' not used therein. This means that the sense 'The pot is clay only' (ghaṭaḥ mṛttikā iti eva) is valid (satyam) as it is known through the proof, pratyabhijñā or recognition. Thus, the interpretation of the text by Rāmānuja involves the defect of prolixity.¹³⁵

This discussion may be summed up by saying that according to Advaita the promissory statement in the Upaniṣad would become significant only if we admit that the world is non-real. Rāmānuja, however, holds

that it could be explained by admitting that the world is real. .

The mūrtāmūrta-brāhmaṇa section of the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad explains in a carefully planned order the nature of the world as non-real (mithyā). It opens with the statement that ‘Brahman has two forms, corporeal and non-corporeal’ (dve vā va brahmaṇo rūpe, mūrtaṁ ca amūrtaṁ evā ca.¹³⁶ Earth, water, and fire fall under the first category, and air and space, under the second one. Brahman is thus described as associated with the world, i.e. as cosmic (saprapāñca). The Upaniṣad then goes on to deny of Brahman these two forms by stating ‘Then there is the instruction, Not this, not this’ (atha ataḥ ādeśo neti neti).¹³⁷ It itself explains the import of this text ‘Not this, not this’ by saying ‘There is no other instruction apart from this one, viz. ‘Not this, not this’ (na hi etasmāt neti anyat param asti).¹³⁸

It may be asked as to how the Upaniṣad could, after ascribing the two forms to Brahman, deny them. The Upaniṣad itself provides the answer by declaring that ‘The secret name of Brahman is the real of the real’ (tasya Upaniṣad satyasya satyamiti).¹³⁹ By way of explaining this, the Upaniṣad further says, ‘The prāṇās

are real; of these, Brahman is the reality' (prāṇāḥ vai satyam, teṣāṃ eṣa satyam).¹⁴⁰ Here the word 'prāṇāḥ' signifies the sense-organs. It is indicative of their respective objects too. Thus it stands for the whole world. The world consisting of sense-organs and their objects is said to be real. And compared with it, it is stated that Brahman is more real. Reality is of the nature of unsublatedness. In respect of it there can be neither superiority nor inferiority. The only distinction that we can make is that, while Brahman remains unsublated for ever, the world remains unsublated for sometime. Hence Brahman which is said to be the real of the real remains unsublated for all time, while the world which is stated to be real is unsublated for the time being. In other words, Brahman is absolutely real, and the world is provisionally so. Reality that is noticed, e. g. in the case of pot of the form 'The pot is real' is not natural to the pot. It is derived from Brahman wherein the object is superimposed. The reality of Brahman, however, is natural to it. From this we could gather that the world whose reality is dependent upon the reality of Brahman is by nature non-real. And so it could be denied of Brahman.¹⁴¹

At this stage, Śāṅkara anticipates the following objection: There is the maxim that instead of attempting at washing one's feet defiled with mire, it is better not to get one's feet deeply mired in waterlogged ground. In accordance with this maxim, the Upaniṣad could have refrained from ascribing the two forms to Brahman rather than ascribing them first and denying them later. It is answered that the Upaniṣad never intends to convey that Brahman possesses two forms. It merely restates these forms which are well-known in ordinary experience as illusorily presented upon Brahman. This it does solely with the view to deny them of Brahman and thus showing Brahman to be free from any duality.¹⁴²

An objection is raised at this stage. The world consisting of corporeal and non-corporeal forms is well-known in ordinary experience. But it is not known as illusorily presented upon Brahman. Hence, the assertion that the two forms are known in ordinary experience as illusorily presented upon Brahman is not correct. Consequently, the assertion that the text, 'There are two forms of Brahman - corporeal and non-corporeal,' restates the two forms that are known in ordinary experience is also wrong.¹⁴³

Advaitānanda in his *Brahma-vidyābhāraṇa* answers the above objection. The world consisting of two forms is known in ordinary experience. But its being of the form of Brahman could not be ascertained without the aid of the Upaniṣad. Yet, an effect always depends upon a material and an efficient cause. The world which is an effect is known from the śruti texts as having Brahman as the material and the efficient cause. According to Advaita, there is a superimposed identity between Brahman, the material cause, and the world, the effect. From this it is decided that the world is of the form of Brahman. And it is restated by the text, 'There are two forms of Brahman- corporeal and non-corporeal.' The text, 'Not this, not this,' denies of Brahman these two form¹⁴⁴

The Upaniṣad predicates the existence of the world, i.e. the two forms, in Brahman first and then negates it with the express aim of proving that the world is non-real and that Brahman is, therefore, non-dual. The very fact that the Upaniṣad negates the existence of the world in Brahman after stating that it constitutes the form of Brahman shows that the world is not real in the sense that it does not remain unsublated at all times; it is, that is to say, merely an

appearance. Brahman is thereby said to be non-dual, i.e. free from any duality, as the presence of the world which is non-real will not contradict the non-dual nature of Brahman. If, however, the Upaniṣad merely denies of Brahman the world without ascribing it to it, then there may arise the doubt that the world denied of Brahman exists elsewhere, just as colour that is negated in air is known to be existing in objects like pot, etc. In that case, one would be having the knowledge of the existence of the world elsewhere and that would definitely contradict the non-dual nature of Brahman. It follows that, with a view to emphasize the non-dual nature of Brahman, the Upaniṣad first ascribes the world to Brahman and then negates it. The world is non-real as it is negated in the substratum, viz. Brahman, wherein it appears. Hence, Brahman is non-dual.

Rāmānuja is of the view that the Bṛhadāraṇyaka text, 'Brahman has two forms- corporeal and non-corporeal,' cannot be considered as a restatement (anuvāda), for the two forms are never known through any proof other than the Upaniṣad as pertaining to Brahman. This text, therefore, conveys something that is unknown hitherto, and hence it is valid. If it were

held, as the Advaitin holds, that the text 'Not this, not this' denies of Brahman the two forms which are ascribed to it by the Upaniṣad itself and which are unknown hitherto, then it amounts to admitting that the Upaniṣad negates what has been prescribed by it. This, however, is an unwelcome position. Therefore, it must be said that the text "Not this, not this" is not intent upon negating the two forms. It is intended to dispel the false notion that Brahman could be thought of as being associated with these two forms alone. The word 'this' (iti) in the expression 'Not this, not this' (neti neti) refers to the limitation or circumscription of Brahman by the two forms alone. The prohibitive particle nañ signifies the negation of such limitation. The whole text means that Brahman is not to be viewed as possessing the two forms alone; it possesses, apart from the two forms, innumerable auspicious attributes too. That this is the import of the text 'Not this, not this' is known from the succeeding text, 'na hi etasmāt iti neti anyat param asti.' This text means that apart from Brahman which is conveyed by the expression 'Not this' as not limited by the two forms alone, there is no other superior principle. Thus, according to Rāmānuja, the mūrtāmūrta-brāhmaṇa section of the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad conveys the transcendental

greatness of Brahman. The text 'Not this, not this' affirms that Brahman is endowed with innumerable attributes apart from the two forms, the corporeal and the non-corporeal. It does not deny of Brahman the two forms. It could be gathered from this that, since the world is not denied of Brahman, it is not non-real or *mithyā* as the Advaitin thinks.¹⁴⁵ The two forms are, therefore, real. Advaitānanda points out that the word 'iti' refers only to the two forms and not to the aspect of limitation of Brahman by the two forms. For, the aspect of limitation is not conveyed by any word in the text, and so it cannot be referred to by the word 'iti'. It must, therefore, be concluded that the word 'iti' refers to the two forms, and they are denied of Brahman by the prohibitive particle *nañ*. The world consisting of these two forms is non-real).¹⁴⁶

According to Advaita, the world is only an illusory manifestation of Brahman, the attributeless reality, while according to Viśiṣṭādvaita it is real, and it constitutes the body of Brahman which is identified as Lord Nārāyaṇa.

5. LIBERATION

Liberation from mundane existence is applicable only to the *jīva*. Brahman which is consciousness attains

the state of the *jīva*. Falsely identifying itself with the mind, it acquires the characteristics of being an agent (*kartr̥tva*), an experient (*bhoktr̥tva*), and a knower (*pramātr̥tva*). These three characteristics are known as *samsāra*, and they are not natural to it, but are only adventitious. As long as the *jīva* is associated with the mind, so long only is the *jīva*, a *jīva*. In reality, however, there is nothing like *jīva*-hood apart from what is fancied to be such by reason of this adjunct.¹⁴⁷ The relation of Brahman to the mind which has caused the notion of the *jīva* has but the indeterminable *māyā* as its source. *Māyā* cannot be removed by anything other than the experience of the true nature of the *jīva*, which is Brahman. Hence, the relation with such a limiting adjunct will not cease so long as the *jīva* does not realize its true nature to be Brahman.¹⁴⁸ This realization is known as the knowledge of Brahman. It would arise from the great sayings of the *śruti* texts such as 'tat tvam asi' and the like.

It has been said earlier that, according to Advaita, *Īsvara* is consciousness associated with the characteristic of being the original (*bimbatva*), and the *jīva* is the consciousness associated with the feature of being a reflected image (*pratibimbatva*). The

consciousness-element in both is real, while *bimbatva* and *pratibimbatva* are non-real as they are projected by *māyā*. These two adventitious features are respectively known as *Īśvaratva* and *jīvatva*. When there arises the immediate knowledge from the great sayings of the śruti texts such as 'tat tvam asi', etc. that the true nature of the *jīva* is Brahman, *māyā* will be removed along with the notions of *Īśvaratva* and *jīvatva* that are illusorily superimposed by it on the consciousness.¹⁴⁹ What would then remain is consciousness free from the veil of *māyā*, and it is liberation. The *jīva*'s identity with Brahman is ever-attained; yet, through a mistaken notion of its not being attained, it longs for it and attains it as if it were unattained. The so-called attainment results from the removal of *māyā* by the direct experience of the true nature of the *jīva* as Brahman.

Now the question arises as to whether the propositions like 'tat tvam asi' are efficacious enough to give rise to immediate knowledge. For, the innate nature of a sentence is to generate mediate knowledge only. The śruti texts, in view of their being sentences, could give rise only to mediate knowledge and not to an immediate one. According to the Advaitin, the

question whether sentences could refer to a mediate or an immediate object depends entirely on the prameya. A sentence would give rise to the mediate knowledge of an object, if the object is mediate, and to immediate knowledge of an object, if the object is immediate. This leads us to a discussion concerning the criterion of immediacy of an object. According to the fundamental position of Advaita, consciousness, although one, is viewed as threefold as *pramāṭṛ-caitanya*, *pramāṇa-caitanya*, and *viṣaya-caitanya* due to its relation with the mind, its modification known as *vṛtti*, and the objects of the world.¹⁵⁰ Of these, the *pramāṭṛ-caitanya* is the *jīva*, the *pramāṇa-caitanya* is empirical cognition, i.e. the consciousness reflected in the mental state in the form of a particular object, and the *viṣaya-caitanya* is the consciousness conditioned by objects. The *viṣaya-caitanya* is concealed by the derivative of *māyā* known as *tūlājñāna* or modal ignorance. That is why objects are not known prior to the functioning of their respective sense-organs. When the sense of sight, for example, comes into contact with an object in front, the mind too, being luminous in nature, reaches the place of the object and undergoes modification into the form of the object. This modification known as *vṛtti* receives

the reflection of consciousness in it and removes the *tūlājñāna* present in the consciousness conditioned by the object. Thereby the object comes into direct contact with *viśaya-caitanya*. When the *vṛtti* is in contact with *viśaya-caitanya*, the mind too, which has undergone such a modification, is in contact with the latter. Now, the three limiting conditions of consciousness, viz. the mind, its modification, and the object, are located in one and the same place. Hence, the consciousness conditioned by the three remains one and the same. That is to say, the *pramātr-caitanya*, the *pramāṇa-caitanya*, and the *viśaya-caitanya* have become one. The *vṛtti*, through the removal of *tūlājñāna* fulfils the purpose of manifesting the identity between the *viśaya-caitanya* and the object, and also between the *viśaya-caitanya* and the *pramātr-caitanya*. When such is the case, the identity between the *pramātr-caitanya* and the object ensues as a matter of course. The object, being in direct contact with the *pramātr-caitanya*, i.e. the *jīva*, is immediate or perceptual to the latter.¹⁵¹ The *vṛtti* in the form of the object inspired by the reflection of consciousness in it is the empirical cognition of the object. It has for its content the object which is immediate. And so it is also immediate or perceptual.¹⁵² Appaya Dīkṣita in his *Siddhānta-leśa-*

saṅgraha sums up the Advaitin's position by stating that immediacy of an object is its identity with the pramātr-caitanya, while immediacy of knowledge lies in its having for its content the object which is immediate.¹⁵³ When such is the case, Brahman, being non-different from the pramātr-caitanya or the jīva, is always immediate. Hence, the knowledge arising from the great sayings of the śruti texts is immediate as it has for its content the identity of the true nature of the jīva with Brahman which is immediate. It must be noted here that the identity of the pramātr-caitanya with objects like pot, etc. is only a superimposed one. The identity between Brahman and the pramātr-caitanya, however, is not a superimposed one. It constitutes the essential nature of the pramātr-caitanya.¹⁵⁴

To drive home most effectively the point that a sentence could give rise to the immediate knowledge of an object provided the object is immediate, the Advaitin gives the example of a secular statement, 'You are the tenth man.' Ten travellers have crossed a stream. On reaching the other shore, the head of the party checked one by one the individuals in order to ascertain that all have reached safely. In this process, he left out himself, and under the false notion that

there are only nine persons and not ten, he suffers deep anguish. A passer-by instructs him, 'You are the tenth man.' On hearing this, the head of the party attains the direct knowledge of his being the tenth man. Here, the state of being the tenth man is immediate, and so the knowledge that arises from the sentence, 'You are the tenth man,' is also immediate. From this it follows that, if the object is immediate, the knowledge which refers to it also is immediate, irrespective of its rise from verbal testimony or sense-organs.¹⁵⁵

It may be said that the immediate knowledge of the tenth could have arisen from the sense of sight, or from the sense of sight aided by the knowledge of the sense of the sentence, 'You are the tenth man.' To either of the views, there are difficulties. The first alternative cannot be maintained; for, in that case there is no need for the sentence at all. There could have arisen the immediate knowledge of the tenth man even without the instruction of the form 'You are the tenth man' which, however, is not the case. The second alternative too cannot be justified on the ground that the sense of sight, without depending upon the knowledge of the sense of a sentence, gives rise to immediate knowledge of objects like pot, etc. Hence,

the assertion that the sense of sight aided by the knowledge of the sense of the sentence could give rise to immediate knowledge is not valid. It comes to this: the immediate knowledge of the tenth man arises only from the sentence, 'You are the tenth man.' Just as the knowledge of the sense of the sentence, 'You are the tenth man' is immediate in view of the fact that it removes the false notion of one not being the tenth man, even so the knowledge arising from the text 'tat tvam asi' is immediate as it conveys the real nature of the jīva by removing māyā.¹⁵⁶

The immediate knowledge of Brahman is only the mental state, which arises from the great sayings of the śruti texts such as 'tat tvam asi' and which is inspired by the reflection of consciousness in it. The Advaitin makes a distinction between Brahman as knowledge and the knowledge of Brahman. The former is the witness of māyā while the latter, being the mental state inspired by the reflection of consciousness, is that which annihilates māyā. This is analogous to the rays of the sun, which illumine the dry grass, and also burn the very grass when reflected through a lens.

The immediate knowledge of Brahman is known as Self-realization. And this expression stands for the

direct experience of the oneness of Ātman and Brahman, i.e. the true nature of the jīva and that of Īśvara, respectively. The process through which such an experience arises from the text 'tat tvam asi' may be explained thus: the term 'tat' primarily signifies Īśvara who is consciousness associated with the state of being the original (bimbatva-viśiṣṭa-caitanya). The term tvam primarily signifies the jīva which is consciousness associated with the characteristic of being a reflected image (pratibimbatva-viśiṣṭa-caitanya). These two terms convey the substantive part, viz. the consciousness-element in both the senses leaving out the adjectival features of bimbatva and pratibimbatva. This mode of signification is known as jahad-ajahallakṣaṇā. The text as a whole signifies the non-difference of Ātman and Brahman by excluding the incompatible determinants. The purport of the sentence 'tat tvam asi' is consciousness which is pure identity.

The practical teaching of the śruti texts is devised to bring about the direct experience of Brahman or Self-realization. The course of discipline prescribed comprises two stages, one preliminary and the other, Vedantic study proper. Of these, the former consists

in the performance of one's duties relating to one's stage of life as an offering to Īśvara without any selfish end in view. This is karma-yoga, which is the remote means to self-realization.¹⁵⁷ It would remove the demerits present in the mind of the aspirant, which prevent the rise of the inclination to attain Self-realization. When the mind is cleansed of demerits, there would ensue the intellectual conviction that Brahman alone is real and that the rest is non-real (nityānitya-vastu-viveka). This would lead to absolute detachment from every object of enjoyment here and hereafter (ihāmutrārtha-bhoga-virāga). This, in turn, prepares the ground for the cultivation of six virtues of which the first two, viz. śama and dama, represent, respectively the control of the mind and of the senses. Uparati, which is the third one, is abandonment of the scripturally enjoined duties relating to the stage of life in which one is stationed. It is adoption of the ascetic stage of life (sannyāsa). The fourth one is titikṣā which is a form of courage in enduring opposites like heat and cold, pleasure and pain, etc. The next one is samādhāna, which is close mental application to the study of the Vedānta texts, reflection, and meditation (śravaṇa, manana, and nididhyāsana). The last one is śraddhā or faith which is complete trust in the authority

of scripture and of the teaching of the preceptor. These six “mental treasures” are known as śamādi-sādhana-sampat; and when pursued, these give rise to an intense desire for release from cyclic existence (mumukṣutva). The desire to attain release would result in the desire to attain its sole means, viz. Self-realization, which could be attained by Vedāntic study, etc. It is through this process that the pursuit of karma-yoga gives rise to an intense desire to attain Self-realization. The above discipline is popularly known as the fourfold aid (sādhana-catuṣṭaya) to the study of Vedānta;¹⁵⁸ it is the proximate means to self-realization.¹⁵⁹ Along with this fourfold aid, śravaṇa, manana, and nididhyāsana too serve as the proximate means. Śravaṇa or Vedāntic study is mental activity in the form of inquiry into the import of the śruti texts in general, and the great sayings such as ‘tat tvam asi’ etc. in particular. Manana or reflection is again mental activity in the form of ratiocination, after knowing definitely what the śruti texts teach, with a view to convince oneself that that teaching is true. Nididhyāsana is mental operation which consists in maintaining in continuous stream of the knowledge of the form ‘I am Brahman’ to the exclusion of everything else. These, like the sādhana-catuṣṭaya mentioned

earlier, must be pursued till there arises Self-realization. The cultivation of sādhanā-catuṣṭaya will remove from the mind of the aspirant the latent impressions arisen from the enjoyment of worldly objects (viṣaya-bhoga-vāsanā). Śravaṇa will remove the doubt as to whether the śruti texts teach the identity of the true nature of the jīva with Brahman (pramāṇāsambhāvanā); manana, the contrary notion that the teaching of the śruti texts is stultified by perceptual evidence and by the viewpoints of the schools that are opposed to Advaita (prameyāsambhāvanā); and nididhyāsana, the false notions of 'I' and 'mine' with reference to the objects of the world (viparītabhāvanā). When the mind of the aspirant becomes free from all these false notions, there would arise the immediate knowledge of Brahman or Self-realization from the texts 'tat tvam asi' and the like. Śāṅkara observes: 'Vedāntic study, etc. have as their end Self-realization which is the visible result. Hence, they must be pursued continually till the result, viz. Self-realization is achieved.'¹⁶⁰

The word 'atha' in the aphorism atha atah brahma-jijñāsā¹⁶¹ signifies immediate succession. The expression brahma-jijñāsā stands for brahma-vicāra

or inquiry into the nature of Brahman, i.e. inquiry into the import of the Upaniṣadic texts. We must, therefore, identify the factor that is invariably required as a condition for inquiry into them. In other words, we have to specify the essential qualification which an aspirant must possess - the qualification which is essential for pursuing the study of Vedānta. Śaṅkara is of the view that neither the inquiry into the import of the ritualistic section of the Veda with the aid of the Pūrva-mīmāṃsā-sūtra, nor the knowledge of the nature of rituals can be thought of as the prerequisite for the study of Vedānta. For, an aspirant who is desirous of liberation and who has learnt the Veda along with its auxiliaries can very well embark upon the study of Vedānta even without carrying on an inquiry into the ritualistic section of the Veda, or without acquiring the knowledge of rituals. The inquiry into the import of the ritualistic section of the Veda is not the distinctive cause of Self-realization, or of the study of Vedānta. For, it is useful only for ascertaining the nature of rituals. The knowledge of the nature of rituals too cannot serve as a precondition; for it is useful for the performance of rituals only. It cannot be thought of as the distinctive cause leading to the study of

Vedānta or Self-realization. It may be said that the performance of rituals constitutes the qualification of an aspirant to pursue the study of Vedānta. This contention is not sound, because the performance of rituals would lead to the cleansing of heart (mind) through which one could attain the 'fourfold aid' described earlier.¹⁶²

It may be argued that the word 'atha' is used in the sense of sequence (krama). For example, the Vedic text, "One should cut the heart first, then the tongue, then the sides," refers to the sequence of action. In the same way here too it can be said that there is sequence between inquiry into the nature of rituals and that of Brahman. This argument has no force. For, in the text cited above, the activity of cutting off of the limbs is to be carried out by a single individual. The limbs cannot be cut off simultaneously; and so an order has to be followed, which is made clear by the text by using the word 'atha' in the sense of 'then.' Here, the inquiry into the nature of rituals and that of Brahman are not to be pursued by a single individual. Hence, the word 'atha' in the aphorism cannot be taken in the sense of sequence between the inquiry into the nature of rituals and that of Brahman.

One may ask why the two kinds of inquiry should not be pursued by a single person. The answer is that, provided there is the subsidiary-principal relation between the two, it could be the case. For example, the prayāja sacrifice is the subsidiary one, and the darśa sacrifice is the principal. These two are to be performed by a single person. Since they cannot be performed simultaneously, krama or sequence is declared between the two. In the same way, the soma sacrifice could be performed only by one who has already performed the darśa pūrṇamāsa sacrifice. Here, the performance of the darśa pūrṇamāsa sacrifice qualifies a person for the performance of the soma sacrifice. And so, the order of succession is declared between the two. But the two kinds of inquiry do not stand in the relation of the principal and the subordinate to each other; nor is here any evidence to consider that the pursuit of the inquiry into the nature of rituals makes one competent to inquire into the nature of Brahman. Therefore, the persons undertaking the two kinds of inquiry are different, and there can be no sequence between the two.¹⁶³ Further, they differ vastly from each other when they are viewed in relation to their respective fruit and content. The inquiry into the nature of rituals gives

rise to the knowledge of the rituals. And it prompts one to perform the rituals where from results material prosperity. The knowledge of Brahman, on the other hand, which is derived from the inquiry into its nature gives rise to spiritual felicity without depending upon any observance whatsoever. Rituals constitute the content of the Pūrva-mīmāṃsā-sūtra. They do not exist at the time of knowing them and are to be accomplished by human effort later. The content of the Uttara-mīmāṃsā-sūtra. is Brahman which, being eternal, exists even at the time of knowing it. And being eternal, it need not be achieved by human effort. The proofs too in respect of rituals and Brahman differ. The text, 'He who is desirous of heaven shall perform the jyotiṣṭoma sacrifice,' imparts to a person the knowledge of the sacrifice only by prompting him towards its performance. The Upaniṣads, on the other hand, merely imparts the knowledge of Brahman and does not direct one toward any activity.¹⁶⁴ Thus, rituals and Brahman which form the content of the Pūrva-mīmāṃsā and the Uttara-mīmāṃsā respectively differ from each other, in respect of their inherent nature, the fruit that ensues from their knowledge, and their pramāṇas. Hence, there can be no sequence between the inquiry into the nature of rituals and that of

Brahman. In other words, the inquiry into the nature of Brahman is not preceded by the inquiry into the nature of rituals. The Uttara-*mīmāṃsā-śāstra* functions quite independently of the pūrva-*mīmāṃsā-śāstra*.

The question remains as to what exactly is the prerequisite for the study of Vedānta. Śaṅkara states that it is the possession of the 'fourfold aid' described earlier. If one possesses this fourfold aid then one would be able to inquire into the nature of Brahman and to attain its immediate knowledge, and not otherwise¹⁶⁵

The mind of the aspirant who possesses the fourfold aid and who pursues Vedāntic study, reflection, and meditation will be freed from viṣaya-*bhoga-vāsanā*, *pramāṇāsambhāvanā*, *prameyāsambhāvanā*, and *viparītabhāvanā*. In his case there would arise the immediate knowledge of Brahman from the great sayings of the śruti texts. *Māyā* will be removed along with all the accumulated merits and demerits. Future merits and demerits will not cling to him as he will not be pursuing any action with a sense of agency. He will continue to remain in the body till the merits and demerits which have given rise to it are exhausted by the experience of their fruits. They are sustained

by the latent impressions of *māyā*. Such an individual who is experiencing only his fructified merits and demerits is called a *jīvan-mukta*. When the fructified merits and demerits are exhausted, his body would fall off, and he will remain as pure consciousness which is liberation. This is *videha-mukti*. Thus, according to Advaita, liberation is only the manifestation of the true nature of the *jīva* through the removal of *māyā*. And it is attained here and now.

According to Viśiṣṭādvaita, the *jīva* is the *śarīra* of Brahman identified as *Īśvara*. It is knowledge by nature, and has knowledge as its attribute. The latter is designated as *dharma-bhūta-jñāna*. It is all-comprehensive by nature. Further, the *jīva* is said to possess eight qualities, viz. freedom from sin, old age, death, grief, hunger and thirst, and also true desires and resolves.¹⁶⁶ These qualities along with the *dharma-bhūta-jñāna* are not fully manifested during transmigratory existence owing to the past karma of the *jīva*. Liberation from the trammels of transmigratory process in its case consists in the attainment of the world of *Īśvara*, the manifestation of its qualities along with the expansion of the *dharma-bhūta-jñāna* and the experience of the auspicious qualities of *Īśvara*.

The sole means to liberation, Rāmānuja holds, is steady remembrance (dhruvā-anusmṛti) of Īśvara not interrupted by any contrary thought and continued till the end of one's life.¹⁶⁷ It is intense meditation upon Īśvara with love, and it is termed bhakti.¹⁶⁸ It is referred to in the śruti texts as upāsanā or dhyāna,¹⁶⁹ and also as jñāna.¹⁷⁰ When it attains ripeness by assiduous and earnest practice, it would assume the vividness of direct experience.¹⁷¹ In order that the jīva may pursue meditation upon Īśvara, purity or cleansing of the heart is necessary, i.e. the state of mind wherein sattva-guṇa becomes predominant, and the rajo-guṇa and the tamo-guṇa remain subdued. Such a state will be achieved only by the performance of ritual-acts by abandoning the sense of independent agency on one's part and also the desire for their fruits. Rāmānuja emphasizes that there is no stage in the life of a person where karma could be dispensed with. Even the seeker after liberation should perform obligatory rites.¹⁷² Their non-performance would involve the sin of omission, as a result of which one will not have sattva-śuddhi or cleansing of heart, and will not be able to pursue meditation upon Īśvara. He who is in the ascetic stage of life has to perform obligatory and occasioned duties, besides the duties

relating to his stage of life. But such a one need not perform any rite that involves consecration of fire. It means that meditation upon Īśvara pursued along with the performance of karma would lead to the state of *dhruvā-anusmṛti* that resembles vivid direct experience.

Along with the performance of karma, the aspirant who pursues meditation upon Īśvara must possess ethical excellences such as control of the mind, control of the sense-organs, abstinence from forbidden and optional deeds, fortitude or courage in enduring opposites like heat and cold, pain and pleasure, etc., and concentration of thought. The *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* text¹⁷³ prescribes these qualities as auxiliaries to meditation.¹⁷⁴ The aspirant who has already made a study of the śruti texts would spontaneously embark upon a detailed inquiry into their import through śravaṇa, and practise manana with a view to ascertain that the teaching of the śruti texts is true. Śravaṇa and manana are not enjoined in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* text¹⁷⁵ they are merely restated.¹⁷⁶ By pursuing śravaṇa and manana, the aspirant attains the intellectual conviction that the *jīva* is the body or the *prakāra* of Īśvara and that Īśvara is the Self or the *prakārī* of the *jīva*.

According to Rāmānuja, any word that refers to the prakāra, or the adjectival feature, would refer to the substantive one. The term 'tvam' in the text 'tat tvam asi' refers to the jīva which, by being the body of Īśvara, is the prakāra. And it conveys Īśvara who is the prakārī. Thus, the word 'tvam' refers to Īśvara who is associated with the jīva as his body. The term 'tat' refers to Īśvara who is endowed with all auspicious attributes. The purport of the text, 'tat tvam asi' is that the jīva is the body of Īśvara who possesses abundant auspicious qualities.¹⁷⁷ This sense is arrived at from the words of the text through primary signification itself.

The jīva has to meditate upon Īśvara as its Self. This meditation, when pursued with diligence, assiduity, and love, is termed steady remembrance. It would bear the likeness to direct experience. By the attainment of dhruvā-anusmṛti, the accumulated merits and demerits of the jīva are removed. No fresh merit or demerit will accrue. The fructified merits and demerits will be removed by experiencing their fruits. When the body falls off, the jīva reaches the world of Īśvara through the path of Gods (devayāna). The Chāndogya text¹⁷⁸ states that the jīva departs from this

body, attains the self-luminous one, i.e. Īśvara, and then is manifested in its own form. From this it follows that the essential qualities of the jīva are fully manifested and its dharma-bhūta-jñāna expands to the maximum. The Taittirīya text says that the released soul experiences Īśvara and his qualities along with other objects of enjoyment.¹⁷⁹ So far, the Viśiṣṭādvaita view on liberation.

Rāmānuja is of the view that the entire Uttara-mīmāṃsā-śāstra speaks of Īśvara as the ultimate reality, and meditation as the sole means of attaining him. Since meditation is a mental activity, it is on par with jyotiṣṭoma and other rites which are also activities and which are set forth in the Pūrva-mīmāṃsā-sūtra. On this ground, he considers that the Pūrva-mīmāṃsā-sūtra and the Uttara-mīmāṃsā-sūtra constitute a single scriptural text, and an inquiry into the former is a prerequisite for the study of the latter.

Śaṅkara is of the view that Brahman does not come within the range of meditation. The Kena Upaniṣad states: "That which is not expressed by words, but through which words are expressed; that verily, know thou, is Brahman; it is not what people here worship."¹⁸⁰ Since Brahman does not fall within the scope of

meditation which is a mental activity, it is not a dharma or religious duty. Jaimini who has fully inquired into dharma in his Vedic exegesis has not addressed himself to the inquiry into Brahman as it does not fall within the range of dharma. Hence, a fresh inquiry is called for. If Brahman were considered as an object of meditation which is a mental activity, then its inquiry would fall within the scope of the first aphorism of the Pūrva-mīmāṃsā-sūtra, viz. *atha ataḥ dharma jijñāsā*. So, a fresh sāstra in the form of the Uttara-mīmāṃsā-sūtra need not be commenced at all. Or, if a fresh sāstra were to be commenced, it would be commenced as follows: 'Then, therefore, the inquiry into the remaining dharma or duty.' Since Brahman which is attributeless and which is beyond the scope of injunction has not been propounded in the Pūrva-mīmāṃsā-sūtra it is quite appropriate that a new sāstra, viz. the Uttara-mīmāṃsā-sūtra whose subject is Brahman should be commenced.¹⁶¹ Earlier we set forth Śaṅkara's view that, since the nature of religious duties and that of Brahman radically differ, the two texts concerning them cannot be treated as one unit.

Rāmānuja is of the view that words referring to adjectival features refer to the substantive ones.

Advaitānanda in his *Brahma-vidyābhāraṇa* points out that in that case the word 'sarīra' must be admitted as referring to the 'sarīrī' as the former stands for the adjectival feature, while the latter, for the substantive one. Not only this. The word 'rūpa' which conveys the adjectival feature, viz. colour, must be understood as conveying the object which possesses colour and which is the substantive feature. And we must have the cognition of the form 'The pot is colour' (rūpaṁ ghaṭaḥ). On this ground, the view that the words which convey the adjectival features signify their respective substantive features must be given up.¹⁸² Consequently, Rāmānuja's interpretation of the text 'tat tvam asi' by applying this view of the signification of words is not correct.

Further, Rāmānuja is of the view that sentences are not efficacious in giving rise to immediate knowledge. We have set forth the Advaitin's view that a sentence could give rise to the immediate knowledge of an object, provided the object is immediate. We have also explained the criteria for deciding the immediacy of knowledge and of object.

Rāmānuja has interpreted the text, 'asmāt sarīrat samutthāya param jyoitirupa sampadya svena rūpeṇa

abhiniṣpadyate' to mean that the jīva rises from this body, attains the self-luminous one, i.e. Īśvara, and then is manifested in its own form. Śaṅkara, however, interprets it thus: The jīva, having acquired from the śruti texts the discriminating knowledge that it is different from its limiting adjuncts, gives up the false notion of its identity with body, etc. It attains the realization of its true nature as Brahman and remains as Brahman.¹⁸³ The expression 'upasampadya abhiniṣpadyate' involves the kṛt suffix 'lyap' which is a substitute morpheme for the suffix ktvā. It is not taken in the sense of sequence, but in the sense of simultaneity. This means that the realization of one's true nature as Brahman and remaining as Brahman occur at the same time. There is no sequence between the two. Sudarśana Sūri too elsewhere takes the ktvā suffix as conveying the sense of simultaneity.¹⁸⁴ Hence, the text cited by Rāmānuja does not mean that the jīva reaches the world of Īśvara wherein its qualities are fully manifested.

The text, 'so 'śnute sarvān kāmān saha, brahmaṇā vipściteti, is interpreted by Rāmānuja in the sense that the released jīva experiences objects of enjoyment, and also Īśvara and his attributes. He construes the

word 'saha' with 'brahmaṇā'. In the traditional mode of learning the Veda by rote, the word 'saha' is construed with the word 'kāmaṇ' And the text means that the liberated soul, remaining as Brahman which is unconditioned bliss, is the witness of all the objects of enjoyment.¹⁸⁵

According to Advaita, the jīva which is no other than Brahman is free by its very nature. During empirical existence, it has to inquire into its true nature and realize its identity with Brahman. Liberation is possible here and now. Advaita holds that in an important sense the central philosophical problem is about the jīva. Though the jīva undertakes inquiry into the beings of the world and their source, it is for the purpose of understanding its own nature and its existential problems, its finitude and the cause thereof. So the inquiring subject becomes the subject of inquiry.¹⁸⁶ As a result of inquiry, it realizes that the source of its suffering through desires and deeds is ignorance. Since knowledge alone can remove ignorance, it endeavours to attain the saving knowledge. There is nothing to prevent the dawn of knowledge in this life itself. Also, it has the assurance through scripture that one who knows the Self

overcomes sorrow through the transcendence of the finitude, and this transcendence can be achieved here and now, provided one works for it. Hence, the importance and the validity of the concept of jīvan-mukti. According to Viśiṣṭādvaita, the jīva has to meditate upon Īśvara in order to attain liberation in some other world through union with Īśvara.

NOTES

1. Srī-bhāṣya (here after ŚB) by Rāmānuja with the commentary, Śruta-prakāśikā by Sudarśana Sūri, 2 Volumes. Visistadvaita Pracarini Sabha, Madras, 1989, 2.1.9.
2. Ibid., 1.1.13
3. Chāndogya Upaniṣad (hereafter CU), 3.14.2.
4. Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad (hereafter MU), 1. 1.9.
5. CU, 8.1.5.
6. Brhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad (hereafter BU), 2.3.1.
7. Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad (hereafter ŚU), 6.19.
8. BU, 3.8.8.
9. MU, 1.1.6.
10. Kaṭha Upaniṣad (hereafter KU), 1.3.15.
11. BU, 2.3.6.
12. Taittirīya Upaniṣad (hereafter TU), 2.1.
13. BU, 3.9.28.
14. KU. 1.3.15.

15. Vedānta-sūtra-bhāṣya of Śaṅkara (hereafter VSB), 3.2.1.
16. Ibid., 3.2.15; 3.2.21.
17. Ibid., 3.2.16.
18. BU, 4.5.13.
19. VSB, 3.2.16.
20. TU, 2.6.1.
21. CU, 6.2.3.
22. Aitareya Upaniṣad (hereafter AU), 1.1.1, 2.
23. MU, 1.1.9.
24. VSB, 1.1.5.
25. Ibid., 1.1.12; 3.2.15.
26. TU, 3.1.
27. Ibid., 2.1.1.
28. BU, 3.9.34,
29. Ibid., 3.8.8.
30. ŚB, 1.1.2.
31. BU, 3.8.8.
32. CU, 8.1.1.
33. BU, 4.4.22.
34. CU, 8.1.5.
35. TU, 3.1.
36. ŚB, 3.3.13; 3.3.34.
37. MU, 1.1.10.
38. CU, 8.1.5.
39. ŚU. 6.11.
40. BU, 3.8.8.

41. Śrutaprāśikā (hereafter ŚP); see ŚB, Vol. I, Part I, p. 87.
42. Ibid., p. 195.
43. ŚB, 1.1.1.
44. CU, 8.1.5.
45. ŚU, 6.11.
46. BU, 3.8.8.
47. ŚB, 1.1.1.
48. ŚU, 6.11.
49. Ibid.
50. BU, 3.8.8.
51. CU, 8.1.5.
52. BU, 3.9.26.
53. Brahma-vidyābhāraṇa (hereafter BVB), commentary on VSB by Advaitānanda, 2 Volumes, Sanskrit Education Society, Chennai, 1979, Vol. II, pp. 443-44.
54. BU 1.5.3
55. Advaitāmōda (hereafter AĀ), by Vāsudeva Śāstri Abhyankar, Anandasrama Sanskrit Series, Poona, 1975, p. 144.
56. AU, 1.3.12.
57. BU, 1.4.7.
58. CU, 6.3.2.
59. TU, 2.6.
60. VSB, 3.2.19.
61. Ibid., 3.2.20
62. 'yathā hi ayam jyotirātmā vivasvān

apo bhinnā bahudhaiko 'nugaccan

upādhinā kriyate bhedarūpaḥ

devaḥ kṣetreṣu ajo 'yam ātmā.' cited in VSB, 3.2.18.-

63. Śāṅkara-bhasya (hereafter Ś) on TU, 2.6.
64. Ś on BU, 1.4.7
65. Vedānta-sūtra (hereafter VS), 2.3.50.
66. VSB, 2.3.50
67. Ś on BU, 1.4.7.
68. Praśna Upaniṣad (hereafter PU), 4.9.
69. BU, 4.3.7.
70. KU, 1.3.4.
71. VSB, 2.3.29
72. BU, 4.4.2.
73. Ibid., 4.4.6.
74. MU, 3.1.9.
75. VSB, 2.3.29.
76. MU, 3.1.9.
77. ŚU, 5.9.
78. VSB, 2.3.29.
79. Bhagavad-gītā, 2.24.
80. ŚU, 5.8.
81. PU, 4.9.
82. ŚB, 2.3.28.
83. BU, 4.3.30.
84. ŚB, 2.3.30.

85. See Note 68.
86. BU, 4.4.6.
87. See Note 77.
88. See Note 79.
89. Nyāya-siddhānjana of Vedānta Deśika, with the commentary by Raṅgarāmānuja, Sri Vaishnava Siddhanta Prachara Sabha Ltd., Madras, 1934. pp. 133-34.
90. ŚB, 2.3.26.
91. Ibid., 4.4.15.
92. Adhikaraṇa-sārāvalī, ed. by Uttamur Vīraraghavacharya, Ubhaya Vedānta Granthamala, Chennai, 1974, verse 225.
93. BVB, Vol. II, pp. 263-64.
94. ŚB, 1.1.1.
95. Śāṅkarāśāṅkara-bhāṣya-vimarśa (hereafter ŚABV), by Rāmarāyakavi, Sri Kavita Venkatasubramanya Sastri, Guntur, 1953, p. 113.
96. ŚB, 1.1.1.
97. For details see ŚABV, pp. 110-115.
98. TU, 2.7.1.
99. VSB, 1.4.26.
100. Kṛṣṇālaṅkāra (hereafter KA), commentary by Acyutakṛṣṇa on the Siddhānanta-leśa-saṅgraha (hereafter SLS) of Appaya Dīkṣita, Appaya Dikshitendra Granthavali Prakasanasamiti, Secunderabad, 1973, p. 48.
101. Māṇḍūkya-kārikā, 4.3.
102. Ibid., 4.4.

103. Ibid., 4.5.
104. Pañcadaśī (hereafter PD), 13.35.
105. CU, 6.1.4.
106. PD, 13.38.
107. Bhāmatī on VSB, 2.1.14.
108. CU, 6.1.2.
109. Ibid., 6.1.4.
110. Amarakośa, 3.245.
111. Sadvidyā-vilāsa (hereafter SVV) with the self-commentary, Rasānubhūti-vyākhyā, by Tyāgarājādhvarīndra. ed. by V. S. V. Guruswami Sastri and V. R. Kalyanasundara Sastri, Adi Sankara Advaita Research Centre, Chennai, 1982, p. 14. See also KA, pp. 48-49.
112. Pāṇini-sūtra, 3.3.19.
113. CU, 6.2.3.
114. Ibid.
115. Ibid., 6.3.2. .
116. VS, 2.1.14.
117. Bhāmatī on VSB, 2.1.14.
118. CU, 6.1.4.
119. BU, 4.5.6.
120. Ibid., 4.4.19.
121. KA, p. 64.
122. MU, 1.1.3.
123. Ibid., 2.1.10.

124. VSB, 1.1.1.
125. PD, 13.60.
126. ŚB, 2.1.14; ŚP on ŚB, 1.1.1.
127. ŚB, 2.1.14.
128. Ibid., 1.4.27; 2.1.35.
129. Ibid., 1.1.1.
130. ŚB, 1.4.24-26.
131. Ibid., 2.3.18.
132. CU, 6.1.4.
133. ŚP on ŚB, 1.4.23.
134. SVV, p. 27.
135. BVB, Vol. II, pp. 38-39.
136. BU, 2.3.1.
137. Ibid.,
138. Ibid., 2.3.6.
139. Ibid., 2.1.20
140. Ibid.
141. BVB, Vol. II, pp. 448-49.
142. VSB, 3.2.22.
143. This objection is raised by Rāmānuja.
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145. ŚB, 3.2.22.
146. BVB, Vol. II, pp. 448.
147. VSB, 2.3.30.
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161. VS, 1.1.1.
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166. CU, 8.7.1.

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169. CU, 4.2.2.
170. Ibid., 3.18.3.
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174. ŚB, 3.4.27.
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181. VSB, 1.1.4.
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184. ŚP, Vol. II p. 170.
185. Ś on TU, 2.1. .
186. I owe this way of putting the matter to R. Balasubramanian.



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
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संसाराध्वनि तापभानुकिरणप्रोद्धृतदाहव्यथा -
 खिन्नानां जलकाङ्क्षया मरुभुवि भ्रान्त्या परिभ्राम्यताम् ।
 अत्यासन्नसुधाम्बुधिं सुखकरं ब्रह्माद्वयं दर्शय -
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*samsārādhvani tāpabhānukiranaprodhūtadāhavyathā
 khinnānām jalakāṅkṣayā marubhuvi bhrāntyā paribhrāmyatām
 atyāsannasudhāmbudhim suhakaram brahmādvayam darśaya-
 ntyeṣā śāṅkara-bhāratī vijayate nirvāṇa-sandāynī*

To Those who are afflicted, in the way of the world, by the burning pain given rise to by the scorching sub-shafts of misery, and who through delusion wander about in the desert (of worldliness) seeking water - which is very near, the non - dual Brahman, this - The Voice of Śaṅkara is victorious, leading as it does, to liberation